

A COMPANION TO
**ANCIENT
MACEDONIA**

EDITED BY
JOSEPH ROISMAN AND
IAN WORTHINGTON



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**ANCIENT
MACEDONIA**

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WILEY-BLACKWELL

A John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., Publication

This edition first published 2010

© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Blackwell Publishing was acquired by John Wiley & Sons in February 2007. Blackwell's publishing program has been merged with Wiley's global Scientific, Technical, and Medical business to form WileyBlackwell.

Registered Office

John Wiley & Sons Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, United Kingdom

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this title

ISBN 978-1-4051-7936-2 (hardcover : alk. paper)

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Photo taken by R. Kousser

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Preface

The aim of the Blackwell *Companions to the Ancient World* series is to 'provide an international audience of students, scholars, and general readers with sophisticated, one-volume companions to classical and near eastern civilizations, classical literature, and ancient history. The chapters in each volume are to be written primarily for those approaching the topic for the first time (be they undergraduates, graduates, or members of the public) and for scholars operating in adjacent fields of study.' At the same time those working in the particular field should also find the chapters stimulating.

The present volume (the first companion on ancient Macedonia) presents a series of specially commissioned, original chapters by specialists that cover the range and nature of the source material we have for ancient Macedonia, its political and military history from early times (the first of the Temenid kings) to the end of Roman rule, as well as its geography, relations with its diverse neighbours, social customs, political institutions, economic matters, artistic and intellectual life and achievements, and how the Macedonians were viewed by other civilizations in antiquity. The concluding part of the volume traces the history of Macedonia in late antiquity to the Slavs and the role of Macedonia today in modern Balkan politics. Each chapter has a bibliographical essay that is a guide to further reading and all quotations from ancient sources are translated into English. An introductory chapter (1) discusses the state of Macedonian studies and summarizes the chapters in this volume. We believe that we have covered as much as humanly can be within one set of covers and that the book, written for the primary audience of the companion series, will also be beneficial to specialists in the field.

The chapters intentionally treat the various topics and history of ancient Macedonia both chronologically and thematically. Hence some chapters are longer than others because of the time span that they cover. In any collaborative project, some overlap of material is unavoidable, and this volume is no different. In addition, there is no consensus of opinion on a variety of issues that affect ancient Macedonia, ranging from establishing the historicity of events to the ethnicity of its people, the nature of its political system, and even the role that Macedonian identity played and plays in ancient and modern times. However, both reiteration and especially plurality of interpretations can enhance our understanding and appreciation of a kingdom that seemed to live in the shadow of the Greeks yet would become one of the superpowers of the ancient world. With that said, the responsibility for facts, findings, interpretations, conclusions and opinions expressed in this volume rests exclusively with the

contributors. They do not necessarily represent or reflect the views of the other contributors or of the editors.

We have a number of people to thank, in particular Al Bertrand at Blackwell, who responded enthusiastically to Ian Worthington's idea for this book, and Galen Smith at Blackwell who was always quick to respond to our many enquiries and provided much valuable help and support throughout the editing process. We would also like to thank the contributors who produced excellent work and patiently responded to our comments and suggestions far more diplomatically at times than we expected.

Joseph Roisman would like to thank Ian Worthington, the originator of this book, for his generous offer to join him as coeditor. The project would not have been completed without his industry and sharing of his knowledge. Roisman owes a special thanks to his wife Hanna and his children, Elad and Shalev, for giving so much meaning to his life.

Ian Worthington owes a debt of gratitude to Joseph Roisman who came on board as co-editor and will never forgive him for that, but whose expertise and sensible judgement on so many occasions were greatly appreciated. Worthington also thanks Dawn Gilley, for co-writing his chapter with him, and Josh Nudell for help in compiling the bibliography. And last but not least Worthington's family deserves special praise for still letting him live under the same roof as them.

Joseph Roisman

Ian Worthington

Notes on Style

Throughout this book, Macedonia/Macedonians refer to the area of the mainland north of Mount Olympus and Greece/Greeks to the area of the mainland south of Mount Olympus.

Greek names are anglicized, but some names and technical terms are transliterated, and these will be obvious when they appear.

References in the text and notes to a scholar's name followed by a chapter number (for example, J. Roisman, chapter 8) refer to the contributor's chapter in this book.

As the contributors are based in several different countries, including North American, Europe and Japan, we have allowed American and UK spellings.

All dates and references to centuries are Bc except where indicated.

Abbreviations

Names of journals are abbreviated as in *L'Année philologique* (less well-known ones are given in full), although consistent with English practice the 'h' is dropped in acronyms (thus, *CP* not *CPh*).

The following abbreviations are used in this book:

Frequently Cited Ancient Authors

Ael.	Aelian
Aes.	Aeschines
Arist.	Aristotle
Arr.	Arrian, <i>Anabasis Alexandri</i>
Athen.	Athenaeus
Curt.	Curtius
Dem.	Demosthenes
Diod.	Diodorus Siculus
Din.	Dinarchus
Hdt.	Herodotus
Hyp.	Hyperides
Isoc.	Isocrates
Paus.	Pausanias
Pl.	Plato
Plut.	Plutarch
Polyb.	Polybius
Thuc.	Thucydides
Xen.	Xenophon

[] around a name denotes the work is spurious but attributed to that author

Frequently Cited Modern Collections of Ancient Literary and Epigraphical Material

BNJ	<i>Brill's New Jacoby</i> , editor-in-chief Ian Worthington (Leiden 2007–)
FGrH	F. Jacoby, <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> 1–3 (Berlin 1926–59)
IG	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i>
Rhodes and	P.J. Rhodes and R. Osborne, <i>Greek Historical Inscriptions</i> , 404–323 Bc (Oxford 2003)
Osborne	<i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i>
SEG	<i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum et Latinarum</i>
SIG ³	<i>Macedoniae</i> ³ (Chicago 1980)

Frequently Cited Modern Works

Borza, <i>Shadow of Olympus</i>	E.N. Borza, <i>In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon</i> (Princeton 1990)
Errington, <i>History of Macedonia</i>	R.M. Errington, <i>A History of Macedonia</i> , trans. C. Errington (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1990)
Hammond, <i>History of Macedonia</i> 1	N.G.L. Hammond, <i>A History of Macedonia</i> 1 (Oxford 1972)
Hammond and Griffith, <i>History of Macedonia</i> 2	N.G.L. Hammond and G.T. Griffith, <i>A History of Macedonia</i> 2 (Oxford 1979)
Hammond and Walbank, <i>History of Macedonia</i> 3	N.G.L. Hammond and F.W. Walbank, <i>A History of Macedonia</i> 3 (Oxford 1988)
Hammond, <i>Macedonian State</i>	N.G.L. Hammond, <i>The Macedonian State: The Origins, Institutions and History</i> (Oxford 1992)
CAH ²	<i>Cambridge Ancient History</i> ² (multi-volume edited by various editors)
PSI	<i>Papiri Greci e Latini</i> (Firenze 1912–79)

Maps

Map 1 Mainland Greece




Map 2 Regions of Macedonia



Map 3 Expansion of Macedonia



Map 4 Alexander the Great's Conquests






Map 5 Roman Macedonia and the Neighbouring Provinces




Map 6 Macedonia, Illyria and Epirus




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|---------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|------------------|
| 1 Acrocerauian Promontory | 12 Corcyra | 23 Lake Lynchitis | 34 Narenta River |
| 2 Adriatic Sea | 13 Damastion | 24 Lake Prespa | 35 Crestes |
| 3 Aegae | 14 Dardanians | 25 Lake (Little) Prespa | 36 Paeonia |
| 4 Agrianians | 15 Drin (Black) River | 26 Lissus | 37 Passaron |
| 5 Appolonia | 16 Drin (White) River | 27 Lyncus | 38 Pelium |
| 6 Arachtus River | 17 Elimea | 28 Mcllossia | 39 Phoenice |
| 7 Ardiaioi | 18 Encheleioi | 29 Mcnistir | 40 Peria |
| 8 Autariates | 19 Eordaea | 30 Mcunt Govrovo | 41 Scodra |
| 9 Eottiaaea | 20 Epidamnus | 31 Mcunt Orbelos | 42 Taulantini |
| 10 Brygi | 21 Gulf of Ambracia | 32 Mcunt Quelqas | 43 Thesprotia |
| 11 Chaonia | 22 Iorian Sea | 33 Mcunt Scardus | 44 Tymphaea |


Map 7 Macedonia and Thessaly



Map 8 Macedonia and Thrace



Map 9 Macedonia in Late Antiquity



Map 10 A map of Macedonia that appeared in the *New York Times* on February 4, 1993, illustrating the portrayal of the existence of two Macedonias



The New York Times

PART I

Preamble

Why Study Ancient Macedonia and What this Companion is About

Edward M. Anson

This *Companion to Ancient Macedonia* reflects a dramatic change in the focus of ancient Greek history over the last half century. The ancient kingdom of Macedonia was typically regarded until the latter part of the twentieth century as the land which produced Alexander the Great, who brought Hellenic civilization to the Near East, and in the view of G. Droysen paved the way for the success of Christianity, but noted for little else.¹ Alexander the Great not only grew beyond his homeland but also transformed the entire Greek world. Indeed, Alexander's creation of the Hellenistic world for most nineteenth- and early twentieth-century historians was sufficient to forgive his participation in the eclipse of the Greek Classical Age and its concomitant reign of the city-states. Alexander's father Philip II then shouldered most of the blame for this end to 'Greek freedom'. For most nineteenth- and early twentieth-century scholars Alexander was Greek. It was only by the accident of birth that he came from Macedonia, the primitive and backward march of the Greek world. Of course, this view has a basis in antiquity. Alexander's dynasty, the Argead or Temenid, was generally acknowledged by contemporaries and vigorously endorsed by the members of the royal family themselves, to have arisen in the Peloponnesian city-state (*polis*) of Argos.²

A more critical view of the great conqueror has emerged in more recent times and is widely seen in this book. The conquests of Alexander and the inauguration of the new Hellenistic Age left his homeland behind in many ways. While Alexander had apparently brought Macedonia to a world stage with his conquest of the Persian Empire, the greatest empire that the West had yet seen, Macedonia benefitted little. On the face of it, Macedonia in a century and a half had achieved a remarkable change of fortune. Beginning in the late

sixth century and lasting until 479, Macedonia had been an appendage of this same Persian Empire and Macedonian troops had even fought alongside those of Persia during the Great Persian War of 480–479 (for this history and Alexander's subsequent conquest of the Persian Empire, see M.J. Olbrycht, 'Macedonia and Persia', chapter 17). While Alexander and the Macedonians had conquered Persia, Olbrycht demonstrates that Alexander, beginning in 330, began to 'Persianize' his court, his dress, and his army. Alexander had left his homeland behind more than just in miles; he was becoming the living god-ruler of a vast empire of which Macedonia was to be but a part. Moreover, D.L. Gilley and Ian Worthington, in chapter 10, 'Alexander the Great, Macedonia and Asia', while relating and discussing the life of this individual who so altered the course of history, emphasize that his effect on Macedonia was not all that positive. Alexander was only present in Macedonia during the first two years of his reign and this long absence, in addition to his tardiness in producing an heir, born after his father's death, who shared the rule with the conqueror's ill-suited half-brother, contributed substantially to the demise of his dynasty as rulers of his native land. P. Millett in 'The Political Economy of Macedonia' (chapter 23) also notes that Alexander's conquests were not made part of a Macedonian empire but rather these lands became independent, competitive, states. Very little of the tens of thousands of pounds of gold and silver liberated from the various Persian treasuries ever made its way to Macedonia. Much of this wealth was expended in the wars that broke out soon after Alexander's death among his successors. W.L. Adams in 'Alexander's Successors to 221 BC' (chapter 11) chronicles these battles and the resulting breakup of Alexander's great empire and the emergence of a new Macedonia, ruled by a new dynasty.

Alexander's failures even had an impact on the end of Macedonian independence before the onslaught of Rome two centuries later. While there were other contributing factors, including the power of the Romans, the expenditure of Macedonian manpower in the initial conquest of and subsequent migration to the greener pastures of Asia and Egypt, the resulting ongoing conflicts among Alexander's successor kingdoms, which sapped the strength of the Greek world, were all part of Alexander's legacy to his homeland. A.M. Eckstein in 'Macedonia and Rome, 221–146 BC' (chapter 12) chronicles the series of wars that led to the Roman conquest, emphasizing the political anarchy especially in the eastern Mediterranean world, which encouraged warfare as the way to settle international disputes. Rome and Macedonia were two aggressive states whose conflicts were not likely 'to result in mutual coexistence or cooperation'. In four wars, fought from the late third century to the middle of the second, Rome

acquired control and then full possession of Alexander the Great's homeland. Macedonia would continue as a Roman province whose borders would expand or contract according to the organizational plans of their Roman overlords for the next thousand years. The first five centuries of this history, down to the reorganization of Roman provinces in the late third century AD, is covered in J. Vanderspoel's '*Provincia Macedonia*' (chapter 13); the account is then continued into the sixth century by C.S. Snively, in '*Macedonia in Late Antiquity*' (chapter 26). The province to the late third century included the lands of the previous independent Macedonia kingdom and also those of neighboring peoples. During the reign of Emperor Diocletian the Roman province of Macedonia was divided into several smaller components and even the core of Macedonia was partially dismembered.

While the obsession with Alexander by so many earlier historians previously obscured Macedonia, what more recent historians have proclaimed is that Alexander did not appear out of a vacuum and that the culture and institutions of the Hellenistic Age did not begin with his death, nor were they mere continuations, albeit muted, of the previous Classical Age and its city-state culture. Increasingly the focus on Macedonia has shown that both Alexander and the Hellenistic era owed much to his homeland. C.G. Thomas in '*The Physical Kingdom*' (chapter 4) reviews the land that was ancient Macedonia. Its often rugged terrain, continental climate, and its location, 'the node of connections between both north/south and east/west', made Macedonia a land that produced a 'tough people'. Macedonia itself was seen in antiquity as divided between the coastal plain, commonly referred to as Lower Macedonia, and the western and northern highlands, referred to as Upper (or Inner) Macedonia.

P. Millett, '*The Political Economy of Macedonia*' (chapter 23), emphasizes that Macedonia was a land of many natural resources, including rich farmland, abundant pastoral wealth, large deposits of base and precious metals, and especially abundant supplies of timber and its by-products which were in short supply in southern Greece. From Macedonia's earliest history these resources made the land a target for its neighbors. Macedonia was surrounded by numbers of often hostile populations, whose frequent incursions were certainly part of the chemistry that made the Macedonians a 'tough people'. To the northwest were the Illyrians and to the west the Epirotes. W.S. Greenwalt in '*Macedonia, Illyria, and Epirus*' (chapter 14) records the long history of interaction and conflict between the Macedonians and the Illyrians and the more peaceful relationship between the former and the Epirote tribes. The frequent hostility between the collective group of tribesmen, called Illyrians by the Greeks, and the

Macedonians was not the result of any long-standing enmity but rather the consequence of proximity, Macedonian weakness, and the importance of raiding and pillaging to the Illyrian economy. By the mid-fourth century with the growth in power of Macedonia, the Illyrians turned their efforts to easier targets. Little is known of Macedonia's relations with its western neighbors, the Epirote tribes, until the fourth century when it became the policy of the Macedonian kings to ally with these western neighbors in part to forge a common resistance to Illyrian raids. To the east of Macedonia were the Thracians whose resources and lifestyle paralleled those of the Macedonians in many ways (see Z. Archibald, 'Macedonia and Thrace', chapter 16), and to the south were the Thessalians, whose history and long-term contacts with their northern neighbors are chronicled by D. Graninger in 'Macedonia and Thessaly' (chapter 15). Thessalian elite society maintained close connections both to the Macedonian kings and to individual Macedonian aristocrats. Of all the areas of the southern Greek world Thessaly shared not only a common border with its northern neighbor but also much else. This was especially true with respect to religion. With regard to the northern neighbors Macedonia had long served as a little-appreciated bulwark for the Greeks to the south, a buffer that repulsed or absorbed attacks from these northern peoples, a condition that remained also through the early years of her existence as a Roman province. It was only with the extension of the Roman frontier to the Danube, and even beyond that great river, that Macedonia relinquished this role to others.

The new scholarly emphasis on Macedonia has developed in part out of the many archaeological finds being revealed almost on a daily basis. Much of our new appreciation of Macedonian culture and society comes from the numerous surviving and excavated tombs of prominent Macedonians dating from the period of the Argead and the following Antigonid dynasties, the latter who ruled until supplanted by Roman suzerainty (see A.M. Eckstein, 'Macedonia and Rome, 221–146 BC', chapter 12). These tombs from the monarchical period contain frescoes and other magnificent objects of artistic manufacture which demonstrate that amongst the upper classes Macedonian society existed at a very high level of sophistication. These remains then give insights into the lifestyle of the upper class, as set forth by N. Sawada in 'Social Customs and Institutions: Aspects of Macedonian Elite Society' (chapter 19). Much of this lifestyle revolved around lavish entertainments and hunting, and such scenes predominate on the walls of the noble tombs.

Macedonia still awaits the intensive field surveys, those meticulous examinations of land surfaces, which should provide more information regarding the ancient Macedonian countryside.³ Such studies as those

conducted in the Argolid,⁴ Boeotia,⁵ and Messenia,⁶ would give historians a better understanding of the life of the Macedonian rural population, the majority of the ancient Macedonian people. Apart from these archaeological discoveries of predominantly upper-class material culture, however, there is little other evidence available for the study of Macedonia. Much of the evidence for the history of Macedonia is reviewed by P.J. Rhodes in 'The Literary and Epigraphic Evidence to the Roman Conquest' (chapter 2).⁷ Most of our literary information comes from late sources and is especially concentrated on the campaigns of Alexander the Great. Rhodes points out that of the lost Greek historians listed by F. Jacoby in *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, only 13 possible writers of histories of Macedonia are listed, and of these perhaps five date from the time of the Roman Empire. For Macedonian history prior to the reign of Philip II, the creator of the united ancient state of Macedonia and Alexander the Great's father and predecessor as king, modern-day historians have to rely on the occasional inscription or other material remains, fragments from these now lost historians, the occasional references to Macedonia and Macedonian affairs in the fifth-century historians Herodotus and Thucydides, and 'universal histories', dating from the Roman era. S.R. Asirvatham, in 'Perspectives on the Macedonians from Greece, Rome, and Beyond' (chapter 6), points out that despite the oft-quoted aphorism that the victors write the history, in the case of Macedonia that is certainly not the situation. Macedonia's entire history is provided to us almost exclusively by non-Macedonian sources. Even with regard to Philip, while there is considerable contemporary evidence, it is largely Athenian and most often hostile. With respect to the great fifth-century historians Herodotus and Thucydides, not to mention many of the inscriptions, the content typically concerns the relations of various Greek city-states with Macedonia, with the focus most often clearly centered on these other entities rather than on Macedonia and her interests. As Rhodes notes, 'there are very few inscriptions, of any kind, from Macedonia or cities and other units within it, of the Classical period; some are of the Hellenistic period but most are later than AD 100'. P. Millett in 'The Political Economy of Macedonia' (chapter 23) comments, 'there is also absent from earlier Macedonia the "epigraphic habit" that was a feature of mainstream *poleis*'. These few inscriptions, however, many of which for the Classical and Hellenistic periods can now be conveniently found in the second volume of M.B. Hatzopoulos's *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings*, provide, among other insights, some understanding of the functioning at the municipal level of the Macedonian kingdom.⁸ Part of the explanation for the reluctance of earlier scholars to pursue Macedonian history was the lack of any

contemporary, relatively detailed, narrative histories until that of Polybius in the second century, and even here much of the focus is otherwise directed and large portions of the original are lost.

Other forms of evidence are examined by K. Dahmen in 'The Numismatic Evidence' (chapter 3), C.I. Hardiman in 'Classical Art to 221 BC' (chapter 24), and R. Kousser in 'Hellenistic and Roman Art, 221 BC–AD 337' (chapter 25). According to Dahmen, coinage began in Macedonia in the sixth century showing wide-ranging influences, including Greek, Persian, and Thracian, and representing different tribes and cities. Beginning with Alexander I (498–454), Macedonian coinage came to be the province of the monarch. Hardiman and Kousser examine the artistic and material culture of Macedonia from earliest times well into its history as part of the Roman Empire. While Hardiman emphasizes that Macedonia's art in the 'Classical' period was derived from strong Hellenic influence, Kousser stresses that subsequently its art maintained a distinctive quality, and in the later Roman and Byzantine Empires Macedonia became a Christian religious and artistic center with Thessaloniki, the modern port and capital of the Greek Periphery (region) of Central Macedonia, becoming a second city to Constantinople in the east (much of this long history is reviewed in C.S. Snively's 'Macedonia in Late Antiquity', chapter 26).

Historians seeking to reconstruct Macedonian history and institutions for the period before and after the reign of Alexander III ('the Great'), down to the regency and monarchy of Antigonos Doson (229–221) and the history of Polybius, must rely primarily on two problematic historians of the Roman era: Diodorus of Sicily, writing a 'universal history' in the last half century of the Roman Republic, and Justin's *Epitome* of the now lost *Philippic History* of Pompeius Trogus, another world history but with its primary focus on the rise of Macedonia and the following Hellenistic Age. Trogus' original was written during the reign of Augustus; the *Epitome* dates probably from the third or fourth century of the Roman imperial period.⁹

Despite the difficulty of the task of reconstructing Macedonia's past prior to the reigns of her two greatest monarchs, Philip II and his son Alexander III, what can be known is well presented in the chapters by S. Sprawski ('The Early Temenid Kings to Alexander I', chapter 7) and J. Roisman ('Classical Macedonia to Perdiccas III', chapter 8). Sprawski relates the mythical origins of the Macedonian ruling house. It is not until the late sixth century that the first truly historical monarch, Amyntas I, appears, but it is this monarch's son, Alexander I, who truly inaugurates Macedonian history. In the period after this early Alexander, Roisman describes a Macedonia often disrupted by internal conflict, power struggles between various members of the

royal Argead clan, and by external forces ranging from the southern *poleis* of the Athenians and Spartans to Macedonia's tribal neighbors. Yet in this Classical period Roisman emphasizes that 'the country had an infrastructure of roads and fortresses, administrative and religious centers in Pella, Aegae, and Dium, and a brisk trade in timber and pitch'.

Perhaps the most significant change in Macedonian studies over the last 30 years has been the emphasis on the role played by Alexander the Great's father.¹⁰ This monarch's reign is examined by S. Müller in 'Philip II' (chapter 9). It was he who, in her words, 'managed to turn the peripheral, disunited, economically and militarily ruined Macedonia into the dominating political power of the Mediterranean world'. As demonstrated in the chapters of Sprawski and Roisman, Macedonia (or at least the part termed Lower Macedonia) prior to the reign of Philip was a country ostensibly unified under the rule of its Argead kings and was hardly more than a footnote in the history of the eastern Mediterranean. The great urban centers on the coast were all Greek colonies founded by the city-states in the south. It was Philip who turned this northern area of the Greek peninsula from a fragmented land of powerful aristocratic land owners and poverty-stricken serfs into a unified state, a nation, with cities and a large free population.¹¹ He created the institutions of the Macedonian royal court, perhaps in emulation of those of the Persian Empire (see M.J. Olbrycht, 'Macedonia and Persia', chapter 17), and it was he who transformed the Macedonian army from a force far inferior to the armies of the southern Greek city-states into the best fighting force in the western world. On the development of the army from the earliest kings through the last independent dynasty of Macedonia, the Antigonid, see N.V. Sekunda in 'The Macedonian Army' (chapter 22). Finally it was Philip who used this new Macedonia to make himself the master of most of the Greek peninsula. His legacy to Alexander was a unified and much expanded kingdom, the army and the nucleus of the officer *corps* with which Alexander conquered the East, and a federation of Greek states answering to first Philip's and subsequently Alexander's leadership.¹² The invasion of Persia had also been planned and its preliminaries carried out by Philip. Philip's assassination in 336 gave Alexander the opportunity to become the greatest conqueror down to his time.¹³

The Hellenistic kingdoms that arose out of Alexander's conquests are now increasingly seen as deriving from Macedonian traditions more than from those of the East, and in their organization certainly more than simply those of the more southern inhabitants of the Greek peninsula. With respect to the original kingdom of Macedonia, a debate rages over many aspects of the traditional Macedonian

monarchy. These arguments are clearly set forth in C.J. King's 'Kingship and other Political Institutions' (chapter 18). While the debate continues, one element stands clear: the monarch was for all practical purposes an autocrat.¹⁴ Even those who postulate limitations on the king's authority do not envision a true constitutional monarchy but rather see an elective kingship and the right of the army or people to judge cases of treason. The monarch's clearly unfettered authority included taxation, foreign policy, including making war and peace,¹⁵ command of the armies,¹⁶ control of most natural resources,¹⁷ the ability to transfer populations within his kingdom without the consent of those inhabitants,¹⁸ and the authority to create new cities.¹⁹ Unlike in the Greek city-states, where religious officials were chosen from the population, in Macedonia, among a variety of distinctive features of this basically Greek religion, described by P. Christesen and S.C. Murray in 'Macedonian Religion' (chapter 21), the king served as the chief religious official. The kingdom itself in large part was regarded by the king as 'spearwon land' and as such subject to the desires of the conqueror or that individual's descendants.²⁰ Most importantly, all modern commentators are agreed that the Argead monarchy possessed a personal, as opposed to a bureaucratic, quality.²¹ Prior to the Hellenistic Age the nobility as a class provided the king with his military commanders and administrators. Their relationship with the king was as his 'companions', the *hetairoi*, who regularly ate and drank with him in *symposia*, those aristocratic banquets so reminiscent of those found in Homer, and participated with him in royal hunts. As noted by Sawada, these were the venues in which regular interaction between the king and his companions would occur. For much of its history Macedonia was a land dominated by these aristocratic elites. One important result of this is examined by E. Carney in 'Macedonian Women' (chapter 20). For her, the importance of royal and elite society throughout the Argead period created a culture where 'the role of both royal and elite women was more like that of royal women in Homeric epic and aristocratic women in the Archaic period'. During the later and more bureaucratic Antigonid dynasty, continues Carney, women were 'far less prominent and politically active'.²²

In the Hellenistic period the kingdoms in general were more bureaucratic, relying less on a noble class. While less bureaucratic than its counterparts in Asia and Egypt, the later Antigonid dynasty in Macedonia proper was still more so than its Argead predecessor. Even so it still maintained much of the personal nature of the Argead dynasty. In these more bureaucratic Hellenistic states in general, especially in Ptolemaic Egypt, there was more social mobility into this privileged class than what had been traditional in Argead Macedonia.

The old aristocratic class had been thinned considerably by Alexander's campaigns and those of his immediate successors. The new world created from Alexander's conquests was too vast and complex to be administered by whatever remained of the old Macedonian nobility, and this was true even in the homeland. In Antigonid Macedonia much of the change was a direct result of the urbanization and growth of a middle class begun during the reign of Philip II. In Asia and Egypt, while initially there was an ethnic distinction made between the previous inhabitants of the Achaemenid Persian Empire and the new Greek and Macedonian settlers, over time and as a result of intermarriage, the distinction became one of language and culture (see S.R. Asirvatham, 'Perspectives on the Macedonians from Greece, Rome, and Beyond', chapter 6).

The evidence also shows that in their organization the cities of the Hellenistic Age owed much to the nature of Macedonian cities, especially those created or captured and transformed by Philip II, rather than to the classical Greek *polis* or those pre-existing communities of the Near East.²³ Certainly the new communities created by Alexander and his successors were not 'free' in the classical Greek sense of being autonomous and at least theoretically in charge of their own destinies. While classical Greek cities often became subject to the authority of some outside power, as in the heyday of the fifth-century Athenian Empire, they tended to remain fiercely independent. Most classical Greek cities guarded their citizenship vigorously.²⁴ Even though certain Greek states were forcibly absorbed by other *poleis*,²⁵ and a number of federations were created in which there was a local citizenship as well as a federal one,²⁶ city-states would seldom willingly give up their independence totally.²⁷ The ancient Spartans once a year purged their population of 'foreigners' and the far more cosmopolitan Athenians instituted a citizenship law requiring that both parents be Athenian citizens for a child to be considered as such. However, 'the Macedonian *polis* [...] was a mixture of Macedonians and other peoples'.²⁸ Nor were the newly created cities of Asia and northeastern Africa the clones of those indigenous communities whose antiquity preceded Alexander. These were seen as tributary communities totally subject to the rulers or their representatives. Yet even here the king's relationship was often shaped by negotiation between the monarch and the local population.²⁹ This was a process that is in evidence in the epigraphical material from the reigns of Philip II, Alexander the Great, and their Hellenistic successors. As with the Macedonian cities prior to Alexander the Great,³⁰ the new Hellenistic foundations exhibited limited local autonomy under the ultimate authority of the monarch.³¹

Ancient Macedonia has significant political and cultural importance to this day. J. Agnew in a recent article, remarks on 'Macedonia's centrality to the making of Greece over the past century'.³² As discussed by L. Danforth in 'Ancient Macedonia, Alexander the Great, and the Star or Sun of Vergina: National Symbols and the Conflict between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia' (chapter 27), the land historically called Macedonia became a contentious issue in the wake of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and this has been amplified in the last two decades of the twentieth century with the break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Out of this dissolution there emerged among a number of new political entities a new state, located across the border from the current Greek Region of Macedonia, and claiming at least a share of the legacy of ancient Macedonia, including the name 'Macedonia', the person of Alexander the Great, and the 'Star of Vergina', emblematic of Alexander's dynasty, as a national symbol. The new nation occupies part of the territory of what was in antiquity Upper Macedonia but mostly that of the ancient kingdom of Paeonia, which was conquered by Philip II but retained a separate status under Macedonian rule until fully annexed during the Antigonid dynasty and later became the separate Roman province of Dardania.³³ This new state called itself the Republic of Macedonia and was so recognized by many nations including the United States, but officially proclaimed in 1993 by the United Nations as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Of all the topics covered in this book, this is both the most controversial and certainly the most impassioned.

As Danforth relates, this new state has stirred the passions of its neighbor to the south, the Hellenic Republic, with the Greeks proclaiming their exclusive hold on the ancient Macedonian legacy: 'Both Greek and Macedonian nationalisms are based on a discourse of racial and cultural continuity in which national identities existing in the present are legitimated by being projected far back in time to the glorious age of Alexander the Great and the ancient Macedonians'. These modern issues put the entire history of ancient Macedonia into a political arena not often encountered by historians of antiquity. However, this modern context in conjunction with its ancient one is very important for a general examination of the creation of national identities. It is commonly accepted today amongst anthropologists and historians that the ultimate basis of ethnicity is popular perception,³⁴ which typically owes much to historical circumstance.³⁵ Any examination of national identity demonstrates just how significant history is in this entire process. As one researcher has remarked, 'the Nation can rarely (if at all) be conceived without ruins'.³⁶ Yet much of this history, as with the sense of belonging to an ethnicity or a

nation itself, may indeed be imagined, built on popular perception but often with little real basis. It has even been stated by B. Anderson that all communities beyond the mere village are imagined.³⁷ Kinship, real or imagined, in the present is then seen as continuing from a past, which may likewise be actual or not, and, consequently, becomes a perceived national heritage.³⁸ Nationhood in that case is embodied and materialized in this past, yet, it is never left in this past. In the Balkans, as noted by Danforth, modern nationalistic claims emphasize long-standing cultural heritages and specific cultural characteristics. For modern Greeks this has typically meant membership in the Greek Orthodox Church, fluency in the Greek language, and descent from the Greeks of antiquity. Similarly, for the Macedonian or FYROM community the definition is membership in the Macedonian Orthodox Church, competency in the Macedonian language,³⁹ and claimed descent from the ancient Macedonians.⁴⁰ Both groups, therefore, base their respective nationalisms on a racial and cultural continuity from the past to the present. Consequently, much of this modern conflict has developed over the nature of these ancient Macedonians. Were they part of ancient Greek civilization or a separate people with a distinct heritage? In many ways the current conversation involving the identity of the ancient Macedonians evokes Herodotus' definition of ethnicity as based on genetics, language, religious institutions and practices, and lifestyles (8.144.2; cf. 7.9b.2). While anthropologists and historians generally accept Fredrik Barth's thesis that ethnicity arises from and is maintained through an interplay between external ascription and individual self-identification,⁴¹ much of the non-academic world views it from a Herodotean perspective of specific genetic and cultural markers. These are regarded by Barth as 'boundaries'⁴² or 'trade-marks' according to Danforth and serve as the proclaimed attributes of the group.

The issue of ethnicity is then complicated by the various definitions applied by a broad range of interpreters from anthropologists to politicians. Both S.R. Asirvatham in 'Perspectives on the Macedonians from Greece, Rome, and Beyond' (chapter 6) and J. Engels in 'Greeks and Macedonians' (chapter 5) look at the issue of ancient Macedonian ethnicity but from slightly different perspectives. The former examines exclusively the literary evidence from a number of different sources, including Persian and Egyptian, and is concerned with the perception that the various groups have of one another. The latter looks at the full range of evidence, including archaeological and literary, seeking some sense of the true nature of Macedonian nationality as it relates to 'Greek' ethnicity, but concludes that 'Hellenic and Macedonian ethnic identity or ethnicity should be regarded as extremely complex and fluid social constructions which

surely deserve further studies'. As noted earlier with regard to Asirvatham's chapter, and reinforced in that of Engels, the evidence is seldom 'Macedonian' in origin but mostly Athenian and Roman. Moreover, as set forth by Asirvatham, 'authors fit and refit the Macedonians into a pre-existing but flexible framework for Panhellenic identity, which was in turn (to different degrees with different authors) based on Hellenic genealogy and, more importantly, political/cultural ideals of Greekness'.

In antiquity Greeks, or Hellenes, as they called themselves, were most often seen as the descendants of those who had sent ships on the great Trojan expedition and been recorded in Homer's catalogue of ships in the *Iliad* (2.494–759)⁴³ and/or as those descended from Hellen, a mythical ancestor.⁴⁴ In general, Greeks divided the world between themselves and the barbarians (that is, non Greeks).⁴⁵ Even the advanced peoples of western Asia were seen as barbarians. The ancient definition of Greek ethnicity, however, was not this simple.⁴⁶ Perhaps, the most 'Greek' of all the Greeks, the ancient Athenians, are reported by Herodotus as being originally Pelasgians, the supposed autochthonic inhabitants of the peninsula, who through the adoption of the Greek language and culture became 'Hellenes' (1.57.3, 58.1; cf. 7.161.3).⁴⁷ Clearly, while Herodotus 8.144.2 lists 'kinship of all Greeks in blood' as a part of ethnicity, he obviously accepted cultural aspects as more important.

Moreover, in antiquity, while in certain contexts the concept of a common Greek ethnicity was accepted, as with the acknowledged right for only 'Greeks' to participate in the Olympic Games, Greeks politically were organized in city-states or tribal affiliations, to which was owed primary allegiance. This narrower definition of ethnicity tied to city-states (*poleis*) or tribal bonds was much responsible for the interminable strife waged amongst the various Greek states and peoples against one another. The issue of ethnicity is still further complicated by the acknowledgment of ethnicities which were wider than the *polis* or tribal group but were less than Panhellenic. In this category were those designations of Aeolian, Ionian or Dorian, reflecting linguistic and perceived ancestral differences;⁴⁸ Euboean, Boeotian, Achaean, Arcadian and so on, indicating regional distinctions, but which likewise were seen as having genetic origins.

It is in this environment of complex ethnic distinctions that any attempt to define ancient 'Macedonian' ethnicity must be placed. Asirvatham describes the changing perception of Macedonians over the course of antiquity. While Aristotle (*Politics* 7.1324b) apparently listed the Macedonians among the barbarians, it is very clear from the earliest Hellenic sources that many 'Greeks' perceived the Macedonians as being some sort of hybrid, related to the Hellenes, but

distinct. This is seen in the ancestral myth presented in *The Catalogue of Women* attributed in antiquity to Hesiod: 'The district Macedonia took its name from Macedon, the son of Zeus and Thyia, Deucalion's daughter, and she conceived and bore to Zeus who delights in the thunderbolt two sons, Magnes and Macedon, rejoicing in horses, who dwell round about Pieria and Olympus'.⁴⁹ The ancestor of the Macedonians is then the nephew of Hellen, the forebear of the Hellenes. By the end of the fifth century Hellanicus, the Greek logographer, makes Macedon the son of Aeolus, a son of Hellen and ancestor of the Aeolians, and hence in the family of Hellenes (*FGrH* 4 F 74). Hellanicus was apparently attempting to systematize all of the various genealogical myths. He must then have believed that the Macedonians were true Greeks.⁵⁰

The evolving view of the ancient Macedonians as seen by the southern 'Greeks' is, therefore, instructive in any discussion of the development of ethnicities whether ancient or modern. Macedonians were not commonly seen as true Greeks before or during the reigns of Philip and Alexander. Throughout the Classical Age most 'Greeks' acknowledged a distinction between themselves and the Macedonians. When the Macedonian king Alexander I attempted to participate in the Olympic Games, the Greeks who were to run against him said that the contest was for Greeks and not for foreigners. Alexander convinced the *Hellenodikai*, the officials in charge, that he was descended from an Argive, and so was judged to be a Greek and competed in the foot race (*Hdt.* 5.22). Apparently as a Macedonian he would have been barred. As noted earlier, the Argive origin of the Macedonian royal house was generally recognized in the Classical period.⁵¹

However, this perceived distinction was not the dichotomy between Greeks and 'barbarians'. While Macedonians were not commonly viewed as Hellenes in the fifth and much of the fourth centuries, a distinction was also seen by most Greeks at that time between Macedonians and the so-called 'barbarians' including those 'barbaric' groups living within the Greek peninsula. Illyrians throughout antiquity were regarded as barbarians,⁵² as were the Paeonians⁵³ and most Thracians.⁵⁴ Thucydides on occasion (4.125.1, 127.2) appears to list the Macedonians separately from barbarians and Diodorus, perhaps following the fourth-century historian Ephorus, also distinguishes between Macedonians and barbarians (16.4.2, 5, 71–2). Demosthenes is clear, however, that, for him, Macedonians were barbarians (3.24, 9.31–32). Isocrates, another Athenian orator of the Classical Age, in his *To Philip* states: 'I assert that it is incumbent upon you to work for the good of the Hellenes to reign as king over the Macedonians and to extend your power over the greatest possible number of the barbarians' (5.154). Nor was this distinction between

Greeks and Macedonians altered during the reigns of Philip and Alexander or through the period of the *Diadochoi*.⁵⁵ However, what is clear from the evidence is that this ambiguous ethnic relationship between the Macedonians and their southern neighbors was evolving over time.⁵⁶ Already by the fifth century Macedonia and the southern Greeks shared most of the same gods; the Greek alphabet and language were employed in Macedonia at least for written communication,⁵⁷ and likely for oral as well;⁵⁸ Macedonian cities possessed theaters and other architectural and cultural attributes of their southern neighbors and Macedonian art, in the words of C.I. Hardiman in 'Classical Art to 221 BC' (chapter 24) 'was part of the general artistic *koinai* of the age'. Indeed, Hardiman states that 'the beginnings of Macedonia as a locus of Hellenic art and as a disseminator of this art may be the most "Macedonian" element of its "classical" period'. Macedonians had also established their own national 'games' clearly modeled after those of Olympia.⁵⁹ Macedonian coinage from its beginnings depicted gods common to the southern Greeks.⁶⁰ D. Graninger, in 'Macedonia and Thessaly' (chapter 15), points out that 'there were religious traditions common to both greater Thessaly and Macedonia'. However, P. Christesen and S.C. Murray in 'Macedonian Religion' (chapter 21), while emphasizing the general Greek context of Macedonian religion, also point to aspects that set it apart. Among these were the existence of certain deities peculiar to Macedonia, the expenditure of resources by the elite on the construction of tombs rather than on temples, and the position of the king in Macedonian religious life. Yet despite sharing a common host of deities all of the city-states and tribal groups also exhibited their own local variations.⁶¹

By the second century the literary evidence suggests that the Macedonians and their southern neighbors saw themselves and each other as Greeks.⁶² Polybius in particular regularly associates Macedonians and Greeks as the same ethnicity.⁶³ This is also the evidence of the Olympic Games. Following Alexander I, the only Macedonian participants down to the reign of Alexander the Great were royal.⁶⁴ Philip II is the recorded winner of three Olympic competitions, the horse race in 356, the four-horse chariot race in 352, and the two-horse chariot race in 348. But in 328 Kliton, the winner of the foot race, is listed as from Macedonia, as is Lampos, the winner of the four-horse chariot race in 304, and five other non-royal Macedonians are recorded as victors in the third century.⁶⁵ Later, Greeks living in the Roman Empire, like Plutarch, accepted the Greekness of the Macedonians.⁶⁶

Were the ancient Macedonians, then, basically Greek, but because of their pastoral and monarchical traditions were rejected during the

Classical Age as such by most inhabitants of the city-states?⁶⁷ If this is the case, then the process by which the nonroyal population of Macedonia was assimilated into the Greek family of peoples becomes easier to understand. The Macedonians, after all, when they emerge onto the world stage share so much with the southern Greek world. Moreover, beginning with Philip II, urban growth, which had been minimal before his reign, expanded and this expansion continued during the subsequent Antigonid dynasty.⁶⁸ Noted distinctions between ancient Greeks and Macedonians in the Classical Age do tend to emphasize the latter's political organization but there is far more variety politically among the 'Greeks', so much more than just *poleis*. The Phocians were a federation of small and medium communities⁶⁹ as were the Aetolians.⁷⁰ Even though Macedonia was a land of much diversity, with its population including a mixture of peoples ranging from southern Greek immigrants to those from the neighboring regions of Thrace and Illyria, among others, the evidence suggests that this region was certainly part of the Greek cultural milieu in the fifth century and, by the end of the fourth century, was recognized as such by the inhabitants of the southern regions of the peninsula.

While, as Danforth explains, 'regardless of whether the ancient Macedonians "were Greek" or not, collective identities change over time, and names used for cultural groups two thousand years ago do not constitute a legitimate basis for resolving contemporary ethnic and national disputes', certain conclusions can be reached with respect to the ancient Macedonians. What appears clear from the currently available evidence is that (1) Macedonia was clearly part of a broader Greek cultural world at least by the fifth century, (2) whatever may be meant by the stray allusions to spoken 'Macedonian'⁷¹ all surviving epigraphical evidence from grave markers to public inscriptions is in Greek, and (3) while the literary evidence into the fourth century suggests that the Greeks did not accept the Macedonians as brothers and there is virtually no evidence to garner the views of non-royal Macedonians, the Argead royal family, including both Philip II and Alexander III, believed themselves to be Greek and were accepted as such by most of the Greek world. But the discussion of the 'Macedonian Question', both ancient and modern, provides insights into the very nature of ethnicity and, perhaps more importantly, its functioning on a practical level among politicians and the populations they represent.

¹ G. Droysen, *Geschichte des Hellenismus* 1, *Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen* (Gotha 1877), p. 4.

² The kings, down to the death of Alexander's son and heir,

Alexander IV, were by tradition descended from the Argive Temenus, thus Temenid: Hdt. 8.137–9, Thuc. 2.99.3. Argead apparently derives from a tribal name, 'Argeas, the son of Macedon' (Stephanus of Byzantium, s.v. Argeou), but was associated by the royal family with their claimed Argive origin. See the full discussion of Argead claimed genealogy in S.R. Asirvatham, 'Perspectives on the Macedonians from Greece, Rome, and Beyond' (chapter 6) and S. Sprawski, 'The Early Temenid Kings to Alexander I' (chapter 7).

³ Intensive field surveys differ from the more traditional 'extensive field survey' in that they do not concentrate on a few sites but rather develop a comprehensive examination of an entire area: J. Bintliff, 'The History of the Greek Countryside: As the Wave Breaks, Prospects for Future Research', in P.N. Doukellis and L. Mendoni (eds.), *Structures rurales et sociétés antiques* (Paris 1994), pp. 7–15 and G. Shipley, 'Hidden Landscapes: Greek Field Survey Data and Hellenistic History', in D. Ogden (ed.), *The Hellenistic World: New Perspectives* (London 2002), pp. 177–98.

⁴ T.H. van Andel and C.N. Runnels, *Beyond the Acropolis: A Rural Greek Past* (Palo Alto 1987).

⁵ J.L. Bintliff, 'Appearance and Reality: Understanding the Buried Landscape through New Techniques in Field Survey', in M. Bernardi (ed.), *Archeologia del Paesaggio* (Florence 1992), pp. 89–137. Most recently the first volume cataloging the findings of the Boeotian Project has been published: J. Bintliff, P. Howard and A. Snodgrass, *Testing the Hinterland: The Work of the Boeotia Survey (1989–1991) in the Southern Approaches to the City of Thespiai* (Cambridge 2007).

⁶ W.A. McDonald and G.R. Rapp (eds.), *Minnesota Messenia Expedition: Reconstructing a Bronze Age Regional Environment* (Minneapolis 1972).

⁷ The sources for the Roman period are discussed in J. Vanderspoel, 'Provincia Macedonia' (chapter 13) and C.S. Snively, 'Macedonia in Late Antiquity' (chapter 26).

⁸ M.B. Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings*, 2 vols. (Athens 1996). The second volume of this work contains the most complete collection currently available in one volume of these

Macedonian inscriptions; the first, an insightful review of this evidence combined with that available from other sources as well.

⁹ J.M. Alonso-Núñez, 'An Augustan World History: The *Historiae Philippicae* of Pompeius Trogus', *G&R*² 34 (1987), pp. 56–72.

¹⁰ For example, J.R. Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism* (London 1976); G.L. Cawkwell, *Philip of Macedon* (London 1978); G. Wirth, *Philipp II. Geschichte Makedoniens* 1 (Stuttgart 1985); N.G.L. Hammond, *Philip of Macedon* (London 1994); Ian Worthington, *Philip II of Macedonia* (New Haven 2008). Worthington in particular emphasizes Philip's achievements and closes his biography as follows: 'does Alexander even deserve to be called Great? His greatness, if such it is, is surely further proof of the success, sensibility and indeed greatness of Philip II' (p. 208).

¹¹ E.M. Anson, 'Philip II and the Transformation of Macedonia: A Reappraisal', in T. Howe and J. Reames (eds.), *Macedonian Legacies: Studies in Ancient Macedonian History and Culture in Honor of Eugene N. Borza* (Claremont 2008), pp. 17–30.

¹² See W. Heckel, *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire* (London 1992), p. 3; E.M. Anson, 'Philip II the Creation of the Pezhetairoi', in P. Wheatley and R. Hannah (eds.), *Alexander and His Successors* (Claremont 2009), pp. 88–98 with his 'The Hypaspists: Macedonia's Professional Citizen-Soldiers', *Historia* 34 (1985), pp. 246–8 and *Eumenes of Cardia: A Greek among Macedonians* (Leiden 2004), pp. 225–31.

¹³ E.A. Fredricksmeyer, 'On the Final Aims of Philip II', in W.L. Adams and E.N. Borza (eds.), *Philip II, Alexander the Great, and the Macedonian Heritage* (Lanham 1982), pp. 85–98, believes that Philip planned to replace the Great King of the Persian Empire, deify himself, and establish an absolute monarchy over the lands of his conquest.

¹⁴ See Griffith in Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 383–5; R.M. Errington, 'The Nature of the Macedonian State under the Monarchy', *Chiron* 8 (1978), pp. 77–133; E.M. Anson, 'Macedonia's Alleged Constitutionalism', *CJ* 80 (1985), pp. 303–16 and 'Macedonian Judicial Assemblies', *CP* 103 (2008), pp. 135–49; Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, pp. 238–9.

- ¹⁵ See Anson, 'Macedonia's Alleged Constitutionalism', p. 304.
- ¹⁶ Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, p. 238.
- ¹⁷ See Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, pp. 56–7, 238. Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions* 1, pp. 431–5, argues that the king was only the trustee of the people's money. Even if this were technically true, there is no evidence of any regulatory body or a postulated 'assembly' overseeing or disciplining the king.
- ¹⁸ J.R. Ellis, 'Population-transplants under Philip II', *Makedonika* 9 (1969), pp. 9–12.
- ¹⁹ See Hammond, *History of Macedonia* 1, pp. 143, 173, 199–200, 204; Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 652–7; A.B. West, *The History of the Chalcidic League* (repr. Chicago, 1973), pp. 131 n. 37, 134. Alexander the Great founded 70 cities according to Plutarch, *Moralia* 328e.
- ²⁰ See N.G.L. Hammond, 'The Continuity of Macedonian Institutions and the Macedonian Kingdoms of the Hellenistic Era', *Historia* 49 (2000), p. 158, and especially Anson, 'Philip II and the Transformation of Macedonia', pp. 17–30.
- ²¹ W.L. Adams, 'Macedonian Kingship and the Right of Petition', *Ancient Macedonia* 4 (Thessaloniki 1986), pp. 43–52; Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, pp. 281–2. It is claimed by D. Kienast, *Phillip II. von Makedonien und das Reich der Achaimeniden* (Marburg 1973) and Fredricksmeier, 'Final Aims of Philip II', *passim*, that Philip II was moving Macedonia towards an autocracy modeled on that of the Persian Empire.
- ²² See E.D. Carney, *Women and Monarchy in Macedonia* (Norman 2000), pp. 199–201.
- ²³ R.M. Errington, 'Recent Research on Ancient Macedonia', *Analele Univ. Galați, s. Istorie* 1 (2002), pp. 9–21, available at www.istorie.ugal.ro/ISTORIE/CERCETARE/ABALE/%20Errington_Macedonia.pdf, last accessed March 2010.
- ²⁴ N.G.L. Hammond, 'The Macedonian Imprint on the Hellenistic World', in P. Green (ed.), *Hellenistic History and Culture* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1993), p. 23.

- ²⁵ For example, the Argives increased their population by eliminating the communities of Tiryns, Hysiae, Orneae, Mycenae, Mideia, along with other towns in Argolis and removing the people to Argos in 462 (Paus. 8.27.1).
- ²⁶ In general, see J.A.O. Larsen, *Greek Federal States: Their Institutions and History* (Oxford 1968).
- ²⁷ Such an exception was the creation of Megalopolis. Here forty-one cities were abandoned and their populations incorporated into the new foundation (Paus. 8.27.2–4). Pausanias 8.27.2 states that this was possible because of the Arcadians' fear of the Spartans. Even here, however, three repented and were removed to Megalopolis by force; many of the residents of Trapezus left the Peloponnese entirely and settled in the area of the Black Sea in order to avoid incorporation; many other dissidents were massacred by other Arcadians (Paus. 8.7.5–6).
- ²⁸ Hammond, 'Macedonian Imprint on the Hellenistic World', p. 37.
- ²⁹ See J. Ma, *Antiochus III and the Cities of Western Asia Minor* (Oxford 2002), pp. 179–234; 'Kings', in A. Erskine (ed.), *A Companion to the Hellenistic World* (Oxford 2003), pp. 182–3; Errington, 'Recent Research on Ancient Macedonia', pp. 12–20.
- ³⁰ Errington, 'Recent Research on Ancient Macedonia', pp. 16–19, believes this relationship between city and monarch developed from the urbanization activities inaugurated by Philip II.
- ³¹ R.A. Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1997), p. 197; Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions* 1, pp. 66–7, 69; Anson, *Eumenes of Cardia*, pp. 221–3; Ma, 'Kings', p. 192. Hatzopoulos and Ma assume that these negotiations reflect the constitutionality of the Macedonian state, but it in actuality reflects the earlier tradition of the non-bureaucratic nature of this monarchy.
- ³² 'No Borders, No Nations: Making Greece in Macedonia', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 97 (2007), p. 398.
- ³³ I.L. Merker, 'The Ancient Kingdom of Paeonia', *Balkan Studies* 6 (1965), pp. 43–4. For the location of Paeonia, see Strabo 7.5.1, 12

(‘it is situated north of Macedonia’), 9.5.1, Livy 45.9.7, 29.12.

³⁴ F. Barth, ‘Introduction’, in F. Barth (ed.), *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference* (Boston 1969), pp. 10–15; R. Just, ‘Triumph of the Ethnos’, in E. Tonkin, M. McDonald and M. Chapman (eds.), *History and Ethnicity* (London 1989), pp. 74–5; T.H. Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives* (Boulder 1993), pp. 20–2, 38; A.C. Renfrew, ‘From Here to Ethnicity, Review of J. Hall, *Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity*’, *Cambridge Archaeological Journal* 8 (1998), pp. 275–7.

³⁵ A.D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford 1986); J. Toland, ‘Dialogue of Self and Other: Ethnicity and the State Building Process’, in J. Toland (ed.), *Ethnicity and the State* (New Brunswick 1993), pp. 1–20; M. Banks, *Ethnicity: Anthropological Constructions* (London 1996).

³⁶ Y. Hamilakis, *The Nation and Its Ruins: Antiquity, Archaeology, and National Imagination in Greece* (Oxford 2007), p. 301.

³⁷ *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London 2006), pp. 6–7.

³⁸ B. Williams, ‘Classification Systems Revisited: Kinship, Caste, Race, and Nationality as the Flow of Blood and the Spread of Rights’, in S. Yanagisako and C. Delaney (eds.), *Naturalizing Power: Essays in Feminist Cultural Analysis* (London 1995), p. 206; D.E. Sutton, ‘Local Names, Foreign Claims: Family Inheritances and National Heritage on a Greek Island’, *American Ethnologist* 24 (1997), pp. 415–16, 428–9.

³⁹ Modern ‘Macedonian’ is defined by the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* as a ‘South Slavic language that is most closely related to Bulgarian and is written in the Cyrillic alphabet’.

⁴⁰ V. Roudometof, ‘Nationalism and Identity Politics in the Balkans: Greece and the Macedonian Question’, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 14 (1996), p. 254.

⁴¹ ‘Introduction’, pp. 9–38.

⁴² ‘Introduction’, p. 15.

⁴³ Thucydides 1.3.4, 12.2 (cf. Hdt. 1.3.2) regards the Trojan War as the first ‘Hellenic enterprise’.

⁴⁴ Genealogical lists became common in the Archaic Age (800–479). These survive today in the so-called Hesiodic *Catalogue of Women*, dating from either the seventh or sixth century, and in *Library of Pseudo-Apollodorus*, a work of unknown authorship and a significantly later date (perhaps first or second century AD) chronicling Greek mythology: see M.L. West, *The Hesiodic Catalogue of Women: Its Nature, Structure and Origins* (Oxford 1985), p. 45.

⁴⁵ See M.J. Olbrycht, ‘Macedonia and Persia’ (chapter 17). J. Engels in ‘Macedonians and Greeks’ (chapter 5) points out that the Persians referred to Macedonians and their southern neighbours as Ionians.

⁴⁶ It is even claimed that the Spartans made no distinction between Hellenic or ‘barbarian’ foreigners. All were regarded as aliens: see P. Cartledge, ‘Greeks and “Barbarians”’, in A.F. Christidis (ed.), *A History of Ancient Greek: From the Beginnings to Late Antiquity* (Cambridge 2007), p. 308.

⁴⁷ The Arcadians, whose Greek ethnicity is never questioned, are omitted from mythical descent from Hellen and are also seen as originally being Pelagians: see T.H. Nielsen and J. Roy (eds.), *Defining Ancient Arkadia* (Copenhagen 1999), pp. 31–3.

⁴⁸ These dialectic designations were tied in the Greek view to different eponymous ancestors and histories: [Apollodorus] 1.7.3, Hdt. 1.143–53, 7.176.4, Thuc. 3.2.3, Paus. 3.1.6, 4.21.5, 30.1, 5.1.26, 4.9, 3.5–7, 7.1.4, 5–9, 2.1–4, 3.9, 8.5.1, 6, 10.8.4. Herodotus 1.56.2 refers to the Dorians and Ionians as *genoi*, or kinship groups.

⁴⁹ West, *Hesiodic Catalogue of Women*, pp. 127–30, 169–71.

⁵⁰ See the comments of Hammond in Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia 2*, p. 47.

⁵¹ Herodotus 5.22, 8.137–9, Thucydides 2.99.3, 5.80.2, and Isocrates 5.32, 107, accept the Argive origin of the Macedonian royal house, probably reflecting general Greek acceptance as well.

Demosthenes, however, is one possible negative voice (14.3). E.N. Borza, 'Athenians, Macedonians, and the Origins of the Macedonian Royal House', in *Studies in Attic Epigraphy, History and Topography. Presented to Eugene Vanderpool* (Princeton 1982), pp. 7–13, believes the Argive connection was a myth put forward by the Argead royal house. Yet, as noted earlier, the officials at Olympia accepted not only the Greekness of the Argead dynasty but also Alexander personally as a valid Greek, permitting his participation in the Olympic Games.

⁵² Thuc. 4.125.1, Diod. 12.30.3, 15.13.3, 14.1–2, 16.4.5; and see W.S. Greenwalt, 'Macedonia, Illyria and Epirus' (chapter 14).

⁵³ Hdt. 5.13.2, Homer, *Iliad* 5.342, Diod. 16.4.2. Pausanias 5.1.5, who wrote *A Description of Greece*, in the second century AD, however, claims that Paeon was the brother of Epeius and Aetolus, the respective founders of the Eleans and Aetolians, both Hellenic peoples. This notice from Pausanias may suggest that at least by the second century AD the Paeonians were seen as part of the Greek community. Merker, 'Ancient Kingdom of Paeonia', pp. 36–93, accepts the Paeonians as Hellenes.

⁵⁴ Aristophanes, *Acharnians* 168, *Birds* 199, Diod. 15.36.4, 16.71.2, and see W.S. Greenwalt, 'Macedonia, Illyria and Epirus' (chapter 14).

⁵⁵ E.N. Borza, 'Greeks and Macedonians in the Age of Alexander. The Source Traditions', in R.W. Wallace and E.M. Harris (eds.), *Transitions to Empire: Essays in Greco-Roman History, 360–146 B.C., in Honor of E. Badian* (Norman 1996), pp. 122–31.

⁵⁶ A point emphasized by W.L. Adams, 'Historical Perceptions of Greco-Macedonian Ethnicity in the Hellenistic Age', *Balkan Studies* 37 (1996), pp. 205–22 and by J. Hall, 'Contested Ethnicities: Perceptions of Macedonia within Evolving Definitions of Greek Identity', in I. Malkin (ed.), *Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity* (Cambridge 2001), pp. 159–86. Hall indeed, states 'to ask whether the Macedonians "really were" Greek or not in antiquity is ultimately a redundant question given the shifting semantics of Greekness between the sixth and fourth centuries B.C. What cannot be denied, however, is that the cultural commodification of Hellenic identity that emerged in the fourth century might have remained a provincial artifact, confined to the Balkan peninsula, had it not been for the Macedonians' (p. 172).

⁵⁷ Of the roughly 6,300 inscriptions recovered within the confines of ancient Macedonia, approximately 99 per cent were written in Greek: A. Panayotou, 'The Position of the Macedonian Dialect', in A.-F. Christidis (ed.), *A History of Ancient Greek: From the Beginnings to Late Antiquity* (Cambridge 2007), p. 436. As K. Dahmen in 'The Numismatic Evidence' (chapter 3) notes, the legends on all currently discovered Macedonian coins are in Greek.

⁵⁸ The evidence suggests that the language spoken by most Macedonians was a dialect of Greek and had been for centuries: E. Voutiras, 'Revue des études grecques: À propos d'une tablette de malédiction de Pella', *REG* 109 (1996), pp. 678–82; O. Masson, 'Macedonian Language', *Oxford Classical Dictionary*³ (Oxford 1996), pp. 905–6. The names of the Macedonian months and the majority of Macedonian towns are Greek in form and even the origin of the word 'Macedonian' probably derives from the Greek word for highlander: see J. Engels, 'Macedonians and Greeks' (chapter 5) with E.M. Anson, 'The Meaning of the Term Macedones', *Anc. World* 10 (1984), pp. 67–8.

⁵⁹ On this last aspect, see W.L. Adams, 'Sport and Ethnicity in Ancient Macedonia', in T. Howe and J. Reames (eds.), *Macedonian Legacies: Studies in Ancient Macedonian History and Culture in Honor of Eugene N. Borza* (Claremont 2008), pp. 57–78.

⁶⁰ These include Heracles, Apollo, Artemis, Athena, Poseidon, and Zeus: see K. Dahmen, 'The Numismatic Evidence' (chapter 3) and M.J. Price, *Coins of the Macedonians* (London 1974).

⁶¹ See J.D. Mikalson, *Ancient Greek Religion* (Oxford 2005), pp. 160–4.

⁶² See Adams, 'Sport and Ethnicity', pp. 220–2; F.W. Walbank, *Polybius, Rome and the Hellenistic World: Essays and Reflections* (Cambridge 2002), p. 98.

⁶³ Polyb. 5.104.1, 7.9.3, 5, 7, 9.37.7, 38.3.8; cf. Livy 31.29.15, Strabo 10.2.23. Asians were still regarded as barbarians (Polyb. 10.30.2, 31.2, 48.8), as were Gauls (Polyb. 9.30.3, 35.1, 2) and Romans (Polyb. 11.5.7, 18.22.8; cf. Livy 31.29.15).

⁶⁴ Solinus 9.16 records that Archelaus competed at Olympia and

also at Delphi. He is listed as the winner of the tethrippon in 408: see L. Moretti, *Olympionikai, i vincitori negli antichi agoni Olimpici, Memorie* (Rome 1957), pp. 110–11, no. 349, however his participation is rejected by E. Badian, ‘Greeks and Macedonians’, in B. Barr-Sharrar and E.N. Borza (eds.), *Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times* (Washington, 1982), pp. 35, 46 n. 16 and Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, p. 174, but accepted by Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, p. 150.

⁶⁵ See Moretti, *Olympionikai*, pp. 127 no. 463, 132 no. 498, 134 no. 527, 135 no. 533, 136 nos. 543 and 549, 137 no. 552.

⁶⁶ Of course Plutarch still accepted the dichotomy between Greeks and ‘barbarians’ as seen in his *Parallel Lives* and in his criticism of Herodotus for being ‘too fond of barbarians’ (*Moralia* 857a). The first-century AD geographer Strabo at 10.2.23 associates the Macedonians with the ‘Greeks’.

⁶⁷ See Anson, *Eumenes of Cardia*, pp. 202–14.

⁶⁸ See the inventory in M.B. Hatzopoulos and P. Paschidis, ‘Makedonika’, in M.H. Hansen and T.H. Nielsen (eds.), *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis* (Oxford 2005), pp. 794–806.

⁶⁹ J. McInerney, *The Folds of Parnassos: Land and Ethnicity in Ancient Phokis* (Austin 1999), pp. 186–7.

⁷⁰ The Aetolians have been described as ‘the best example known of a Greek tribal state’ by Larsen, *Greek Federal States*, p. 78. While Pausanias 5.1.3 relates a tradition that puts the Aetolians outside of the Hellenic line, he further relates that ‘others with greater probability’ traced their lineage directly to Hellen (5.1.4). The Aetolians are recorded in Homer’s *Iliad* as having sent forty ships to Troy (2.638–44).

⁷¹ References to ‘Macedonian speech’: Curt. 6.9.36, *PSI* 12.1284. Plut., *Alexander* 51.11, *Eumenes* 14.5, *Antony* 27.4. While Herodotus routinely refers to ‘Greek speech’ he is nonetheless cognizant of the many variations in the Greek language during the fifth century, and while Plato has Socrates speak of ‘Greek speech’ (*Crates* 409e, 410a) he also acknowledges that Greeks differed in their speech (*Crates* 385e). Our sources routinely refer to

‘Boeotian speech’ (Xen., *Anabasis* 3.1.26, Arr. 6.13.5, Paus. 9.34.2.), ‘Laconian speech’ (Plut., *Pyrrhus* 26.11), ‘Aeolian speech’ (Paus. 9.22.3), ‘Chalcidian speech’ (Thuc. 6.5.1), ‘Phocian speech’ (Aeschylus, *Supplices* 563–4), ‘Arcadian speech’ (Paus. 8.23), and ‘Attic speech’ (Hdt. 6.138.2, Xen., *Memorabilia* 3.14.7), etc.

PART II

Evidence

The Literary and Epigraphic Evidence to the Roman Conquest

P.J. Rhodes

1 Introduction

*Like the Carthaginians and the Spartans, the Macedonians are among the silent people of the ancient Mediterranean basin. Almost everything we know about them derives from the written accounts of others, and – as in the case of the Carthaginians and the Spartans – those written accounts were either not well-informed or they were hostile, and occasionally both.*¹

Thus wrote E.N. Borza, at the beginning of a survey of recent work on early Macedonia published in 1999. F. Jacoby in collecting the fragments of the lost Greek historians listed just 13 possible writers of histories of Macedonia, perhaps five of them from the time of the Roman Empire: apart from one of those five (Theagenes)², the only ones for whom he found more than three fragments were two men called Marsyas, one from Pella, in the late fourth century (*FGrH* 135) and one from Philippi, in the early third century (*FGrH* 136). Antipater, the general of Philip II, wrote an account of the Illyrian war of Perdiccas III, but we know nothing about it beyond that fact (*FGrH* 114 T 1). For ‘Philippic histories’ and the *Makedonika* of Duris, which are general histories though centred on Macedonia, see below. Most of our literary evidence for Macedonia comes from these and other general histories in which Macedonia is included, and from texts of other kinds written outside Macedonia in the fourth century and later.

As we shall see below, there is also a shortage of Macedonian epigraphic material, and particularly down to the end of the fourth century the most important inscriptions for the history of Macedonia are inscriptions set up by Greek states in connection with their

2 Literary Evidence

Before we turn to historians, we should notice the attempts to provide a genealogy for the Macedonians' eponymous ancestor Macedon. A fragment from the *Catalogue of Women* attributed to Hesiod gives to Zeus two sons by Thyia the daughter of Deucalion, 'Magnes and Macedon who delights in horses, whose homes were around Pieria and Olympus' (that is, to the south of the plain of Lower Macedonia)⁴. Other versions made Macedon the son of Aeolus, ancestor of the Aeolian Greeks and brother of the Dorian and Ionian ancestors Dorus and Xuthus (Hellanicus, *FGrH* 4 F 74), or the son of Lycaon the son of Pelasgus,⁵ or even the son of the Egyptian Osiris (Diod. 1.18.1, 20.3). Probably there was no justification for any of these, and Macedon himself is fictitious.

Herodotus, the earliest major historian whose work survives (written about the third quarter of the fifth century), has three kinds of material on Macedonia. Macedonia was involved in the main narrative of books 5–9, running from the aftermath of the Persians' Scythian expedition of about 514 to their large-scale invasion of Greece in 480–479, and is mentioned where relevant. The Macedonian king Alexander I figures in the narrative at various points: his alleged secret killing of Megabazus' envoys to Amyntas I (5.17–21); his successful claim to be of Argive descent and therefore eligible to compete at Olympia (5.22); his advice to the Greeks in 480 not to wait in Thessaly for the Persian invaders (7.173); his sending Macedonians to the Boeotian cities after Thermopylae to confirm that they were now on Xerxes' side (8.34); Mardonius' sending him in an unsuccessful attempt to win over Athens in winter 480/79 (8.136–44); and his going to the Athenians at Plataea with news of Mardonius' intentions (9.44–5). Finally, Macedonia appears in various stories of origins and migrations, most strikingly the story of the Argive origin of the Macedonian royal house (8.137–9; cf. 5.22).

The stories of Alexander show him nominally on the Persian side but in fact sympathetic to the Greeks, and they are presumably stories which it suited him to put into circulation once the Persian War of 480–479 had ended in a Greek victory.⁶ The story of the royal family's Greek origin Herodotus accepts, but it is a story in which Perdiccas I and his brothers come from outside and conquer the Macedonians, who by implication (though it is not directly stated) are themselves not Greek. Macedonia is not sufficiently exotic for

Herodotus to treat it as truly exotic places are treated, but the account of Perdiccas' conquest includes the Gardens of Midas, with exceptional wild roses (where according to the Macedonians Silenus was caught by Midas), and Mount Bermium, which is too cold for anybody to climb it (8.138).

In the second half of the fifth century, covered by Thucydides, the king was Perdiccas II, and most of Thucydides' references to Macedonia are connected with Perdiccas' switching between alliance with Athens and hostility to Athens. He mentions also a campaign against Perdiccas by the Thracian ruler Sitalces in 429/8, in which the Athenians were expected to join but failed to join (2.95–101).

Thucydides tells us incidentally of relatives who were rival claimants to rule Macedonia in the 430s and early 420s (1.56–63, 2.95, 100); and in the late 420s we hear no more of these but instead find Perdiccas at war with Arrhabaeus, the ruler of Lyncestis to the west of Lower Macedonia (4.79, 83, 124–8). In the last of those passages the Lyncestians, reckoned among the peoples of Upper Macedonia in 2.99, are described as barbarians (and as behaving like other barbarian forces in Thucydides); the (Lower) Macedonians seem to be distinguished both from Greeks on one side and also from (utter) barbarians on the other.⁷

In connection with Sitalces' campaign Thucydides gives a pair of digressions on Macedonia. The first distinguishes Lower Macedonia, ruled by Perdiccas, from Upper, comprising peoples with their own kings but allied and subject to Perdiccas; it accepts the story of Macedonia's being conquered by Temenids from Argos and expelling other peoples including the Bottiaeans (2.99; cf. 5.80.2). The second looks forward admiringly to the achievements of Perdiccas' successor Archelaus, who did more to make Macedonia powerful than the eight kings before him (2.100). There is much here that is not in Herodotus, but in so far as they overlap they are in agreement, as scholars have noticed.⁸ As a man with Thracian connections Thucydides may well have visited Macedonia, but the assumption of Hammond that he must have spoken to Perdiccas since he would not otherwise have ascribed motives to him⁹ is fragile.

Perdiccas died about 413 and Thucydides' narrative breaks off in the autumn of 411. From then until 362 we have two surviving narratives, one in the contemporary *Hellenica* of the Athenian Xenophon and one in the universal history of Diodorus Siculus. Diodorus, writing in the first century BC, had a table of dates, including reigns of kings, but used as his main source for Greek history in this period the fourth-century Ephorus of Cyme. Ephorus from 411 to perhaps 386 used the history of which fragments survive as the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*.¹⁰ This is a tradition separate from

Xenophon, and for this period both need to be taken into account.

Xenophon¹¹ does not attempt to be comprehensive and omits matters which he finds uninteresting or uncongenial; he does not include Macedonia often. He has one major section of narrative in which Macedonia is involved (5.2.11–3.26). His version of the invitation to Sparta to intervene in 382 against the growing power of Olynthus in the north-east has representations made to Sparta by Greek cities threatened by Olynthus, but they claim that Olynthus is rapidly taking over Macedonia, already controls the capital Pella, and has driven Amyntas III out of virtually the whole of his kingdom. In the war which the Spartans undertake they contact both Amyntas and Derdas of Elimea (to the west of Lower Macedonia), both of whom join in enthusiastically.

Diodorus in the final years of the Peloponnesian War records two episodes in connection with Archelaus (13.49.1, 103.5). For the rest of the period covered by Xenophon most of his information on Macedonia concerns the beginnings and ends of kings' reigns.¹² Twice he mentions Amyntas' being driven out by the Illyrians and ceding land to Olynthus but later recovering his kingdom (14.92.3–4, 15.19.2–3; cf. 20.3); on the second occasion this leads to his making an alliance with Sparta and Sparta's going to war against Olynthus, which resembles Xenophon's account of the beginning of that war except that for Xenophon the actual appeal to Sparta was made by Greek cities (cf. above). Diodorus is capable of repeating himself, in the course of using material from different sources or fitting his material into an annalistic framework, and I believe though many do not that he has done that here and that Amyntas was expelled and returned only once.¹³ Later he mentions the rival involvement of Macedonia and Thebes in Thessaly in the 360s, an affair not treated by Xenophon (15.61.3–5, 67.3–4).

With the accession of Philip in 359 the history of Macedonia becomes part of the main stream of Greek history rather than something caught up in it from time to time, and as a result our information becomes a good deal less sporadic. In book 16 on Philip's reign, Diodorus still used Ephorus as far as he was available and the account of the Third Sacred War written by Ephorus' son Demophilus to complete his history. That ended with Philip's siege of Perinthus in 340, and for the last years of his reign Diodorus perhaps used the rhetorical and anecdotal Diyllus of Athens (*FGrH* 73), whose history ran from the beginning of the Third Sacred War in 356 to the early third century (16.14.3–5, 16.76.5–6; cf. 21.5). The result is an account which is generally favourable to Philip, and is more detailed before 356 than after.

We have another account of Philip's reign to set beside that of

Diodorus. In the first century BC a Gaul writing in Latin, Pompeius Trogus, wrote a 'Philippic history', which was in fact a universal history centred on the rise and fall of the Macedonian and Successor kingdoms (from which we have *Prologi*, tables of contents, and an *Epitome* by Justin, who is variously dated between about AD 200 and 400).¹⁴ After dealing in books 1–6 with Near Eastern and Greek history from the Assyrian Empire to the 350s, the narrative turns in book 7 to Macedonia, from its legendary beginnings to the accession of Philip (Justin 7.1–5) and the events of the first few years of his reign (7.6), continuing with Philip's reign from the beginning of the Third Sacred War to the siege of Perinthus in book 8, and the final years of Philip's reign in book 9. This account is generally more hostile to Philip than that of Diodorus.¹⁵

We must consider also the two 'Philippic histories' by fourth-century writers, Theopompus (*FGrH* 115) and Anaximenes (*FGrH* 72), which survive only in fragments. Theopompus was a very frequently cited writer, with 411 fragments in all and 223 from the Philippic history. That work was nominally a history of Macedonia and Greece in the reign of Philip, in 58 books, but it was a 'sprawling mammoth'¹⁶ and was liberally supplied with digressions on a wide range of topics.¹⁷ Theopompus is said to have visited Philip's court, and Speusippus claims that he made himself objectionable there.¹⁸ He began by claiming that Europe had never produced such a man as Philip,¹⁹ but he was clearly hostile to Philip, representing him as both personally and politically irresponsible; and Flower argues that for him Philip's success was not a creditable achievement of his but an indictment of the Greeks who failed to prevent it.²⁰ Many of the fragments are quoted for what they say about dissolute lives, in Macedonia or elsewhere; but there are some which should be taken seriously as evidence for Macedonian history,²¹ and his notes on supporters of Philip in various places are significant, even if his condemnation of their morals is less so.²² He was not opposed only to Philip: his treatment of Philip's Athenian opponent Demosthenes was hostile too.²³

Anaximenes' Philippic history was in at least eight books.²⁴ Far fewer fragments have survived (perhaps 14 including the letters Demosthenes 11 and 12, which are better not ascribed to him), and most of them merely report that Anaximenes mentioned something; but F 4 quotes Anaximenes' words stating that (an) Alexander organised the Macedonian cavalry as *hetairoi* ('companions') and the infantry as *pezetairoi* ('foot companions'). He is said to have written and circulated a vitriolic text in the style and in the name of Theopompus (T 6, from Pausanias).

Fourth-century texts of other kinds are relevant to Macedonia.

From the 360s Athens attempted to recover its Thracian colony Amphipolis, lost during the Peloponnesian War, to do which it began fighting in the vicinity of Macedonia, and although Philip took Amphipolis himself in 357 the Athenians did not abandon hope of regaining it. The expansion of his power eastwards towards the Hellespont and southwards into Greece could be seen as a threat to Athens, and how to treat Philip in general and in particular situations became a major concern of the Athenians. Of the speeches which survive, the three law-court speeches of Aeschines, and most of the assembly speeches and some of the law-court speeches of Demosthenes, and also some of the speeches from the reign of Alexander by Dinarchus, Hyperides and Lycurgus, are therefore important for the history of Macedonia and of Athens' dealings with Macedonia, though it is not always easy to elicit the truth behind what the orators say.²⁵

Isocrates, who wrote pamphlets in the form of speeches, finally settled on Philip as the man to unite the Greeks in the new war against the Persians which he had been advocating for several decades (from his *Panegyricus* of about 380). The *Philip* (5), written in 346, tells us more about the Greek world and the Persians than about Philip, but there are some passages dealing with Macedonia, particularly 1–7,²⁶ 14–21, 55, 73–5, and 105–6. Among the letters attributed to Isocrates two are addressed to Philip (2, 3), one to Philip's general Antipater (4, a letter of recommendation for one of Isocrates' pupils) and one to the young Alexander (5). Elsewhere in his works there are just two mentions of Amyntas III (4.126, 6.46) and an allusion to Amphipolis (8.22).

There is also material in the philosophers. Plato cites Archelaus (whose accession Diodorus omitted to mention) as a 'happy unjust man', who was born to a slave woman but after killing his uncle, cousin and half brother became king – and who was better judged to be 'the greatest wrongdoer in Macedonia, the most wretched of all the Macedonians, and not the happiest' (Pl., *Gorgias* 470c–472d). As Plato tried personally to intervene in Syracuse in Sicily, he sent his associate Euphraeus to intervene in Macedonia in the reign of Perdiccas III,²⁷ and that seems to have resulted in hostility between Philip II and Plato afterwards (cf. below).

Aristotle spent part of his life in Macedonia as a tutor of Alexander the Great (for example, Plut., *Alexander* 7–8), but there are not many allusions to Macedonia in his works. His school's collection of *Constitutions* did not as far as we know include one of Macedonia (though we do not have a complete list of titles); a fragment from the *Constitution of Chalcis* refers to the colonies of Eretria and Chalcis in the Chalcidice as being in Macedonia.²⁸ The *Politics* mentions the

assassination of three kings (5.1311b1–20, that of Philip being the latest datable reference in the *Politics*), and has three other allusions to Macedonia;²⁹ the *Rhetoric* uses in a sample argument Philip's request to pass through Theban territory to Attica (2.1397b34–1398a2), and mentions a refusal by Socrates to visit Archelaus, and Isocrates' *Philip* (2.1398a25, 3.1418b27). Archelaus is described as too bold in the *Problems* (30.954b32–4) and the pseudo-Aristotelian *Oeconomica* mentions the increase in the yield of the Macedonian harbour taxes achieved about 360 by the exiled Athenian Callistratus (2.1350a16–22).

We also have a *Letter to Philip* written about 343–342 by Plato's nephew and successor Speusippus. Nominally a request to Philip to protect a Thessalian historian, Alexander of Magnesia, it develops into a denunciation of Isocrates' *Philip*, and has been interpreted as an attempt to restore good relations between Philip and Plato's Academy after Euphraeus' involvement with Perdiccas.³⁰ The *Letter* contains remarks on Macedonia in Philip's time and on its earlier history.

For the reign of Alexander our sources are more interested in him and his campaigns than in Macedonia during his campaigns. The contemporary and nearcontemporary accounts have not survived, and the principal surviving sources are, in chronological order, Diodorus book 17 (first century), Q. Curtius Rufus (in Latin, first century AD), Plutarch's *Alexander* (first/second century AD: on Plutarch see below), Arrian's *Anabasis* (second century AD) and books 11–12 of Justin's *Epitome* of Pompeius Trogus (in Latin, between about AD 200 and 400: cf. above). Diodorus gives in 17.2–4 the most detailed narrative of the events surrounding Alexander's accession and in 17.62–3, 73.5–6 the most detailed general account of the Greek rising of 331–330 led by Agis of Sparta and defeated by Antipater.³¹ There are passages in all the Alexander historians on the feud involving Alexander's mother Olympias, his sister Cleopatra and Antipater.

After the death of Alexander the history of Macedonia – control of which was for a time contested but ultimately obtained by the descendants of Alexander's general Antigonus Monophthalmus (the One-Eyed) – is one strand in the history of Alexander's empire and the separate entities into which it split. Most of what our sources report concerns not the internal affairs of Macedonia but the dealings of the Macedonian kingdom with the Greeks and with the other Successor kingdoms. There is a good general survey of the literary and other sources for the first century of this period by F.W. Walbank in the revised *Cambridge Ancient History*.³²

For the earliest part of this 'Hellenistic' period, from Alexander's death to the Roman conquest, the most important of the sources which have not survived but have influenced later texts which do

survive is the history of Hieronymus of Cardia (*FGrH* 154), who was perhaps archivist of Alexander the Great and subsequently served Eumenes of Cardia and then the Antigonids. He wrote a history of the Successors of Alexander (cf. Diod. 18.42.1 = T 3) from 323 to at least 272, and was clearly a well-informed and serious historian.³³ Another historian, Duris of Samos,³⁴ wrote *Makedonika* covering the period from 370 (cf. Diod. 15.60.6 = T 5) to at least 281, but was more interested in sensational matters, and Hieronymus was at least in part reacting against him.³⁵ The principal historian of the period 272–219 was Phylarchus of Athens or Naucratis (*FGrH* 81), another lover of the sensational (for which he was criticised by Polybius at 2.56 = T 3).³⁶ Aratus of Sicyon (*FGrH* 231) was an active politician in the Achaean League from 251 to his death in 213; he wrote *Memoirs* (*Hypomnematismoi*), which Polybius as another politician of the Achaean League was too eager to accept as truthful (2.40.4 = T 3).³⁷

After Alexander three further books of Diodorus' universal history survive (18–20), taking his narrative down to the Battle of Ipsus in 301, at which Antigonos Monophthalmus was defeated and killed; after that we have only fragments. In those three books his main source was Hieronymus, and much of the time he 'merely paraphrased or extracted, without addition or interpolation except of the simplest kind'³⁸ but, since he was doing this with a good source, he here 'abruptly rises to a quality not found elsewhere'.³⁹ From Trogus the *Prologi* and the *Epitome* by Justin also continue, with material on Macedonia and Greece down to 146 in books 13–16 and 24–34.2. This too is dependent ultimately on Hieronymus for the period which he covered; beyond that it is not clear what sources were used. Arrian, one of the historians of Alexander, wrote also 10 books on *Affairs after Alexander*: we have some fragments, including a summary by Photius, from which it appears that he wrote a detailed narrative which went only as far as 320 or 319.⁴⁰

Polybius of Megalopolis, who was taken from the Peloponnese to Rome as a hostage for the years 168–150, became a friend of P. Scipio Aemilianus. His *Histories* was originally intended to cover 220–167 and to show 'how and thanks to what kind of constitution almost the whole of the inhabited world fell subject to the single empire of the Romans in not quite fifty-three years' (1.1.5); later he decided to continue to 146, showing the policies of the victors and their methods of rule (3.4).⁴¹ This involved a good deal of material on Greece and Macedonia as well as Rome's dealings with them. He was a serious political historian, for most of the period relying on his own direct knowledge, interrogation of witnesses and the study of terrain and documents; for his earlier material on Greece and Macedonia he relied

on Aratus and Phylarchus.

Like Diodorus, Polybius is a historian of whose work only part survives complete. That part is books 1–5, containing his introduction and narrative of 220/19–217/16. For books 6, on the Roman constitution and military system, and 7–18, on 216/5–197/6, we have in addition to other fragments the abridgment known as the *excerpta antiqua*; after that, only fragments. However, the period 216–167 is covered in some of the surviving books, 23–45, of the Roman historian Livy (first century BC to first century AD); and for Rome's dealings with the Greek and Macedonian world Livy used Polybius occasionally in books 21–3, frequently in 24–30 and regularly in 31–45 (and in the lost books 46–52, which took his narrative to the year 146).⁴² He sometimes misunderstood Polybius, he sometimes had difficulty in combining Polybius with his other sources, and he tried to make his own narrative more dramatic than that of Polybius; but on the whole he followed Polybius faithfully, and thanks to him much more of what Polybius' lost books contained is recoverable than would otherwise be the case.

Three later writers deserve to be included in this survey. Strabo, of Amasea in Asia Minor (first century BC to first century AD), was the author of a *Geography* of the Greek and Roman world, and included Macedonia and Thrace in the later part of book 7 (which does not survive intact, but from which we have a number of fragments).⁴³ His main interest was in describing the terrain and locating cities and peoples; and he often added historical notes, particularly in connection with foundations of cities and movements of peoples. The Macedonians are mentioned in historical passages throughout his work, in addition to the section devoted directly to Macedonia.

Plutarch of Chaeronea in Greece (first to second century AD) wrote *Parallel Lives* of famous Greeks and famous Romans (to the end of the Republic) and essays on a wide range of subjects known collectively as the *Moralia* (but not all the items in the collection are authentic works of Plutarch).⁴⁴ The *Lives* were intended to illustrate the subjects' characters, and combine material on their public careers, of a kind which interested the historians, with personal material, which did not. They were based on a wide range of sources, some of them perhaps available to Plutarch for immediate consultation while he was writing but others noted or remembered; and, like ancient writers in general, he cited sources for particular statements sometimes but not systematically. One of his lives is of Alexander the Great, a substantial amount of which (2–14) is devoted to the period before the Persian campaign, when Alexander was in Macedonia and neighbouring regions. Another is of Demetrius Poliorcetes (son of Antigonus Monophthalmus). The other lives of most importance for Macedonia

are those of Pelopidas, Demosthenes and Phocion for the fourth century, Agis and Cleomenes (in fact only Cleomenes has material concerning Macedonia) for the third and Philopoemen for the late third and early second. In the *Moralia*, *Sayings of Kings and Commanders* includes sayings attributed to Archelaus, Philip II, Alexander the Great, Ptolemy, Antigonus Monophthalmus, Demetrius, Antigonus Gonatas, Lysimachus and Antipater (177a–183f), and to some Greeks in their dealings with Macedonia. There are mentions of Macedonia and Macedonians in *Precepts of Statecraft* and in the *Lives of the Ten Orators*, and there are the two speeches that comprise the work *On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander*.

Finally, Athenaeus of Naucratis in Egypt (second to third century AD) was the author of the *Intellectuals at Dinner* (*Deipnosophistai*), a collection of material, more often dramatic and light-hearted than serious, drawn from a very wide range of authors writing in different genres. He is the source for many of our fragments of the lost historians cited above – and popularity with Athenaeus is a sign that a historian included (but not proof that he concentrated on) frivolous and sensational items.⁴⁵

3 Epigraphic Evidence

I turn from literary texts to inscriptions.⁴⁶ Inscriptions on durable materials are still used for various purposes in the modern world (for example, tombstones, war memorials, announcements of various kinds outside and inside buildings), and they were used much more in the ancient world, which lacked printing and other means of making texts publicly available. In Greece the alphabet was adopted (by modification of the Phoenician script) probably in the late eighth century; the earliest texts produced by public bodies date from the late seventh; texts were set up at Olympia from the late sixth/early fifth century onwards; and Athens produced inscriptions on a particularly large scale from the middle of the fifth century onwards. For permanent publication the normal medium was stone, occasionally metal; temporary notices were written with charcoal on whitewashed wooden boards (which have not survived, but are known about from references to them). Texts from public bodies particularly excite the interest of historians, but private texts – dedications and funerary monuments are far more numerous, and interesting things can be learned from the study of them too, in groups of similar material if not from every single text on its own.

The survival of literary texts depends on their having been

considered worthwhile by generations of copyists. The availability of inscriptions depends on their being found by archaeologists and then edited. The body of material continues to grow from year to year, but it takes time for texts to find their way from their first publication into regional and other kinds of collections in which they will be readily accessible.⁴⁷ So far the only attempt at a comprehensive collection of Macedonian inscriptions is one published in the 1890s, M.G. Demitsas' *He Makedonia*.⁴⁸ The Berlin Academy in the nineteenth century undertook to publish a collection of all the Greek inscriptions from Europe, and under the revised plan of 1906 the collection was entitled *Inscriptiones Graecae* and volume 10 was to contain the inscriptions of Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace and Scythia: the only part of that covering Lower Macedonia which has yet been published is volume 10.2.1, with the inscriptions of Thessalonica and its neighbourhood.⁴⁹ One volume has been published of a separate corpus for Lower Macedonia, devoted to Beroea.⁵⁰ For the south-western part of Upper Macedonia (the part within the borders of present-day Greece) there is *Epigraphes ano Makedonias*,⁵¹ for the north-eastern part (within present-day Bulgaria) there is *Inscriptiones Graecae in Bulgaria Repertae*,⁵² and for the northwestern part (within the Republic of Macedonia) there is now *Inscriptiones Graecae* 10.2.2.1.⁵³ There is a collection of inscriptions important for Macedonia in the classical and Hellenistic periods in a book on Macedonian institutions by M.B. Hatzopoulos (but some of his opinions are controversial).⁵⁴ The Macedonian kings never developed the habit of publishing documents as Greek states did. There are very few inscriptions of any kind from Macedonia or cities and other units within it of the classical period. Some are of the Hellenistic period but most are later than AD 100, and for the classical and Hellenistic periods covered by this chapter many of the significant texts come not from Macedonia itself but from Greek states as a result of their dealings with the Macedonians.

From the fifth century we have three interesting Athenian texts. *IG* 1³ 89 is a lengthy but fragmentary inscription which has been assigned to various dates between about 435 and about 415: it is an alliance with Perdiccas II and others, in particular with Arrhabaeus (perhaps the Arrhabaeus of Thucydides 4: ll. 10, 56–8), and it ends with a long list of Macedonians, probably men who swore to the treaty (ll. 60–78). There is a *dossier* of decrees from about 430 to 423 for Methone, a Greek city on the coast of the Thermaic Gulf, which includes undertakings to protect Methone's interests against Perdiccas.⁵⁵ And there is a fragmentary decree probably of 407/6 in which before honours for Archelaus editors have restored a proposal of Alcibiades that, at this critical time towards the end of the Peloponnesian War, Athens should not import timber for ship-

building but have new ships built in Macedonia and then brought to Athens.⁵⁶

From the fourth century our material is more plentiful and also more varied. There is a treaty between Amyntas III and the Chalcidian state centred on Olynthus: in addition to a standard defensive alliance there are clauses favourable to the Chalcidians concerning trade and neighbouring states which were hostile to them.⁵⁷ There is an Athenian alliance with Amyntas, mentioning also his son Alexander, of which only the end survives.⁵⁸ In 371/0 Athens honoured a king of Pelagonia, in Upper Macedonia (*IG* 2² 190), and in 363/2 it honoured Menelaus of Pelagonia, who was helping in Athens' war to recover Amphipolis;⁵⁹ afterwards he fled to Athens, became an Athenian citizen, and as such was honoured by Ilium.⁶⁰ Probably in 365 or 364 the Boeotians honoured a Macedonian called Athenaeus (*SEG* 34.355).⁶¹ After Philip had taken Amphipolis for himself in 357 the city exiled opponents of his,⁶² and there is an inscription recording his alliance with the Chalcidians in 357/6,⁶³ while Athens in 356/5 made an alliance for waging 'the war against Philip' with barbarian kings to the east, north and west of Macedonia,⁶⁴ but was distracted by the Social War against its allies and prevented from acting on it. When Philip drove out Arybbas of Molossis, replacing him with Arybbas' nephew Alexander, in 343/2, Arybbas took refuge in Athens, and the Athenian decree for him includes an undertaking – never fulfilled – to restore him to his ancestral realm.⁶⁵

In the reorganisation of the Delphic Amphictyony which followed the ending of the Third Sacred War in 346, two votes were given to Philip (rather than to 'the Macedonians'), and subsequent lists of the Amphictyony's *hieromnamones* include two men 'from Philip' in the third and fourth places after the two Thessalians who head the lists.⁶⁶ It was probably in a brief period of independence from both Athens and Thebes, between 338 and 335, that Oropus honoured two Macedonians, Amyntas the son of Perdiccas III, and another Amyntas who later joined the Persians.⁶⁷ Amyntas the son of Perdiccas appears also, with the description 'king of the Macedonians' (on which see below), in an inscription concerning payments by those who consulted the oracle of Trophonius at Lebadea in Boeotia (*SEG* 44.414.7–10). The settlement which Philip imposed on the Greeks after his victory at Chaeronea in 338 included the creation of what modern scholars call the League of Corinth, in which they were enrolled. It is commonly assumed that the foundation document was published in many or all of the participating states, and that two fragments belong to the Athenian copy of this, giving most of the oath sworn by the members and part of the list of members.⁶⁸

From the Hellenistic period we continue to have inscriptions which

shed light on the major political and military events. One lengthy but fragmentary text concerns the foundation of a Greek league by Antigonos Monophthalmus and Demetrius Poliorcetes in 302, potentially a very important move but one which was rendered obsolete by their defeat at Ipsus the next year.⁶⁹ This could be seen as a revival of Philip's League of Corinth (cf. Plut., *Demetrius* 25.3), and scholars have debated whether some of the rules attested for this league should be postulated also for the League of Corinth. Several inscriptions mention Adimantus of Lampsacus, and the Athenian decree honouring him reveals that he was one of the men appointed by Demetrius as *proedroi* of this league's council.⁷⁰

A number of Athenian decrees help us to understand the successful revolt of Athens against Demetrius in 287. Particularly informative is the decree honouring Callias of the deme Sphettus: among the services for which he was honoured was defending the city, in cooperation with Ptolemy, against an attempt by Demetrius to recover control of it, and representing Athens when peace was subsequently made between Demetrius and Ptolemy.⁷¹ Another angle on the same events is provided by a decree honouring Strombichus, a mercenary commander under Demetrius who defected to the other side (*IG* 2² 666.7–15); and we learn more about the provisioning of Athens in this crisis from the decrees honouring Callias' brother Phaedrus (*IG* 2² 682.30–40) and a Ptolemaic officer called Zenon.⁷² Another hero of the anti-Macedonian regime which then came to power in Athens, the poet Philippides of the deme Cephale, is said to have obtained money and grain from Lysimachus after the liberation.⁷³

From Gortyn in Crete we have a fragment of an alliance which it made with Demetrius II, in 237/6 (*I. Cret.* 4 167), and we have two fragments of a treaty made by Lysimachea (formerly Cardia) in the Chersonese with Philip V about 200.⁷⁴ Two inscriptions, both from Cassandrea (formerly Potidaea), record grants of land by the current ruler of Macedonia, by Cassander in 306–297 and by Lysimachus in 285/4.⁷⁵ They were presumably inscribed on the initiative of the beneficiaries; they are formulated in the same style as was used by some Greek states for abbreviated records of their awards of citizenship or proxeny,⁷⁶ and that echoing of Greek style is reminiscent of the epigraphic practice of some other rulers on the edges of the Greek world.⁷⁷

Inscriptions help us to address various kinds of questions about Macedonia. One such question is when *basileus* ('king') became a formal title of the Macedonian rulers. Among the inscriptions which have been adduced in this debate, the use of *basileus* of Amyntas son of Perdiccas when he was not ruler, in the text from Lebadea cited above (*SEG* 44.414), is likely to be an informal act of politeness by the

Lebadeans, not evidence that Amyntas claimed that title.⁷⁸ In the oath commonly attributed to the League of Corinth the agreement is 'with Philip' (given no title: restored), but includes an undertaking not to overthrow the *basileia* ('kingdom') of Philip.⁷⁹ Two other inscriptions are problematic. One which mentions 'King Philip' has been taken as referring either to Philip II or to Philip V, and one which records a determination of boundaries is dated by the *basileia* of a ruler whom Hatzopoulos restores as Philip (II) but others restore as a later king; neither necessarily reflects the official usage of the ruler and his court.⁸⁰ However, Alexander the Great's first letter to Chios, probably in 334, identifies him as 'King Alexander'.⁸¹

The divinity of the ruler is another topic on which an inscription sheds light. One of the indications that, if he did not go all the way to claiming divine status, Philip II went a long way in that direction is a text revealing that, when Eresus on Lesbos was admitted along with other Aegean states to Philip's League of Corinth by Parmenion and Attalus in 336, a cult of Zeus Philippius, Zeus the protector of Philip, was instituted there – but the altars were demolished by the pro-Persian regime installed in 333.⁸²

Inscriptions make it clear that cities and other civic units inside Macedonia were less free and independent than those in the Greek heartland. When about 242/1 Cos called on the Greek states to recognise the inviolability of its sanctuary of Asclepius and published a *dossier* of responses, among them were four from cities in Macedonia: Cassandrea, Amphipolis, Philippi and Pella.⁸³ The extent to which the cities were dependent on the king is shown by the fact that all four record the goodwill of Cos towards Antigonus (Gonatas) and the Macedonians, and all except Pella state that they are granting the request in accordance with the wishes of Antigonus (the omission of this from the text of Pella's decree is probably not significant).

In 249/8, in Antigonus Gonatas' reign, his son (the later Demetrius II) sent a series of letters to Harpalus, the king's agent in Beroea, giving orders about the priests and sanctuary of Heracles;⁸⁴ and in 188/7 Philip V sent a letter to Andronicus, his agent in Thessalonica, forbidding the alienation of the funds of Sarapis.⁸⁵ No title is specified for Harpalus or Andronicus, but *epistates* was widely used for royal agents of this kind (cf. Polyb. 5.26.5), the instructions to Thessalonica make it clear that the *epistates* was an important man there, and (for instance) in the late fourth and the third century Amphipolis dated by *epistates* and priest.⁸⁶ Outside Macedonia the kings did not normally intervene directly in the cities' affairs in this way; but they may have ruled Thessaly directly between 321 and 227,⁸⁷ and after that, in 217 and 214, Philip V first in response to an approach from Larissa sent instructions to it to grant citizenship to

non-citizen residents and then, when that original decision had been overridden, sent further instructions to reinstate it.⁸⁸ Even Athens seems to have been directly subject to Antigonos Gonatas about 260, for a few years immediately after the Chremonidean War: there is an Athenian decree which honours Apollodorus as ‘appointed *strategos* by king Antigonos and elected by the *demos* in charge of the coastal territory’, presumably indicating that Antigonos had appointed him to the board of *stratego*i and the assembly had then decided which of the particular assignments was to be given to him.⁸⁹ As another sign of this dependent position C. Habicht has suggested that Demetrius the grandson of Demetrius of Phalerum was appointed as Antigonos’ agent in Athens, but with the Athenian-sounding title *thesmothetes* rather than *epistates*.⁹⁰

Among the earlier inscriptions from inside Macedonia are documents of the late fourth and third centuries from several cities which record the sale of land and houses.⁹¹ From Beroea we have a decree and the law whose publication it ordered, of the early third century, regulating the conduct of the city’s gymnasium.⁹² A number of inscriptions to be dated about 200 deal with military matters. One from Amphipolis gives us fragments from a code of discipline for the Macedonian army,⁹³ one, of which we have parts of two copies, deals with obligations to perform military service,⁹⁴ and one, of which we have one complete copy and another giving only the end, is concerned with the good keeping of a garrison’s stores.⁹⁵

Another kind of study, which is based largely on inscriptions in the mass rather than on particular major texts, is the study of individuals and their names and of what can be inferred about the society in which they lived. Three detailed Macedonian investigations of this kind covering the classical and Hellenistic and also the later periods have been produced by A.B. Tataki;⁹⁶ Hatzopoulos has used personal names to study the beginnings and expansion of the Macedonian kingdom,⁹⁷ and Macedonians are now to be found in the *Lexicon of Greek Personal Names*.⁹⁸

Just as we have inscriptions from the Greek states which document their dealings with Macedonia, we have inscriptions generated by Rome which document its dealings with Macedonia, and I end this survey with the conquest of Macedonia by Rome. A letter of T. Quinctius Flamininus sent to Chyretiae in northern Thessaly (which had been subject to Philip V), and inscribed there, seeks to win the loyalty of the upper class by offering to restore to its rightful owners land confiscated by Rome after the Battle of Cynoscephalae in 197.⁹⁹ The last of the Macedonian kings, Perseus (179–168), was too successful for Rome to coexist with him, and an inscription gives a catalogue of Roman grievances against him, sent about 171–170 to

4 Conclusion

Although Macedonia itself did not in this period produce many literary texts or inscriptions, it figures in the works of Greek writers in various genres, and the dealings of Macedonia and Macedonians with the Greek states and with Rome have resulted in a number of significant inscriptions. Thus, although the Macedonians are ‘among the silent people of the ancient Mediterranean basin’, we do have source material which enables us to study them from various angles.

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¹⁵ But notice, for instance, the obituary of Philip in 9.8.

¹⁶ W.R. Connor, ‘History without Heroes: Theopompus’ Treatment of Philip of Macedon’, *GRBS* 8 (1967), pp. 133–54 at 151.

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²⁰ Flower, *Theopompus of Chios*, p. 98.

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²² For example, Fragments 35, 41, 119, 209, 210, 230, 231.

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⁸⁷ For example, Errington, *History of Macedonia*, pp. 69, 177, with 289 n. 6, 235–6.

⁸⁸ *IG* 9.2 517, trans. Austin, *Hellenistic World*², no. 75.

⁸⁹ L. Moretti, *Iscrizioni storiche ellenistiche* 1 (Florence 1967), no. 22.7–8.

⁹⁰ C. Habicht, *Athens from Alexander to Antony*, trans. D.L. Schneider (Cambridge 1997), pp. 153–4: appointment as *thesmothetes*, Athen. 4.168e–f, from Hegesander (second century BC).

⁹¹ Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions*, nos. 83–92, and more

have been found and published subsequently.

⁹² Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions* no. 60, trans. Austin, *Hellenistic World*², no. 137.

⁹³ Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions*, no. 12, trans. Austin, *Hellenistic World*², no. 90.

⁹⁴ SEG 49.722 (from Cassandrea), 855 (of unknown origin).

⁹⁵ IG 12 Supp. 644 = Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions*, no. 13 (the complete copy: from Chalcis); SEG 51.640 bis (from Eastern Locris).

⁹⁶ A.B. Tataki, *Ancient Beroea: Prosopography and Society* (Athens 1988), *Macedonian Edessa: Prosopography and Onomasticon* (Athens 1994) and *Macedonians Abroad: A Contribution to the Prosopography of Ancient Macedonia* (Athens 1998).

⁹⁷ M.B. Hatzopoulos, “L’histoire par les noms” in Macedonia’, in S. Hornblower and E. Matthews (eds.), *Greek Personal Names: Their Value as Evidence* (Oxford 2000), pp. 99–117.

⁹⁸ P.M. Fraser and E. Matthews (eds.), *A Lexicon of Greek Personal Names* 4 (Oxford 2005).

⁹⁹ R.K. Sherk, *Roman Documents from the Greek East* (Baltimore 1969), no. 33.

¹⁰⁰ Sherk, *Roman Documents from the Greek East*, no. 40: Sherk gives two reconstructions, and lines 7–33 of his version A are translated by Austin, *Hellenistic World*², no. 93.

*The Numismatic Evidence*¹

Karsten Dahmen

1 Money Matters

He [Philip II] then went to the City of Crenides, expanded its population greatly and changed its name to Philippi after himself. And he increased the output of the small and insignificant gold mines in the area so much by his improvements that they were able to bring him a revenue of more than a thousand talents. He soon amassed a fortune from them and began continually raising the Macedonian kingdom to a great position of superiority by means of this plentiful supply of wealth. For when he had struck gold coinage which was called 'Philippic' after him, he put together an impressive force of mercenaries and by means of this induced many of the Greeks to become traitors to their country.

Diod. 16.8.6–7

Diodorus' report of Philip II's strategy is often cited and discussed, at times contentiously. It demonstrates the economic, political and military importance of coinage very clearly.² Looking beyond the situation described here, in Macedonia in the mid-fourth century, it is worth first considering the phenomenon of money from a range of perspectives. There is more to a coin than its face value. The geographical context of this region of northern Greece led to the use of coined money in the course of the sixth century. The existence of silver mines in the Dysoros mountains in the west and the rich deposits in the Pangaion mountains in the east (cf. Strabo 7.34) provided easy access to the metal needed for this. The region's role as a land-bridge between Asia and Europe and the foundation of colonies by Greek cities in the adjoining Chalcidice peninsula promoted the exchange of goods and maritime trade. In addition, the colonists were already familiar with the use of coins in their native cities, and the

proximity of the west coast of Asia Minor, an area with well-developed monetary habits, will have done the rest. In Macedonia the tribes, colonial cities and kingdom soon discovered the advantages of producing coins.

The coin originated in a lump of metal which was marked during production with a stamped image as the sign of a particular authority and which was guaranteed as having a certain purity and weight so that it could serve as a convenient, easily transported and permanently storable stock of value for the exchange of goods.³ Coins are struck by an obverse and a reverse die that can be identified by comparing the extant coins. As the obverse dies will be in use longer due to their better conservation in the anvil (as opposed to the reverse die which has to withstand the hammer blow), the number of obverse dies identified for a certain coin-type permits an estimate of the size of an issue. The value of a coin was judged by the precious metal it contained; token coinage only developed with the emergence of smaller denominations in bronze from mainly the fourth century onwards. The images used on coins evoke the authority or institution responsible for its production. Depictions of deities or objects provide evidence for religious beliefs and traditions. The iconography of coin-images and its stylistic development can identify or date the coinage of a whole region or show connections between the coinage of, for example, a colony and its mother city (for example, the eagle of Chalcis and its colony Olynthus). The legend on a coin can make dating easier through its letter forms as an additional stylistic characteristic; it can complement epigraphic evidence from other sources, or provide additional information on people, institutions and official positions or dialect used.⁴ The grade of purity of a precious-metal coin (that is, the proportion of gold or silver making up its total weight) can usually not be assessed by sight alone. Variations in this purity or manipulations of the total weight may indicate interventions into the monetary system or the intentional restriction of a coinage's circulation to the area in which it is produced (see section 4 'The Kings', this chapter, for light tetrobols or four obol coins). Modern methods of metal analysis can sometimes provide information on the origin of the metal used in the coin (see section 4). The weight-standard adopted reflects the system of weights and measures in use and the inclusion or exclusion of a region in or from certain areas of circulation. In the Thraco-Macedonian region in the sixth to fourth centuries there is a confusingly large number of different coin-standards used in parallel for some periods even within the same city, and this is clear evidence for the politically fractured character of the region, divided between the Persian Empire, the tribes, the kingdom and the Greek cities. The area of circulation of the money can be

sketched on the basis of coin finds – hoards, which contain a large number of items are especially helpful – while single or scattered finds or the occasional overstriking of older coins provide further indications for a site or relative chronology respectively. Archaeological finds and contexts gain added significance through coin-finds because numismatics can offer chronological indications or information on the site's economic links. But for the region of Macedonia coins are above all a very special historical source: this is true in general for the early phase from the archaic to classical periods in which literary historical sources are very rare; but it is especially important for the Thraco-Macedonian tribal groupings which could otherwise hardly be known at all. The money they coined – not least because it occurs in a context of serial mass production, an aspect that should never be underestimated – opens up a perspective on the lives and influence of the protagonists in this region.

A series of studies and enquiries in the numismatics of ancient Macedonia have been completed in recent decades, but despite this, or perhaps because of it, there is at present no up-to-date, complete overview of the topic. In particular, Greek research institutes and universities have presented numerous monographs and find publications. Through this, new material has come to light and some of the principles by which the coins have been ordered and some metrological and dating approaches have in the process come unstuck. New studies of, in particular, the coinage of individual cities are now being produced. Once this basis has been created, the evaluation of coin-finds, coin circulation, monetary relationships and interdisciplinary collaboration with historians and epigraphists will be the key to a new numismatic picture of ancient Macedonia, offering new information and a basis for further research.⁵

2 The Tribes

The kings of Macedonia and the Greek colonies, mostly based on the Chalcidice peninsula, forced the native Thraco-Macedonian tribes which had originally inhabited the region ever further into the Macedonian hinterland until finally they were assimilated into the Macedonian kingdom.⁶ Initially, up to the period of the Persian Wars or approximately 460, the tribes were in control of the mines in the area and these provided rich deposits of precious metals, part of the basis for an impressive production of coinage.

Previously unknown types have also become known from the 'Asyut' hoard, which also indicates the wide area circulation of coins

from northern Greece,⁷ but it remains the case that there is at present no thorough study which examines all aspects of the coinage of these tribes. Coins are known, and can be assigned thanks to their legends in Greek, for the Derrones, Orescii, Tynteni, Zaielii, Edones, Bisaltae and Ichnaii.⁸ Of these, the first four are known only from their coins, while the Ichnaii, Bisaltae and Edoni are mentioned in Herodotus 7.123 and 7.110. However, Herodotus 7.113 also mentions the Pieres, Odomantes and Satri as exploiting the rich mines of precious metal on Pangaion; but for none of these is an independent coinage recorded. Possibly Herodotus is here transmitting otherwise unknown names for tribes which are else-where recorded under different names.⁹ There are also unnamed types which are assigned to these tribes and a large number of Thraco-Macedonian coins which have so far not been identified. The coins of these tribes are minted on the so-called 'Thraco-Macedonian' standard, with a principal unit (in Greek stater)¹⁰ of just under ten grams. The Ichnaii, Edones and Bisaltae also struck octodrachms (8-drachma pieces of about 28–29 grams), whereas the Derrones struck the large silver pieces known sometimes as decadrachms (10-drachma, a drachma being 'a handful' of obols, six of the latter commonly made up for a full drachma) but better described as 12-drachma pieces (dodecadrachms) of around 40 grams. The coin standard chosen made it possible through the use of fractions to use the coins interchangeably with both the Persian weight-standard and that of the Greek homeland.¹¹ The proximity of the Persian Empire and the inclusion of Thrace within it between 512 and the end of the Persian wars (cf. Hdt. 5.2, 14–16, 6.44–46) are among the reasons for this. The large silver coins of the tribes have been found principally (though not exclusively) in foreign hoards in Phoenicia, Syria and Egypt, where they appear together with other coins. As well as tax or tribute payments to the Achaemenid Empire, trading relations may be a reason for this along with the use of these heavy silver coins as bullion in an area like Egypt, which had little silver of its own.¹² These coins are generally dated between the beginning of the fifth century and approximately 460; the 'Asyut' hoard mentioned above serves as an example for this as it was buried around 475 and lacks the coins with decorated reverse which later become the norm evidently after this date.¹³ The coins of the Bisaltae and Edones, in contrast, were presumably first struck between 475 and 465 as they are not present in earlier hoards.¹⁴

The heavy coins of the Derrones have as a characteristic a bull, either yoked and pulling a wagon with driver or else singly, but harnessed and led by a man. He is sometimes characterized by his herald's staff (*kerykeion*) as Hermes, recalling the worship of this god which Herodotus 5.7 records for the region. This would also suit the

interpretation of Yourukova, who refers to book 24 of the *Iliad* to identify the enigmatic wagon-driver with Hermes transporting the body of Hector accompanied by an eagle.¹⁵ The reverses remain incuse or are decorated with a triskeles or helmet. The Derrones are now identified as a Paeonian tribe in the area of the river Axios¹⁶ and so are the most westerly of the tribes discussed here; they are distinguished from the others through their preference for the bull motif and by their large currency unit. The Ichnaii on the upper Axios play a less significant role but also depict either bulls led by a man or a man leading a horse. The latter motif appears also among the Tynteni who are to be located in the same area. The Bisaltae were settled west of the Strymon while the Edones and Orescii were east of it in the basin of the Pangaion mountains; the Pangaion mines were the source of the Orescii's coin-metal.¹⁷ Among the Bisaltae the image often appears of a man with two spears, often thought to be Ares leading a horse. On smaller denominations he in fact appears in armour. On the octodrachms he appears without armour, though sometimes with hat and cloak, anticipating the hunt-like rider motif of the first Macedonian royal coins (see below and plate 1).¹⁸ The Edones¹⁹ and the much more significant Orescii are closely associated in their regular coin-imagery and depict a driver (Hermes again?) with two oxen; among the Orescii there are also motifs of a centaur carrying off a maenad²⁰ and of the man leading a horse. The smaller denominations show abbreviated versions of these motifs.

An important series of coins, known for over a century as the 'Lete' series, is characterized both by the striking motif of satyr and nymph and by its frequent presence in finds outside the region; the staters are of just under 10 grams and there are also fractions. The assignment of these coins to the Macedonian city of Lete on the basis of a doubtful reading of a supposed coin-legend 'Leteion' (in Greek letters) has always been found unsatisfactory. Smith was able to show that the alleged legend is actually no such thing but rather the result of wear on a coin die.²¹ With reference to the coin-standard used in the series, which differs from that usual in the Chalcidice (where weights around 17.2 grams would be expected), Smith has assigned this important group to the Pangaion area/Thasian peraia. Similar motifs are also known from nearby Thasos (satyr/nymph) and among the Orescii (centaur/nymph).²² On the question of the identity of the mint, it has been proposed that a number of mints active in the region had joined together, though Eion and Berge are now considered good candidates.²³ The high number of 134 obverse dies identified so far for the staters alone clearly shows the significant quantity of this coinage; the use of fractions also shows that as well as exporting the staters the smaller denominations were used for local trade.²⁴ The

entire series is dated to about 525/515 to 470/460. It is a characteristic of the various coinages of this period and region that common types (herdsman, cattle, satyr) are employed.

As well as King Getas of the Edones mentioned above, the coins of two other rulers have recently been identified. Derdas II (?), who reigned around 383, of the Elimiotes in Upper Macedonia has been assigned bronze coins with the motif of horseman/spear and club. Other bronze coins in the name of Philotas (head of unbearded Heracles/eagle on thunderbolt), probably the father of Alexander's famous general Parmenion, also belong to the period around 400.²⁵ Both examples show how in the face of the weakened royal position and the lack of sufficient quantities of money, the older lordships that had already been integrated into the Macedonian kingdom were nonetheless able to maintain a degree of independence – compare Thucydides 2.99.2.

3 The Cities

For the period from the sixth to the fourth century, intensive and complex civic coining activity is recorded in northern Greece. The responsibility for this lies with the numerous Greek *poleis* that had arisen as colonial foundations of their mother-cities since the eighth century. It is not without reason that the Chalcidice peninsula takes its name from the city Chalcis on Euboea that settled two daughter-cities there, Olynthus and Torone, while Chalcis's neighbour Eretria founded Dicaea, Mende and Methone (this last in Pieria). Potidaea was the only colony of Corinth in this region, and Acanthus and Stagira were founded by Andros. Scione, which traced its foundation to the Thessalian hero Protesilaus, had according to Thucydides 2.120 received a proportion of settlers from Pellene. Ainea in the far west of the peninsula boasted of Aeneas as founder and a contemporary mother-city is not recorded, as is also the case with Sermylea. South of Lake Kerkinitis are Tragilus and Argilus (plate 2), a colony of Andros. In the Pangaion area, on the same spot as the later city Amphipolis, stood Ennea Odoi ('nine ways'), founded by Paros. Thasos, itself a Parian colony, protected its strategic and economic interests by founding Neapolis on the Thracian coast opposite and Eion-on-the-Strymon and Galepsus to the west, nearer to the Strymon river. In the Chalcidice between the last years of Persian rule and the years around 480, a dramatic reduction in active mints can be detected; only Acanthus and Mende are still active to a significant degree into the fourth century. This is a reflection of the changing function of money

that, in contrast to the previous period, was no longer exported out of the region of northern Greece and instead had an essentially local circulation. A further reason is the growing power of Athens that forced many of the cities into its newly founded maritime league and demanded tribute in return.²⁶ The precise effects on the allies of the Attic coinage decree of the 420s/410s, requiring the exclusive use of Athenian money, remains a matter of controversy.²⁷

In the area ruled by the Macedonian king, on the other hand, civic coinage was a rare exception. The type from around 490/470 bearing an image of a goat was previously assigned to the capital city Aegae and thought to refer by a monogram to Alexander I, but it is now recognised as an independent coinage, assigned either to the tribes of Bisaltia or tentatively to the city Galepsus.²⁸ Only for Pydna are bronze coins known, struck in the reign of Amyntas III (about 393–370/369), as well as a small series around 365/364. An explanation for this occurrence is the special role of this city, which was first an independent *polis* then from 410 belonged to the Macedonian kingdom and around 365 briefly fell to Athens.²⁹

Similarly Philip to some extent tolerated local minting when expanding Macedonian rule into the Chalcidice peninsula and the Pangaion area. With the support of Perdiccas II (451–413), the cities of Chalcidice had in 432 successfully rebelled against their domination by Athens and had united to form the Chalcidian League.³⁰ The capital was the newly founded Olynthus that briefly issued coins in its own name too. But much more important are the federal issues in silver and bronze (more rarely gold on the Attic standard) which were produced between 432 and 348. Based on a 'Chalcidian' standard of 14.5 grams,³¹ the tetradrachms are an important silver coinage for this region (plate 3), which clearly reflects the economic and political role of the league.

The principal types feature a head of the god Apollo or his *kithara*. The changed power relations after the accession of Philip II in 359, with the annexation of Chalcidice by the Macedonian kingdom, removed the league's reason for existing. Olynthus was taken by Philip in 348 and razed to the ground.³² But in two ways the coinage of the league influenced that of its conqueror. Firstly, Philip II adopted the image showing Apollo for his gold coinage. And secondly, for his gold staters he chose the Attic, that is the heavier, weight-standard which had been used by the Chalcidian League, and so he continued the tradition of using two standards for gold and silver. The role previously played by the coins of the league was now taken over by the Macedonian royal money.

A special case is Philip's actions towards the city of Crenides/Philippi. Following the discovery of gold deposits in the area, Thasian

settlers in 360 had created a settlement, Datas, at a place known as Crenides (the springs; cf. Strabo 7.41). They issued gold staters on the Attic standard and bronze coins. These bear the name of ‘the Thasians of the mainland’ (ΘΑΣΙΟΝ ΗΠΕΙΡΟ). Philip II took the city under his protection in 356 (Diod. 16.8.6) and renamed it ‘Philippi’ (Philippi) after himself. Its citizens now enjoyed a special status and privileges, possibly as late as 168, mainly because of their friendly welcome to their new protector. Not only was the city allowed (for a few years only) to strike coins in its new name and with the old types (Heracles/tripod), but also in doing so to issue once again Attic staters in gold together with tetradrachms and smaller denominations based on the Chalcidian standard. Though of small scale, Philippi produced a coinage that served as a model for Philip’s creations of a parallel silver and gold currency and the later adoption of the same bimetallism from the Chalcidian League. In any regard – the existence of a gold coinage and the striking of coins in general – Philippi represents a rare, though temporarily isolated, case of civic coin production in late classical Macedonia.³³

Amphipolis (meaning ‘surrounded city’ – that is, by the Strymon) presents another example of a city’s development during the fifth and fourth centuries. Founded by Athens in 437 to replace Ennea Odoi, its citizens changed their allegiance in 422 when they surrendered the city to the Spartan Brasidas and were soon successful in gaining full independence from both Spartan and Athenian supremacy. Amphipolis struck coins presumably from about 370 onwards when Athens again threatened to retake its former colony, and it used the Chalcidian standard not only for economic reasons but also as a strong reminder of its political agenda. In order to gain support from Athens in this period even the city’s name on the coin was allegedly changed from the East Ionic to the Attic dialect (from ΑΜΦΙΠΟΛΙΤΕΩΝ [*Amphipoliteôn*] to ΑΜΦΙΠΟΛΙΤΩΝ [*Amphipolitôn*]). Iconography may also have been used to this end as the characteristic head of Apollo on the obverses in this critical period was modelled on the representation of this god from the Parthenon at Athens (plate 4).³⁴ The civic coinage was continued under Philip II for a few years and terminated in about 353. As at Philippi, the continuation of coin production under Macedonian rule very much gives the impression of being a test field for Philip’s monetary policy leading towards the creation of a royal coinage in gold and silver, which was only achieved as ‘late’ as about 348. The well known coins of Amphipolis for the time being served Philip’s interests and as a suitable form of currency. Therefore the discussion of the inauguration of Philip’s Macedonian types is closely linked to the monetary policy in these two, now Macedonian, cities.³⁵

4 The Kings³⁶

The first Argead king to issue coins was Alexander I (498 – 454). The power vacuum which occurred in the north after the end of the Persian wars and a policy of beating back the tribes allowed him, at least for a few decades, to exploit the metal deposits which had previously been under their control.³⁷ Herodotus reports (5.17) that Alexander extracted a talent a day from the mine at Lake Prasias by the mountain Dysoron. His coins are clearly designed on the model of the contemporary and slightly earlier tribal issues and show on the obverse the king on horseback. Alexander also issued octodrachms (plate 1), tetradrachms³⁸ and fractions, but in two different weight-standards. The octodrachms at about 28 grams match those of the tribes but the tetradrachms weigh 13 grams. Each of these two denominations have tetrobols as fractions, though the so-called heavy tetrobols at 2.4 grams are made of good silver and so are genuine fractions of the larger denomination, whereas the so-called light tetrobols at 2.18 grams have a proportion of base metal and so a lower level of purity which can sometimes even be seen with the naked eye.³⁹ The heavy fractions could therefore circulate freely. The light tetrobols, in contrast, were hardly recognized outside Macedonia and so served as token coinage.⁴⁰

While Alexander's coinage thus achieved an impressive complexity and equally impressive quantity of output, that of his son Perdiccas II (451 – 413) is far less spectacular and is limited to light and heavy tetrobols.⁴¹ Perdiccas' successor Archelaus (413 – 400/399) reformed the coinage too as part of his thoroughgoing modernization of the Macedonian state. He is also the first Argead to include his name on all his coin issues. Archelaus issued so-called staters of 10 – 11 gram weight and soon gave up the tetrobols, whose function as token coinage was now taken over by the newly issued bronze coins. Under his successors down to and including Perdiccas III (365 – 359) all that changes is the details of the imagery. The declining quality of the coinage of these Macedonian kings clearly reflects their shrinking political significance. It is also very clear that the continuing supply of precious metal was limited and that the attempt was therefore made to conserve this valuable resource in domestic trade. This changed with the Macedonian hegemony under Philip II and Alexander III (the Great). As mentioned above, Philip was the first to introduce a bimetallic currency system and issued gold coins on the Attic standard. In contrast to this, the silver coins were produced on the lighter Chalcidian standard like the widely circulated coins of the Chalcidian League.⁴² However, it should be noted that the sources' depiction of Philip as overthrowing the political life of all of Greece by

deploying large sums of money in precious metals extracted from Pangaion (here compare the quotation at the start of the introduction) is only true of the second half of his reign. The new silver coinage (plate 5) was probably begun only around 356 and the famous golden philippics around 348.⁴³ The images on the coins – Apollo, Zeus, horseman and chariot – play cleverly with older Macedonian models (king on horseback), the coin-age of the Chalcidian League (Apollo), the dynasty's claims of legitimacy (Zeus) and the successes of Philip in Olympia (youth on horseback, chariot). A characteristic type of imagery, the rider (plates 1, 5 and 10), has been studied by a number of authors.⁴⁴ In addition, the large number of coins in Philip's name that are extant even today is explained by the posthumous issue of these coin-types that were prized especially in the north. Their popularity in Thrace and the Danube region is also shown by the large number of Celtic imitations.⁴⁵

For Alexander's coinage (plate 6), the following questions have been especially contentious in recent years: Le Rider and Troxell stress the existence of only two principal mints (as opposed to the three proposed by Price) in Macedonia, and argue for a partly revised arrangement of the material, for example on the question of the so-called 'grand Macedonian series' (spanning from about 332 to approximately the turn of the century) and they date the start of Alexander's empire-wide coinage to 333/332 and not 336.⁴⁶ Alexander's new money was based in both metals on the 'international' Attic standard and was produced in his lifetime in 26 mints from Macedonia to Babylon, but only two of these are in his homeland. Alexander's money was therefore able to circulate freely in the entire Mediterranean area and in the east unlike Philip's silver coinage that was limited to the region of northern Greece. The arrival of enormous quantities of silver and gold as a result of Alexander's conquests, as reported in literary sources, is also reflected indirectly in the coin production. It was of course used for financing the army and the increased need for coined money that consequently arose from time to time had an impact on the size of the emission.⁴⁷ A metal analysis of a silver coin struck in Amphipolis shows unambiguously that the precious metal coined here in fact does not come, as we would have expected, from the nearby Pangaion but must derive from various sources as is revealed by its variable gold content.⁴⁸ The image-types Heracles/Zeus (plate 6) and Athena/Nike permit both a Macedonian and a wider 'Greek' reading and so support the Alexander-coinage's function as the money of an empire that now stretched far beyond Macedonia.

Alexander's son Alexander IV and his brother Philip III, with whose deaths in 317 and 309 respectively the Argead dynasty ended, make

no appearance other than through their names on coins of the Alexander-type. Cassander and his sons form a brief episode, issuing silver coins of the Alexander-type but only bronze coins in their own name.⁴⁹ In stark contrast to this are the coins of the new dynasty of the Antigonids that begin with Demetrius Poliorcetes and are characterized by impressive coin-images, such as Demetrius' portrait with bull's horns or the Pan on the coins of Antigonus Gonatas.⁵⁰ Especially Demetrius' coinage stands out both for his inauguration of a divine portrait of a (living) ruler and for the rapid sequence of coin-types issued when he took over Macedonia, and which ranges from posthumous Alexanders to new personal types bearing his portrait.⁵¹ The coins of Philip V and the last king Perseus are the first since Demetrius to show the king's portrait again on the coins.⁵² Philip V also carried out a reform of the coinage with two aspects. As well as issuing a new coin series in widely varying denominations and metals (except gold, which no longer played a role), coins without the king's name were now produced. These either bear the ethnic 'of the Macedonians' or else the name of the Amphaxians or Bottiaeans, residents of two Macedonian districts. The king was therefore trying to strengthen his subjects' identification with the kingdom by strengthening the old districts (*merides*), and so to support the kingdom's economic health.⁵³ However the crisis of the kingdom, which was also economic, in its ever more desperate defence against Roman influence in Greece, is especially clear in the comparison between the first coin series of Perseus (179–168) with his last, from the Third Macedonian War. The latter has lost a full 10 per cent of its weight compared to the earlier series.⁵⁴ With the defeat at Pydna in June 168 the sequence of coins of the kings of Macedonia comes to an end; but their legacy remained influential in the country.

5 The Roman Province of Macedonia

Livy and other ancient authors describe the break-up of the defeated Macedonia into four independent republics (districts or *merides*).⁵⁵ These districts were forbidden from exploiting the gold and silver deposits (this prohibition was lifted in 158; cf. Cassiodorus, *Chronicle on Livy* 47), from trading salt and wood, and from intermarriage between inhabitants of the different republics.⁵⁶ It has now been recognized that this artificial division by Rome goes back to administrative changes under Philip V, which were based in turn on older, locally organized muster-districts from the time of Philip II or Alexander the Great.⁵⁷ The coinage of this period of Roman

dominance from 167, the opening of the mines in 158, and the foundation of the larger province of Macedonia provide the framework for the history of Macedonia in the second century. This, as noted above, is at present undergoing major revisions in the dating and assignment of series and the secure identification of the numismatic material as a whole has not yet been achieved.⁵⁸ Perhaps Livy should be taken literally and the start of coin production be set in 158, but the phrasing used in the Roman prohibition should prompt caution as it forbids the exploitation of resources, but not explicitly the minting of coins. Tetradrachms (plate 7) and didrachms (two-drachma pieces) are issued, mostly in the name of the first *meris* (Amphipolis), less often in the name of the second *meris* (Thessaloniki). The third district (Pella) does not appear and the fourth (Heraklea Pelagonia) issues only bronze coins. The most prominent issue is that of the first *meris*. The imagery in this is purely Macedonian and shows the bust of Artemis on a Macedonian shield; on the reverse the coin is recorded as that ‘of the first [*meris*] of the Macedonians’ (plate 7). It is a comparatively new insight that this series was still being produced into the first century.⁵⁹

There is also numismatic evidence for measures taken directly by the Roman administration. The first Roman officials in the area to be turned into the province struck bronze coins featuring their own names. The legends and official titles are Greek (so *tamias* for the Latin *quaestor*) but some of the coins show the head of Roma as well as Poseidon, Athena, Dionysus and Pan.⁶⁰ From the first half of the first century there is an impressive series of tetradrachms with the portrait of Alexander the Great (without diadem) and the depiction of a club, but also of the insignia of a Roman quaestor – that is, for the first time elements of Roman iconography appear prominently, especially the magistrate Aesillas, but also a *SVVRA LEG PRO Q*, and *CAE PR* appear in Latin script. In addition, the Greek ethnic ‘of the Macedonians’ still appears.⁶¹ A study has shown that these coins had the function of keeping the Thracian neighbours to the north quiet especially during the Mithradatic War⁶² and so to secure the sensitive area of the land route between the Balkans and Asia along the Via Egnatia. This also makes clear the character of the province during the Roman republic as a strategically important border region secured by the military. In addition, the circulation of coins in the second and early first century was characterized by the use of the ‘large’ coins of this period: the new style tetradrachms of Athens make up a large part of the finds down to the Sullan period; in addition, there are the large silver coins of Thasos and Maroneia and, more frequently in the eastern, Illyrian part of the province, the coins of Dyrrachium and Apollonia.⁶³ It is only in the second quarter of the century and then

in the civil wars between Caesar and Pompey and the struggle against the tyrannicides that the Roman denarius (25 of this silver coins equal one gold aureus) becomes most common; some series were produced by the opposing sides in the civil war in Macedonia itself.⁶⁴

In the imperial period, in contrast, Macedonia was no longer a border province, apart from the brief episode from Tiberius to Claudius. The significance of the army decreased and from AD 41 or 44 the province was governed by senatorial proconsuls. The emissions now consisted entirely of bronze coins designed for local circulation. These coins were produced by individual cities, Roman colonies in Macedonia and the Macedonian *koinon* (see below), the political body of governance of the Province. Higher-value payments were made using Roman imperial coins (denarii and aurei). From Augustus on, magistrates of the Roman state cease to appear.

The foundation of Roman colonies in Cassandreia, Dium/Dion, Pella and Philippi (that is, in previously existing communities, beginning with Mark Antony in 43/42) is attested except in the case of Dium by coins that refer unambiguously to the foundation.⁶⁵ In part they bear the name of the proconsul responsible, Q. Hortensius Hortalus or the legate Q. Paquius Rufus. There is debate on whether certain series should be assigned to Cassandreia or to Dium.⁶⁶ Except in the case of Pella, the date of which is contested, the legends on the coins are always in Latin, which was the regular, common mark of the coinage of Roman colonies, showing their citizenry as full Roman citizens. Some of the coin-images depict the classic motif of a colony foundation, the founder conducting the ritual ploughing of the city limits or, in abbreviated form, the plough alone; others use images of military standards to refer to the military origin of the first citizens settled there. From Thessaloniki (not a colony) there is a coin jointly issued in the names of Antony and Octavian.⁶⁷ After Antony's defeat, these colonies were refounded by Octavian but there are no coins which refer directly to that event. Subsequently these colonies continued to issue coins, though not without interruption, into the third-century AD and these coins are an important source for the institutions and self-image of these citizen-bodies. The local magistrates (*duumviri quinquennales*), for example, are named on them and references are made to buildings or events in the colony. As well as the colonies (and the *Flavian municipium*, with reduced rights, of Stobi should also be mentioned, which issued coins into the Severan period),⁶⁸ the coinage of the cities made up an important part of the money in circulation. In particular the cities of Thessaloniki and Amphipolis, which had long been of importance and economically remained more significant than the colonies, issued extensive coin series. Like the coins of the *koinon*, these are evidence of the tension

between an identification with Rome and the promotion of a local identity. For example, we find here numismatic references to the cult of Roma, introduced as early as 168 (?), which is also recorded epigraphically in many places in Macedonia. As well as the frequent occurrence of a portrait of the emperor and his family, we also find references to the imperial cult. A cult of Divus Iulius is recorded, for example in Thessaloniki, where the epigraphic record of a temple to him is supported by coins with the portrait of the deified Caesar and Augustus.⁶⁹ In the colony of Philippi, the actual statue group is depicted and direct reference made to the foundation by Augustus (plate 8).⁷⁰ The depiction of Roman Victoria is a similar case.⁷¹ The contrasting aspect of the civic coinage is seen in the increase in local references. Whereas in the first century great restraint can be observed in the use of locally derived iconography, reflecting the traditionally subordinate role of the cities since the days of royal rule, under Hadrian and then again from the Severan dynasty agonistic motifs, for example, appear, or motifs of mythological themes. Examples are the cult of Poseidon in Cassandreia, built on the site of the old city Potidaea, which appears under Commodus, or in Pella the cult of Pan, a god previously associated with the kings (plate 9).⁷²

A third group is formed by the coins of the Macedonian *koinon* (plate 10), the ethnic and cultural association of Macedonian cities.⁷³ This institution first made an appearance numismatically under the last kings and was reorganized in the early empire. From Claudius, coins were once again produced in the name of the Macedonians. Almost all emperors from Claudius (AD 41–54) to Philip the Arab (AD 244–249) are represented. However with Elagabalus (AD 218–222), coins with the emperor's portrait drop in number and are replaced by ones with the portrait of Alexander the Great. The reverses of the coins, previously showing independent motifs like the Macedonian shield, now refer proudly to Alexander or to games in his honour or depict the personification of Macedonia or Athena, Heracles and Dionysus. In this we can clearly see the interplay of a renaissance of 'Macedonian' consciousness, financially significant and prestigious agonistic festivals and the cult of emperor and Alexander in a joint neokoric temple (the term *neocorus* or temple warden highlights the privilege to build a temple for the imperial cult). The independent coinage in Macedonia ended, like the minting activity of other provinces, in the course of the mid-third-century AD; the last coin from a colony was struck in Philippi under Gallienus (AD 253/260–268). The growing inflation and devaluation of the bronze coinage in the course of the 260s AD made its production increasingly uneconomic and removed the economic basis of the cities' coin production. The numerous reforms of Diocletian placed one of the

imperial mints in Thessaloniki, now an imperial residence, and this mint continued to issue imperial coinage into the Byzantine period.⁷⁴

The circulation areas of the civic coinages are normally close to their point of origin. Thus, for example, coins from Dium are found in its surrounding district of Pieria and the same pattern is found with the coins of Cassandreia, Philippi and Amphipolis, which are found primarily in eastern Macedonia. On the other hand, the coins of Thessaloniki are spread throughout the country and so were used as a regional currency.⁷⁵ Along with Thessaloniki, the Macedonian *koinon* provided the greater part of the money in circulation. Its coins are found in central and eastern Macedonia and there they have a strikingly prominent position as regards quantity and circulation, which is an unusual feature in this genre.⁷⁶ In contrast to southern Greece, there are no finds from the imperial period of Roman sesterces, dupondii or asses known from Macedonia, and even denarii and aurei only appear again under M. Aurelius – a clear sign of the province's character as a secure hinterland.⁷⁷

6 Case Study – From Coin to History: Rome, Macedonia and Alexander the Great

A telling insight into the use and circulation of coinage in Macedonia during the early first century is offered by the silver coinage with the types of Aesillas the quaestor (plate 11).⁷⁸ They were issued both in the name of the Macedonians, like earlier and still contemporary coins naming the first and second districts, and in the name of a Roman official, like the tetradrachms with **LEG MAKEDONWN**, as they bear the names and titles of a Quaestor Aesillas – and rarely in addition a **CAE PR** (*Cae... Praetor*) on the obverse or **SVVRA LEG PRO Q** (*Suura Legatus pro quaestore*) taking Aesillas' place on the reverse. The letter *theta* that marks the main body of this coinage most probably names the mint Thessaloniki, while a much scarcer *B* may point at the Bottiaean district and the mint of Pella. The obverse combines the ethnic (which commonly appears on the reverse) with a portrait of Alexander the Great wearing the horn of Zeus Ammon. This type of portrait is reminiscent of the representation of Alexander the Great on the coins of Lysimachus of Thrace, which constitute an important body of coinage in the region from the early third century onwards as they were fixed in form and issued continually down to the first century. The reverse features within a laurel wreath a chair and a

chest as the symbols of the quaestorial office and as a 'national' Macedonian motive the club of Heracles.

A careful recent analysis of the coinage, including a die study and examination of hoard evidence, allowed further insight into the production and use of these coins (and corrected and sharpened earlier views).⁷⁹ Firstly the identification of the obverse and reverse dies allowed the dies used and known to us to be counted properly, which in turn made it possible to group the coins by dies into eight distinct groups. A total of 102 obverse and 378 reverse dies make this coinage a quite important one, but comparison with the annual issues of the new style coins of Athens indicates that this number would only cover the production of eight years. It has been estimated by Bauslaugh that the number of coins produced would be about 1,020,000 or 680 talents. However, these coins were produced not on a regular basis but sporadically when the need arose. The groups identified bear witness to this pattern of coining as Groups I – III show signs of intense production while later groups are of limited activity, with Group VII (with *CAE PR*) though small with a more intense production. This sequence of groups is also confirmed by a gradual shrinking of both weight and diameter. Both hoard evidence and an overstrike of an Aesillas coin by a Lysimachus type tetradrachm of Byzantium confirm the start of their production around 90, and hoards also point to an end of their issue in the late 70s or earlier 60s. This would date the main body of the Aesillas coins to the period of the wars against Mithradates VI of Pontus (three consecutive wars fought 88–85, 83–82, and 74–64), and in addition production patterns confirm that this sequence, as an intense period of striking, would have been followed by a more sporadic one. Coins from the same obverses and reverses as the specimen illustrated here are known from the Siderokastro hoard of 1961,⁸⁰ located about 20 km from the Bulgarian border close to Lake Prasias at the Strymon river in north-eastern Greece.

Although the hoard was quickly dispersed, its reconstruction allowed for the identification of an important find of coins with the types of Aesillas and a burial date of about 90. Other hoards originate from present-day Bulgaria and hoard evidence does indeed show a very restricted area of circulation in the regions of Bulgaria and northern Greece. The conditions of the coins buried, and especially their low grade of wear, makes it very clear that the coins did not circulate for a long period but were taken out of circulation shortly after their issue, and some coins (and a higher proportion than is known for the New Style coinage of Athens) were even holed and thereby turned into jewellery. This points to a very specific use and function for these coins and a deliberate production aiming at a

precisely defined political agenda. The coins with the types of Aesillas were issued to pacify those Thracian tribes during the Mithradatic wars that were living in the regions neighbouring the Via Egnatia, Rome's strategic connecting road from Dyrrachium through Macedonia to the harbours and ports which were the starting points for the passage into Asia. This historical period of critical military conflict is the context within which this coinage belongs and is what it was created for. The dating of groups in fact allows the identification of the *SVVRA LEG PRO Q* as Q. Braetius Sura, who served as a legate in Macedonia between 93 and 87. The rare appearance of the letters *SI* (*Surae* or *Senti iussu*) on the obverse has also been taken as referring to either Sura or the governor of about 93–87, C. Senti Saturninus. Aesillas himself remains known only by his name, but a monogram on coins from Thasos, a similar type of coinage from this period, has been identified as an abbreviation of his name, and the same has been the case with Sura.⁸¹ *CAE PR* had been related to L. Iulius Caesar, consul of 64, but the dating of this group into the early 70s would exclude this identification.

The iconography of the coins marks an amazing step away from the traditional types used in the province earlier. The symbols of a Roman financial officer clearly show the source of their production and the choice of a portrait of Alexander the Great even more clearly testifies to a deliberate and quite ingenious decision. Alexander's portrait resembles the one on the coins with the type of Lysimachus and therefore was already familiar especially to the Thracian tribes. In addition Alexander's appearance certainly played to Macedonian national pride and in a way enrolled a national icon into Roman service. But, to stay on the safe side, Aesillas deliberately left out the royal diadem of Alexander that marks his royal rank on the Lysimachi. The former king may now be a god but there was certainly no longer any need for a Macedonian king in a Roman province.

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¹ I am grateful to Bernhard Weisser of the Münzkabinett Berlin and Wolfgang Fischer-Bossert, Berlin, for shared discussion, and to S. Psoma for allowing me to read the manuscript of her forthcoming 'Survey of Numismatic Research 2002 – 2007' on Macedonia, now published as 'Greece from the archaic through to the hellenistic period', in M. Amandry and D. Bateson (eds.), *A Survey of Numismatic Research 2002 – 2007* (Glasgow 2009), pp. 46-64, especially pp. 46-53. The English translation is by Orla Mullholland, Berlin.

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- ⁶ The fact that the historical sources are largely silent about the tribes reflects also a lack of interest on the part of ancient authors more engaged with Greek concerns.

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- ⁸ Cf. O. Picard, 'Monnayages en Thrace à l'époque achéménide', in O. Casabonne (ed.), *Mécanismes et innovations monétaires dans l'Anatolie achéménide. Numismatique et histoire* (Istanbul 2000), tables on pp. 243–4 for references.

- ⁹ Picard, 'Monnayages en Thrace à l'époque achéménide', p. 246, reminds us of Herodotus' own statement at 5.3 on the confusing variety of these tribes' names.

- ¹⁰ This term is used for any main denomination within a state, for example the tridrachm at Corinth or the tetradrachm at Athens, but also today for the main gold coin, for example of Philip II and Alexander the Great. For names of coins used in antiquity, see the index of J.R. Melville Jones, *Testimonia Numaria* (London 1993).

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¹³ Such as coins of the Derrones with triskeles on the reverse: Price and Waggoner, *Archaic Greek Silver Coinage*, p. 29; and also among the Orescii the form of the incusum can provide indications of the chronological sequence: Price and Waggoner, *Archaic Greek Silver Coinage*, p. 34. See also Kraay, *Archaic and Classical Greek Coins*, p. 141 n. 3.

¹⁴ Price and Waggoner, *Archaic Greek Silver Coinage*, p. 39, M.J. Price, 'Coinages of the Northern Aegean', in I. Carradice (ed.), *Coinage and Administration in the Athenian and Persian Empires*, BAR International Series 343 (1987), p. 44.

¹⁵ Y. Yourukova, 'Sur les monnayage des tribus Thraces', in M. Amandry and S. Hurter (eds.), *Travaux de numismatique Grecque offerts a Georges Le Rider* (London 1999), p. 436.

¹⁶ This view is supported by exclusively Derronian coin finds in Bulgaria: Kraay, *Archaic and Classical Greek Coins*, p. 141 n. 2, Yourukova, 'Sur les monnayage des tribus Thraces', pp. 435–8.

¹⁷ The Bisaltae may have relied on the mines of the Dysoros region instead: see below.

¹⁸ See Kraay, *Archaic and Classical Greek Coins*, p. 140.

¹⁹ The coins bear the name and title of Edonian king Getas who is not known from literary sources: M. Tatscheva, 'GETAS

HDONEON BASILEYS', in U. Peter (ed.), *Stephanos Nomismatikos. Edith Schönert-Geiss zum 65. Geburtstag* (Berlin 1998), pp. 613 – 26.

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²² See now D. Paléothodoros, 'Le «Satyre et le Ménade thasiens». Étude d'iconographie numis-matique', in M.B. Borba Florenzano et al. (eds.), *Liber amicorum Tony Hackens* (Louvaine-la-Neuve 2007), pp. 143 – 51 and J.G.F. Hind, 'Centaur, Satyr and Nymphs on the Early Silver Coins of Thasos and the Tribes of Mount Pangaion', *NC* 161 (2001), pp. 279 – 82.

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²⁸ O. Picard, 'Les monnaies au bouc attribuées à Aigai', *Bulletin de la Société Française de Numismatique* (1995), pp. 1071–5. C.C. Lorber, 'The Goats of "Aigai"', in S. Mani Hurter and C. Arnold-Biucchi (eds.), *Pour Denyse. Divertissements numismatiques* (Bern 2000), pp. 113–33, advocates an attribution to the Mygdones or Krestones, while S. Psoma, 'Les «boucs» de la Grèce du Nord. Problèmes d'attribution', *RN* 159 (2003), pp. 227–42, suggests Galepsus.

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³⁰ On the history of this league and its coinage, see D.M. Robinson and P.S. Clement, *Excavations of Olynthus IX: The Chalcidic Mint and the Excavation Coins found in 1928–1934* (Baltimore 1938), U. Westermark, 'The Coinage of the Chalcidian League Reconsidered', in A. Damsgaard-Madsen et al. (eds.), *Studies in Ancient History and Numismatics presented to R. Thomsen* (Aarhus 1988), pp. 91–103 and S. Psoma, *Olynthe et les Chalcidiens de Thrace* (Stuttgart 2001). From 379 onwards, they also bear the names of magistrates. The chronological sequence of these groups has been revised by P.S. Clement, 'The Chalcidic Coinage: Epilogue', *Ancient Macedonia* 1 (Thessaloniki 1970), pp. 252–5. Arguments against the traditional dates of 432 and 379 have been collected by Lorber, *Amphipolis*, pp. 165–75, Appendix 2: the inauguration was possibly around 400 and signed issues only from about 364 onwards. See too Psoma, *Olynthe et les Chalcidiens de Thrace*, pp. 200–3, 249–51.

³¹ J.M.F. May, *The Coinage of Damastion and the Lesser Coinages of the Illyro-Paeonian Region* (Oxford 1939), p. 17, derives this standard from the oldest one at Abdera; cf. his *The Coinage of Abdera (540–345 B.C.)* (London 1966), pp. 22–3 n. 3, while Kraay, *Archaic and Classical Greek Coins*, pp. 136 and 330, favours the 'Phoenician' standard as a model.

³² An event which provided archaeologists with an extraordinarily rich field of research and securely dated coin finds.

See above.

³³ For examples of the coins in question, see A.R. Bellinger, 'Philippi in Macedonia', *ANS Museum Notes* 11 (1964), pp. 29–52. See also Lorber, *Amphipolis*, pp. 63–5. For the status of the city, see M.B. Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings* 1, *A Historical and Epigraphic Study* and 2, *Epigraphic Appendix* (Athens 1996), especially pp. 165, 186. T.R. Martin, in his stimulating *Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical Greece* (Princeton 1985), doubted any connection between coinage and sovereignty in view of Philip's tolerance of local mintage in Thessaly. However, other cases such as Ptolemaic Egypt prove this relationship and coinage should indeed be considered and seen 'as one of the media through which this negotiation might take place' (Howgego, *Ancient History from Coins*, p. 40).

³⁴ Type N according to Lorber, *Amphipolis*, pp. 96–7, pl. XIII, figs. 61–3.

³⁵ Lorber, *Amphipolis*, pp. 57–63, O. Picard, 'Deux émissions de bronze d'Amphipolis', *BCH* 118 (1994), pp. 207–14. Critical of Lorber's arrangement is U. Wartenberg, 'Review of C.C. Lorber, *Amphipolis: The Civic Coinage in Silver and Gold* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1990)', *NC* 152 (1992), pp. 193–5. For a group of modern forgeries see *Bulletin on Counterfeits* 22, no. 2 (1997), pp. 6–13. See also Psoma, *Olynthe et les Chalcidiens de Thrace*, pp. 231–7.

³⁶ On the historical background in this and the following sections, see part IV 'History'.

³⁷ On the identification of Dysoron with Menoikion and Alexander's temporary gain of control of the Pangaion area, see O. Picard, 'Mines, monnaies et impérialisme: Conflits autour du Pangée (478–413 av. J.–C.)', in A.M. Guimier-Sorbets, M.B. Hatzopoulos and Y. Morizot (eds.), *Rois, cités, nécropoles. Institutions, rites et monuments en Macédoine* (Athens 2006), pp. 269–83.

³⁸ These are frequently struck from worn and re-cut dies indicating their scarce issue only when need arose. This view is supported by the fact that tetrobols are much more common and only one secure tetradrachm hoard, which was found in

Macedonia, is on record: Thompson, Mørkholm and Kraay, *Inventory of Greek Coin Hoards* 1, no. 365, with U. Wartenberg, 'A Small Group of Tetradrachms of Alexander I of Macedon (CH 9.9)', *CH* 9 (2002), pp. 85–6.

³⁹ C.M. Kraay and V.M. Emelus, *The Composition of Greek Silver Coins: Analysis by Neutron Activation* (Oxford 1962), p. 20.

⁴⁰ The number of light tetrobols of Perdiccas II found for example during the excavations of Olynthus is much smaller than the number of heavier ones: Kraay, *Archaic and Classical Greek Coins*, pp. 142–3. See also D. Raymond, *Macedonian Regal Coinage to 413 B.C.* (New York 1953), pp. 142–3, Psoma, *Olynthe et les Chalcidiens de Thrace*, pp. 175–9.

⁴¹ The term 'tetrobol' is well established and commonly used in modern scholarship but is not without problems of its own: Polyaeus, *Stratagemata* 3.10.14, names a pentadrachm (five drachma piece) being used in Macedonia – see S. Psoma, 'Tas palaias pentedrachmias: Un stratagème de Polyen et le monnayage d'argent des rois de Macédoine de 413 à 360 av. J.-C.', *RN* 155 (2000), pp. 123–36 – that is a full unit (stater) made of five drachmas, but the latter are what we actually call light tetrobols: see M.J. Price, *Coins of the Macedonians* (London 1974), p. 20, U. Westermark, 'Remarks on the Regal Macedonian Coinage ca. 413–359 BC', in G. Le Rider, K. Jenkins, N. Waggoner and U. Westermark (eds.), *Kraay – Mørkholm Essays. Numismatic Studies in Memory of C.M. Kraay and O. Mørkholm* (Louvain-la-Neuve 1989), p. 303. G. Le Rider, *Le monnayage d'argent et d'or de Philippe II frappé en Macédoine* (Paris 1977), pp. 359–60, has shown that Philip II's tetrobols were actually a fifth of his 'tetradrachm' and M.J. Price, *The Coinage in the Name of Alexander the Great and Philip Arrhidaeus* (London 1991), pp. 38–9, identifies another example from the civic coinage of Mende. It has also been suggested that the civic coins of Argilus used such a fifth: see W. Fischer-Bossert, 'Review of K. Liampi, *Argilos. A Historical and Numismatic Study* (Athens 2005)', *SNR* 86 (2007), pp. 177–89, especially p. 186.

⁴² Le Rider, *Le monnayage d'argent et d'or*, pp. 354–5 and *Monnayage et finances de Philippe II*, p. 21.

⁴³ For a useful overview of the historical and numismatic debate, see the review of Le Rider, *Monnayage et finances de Philippe II* by

C.C. Lorber, *SNR* 78 (1999), pp. 205–9, especially for further references on the find of inscriptions with sale bills from Amphipolis, on the issue of coins still tolerated at least for few years by the captured city of Amphipolis and on the means of currency Philip may have used prior to the introduction of his silver coins, for example revenues from Thessaly whose hegemon (head) was Philip II, or tribute from Illyria and Paeonia.

⁴⁴ Recently M. Caccamo Caltabiano, ‘Il tipo monetale del cavaliere nell’ottica del Lessico Iconografico Numismatico’, in M. Caccamo Caltabiano, D. Castrizio and M. Puglisi (eds.), *La tradizione iconica come fonte storica. Il ruolo della numismatica negli studi di iconografia* (Reggio Calabria 2004), pp. 17–45.

⁴⁵ For example, D. Allen, *Catalogue of the Celtic Coins in the British Museum* 1 (Cambridge 1987), pp. 24–34 (for Philip) and 34–5 (Alexander-types).

⁴⁶ See G. Le Rider, *Alexander the Great: Coinage, Finances and Policy*, trans. W.E. Higgins (Philadelphia 2007), pp. 8–16, with discussion and references, Price, *Coinage in the Name of Alexander*, pp. 27–9, 85–9, and H.A. Troxell, *Studies in the Macedonian Coinage of Alexander the Great* (New York 1997), pp. 48–50, 86–98. A small series of coins of the types Heracles/eagle belong to the period of Alexander’s accession to the throne. They are, like Philip’s silver, based on the Chalcidian standard and constitute Alexander’s first, though less impressive, coinage: U. Wartenberg, ‘The Alexander-eagle Hoard: Thessaly 1992’, *NC* 157 (1997), pp. 179–88, Le Rider, *Alexander the Great*, pp. 32–7.

⁴⁷ However, Le Rider, *Alexander the Great*, pp. 60–72, presents strong arguments against the so-called Thompson thesis, which attributes the increased production of the mint at Amphipolis to the payment of the 10,000 of Alexander’s veterans who were sent home in 324. Y. Touratsoglou in his ‘Review of G. Le Rider, *Alexander the Great: Coinage, Finances and Policy* (Philadelphia 2007)’ in *SNR* 83 (2004), at pp. 182–4, stresses hoard evidence as proof for the influx of silver coins first to Thessaly and the Peloponnese as payment for veterans from these regions discharged in 330/329.

⁴⁸ N. Kallithratis-Kontos, A.A. Katsanos and Y. Touratsoglou, ‘Trace Element Analysis of Alexander the Great’s Silver Tetradrachms Minted in Macedonia’, *Nuclear Instruments and*

Methods in Physics Research 171 (2000), pp. 342–9. On Alexander's gold, see A. Gondonneau and M. F. Guerra, 'Les statères au type d'Alexandre: apport analytique', *BSFN* 55 (2000), pp. 97–101.

⁴⁹ C. Valassiadis, 'A contribution to Cassander's bronze coinage', in C. Alfaro, C. Marcos and P. Otero, (eds.), *Actas del XIII Congreso Internacional de Numismática, Madrid 2003* 1 (Madrid 2005), pp. 405–13, C. Ehrhardt, 'The Coins of Cassander', *Journal of Numismatic Fine Arts* 2.2 (1973), pp. 25–32, O. Mørkholm, *Early Hellenistic Coinage from the Accession of Alexander to the Peace of Apamea* (Cambridge 1991), pp. 60 and 79.

⁵⁰ E.T. Newell, *The Coinages of Demetrius Poliorcetes* (New York 1927), I. Merker, *The Silver Coinage of Antigonus Gonatas and Antigonus Doson* (New York 1960), pp. 49–60, R.W. Mathisen, 'Antigonus Gonatas and the Silver Coinages of Macedonia circa 280–270 B.C.', *ANS Museum Notes* 26 (1981), pp. 79–124 and 'The Administrative Organization of the Mint of Amphipolis in Early Antigonid Macedonia (c. 280–270 B.C.) II', *Journal for the Society of Ancient Numismatics* 14 (1983), pp. 24–7, 44–6.

⁵¹ For illustrations of these types, see Mørkholm, *Early Hellenistic Coinage*, nos. 170–4, pl. 10. Note especially the gold stater no. 174, whose reverse again features the familiar type of the Macedonian king on horse.

⁵² A later Roman perspective is offered by the representation of a Macedonian helmet with goat horns and the head of Philip V wearing such a helmet on two Roman denarii of the late second century: see M.H. Crawford, *Roman Republican Coinage* (Cambridge 1974), pp. 284–5, 307–8, nos. 259 and 293/1, R.R.R. Smith, *Hellenistic Royal Portraits* (Oxford 1988), pp. 42–3. See also Livy 37.33.2–3.

⁵³ See Mørkholm, *Early Hellenistic Coinage*, pp. 163–5. On the districts see Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions* 1, pp. 231–60. Bronze coins of the cities also appear, for example of Thessaloniki, Pella and Amphipolis.

⁵⁴ The corpus of the royal coinages of these last two kings remains that provided by A. Mammoth, 'Die Silbermünzen des Königs Perseus', *ZfN* 38 (1928), pp. 1–28, 'Die Silbermünzen des

Königs Philippos V. von Makedonien', *ZfN* 40 (1930), pp. 277–303 and 'Die Bronzemünzen des Königs Philippos V. von Makedonien', *ZfN* 42 (1935), pp. 219–51. For a recent study, see F. Burrer, 'Die Tetradrachmenprägung Philipps V. von Makedonien Serie II', *JNG* 59 (2009), pp. 1–70.

⁵⁵ Livy 45.18.3–7, 29.5–11, Diod. 31.8.7–8, Strabo 7.47.

⁵⁶ That is, some of the main sources of income to the Macedonian king, which were leases paid by contractors of the mines, forests and harbour dues: see Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions* 1, pp. 434–5.

⁵⁷ See S. Kremydi-Sicilianou, 'MAKEΔONΩN ΠΙΡΩΤΗΣ ΜΕΠΙΔΟΣ: Evidence for a Coinage under the Antigonids', *RN* 163 (2007), pp. 91–100, with various examples.

⁵⁸ An example is the tetradrachm series with bust of Artemis on a Macedonian shield/LEG MAKEΔONΩN and club: traditionally dated to the context of the Roman embassy of 149, but a hoard now seems to indicate also a date in the early first century: A. Burnett, 'Aesillas. Two New Hoards', *CH* 7 (1985), pp. 54–67, especially p. 58, is not uncontroversial; see also the extensive bibliography at the relevant entry in *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum*, Greece 4, nos. 978–9.

⁵⁹ I. Prokopov, *The Tetradrachms of First Macedonian Region* (Sofia 1994), p. 21, Kremydi-Sicilianou, 'Evidence for a Coinage under the Antigonids', p. 92 n. 5, *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum*, Greece 4, nos. 974–7.

⁶⁰ See H. Gaebler, *Die antiken Münzen von Makedonia und Paionia. Die antiken Münzen Nord-Griechenlands* 3.1 (Berlin 1906), pp. 65–9, nos. 197–212, P.A. MacKay, 'Bronze Coinage in Macedonia, 168–166 B.C.', *ANS Museum Notes* 14 (1968), pp. 5–13 and 'The Coinages of the Macedonian Republics, 168–146 B.C.', in B. Laourdas and C. Makaromas (eds.), *Ancient Macedonia* 1 (Thessaloniki 1970), pp. 256–64, K. Liampi, 'Die Einführung des Kultes des Zeus Eleutherios in Makedonien', *Ath. Mitt.* 17 (2002), pp. 216–17, T.R.S. Broughton, *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic* 1 (New York 1951), pp. 461–6 still relies on Gaebler, *Antiken Münzen von Makedonia und Paionia* and dates to 148/146. There is no reference in the supplement volumes.

⁶¹ R.A. Bauslaugh, *Silver Coinage with the Types of Aesillas the Quaestor* (New York 2000), especially pp. 111–15, who intriguingly shows how a die-study and analysis of this coinage's development can change our view of the sequence – for example of the magistrates named above and the function of this series. See section 6, 'Case Study', this chapter, below.

⁶² The numismatic legacy of this conflict was analysed by F. de Callataÿ, *L'histoire des guerres mithridatiques vue par les monnaies* (Louvain-la-Neuve 1997).

⁶³ See Y. Touratsoglou, *The Coin Circulation in Ancient Macedonia* (Athens 1993), p. 37. Athens: M. Thompson, *The New Style Silver Coinage of Athens* (New York 1961). Note the lower chronology that is now accepted: O. Mørkholm, 'The Chronology of the New Style Silver Coinage of Athens', *ANS Museum Notes* 29 (1984), pp. 29–42, C. Habicht, 'Zu den Münzmagistraten der Silberprägung des Neuen Stils', *Chiron* 21 (1991), pp. 1–23. Thasos: I. Prokopov, *Die Silberprägung der Insel Thasos und die Tetradrachmen des "thasischen Typs" vom 2. – 1. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* (Berlin 2006). Maroneia: E. Schönert-Geiss, *Die Münzprägung von Maroneia* (Berlin 1987). For the role of Apollonia and Dyrrachium, see M.H. Crawford, *Coinage and Money Under the Roman Republic: Italy and the Mediterranean Economy* (London 1985), pp. 224–5 and A. Burnett, 'The Coinage of Roman Macedonia', in P. Adam-Veleni (ed.), *To Nomisma sto Makedoniko Choro*, *Obolos* 4 (2000), pp. 89–91 n. 7.

⁶⁴ For these coins in general, see Crawford, *Roman Republican Coinage*, for coins possibly minted within Macedonia, for example nos. 484 and 508.

⁶⁵ Cassandreia: A. Burnett, M. Amandry and P. Pau Ripollès (eds.), *Roman Provincial Coinage 1, From the Death of Caesar to the Death of Vitellius (44 BC – AD 69)*³ (London/Paris 2006), no. 1511. Pella: Burnett, Amandry and Pau Ripollès, *Roman Provincial Coinage 1*, nos. 1545–7. Philippi: Burnett, Amandry and Pau Ripollès, *Roman Provincial Coinage 1*, nos. 1646–9 (for example, with abbreviated legend *A I C V P* = *Antoni iussu colonia victrix Philippensis* and the legate's name followed by *C D* for *coloniam deduxit* or *colonia deducendae*). On Hortalus, see S. Kremydi-Sicilianou, 'Quintus Hortensius Hortalus in Macedonia (44–42 BC)', *Tekmeria* 4 (1998–9), pp. 61–76, who assigns Hortalus to Caesar and dates accordingly to 44 BC.

⁶⁶ Burnett, Amandry and Pau Ripollès, *Roman Provincial Coinage* 1, nos. 1509 – 10.

⁶⁷ Burnett, Amandry and Pau Ripollès, *Roman Provincial Coinage* 1, no. 1551.

⁶⁸ A. Burnett, M. Amandry and I. Carradice (eds.), *Roman Provincial Coinage* 2, *From Vespasian to Domitian*/(AD 69 – 96) (London/Paris 1999), nos. 301 – 12.

⁶⁹ IG 10.2.1 no. 31 and Burnett, Amandry and Pau Ripollès, *Roman Provincial Coinage* 1, nos. 1554 – 5. See also Y. Touratsoglou, *Die Münzstätte von Thessaloniki in der römischen Kaiserzeit* (Berlin 1988), pp. 10, 140 – 4, nos. 1 – 88.

⁷⁰ Burnett, Amandry and Pau Ripollès, *Roman Provincial Coinage* 1, no. 1650. See numbers 1653 – 5 for similar reverse-types under Claudius and Nero.

⁷¹ S. Kremydi-Sicilianou, ‘Victoria Augusta on Macedonian Coins. Remarks on Dating and Interpretation’, *Tekmeria* 7 (2002), pp. 63 – 84.

⁷² Cassandreia: H. Gaebler, *Die antiken Münzen von Makedonia und Paionia. Die antiken Münzen Nord-Griechenlands* 3.2 (Berlin 1935), p. 53, no. 10, pl. 13.9. Earlier cult of Poseidon at Potidaia: Herodotus 8.129. Pan: Pliny, *Natural History* 35.62. Cf. S. Kremydi-Sicilianou, “‘Belonging’ to Rome, ‘Remaining’ Greek: Coinage and Identity in Roman Macedonia”, in C. Howgego, V. Heuchert and A. Burnett (eds.), *Coinage and Identity in the Roman Provinces* (Oxford 2005), pp. 95 – 106, especially p. 105.

⁷³ The basic reference for this material is still Gaebler, *Antiken Münzen von Makedonia und Paionia* 3.2. An updated analysis of production patterns and circulation is provided by K. Liampi, ‘Die Münzprägung des makedonischen Koinon’, in C. Alfaro, C. Marcos and P. Otero, (eds.), *Actas del XIII Congreso Internacional de Numismática, Madrid 2003* 1 (Madrid 2005), pp. 891 – 901. On *koina* and especially the Macedonian *koinon*, see B. Burrell, *Neokoroi: Greek Cities and Roman Emperors* (Leiden 2004), pp. 2, 191 – 2, 344 – 5.

⁷⁴ C.H.V. Sutherland, *The Roman Imperial Coinage* 6, From

Diocletian's Reform (A.D. 294) to the Death of Maximinus (A.D. 313) (London 1967), p. 501, J.P.C. Kent, *The Roman Imperial Coinage* 10, *The Divided Empire and the Fall of the Western Parts* 395–491 (London 1994), pp. 36–8, P. Grierson and M. May, *Catalogue of Late Roman Coins in the Dumbarton Oaks Collection* (Washington 1992), pp. 67–8, D.M. Metcalf, 'The Minting of Gold Coinage at Thessalonica in the Fifth and Sixth Centuries and the Gold Currency in Illyricum and Dalmatia', in W. Hahn and D.M. Metcalf (eds.), *Studies in Early Byzantine Gold Coinage* (New York 1988), pp. 65–109 and 'Mint Activity in Byzantine Thessaloniki', in P. Adam-Veleni (ed.), *To Nomisma sto Makedoniko Choro*, *Obolos* 4 (2000), pp. 171–82.

⁷⁵ Dium: Kremydi-Sicilianou, "Belonging" to Rome', p. 285 and 'Multiple Hoards of the Second Century AD from the Sanctuary of Zeus Olympios at Dium (Macedonia)', *AJN* 16–17 (2004–5), pp. 93–112. Thessaloniki: Touratsoglou, *Thessaloniki*, pp. 130–4 and *Coin Circulation in Ancient Macedonia*, pp. 41–2.

⁷⁶ Liampi, 'Münzprägung des makedonischen Koinon', pp. 899–901.

⁷⁷ Touratsoglou, *Coin Circulation in Ancient Macedonia*, p. 38.

⁷⁸ See Howgego, *Ancient History from Coins*, H.B. Mattingly, *From Coins to History*, and for the results presented here Bauslaugh, *Silver Coinage*.

⁷⁹ Bauslaugh, *Silver Coinage*.

⁸⁰ Thompson, Mørkholm and Kraay, *Inventory of Greek Coin Hoards* 1, no. 642.

⁸¹ See now also Prokopov, *Silberprägung der Insel Thasos*, pp. 57–8.

PART III

Macedonia and Macedonians

The Physical Kingdom

Carol G. Thomas

1 Introduction

To understand the physical kingdom of Macedonia we should remember the words of a doyen of Macedonian studies who knew the region as an inveterate walker and as a participant in the allied war efforts of World War II: 'Our first need,' wrote N.G.L. Hammond, 'is to define Macedonia not as a political area but as a geographical entity.'¹ To Hammond, Macedonia's geographical identity was a causal factor in its political form(s).

From antiquity to modern times the resources and location of the region made Macedonia a principal highway through it and, all too often, into the area with the goal of permanent occupancy.² Situated at the node of connections between both north/south and east/west, Macedonia can be described as a middle ground. Early humans entered Greece from Europe and from Anatolia. The migratory route of the European stock was by land through the Balkans into Macedonia and then, for some, southward. The Neolithic settlements in Macedonia and Thessaly seem to have been accomplished by gradual landward movement out of Anatolia and across the northern Aegean. ³ Recent study of the flooding of the Black Sea about 8,400 years ago suggested that early farmers in Macedonia and Northern Greece were refugees from that region.⁴ In the Bronze Age, Mycenaean Greeks and their products would push northward into Macedonia as would the colonizing Greeks beginning in the ninth and eighth centuries. Incursions of peoples west of the Pindus range, which were common in prehistoric times, continued to be all too frequent; from the east, Thracian tribes advanced westward, and early in the fifth century the Persians found Macedonia to be a useful point from which to advance into Greece. In fact, more recent times

demonstrate the same middling position of the region.

The region is also a middle ground in its location as a transitional zone between European and Mediterranean physical features and climatic conditions. The Balkan Mountains exercise a dominating influence, creating a barrier between the north and south. On the other hand, the coastal region of the Aegean is affected by the nature of the sea as well as winds arising in the southern Mediterranean.

Three principal masses of air regulate the climate. Polar maritime winds from the north of Europe bring cold winds, often bitterly so, and low temperatures in the winter months, and snow remains on the higher plateaus for two to three months and for much longer on the mountain peaks. Quite different are the winds originating in the south: the tropical winds from the Mediterranean bring heat in the summer and warm, dry conditions in winter. The region's situation in the path of these distinctly different forces creates other consequences of a middle-ground position, especially noticeable in the confrontation between the masses of air. The Etesian winds (named after their yearly appearance, *etos*) arrive in summer. After beginning with 5–10 days of clear, fresh conditions, storms erupt, especially in the mountains, but yield to the arrival of tropical winds from the south. Initially the southerly winds produce 2–4 days of hot, dry weather which vanish in destabilization resulting in 10–15 days of storms. 5

During the winter months rainfall – or snow in the higher regions – is heavier in the north than it is further south and winter conditions linger into early spring. Brilliant sunshine on the slopes of Mount Olympus belies the freezing temperatures well into April. When Xenophon was in the northern Aegean in winter, he learned that water and even wine froze in their vessels and that many men suffered from frostbitten noses and ears (*Hell.* 7.4). Enduring winter in the high Pindus massif in 1943 taught Nicholas Hammond ‘the meaning of “the cold which kills the birds”’. 6 Summers in the lower lying plains can be equally daunting due to the opposite level of temperatures with heat climbing above 40 °C (104 °F). It is not surprising that the severity of seasonal conditions fostered transhumance at the end and the beginning of winter.

Only by appreciating its status as a middle ground in these several respects could Macedonians turn geographical features into an asset to reverse the region's role as a highway without any tolls. The same perception could eventually assist an Argead king in fostering Macedonia's ‘meteoric rise [...] to the position of a great power’. 7 Accomplishing this reversal took time – about three and a half centuries. Consequently, the physical form of the kingdom had different configurations from its origin to the dimensions it assumed during the reign of Philip II (359–336). It is useful to move

chronologically in step with the expansion while emphasizing the physical features that persisted throughout Macedonia's early history.

2 Creating a Kingdom

The region known as ancient Macedonia has attracted permanent settlers from early Neolithic times but the people recognized as the ancestors of Philip II were late arrivers, migrating into what would become the core of the kingdom in the seventh century BC. ⁸ These newcomers are remembered as coming from Orestis on the eastern slopes of the Pindus range (Diod. 7.15, Marsyas, *FGrH* 135–6). On moving toward the Thermaic Gulf, Thucydides 2.99.2-3 reported that:

Alexander, father of Perdiccas, and his forebears first settled and ruled a Macedonia alongside the sea, having driven by battle the Pierians from Pieria who later occupied Phagres and other places below Mount Pangaeum beyond the Strymon river. (Even now the land beneath Mt. Pangaeum up to the sea is called the Pierian Gulf.) And they also drove the Bottiaians from the region called Bottiaia; they now live as neighbors of the Chalcidians.

The expanded core consisting of Pieria and Bottiaia was a strip along the Thermaic Gulf of the Aegean extending some 60 miles north to south with variable breadth due to both the physical features of the region and the nature of its relations with neighboring peoples. Stretching along the coast of the Thermaic Gulf, the region was lower lying than the lands to the west, south, and north which reach increasingly to higher altitudes first as hills, then lower mountains and then as lofty mountain peaks. These mountains and the rivers that run through them defined the other boundaries. Thus the core is known as Lower Macedonia and it would continue to define the center of the kingdom even as it assumed greater dimensions.

French scholars have provided a graphic word picture of a region defined by three horizontal lines: looking inland, the furthest line is a backdrop formed by the mountain massifs with their steep slopes standing behind a second horizontal line of hills whose gentle slopes descend toward a central depression or toward the coast while the front line is dominated by flood plains or by lakes – and we should add marshes. ⁹This French study examines eastern Macedonia, east of the Axios (Vardar) river, which was not part of the original core of the Argead kingdom of Macedonia. However, as we shall see, it was akin in landscape to the original core of Macedonia, thus providing an image applicable to western Macedonia as well as *Macédoine orientale*. Shaping it all was the interplay between the two main physical

features: rivers and mountains.

3 Rivers

The two great rivers systems of the Haliacmon and the Axios serve as the boundaries of the original core of the kingdom encompassing Pieria and Bottiaea. But since they extend far beyond those two regions they were also major routes into and beyond Lower Macedonia. The Haliacmon rises in the high Boion Mountains, then covers 297 km in moving toward the sea traveling more or less westward from the high Pindus massif separating Pieria and Bottiaea. The watershed of the Axios is in the Sar Mountains of the central Balkans; its course to the sea west of Thessaloniki is 420 km. Both rivers have numerous tributaries that carry water to regions along the main routes. These systems are characterized by their relationship with the mountains: over much of their distance from the watershed to the coast they course through deep gullies with precipitous slopes. Recounting Alexander the Great's return from Illyria in 335, Arrian describes the withdrawal through 'narrows bounded between the river and the exceedingly high mountain so that his soldiers could proceed only four abreast' (1.5.12). Inasmuch as the main rivers are perennial most human traffic passes by way of high ledges along the sides of the gorges through which the water runs. Only when the flow of water is less in the summer or, in the case of tributaries, when the beds are dry can travelers move along the beds themselves. This general configuration of the beds in deep, narrow gullies will inhibit the establishment of settlements along their waters.

Two other rivers assist in defining the core. The Ludias river, flowing between the Axios and the Haliacmon, has a far shorter course but it became extremely significant as the location for a new center of the kingdom established toward the end of the fifth century. Located about 24 km upstream, the site of Pella had the advantage of access to the sea without being exposed to attack from the sea. ¹⁰ Thessaly, rather than Macedonia, claims the Peneus river and its tributaries; thus it serves as something of a boundary between Macedonia and Greece. Rising in the Pindus Mountains, the course runs for 205 km between the Olympus and Ossa massifs before reaching the coast.

When the kingdom of Macedonia expanded beyond its original core it would gain two other river systems east of the Axios. The Echedorus (Gallikos) reached the Thermaic Gulf on the west of the Chalcidice peninsula traveling from Mount Dysoron some 65 km, to the north. The Strymon (Struma) entered the sea east of that peninsula

after moving from the Rhodope Mountains in Thrace over 415 km. The larger rivers are perennial thanks to the rain and snow-bearing winds. The annual discharge of water from the Axios now is 4.56 million m³; since controls have been created to manage the flow, the discharge in antiquity is likely to have been even greater.

The rivers' water not only irrigated lands through which they passed but also settled in natural basins as perennial lakes from the upper reaches like the Lake of Cerkinitis near the Bulgarian border and Lake Kastoria near the headwaters of the Haliacmon. Pouqueville, a traveler in the early nineteenth century, was clearly impressed by Lake Kastoria, which although relatively small – some 13 km in length and 11 km in breadth – was appealing for its woods, gardens and villages along the shore and the rocky hill on its west spewing springs and rivulets. The depth of the water varied from 1 to 11 m on its mud bottom which was 'continually augmenting by the substances introduced from the surrounding hills'. ¹¹

Pouqueville encountered many similar lakes in his travels leading up and down river routes. If traveling in later spring the waters would be high due to the heavy rainfall and melting snow – sufficiently high to cause inundations in the plateaus and valleys interspersed in the mountains and lower hills.¹² In cases where the waters of two major rivers were in flood vast regions would be inundated. The plain of Emathia stretching between the Haliacmon and the Ludias rivers could be fertile agricultural land but only when drained, as Philip II is said to have managed early in his rule (Theophrastus, *Caus. Pl.* 5.14.6). As the rivers approached the coastal plain, they would deposit water and sediment sufficient to create marshland. During the dry summer months, heat would evaporate some of the water.

Blessings of the rivers were numerous, so much so that, in antiquity, they were regarded as favored haunts of the gods. As the Chorus in Euripides' *Bacchae* asks Dionysus where he carries his *thyrsos* (560–75), it is:

In the heavy-forested dens of Olympus
Where Orpheus assembled the trees
And the wild beasts with the music of his lyre.
O blessed Pieria,
Euioi honors you coming with his Bacchae to dance
Leading his whirling Maenades across the Axios,
Father of the Ludias,
Axios who brings prosperity to mortals

When regions were drained after long-standing inundations they had accumulated rich diluvial and alluvial soil valuable for growing a wide variety of crops and also for pasturage for sheep, cattle, goats and horses. In addition to water and soil, rivers and lakes were homes of such an abundance of fish that, if we believe Herodotus, traps lowered into the water were very quickly filled with fish. So great is the supply of fish that they are fed to horses and pack animals Herodotus reports (5.16.4). Even today the Haliacmon contains 33 fish species, thus suggesting that claim is valid. Inasmuch as similar conditions existed throughout the larger region, a high degree of self-sufficiency was possible.

On the other hand, waterways allow interconnections along their courses. In Macedonia they are the natural paths for movement of goods – timber from the higher ranges, for instance, as well as metals like the bits of gold still found in the sands of the Echedorus (Gallikos) river. As noted above, they are also paths for people traveling between regions of Macedonia. The Axios is ‘le grand axe de circulation des Balkans, principale voie de commerce terrestre’; 14 the Haliacmon corridor between two mountain ranges provides access from the Pindus massif southeasterly into Elimeia then northeasterly to the Thermaic Gulf between Pieria and Bottiaea. On reaching the coast, the rivers produce marsh-land which, together with the absence of harbors suitable for large vessels, are impediments to large settlements.

In those settlements that did exist the waters of the rivers created serious problems for those who lived near them. As mentioned above, flooding was often sudden as it is even today. In addition to destruction of crops, animals and human life, water accumulated in the low-lying marshes made them breeding grounds for disease, especially malaria (see pl. 12). In modern times malaria is common in these marshy areas and skeletal remains from antiquity have been seen as evidence for the existence of the malaria parasite then. 15 While the evidence is not conclusive, Borza reaches the sensible conclusion that ‘if we accept the notion that malaria was endemic in Greece at least by the fifth century – whatever its origin – and we believe that the Macedonian environment was as conducive to the affliction then as in modern times, we have little reason to doubt that it was a factor in Macedonian history’. 16 Dealing with the diseasebearing regions produced a further consequence in the labor required to drain such large areas as Lake Ludias. As Borza reports, a similar project stretched over two decades in the twentieth century

4 Mountains

Mountains are a second defining feature of Macedonia for massifs surround almost the entire central plain and they mark the edge of the kingdom. A vivid image of their prominence is that of the edges of a fan with its hinge at Thessaloniki: viewed from above, mountains form the outer edge. 18 In fact, the majority of the territory of the kingdom created by Philip II is over 600 m and many of the peaks reach from 2000 to 3000 m.

To the west the Pindus range is a southern extension of the Dinaric Alps traveling through the territory of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and Albania down to the Gulf of Corinth. Smolikas is the highest peak at 2,637 m in a range that has, even today, few passes between the lower lying plains to the west and the east. To the north the Barnous and Babuna massifs are similarly imposing: a peak in the Barnous range reaches 2,524 m while one in the Babuna extension is 2,540 m. Although well beyond the original core of Macedonia, the Thracian massif pushes westward. In the south, the Cambounian and Pierian mountains stretch into Pieria while the peak of Mount Olympus at 2,917 m was a suitable home to only the Olympian deities.

Forests were one of the gifts of the mountains and until 4,000 years ago large amounts of the Balkans and Greece were heavily forested. While Greece began to lose much of its forest in the Bronze Age, Macedonia retained its trees, 19 a situation producing another consequence of Macedonia's attraction to its southern neighbors. Even today it is estimated that approximately a fifth of the region of ancient Macedonia is forested. Alpine ecosystems prevail near the mountain peaks; lower down the slopes, pine trees grew, and oak, fir, and cedar dominated even further down. Amongst these more common varieties grew trees that provided special resources. The cornel, a species of dogwood, for example, proved well suited for the Macedonian weapons although probably not the long spear, the sarissa. 20

Forests also afford food and shelter for animals and Macedonian forests were no exception in antiquity. The wide range of wild animals included both harmless creatures such as the red and roe deer and fearsome species including wild boars and wild bulls or aurochs, brown bears, wolves, lynx, panthers, leopards and lions. Macedonian lions made Xerxes' encampment in Macedonian difficult since, as Herodotus records, 'lions coming down regularly at night and leaving

their usual haunts attacked no beast of burden or man other than the camels' (7.125).

Domesticated animals also benefited from the mountain ranges that provided excellent summer pastures for flocks of sheep and goats. Much of the population of the northern and western regions of Macedonia was pastoral from prehistoric times into the fourth century. When Hammond trekked through the Pindus range before World War II he discovered the same pattern of transhumance in April and October and also material evidence that routes used by the Vlachs in the twentieth century AD followed those used in antiquity. [21](#)

Mineral resources too were a potential resource. Copper existed in the general proximity of the major river systems; iron was found in the Pierian Mountains, and, while only small amounts of tin were available in ancient Macedonia, both silver and gold were plentiful. In Philip II's time, the king received an annual income of 1,000 talents from the gold mines of Mount Pangaeum alone (Diod. 16.8.6–7). The very rock of the mountains, when quarried, was essential for construction whether of essential structures like fortifications and roads or graceful elements crafted from fine marble.

Smaller ranges protrude from the massifs, pushing their fingers and resources into more accessible regions. As they descend toward the sea, their height gradually declines, except of course for Mount Olympus. Looking toward the Pindus range from the central core presents a series of heights that separate extensive plains (see pl. 13).

Hammond gives the names of 19 main fertile basins in Macedonia, and their soil provided the main centers of production in antiquity and today. [22](#) A traveler hiking west or north from the central core would encounter layers of similar valleys and settlements that, while varying in types of vegetation, supported both farming and stock breeding. Already in the Neolithic Age, two kinds of wheat as well as barley, lentils, peas and millet were cultivated. Several varieties of fruits were grown, even a sprinkling of olives in the coastal regions. Goats, sheep, pigs, cattle and horses were plentiful. While the lives of inhabitants of the valleys may have been similar, the mountain spurs and the rivers that run through them screened inhabitants of individual valleys from one another. And since each region could be essentially self-sufficient thanks to a mixture of its natural resources it is not surprising to find that regions claimed individual political autonomy. One example may define a kind of commonality within all the separate regions.

To the west of the Haliacmon the ancient site of Aiani is situated in a terrace of sediment forced in the third interglacial age. The level of the rock base has risen to 650 m above sea level while further to the

west, north and east mountains rise to 1,300–1,850 m above sea level. Aiani was centered on the imposing hill of Megali Rachi which ‘gave a view to all points of the compass. Steep slopes on the south and west form small caves before ending in a deep ravine with a small river. [...] On the north and east sides of the hill there are larger plateaus [...]’ ²³ In recognition of its kinship with other settlements in the plateau Aiani was drawn into a larger regional character to become the kingdom of Elimeia. Calculation of its size in antiquity is difficult to determine, for borders were flexible and were set by mountains, rivers and encroachment of neighboring peoples. Nowadays this region is the modern prefecture of Kozani that unites roughly 2,500 square kilometers. Herodotus described the value of the physical features of the region in his account of the travels of the three Temenid brothers who would be the progenitors of the royal family of Macedonia. Having crossed the Haliacmon river ‘they settled near a place known as the gardens of Midas of Gordium, in which uncultivated roses grew, each of them having sixty petals with scent surpassing all others’ (8.138.2). These splendid gardens seem to have been located beneath Mount Bermion, which is largely inaccessible because of its heavy accumulation of snow. The region has kept its renown for production of fruits and flowers as attested by the testimony of a modern expedition (see pl. 14).

Aiani was the starting point of the first historical ride organized by the Archaeological Museum of Aiani and supported by the Hellenic Federation of Traditional Equitation. Sixty horsemen and their mounts converged in Aiani by the Haliacmon with the purpose of following the initial itinerary of the three young Argead brothers as recounted by Herodotus. Leaving Aiani on 4 September, 1996, they headed for the foothills of the Pierian Mountains. A summary of the journey provides a visual picture of the core of ancient Macedonia: ²⁴

The wealth of the Haliacmon river below was easy to see from horseback: the artificial lake created by a modern dam on Haliacmon is not only filled with fish but also generates hydroelectric power enough to provide electricity to a large part of modern Greece. Just as visible were the heavy forested piedmonts of the Pierian range at the altitude of 1,372 meters from where we cross into Pieria. The route is filled with ancient and modern stone and marblerich quarries. An altar near Leukopetra and three Iron Age settlements near Beroia took our breath away. In fact, a two-year anthropological and zoological research project on the finds of these sites proved that as early as the Iron Age, the Pierian and Bermion sites on the banks of Haliacmon were rich in game, and domesticated animals as well as fish.

As we were about to stroll down the path heading to Aigai, the cloud-capped Olympic summits to the south and the equally impressive Bermion were so awe-inspiring that I forgot the rain, the fatigue and the muscle pain from riding non-stop for two days except for a short night's sleep in an abandoned village found at an altitude of 1,463 meters. Well, Herodotus was right again. His description of 60-petal roses in the 'Gardens of Midas' is certainly not an exaggeration. When one reaches the valley it is filled with literally thousands of peach, apricot and cherry tree orchards. There may be no 60-petal roses today, but the fruit orchards bring so much wealth to the local farmers that the region is among the top ten regions with the highest per capita income in Greece.

Although cohesion of individual villages into larger territorial entities became increasingly common in both Lower and Upper Macedonia the pattern of life was not precisely identical even in individual regions due to physical conditions. The three grand types of human activity described for oriental Macedonia in early modern times characterize similar patterns in antiquity. One type of landscape was strongly humanized, cultivated or even urbanized, characteristically situated in a defensive position close to fertile, or potentially fertile, land. A second landscape, essentially that of the slopes of mountains or hills, was degraded or even strongly degraded, boldly marked by the activity of humans but indirectly utilized, for example, as pasture land or harvesting of trees. The other combination of physical factors produced a landscape where the imprint of humans remained secondary. These were rather domains of forests. ²⁵ Thus Alexander the Great's angry speech to his recalcitrant army in 324 rings true (Arr. 7.9.2): ²⁶

When Philip took you on, you were a pack of indigent drifters. Most of you were dressed in skins and grazed on the hills a few sheep, for which you fought – and fought badly – against Illyrians, Triballians and the Thracians on your borders. Philip gave you cloaks to wear in place of the skins and he brought you down from the hills to the plains.

But the description is not completely true, for not all Macedonians were shepherds when Philip was acclaimed king in 359 since, as Alexander continues, 'he made you city-dwellers'. As the description of the three types of landscapes reveals, there was another way of life between the two extremes of pasture land and cities: namely, the villages, like Aiani, that archaeologists have identified in the lower plateaus and hill slopes. In a word, the different modes of life could and did overlap. As we have seen, the physical dividers were porous

even while they served to identify several separate regions in Lower and Upper Macedonia. Largely self-sufficient regions were linked with one another in belonging to main routes of passage that lead from the sea northward to the central Balkans, southward to Greece, westward to the Adriatic, and eastward into Thrace.

5 Expansion from the Core

Given these physical circumstances we can see that interaction occurred and could foster cooperation between neighboring areas. Recognition of a common way of life, fostered by similar physical conditions, that combined sedentary agriculture with transhumant pasturing – likely combined with concern regarding more distant neighbors – helped to create a nominal confederacy of Elimeia, Orestis, Lyncestis and Pelagonia with Lower Macedonia (Pieria and Bottiaea) in the first half of the fifth century during the reign of Alexander I (about 495–454). That Lower Macedonia should be the hub owed at least something to its command of major east/west and north/south routes as well as its direct access to the sea. As their locations testify, the first three regions are immediate neighbors to the core: Elimeia borders Pieria while Orestis and Lyncestis are west of Bottiaea. Pelagonia has an easy, natural access to Orestis and Lyncestis from its situation in the corridor between the mountain range stretching from Illyris toward the Haliacmon and the massif leading from Mount Boras in the north to Mount Bermion in the south, also near the Haliacmon. The Pelagonian plain yields to the good pasture and timber land of Lyncestis in such a fashion that ‘it is difficult to fix the frontier between Pelagonia and Lyncestis’. ²⁷ Another neighbor was Almopia, north of Bottiaea, one of the most fertile places in the region with its basin surrounded by forested peaks. ²⁸ As Thucydides reported the fate of the earlier inhabitants of Pieria and Bottiaea in being driven from their land by the Macedonians, so too he noted that the Almopians were driven from Almopia by Alexander I (2.99.5). ²⁹

Two other regions to the south and west of Pieria have a more ambiguous status in their relation to the original core created in part by their different orientation. The region of Tymphaea lies in the eastern slopes of the Pindus massif southeast of Elimeia, thus standing astride routes to Thessaly and to Epirus. As a result it is often placed in the sphere of Epirus. ³⁰ The second region, Perrhaebia, is also a mountainous region nestled in both the Mount Bournio and Mount Olympus massifs with a southern orientation toward the Thessalian plain. They were not incorporated into the expanding kingdom as

early as Elimeia, Orestis, Lyncestis and Pelagonia were added (see map 2).

Apparently Alexander I was also able to advance into the east of the Axios: as Thucydides reports, ‘the Makedonians also prevailed over other peoples [...] in Anthemus, Crestonia and Bisaltia’ (2.99.6). ³¹ Not only close, the physical character of these areas is a smaller version of the central plain of Lower Macedonia, for the landscapes are characterized by mountains, although not as high, and rivers, albeit not as extensive. The hinterland east of the Axios is separated from the central plain by two low hills and the Echedorus river runs through the plain. Closest to the Axios, the region known as Crestonia is gently rolling as it makes a gradual ascent to Lake Doiran. The area contains a fertile basin as well as a larger expanse of thickly forested high land. On the west side of the Strymon river lived the Bisaltae in a landscape similar to that of Crestonia with mountains such as Kerdyllion that is snow-covered in winter. Even the higher plains have winter snow, although in other seasons they provide good pasture land. Some mountains are excellent sources of metals: Dysorum for silver in the north and Pangaeum for gold in the south. Diodorus 16.8.6-7 says that the potential wealth from Pangaeum was recognized by Philip II who:

went to the city of Grenides and having increased its size with a large number of inhabitants, changed its name to Philippi, giving it his own name, and then turning to the gold mines in the territory, which were very scanty and insignificant, he increased their output so much by his improvement that they could bring him a revenue of more than a thousand talents. And because from these mines he had soon amassed a fortune, he raised the Macedonian kingdom higher and higher to a greatly superior position. ³²

Extensive flat land running along both sides of the Strymon was – and still is – both passable and productive. Mygdonia is south of Crestonia extending from the Axios river to the pass of Redina at the eastern edge of the Chalcidice peninsula. Two large lakes – Koroneia and Bolbe – water the extensive plains surrounding them while the foothills rise to ranges in the south – for example, Mount Cissus at 1,201 m in height – and provide good pastures and access to timber. In the lower lying forests today oak, ash and pine trees prevail; the higher forests contain denser growth of wild pine and fir trees. Obeying the constraints of nature that ‘has placed strictest limits on possible lines of route’, ³³ the main motorway from Thessaloniki eastward still follows the ancient route passing through the lake region of Mygdonia.

The success of Alexander I united the 12 major regions mentioned in this section. However, the inherent force of regionalism, exacerbated by geographical circumstances and self-sufficiency, reasserted itself, collapsing confederation between the time of Alexander I and Philip II. It is important to note that the core from which Philip's kingdom expanded would be the reconfiguration of these same 12 regions.

6 Expansion by 336

Under the leadership of Alexander I (about 495–454), the territory of the kingdom had more than doubled to include 17,200 km²; Philip II extended Macedonian control over 43,210 km², which was more than double its size at the end of the Peloponnesian War (see map 3). ³⁴ The first need was to reconstitute the kingdom created by Alexander I in order to deal successfully with peoples on the borders of that sphere. In fact, the threat of those more distant neighbors surely was a key factor in the new confederation: in 360 or 359 Illyrian troops penetrated into Macedonia where they decimated the Macedonian force. In marching east, the route would carry the Illyrians through the regions of Upper Macedonia. Thus, common danger joined similar geographical conditions in the renewed alliance. The merits of cooperation were demonstrated in 358 when a Macedonian campaign in Illyria brought the defeat of the Illyrian king and 7,000 of his troops.

When the core of 12 regions was again in place attention could look further afield. And it was essential to look into the distance since the larger physical kingdom remained a middle ground drawing others to it and with greater frequency as it achieved control over increased resources in both manpower and materiel. These resources would also be essential in dealing with the Thracians who regularly marched west beyond the Strymon to the Axios. In 429, moving out of the marshland of the Axios, a large Thracian force headed toward Pella but did not reach it (Thuc. 2.99.4).

A degree of physical similarity aided the new expansion as geographical features and climatic conditions from the Adriatic to the Black Sea in the north and in Greece to the south were akin to those of Macedonia as the enlarged Macedonian army campaigned in every direction.

The Adriatic marked the western border of the kingdom under Philip II when Epirus became an ally. That it did not need to be conquered was fortunate for the Macedonians since the region

(modern Albania) has long been virtually unconquerable. The lateness of the alliance can be attributed in large measure to physical conditions that provided a more effective shield than did many of the ranges within Lower and Upper Macedonia. The Pindus range marking its flexible eastern reach has mountains rising 2440 m – the peak of Smolikas is ever loftier at 2,634 m. This massif is one of five parallel ranges running north to south. Rather than a fan a more apt visual image of the region is a gigantic ploughed field: ridges left by the plough are the mountain ranges and the furrows are deep valleys. 35 Although many of the valleys are extremely narrow river beds some serve as routes for people and goods; they terminate, as in other parts of this large northern region, at the sea: the Gulf of Valona in the north and into the Gulf of Arta in the south. 36 As in Macedonia, the mouths of the rivers foster the unwelcome conditions for malaria. The plain of the Acheron, Hammond reports, is ‘an area where benign tertian malaria was endemic and uncontrolled’. 37 The main deep river beds that run through the mountains are the Aous (Vijosë), Arachthus (Arta), Kalamas and Acheron. The Aous is joined at the Albanian-Greek frontier by two large rivers, the ‘Forty-Forder’ (Sarandoporos) and the ‘Cow’s Eye’ (Voïdhomati). 38

Affected by the continental winds, the mountains are often covered with more snow than the Macedonian peaks receive. They are forested – today with beech, sweet chestnut, oak, pine and fir. Within those forests there lived – and still live – wild animals, at present including ibex, fallow deer, boar, lynx, marten, otter, wolf and bear. As in antiquity there is abundant hunting. One also finds today many domesticated animals, especially sheep. Hammond wrote of his hike through Epirus that ‘the Vlach villages of the Pindus range alone owned a million or more sheep, as each village I visited had 30,000 or 40,000 head of sheep on the summer pastures’. 39 Transhumance was practiced in antiquity as it is today. As in Macedonia, the mountains may plunge into gorges or decline into basins and high grasslands although the valleys ‘are squeezed tighter and tighter as one moves from north to south’ while Macedonia’s plains are more open and extensive. 40

As we noted in discussing the western districts of Upper Macedonia, communication between Epirus and Macedonia is aided by some – but not many – routes across the mountains; one later route followed by the Roman Via Egnatia extended from Thessaloniki to Dyrrhachium in northern Albania. A more southerly route led from Lyncestis over a pass between two ranges into the Haliacmon valley then through another pass at a high altitude that is a cleft in the main mountain range, ‘a natural gateway’, to Koritsa in ancient Epirote territory whence the path descends to the coastal plain. 41 While

Alexander III and his troops were on a campaign against the Illyrians in western Lyncestis in 335, he learned that Thebes in Boeotia had revolted. The Macedonians proceeded eastward 'by way of Eordaea and Elimiotis, reaching Thessaly in seven days and Boeotia six days later' (Arr. 1.5–7). Hammond tracks the route through 'Tymphaea, a canton of Epirus, into Perrhaebian territory, then down the tributary of the Titaesius and over the last hills to Pelinna, in Thessaly'. ⁴² It is instructive to note that the Thebans were astonished by the speed of the Macedonian march through such mountainous territory.

The land of the Thracians was eventually drawn into the kingdom of Macedonia by Philip II's conquest of it in the late 340s. One cause of the difficulty can be found in the lack of regionalism in Thrace that had developed in the Macedonian core. Shifting relationships between various tribes led by warrior chieftains fostered a continuing degree of migratory life rather than cohesive territorial configurations.

Thrace, essentially modern Bulgaria, is defined by rivers, seas and mountains as is Macedonia. The Danube marks the northern extent; its tributaries, with the exception of the Iskur, originate in the Balkan mountains and, akin to the major river systems in Macedonia, they both nourish and separate regions as they flow through the valleys, many of them into the Aegean. Depending on the potency of Thracian arms against peoples to the west, the more eastern Strymon or the western Axios river served as marker – not a firm divider since both are porous in places along their long courses – between the two peoples. The Aegean is the southern border as the Black Sea is in the east.

The same landscape that prevails in Macedonia exists in Thrace. Moving south from the Danubian plain two massifs reach horizontally across the region: first the Balkan mountains with a high point of 2,376 m that slope down to plains that gradually rise into the Rhodope mountains with peaks more than 2,900 m. Interspersed in the peaks are basins, some inundated to become lakes, and plateaus. Since the climate is, like that of Macedonia, a mix of continental and Mediterranean forces, the high lands will have snowfall in the winter while the Mediterranean conditions bring dry, hot weather in the summer, particularly to the lower lying areas.

Communication between Thrace and Macedonia is not difficult as the Persians recognized and used to their advantage in 481. As Herodotus recounts, starting from Doriscus, the Persian force crossed the dried-up channel of the Lisus river moving past Greek towns of Maroneia, Dicaea and Abdera where it crossed the Nestus river (7.108–130). Approaching the Strymon, the Pangaeum range was on the right, and beyond the Strymon the army entered Bisaltia, continuing on to Acanthus on the eastern peninsula of the Chalcidice

where the canal had been constructed. The fleet was sent on to the western peninsula while the land force continued through Paeonia and Crestonia to the Echedorus river. When the forces reassembled 'they were so numerous that they occupied the coast from Therme to the Ludias and the Haliacmon rivers' (Hdt. 7.127).

It was there that Xerxes decided to investigate the course of the Strymon and, to do so, he boarded a special Sidonian ship whose crew made its way to the river mouth. Although Xerxes did not pursue his exploration, it would have been possible to travel up the river valley depression to Lake Prasias (some 80 km) and then follow the Kumli tributary either to the Echedorus river to return to the sea or to continue through the Stena Dor Tepe pass into the basin occupied by Lake Doiran. Two routes led into the territory by the Axios river. 43

Macedonians and Greeks to the south had a long history of interaction helped by proximity and the status of Macedonia as a highway. 44 When the Greeks became active colonizers, they gained the status of neighbors along the northern coast of the Aegean and even in the territory of the Macedonian original core at Pydna and Methone. They grew to know one another well though much of the time on hostile terms.

Physical features of Macedonia and Greece were similar although Edson's description of Macedonia as 'larger in scale' than Greece is an apt choice. 45 Macedonian mountains are higher, its river systems greater in scope and in flow of water, it has more lakes, and the shape of the mountains and river beds foster larger regional entities. By contrast, conditions in Greece encourage smaller concentrations of population in tighter space, a situation that gave rise to hundreds of *poleis* in the late Dark Age and early Archaic period. Toward the end of the Dark Age, a rise in population in these small territories, often dramatic in increase, made the more abundant natural resources of Macedonia all the more attractive to many Greek states. The final conquest of the Greeks by Philip II at Chaeronea in 338 and his creation of the League of Corinth in 337 are more understandable when we appreciate not only proximity but also the physical attributes of both regions that are akin but not identical.

7 Conclusion

The form of the kingdom of Macedonia provided the base for the further expansion of Alexander the Great by 334. The destruction of Thebes in 335 had been proper admonition to other appendages to the original core. 46 The story of ancient Macedonia cannot be explained

solely through an account of its physical parameters. On the other hand, that story cannot be properly understood without appreciation of those physical conditions. In systems analysis of cultures two fundamental parameters interact to create the particular features of a culture: the environment and the human population. Humans must come to terms with the nature of the environment in which they dwell since the features of that territory will shape their actions. The physical features of Macedonia were challenging, and they produced in the view of Hippocrates a tough people. Its pivotal location between north and south, east and west, demanded toughness against others who were regularly drawn to the small kingdom. One tool was to unite neighboring peoples who shared similar environments, related life styles and common dangers. It is noteworthy that many of the 12 regions drawn under Macedonian control during the reign of Alexander I also spoke similar languages.

Access to immediate neighbors from Macedonia's original core was available in the configuration of hills and mountains and rivers. Access to peoples beyond the immediate neighbors was less easy although natural routes from Lower Macedonia eastward to Thrace and west to Epirus existed. Thus an understanding of physical configuration is essential to the story of the growth of the kingdom, and we can assume the most of the Argead kings knew the importance of such an understanding.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

The best way to understand the physical character of ancient Macedonia is to see it firsthand due largely to the history of the region as peripheral to the 'true' centers of power. One can also travel with the ancients – Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Euripides, Hippocrates – to see Macedonia through their eyes or follow later travelers' accounts such as F.C.H. Pouqueville, *Travels in Epirus, Albania, Macedonia, and Thessaly* (London 1820). Not a travel account but a detailed description of the region is *A Handbook of Macedonia and Surrounding Territories*, which was compiled by the Geographical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division of the Naval Staff, Admiralty, of Great Britain (London 1918). The physical nature, climate and even major itineraries are largely unchanged from antiquity to the present. N.G.L. Hammond's status as the doyen of the region's geographical entity is demonstrated in all of his writings, perhaps particularly in his *A History of Macedonia* 1, *Historical Geography and Prehistory* (Oxford 1972). E.N. Borza has continued that

tradition in his *In the Shadow of Olympus. The Emergence of Macedon* (Princeton 1990), which is built upon deep familiarity with the land of Macedonia. Many of his articles have been reprinted in C.G. Thomas (ed.), *Makedonika* (Claremont 1995.)

Careful attention to the landscape of *Macédoine orientale* is provided by P. Bellier, R.-C. Bondoux, J.-C. Cheynet, B. Geyer, J.-P. Grélois and V. Kravara, *Paysages de Macédoine* (Paris 1986). Those landscapes are shared by the original core and its eastern extension, and although the book's focus is the Moyen Age the major features that defined the ancient landscape persist to today. J.-N. Corvisier's *Aux origines du miracle Grec* (Paris 1991) offers a comparative account of the settlement, habitat and use of land, and demography of Thessaly, Macedonia and Epirus. *Macedonians: The Northern Greeks*, published by the Archaeological Museum of Thessaloniki (Athens 1996), contains contributions from a number of Greek archaeologists to demonstrate, as J. Vokotopoulou writes in its prologue, that 'the work accomplished by Alexander the Great was not the isolated achievement of an outstanding personality but the product of a long process of evolution similar to that experienced by the other Greeks'.

¹ Hammond, *History of Macedonia* 1, p. 3.

² L. Rey, 'Observations sur les sites préhistoriques et protohistoriques de la Macédoine', *BCH* 40 (1916), p. 257.

³ C. Renfrew, *Archaeology and Language: The Puzzle of Indo-European Origins* (Cambridge 1987), pp. 126–31, 265–73.

⁴ V.A. Dergachev and P.M. Dolukhanov, 'The Neolithization of the North Pontic Area and the Balkans in the Context of the Black Sea Floods', in V. Yanko-Hombach, A.S. Golbert, N. Panin and P.M. Dolukhanov (eds.), *The Black Sea Flood Question* (Dordrecht 2007), pp. 489–518, refute the theory that the flood was the impetus for migration of early farmers.

⁵ P. Bellier, R.-C. Bondoux, J.-C. Cheynet, B. Geyer, J.-P. Grélois and V. Kravara, *Paysages de Macédoine* (Paris 1986), pp. 11–13.

⁶ Hammond, *History of Macedonia* 1, p. 5.

⁷ C.F. Edson, 'Early Macedonia', *Ancient Macedonia* 1 (Thessaloniki 1970), p. 43.

⁸ J.N. Corvisier, *Aux origines du miracle Grec* (Paris 1991), pp. 85–6.

⁹ Bellier, Bondoux, Cheynet, Geyer, Grémois, and Kravara, *Paysages de Macédoine*, p. 5.

¹⁰ Confusion exists about the status of the Ludias: is it a joint stream with the Axios as W.M. Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece* 3 (London 1835), p. 436, believed, or did it join the Haliacmon as Herodotus 7.127.1 reported? Both configurations may be true during different periods. Along the course of the rivers lie numerous basins that, with a strong flow of river water, become lakes or marshes. Thus, as Hammond, *History of Macedonia* 1, p. 144, explains, ‘as regards an arm of the Axios flowing into Lake Ludias, this is possible, particularly in times of flood’. Confluence with the Haliacmon, on the other hand, ‘is likely to have occurred only when the Haliacmon flowed north-eastwards into the plain for some distance and the Ludias flowed towards the Haliacmon’.

¹¹ F.C.H. Pouqueville, *Travels in Epirus, Albania, Macedonia, and Thessaly* (London 1820), pp. 82–83.

¹² Bellier, Bondoux, Cheynet, Geyer, Grémois, and Kravara, *Paysages de Macédoine*, p. 26.

¹³ The setting of the play is Thebes and Mount Cithaeron but the presence of Macedonia is understandable in the light of generally accepted view that Euripides left Athens to come to Pella on invitation of King Archelaus, probably in 408, and may have died there in 406. S. Scullion, ‘Euripides and Macedon, or the Silence of the *Frogs*’, *CQ*² 53 (2003), pp. 389–400, has challenged this view, suggesting that while Euripides possibly went to Pella to supervise production of his play *Archelaus* – now lost – he most likely died in Athens. Whatever the truth may be, the description of the Macedonian rivers reveals their importance in defining the physical qualities of that kingdom.

¹⁴ Bellier, Bondoux, Cheynet, Geyer, Grémois, and Kravara, *Paysages de Macédoine*, p. 7.

¹⁵ J.L. Angel, ‘Porotic Hyperostosis, Anemias, Malaras and Marshes in the Prehistoric Eastern Mediterranean’, *Science* 153 (1966), pp. 760–3.

¹⁶ E.N. Borza, 'Malaria and the Ecology of Central Macedonia', *AJAH* 4 (1979), p. 113.

¹⁷ Borza, 'Malaria and the Ecology of Central Macedonia', p. 114.

¹⁸ A *Handbook of Macedonia and Surrounding Territories*, compiled by the Geographical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff, Admiralty (London 1918), p. 34.

¹⁹ J.R. McNeill, *The Mountains of the Mediterranean World: An Environmental History* (Cambridge 1992), p. 71.

²⁰ N.V. Sekunda, 'The Sarissa', *Acta Universitatis Lodzianae, Folia Archaeologica* 23 (Łódź; 2001), pp. 22–30, argues persuasively that the trunk of the cornel tree that would provide wood for the sarissa was not tall enough for the great length of the sarissa.

²¹ N.G.L. Hammond, 'Travels in Epirus and South Albania before World War II', *Anc. World* 8.1-2 (1983), pp. 36, 44.

²² Hammond, *History of Macedonia* 1, p. 9.

²³ G. Karamitrou-Mentesidi, *Aiani* (Athens 1996), p. 16.

²⁴ This is the account of one of the riders and a primary organizer, Theo Antikas, who grew up in the physical kingdom of ancient Macedonia and now lives near the ancient site of Pydna. His education includes degrees in Veterinary Science and in Law, Politics and Economics and a PhD in Medicine. This combination regularly brings requests to identify, catalog and help exhibit archaeological finds containing animals as well as human remains, an important example being the finds from the pyres of Tomb II at Vergina. My own good fortune was to travel from original core outward in all directions with such an experienced 'guide', albeit not on horseback.

²⁵ Bellier, Bondoux, Cheynet, Geyer, Grémois, and Kravara, *Paysages de Macédoine*, pp. 35–6.

²⁶ The translation is that of W. Heckel and J. Yardley, *Alexander the Great: Historical Sources in Translation* (Malden 2004), p. 268.

²⁷ E.N. Borza, *In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon* (Princeton 1990), p. 36.

²⁸ Hammond, *History of Macedonia* 1, p. 166.

²⁹ See further, S. Sprawski, chapter 7.

³⁰ Corvisier, *Aux origines du miracle Grec*, p. 276: with two other peoples 'intégrés au koinon des Molosses vers 370'; Hammond, *History of Macedonia* 1, p. 118: 'Tymphaea, a canton of Epirus'.

³¹ The identification of Anthemus is difficult since it is the name of a city and a river as well as a region. Hammond, *History of Macedonia* 1, p. 190, places the region on a coastal plain extending into a wooded hinterland south of Almopia.

³² The translation is that of C.L. Sherman, *Diodorus* 7, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge 1952).

³³ *Admiralty Handbook*, p. 19.

³⁴ Corvisier, *Aux origines du miracle Grec*, p. 259. On Philip II, see further S. Müller, chapter 9.

³⁵ *A Handbook of Macedonia*, pp. 20–1.

³⁶ Hammond, 'Travels in Epirus and South Albania', p. 18.

³⁷ Hammond, 'Travels in Epirus and South Albania', p. 17.

³⁸ Hammond, 'Travels in Epirus and South Albania', pp. 35–6.

³⁹ Hammond, 'Travels in Epirus and South Albania', p. 43.

⁴⁰ Hammond, *History of Macedonia* 1, p. 36.

⁴¹ Hammond, *History of Macedonia* 1, p. 99.

⁴² Hammond, 'Travels in Epirus and South Albania', p. 118.

⁴³ Hammond, *History of Macedonia* 1, p. 194.

⁴⁴*Macedonians: The Northern Greeks*, Greek Ministry of Culture, Icom-National Hellenic Committee and Florida International Museum (Athens 1996).

⁴⁵Edson, 'Early Macedonia', p. 18.

⁴⁶On which, see D.L. Gilley and Ian Worthington, chapter 10.

Macedonians and Greeks

Johannes Engels

Herodotus' definition of '*to Hellenikon*' at 8.144.2 is a key passage in any discussion about Macedonians and Greeks. According to him, these were the main criteria on which ancient Greeks based their general ideas of Hellenic identity or Hellenicity¹: 'to be of the same blood' (to have common ancestors), to use the same Greek language, to share certain religious traditions at common sanctuaries and with common sacrifices, and to practise similar customs. Did the Macedonians meet with the typical common traits of 'Greekness' that Herodotus mentions in this passage? Or were there different criteria by which the Macedonians themselves distinguished their own *ethnos*? In this chapter I shall focus on the discussion about Macedonian ethnical, political, religious and cultural identity and the Macedonian people's self-perception as well as the way the Macedonians were perceived by other Greeks and neighbouring people such as the Persians. On this last aspect see in more detail S.R. Asirvatham, chapter 6.

Instead of 'ethnic identity' some modern anthropologists, social scientists and ancient historians prefer the more recent term 'ethnicity'.² Ethnicity denotes the self-consciousness of belonging to an ethnic group and describes different ethnic groups in their social interaction with one another. To most modern scholars ethnical and cultural identity and ethnicity appear to be something socially constructed. As we shall see, the discussion on Macedonian ethnicity and Macedonian self-perception is complicated by intricate source problems. With regard to literary sources, most indigenous ancient Macedonian historical, geographical and mythological works have not been preserved except for a few testimonies and fragments. Thus we have to rely almost completely on Greek authors (or even on later Roman ones) who wrote on Macedonia and Macedonian history. Most of these sources, however, are biased and (in the Classical and early

Hellenistic periods) many are dominated by an Athenian perspective.

Much interesting information has been added by excavation projects of ancient Macedonian cemeteries and single burials, cities, sanctuaries and palaces. Serious doubts, however, remain as to whether we can answer basic questions about Macedonian identity and ethnicity merely – or primarily – on the basis of archaeological evidence and the material remains of peoples living in ancient Macedonia. In the last decades an increasing number of inscriptions have been found on the territory of the Macedonian kingdom and in the neighbouring regions. These are most welcome additional sources on many different issues but only rarely do inscriptions add to our knowledge about Macedonian identity or ethnicity (see the detailed remarks on the literary and epigraphic evidence by P.J. Rhodes, chapter 2). The same observation holds true for the analysis of Macedonian coin legends and the iconography of Macedonian coinage (on which, see K. Dahmen, chapter 3).

Recent historical, anthropological and sociological scholarship has amply shown that ancient identities and concepts of ethnicity are historically and socially complex and fluid constructions, although often its participants believe that ethnicity is a simple and innate quality and that it is sufficiently defined by common descent and strong blood-ties.³ With respect to the Macedonians one may mention the belief in the (merely fictitious) common descent from a mythical ancestor, a man called ‘Makedon’. Social solidarity of an *ethnos*, for example among the Macedonians, according to Greek authors can be most easily attributed both to *genos* (birth) and *syngeneia* (kinship). Another convincing hypothesis is that the Macedonians only gradually became a greater Macedonian *ethnos* under the rule of a series of Argeid kings that played a key role in this process. Then the discussion about ancient Macedonian as a Greek dialect and the linguistic, onomastic and prosopographical evidence appear to be of highest importance. There is also no doubt about the role of central places at which all Macedonians regularly met, such as the old capital Aegae and the new capital Pella or the sanctuary of Zeus at Dium. Finally, shared religious beliefs and customs are basic elements of any cultural identity, especially in ancient Greek and Roman societies. I shall conclude with some remarks on Macedonian cults, festivals and customs.

1 Macedonian Ethnic Identity and Ethnicity

Perhaps at least in the Archaic period of Macedonia we should distinguish between different regional and tribal identities of the single tribes dwelling in Upper and Lower Macedonia. For these tribes dwelled on a geographically very inhomogeneous and – by Greek standards – large physical area of the later kingdom of Macedonia.⁴ Only step by step did they develop above and in addition to their traditional regional and tribal affiliations, identities, and local traditions a common ‘Macedonian’ identity.⁵

Defining Macedonian identity or ethnicity does not affect only modern scholars as a methodological problem, for ancient Greek or Roman observers faced difficulties in distinguishing the inhabitants of the kingdom of Macedonia from their immediate neighbours – the Illyrians, the Epirotans, the Thracians, the Thessalians – and from other Greeks in central and southern Greece.⁶ Ancient Macedonian identity was primarily discussed as a topic by ancient authors who were contrasting Macedonians with southern Greeks (especially with the Athenians or the Spartans) and only rarely with their immediate neighbours, with the peoples of the Achaemenid Empire, or with the Romans. Each of the ancient writers, however, pursued his own political and ideological aims which have to be taken into account when one wishes to evaluate accurately their texts.

Any simple attempt of defining ‘Macedonians’ and ancient Macedonian selfperception and identity by purely linguistic, ethnic,⁷ constitutional, social or religious criteria seems to be highly problematic. J. Hall differentiated between ‘aggregative strategies’ of group definition based often on a mythic genealogy and a common ancestor and ‘oppositional ethnic concepts’.⁸ Both ideas appear to be equally helpful in a discussion of Macedonian ethnicity or identity. Aggregative strategies are more typical of the aristocratic world of Archaic Greece, but in remote areas such as Macedonia and Epirus they remained influential in classical and Hellenistic times. The most important oppositional concept is the contrast between *Hellenes* and *Barbaroi* that was stressed after the Persian Wars and until the reign of Philip II and Alexander the Great and often used against Macedonian claims of Greekness. In late classical and Hellenistic times, however, an alternative definition of ‘Greekness’ also emerged which focused on a shared ideal of Greek education (*paideia*) and a common culture of the citizen elite (*hoi apo tou gymnasiou*).

Epirus, Macedonia’s western neighbour, offers an interesting parallel of Greek ambiguity in a north-west border area of the Greek world which may throw some light on the debate about Macedonian identity.⁹ Old genealogical links through the stories about the return voyages of the Trojan heroes (*nostoi*) and other Greek myths strongly connected Epirus with the rest of Greece and these stories precluded

any serious debate about the Greekness of the Epirotans. Epirotic language was regarded as a primitive north-western Greek dialect, but there was no discussion that it was basically Greek. Epirotans like Macedonians in classical times still lived an archaic way of life with old-fashioned and some crude customs that clearly differed from the refined way of life in the Corinthian and Corcyraean colonies at the western Greek coast. There were only few urban settlements of the *polis* type in Epirus in the Classical period, for most people were still living in villages and the elite in fortresses and palaces. Thus in Epirus we observe a settlement pattern quite similar to the Macedonian one until the late fifth century. Nevertheless, there was never a sharp discussion about the Greekness of the Epirotans as with the Macedonians. The main reason for this telling difference might well be the simple fact that the Epirotan *ethnos* never attempted to rise to the status of the hegemonial power in Greece while the Macedonians under Philip II achieved this aim.

2 Methodological Problems Resulting from Our Sources

The discussion about Macedonian ethnicity is complicated by some intricate and basic source problems. Although P.J. Rhodes in this volume discusses the literary and epigraphic evidence (chapter 2) and K. Dahmen the numismatic (chapter 3), it is useful to comment briefly in this chapter on the particular importance of literary, epigraphic and numismatic evidence and on material remains as sources on identity and ethnicity.

In our preserved historical sources reliable information about Macedonia starts no earlier than with Herodotus and Thucydides in the fifth century. Both historians regard the Macedonians as northern Greeks (*Hellenes*), as barbarians, or as an intermediate group between pure Greeks and utter barbarians. For instance, Herodotus 1.56.3 and 8.43 refer to a reliable tradition that the Dorians were formed by a fusion of Macedonians with other tribes, and this would amount to important evidence of a Greek character of the Macedonians. At 5.20.4 Herodotus calls King Amyntas an *aner Hellen Makedonon hyparchos*, a Greek who ruled (as a satrap) over Macedonians, and here we should understand Macedonians as a non-Greek people. Yet Herodotus himself provides us with the mythical story about the Greek roots of the Argead royal house and with the list of the seven earliest Macedonian kings (8.137–138), which is our essential guideline in any attempt to reconstruct early Macedonian history.

Neither in Thucydides' famous excursus on Macedonia's regions and early history at 2.99–101 nor when he comes to describing Brasidas' campaign at 4.124.1 and 4.125.1 is his view on the ethnic identity and Greekness of the Macedonians consistent and completely unambiguous.¹⁰ In 2.99 – following Herodotus – he equates the beginning of the Argead monarchy with the beginning of a common Macedonian self-perception and identity and readily accepts also the Argead kings' claims to Hellenic identity. In book 4, however, he distinguishes between three groups of fighters in the Peloponnesian War: the Greeks (including Peloponnesians), the Illyrian barbarians and the Macedonians, whom he judges at least in one passage to be neither Greeks nor barbarians.

Unfortunately, the rich ancient *Makedonika* (*Macedonian Histories*) literature and other historical, ethnographical and geographical works which focused on Macedonia and Macedonian customs or on single Macedonian towns is lost except for the names of several authors, a few fragments and testimonies.¹¹ These works surely would have counterweighted the preserved and prominent 'anti-Macedonian' Athenian sources. Still, one can see from the scanty remains that in Macedonia from the fourth century historical and geographical prose literature dominated and that among the poetical genres epigrams were popular. Most of these epigrams come from inscriptions (grave or votive epigrams), others from collections of ancient Greek epigrams. The high quality of some of the lost historical works may be surmised from the names of their authors, some of whom were of the highest social status and experienced Macedonian politicians or commanders. For instance Antipater, the marshal of Philip II and Alexander the Great, wrote *On the Deeds of King Perdikkas* in Illyria (FGrH 114 T 1), Ptolemy I of Egypt composed an important monograph on Alexander the Great (FGrH 138), and some fragments have been preserved from Marsyas of Pella and Philip of Pella, authors of treatises entitled *Makedonika* (*Macedonian Histories*) and *Ta peri Alexandron* (*History of Alexander*, FGrH 135–6).¹²

Almost all ancient Greek preserved sources focus on the deeds and characters of the Macedonian kings, on members of the royal family, or on Macedonian aristocrats. And even these members of the Macedonian elite are usually mentioned in connection with major military and political events of Greek history, such as the Persian Wars, the Peloponnesian War, or the war between Philip II and Athens before the Battle of Chaeroneia in 338. Only very rarely were prominent Macedonians of interest to ancient Greek authors for their own sake. In general, our literary evidence about the ethnic identity of Macedonians of lower social status is extremely fragmentary and unsatisfactory from the Archaic to the Hellenistic periods, not least

because no *Makedonon politeia* (*Constitution of the Macedonians*) has been preserved.¹³

In order to gauge the content of large-scale *Makedonika*, let us briefly look at the 15 preserved fragments of Theagenes' *Makedonika*.¹⁴ Theagenes was a Macedonian historian and ethnographer who probably lived in the Hellenistic period. His *Makedonika* discuss place-names and their origins, *ktisis*-stories and issues of Greek mythology that were connected with places in Lower Macedonia, the western part of Thrace, the Chalcidice, and the Orestis region at the border of Macedonia and Illyria. Most fragments of Theagenes' *Makedonika* – as they have been preserved in Stephanus' *Ethnika* – are very brief and offer only basic pieces of information. One may, however, confidently surmise that many passages of Theagenes' original work will have been considerably more detailed. Nevertheless, Theagenes' *Makedonika* are an important source on ancient Macedonian toponyms and the history of urban settlements,¹⁵ and his discussion of such things as place-names and their origins, *ktisis*-stories, and issues of Greek mythology are of direct importance to Macedonian identity.

A small group of Athenian patriotic historians and orators of the fifth and fourth centuries are mainly responsible for many ambiguities about Macedonian ethnic identity and for the sharp contrast between Macedonian 'barbarians' and genuine Greeks.¹⁶ One should remember the basic fact that not a single contemporary Macedonian speech has been preserved which might counterweigh the Athenian speeches. Most influential among the enemies of Philip II and Macedonian expansion towards southern Greece was the Athenian orator Demosthenes. Several passages in his *Olynthiac* and *Philippic* speeches and in his speech *On the Crown* attack the Macedonians and Philip as barbarians (see, for instance, 3.16, 20, 24, 9.30-31, 19.327). We read similar attacks and propaganda slogans in contemporary speeches delivered by Hypereides (6 *Epitaphios*), Aeschines (2), and even in treatises by Isocrates. While Isocrates on the one hand accepts the 'Greekness' of Philip II and the royal Argead house, on the other hand he clearly rejects the Hellenic identity of the Macedonian people (cf. 5.106–108, 154).¹⁷ Despite their obvious bias, the aggressive sections in some speeches may also express actual differences between the Macedonian way of life and the typical Greek one in southern *poleis*.

Aristotle is a very interesting witness of ancient uncertainty about Macedonian ethnic identity. The son of a Greek doctor at the Macedonian court, he was born at Stageira close to the Macedonian border and later became the teacher of the heir Alexander; hence he surely was one of the best experts on Macedonia and Macedonians among the Greeks of the Classical period. But he did not include any

systematic discussion of Macedonian monarchy or Macedonian ethnic and cultural identity in either his *Politics* or any other known major work. Should this be explained by political caution in the age of Alexander's campaign? Unfortunately, there are also no meaningful fragments of a Macedonian constitution or on Macedonian identity preserved among the relics of the 158 different constitutions that were collected by Aristotle and his school. Of course, Aristotle knew about the central importance of the kings for the coherence and identity of the Macedonian people and their state. According to him monarchy was the best form of government for an *ethnos* such as the Macedonians. Some remarks in the *Politics* quite exactly fit the situation in Macedonia (1285 b6–9 and 1310 b9–12), and once the Macedonian monarchy is explicitly mentioned (1310 b35–40).

It would also be well worth learning more details about the Persians' views on the ethnic identity of the Macedonians since the Persians were contemporary neighbours of the Greeks and for a time the kingdom of Macedonia even belonged to their empire. After about 510 King Darius I received a regular tribute from Amyntas of Macedonia and Macedonia is registered in Persian royal inscriptions among the subject peoples of the Great King. The Persians called both Greeks and Macedonians 'Yauna' (Ionians), but they distinguished between 'Yauna by the sea and across the sea' and those 'with hats that look like shields' (*yauna takabara*), denoting probably the Macedonians and their typical *kausia* or type of hat. In the subject lists and visual representations of subjected people at Persepolis and Naqsch-e Rostam there is no distinct category of Macedonians clearly separated from the other Yauna unless we understand the reference to these hats as a reliable hint.¹⁸ Also Herodotus at 5.20.4 presents Alexander I of Macedonia as 'a Hellenic man ruling over Macedonians' while he was speaking to Persians.

Whereas proud Athenians like Demosthenes in the fourth century still fiercely attacked the Macedonian people and their royal house as barbarians, in Hellenistic times most Egyptians or Syrians would have incorporated the Macedonians within their larger category of 'Greeks' without any hesitation as the Persians had done earlier. On the other side, during this period new ways of being Greek also developed in the Hellenistic kingdoms.¹⁹ In Polybius' view at least the Hellenistic Macedonians clearly were northern Greeks and Macedonia a part of Greece.²⁰

The population of the Macedonian kingdom was of different ethnic origins. Due to a lack of convincing sources no scholarly consensus has been reached from where exactly and into which region precisely the earliest north-western tribal 'Macedonian' groups immigrated. Then coastal Pieria and the region east and north of Mount Olympus around

Aegae became the core territory of Lower Macedonia.²¹ As a result of the expansion of the early Macedonians during the Archaic period all the other regional tribes fused together into a larger unit of Macedonians. Passages in the works of leading ancient geographers show their difficulties in describing this historical process in determining Macedonia as a geographic entity and in defining Macedonia's borders to its neighbours, let alone in defining Macedonian ethnic identity on the basis of a cultural geography of Macedonian tribes. It has been convincingly demonstrated by modern scholars that the independent kingdom of Macedonia – as well as the Roman *provincia Macedonia* in republican times (cf. J. Vanderspoel, chapter 13) – essentially remained a political (or a military) concept while from a geographical point of view it was almost permanently a changing entity with unclear borders.²²

Ancient geographers differed in their views about the size of Macedonia and, more important in the present context, in their opinion about the Macedonians as a branch of northern Greeks or of neighbouring barbarians. But it appears that most ancient Greek geographers did not include the core territories of the kingdom of Macedonia in their descriptions of Greece. They usually drew the borderline of Hellas in the strict sense from the Ambracian Gulf to Mount Olympus and the Thessalian Tempe Valley. To take Strabo's *Geographika* as an example: Hellas is described in books 8-10 whereas most of his remarks on Macedonia were included in book 7 that unfortunately is not completely preserved. And this fact makes every general statement on Strabo's views of Macedonia hypothetical. *Geographika* 8.1.3 C 334 (= Ephorus, *FGrH* 70 F 143) describes Macedonia as an area outside Greece but Strabo's views are inconsistent. For instance, 7.7.1 C 321 mentions parts of Greece (including Macedonia) held by barbarians, 7.7.8 C 328 notes close similarities between Macedonians and neighbouring tribes in the west in tonsure, language, short cloak and other respects, and 7 F 5 (Radt) states that 'Macedonia, of course, is a part of Greece, yet now, since I am following the nature and shape of the places geographically, I have chosen to classify it apart from the rest of Greece' (cf. 7 F 35 Radt). Also, in 10.2.23 C 460 Strabo simply speaks of 'the Macedonians and the other Greeks'. There is a historian of Alexander the Great named Medeios, a Thessalian quoted by Strabo, who called the Thessalians the 'most northern of Greeks' (*FGrH* 129 F 1 = Strabo 11.14.12 C 530). Thus here Strabo implicitly excludes the Macedonians from the Greek peoples. Significantly, Pausanias also did not include Macedonia in the 10 books of his description of Hellas.

A highly controversial question among archaeologists and ancient historians is whether Macedonian ethnicity can be identified

exclusively on the basis of material remains found in their region and whether such a definition can primarily be based on the analysis of grave-goods, burial customs, settlement patterns, regional weapons (perhaps the typical Macedonian sarissa and the Macedonian shield?), costumes and single items of clothes (like the Macedonian *kausia*), or special regional forms of ceramics. Many experts in my view justly hold that, when it comes to defining Macedonian identity and ethnicity, archaeological evidence from Macedonia still remains inconclusive although it increases year by year as recent excavations are published.²³ Moreover, one may even doubt that fresh evidence will radically change the picture in the future since the Macedonians show a strong eclectic approach in their material culture. From the earliest times they borrowed widely from other people. In addition to that, the convincing theory has already been mentioned that ethnicity is something socially constructed and is produced by discourse. If so, then literary sources anyway remain the crucial evidence in this debate.²⁴

Inscriptions have become an increasingly important class of evidence in Macedonian studies. But most inscriptions are not very helpful as evidence on the discussion of Macedonian identity and self-perception although in many other respects we have learned a lot from these documentary texts (for instance about Macedonian cities, their institutions and relations to the kings, or Macedonian onomastics and prosopography). The same holds true for the numismatic evidence and the analysis of Macedonian coin images (kings, gods, symbols) and coin legends.²⁵ To sum up, because of the scarcity and fragmentary condition and/or the bias of the preserved literary sources, the restricted source value of inscriptions and coins, and finally the inconclusive character of the rich material evidence, the Macedonians at least from the late eighth to the early fifth centuries still belong to the many ‘silent peoples’ of antiquity.

3 Makedon as Mythical Ancestor, the Kings, Macedonian Language and Focal Places for all Macedonians

Many scholars assume that the Greek word *Makedones* originally meant something like ‘highlanders’ or the ‘high-grown’ men.²⁶ There is no mention at all of Macedonians or their ancestral hero Makedon in Homer’s epics, especially in the so-called ‘Catalogue of Ships’ with its long and detailed list of Greek peoples in *Iliad* 2. The *Hellanes*

(*Hellenes*), however, are mentioned in Homer, but in his time the name merely denotes a tribe in southern Thessaly that lived around the river Spercheius.²⁷ In antiquity, mythological ancestors have been often invented with the clear intention to strengthen the sense of ethnic unity. This may also be true for Makedon as the mythical ancestor of the Macedonians. There are concurring genealogies of Makedon. The main version in Hesiod's *Catalogue of Women* narrates that he was a son of Zeus and Thyia, a daughter of Deucalion, and a brother of Magnes.²⁸ In this version there is no direct genealogical connection to Hellen and his descendants, the *Hellenes*. 'Makednos' is found (instead of 'Makedon') in a fragment taken from the fifth century Hellanicus' work *The Priestesses of Argos* (FGrH 4 F 74); following him, however, Makednos was a son of Aeolus, the founder of the Aiolian tribe and a grandson of Hellen. This genealogy sounds more 'Greek' and is possibly more recent. It connects the Macedonians closely to the Aiolic speaking Greeks. Despite serious differences in their genealogies, both Hesiod and Hellanicus count the Macedonians among the Greek speaking peoples and hence regard them as Greeks.²⁹

Two different foundation myths of the royal house apparently date from different periods and refer to the genealogy of the Argeid or Temenid royal family, for which Herodotus 8.137–139 is our earliest source. According to him three brothers – Gyanes, Aeropus and Perdiccas – of the noble Temenid family emigrated from their home town of Argos. They settled in the so-called 'Gardens of Midas' in Lower Macedonia and founded Aegae ('goat-town') where Perdiccas became the first Macedonian king. Thucydides tells a similar story in an excursus on Macedonia, which reflects the official late fifth-century royal Macedonian version.³⁰ Alexander I in the early fifth century successfully appealed to the link of his 'Argead' dynasty to Argos and to the mythological stories about Heracles and Zeus. Temenus was a son of Heracles and the mythical founder of Argos, Perdiccas for his part a son of Temenus, and he became the first ruler in Macedonia (cf. Hdt. 8.137). The simple fact that several Macedonian kings even during the late fifth and fourth centuries so strongly stressed the Greekness of their ancestors and their royal house suggests that there were still many Greeks who rejected accepting the Macedonian royal family as Greeks, not least the Macedonian *ethnos*. A second, more recent version of the myth about the royal dynasty is preserved in Justin's epitome of Pompeius Trogus' *Historiae Philippicae* (7.1.7–12).³¹ In this version Caranus, allegedly a son of the Argive Temenus, was added to the genealogical scheme. According to Justin a shepherd named Caranus (a Doric Greek word meaning 'head' or 'ruler') gained command over Edessa and renamed the place to Aegae. Perdiccas

became his successor and the first king of the Macedonians. The most important aspect about both versions of the royal genealogies is that the Macedonian kings were *diogeneis* or direct descendants of Zeus, the highest god, hence the genealogy provided them with a sacred aura.

In the often bloody history of the Balkan lands with their complex mixture of tribes and nations, religions, languages and cultures, the most controversial articulations of ethnic identity (and the hottest debates about it) usually can be found in times of military conflict among neighbouring peoples. This would apply for the fifth and fourth centuries when the Macedonians were first involved in two major Greek wars (the Persian and the Peloponnesian) and then fought against Athens for hegemony over mainland Greece. Accordingly, major differences between Greeks and Macedonians and the classification of the Macedonians as northern barbarians were heavily stressed by Greek authors only after the Persian wars and Xerxes' campaign to which the Macedonians as Persian subjects contributed troops. This crime of *medismos* resulted in accusing the Macedonians of being barbarians and in stressing a cultural opposition between pure Greeks (who fought bravely for their freedom against the Persians) and Macedonians. The dichotomy *Hellenes* versus *Barbaroi* became central to the new classical Greek identity. Interestingly, similar accusations were not raised against the Thebans as 'barbarians', who also had openly committed *medismos*, but because of their glorious mythical past they could not be separated from the Greek community as 'barbarians'.

The Macedonian kings played a key role both as active creators and as symbolic figures of Macedonian identity. This becomes especially clear from the political developments in Upper Macedonia and in the newly won Macedonian territories in the north and east of the kingdom that were annexed in the fifth and fourth centuries. The political and military consolidation of the Macedonian kingdom and the emergence of a Macedonian identity in these regions evidently were parallel historical developments. Monarchy as the 'natural' constitution for the Macedonian *ethnos* was without any alternative in Macedonia even after it had been abolished almost everywhere in the Greek world in the Classical period apart from Sparta, Cyprus, and a few border regions in the north, such as Epirus or Illyria. The strong political, judicial, administrative and military powers of the Macedonian kings were customarily checked by the Assembly of Macedonians that came together under arms and represented the serving soldiers of the kingdom.³² Perhaps the Macedonian army, although it was recruited region by region and city by city, functioned as the most effective social institution of creating a common Macedonian identity under the kings as supreme commanders (see

N.V. Sekunda, chapter 22). According to Herodotus 8.137–139, the Macedonians themselves did not have any reliable information about their early history before Perdiccas as the first Argead king.

Given the importance of the Argead kings, did Macedonian identity change considerably after the end of the Argead dynasty in 310 and then under the new Antigonid dynasty that ruled the Hellenistic kingdom from 276 to 168? Presumably not, for the crucial event was the crushing defeat in the Third Macedonian War against Rome in 168 which led to the dissolution of the Macedonian kingdom and to the establishing of a new Roman *provincia Macedonia* in 148 (see further, W.L. Adams, chapter 11 and A.M. Eckstein, chapter 12). These brutal changes profoundly undermined traditional Macedonian identity. Under Roman rule in the *provincia Macedonia* new problems emerged of keeping alive a local Macedonian identity and – at least for members of the provincial elite – becoming more and more integrated into the ruling classes of the Roman Empire (cf. J. Vanderspoel, chapter 13).

In the eyes of most Greeks who came from a classical *polis* the Macedonian kingdom, despite an increasing urbanization, also preserved old-fashioned, strong feudal structures. This feudal character and the strong personal relationship between the Macedonian kings and their aristocracy (*hetairoi* or the king's companions) was also a social custom and institution which distinguished Macedonian identity from most southern Greek city-states (see N. Sawada, chapter 19). Moreover, at least in the Classical period there were only comparatively small numbers of slaves in the Macedonian core region, and this astonishingly low percentage of an unfree population marks another important difference to other Greek regions, especially to merchant and harbour towns such as Athens or Corinth.

While functioning as symbols of the Macedonian state the kings and the royal family at the same time counted among the most intensely 'Hellenized' persons in Macedonia. This intense Hellenization of the royal house began in the fifth century with Archelaus I and it became stronger in each generation, reaching a climax under Philip II and Alexander the Great. At the royal court the ambiguities of defining Macedonian ethnicity and identity as distinct from a general Hellenic identity become most obvious. In 399 Archelaus I founded the new capital of Pella, which offered a focal place for all Macedonians until the dissolution of the kingdom in 168. Pella became a much more important capital than the old capital Aegae had been because in the fourth- to second-century monarchies the importance of the capital of a kingdom and the royal court significantly increased. At Pella famous Greek intellectuals, artists and

authors often stayed as visitors, for instance the poets Pindar and Bacchylides, the tragedians Euripides and Agathon, the epic poet Choerilus, the painter Zeuxis or the musician Timotheus (see J. Roisman, chapter 8). At these capital cities as well as at Dium the kings and other members of the royal house regularly performed the most important ceremonies and sacrifices to the gods especially to Zeus and to Heracles Patroos on behalf of the dynasty and the state. Ancient sources note also the extraordinary splendour which was displayed at royal Macedonian funerals and wedding ceremonies at Aegae and Pella which as social events united king, aristocracy and common Macedonians in a visible and emotional way.

Interesting pieces of information deal with Macedonian kings as participants and winners at the Panhellenic games held in Olympia or in Nemea. Alexander I still met with some opposition against his participation at the Olympic Games in about 504 or 500. However, he was finally admitted by the *hellanodikai*, because of his Argive descent. Moreover, a bronze tripod with an inscription remembering Archelaus also as winner of the Nemean Games in honour of Hera at Argos was found in the excavations at Aegae/Vergina and dates from the mid-fifth century (Hdt. 5.22, SEG 29.652). Other kings, for instance Philip II, won Olympic victories (for example, in 356), but so also did ordinary Macedonians without any known connection to the royal houses of the Argeads or the Antigonids. Alexander I also took the surname *philhellenos* ('friend of the Greeks'). This cognomen, however, implies that the Macedonians as a people in the first half of the fifth century usually were not regarded as Greeks by other Greeks (nor perhaps by the Macedonian kings themselves?) simply because no ruler of a Greek people felt a need to style himself in the Classical period as *philhellenos*. In the fourth century Philip II and Alexander the Great ultimately styled themselves as true champions of the much debated propaganda concept of 'Panhellenism'.³³

Despite major differences between ancient Greek dialects (Ionian, Dorian, Aeolic Greek) to speak Greek as a common language was one of the strongest bonds among Greeks in their polycentric world of more than 1,000 *poleis* and many more *ethne*. Was ancient Macedonian a northern Greek dialect – a north-western variant of Doric Greek or a northern Greek dialect more closely related to Aeolian and Thessalian Greek? – or was it a related and neighbouring but separate Indo-European language with influences from Greek, Thracian and other languages? When Livy is describing political negotiations between Macedonians and Aetolians in the late third century, he has a Macedonian ambassador simply state that Aetolians, Acarnanians and Macedonians were all 'men of the same language' (31.29.15), that is of a common north-western Greek dialect group or perhaps at this

date of a Hellenistic Koine. Our sources only rarely mention *makedonizein*, to speak Macedonian, or the fact that someone speaks *makedonisti*, that is in Macedonian.³⁴ This language surely shared a substantial part of its vocabulary with north-western Greek dialects but there were also demonstrable influences from Illyrian, Phrygian and Thracian.³⁵

As with the discussion about Macedonian ethnicity, so also the debate about the Greek character of the ancient Macedonian language has unfortunately suffered over the last decades from contemporary modern political hostilities among the neighbouring states of this Balkan region and their search for ancient roots of their fragile modern 'national' identity. I refrain from entering into these sharp disputes in this chapter.³⁶ However, with respect to the discussion in this chapter it seems to be quite clear that (a) ancient Macedonian at some date during the Hellenistic or Roman imperial era was completely replaced by *koinē* Greek and died out, and (b) that ancient Macedonian has no relationship with modern Macedonian which together with Bulgarian belongs to the eastern branch of southern Slavonic languages.

A serious methodological obstacle to any discussion about the ancient Macedonian language is the fact that there are almost no surviving texts that are undisputably written in this language because it always was primarily a spoken language, nor enough preserved texts of a sufficient length that would allow for trustworthy conclusions. Many surviving public and private inscriptions indicate that in the Macedonian kingdom there was no dominant written language but standard Attic and later on *koinē* Greek. Nevertheless, a number of Macedonian words have been collected from stray passages in literary sources, ancient coins, inscriptions and mainly from the late fifth-century AD lexicographer Hesychius of Alexandria. This body of evidence amounts to roughly 150–200 words.³⁷ Most of this vocabulary seems to be regular Greek but other words show separate, non-Greek roots and are borrowed from common Indo-European roots or from Thracian and Illyrian. These neighbouring languages, however, are just as inadequately known as ancient Macedonian itself and the whole linguistic debate sometimes suffers from circular arguments or political prejudice.

A currently rewarding field of study deals with Macedonian onomastics. We know of about 200 personal names of people of Macedonian origin and of many placenames or apparently 'Macedonian' names of rivers, mountains or regions. The material has been conveniently collected in volume 4 of the comprehensive *Lexicon of Greek Personal names (LGPN)*.³⁸ In the mainly epigraphic and lexicographic sources we observe a mixture of epichoric Greek names

which sometimes differ significantly from the phonology of standard Greek or Attic names, a few names which are found almost exclusively in the Macedonian region, Panhellenic Greek names, but also nonGreek Illyrian or Thracian names. The material supports the observation that Macedonian personal names show a predominantly Greek character. In *LGP* 4 we find nine male personal names with more than 200 different entries. These were the most popular names in ancient Macedonia and the surrounding regions: Dionysius, Alexandrus (Alexander), Apollonius, Posidippus, Demetrius, Philippus (Philip), Artemidorus, Heracleides and Bithys, and apart from Bithys these are clearly Greek names. An interesting set of grave inscriptions with personal names comes from classical tombstones found at Vergina (Aegae) of the fourth century that also show many Greek names, of which some are prominent, such as Alexandrus, or go back to Mycenaean or, as Ptolemaeus, to Homeric Greek. These names clearly express an important aspect of Macedonian identity on an onomastic level.³⁹

There is another interesting short testimony on ancient Macedonian coming from one of Strattis' comedies.⁴⁰ In this passage a stranger speaks some words in a rural and unpolished dialect that some scholars explain as a comic persiflage of ancient Macedonian. Another very important testimony comes from the so-called Pella curse tablet (see figure 1 and plate 15). This is a text written in a Doric Greek and found in 1986, and its importance also for Macedonian religion is discussed by P. Christesen and S.C. Murray in chapter 21. It is dated to the mid- to early fourth century and shows a curse by the present consort on Dionysophon and his projected *gamos* (marriage) with another woman. This has been judged to be the most important ancient testimony to substantiate the theory that Macedonian was a north-western Greek and mainly Doric dialect (*SEG* 43.434).⁴¹ In the near future one may expect more interesting studies on the origins and the diffusion of ancient Macedonian also outside the core region of Macedonia.

Despite the importance of Attic and Koine Greek for official purposes in the kingdom, ancient Macedonian still was the common language among many ordinary Macedonians in the army in the late fourth century. This observation may be deduced from several passages about speeches and commands given to the Macedonian soldiers in the time of Alexander the Great and the early Diadochoi. First there is a hint in the *patrius sermo* (the Macedonian dialect) during the Philotas affair (Curt. 6.9.34–36).⁴² Philotas is mocked in the Assembly of Macedonians for not speaking in Macedonian. Further, Plutarch reports that during the fatal drinking party that cost Cleitus his life Alexander shouted an order in Macedonian when he

was summoning his guard with an emergency command while Greek was the usual language of command in his army (*Alexander* 51.4–6). Then in 321, when the Greek Eumenes defeated the forces of Neoptolemus, he successfully sent an Macedonian officer named Xennias to address the phalanx troops in Macedonian speech (*PSI* 12 1284, *Plut.*, *Eumenes* 5.3) and in 317/16 the same Eumenes was greeted by his troops ‘in their Macedonian speech’ (*Plut.*, *Eumenes* 14.5, 11); probably these were the ‘Silvershields’.⁴³ Macedonian veterans perhaps used their native dialect when on campaign and far away from their homeland to express their ‘national identity’.

Many ancient observers noted that a characteristic element of the ancient Greek way of life was to live together in *poleis* with urban centers that showed characteristic public buildings. In Macedonia the process of urbanization was continuously encouraged (and controlled) by the Macedonian kings as founders of new cities, by conquering and incorporating earlier Greek *poleis* into the kingdom, or as benefactors of existing cities. Cultural life in Macedonia, however, down to the fourth century was almost completely determined by the royal court at Aegae and Pella.⁴⁴ Despite their substantial local autonomy the cities in the Macedonian kingdom from a Greek point of view ultimately were subject to the king’s decisions and they were not allowed to pursue an autonomous foreign or military policy. This was a major difference between Greek and Macedonian cities and an important aspect of Macedonian political, military and social identity. Generally the towns in Macedonia may be classified as three categories and they contributed in a different way to the process of shaping a common Macedonian identity: (1) relatively few ‘ancient’ and traditional Macedonian towns were of paramount importance to all Macedonians, such as Aegae, Pella or Dium, (2) many economically and culturally influential Greek colonies were conquered and integrated in the kingdom at some date, such as Pydna, Methone, Amphipolis or Potidaea, (3) more recently founded ‘royal’ towns such as Philippi, Alexandropolis, Thessalonike and Cassandreia. They all functioned as central places of royal administration and centers of radiating a ‘Greek’ way of life.⁴⁵ In late classical and Hellenistic times many public buildings which were typical of urban Greek infrastructure were erected in Macedonian cities, such as theatres, gymnasia, or temples. Increasing urbanization and the corresponding adaptation of a Greek way of life were important long-term developments which finally led in the Macedonian region to a fusion of Macedonian and common Greek identity.

Ancient Greeks regarded it as an essential element of Hellenic identity to share common religious beliefs and to come together at regular intervals at Panhellenic sanctuaries (Olympia, Delphi, Nemea/

Argos, etc.) in order to celebrate Panhellenic festivals. Most of the gods who were worshipped in southern Greece can also be found in the Macedonian pantheon. Several Greek gods also appear regularly on Macedonian coinage, especially Zeus, Apollo, Heracles, Dionysus and Athena. These 'Greek' gods stress the close links of Macedonian religion to the usual Greek pantheon. The names of the most important Macedonian religious festivals are also typically Greek.⁴⁶

Whereas in late Archaic and classical Greece many cities concurred with building big new temples or extending size and beauty of earlier temple structures, there is no evidence of impressive Macedonian temple building before the Temple of Zeus in Dium was built by Archelaus I. At Dium the greatest festival for all Macedonians, a nine-day-festival for Zeus of Mount Olympus, was celebrated, which some scholars even regard as a concurring festival to the Olympic games in Elis. This sanctuary surely played a key role in shaping a religious Macedonian identity. Before this temple was founded there had been earlier but more primitive popular cults of Zeus on Mount Olympus (Arr. 1.11.1) and in Aegae. Magnesians and Macedonians both worshipped Zeus as the god of the high mountain (*IG* 9.2 1109, 55) and they held the common festival of the *Hetairideia* (Athen. 572d). Thus Archelaus created a religious focal point for all Macedonians by instituting this pan-Macedonian cult centre and festival at Dium.

However, the Macedonians also shared popular cults with the neighbouring Thracians, especially those of Bendis, Orpheus, and the Thracian Rider, and some other 'primitive' indigenous Balkan cults typical of herdsmen. Noteworthy evidence of regional Thracian and Macedonian religious ideas also came from the famous preHellenistic Orphic papyrus that was found at Derveni in Macedonia.

Several members of the Macedonian royal families of the Argeadae and the Antigonidae supported neighbouring sanctuaries of Zeus at Dodona in Epirus and of the Cabiri on the island of Samothrace (especially Philip II, Olympias, and Alexander the Great). Their interest in the Panhellenic sanctuaries at Olympia and Delphi is also well attested. During the reign of Perdiccas III in 365, we also learn for the first time about Macedonian *theoroi*, or sacred envoys, to the sanctuary of Asclepius at Epidaurus in a list of *theorodokoi* (*IG* 4.2 1, 94). A similar list from Delphi (late third century) names no less than 31 Macedonian communities with strong religious and diplomatic connections to the Panhellenic sanctuary at Delphi. This is strong evidence of a process of fusion of regional Macedonian and common Greek religious identity in the Hellenistic period.

This chapter has supported the view that Hellenic and Macedonian ethnic identity or ethnicity should be regarded as extremely complex and fluid social constructions which surely deserve further study. In

this area of research detailed analysis of ancient literary, epigraphic, numismatic and archaeological evidence needs to be cautiously combined in the future with modern anthropological, ethnographical and sociological theories to achieve any substantial progress in our knowledge about ‘Macedonians’ and ‘Greeks’.

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³⁷ For a valuable albeit now outdated and incomplete list of Macedonian words, see J. Kalléris, *Les anciens Macédoniens* 1 (Athens 1954), pp. 66–304.

³⁸ See P.M. Fraser and E. Matthews (eds.), *A Lexicon of Greek Personal Names 4, Macedonia, Thrace, Northern Regions of the Black Sea* (Oxford 2005).

³⁹ On methodological problems of the historical interpretation of ancient names, see S. Hornblower and E. Matthews (eds.), *Greek Personal Names: Their Value as Evidence* (Oxford 2000), especially the chapter by M.B. Hatzopoulos, ‘L’histoire par les noms in Macedonia’, pp. 99–117; for an exemplary study on Beroea, see A.B. Tataki, *Ancient Beroea: Prosopography and Society* (Athens 1988).

⁴⁰ R. Kassel and C. Austin (eds.), *Poetae Comici Graeci* 7 (Berlin 1996), F 29.

⁴¹ See E. Voutiras, *Dionysophontos Gamoi: Marital Life and Magic in Fourth Century Pella* (Amsterdam 1998). See also briefly D.R. Jordan, ‘New Greek Curse Tablets (1985–2000)’, *GRBS* 41 (2000), pp. 5–46, especially no. 31, pp. 13–14.

⁴² See E. Kapetanopoulos, ‘Alexander’s *patrius sermo* in the Philotas Affair’, *Anc. World* 30 (1999), pp. 117–28.

⁴³ See Badian, ‘Greeks and Macedonians’, especially p. 50 and A.B. Bosworth, ‘Eumenes, Neoptolemus, and PSI XII 1284’, *GRBS* 19 (1978), pp. 227–37, who has republished the papyrus and commented on its importance.

⁴⁴ See M. Andronikos, *Vergina: The Royal Tombs and the Ancient City* (Athens 1988), P. Petsas, *Pella, Alexander the Great’s Capital* (Thessaloniki 1978).

⁴⁵ For a comprehensive list of Macedonian cities, see Papazoglou, *Villes de Macédoine* and also P. Millett, chapter 23.

⁴⁶ See briefly M. Oppermann, ‘Macedonia, cults’, *Oxford Classical Dictionary*³ (Oxford 1996), p. 905 and Sakellariou, ‘Inhabitants’,

p. 60 for a list of gods; see also the thorough study of M.B. Hatzopoulos, *Cultes et rites de passage en Macédoine* (Athens 1994) and P. Christesen and S.C. Murray, chapter 21.

Perspectives on the Macedonians from Greece, Rome, and Beyond

Sulochana R. Asirvatham

1 Introduction

The ancient Macedonians, who defeated an empire despite their vastly outnumbered forces – and whom we thank today for ensuring the survival of Greek culture – are a challenge to Winston Churchill’s famous dictum that history is always written by the victors. It is not that we altogether lack Macedonian perspectives: Macedonians inscribed an identity on stones and coins, and Greek writers took their lead from the philhellenism of the Macedonian ruling class, with profound consequences for their future image. But there is no more powerful and lasting medium than written discourse for articulating ethnic identities, and whatever purely ‘Macedonian’-identified writers may have existed in Alexander’s age (if any actually did; men like Ptolemy and Aristobulus were, like their king, Greek-educated) they exist only as fragments in the extant authors who use them for their own ends. We cannot assume that our non-Macedonian and usually late sources lined up their own ideological priorities to match those of long-deceased kings and their companions. Staggering though it is to consider the Macedonians’ enormous impact on history, we must admit how seldom we are seeing Macedonian history through Macedonian eyes.¹

For western audiences, the Greek and Roman writers who bookend the fourth-century rise and second-century fall of the Macedonian Empire have wielded the most influence on present-day perceptions of the Macedonians. Our earliest extant visions of the Macedonians (as of the Persian Empire under the Achaemenids) are refracted through a Greek, and specifically Athenian, lens – even up to the very moment

when Philip II and Alexander the Great brought the Greeks to their knees at Chaeronea in 338, and at which point ‘Greek history’ might have begun to appear to us as ‘Macedonian history’. The gap in our sources, however, means that the perspectives we are offered leap directly from Hellenocentric to Rome-centric (or Greco-Roman centric). In the Roman period the focus is inevitably on Alexander the Great: of our four main sources for Alexander history, one, Diodorus Siculus, dates to the late Republic; the other three, Plutarch, Arrian, and Quintus Curtius Rufus, belong to the Nervan-Antonine age of AD 96–180. Alexander’s image, of course, has stretched far beyond what even this fatally ambitious man or his Roman chroniclers could have imagined.

In this chapter, I begin by looking at how classical Greeks, with their burgeoning sense of Panhellenism, reacted to Argead royals’ ‘proofs’ of their Hellenicity. I then move onto the Hellenistic world, where Greek writers tended to judge Macedonian kings as individuals rather than on their degree of Hellenicity – although classical ‘Panhellenic’ rhetoric was still used by and against the Macedonians in the public sphere. In section 3 I examine the treatment of the Macedonian soldiery as separate from their kings in the classical and Hellenistic periods (and beyond). I regard this as a long-term consequence of early Argead claims to Hellenicity that implicitly excluded the Macedonians as their barbarian or, at any rate, non-Greek ‘subjects.’ Then in section 4 I deal with the Roman view of the Macedonians, revolving – crucially – around the larger-than-life image of Alexander the Great. While some Roman Greek writers, encouraged by Roman strongmen’s long-time interest in Alexander, used his combination of philhellenism and military skill to make him a ‘Greco-Roman’ hybrid, Latin writers tended to see him as a cautionary example of the type of tyrannical ruler they feared most. Finally, I turn to perceptions of Macedonia by two ‘Others’ – the Persians and Egyptians – thereby opening a window onto an ‘Alexander of Macedonia’ who operates as far as one can imagine from his Macedonian context.

2 Classical and Hellenistic Perceptions of the Kings of Macedonia

Classical Reactions to Argead Self-Presentation

The first Macedonians to enter the historical record were the Argeads – the Macedonian royals – who were perfectly complicit in the co-option of their image by Greeks. Dating back at least to the Persian Wars, the Argead kings were ardently philhellenic, enjoying proxeny with the Athenians and, if the situation required it, able to ‘prove’ their Greek lineage. The first mention of anything relating to the Macedonians is in the Hesiodic *Catalogue of Women*, in which Macedon appears as the brother to the Hellenes’ eponymous Hellen.² This genealogy is not, to my knowledge, found elsewhere, although *Makednos* appears in Hellanicus as a grand-son of Hellen through Aeolus, establishing him more firmly as a Greek (*FGrH* 4 F 74), and in any case the Argead kings apparently had better means with which to connect themselves to the Greeks. Wishing to enter the Olympic games, Herodotus tells us that Alexander I (498 to 454) tried to establish himself as Greek by an appeal to his Argive heritage through a convenient (false) etymological link between the royal dynasty’s name and the city of Argos. The historicity of the incident is not certain (Alexander’s name appears nowhere on the victor lists), which makes it all the more likely that the Argeads propagated the story themselves. The Argos connection also included Heracles via his son Temenos, the legendary founder of Argos, whose own son Perdiccas took over the ‘tyranny’ of Macedonia (Hdt. 5.22, 8.137).³ Later traditions that linked the Argeads to Caranus, one of Temenos’ sons, seem equally influenced by Macedonian sources: Caranus is first mentioned in Theopompus as an ancestor to Philip II (*FGrH* 115 F 393) and in describing Caranus’ conquest of Macedonia, Justin (7.1) cites a presumably Macedonian writer named Marsyas of Pella who (the *Suda* claims) was the brother of Antigonos Monophthalmus.⁴

The figure of Heracles loomed large in Alexander the Great’s self-presentation, as seen in stark visual terms in the widely distributed coin-type whose obverse depicts Heracles hooded by his legendary lion skin.⁵ Alexander also connected himself to Achilles through his mother Olympias, whose Aeacid clan of Epirus drew its lineage back to Achilles’ son Neoptolemus. The young prince Alexander – whose ancestors were steeped in Greek culture and whose tutor was none other than Aristotle – may not have felt the need to prove his ethnic Greekness and cultural education. Rather, it seems likely that his goal was to present himself as a hero and an adventurer, and ultimately as the son of Zeus (whose image, in fact, is represented in the reverse of the Heracles coins).⁶

To what degree, and under what circumstances, did Greeks accept these Argead self-representations? We have already mentioned Herodotus as the earliest source for Alexander I’s Argive lineage and the Heracleid/Temenid connection. This view was accepted a

generation later by Thucydides in regards to Perdiccas (2.99) and, at a more crucial moment, by Isocrates (5.32–33, 106–108), who used it to support Philip not only as a Macedonian but also as the first individual to make a play for the position of *hēgemon* of the Greek states against Persia.⁷ In his lost *Philippica*, Theopompus was critical of Philip and yet (as noted above) seems to have accepted a lineage back to Heracles through Caranus. By Philip's death, the heroic connection seemed to out-strip ethnic origins in importance. Philip's coinage had images of Apollo, Heracles, and Zeus, and Alexander took the Argead connection straight back to Achilles, Heracles and Dionysus. For the latter, these became permanently incorporated into his carefully controlled physical image as a young, unbearded, heroic warrior – an image the lasting resonance of which is best seen in the Heracles coin-types that continued to circulate after his death.⁸

Greeks and Macedonians alike may have been somewhat perturbed, at least in the beginning, by Alexander's pretensions to divine birth, an idea he started cultivating openly when the Oracle of Zeus Ammon in Siwah validated his (supposed) belief that he was the son of Ammon. The incident was recorded by Callisthenes, whose job it was to present Alexander to a Greek audience, and would eventually, and somewhat ironically, be imprisoned for refusing to perform the Persian ritual of *proskynesis*, or obeisance, before the king. Since the latter was a ritual Greeks normally only performed before gods, some of them may have interpreted it as a sign that Alexander wanted to be recognized as one, but the more obvious political aim would have been to regularize court etiquette between Macedonians and Asians. Even if Greeks thought Alexander wanted to be recognized as a god, however,⁹ the idea would not necessarily have struck them as 'un-Greek' as the late sources that tell the story in detail (for example Plutarch and Arrian) tend to suggest.¹⁰ Greeks had gone further before, accepting ruler cult on at least one occasion in the shape of the Spartan Lysander (Plut., *Lysander* 18.17.2–3, citing Duris of Samos), and Agesilaus was also apparently offered cult.¹¹

Greeks were much more bothered by questions of Macedonian kingship than of Macedonian culture. Proxeny with Athens was only one side of the coin, for the Argeads had also been part of the Persian Empire during the fifth-century wars. It is true that Macedonian kingship, which focused on the close relationship between individual kings and their soldiery and allowed free speech (*parrhēsia*) amongst them, was not the formal and distant institution that Persian kingship was. Nevertheless, there were limitations to Macedonian free speech, for it was still one-man rule, and as such it could easily symbolize the kind of despotic power that was anathema to the very notion of 'Greekness'. Hence, fifth-century writers could see the Argead kings as

politically ambiguous. Herodotus 5.18–21, for example, tells us a story of Alexander I's trickery-by-disguise and slaughter of a Persian embassy, which, within the entire matrix of Herodotus' ethnographic tales, can easily be read side-by-side with other stories he tells of barbarians mistreating other barbarians (since they appear to lack Greek ethics). Thucydides too makes no secret of Perdiccas' ever-shifting alliances between the Athenians and Spartans, and he puts the story of his Hellenicity at the end of an 'ethnographic' digression on the political relationship between Thracian Odrysians and the Macedonians, which makes them both look like 'barbarian' threats to the Greeks (2.99 on Perdiccas' Hellenicity; the digression covers 2.95–98). And yet Thucydides also seems to see Greeks and barbarians on a sliding scale: while in 4.124 he seems to classify the Macedonians first as the opposite of Greek, then as something between Greek and barbarians (with the tripartite division of Greek, Macedonian/Chalcidian, and barbarian), he has the Spartan Brasidas classify the Upper Macedonians as barbarians.¹² The picture is less ambiguous when matters came to a head in the fourth century. Demosthenes powerfully rebukes Philip on the charge of tyranny (in Philippic 2 in general). Theopompus, who (as noted above) accepts Philip's Heracleid lineage, characterizes him as nonetheless politically barbaric, evidenced by Polybius' complaint in 8.9.6 that the earlier writer treated the king in contradictory ways. These fears seem, in the end, quite justified: in 324 came Alexander's Exiles Decree, a political tactic that profoundly threatened each city's sense of autonomy as well as its internal stability, and which was met with wide-spread outcry by the Greeks.

Hellenistic Views of the Successors and Beyond

Now we come to the gap in our sources at the high point of Macedonian power, although inscriptions and later Hellenistic literature tell us much about this period. They suggest, for one, that from Philip II's death in 336 to the end of the Macedonian Empire, Greek states continued to push – as 'Greeks' – against their Macedonian overlords. They rejoiced on the death of Philip (Diod. 17.3) and the news of Alexander's death led to a conflict between Antipater's Macedonia and the Athenian alliance that we call the Lamian War (but that Greeks, revealingly, called the 'Hellenic War': *IG* 2² 448.40–51, *SIG*³ 317.6–19). Conflict between Macedonians and Greeks continued under the Antigonids. Here I limit my discussion largely to mainland Greek reactions to these Macedonian rulers: other Hellenistic kings were, of course, Macedonian in origin, but only the Antigonids, who ruled with the help of their Macedonian companions,

appear to have retained a fully Macedonian identity. By contrast, the Ptolemies and Seleucids, to whom I will return in section 5, gathered their *hetairoi* (Companions) from all around the Greek world and maintained a more personal than national rule; the Hellenization of culture through the medium of *koinê* presumably further eroded Macedonian identity. (That said, the identification of non-Antigonid kings as Macedonian does not die out completely: note, for example, that *IG* 9.1² 1, 5, a dedication to Ptolemy III Euergetes, refers to him as ‘the Macedonian’.¹³) These tend to show how the use of the term ‘Macedonian’ can vary according to context, (a point to which I return in section 3 below).

At any rate, during the period of Antigonid dominance over Greece we see re-invocations of Panhellenic sloganeering both by the kings, in the tradition of Philip II, and by the Greeks against them. Two examples on the Antigonid side: Diodorus tells us that in 319 Polyperchon, newly appointed regent of Macedonia, called a council with the ostensible purpose of ‘liberating the Greek cities’ from Antipater’s oligarchies’ (Diod. 18.55.2–57.1, Plut., *Phocion* 31.1), and an inscription dated to 303/2 suggests that Antigonus Monophthalmus and his son Demetrius attempted, albeit with limited success, to re-establish Philip II’s League of Corinth.¹⁴

On the Greek side against the Macedonians, Polybius tells us, for example, that in 210 the Aetolian Chlaeneas made a plea to the Spartans to help Rome against Macedonia. Chlaeneas blames Philip II for the original ‘enslavement’ of Greece (in the Greek rhetoric of identity, a ‘barbarian’ action) and points to the other wrongs done to Greece by Alexander and his Antigonid Successors down to Philip V (9.28–31). The Acharnanian Lysicus, in turn, defends Philip II and the Macedonians for their protection of the Greeks, noting that the conflict is no longer between men who were related (*homophuloi*) but between them and men who were alien (*allophuloi*), that is, the Romans (9.32–39). Note that in this passage the stronger word ‘barbarians’ is used only for the fifth-century Persian enemy of the Greeks.

These periodic public re-invocations of old Panhellenic propaganda, however, do not necessarily reflect the perspectives of the Late Hellenistic writers who recorded them. These have ideological biases all of their own that indirectly or directly affect the presentation of the Macedonians. For one thing, the fact of their writing ‘universal’ history tends automatically to take them back to the Macedonians’ original empire. Furthermore, at least one writer, Polybius in his *Histories*, demonstrates signs of influence from a Macedonian king’s own propagandistic interest: in this case, Philip V’s *imitatio Alexandri*, which left him open to subtle comparison and

contrast with the founders of the Macedonian Empire.

Polybius is the earliest extant source we have for Macedonian history after the fourth-century Attic orators. He lived through the Second and Third Macedonian Wars and his aim was to chronicle how Rome rose to become the greatest imperial power in history. As such, he frames his *History* at the outset by subordinating the achievements of the Macedonian kings to those of the Roman emperors (1.2.4.1):¹⁵

The Macedonians ruled over Europe from the lands of the Adriatic to the Istron (Danube) River, which would appear an altogether trivial portion of the aforementioned continent. Afterwards, they became rulers of Asia once they had freed them from the Persians. But nevertheless these men, far from seeming to have ruled over the greatest extent, left the larger part of the inhabited world outside of it. For they altogether failed to attempt Sicily, Sardinia or Libya, and (to say it plainly) they had no awareness at all of the most warlike western peoples of Europe. The Romans, on the other hand, reduced not only parts but practically the whole inhabited world to their subjection. The empire they left behind is not surpassed by those who came before, or to be rivaled by those who come after.

In general, however, Polybius' attitude toward the Macedonian kings, especially Philip II (who once upon a time provided favors to Polybius' hometown of Megalopolis) is quite fair. He praises Philip for his gentleness (*epieikeia*) and humaneness (*philanthropia*) (5.10.1) and asserts that the king had given the Peloponnesians their first taste of freedom (*eleutheria*) by defeating the Spartans (18.14.6). Alexander he treats more critically, giving credit to his father for many of his achievements, as well as to the *tuchē* ('fortune') that the historian believed ruled human affairs. But he also praises the young conqueror for showing piety after acting violently toward the Thebans (5.10.6). Polybius also extends praise to some Successors when it suits Achaean interests; for example, he castigates the Spartans for joining the Aetolians against Antigonus and the Achaeans (4.16.5). Polybius sees Philip V as a philhellene who takes a tragic turn toward tyranny, and specifically away from the legacy of Philip's and Alexander's principles and magnanimity (*proairesis*, *megalopsuchia*, 5.10.9) – pointedly given Philip V's claim to be related to him, which Polybius himself notes in 5.10.10.¹⁶ In his individuation of the Antigonid kings, Polybius contrasts with classical Athenian writers as well as classicizing Greek writers of the Roman Empire (whom we will discuss presently) in that he does not read the kings from the point of view of Panhellenic identity. That is to say, Polybius' evaluation of the Macedonians is not about ethnic, cultural, or political 'Greekness'

perse, but about a more intimate political ‘genealogy’ that links the Antigonids to a now-appreciated Argead past.

Like Polybius, Diodorus was influenced by the tradition of universal history that had begun with Alexander the Great’s contemporary Ephorus, but with a much larger scope than that of Polybius. The *Library of History* covers an enormous range of time and space from the Trojan War to 60, and from Greece (including its ‘barbarians’) to Italy and Sicily. Like Polybius, Diodorus is not one for hard ideological stances, Panhellenic or otherwise, although he is more critical of Rome than Polybius.¹⁷ Philip II and Alexander are largely positive figures, father perhaps even more so than son. Philip receives praise for the military reforms (16.3.1–2) that raised the Macedonians’ fortunes (16.1.3, 8.7, 95.2), as well as his great generalship (16.60.4), and qualities such as *philanthrôpia* (16.8.2, 8.5, 95.2), which he also attributed to the great Epaminondas (15.57.1). His notorious drinking is mentioned, but hardly counts against him: soon after Diodorus tells us that the Athenian orator Demades (who was captured at Chaeronea) berated Philip for his excessive carousing (16.87.1–2), the historian described him as ‘courteous’ (*philophronoumenos*) to the Greeks when seeking the hegemony over the city-states (16.89.2). As for Alexander, ‘this king brought great things to fruition, and because of his native sagacity and courage he surpassed in the immensity of his accomplishments all the kings whose memory has been passed down over the ages’ (17.1.3), though his character was sometimes questionable. Diodorus highlighted Alexander’s beneficence toward Darius’ captured mother, son, and wife (17.37.5–6, 38.1–3) as evidence of something greater in him than his accomplishments on the battlefield, but also his great rage (toward the Thebans for example at 17.9.6). Diodorus’ books 18–20 are acknowledged as one of the best sources for the history of the Successors, with some biases that may reflect his sources (for example, in general the best source for Succession history was that of Hieronymous of Cardia, but Diodorus’ positive depiction of Ptolemy may point to a Ptolemaist source). His view of Perseus, on the other hand, shows a more contemporary outlook. While he offers a critique of Macedonian imperialism and a praise of Rome against it in 31.8–9, he also critiques the effect of Roman terrorism on Corinth, Carthage, Perseus and the Macedonians, and Numantia in 32.4.5.

3 Greek Perspectives on the Macedonian Soldiery

The Macedonian soldiery does not always receive the same narrative treatment as the kings in Diodorus. Striking in particular is their negative portrayal in the Alexander-account. The historian describes, for example, how Alexander's men plundered Persepolis, slaughtering everyone in their way including fellow Macedonians. While Alexander had encouraged them to plunder the private houses, on the grounds that Persepolis was the 'most hateful' of all Asian cities, he expressly told them not to plunder the palaces, which Diodorus says were famous all over the entire 'civilized world' (*oikoumenē*); yet still they fell to the Macedonians' 'assault' and 'devastation' (*hubris, phthora*, 17.70.3).¹⁸

Indeed, the presentation of Macedonian soldiers as a force unto themselves is well worth our attention. Scholars have tended to ignore the fact that the Macedonian people (who basically equal the soldiery in our sources) are so often treated separately from their kings. This is not universally true, of course (cf. Diod. 17.9.3 where they are treated as the same), and yet this separation is significant enough to be, I believe, largely responsible for the fact that we cannot easily settle on an answer to the question Macedonian Hellenicity in antiquity. Before we answer that, we need to decide to which Macedonians we are referring.

Early Argead claims to Hellenicity both emblemized and reinforced the perceived non-Hellenicity of Macedonia and the Macedonian people. Rulers who wanted to be accepted as Greek seemed obligated to distance themselves from the Macedonians, and Argead foundation stories of Argives coming to rule over the Macedonians necessarily implied that the Macedonians were 'able to be ruled' – which, within the logic of classical Greek identity, automatically implied that they were barbarians. This is why, when Herodotus tells the story of Alexander I at the Olympics, he says that the king's potential competitors wanted him barred, 'saying that the contest was not for barbarian competitors but for Greek ones.' Conversely, a century later Demosthenes uses the specter of association with Macedonia to argue against Philip's Hellenicity, claiming that he is 'not even a barbarian from a place that can be spoken well of, but is a pest from Macedonia, a place where you could not even buy a good slave in the past' (9.30–31). The pro-Philip Isocrates finds an odd solution: he tells the king to treat the Greeks, Macedonians, and barbarians as benefactor, king, and ruler, respectively – momentarily making them an intriguing 'third term' between Greek and barbarian (5.154), but ultimately failing to provide a counterargument to their 'bar-barism'. And, as Athenaeus tells us, Theopompus called Philip 'the Macedonian,' (6.259f–260a) with presumable contempt when castigating him for being susceptible

to flattery.

Notable is Diodorus' specific characterization of the Macedonians as violently money-hungry in their plunder of Persepolis (17.70.4–5):

The Macedonians, having spent the entire day in pillaging, were still not able to fulfill their boundless desire for more. Their overarching greediness for their plunder was so great that they fought with one other and killed many of those who had obtained more of it than they had. Some men, cutting through the most expensive of the finds with their swords, carried off their own portions. Other men chopped off the hands of those who tried to grab onto property that was under dispute, having gone insane due to their passions.

This image may echo earlier stereotypes of the Macedonians. Like Persia, Macedonia – despite its kings' philhellenism – was not known as a place of indigenous culture (although it had a number of Greek intellectuals in residence, most famously Euripides).¹⁹ It was known, however, as a place of wealth, which for Greeks (as for us at times) was easily associated with corruption.²⁰ Macedonia had always been rich in timber, and the Athenians exploited this (at the latest) by 423/2 when Perdiccas promised to sell timber to them exclusively (*IG*³ 89). In gaining control of Amphipolis and Crenides in the 350s, Philip also got access to the prodigious gold and silver mines of Mount Pangaeum. To impute wealth to the Macedonians was from the beginning to tacitly associate them with barbarians, and this was used to suggest how easily bribed pro-Macedonian Athenian supporters were.²¹ Witness this passage from Demosthenes 19.265: 'But when some had begun to take bribes, and the people, in their foolishness –or misfortune, rather – thought that those men were more trustworthy than the men who were speaking on their behalf, and Lasthenes had roofed his house with timber from Macedonia [...]'.

But perhaps the most famous 'compromising' stereotype of the Macedonians, so famous that a recent biographer made it the root of Alexander's demise, was that they were heavy drinkers and drank unmixed wine. Since Greeks drank their wine diluted, to do otherwise was automatically a sign of barbarism. The Macedonian stereotype apparently goes back to Demosthenes (and Aeschines specifically in relation to Philip), Theopompus, and the scandal-mongering Ephippus. Exaggerations from anti-Macedonian sources are perhaps to be expected, but there is no reason to disbelieve the prevalence of drinking in Macedonia: the abundance of sympotic finds in the royal Macedonian tombs at Vergina, for example, are good material evidence for it.²²

And in any case, the drinking stereotype may in some instances be

admiring: in this warrior society, being able to participate in a drinking culture may have been part of the *cursus honorum* for Macedonian youths. Yet it is another stereotype of manliness that will serve the Macedonians' memory most positively: their military discipline and prowess, which fourth-century Athenians ignored at their peril. Take Demosthenes, for example, who, in his desire to urge the Athenians to war, strategically and tendentiously dismisses the power of Macedonia in his second *Olynthiac*. Having declared that 'by itself the country is weak and full of defects' (*autē de kath' hautēn asthenēs kai pollōn kakōn esti mestē*, 2.14) and that the Macedonian people were exhausted, subjected as they were to their kings' constant need for war (2.15–16), he flat-out denies that Philip's Companions are worthy of their (presumably growing) reputation as superior soldiers (2.17): 'His household troops and foot guards indeed have a reputation of being amazing soldiers, and well educated in the science of war. But I have heard from a certain man who has lived in that very place – a man who cannot tell a lie – that they are no better than any other soldiers.'

By the Hellenistic period the association of the Macedonians with good soldiery is commonplace, and it is unaffected even by perceptions of their status as barbarians. Polybius 4.29.2, for example, refers to the 'barbarians of Macedonia' (*tēs Makedoniās barbarous*) in a battle formation, but this does not stop him from praising them for fighting 'valiantly' (*gennaiōs*) against both Attalus (16.4.13) and the Romans (18.21.8), even when they were losing. He also uses the present tense to describe the courage and warlike disposition of Philip V's Macedonian fighting force during the Social War of 220–217 (5.2.4-6):

The Macedonians complied with his orders enthusiastically, for they are in fact not only most courageous soldiers in land skirmishes, but are most ready to perform service at sea when necessary, and are also the most hard-working in trench-digging, palisade-building, and all other sorts of engineering, just the sort that as Hesiod says the sons of Achaeus to be, 'taking joy in war as if it were a feast.'

Furthermore, in explaining how the Roman phalanx was able to defeat the Macedonian phalanx, Polybius suggests that his readership is predisposed toward being impressed by the Macedonians' war machine (18.12.13):

I thought it was necessary to talk about this subject for a while, because many Greeks felt – during those actual circumstances when the Macedonians were defeated – that this was impossible to comprehend. Many will keep wondering why and how the

phalanx is inferior to those armed in the manner of the Romans (*hupo tou Rōmaiōn kathoplismou*).

Diodorus himself notes the Macedonians' fighting qualities (*aretai*, 17.30.7 and *andragathiai*, 17.34.4), although he offers a slightly less flattering assessment than Polybius. He praises the numbers and weight of the Macedonian phalanx under Philip II, claiming that their opponents the Thebans were physically stronger because they spent more time in the gymnasium (17.11.4). Furthermore, his comments that the Macedonian soldiers attacked the Thebans more 'fiercely than is normal in war' (*pikroteron ē polemikōteron*) may suggest an excessiveness similar to that seen at Persepolis (17.70.3-5, described above). It is true that the Macedonians were goaded by the Thebans' taunts (17.12.2) but Diodorus presents this as an act of 'courage' (*andragathia*) and emphasizes the steadfast (*anuperblētos*) nature of the Theban spirit.

What is clear, at any rate, is that by the Hellenistic period the warrior stereotype of the Macedonians has become commonplace. Particularly noteworthy is the use of the word 'Macedonian' for a type of fighting in the Hellenistic period (as we see for the Romans in the final phrase in Polybius' passage above, 'armed in the manner of the Romans'). In fact, many Hellenistic ethnic labels for fighting forces refer not to the individuals fighting but to a fighting-style (that is, the 'ethnicity' of the technique determines the ethnicity of the soldiers, and not vice versa). In his account of the battle between Antigonos and Eumenes, Diodorus describes this sort of soldier in detail. In Eumenes' army were 'about five thousand men who had been equipped in the Macedonian fashion although they were of all races' (19.27.6) and Antigonos had 'more than eight thousand mixed troops in Macedonian equipment, and nearly eight thousand Macedonians' (19.29.3). According to Josephus, the same military definition of Macedonian obtained in Seleucid Asia: 'Antiochus Epiphanes came to the city having a large number of other armed men with him, and surrounding him a band called the Macedonian band. They were all the same age, tall, and just past their childhood, bearing arms and trained in the Macedonian way, which is how they got that name. And yet so many of them were unworthy of so illustrious a nation' (7.5.11.3). As we will see below, while a majority of Roman writers are content with negative Macedonian stereotypes, those who are military-minded will exploit the positive connotations of the Macedonian name in significant ways.

4 Roman Perspectives on the Macedonians and their Kings

Roman Greek Writers

Hellenistic writers saw Roman rule as inevitable but also as impermanent. For Polybius, history went through *anakuklosis* (a continual cycling through the process of birth, acme, and decline), and while Rome's mixed constitution might slow down that cycling it would not put a stop to it (4.57). Diodorus, on the other hand, saw con-temporary Rome as a shadow of its glorious past and twice gives Alexandria credit for being the first city in the world (1.50.7, 17.52.5). But soon enough, Greek literary men would begin to climb further on board: Roman rule is not just inevitable but is a glorious endpoint to history. Their treatment of the Macedonian moment changes accordingly: the flipside of favoring Rome's empire is dismissing the empire that came before it. Strabo, who sees Macedonia as part of Greece (7.7, 7a.1.9) and is the first extant author to use the phrase 'Macedonians and the *other* Greeks' (10.2), deals seldom with the Macedonian Empire *per se*, which he mentions as only one in the series of empires preceding Rome (15.1, 16.2). (In other words, from both a Greek and Roman point of view, there is nothing to 'prove' concerning Macedonia.) The anti-quarian Dionysius of Halicarnassus is more explicit on the contrast between the Macedonian and Roman empires: he admits that the Macedonians defeated a mighty empire before them and that they extended their rule over a greater area than any previous power, but he also emphasizes that the empire dissolved on Alexander's death and its piecemeal shadow would eventually fall to Rome. Putting a finer point on that, Dionysius lists the lands that Macedonia had failed to capture: 'Even the Macedonian power did not subjugate every country and every sea; for it neither conquered Libya, with the exception of the small portion bordering on Egypt, nor subdued all Europe, but in the North advanced only as far as Thrace and in the West down to the Adriatic Sea' (1.3.1).

Dionysius also makes a clear ideological connection between Greece and Rome by proving Rome to be Greek city (1.5.1, 89.1-2, 90.1) – an early sign of the re-emergence of a particularly 'Greek' self-consciousness in the face of a *new* imperial power. This is the moment we call the 'Second Sophistic', when Greek intellectualism was nurtured by the Roman emperors, most notably Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, and Marcus Aurelius, and yet was manifested in a classicizing, or backwards-looking, form. We find unity in the

diversity of Second Sophistic authors in their focus on practicing declamation and producing literary texts that eschew the *koinē* (Common Greek) of Polybius, Diodorus, and Dionysius in favor of the Attic-Ionic of the classical period, and which tend to focus on Homeric themes and classical Athenian intellectual and political history.²³ But there is also a renewed attitude toward Rome: as Greek culture is valorized as equal to Roman power, Roman power is praised as having enabled Greek cultural flourishing. For some writers, Macedonia stands in contrast to both Greece and Rome. The second century AD rhetorician Aelius Aristides, for example, addresses Rome in a paean to the city thus: ‘The others who ruled before you were despots and slaves of one another, each in turn, and thus each came to power as bastards of empire, changing position as if in a ball game: Macedonians were slaves to Persians, Persians to Medes, Medes to Assyrians. But however long all have known you, they have known you as rulers’ (*To Rome* 91). Aristides also denigrates the capital cities of Macedonia in contrast to Athens, long past its peak of power but still considered by Roman Greeks as the *omphalos* of culture: ‘No one would show patriotic fervor for Pella or Aegae, if that were their home-land’ (*To Rome* 334), and he takes care to note in his *To Plato* (at 55) that Macedonia is a place lacking the art of rhetoric. The context is the past, but the reference to the central intellectual activity of the present era is unmistakable. Finally, Aristides’ con-temporary Lucian dismisses Pella as insignificant in the present day (*Alexander the False Prophet* 6).

Others, however, choose to exploit Macedonian history in a positive way through the figure of Alexander the Great. It does not last as long as we might hope: Alexander’s singular appeal seems to disappear by the third century when Aristides, Lucian, and anecdotalists like Athenaeus, who referred occasionally to the Macedonians and their kings, focusing on their debauchery and excessive warlike nature, wrote. But in the first and second centuries, Alexander is a ‘Greek’ culture hero and a powerful one at that.²⁴

Plutarch makes much of Alexander’s genealogical link to Achilles and Heracles, on the one hand, and his education by Aristotle on the other;²⁵ Arrian uses Alexander’s connection to Achilles to promote the king as a warrior and himself as an analogue to Homer (1.12.1–2). Dio Chrysostom posits Heracles as a model of the good king whom Alexander should emulate (for example at 2.78). And yet this Alexander is also peculiarly Roman – and here his Macedonian background contributes. While culture-obsessed writers like Aristides have nothing good to say about Macedonia, writers like Polyaeus, who collected colorful episodes from military history in his *Stratagems*, identifies himself as a Macedonian in the preface to book 1 and goes

on to claim at the beginning of book 4, on Macedonian stratagems, that it was the most enjoyable book of them all to write, and was the means by which the emperors might learn ‘the excellences of my ancestors’. And as for the ‘Macedonianness’ of Alexander, Arrian, who was a Roman general of Greek origin and one-time governor of the province of Cappadocia, exploits Alexander’s connection to Macedonia fully by explicitly calling Alexander a ‘Macedonian’ (or rather, having Alexander call himself a Macedonian before his troops, in 2.7.3; in any event, this is the single use of the label for Alexander in the Second Sophistic), and by showing the Macedonians to be a formidable fighting force alongside their king throughout the text (for example, 1.13.6–7).

Writers who are more interested in the intellectual and ethical aspects of the Hellenic ideal also exploit the Macedonians, but negatively, as an integral part of Alexander’s background that must be suppressed if he is to become successful. For the philosopher Dio Chrysostom, Alexander must be true to his descent from Heracles (here a Cynic model) and temper the warlike (that is, Macedonian) disposition of himself and his Macedonian soldiers with philosophy (Dio, an oblique writer, implies this, for example, in *Or.* 1.6, 4.8).²⁶ And for Plutarch, Alexander’s good rule comes to light through contrast with his Macedonians (and note too that when he is at his most barbaric he speaks for the one and only time ‘in Macedonian’ – *Makedonisti*, *Alexander* 51). Plutarch also carefully contrasts Alexander with Olympias and Philip, largely because of their role in Alexander’s divine pretensions, something of which Plutarch happens to disapprove. In a divergence from the Hellenistic writings, the Second Sophistic generally tends to judge Philip, at any rate, as inferior to his son. The constant bolstering of Alexander to the detriment of other Macedonians (when Alexander is a positive figure, that is), even as he gains credit as a warrior by association with them, reinforces the sense that he alone of the Macedonian kings is considered worthy of playing this hybrid Greco-Roman role.

One might reasonably ask why Alexander is idealized in the empire but not in our Hellenistic sources. This seems most logically answered by the Romans’ own long-standing interest in the youthful conqueror of the world. Alexander’s *paideia* in the Second Sophistic is also not just about book learning, but is uniquely ‘active’ in a way that looks quite Roman. This is perhaps most obvious in Plutarch’s treatise *De Alexandri Fortuna aut Virtute* (‘On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander’), which goes so far as to depict Alexander as a ‘philosopher in action’ and a man of *philanthrō-pia* (‘love of mankind’ or ‘humanness’) who encourages all to see the entire world (*oikoumenē*) as their fatherland. This is where ‘Greekness’ and the Roman ideal of *humanitas* – which

sees the empire as a humane civilizing force over its subjects – seem to meet.²⁷ It is also an interesting rewriting of Alexander's policies. W.W. Tarn's acceptance in his *Alexander the Great* (Cambridge 1948) of Plutarch's idea that Alexander had a 'policy of 'fusion' of Greeks and barbarians (as opposed to merely wishing for world-rule) has had long legs but is, in fact, new in Greek writing and looks perfectly Roman. Similarly, Plutarch's *Alexander* emphasizes Alexander's fine treatment of barbarians, although the text is not wholly uncritical. Plutarch shows the king eventually going too far into barbarism himself, especially in his murder of Cleitus and imprisonment of Callisthenes, suggesting the difficulty of keeping oneself 'pure' when spending too much time in the East. Elsewhere, the analogy between Alexander and the philhellenic prince is even more obvious and also comes with a warning: Dio of Prusa (or Chrysostom) addressed four orations to Trajan, Alexander's great admirer, two of which use Alexander as a seeming stand-in for the emperor. Contained within seems to be a lesson that too much militarism can compromise (Greek) ethical propriety. Reflecting a Roman civilizing ideal, as he did in Plutarch's *On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander*, Alexander is shown to have universal sway over both Greeks and barbarians. While sometimes this is explicitly supported by his association with Macedonian arms, other times it is compromised by the Macedonians' concomitant lack of ethics, on display in their temptation by barbarian wealth. Dio classifies the Macedonians among the Greeks on the battlefield (4.9), but they are far from culturally Greek.

Roman Strongmen and Latin Literature

As we see, there is nothing purist about the use of Alexander from the point of view of classicism. He is useful to Roman Greek writers to the degree that he looks like a powerful and culturally savvy emperor: a philhellene, a great expansionist, and a putative unifier of mankind under a single ideology. Turning now to the perspective of those military victors of this era (as opposed to the 'cultural victors' the Greeks fancied themselves), it is clear that the Romans got a hold of this 'imperial Alexander' long before the Greeks did.

The general analogy between Rome and Alexander was suggested by Roman generals who asserted their supremacy over the Macedonians. While Republican figures might not always wish to be associated with Alexander's excesses, men like Pompey, who famously adopted 'Magnus' (an epithet first found early in the second century at Plautus, *Mostellaria* 775) and Alexander's anastole style of haircut and cloak, were appropriating the legacy of Alexander to (somewhat ironically) aggrandize their own military successes in contrast to the

Macedonians (Plut., *Pompey* 2.1). Caesar dedicated a Lysippean bronze equestrian statue in the forum but replaced Alexander's head with his own (Suetonius, *Caesar* 7). Octavian posited himself as the Apollonian counterweight to Antony's Heracles and Dionysus (and, by extension, Alexander, whom Antony wished to emulate), but after Actium he visited Alexander's grave in Alexandria and for a short time changed his personal seal from a sphinx to an Alexander (Pliny, *Natural History* 37.10 Suetonius, *Augustus* 50). Nero, appropriating others' glory where he could not, was said to have had a boy-Alexander statue gilded, which was then removed after his murder (Pliny, *Natural History* 35.27, 93–94). There was a lull in *imitatio Alexandri* until the warlike philhellene Trajan, and in the early third century Caracalla raised a 'Macedonian phalanx', clearly suggesting the continued link of the Macedonian name with military achievement (Dio 77.7.–2).²⁸

As always, however, literary men operated by their own rules. At times they exploited generals' and emperors' self-associations with Alexander but their comparisons between Macedonian and Roman autocracy seemed to proliferate far beyond real-life Alexander-imitation. A single Latin monograph on Alexander exists, that of Quintus Curtius Rufus.²⁹ Otherwise, Alexander shows up in writers as diverse as Cicero, Livy, Horace, Velleius Paterculus, Quintilian, Lucan, Statius, and Aulus Gellius,³⁰ who (broadly influenced by the Hellenistic philosophical and rhetorical traditions) used him as an exemplum of ruler virtues like *amicitia* (friendship) and *clementia* (clemency) and vices like *iracundia* (anger) and *cupiditas gloriae* (over-desire for glory).³¹ He is perhaps most often used as a cautionary example, particularly as writers wrestle with the question of how autocracy can be tempered by senatorial/republican values. Curtius' overarching theme was how *fortuna* gave Alexander glory but eventually turned him from *rex* to *tyrannus*. A writer like Seneca, who lived during the reign of the Alexander-admiring madman Caligula, represents the senatorial anti-Alexander posture when in *De Beneficiis* 2.16.1 he criticizes Alexander the madman (*vesanus*) for bequeathing to an unnamed individual an entire city, then bragging that this action was based not on what the recipient needed, but on his own exalted position.

What we do not see in Latin writing, not surprisingly, is the Alexander-apology of Greek writers who wished to Hellenize him, and who thus tried to keep him away from barbaric elements – which sometimes included Macedonia. Some familiar old stereotypes of the country as culturally backwards do emerge, although they often seem to say less about the writer's attitude toward the backwater than to the king himself. When Lucan, depicting that certainly fictional visit of Caesar to Alexander's tomb in Egypt, swipes viciously at Alexander as

the ‘insane (*vesanus*) offspring of Pelleian Philip’ (*Pharsalia* 10.1), he does so as a means of disparaging the prince’s divine pretensions. And when Curtius has Alexander say, in a speech to his men, that he could have ‘within the bounds of Macedonia looked forward to a life of leisure leading to an obscure and unremarkable old age’ (9.6.19) this may be taken in the context of Alexander’s over-ambition. Even more striking is the positive role given to the Macedonians. Many Latin authors seemed to use Alexander and the Macedonians to encapsulate their own (and their audience’s) fear of mistreatment at the hands of autocratic rulers. For Roman Greeks, the Macedonians are always ‘other’ – except at times on the battlefield; for Romans, the Macedonians are ‘us.’ After Alexander’s murder of Cleitus in 328, Seneca in *De Ira* defends the victim on the grounds that he was merely ‘sparing with his flattery and reluctant to transform himself from a Macedonian and a free man into a Persian slave’ (3.17.1), and he directly associates the Macedonians with the cause of freedom against the barbarian. And in discussing the *proskynesis* humiliation, Curtius, having earlier had the Athenian Charidemus vouch both for the Macedonians’ skill in battle and also for the fact that, far from being greedy for gold and silver, their discipline resulted from having poverty as a schoolmistress (*paupertate magistra*; 3.2.15), defends them for their ill reaction to Alexander’s behavior, blaming the *Greeks* ‘who had debased the profession of the liberal arts by their evil habits’ and were ‘opening the road to heaven for [Alexander], claiming that Heracles, Father Liber and Castor and Pollux would yield before this new divinity’ (8.5.8). Justin’s epitome of Trogus suggests that the lost Augustan writer used the relationship between Alexander and the Macedonians to narrate a cautionary tale of the gradual corruption of soldiers by bad leadership.³² This is a good measure of whom Greek and Latin writers considered ‘other’ to themselves: whereas classicizing Greek writers had to work with and around their traditional attitudes, even myths, about the ‘barbarian’ Macedonians in order to create a Greco-Roman Alexander, Rome’s main foils were less the Macedonians than the Carthaginians and even the Greeks. Ever irresistible as exempla, Alexander and the Macedonians could represent a somewhat wider range of concerns about the nature of autocracy and democracy for Latin writers than for their Greek contemporaries, who would always see them somewhat in the light of their historical relation-ship with Greece.

5 Two Eastern Perspectives on the

Macedonian Victors: Persian and Egyptian

Alexander's Afterlife from Conqueror to Everyman

Sections 2–4 studied the various ways in which Greeks and Romans comprehended the Macedonians and their kings or exploited their memory. But, of course, many other peoples came into contact with the Macedonians and the legend of Alexander would eventually touch every corner of the globe. This final section briefly examines two of the most obviously important ‘eastern’ perspectives on the Macedonians: the Persian and the Egyptian. Once again, we are seeing the Macedonians from the point of view of the conquered, although of course this is not immediately the case with the Persians, who had sovereignty over the Macedonians during the fifth-century Persian Wars. Both the Persians and Egyptians adapted to different degrees to Macedonian rule during Alexander’s conquests, but under the Seleucids and the Ptolemies the Macedonian legacy branches out in rather different ways. In the Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic world, it is difficult to talk about the afterlife of the Macedonians without reference to the *Alexander Romance*, which began to be formed in the third century but was eventually translated into numerous languages, including Icelandic, then expanded on and embellished; it also influenced much better works of literature in traditions from Persian (a few of which I will discuss below) to medieval European to modern Greek.³³

Perceptions of the Macedonians in Persia, from Achaemenid to Islamic

The Persian view of the Macedonians, and of Alexander in particular, is complicated by the relative dearth of Persian sources for some periods of history. Until the medieval period, with Firdausi (about AD 934–1020), there are no full-length ‘narratives’ to represent the complexities of Persian identity. The following brief account attempts to give a chronological overview of Alexander’s earlier image, but the reader should note that it entails a certain amount of guesswork from later sources. See also the Iranians’ reaction to Macedonia, and especially Alexander the Great, as discussed in M.J. Olbrycht, chapter 17.

Historiographical and other texts like the Babylonian Chronicles

and the Dynastic Prophecy give intriguing clues concerning ‘perceptions’ of the Macedonians before and after Alexander’s conquest of Persia. In the period before Alexander’s conquest unfortunately such texts tend to ignore regions outside of Babylon unless they directly relate to the king’s movements. We are therefore left to reconstruct early Persian perceptions of the Macedonians from Greek literary sources – and can do so only in rather sweeping terms. For example, Herodotus’ account of Mardonius’ use of Alexander I as a go-between for Persia with Greece suggests a Persian sense of their exploitability. As for Philip II, the fact that the Persians had sent aid to Perinthus (which Demosthenes urged the Athenians to do at 4.32) may indicate some worry over the Macedonian king. When Alexander arrives on the scene, however, it is possible to see sympathy between Greek and Babylonian sources, even given the fragmentary nature of the latter. Both seem to suggest that the Persians were confident in their ability to defeat Alexander. Diodorus, for example, saw the Persians’ decision to eschew Memnon’s scorched-earth policy in favour of Arsites’ advocacy of battle, for example, as sign of arrogance or *megalopsuchia* (17.18.3), although the fact that they had success against the Macedonians in the previous year was a good reason to feel some confidence.³⁴ One Babylonian document in particular reinforces this idea of Persian self-assurance – at least the projection of it: a short text called the ‘Dynastic Prophecy’ (British Museum 40623), as edited by A.K. Grayson.³⁵ This text lists a series of predictions from the Neo-Assyrian period (934–609) through the Macedonian conquest and makes an astonishing claim that has been routinely ignored: that Darius, after being repulsed by Alexander the ‘Hanaean’,³⁶ had returned to defeat him and thus usher in a new era of glory for the Babylonians. M. Neujahr has recently suggested that the ‘triumph of Darius’ was a failed prediction meant to rally the troops for Darius after either Granicus (in 334) or Issus (in 333). The transmitter of the text chose to revise by simply adding updated information rather than rewriting, hence the inclusion of historical events postdating and contradicting it.³⁷ In terms of perceptions of the Macedonians, then, it seems that even after their first or second initial encounter the Persians were confident or hopeful enough that the Great King would eventually triumph over his enemy to record it as a prediction.

It is possible too that some of the more explicitly negative views of Alexander we see in the medieval period were fertilized during the period of his conquest. The conventional view – put forth by scholars ranging from T. Nöldeke in the late 1800s to C. Ciancaglini in the 1990s³⁸ – is that stories like Alexander’s destruction of the Zoroastrian books (propagated by historians like Gardizi in the

eleventh century but first attested in the sixth century AD)³⁹ come from the Sassanid dynasty (AD 226–651), which traced its lineage back to Darius. A.S. Shahbazi, however, suggested that the negative views of Alexander were ancient, some pre-dating Darius' death.⁴⁰ Arguing from Greek and Persian sources, for example, Shahbazi validates the Dynastic Prophecy's anti-Macedonian view and attributes it largely to the Magi, who would have associated Alexander's victories as a 'calamity' presaged in 356 by the burning of the Temple of Artemis (something that Plutarch mentions as an omen at Alexander's birth, *Alexander* 3). Shahbazi also suggests that Manichaean Sogdian texts show traces of Old Iranian language when portraying Alexander as the destroyer of the Magi, hence dating the religious hatred of Alexander to the pre-Sassanian period. (Fascinatingly, it is the Persian enmity with the Romans who imitated the Macedonian conqueror that seems to have provoked this hatred for Alexander.) If we accept even some of Shahbazi's conclusions, the period surrounding Alexander's conquests may have been more aggressively anti-Alexander than is usually believed.

In 238 the Parthians under Arsaces established independence from the Seleucids and would retain intermittent independence under the Greeks and Romans from 248 BC to AD 226 until the rise of the Sassanian dynasty (AD 226–642). Unfortunately, the almost complete loss of written sources from the Parthian era is a hindrance to understanding Parthian 'perceptions', but it is possible to guess something of how complex these may have been in terms of old/new, east/west. As they rose to power, the Parthians (who were once a portion of the Persian Empire) fought alongside the Greco-Bactrians (who were a Hellenistic invention based on the meeting between Greco-Macedonians and former Persian subjects) against the Greco-Macedonian Seleucids. At the same time the Parthians were influenced by the Greek culture of both the Greco-Bactrians and the Seleucids (as seen on the coins of Artabanus I (128–124), for example, which bore a Greek legend), on the one hand, and the Achaemenid culture that preceded theirs—although politically they saw themselves as the inheritors of the lands of Alexander and Cyrus (Tacitus, *Annals* 6.31).⁴¹ One may wonder, therefore, whether in the Parthian era it even makes sense to ask questions concerning the 'Persian' perception of the 'Macedonians'. We do not know, for example, whether the Parthians saw themselves as true 'Persian' heirs to the Achaemenids nor can we say for sure whether they would have seen the Seleucids as 'Macedonian', 'Greek', or both.

We are also lacking sources from the Sassanian period since the Arabs tended to translate into Arabic from Pahlavi when they conquered Persia.⁴² It is here, however, where scholars have detected

the roots of a recurring image of Alexander as the philosophical man, seen ubiquitously in Persian literature after the Islamic conquest of the seventh century. To what extent is this Alexander a 'Greek'? The earliest Persian-language version of the *Alexander Romance* is contained in books 18–20 of Firdausi's tenth/eleventh century *Shahnameh* (which, somewhat like Greek writings in the Roman Empire, was a monument of Persian classicism at a time of Arab rule), but was most likely transmitted through the Syriac translation of the Greek that was made under Sassanian King Chosroes I (AD 531–79), who was a lover of Greek philosophy.⁴³ Persian writers after Firdausi often associated Alexander with philosophy: for example, Nimazi (late twelfth century) and Jami (late fifteenth century), who depicted him at a *symposium* of the greatest Greek philosophers including Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, although eventually the 'Greekness' of these associations has been superseded by the emphasis on Alexander as an Everyman who wishes to reach immortality (an extension of Alexander's 'longing' or *pothos* from Arrian), but who had to face the certainty of death.

At this time, a certain portion of Greek intellectual thought had been syncretized into Persian thought; thus the 'Greekness' of those cultural inheritances does not appear to conflict with the religious context of the Sassanian and Arab writings on Alexander. In the Syriac *Alexander Romance* Alexander is an ideal Christian world conqueror, who before his expedition 'prayed to the one true God', and to whom is attributed some of the glory of the real-life kings Cabades and Chosroes I by claiming that he built the wall on the Caucasus mountains that kept the 'Unclean Nations' led by the biblical Gog and Magog at bay. (Roxane is also made the daughter of Darius, hence connecting Alexander to the glorious Achaemenids by marriage.) In the Quran, on the other hand, Alexander becomes Dhul-Qarain, the 'two-horned one', in search of the Water of Life and Immortality.⁴⁴ As such, he also protects the west from Gog and Magog,⁴⁵ but there is at least one very important change in the biography of the man who is now, for linguistic reasons, called 'Iskandar' or 'Sikandar': the story of his birth. While the Syriac version maintains the birth story found in the Greek *Alexander Romance*, where Alexander is the son of the last pharaoh, Nectanebo, Firdausi, for example, makes Alexander a half-brother to Darius through the brief marriage of the Elder Darius to Philip II's daughter, whose bad breath caused her to be sent back to Philip, unwittingly pregnant with Iskandar, who would eventually and rightfully claim the Persian throne.⁴⁶ Alexander's ascension is, therefore, seen as the result of a dynastic struggle rather than of a foreign conquest – something that Persian myth denied had ever happened in the history of the land – and thus helped reconcile for the

Muslim world Alexander's defeat of Darius with his heroic appearance in the Quran.

The 'Greek' cultural content of Alexander seems to evaporate largely although not completely. Manuscript illustrations tend to depict the Macedonians like medieval Persians. In the opposite manner to the classical Greek vase painters who had depicted Persians in exotic costumes, Persian illustrators did not 'otherize' the Macedonians but assimilated them, rewriting Macedonian history in self-promoting ways. However, the negative Zoroastrian view of Alexander could be presented as anti-Hellenic. For example, men who wrote from an Islamic (and thus anti-Zoroastrian) point of view like Nizami and the fifteenth-century writer Mirkhoun cited the above-discussed story of the destruction of the Zoroastrian books (which does not appear at all in Firdausi) approvingly. But for the mid-eleventh century Gardizi, this was just more proof, along with the translation of Persian literature into Greek, of how Alexander had destroyed Iranian culture via Hellenization.⁴⁷

Macedonians within Greek/Egyptian Identities

I conclude here with some brief comments on the Egyptians, whose dominant social, cultural, and political opposition of 'Greek' and 'Egyptian' (and eventually, Greco-Egyptians vs. Jews) tends to obscure the Macedonians as a separate entity.⁴⁸ From the time Alexander landed until the Roman period, Egyptians do not appear to have distinguished Macedonians from Greeks in any politically meaningful way; indeed, in Ptolemaic Egypt it was possible for a man who was culturally both Greek and Egyptian to take on a 'Macedonian' identity. The Egyptians were particularly unresistant to Alexander, and one gets the sense that they accepted the Macedonians more or less as Greeks, with whom they were not only familiar enough but shared a common enemy: the Persians. Indeed, upon arrival in Egypt, Alexander immediately ratified the Hellenicity of the Macedonians for an Egyptian audience by staging traditional Panhellenic games.

Harder evidence for the conflation of Greek and Macedonian in the public sphere is found in legal texts of the Ptolemaic and Roman period. The Ptolemies brought in a large influx of immigrants from all over the Greek and non-Greek world but tax documents from the Fayum show only a stark division of 'Greek' (*Hellēn*) and 'Egyptian' (*Aiguptoi*). Here the Greek category represents a range of immigrants (surprisingly wide by the standards of classical Greek ethnic divisions) that includes not only Athenians and Thebans, for example, but also Thracians, Judaeans, and Macedonians. The opposition itself is

hierarchical because ‘Greeks’ received a tax break, but membership in the categories is rather fluid. One could become a Hellene by marrying a Hellene or by joining the army. Take, for example, the case of Dionysius alias Plenis, who confounds the line between Greek and Egyptian and also shows the subsumption of ‘Macedonian’ within ‘Hellene’. This was a man who held offices in the Egyptian priesthood, is called in some texts a *basilikos georgos* (‘a status generally regarded as the very definition of a purely Egyptian peasant’), who wrote Demotic and Greek equally well, who enrolled as a ‘Macedonian’ and was undoubtedly of elite *Hellene* status.⁴⁹ Furthermore, the Romanization of Egypt created more elaborate legal hierarchies, for now the *Hellenes* became an elite subdivision of what the Romans called *Aiguptioi* (above them were the *astoi*, the Greek-speakers of the Egyptian Greek cities, who were Roman citizens but not labelled as such, and at the top Roman citizens proper or *Romaioi*). Presumably there were Macedonians in both the Hellene and *astoi* categories, but this tells us nothing of the attitudes of those in the *Aiguptioi* category, and this is, of course, even assuming that these legal categories determined personal identities, which we should not necessarily do.

Once more we look to narrative for better insight. Narratives are personal voices clearly, but they are also collective voices in that they reflect audience expectations. The Greek *Alexander Romance* (third century AD) is particularly ‘collective’: it is the product of five or more centuries of adding, subtracting, and embellishing. Its ensuing popularity (among Greek texts it is second only to the New Testament in the Middle Ages) also suggests the wide acceptability of its viewpoint, the most obvious feature of which is the fixation on Alexander the Great as a mortality-denying Everyman rather divorced from his original political context. But, in an inverted view to that seen in Gardizi’s eleventh century-historical text, the *Alexander Romance* implies that the hero’s defeat of Darius is a salvation to Egypt. It is ‘nationalistic’ not only in that its ‘Egyptianizing’ Alexander subverts the legal hierarchies of Greek and Egyptian but also because it connects Alexander and Egypt through hatred of the Persians. The *Romance* is ‘Greek’ to the extent that it is written in *koinē* and, for example, tends to emphasize Alexander’s connection to the Greek philosophers. But its beginning at least is very Egyptian. If Firdausi made Alexander the half-brother to Darius, the *Alexander Romance* makes him the son of the Egyptian Nectanebo, the last Pharaoh of Egypt before Persian rule. Using a traditional Egyptian story-type of magic and trickery (the Pharaoh seduced Alexander’s mother Olympias in the form of a snake, that is, Zeus Ammon), the author of the tale not only legitimizes Alexander’s possession of the throne but also more importantly ‘proves’ that (half-) Egyptians have continued

to rule Egypt. Like Firdausi's *Shahnameh*, the Greek *Alexander Romance* divorces Alexander from the Macedonian past in order to support quasi-national agenda, but by dehistoricizing him from history it makes him ever more appealing.

6 Conclusion

The first appearances of the Macedonians in the *Histories* of Herodotus were modest, presaging little of what could come. Yet, when the fourth century Macedonian moment does arrive, we do not witness it from contemporary accounts but are left to reconstruct it from Roman sources. Of course we are lucky to have those Roman sources and yet, as we count our blessings, we should also wonder why such sources appear at a time when the Macedonian moment has become a mere memory.

As we have seen, Greek reasons will not always be Roman reasons. Roman reasons will not always be Persian reasons or Persian Egyptian ones. As the Macedonians went from sometime ally to possible threat in the fifth and fourth centuries classical authors fit and refit them into a pre-existing but flexible framework for Panhellenic identity, which was in turn (to different degrees with different authors) based on Hellenic genealogy and, more importantly, political/cultural ideals of Greekness. The overall result is an ambiguous picture of the Macedonians in classical Greek texts, which is true even when reflecting Argead kings' attempts to frame their own image in Greek terms. To the extent that Hellenistic authors, on the other hand, were less interested in recapturing the nostalgia of Panhellenism than in reading the new world order the Macedonians are somewhat less freighted with ideology. Hellenistic writers' reportage suggests that the Panhellenic rhetoric of the struggle of the free world 'against the barbarian' was commonly exploited by Macedonians and Romans alike, but the writers themselves – who, after all, live in a multicultural world bearing little resemblance to the fifth and fourth century Athens and whose loyalties seem local rather than Panhellenic – less insistently defined themselves oppositionally against either power.

In the era of the philhellene emperors, Greek writers show increasing comfort defining their 'Greekness' against *Romanitas*, and this seems to be exemplified in their tendency to actively 'Hellenize' the figure of Alexander the Great. For classicizing writers whose Greek pride revolved around Greek intellectual supremacy in the empire, the military aspects of Macedonian history hold little interest.

But others who wish to claim Greek primacy in the realm of world-rule find ways of appropriating both military aspects of ‘Macedonianness’ and embellishing Alexander’s Greek cultural qualities. Despite imagining themselves as somewhat free from Roman influence, it is clear that their interest in Alexander came from Rome, whose strongmen had long manipulated Alexander’s symbolic value. Latin writers, in turn, respond to their leaders’ alteration between autocratic power-mongering and democratic posturing by using Alexander as an exemplum – sometimes good, more often bad – of the possibilities and limits of autocratic rule. For many Latin writers, the Macedonians can become the victim-foil to Alexander, representing ‘self’ against all potentially tyrannical Roman leaders.

The Macedonian triumph had different effects on the Persians and Egyptians on first encounter: the Persians show a fighting spirit as their fifth-century subjects transform into their most potent threat, then they accept Alexander in purely Persian terms; the Egyptians show eager hope that Macedonian rule would be less harsh than that of the Persians. But for both, as with so many other peoples, the figure of Alexander the Great would become divorced from Macedonian and Greek history and incorporated into new national mythologies. Alexander’s appeal is not his defeat of the Persians *per se* but his universality, encapsulated in the notion of his *pothos*: the hero of the *Alexander Romance* and its offshoots longs for immortality but fails, as we all will eventually fail. Whatever combination of qualities – his youth, his ambition, his warrior spirit, his inquisitiveness, his ruthlessness, his untimely death – explains his attraction to so many different people throughout time and space, the further away we get from the historical man himself, the more accessibly human he seems to become.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

Scholars have only recently turned their attention to how our modern perceptions of the ‘silent’ Macedonians are impacted by non-Macedonian perspectives. Recognition of the biased nature of Alexander-sources has caused some scholars to ask why Alexander is mythologized in particular ways from ancient to modern times: useful here are E. Badian (ed.), *Alexandre le grand: Image et réalité* (Geneva 1976), A.B. Bosworth and E. Baynham (eds.), *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction* (Oxford 2000), and C. Mossé, *Alexander: Destiny and Myth*, trans. J. Lloyd (Baltimore 2004), pp. 167–210. Another impetus for studying perceptions has been the enduring controversy on

Macedonian origins, on which see J. Engels, chapter 5. For the broader embedment of the Macedonians within Greek constructions of self-identity, see J. Hall, 'Contested Ethnicities: Perceptions of Macedonia within Evolving Definitions of Greek Identity', in I. Malkin (ed.), *Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity* (Cambridge 2001), pp. 159–86 and S.R. Asirvatham, 'The Roots of Macedonian Ambiguity in Classical Athenian Literature', in T. Howe and J. Reames (eds.), *Macedonian Legacies: Studies on Macedonian Culture and History in Honor of Eugene N. Borza* (Claremont 2009), pp. 235–55. Little has been written on Hellenistic writers' perceptions of the Macedonian past although J.E. Atkinson, 'Originality and Its Limits in the Alexander Sources of the Early Empire', in A.B. Bosworth and E. Baynham (eds.), *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction* (Oxford 2000), pp. 307–26, is useful. For the Second Sophistic, one must consult work on individual authors: e.g., J. Moles, 'The Kingship Orations of Dio Chrysostom', *Papers of the Leeds International Latin Seminar* 6: (Leeds 1990), pp. 297–375, T. Whitmarsh, 'Alexander's Hellenism and Plutarch's Textualism', *CQ*² 52 (2002), pp. 174–92, and S.R. Asirvatham, 'No Patriotic Fervor for Pella: Aelius Aristides and the Presentation of the Macedonians in the Second Sophistic', *Mnem.*⁴ 61 (2008), pp. 207–27. D. Spencer covers the Latin side in *The Roman Alexander* (Exeter 2002). On the main Latin source for Alexander, see E. Baynham, *Alexander the Great: The Unique History of Quintus Curtius* (Ann Arbor 1998). For the early Persian perspective, see R.J. van der Spek, 'Darius III, Alexander the Great and Babylonian Scholarship', *Achaemenid History* 13 (2003), pp. 289–346 and A.S. Shahbazi, 'IranoHellenic Notes. 3, Iranians and Alexander', *AJAH*² 2 (2003), pp. 5–38. R. Stoneman, *Alexander the Great: A Life in Legend* (New Haven 2008), addresses medieval Iran's Alexander-centric view (with Parthian and Sassanian source material), as well as Egyptian views.

¹ See P.J. Rhodes, chapter 2. The fragments of Theagenes of Macedonia with commentary prepared by J. Engels are now published in *BNJ* 774. My focus in this chapter is on how the Macedonians are presented in written discourse, and I leave it to experts in material culture to theorize the ways in which identity emerges in art. However, I do casually refer to visual evidence of attitudes toward the Macedonians – most obviously, for example, when it comes to Hellenistic and Roman strongmen's *imitatio Alexandri* in coins and portraiture. For more in-depth study on Alexander's visual image in the Hellenistic period, see, for example, A. Stewart, *Faces of Power: Alexander's Image and Hellenistic Politics* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1993) and A. Cohen, *The Alexander Mosaic: Stories of Victory and Defeat* (Cambridge

1997); also seen. 8 below. For Rome, see bibliography in n. 28.

² R. Merkelbach and M.L. West (eds.), *Fragmenta Hesiodica* (Oxford 1967), p. 6.

³ The connection of the Temenids to Heracles naturally also took the Argeads back to Zeus, as did the alternative genealogy given by Hesiod (*Eoae* F 7) and Appian (11.63), which took the Argeads back to Argeas son of Macedon son of Zeus: see C.J. King, chapter 18.

⁴ Debunking the Argead myth: E.N. Borza, 'Athenians, Macedonians, and the Origins of the Macedonian Royal House', in *Studies in Attic Epigraphy, History and Topography. Presented to Eugene Vanderpool* (Princeton 1982), pp. 7–13. On the introduction of Caranus into the lineage, see W.S. Greenwalt, 'The Introduction of Caranus into the Argead King List', *GRBS* 26 (1985), pp. 43–9 and Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, pp. 83, 179. For ancient sources, see Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 7–14, 31–9 and E. Badian, 'Greeks and Macedonians', in B. Barr-Sharrar and E.N. Borza (eds.), *Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times* (Washington 1982), pp. 34–5.

⁵ Not Alexander as Heracles as often understood in antiquity and today: see K. Dahmen, *The Legend of Alexander the Great on Greek and Roman Coins* (London 2007), pp. 40–1.

⁶ Hellenistic kings continued the tradition of connecting themselves to the heroic lineage of Philip and Alexander. Pyrrhus, for example, belonged to the same Epiric Aeacid clan as Olympias and therefore could make an ancestral connection to Achilles. The Ptolemies reinvented their founding father Ptolemy Soter as the illegitimate child of Philip II (Paus. 1.6.2, Curt. 9.8.22; see also *Suda*, s.v. Lagos), and therefore a descendant of Heracles. For these 'Greco-Macedonian' kings to connect themselves to heroic ancestry is not, of course, to Hellenize but to display royal, and ultimately divine, self-aggrandizement.

⁷ In what he posed as a war of revenge for Xerxes' destruction of Greece's temples: Diod. 16.89.2. Diodorus 17.72.6 implies that Alexander followed his father's rationale.

⁸ See A. Stewart, 'Alexander the Great in Greek and Roman Art',

in J. Roisman (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great* (Leiden 2003), p. 40, with p. 31 n. 1 for additional bibliography.

⁹ As Demades must have hoped in 324 when he proposed to the Athenians that Alexander be given divine honors (Din. 1.94). G.L. Cawkwell, 'The Deification of Alexander the Great: A Note', in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Ventures into Greek History: Essays in Honour of N.G.L. Hammond* (Oxford: 1994), pp. 293–306, discredits the belief that Alexander demanded divine honors from the Greeks in the form of a so-called Deification Decree. As with Ian Worthington, *A Historical Commentary on Dinarchus* (Ann Arbor 1992), for example pp. 60–2, he sees the Greeks motivated by the hope that Alexander could be persuaded not to implement his Exiles Decree.

¹⁰ Some starting points for the much-discussed subject of deification in the Greco-Macedonian world are the summary in J.P.V.D. Balsdon, 'The "Divinity" of Alexander', *Historia* 1 (1950), pp. 363–88 and C. Habicht, *Gottmenschentum und griechische Städte* (Munich 1970); for Alexander in particular, see E. Badian, 'The Deification of Alexander the Great', in H.J. Dell (ed.), *Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honor of Charles F. Edson* (Thessaloniki 1981), pp. 27–71 and 'Alexander the Great between Two Thrones and Heaven: Variations on an Old Theme', in A. Small (ed.), *Subject and Ruler: The Cult of the Ruling Power in Classical Antiquity* = *JRA Suppl.* 17 (1996), pp. 11–26, and E.A. Fredricksmeyer, 'Alexander's Religion and Divinity', in J. Roisman (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great* (Leiden 2003), pp. 253–78, with recent bibliography.

¹¹ Indicated by his refusal: Plut., *Agesilaus* 25 and *Moralia* 210d. Against the notion that this was a late invention, M.A. Flower, 'Agesilaus of Sparta and the Origins of the Ruler Cult', *CQ*² 38 (1988), pp. 123–34, traces Plutarch's source to Theopompus.

¹² See S.R. Asirvatham, 'The Roots of Macedonian Ambiguity in Classical Athenian Literature', in T. Howe and J. Reames (eds.), *Macedonian Legacies: Papers on Macedonian Culture and History in Honor of Eugene N. Borza* (Claremont 2009), pp. 235–55.

¹³ These passages are studied in C.F. Edson, 'Imperium Macedonicum: The Seleucid Empire and the Literary Evidence', *CP* 53 (1958), pp. 153–70.

¹⁴ H.H. Schmitt, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums* 3 (Munich 1969), no. 446.

¹⁵ All translations in this chapter are my own.

¹⁶ See also Livy 27.30.9 and 32.22.11 on the friendship of Philip with Argos based on his ‘ancestral ties’ there.

¹⁷ Diodorus takes the empire to task for its harshness toward its subjects, finding heroism in the anti-imperial figure of Pompey. His moralizing view of certain individuals, however, does not mean that he necessarily includes them in a larger ideological agenda, and this includes the Macedonian kings: see K.S. Sacks, *Diodorus Siculus and the First Century* (Princeton 1990), especially ch. 5 (pp. 117–59) on Rome.

¹⁸ Contrast the presentation of Alexander: immediately before the Persepolis scene (17.69.9), Diodorus emphasizes his *euergetiai* for example. And in taking over the treasury of Persepolis, Alexander is described in relatively practical terms: he wants some money to continue pursuing the war and wishes to keep the rest under guard at Susa (17.71.2). The comment in 17.71.3 that Alexander had a bitter hatred for the people of Persepolis and did not trust them has nothing of the moralizing tone taken toward the Macedonians, on which we see more below.

¹⁹ S. Scullion, ‘Euripides and Macedon, or the Silence of the Frogs’, *CQ*² 53 (2003), pp. 389–400, does not think that Euripides went to Pella.

²⁰ Today we tend to equate wealth with culture and the high quality of some Macedonian finds suggests a combination of means and high skill. Most famous are Andronikos’ finds in the late 1970s at Vergina, with its royal tombs that sport architectural facades and sophisticated wall-paintings and contain exquisite gold objects within like the now iconic sunburst-embossed larynx. For a catalogue of finds see M. Andronikos, *Vergina: The Royal Tombs* (Athens 1988); for an introduction to tomb architecture, see S. Miller, ‘Macedonian Tombs: Their Architecture and Architectural Decoration’, in B. Barr-Sharrar and E.N. Borza (eds.), *Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times* (Washington 1982), pp. 153–71.

Impressive temples and mosaics from the early Hellenistic

period have also been unearthed at Pella. It is possible that Greek writers had, in fact, not seen these artifacts (especially the Vergina tombs which would have been covered). Nevertheless, the silence concerning Macedonian material culture – especially from those who were generally interested in antiquities like Dionysius and Pausanias (who does not include Macedonia in his description of Greece) – is rather striking.

21 For references to the Macedonian kings' control of wealth and penchant for bribery, see C.J. King, chapter 18.

22 For Alexander the alcoholic, see J.M. O'Brien, *Alexander the Great: The Invisible Enemy* (London 1992). For drinking paraphernalia found in tombs, see Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, p. 270. Ancient sources are Plut., *Demosthenes* 16.4, Aes. 2.47, Theopompus, *FGrH* 115 FF 236, 282, 225, 236, for example, Ehippus, *FGrH* 126 F 1, Athen. 3.120d–e. For Macedonian *symposia*, see N. Sawada, chapter 19.

23 See, for example, E.L. Bowie, 'Greeks and Their Past in the Second Sophistic', *Past & Present* 46 (1970), pp. 3–41, and S. Swain, *Hellenism and Empire* (Oxford 1996), especially pp. 17–100.

24 See, for example, G. Zecchini, 'Alessandro Magno nella cultura dell'età Antonina', in M. Sordi (ed.), *Alessandro Magno tra storia e mito* (Milan 1984), pp. 195–212.

25 A chilles: Plut., *Alexander* 5.8, 15.8–9, 54.1 and *Moralia* 331d, 343b; Heracles: Plut., *Alexander* 2.1, 24.5, 68.1, 75.5 and *Moralia* 332a, 334d, 340c, 341e, 341f; Aristotle: Plut., *Alexander* 7–8, 17.9 and *Moralia* 327f, 331e.

26 On Alexander and the Hellenistic philosophical traditions, see J.R. Fears, 'The Stoic View of the Career and Character of Alexander the Great', *Philologus* 118 (1974), pp. 113–30. For Alexander as a Romanizing philosopher in Plutarch, see S.R. Asirvatham, 'Classicism and Romanitas in Plutarch's *De Alexandri Fortuna aut Virtute*', *AJP* 126 (2005), pp. 107–25. In general on Alexander in the philosophical tradition, see R. Stoneman, 'The Legacy of Alexander in Ancient Philosophy', in J. Roisman (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great* (Leiden 2003), pp. 325–46.

²⁷ Note here that in the context of *On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander*, which integrates military with cultural ‘Hellenism’, Plutarch combines references to the Macedonians as brave soldiers and rulers (for example, 327b, 330a–b) with cultural and ethnic references to the Greeks (for example, 328c–e, 332a), associating Alexander deeply with both and at the same time claiming that the king surpassed such distinctions.

²⁸ On Trajan’s imitation of Alexander, see Cassius Dio 68.29f, Julian, *Caesar* 333a and 335d, and the *Historia Augustae*, *Hadrian* 4.9. The brief discussion by Stewart, ‘Alexander the Great in Greek and Roman Art’, pp. 55–61, is useful. Broader treatments on *imitatio-Alexandri* include O. Weippert, *Alexander-Imitatio und Römische Politik in republikanischer Zeit* (diss. University of Würzburg 1972), L. Braccisi, *Alessandro e i Romani* (Bologna 1975), pp. 225–7, and J.M. Croisille, *Neronia 4, Alejandro Magno, modelo de los emperadores romanos* (Brussels 1990).

²⁹ Curtius is difficult to date, but he may be from Vespasian’s reign: see E. Baynham, *Alexander the Great: The Unique History of Quintus Curtius* (Ann Arbor 1998), pp. 201–19 and A.B. Bosworth, ‘Cornelius Tacitus and Quintus Curtius,’ *CQ*² 54 (2004), p. 566 and n. 94, with additional references.

³⁰ As collected in D. Spencer, *The Roman Alexander* (Exeter 2002).

³¹ See Baynham, *Alexander the Great*, p. 26 n. 40, for ancient references.

³² See J. Rich and G. Shipley, *War and Society in the Greek World* (London 1993), p. 217, for the references.

³³ For the complexities of the *Alexander Romance*, and of the Alexander legend in general, essential is R. Stoneman, *Alexander the Great: A Life in Legend* (New Haven 2008), especially appendix 1, pp. 230–45, for understanding the range and reach of the *Romance*, and see too Stoneman’s introduction to his Penguin translation of *The Greek Alexander Romance* (New York 1991), pp. 2, 7–8. The standard Greek text is W. Kroll, *Historia Alexandri Magni rescencio vetusta* (Berlin 1926). For the Hebrew version, with translations, see I.J. Kazis, *The Book of the Gestes of Alexander of Macedon, Sefer Toledot Alexandros ha-Makdoni: A Medieval Hebrew Version of the Alexander Romance by Immanuel ben Jacob*

Bonfils (Cambridge 1962), W.J. van Bakkum, *A Hebrew Alexander Romance According to Ms. London, Jew's College, no. 145* (Leuven 1992), and W.J. van Bakkum, *A Hebrew Alexander Romance according to MS Hébr. 671.5 Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale* (Leiden 1994). For the Persian, see M. Southgate, *Iskandarnamah: A Persian Medieval Alexander-romance* (New York 1978). For a translation of the Armenian text, see A.M. Wolohojian, *The Romance of Alexander the Great of Pseudo-Callisthenes* (New York 1969). On the medieval European tradition, see D.J.A. Ross, *Alexander Historiatus: A Guide to Medieval Illustrated Alexander Literature* (London 1963) and G. Cary (ed. by D.J.A. Ross), *The Medieval Alexander* (Cambridge 1967). On the medieval French version, see the collection of interpretative essays in D. Maddox and S. Sturm-Maddox (eds.), *The Medieval French Alexander* (Albany 2002).

³⁴ P. Briant, *From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire*, trans. P.T. Daniels (Winona Lake 2002), pp. 820, 822.

³⁵ See A.K. Grayson, *Babylonian Historical-Literary Texts* (Toronto 1975), hand-copy on pp. 28–9; transcription and translation on pp. 30–6.

³⁶ In the Dynastic Prophecy, the term *Hanû* is anachronistic and parallels the use of ‘Elamite’ in the text for the Persians. The word *hanû* was originally used for a class of soldiers but by the Hellenistic period the land of the *Hanû* seems to have referred to Thrace and was used for Alexander’s successors as well – an Antigonos as well as a Seleucus (thus negating the theory that the army of the Hanaeans here refers to that of Antigonos). That the Dynastic Prophecy is referring to Alexander is proven by his designation as the ‘King of Hanaeans’ in an astronomical text of 329: see M. Neujahr, ‘When Darius Defeated Alexander: Composition and Redaction in the Dynastic Prophecy’, *JNES* 64 (2005), pp. 102 and nn. 8 and 9.

³⁷ His proof is parallel instances in *Daniel* 12 and *Sibylline Oracle* 4 of such failed anti-Macedonian predictions. Some lines of *Sibylline Oracle* 4, for example, claim the Macedonians as the herald of the end-time even when end-time does not actually come until the Roman destruction of Jerusalem.

³⁸ T. Nöldeke, *Geschichte des Artachšir i Pâpakân*, aus dem Pehlewi übersetzt = A. Bezzenberger (ed.), *Beiträge zur Kunde*

der indogermanischen Sprachen 4 (Vienna 1878), pp. 22–69 and Beiträge zur Geschichte des Alexanderromans (Vienna 1890), C. Ciancaglini, ‘Alessandro e l’incendio di Persepoli’, in A. Valvo (ed.), La diffusione dell’eredità classica nell’età tardoantica e medioevale: Forme e modi di trasmissione (Alessandria 1997), pp. 51–81.

³⁹ Stoneman, *Life in Legend*, p. 41.

⁴⁰ A. S. Shahbazi, ‘Irano-Hellenic Notes. 3, Iranians and Alexander’, *AJAH*² 2 (2003), pp. 5–38.

⁴¹ Stoneman, *Life in Legend*, p. 43, discussing Ciancaglini, ‘Alessandro e l’incendio di Persepoli’.

⁴² See Stoneman, *Life in Legend*, pp. 32, 257–8 n. 17.

⁴³ Stoneman, *Life in Legend*, p. 31.

⁴⁴ Scholars trying to answer the vexed question of how and when the Greek romance on the whole was transmitted into Arabic seem to have finally found their missing link – an Arabic manuscript that may also be the original Arabic source for the Ethiopic version of the romance: see F. Doufikar-Aerts, *Alexander Magnus Arabicus. Zeven eeuwen Arabische Alexandertraditie: van Pseudo-Callisthenes tot Suri* (diss. Leiden University 2003), forth-coming as *Alexander Magnus Arabicus. A Survey of the Alexander Tradition through Seven Centuries: From Pseudo-Callisthenes to Suri* (Groningen 2010).

⁴⁵ Unable to reconcile the old image of Alexander the destroyer with his exaltation in the Quran, some scholars still maintain that the unnamed hero was Cyrus the Great. Against this view, see Shahbazi, ‘Iranians and Alexander’, p. 38.

⁴⁶ For this colorful story, see Shahbazi, ‘Iranians and Alexander’, pp. 35–36 and Stoneman, *Life in Legend*, pp. 24–6.

⁴⁷ Stoneman, *Life in Legend*, p. 41.

⁴⁸ In general, see K. Goudriaan, *Ethnicity in Ptolemaic Egypt* (Amsterdam 1988).

⁴⁹ R. Bagnall, 'The People of the Roman Fayum', in M.L. Bierbrier (ed.), *Portraits and Masks: Burial Customs in Roman Egypt* (London 1997), pp. 4–5.

PART IV

History

The Early Temenid Kings to Alexander I

Sławomir Sprawski

1 Perdiccas and the Dynastic Tradition of the Temenidae

Both Herodotus and Thucydides present the birth and history of the Macedonian state as a result of kings' actions. The earliest tradition related to the beginnings of the dynasty can be found at Herodotus 8.137–8. According to him, the founder of the dynasty was Perdiccas of Argos, descended from the line of Temenos, a descendant of Heracles. Together with two older brothers he arrived at the city of Lebadea, located in Upper Macedonia. There the brothers were hired as shepherds for a local ruler. The ruler, dismissing them, offered them only the sunlight that shone down the smokevent into the house instead of payment. The older brothers were appalled but Perdiccas drew a line on the floor of the house around the sunlight with a knife and accepted this payment. The king, advised by his attendants that this gesture threatened his rule, was concerned that he had made a mistake and ordered the brothers be killed. The brothers left for another region of Macedonia, crossing a river that suddenly rose, so stopping the chase. They settled near the so-called Midas gardens at the foot of Mount Bermion, and when they brought that region under their control they set about controlling the rest of the country. Herodotus 8.139 then mentions Perdiccas' six successive heirs: Argeus, Philip, Aeropus, Alcetas, Amyntas and Alexander, stating that in each generation power was handed down from father to son.

Some elements of this story about the three brothers in which the youngest and cleverest one became the founder of the dynasty seem to be a piece of local folklore or *topoi* found in other dynastic traditions (Hdt. 4.5). There have also been indications of its religious aspect as

aetiological explanations of some religious rituals and the divine legitimacy of royal power.¹ A reflection of the topography was sought in the story, which made it a unique record of early Macedonian history. The attempt was made to identify the Lebaea of Herodotus with the village of Alebea mentioned in two Macedonian inscriptions and with a village called Polymylos located in the northeastern Elimea. This identification makes it possible to reconstruct the first steps of the early Temenid expansion from Elimea along the valley of the Haliacmon to Aegae in Pieria, the cradle of the Macedonian kingdom.² Undoubtedly the story points to Perdiccas as the founder of the dynasty and the Macedonian state, and as Herodotus adds elsewhere this was the opinion of the Macedonians themselves (5.22). Thucydides 2.99 seems to confirm this tradition on the whole, admitting that the Macedonian kings were descended from the Temenidae of Argos and citing the same number of predecessors of the current king. There is, however, no certainty as to whether his information came from sources other than Herodotus. In any event, the accounts of two historians writing in close proximity are similar, which makes it probable that they are based on a version disseminated at the Macedonian court.

Even if the Macedonians in the middle of the fifth century believed that the story about Perdiccas and the list of his successors were true, it did not prevent an important modification of this dynastic tradition. At the end of the fifth century when Archelaus was king of Macedonia, Euripides wrote a drama titled *Archelaus*. In this play a character of this name was introduced as the son of Temenos of Argos and the ancestor of the Macedonian royal family. Probably at the beginning of the fourth century, another ancestor became known (Justin 7.1.7, Satyrus, *FGrH* 631 F 1) – his name was Caranus and was known to Theopompus (*FGrH* 115 F 393) and Marsyas (*FGrH* 135–6 F 14). In time, various versions of the story about Caranus emerged and he became such a well-known figure that Plutarch was able to write that all the sources he used agreed that Caranus was the founder of Alexander the Great's dynasty (*Alexander* 2.1). In the version of the story written down by Justin in his epitome of Pompeius Trogus (7.1), Caranus arrived with his Greek companions at Emathia following the advice of the Delphic oracle and, as *ktistes*, founded the city of Aegae acting on the words of the Delphic oracle, which told him to follow goats to find the place.

Caranus also reportedly created the Macedonian state by uniting various peoples. In the version preserved in the work of the Byzantine chronographer George Synkellos he was a conqueror who led an army from Argos and the rest of the Peloponnese and conquered his kingdom with the aid of the king of Orestis.³ His connections to Argos

and the Heraclidae were emphasised by linking him to Pheidon, the most famous figure of early Argos; according to various authors, Caranus was supposed either to be his son, brother, or a relative. Introducing Caranus into the genealogy of Macedonian kings did not mean that Perdiccas was completely forgotten; on the contrary, we can see efforts to reconcile both traditions. Perdiccas was no longer regarded as the founder of the dynasty but as the direct successor (Justin 7.1.6) or three generations later successor of Caranus (Marsyas, *FGrH* 135–6 F 14, Eusebius, *Chronicle* 1.108.21). However, one version of the dynastic tradition preserved in the later sources points at Perdiccas as the founder of Aegeae, which had not been known to Herodotus.⁴ In this case we are probably dealing with different versions of one story about the beginning of Aegeae, whose founder followed the advice of the Delphic oracle that told him to found the city in the place where goats were grazing. Depending on the version of the story, Perdiccas or Caranus were named as the founder. The motif of animals showing the place to found a city is known in Greek tradition; in this case goats may have appeared in the tradition in connection with linking the etymology of the name of the city with the word *aiges* or goats. This etymology was called into question and it has been suggested that the name of the city may have had more in common with the word water.⁵

It seems likely that when Herodotus wrote about Perdiccas he used information that came from the Macedonians themselves and his account may be a reflection of at least the belief they had about the beginning of the dynasty, if not the memory of this beginning. It is a matter of contention as to what extent Herodotus repeated the dynastic tradition disseminated at the court of Alexander I or his son Perdiccas II and to what extent he used other local sources. It is also unclear to what extent the dynastic tradition was created with the view to build relations between the royal family and the Macedonians on the basis of family tradition and to what degree it was a pure literary creation aimed at providing a desirable image of the dynasty in the eyes of the Greeks from the south. It was suggested that Caranus, whose name can mean ‘chief’ or ‘lord’, was introduced in the beginning of the fourth century in a time of rivalry between the three branches of the royal family. The successors of Perdiccas II might have used their forefather’s namesake to justify their superior claim to royal authority and the introduction of Caranus supported the challenge to this claim.⁶

According to Herodotus 5.22, the Olympic judges believed that the Macedonian kings were descended from the Temenidae of Argos when Alexander strove to be entered, as a Greek, in the competition. Thucydides did not doubt this and probably neither did the majority

of ancient writers. Many modern researchers shared this opinion, however the number of sceptics has now increased. It is emphasized in the discussion that pointing to newcomers as ancestors of the ruling families was not an exception – on the contrary it was frequent in the case of royal families in the countries neighbouring with Macedonia; for example, the Aeacidae who ruled the Molossians and the kings of Chaonians or Lyncestis (Strabo 7.7.8). The claim of the Spartan king Cleomnes that he was not of Dorian but Achaean descent seems to be a similar tradition (Hdt. 5.72.3). Creating complex genealogical connections certainly made making contacts with the outside world easier, but invoking foreign descent may also have been attractive in building relations inside the *ethnos* by emphasizing the uniqueness of the royal family and its special and exclusive right to power.

In the wake of questioning the reliability of the tradition about the descent of the Macedonian royal family from Argos, there was a postulate to abandon the practice of calling them the Temenidae in favour of the name Argeadae. This matter is a contentious one and many scholars still use the name Temenidae as numerous ancient writers did. For example, we can find this term in Diodorus 7.16, which however appears as a fragment of the prophecy (definitely fictitious) given to Perdiccas in Delphi: ‘The noble Temenidae have royal rule over a wealth-producing land’.⁷

The name Argeadae, well established in modern historiography, does not appear in Herodotus’ or Thucydides’ works but it is cited in the later sources.⁸ There is, however, the belief that it was not a family name but a tribe name. Appian’s phrase ‘Argeadae Macedones’ at 11.63.333 may be a confirmation of such an interpretation; it seems analogous to the way Thucydides at 4.83.1 calls the inhabitants of Lyncestis ‘Lyncestae Macedones’. According to this interpretation, the Argeadae were one of the Macedonian tribes that subjugated their kinsmen under the leadership of the kings from the Heraclidae/Temenidae family. This proposal, reconciling both traditions, has been accepted by some scholars.⁹

The origin of the name Argeadae is unclear. According to Herodotus 5.22, Alexander I proved that he came from Argos therefore the connection with this city is the most obvious one, although one of the later writers also pointed to Argos Oresticus in Upper Macedonia (Appian 11.63.333). According to another tradition, when Caranus changed the name from Edessa to Ageae its citizens were called Aegeadae (Justin 7.1.10). The lexicographer Stephanus of Byzantium (s.v. Argeou) believed that they were so called after the mythical eponym Argeas, son of Macedon. It is also worth noting that in Homer’s *Iliad* we have mention of the figure of Argeas, father of Polymelus (16.417). It cannot, therefore, be excluded that there had

been an even earlier tradition deriving the genealogy of the Macedonian kings from the heroes of the Trojan Cycle, which was quite popular in neighbouring Epirus.¹⁰

The list of Alexander I's predecessors cited by Herodotus, which - being the oldest - is considered to be the most credible, allows us to put forward theories about the beginning of the dynasty and, by the same token, the Macedonian state. If Alexander I took over power in the early fifth century and each of his six predecessors had ruled for approximately 25–35 years, then the beginning of the dynasty can be dated to the middle of the seventh century. However, the first information about the Macedonians is not older than the middle of the sixth century when the poem *Ehoie* was composed.¹¹ The predecessors of Alexander I listed by Herodotus are in fact just names to us, and the first truly historic figure is his father Amyntas I. However, even in the case of Amyntas I and Alexander, information is surprisingly scarce. Herodotus presents both rulers almost exclusively in the context of their relations with the Persians and Alexander's efforts to build his image in the eyes of the southern Greeks.

2 Formation of the Early Macedonian State

Based on Herodotus' account we may conclude that Amyntas I ruled at the time when the Persians conquered the Paeonians in about 512 since it was to him that the Persian general Megabazus reportedly sent envoys after the warfare stopped (Hdt. 5.17.1–2). But Herodotus' attention is focused on Alexander, whose rule is usually dated from 495 (or 498) to 454. The importance of this ruler in the formation of the Macedonian state is also emphasized by Thucydides, who does not even mention the names of any of his predecessors.

It can therefore be suspected that neither Herodotus or Thucydides in the second half of the fifth century or other later authors had any information about the early Macedonian kings, and for them the only significant figure in the history of this state was Alexander. Interestingly, the discoveries made so far in the burial site in Vergina indicate that approximately in the middle of the sixth century, in the area later reserved for the distinguished dead, new customs appeared, including cremation of bodies, which might have been a testament to efforts aimed at emphasizing the status of the persons buried there.¹² Perhaps this is an indication that it was only then that the great career of the Temenidae/Argeadae as Macedonian rulers started. Amyntas'

predecessors, if they were indeed historical figures, did not necessarily hold the same position in society as himself and his son as it was later claimed.

The process of formation of the Macedonian state can only be reconstructed hypothetically since information that can be found in the sources is very scarce. In his story about the founder of the dynasty, Perdiccas, Herodotus mentions that after strengthening his position at the foot of Mount Bermion, he began to conquer the rest of the country. Herodotus unfortunately does not mention which lands were conquered by Perdiccas himself and which by his ancestors. The information about Anthemus, located in the Chalcidice, may be regarded as an exception. According to Herodotus, it was Amyntas I who offered to give this land to Hippias, which may indicate that he had controlled this area or at least had laid claims to it (5.94). The second important piece of information passed on by Herodotus was that Alexander ruled a place where silver was mined on Mount Dysoron, located not far from Lake Prasias in the Strymon valley (5.17). This area must have been under the reign of the Macedonian king at least temporarily.

Thucydides 2.99, describing the Macedonian state under the rule of Perdiccas II, son of Alexander I, in the time of Sitalces' invasion of 429 BC, presented, so to speak, the final effect of the efforts undertaken by his ancestors:

So they assembled in Doberos and prepared to make an invasion from the heights into Lower Macedonia, which Perdiccas ruled. The Macedonians also include the Lyncestians, Elimiotae, and other tribes of the upper region who are allies of the Lower Macedonians and subject to them yet have kings of their own. Alexander the father of Perdiccas and his ancestors, who are Temenidae of ancient Argive origins, first acquired what is now the coastal part of Macedonia and established themselves as kings by defending and driving the Pierians from Pieria (they later settled Phagres and other places below Pangaion beyond the Strymon, and even today the area below Pangaion along the sea is still called the Pierian gulf) and the Bottiaeans from what is called Bottia (they now live on the borders of the Chalcidians). They acquired a narrow part of Paeonia along the Axios river down to Pella and the sea, and they occupy the land called Mygdonia beyond Axios as far as the Strymon after driving out the Edonians. They also drove the Eordians from what is now called Eordaea (most of them were killed, but a scant few settled near Physca) and the Almopians from Almopia. These Macedonians also conquered other peoples whom they still

control even today, those in Anthemus, Grestonia, Bisaltia, and much of Macedonia itself. The whole is called Macedonia, and Perdicas son of Alexander was its king when Sitalces attacked. (trans. Lattimore with some changes)

Strabo also emphasizes the fact that Macedonia used to be inhabited by various peoples that were ultimately subdued by the Argeadae (7 F 11). His account, however, is completely devoid of information that would enable us to reconstruct the time and stages of the process of this subjugation.

The authors of the above mentioned accounts are in agreement over presenting the beginnings of Macedonia as a process of conquest undertaken by the royal dynasty or the Argeadae tribe. However, it is quite obvious that their information about the stages of the formation of the Macedonian state is relatively imprecise. Thucydides' account seems the most valuable one, but even in this case the reconstruction of the process of the territorial development of the state is made more difficult by the fact that since the fifth century significant changes had been taking place in the geographical landscape of Macedonia. This is the most noticeable in the case of the coastline of the Thermaic Gulf, and consequently the lower course of the rivers that have their estuaries there, which makes it more difficult to define the boundaries of the regions he mentions. Despite these obstacles, there have been attempts to reconstruct the conquests undertaken by the Macedonian rulers based on this account, supplemented by fragmentary information taken from other authors.

It is believed that the first lands to be ruled by the Macedonian kings were the terrains on both sides of the lower Haliacmon – the area around Vergina and the foot of Mount Bermion – and their borders were delineated by the course of the Loudias river.¹³ Aegae, now identified with Vergina, was probably the centre of this region. This is supported by the symbolic significance of the place as the burial place of Macedonian kings (Diod. 22.12). Pella itself, together with a narrow strip of coast and lands on the western bank of the Axios river, must have been outside the power of the Macedonian kings since Thucydides writes about the regions as part of Paeonia.

If we assume that Thucydides presented the stages of Macedonian conquests in chronological order the coastal Pieria with Pydna and Dium could have been among the first acquisitions. The city of Methone, which according to tradition was a colony founded in about 710 by the Eretrians of Euboea, was out of Macedonian control. Prior to the sixth century Macedonian kings may have also gained the sovereignty of some inland areas west of the coastal plain: Almopia and Eordaea. The conquest of Mygdonia, Bisaltia and Anthemus must have been connected with great political changes that occurred in the

region as a result of the Persians' appearance. It is likely that Alexander I used the weakened position of the Paeonians following their defeat at the hands of the Persians and took control of a strip of land stretching west of the Axios river as well as Pella. The subjugation of Mygdonia, stretching from the Axios to the Strymon, including Anthemus in the Chalcidice as well as Crestonia (Grestonia) and Bisaltia located north of these lands, was probably possible only after the Persian defeat in 479.¹⁴

We cannot be certain to what extent the description of the process of formation of the Macedonian state presented by Thucydides was based on the recollections kept by the Macedonians and to what extent it was his own reconstruction. The motive of fighting for fertile lands and removing previous inhabitants plays a key role in his reconstruction of the most ancient history of Greece, which opens the first book of Thucydides' work (1.2). It cannot be excluded that Thucydides, who had family connections in the lands situated on the lower Strymon, associated the similarity of names of the Pierians and Bottiaeans living there with the names of Macedonian regions that he might have considered to be a result of forced migration, whereas in the case of the Eordians he explained a lack of such homonymy by claiming that the Macedonians had exterminated them. Such a reconstruction could have been modelled on the (famous in his time) case of the Messenian refugees who sought the Athenians' protection at Naupactus or on the inhabitants of Histiaea on Euboea, removed by the Athenians, who looked for shelter in Macedonia. A lack of factual information about the earliest history of Macedonia may explain why Thucydides neither named the original homeland of the Macedonians nor quoted the names of any other king apart from Alexander, who was said to be responsible for the conquests.

It is possible to imagine an alternative model for the formation of the Macedonian state whereby the inhabitants of the lowlands situated in the Thermaic Gulf found it attractive to accept the reign of the Argeadae and to identify themselves with the Macedonians. This could have occurred under pressure from the Paeonians in the north, with the increased importance of the Thessalians in the south, and mostly with the arrival of the Persians. Indeed, there is no mention of local autonomies persisting in Pieria or Bottia; however, this was not necessarily the result of replacing the original inhabitants by the Macedonians. It could have been the result of the fact that prior to annexing these lands to the Argeadae's kingdom the local identity had not been well developed. The process of integration could have been made easier by a network of contacts connecting the elites of local communities inhabiting the lands which gradually became part of Macedonia, as may be attested by the discovered contents of tombs

scattered in the whole region dated to the sixth and the first half of the fifth century. What is of particular interest among the objects found in Trebeniste, Aiani, Vergina, Pella-Archontiko, Sindos, Agia Paraskevia on the edge of the Anthemus Valley as well as Gavgelija in the north and Amphipolis in the east, are golden masks and other objects made of gold foil. We can surmise that the dead buried with such artefacts were members of the ruling class.¹⁵ Even though they belonged to different communities and may have used different languages or dialects, their funeral rites were either the same or very similar. Although written sources paint the picture of the region as an ever-changing ethnic mosaic, funeral rites may be an indication that at least the upper classes were not necessarily so very different. Common values shared by the members made it easier to communicate and to accept a common ethnic identity as Macedonians under the leadership of the Temenidae/Argeadae.

3 Amyntas I and the Coming of the Persians

It was most likely in 513 that the Persian king Darius arrived in Europe and started a campaign against the Scythians. Having completed the expedition, he crossed the Hellespont and spent a longer period in Asia Minor, residing at Sardes. He did not give up his attempts to strengthen his control over the other side of the strait, leaving considerable forces in Europe under the command of Megabazus (Hdt. 4.143–4). The Persian presence in Europe lasted for the next few decades although it is difficult to determine its extent and nature. Herodotus' brief account mentions that Megabazus received an order to conquer the whole of Thrace and so he set out to bring every city and every people under Persian control. As a result of his campaigns, probably carried out in 512 and 511, he was said to have subjugated 'all peoples including the Macedonians' (Hdt. 6.44.1). Elsewhere, however, Herodotus indicates that as a result of the campaigns only a strip of the coast was subdued (5.10). Control over the coast was definitely the centre of the Persians' attention, as is evidenced by the fact that military garrisons were placed in strongholds at Doriscus and later also at Eion.¹⁶

According to Herodotus 5.15, Megabazus defeated the Paeonians, a tribe inhabiting the vast area between Axios and Strymon. The Persians forced many Paeonians to settle in Asia Minor and subjugated and partly displaced the Siriopaeones, the Paeoplae and the remaining Paeonians, who inhabited the territories up to Lake Prasias. It seems

that the inhabitants of settlements around Lake Prasias, as well as Mount Pangaion, Doberes, Agrianes and Odomantes, remained out of Persian control.¹⁷

After the outbreak of the Ionian Revolt in 499, the Persian control of the Strymon valley must have been completely illusory. The actions of Aristagoras, the tyrant of Miletus and one of the leaders of the rebellion, may be evidence of this. When the revolt died down, he reckoned that it would be safe for him to find shelter at Myrcinus on the Strymon river, which Darius formerly had given to Histiaeus. The Persians were unable to stop him from settling there and ruling the area. What is more, Aristagoras reportedly helped some of the Paeonians deported to Asia to return home (Hdt. 5.98). His rule was only ended by the Thracians when he tried to expand his territory at their expense (Hdt. 5.124, 126).

When the revolt in Ionia was stifled, Persian power in Europe was restored by Mardonius in 492. Herodotus claims that the targets of the expedition were Athens and Eretria but his opinion has been questioned. Mardonius' first target was Thasos, which he captured with the help of his fleet. Then he lost many of his ships while sailing around Mount Athos, while the land forces, after reaching Macedonia, suffered during difficult battles against the Briges. Despite these defeats Herodotus claims that Mardonius 'added Macedonians to the subjects (of the Persians) that they had already' (6.44.1).

Herodotus states explicitly that Mardonius subdued the Macedonians to Persian rule. However, Herodotus also describes much earlier contacts between the Persians and the Macedonians during the campaign of Megabazus (about 512), who supposedly was the first who sent to Amyntas a demand for 'earth and water' (5.18). But it is worthwhile noticing that the exact meaning of this request is not clear and it seems that the act of offering earth and water could signify something different than unconditional surrender to the Persian king.¹⁸ Herodotus depicts the visit of Megabazus' envoys to the Macedonian court relatively thoroughly, but his narrative is so ambiguous that it is difficult to understand what really happened and what the consequences were. First we find out that Amyntas I would meet Megabazus' demands passed on by the envoys. But he describes also an incident that occurred during a feast with the Persian envoys that undermines the act of accepting Persian sovereignty. During the feast, the Persians reportedly demanded the presence of Macedonian women, and their demand was met even though it was against Macedonian customs. Alexander reacted to the Persians' increasingly loose behaviour by asking his father to allow him to take care of the guests himself, and when Amyntas I left the feast he carried out an assassination. Young Macedonians dressed up as women were

smuggled in by Alexander and deceitfully murdered all seven envoys. The incident was kept secret but soon the Persians started to search for the missing men. However, Alexander put an end to the search, giving the Persian general Bubares precious gifts and the hand of his sister Gygaea (Hdt. 5.21). It follows from the account that all this happened soon after the envoys were murdered and probably while Amyntas I was still alive, although Herodotus does not mention his role in this important event. If it had not been for the information that he offered Anthemus to Hippias after his exile in 510, we could have concluded that by leaving the feast with the Persian envoys Amyntas I left the political stage as well.

The story about murdering the Persian envoys seems improbable enough for it to be the subject of contention among scholars. Some believe that it was fabricated by Herodotus and served him, among others, to paint Alexander's profile.¹⁹ Others tend to believe that Herodotus merely quoted information that he had heard in Macedonia.²⁰ While few people believe in the murder of the Persian envoys, the information about Gygaea's marriage to Bubares, who was probably the son of the already-mentioned Megabazus (Hdt. 7.22.1), seems to be met with more trust.²¹ According to Herodotus, this marriage resulted in the birth of a son, named Amyntas after his grandfather, who later received the city of Alabanda in Caria from the Persian king (8.136.1). We can find more information about this marriage in Justin 7.4.1, where Bubares set out to fight against the Macedonians but fell in love with the daughter of Amyntas I, which led him to give up his hostile intentions in exchange for her hand. Bubares stayed in Macedonia for a while and left shortly before Amyntas' death. Moreover, Justin also writes that thanks to his sister's marriage Alexander was in favour with Darius and Xerxes, who offered him reign over the lands between Mount Olympus and Haemus (7.4). It was assumed that Bubares stayed in Macedonia as its formal governor or the king's advisor.²² It seems, however, that the version reported by Justin was created late, as a result of adding a romantic motive to Herodotus' account, and it does not appear to be trustworthy.

If we reject Justin's account (based on Trogus) we can put forward a different reconstruction of events. After the outbreak of the Ionian Revolt Persian control over Europe became weaker, which Alexander used to set himself free from the Persian rule or at least to take advantage of the greater freedom he gained. Mardonius restored control over the lost territories of Thrace and Macedonia, forcing Alexander to pay tribute, which Herodotus may have recorded as inclusion of the Macedonians among Persian subjects.²³ If we consider Herodotus' account of the assassination of Persian envoys to

be fictitious, we may also reject his chronology and assume that it was not Megabazus but Mardonius who established first contacts with Macedonia and we may date Buberas' marriage to Gygaea to this period since we have no information about Mardonius' intentions of punishing the Macedonians for failing to meet their obligations to the Great King or for their attempts to set themselves free from his power.²⁴ It is worth noting that the Byzantine chronicler George Syncellus wrote that Alexander gave 'earth and water' to the Persians.²⁵ This information may have been a mistake by Syncellus but it cannot be completely excluded that he had access to a different tradition than the one recorded by Herodotus. Another solution is to assume that the contacts with the Persians were established at the turn of the sixth century, but initially their only result was Gygaea's marriage.²⁶

While the fact that Macedonia was subordinate to Persia raises no doubts, attempts to define the character of their relations are quite difficult: see further, M.J. Olbrycht, chapter 17. A lot of attention has been paid to the problem whether there existed a Persian satrapy named Skudra including Thrace and whether the Macedonians were part of it. Such a theory has been formulated on the basis of Persian documents. According to some, the Persians subdued the vast terrains of Thrace including the plain of Marica. The existence of the satrapy might also be confirmed by Herodotus, who mentions however that Darius was paid tribute by peoples inhabiting Europe as far as Thessaly (3.96.1).²⁷ Despite some scholars' enthusiastic attitude to this interpretation the existence of such satrapy is doubtful.²⁸

Forms of subordination to the Great King may have been more diverse. For example, Herodotus mentions peoples that accepted his sovereignty but did not pay tribute, and ones that chose the form of tribute themselves, the tribute sometimes being merely symbolic. It may therefore be assumed that Macedonia became a *sui generis* Persian protectorate at that time. Herodotus, describing Alexander's position during the Persian domination, calls him '*strategos* and *basileus* of the Macedonians' (9.44.1), so we may presume that he kept his father's position. On the other hand, Herodotus 7.108 does not mention Macedonia's special status; on the contrary, he seems to emphasize that at least since Mardonius' campaign 'all the country as far as Thessaly had been enslaved and was tributary to the king'.²⁹ The term used by Herodotus at 5.20.4 to describe the Macedonian ruler, *hyparchos* (subordinate governor), may also indicate that the country was included in the empire's administrative structure. According to some, *hyparchos* indicates that Alexander submitted to the king, in return keeping his reign over the Macedonians. In this sense, he would be the first native ruler appointed governor that we have heard of.³⁰

According to a different interpretation, Alexander's position was much weaker, so *hyparchos* could have been used not only to describe province governors appointed by the Great King but also officials of lower rank. Alexander, included in the empire's system of administration, was subordinate not directly to the king but to a local Persian governor probably residing in Eion. His family connections with Megabazus may have only slightly strengthened his position but they did not ensure him a high rank in the hierarchy of the empire.³¹

4 Alexander I in the Time of Xerxes' Invasion of Greece

In 480 Xerxes' army reached Macedonia. Although we have no information about Alexander's and the Macedonians' actions at the time, we may presume that they were forced to lend their aid to the king. In his description of later events, Herodotus several times mentions Alexander as a man who is on Xerxes' side and follows the assigned tasks but continues to try to give good advice to the Greeks.

When the forces of the Greek coalition gathered together in the Tempe Valley on the Thessalian-Macedonian border in order to stop the Persian army there, Alexander reportedly sent his envoys to them. The Macedonian king dissuaded the Greeks from trying to put up resistance on this particular spot, making them aware how enormous the Persian army was. The coalition forces did indeed retreat but Herodotus thinks it was because of the fear that they might be surrounded by forces that could have reached Thessaly by different routes (7.173.3). In the middle of the fourth century, in his letter to Philip, Speusippus praised Alexander for this, crediting him for saving the Greek forces from destruction (30.3). In Herodotus' account, however, Alexander's intentions remain unclear and his influence on the decisions of the Greek generals is played down.

Herodotus lists the Macedonians among the peoples who sent their men to Xerxes' army (7.185). In the description of the events of 480 we only hear of them in the context of the Persians taking over Boeotian cities, which survived thanks to Alexander's help. The Macedonians sent by the king reportedly tried to convince Xerxes that the Boeotians were on his side (Hdt. 8.34). The point was probably not to introduce Macedonian garrisons in these towns as some supposed but to make sure that men sent by Alexander were among the guides leading the Persian army so that at the decisive moment they could convince Persian generals as to the attitude of Boeotian

cities.³² Herodotus ascribes a similar role to the Thessalians, who were said to save the Thebans at the Thermopylae (7.233) and later saved Dorida from being destroyed. The help given to the Boeotians may be an indication of earlier contacts with Alexander, which perhaps, as was the case with Athens, were based on *proxenia*.

After the Persian defeat at Salamis in 480 and Xerxes' flight, the Persian army spent the winter in Thessaly and Macedonia (Hdt. 8.126). At the time, the Persians' authority must have decreased significantly, which encouraged the inhabitants of the Pallene peninsula to break away. In order to control the situation, the Persian general Artabazus captured Olynthus, which was thought to be disloyal, and murdered its citizens (according to Herodotus they were the Bottiaeans who had been exiled from the Thermaic Gulf by the Macedonians). We do not know if Alexander played any role in these events. He certainly remained a faithful ally to Mardonius since the latter decided to send him on a mission to the Athenians. Alexander, who was a *proxenos* of the Athenians, seemed like a good candidate. According to Herodotus, Mardonius wanted to bring the Athenians over to his side by offering them the Great King's forgiveness. Alexander was to encourage them to accept this offer and to dissuade them from continuing the war against the Persians. Judging from Herodotus' description, Alexander's mission was met with great reserve. Not only did the Athenians decisively reject the proposal but also they warned Alexander against undertaking similar missions in future (8.140–4). It is doubtful that, as some believe, Alexander dared to do anything other than loyally perform the task he was assigned. With the Persian army on his territory, he could not very well afford to play a risky double game.³³

The outcome of the Persian invasion in Greece was determined in 479 on the fields of Plataea. On the Persian side, the battle was fought by units of Greek allies, including the Macedonians, who faced the Athenians. According to Herodotus, on the night preceding the battle Alexander himself secretly went to the Athenians' camp and revealed to them Mardonius' plan of an unexpected attack. In exchange he asked them to keep his mission secret and to help him later to free himself from the Persian domination (Hdt. 9.44–5). As in many other cases, the veracity of the story is suspect.³⁴

5 The Aftermath of Persian Withdrawal

Herodotus does not mention Alexander's actions after the Persians' defeat and Mardonius' death, when what was left of the Persian army

hastily retreated towards the Hellespont. It follows from his narrative that the Persian general Artabazus did not meet any obstacles leading his troops across Thessaly and Macedonia and was only attacked by the Thracians (Hdt. 9.89). On the other hand, Demosthenes mentions a defeat suffered by the Persians during their retreat from Plataea inflicted by Perdiccas, King of Macedonia (23.200). As a reward he was said to have been given citizenship by the Athenians. Demosthenes confused the kings' names and perhaps he was not accurate as to the circumstances in which fights broke out between them and the Persians. Elsewhere, the author of Demosthenes 12 cites the words of Philip II, who reportedly claimed that Alexander captured the place where Amphipolis was later founded and took some Persians hostage (12.21). He used the ransom he received for them to have a golden statue built in Delphi. It can therefore be assumed that at least in the fourth century the Macedonians claimed that there had been fighting between them and the Persians. Herodotus, however, does not mention their participation in Cimon's attack on the Persian base at Eion, situated near the place where Amphipolis later stood in 476/5. Although it cannot be excluded that Alexander decided to openly confront the Persians, it is just as likely that he adopted a more cautious strategy, which he later attempted to hide (Hdt. 7.107, Plut., *Cimon* 7.1–2).

The Persians' defeat became a turning point in the history of Macedonia and Alexander I's rule. Even though he fought on the Persian side, the king maintained his power and even extended it. Herodotus 5.17 describes him as an affluent king, who 'drew a daily revenue of a talent of silver' from the mines on Mount Dysoron. Even if this information is exaggerated, it still indicates impressive annual revenue for the king. This information is perhaps confirmed by the minting of silver coins, which Alexander started around 475 (shortly after driving the Persians away).³⁵

It seems that after taking over power, which is usually dated to 498 or 495, Alexander's position in the region was not particularly strong. Amyntas I and his son decided to establish connections with the empire, seeing this as a chance to strengthen themselves as their neighbours were much more powerful. Establishing family connections with a Persian official certainly improved Alexander's position but their significance should not be overestimated. Alexander was not a high-ranking ally, but he was certainly treated as a trusted person since he was able to act in defence of Boeotian cities and he was sent on a mission to the Athenians. Strengthening their control in the region, the Persians had to change the existing power relations in the region. They did not hesitate to displace whole tribes, as was the case with the Paeonians, or to murder the people suspected of being

disloyal, as was the case with Olynthus. Local elites must have suffered, especially those who could not earn the trust of the Great King and his representatives.

When the Persians left there was a political vacuum of sorts around the borders of Macedonia. Communities inhabiting this area found themselves in a difficult position also because of the uncertainty of their future. The Persians had been driven away but there was fear that their armies could come back, as they had in 492. There were also fears about the intentions of the Greek coalition, which could have looked for an opportunity of revenge, and later there were fears about the Athenians' imperial ambitions. It seems that Alexander read the situation correctly and used it to his advantage as he could have gathered these communities around him. As long as the Persians' return seemed realistic, his family connections could have been regarded as some guarantee of reaching an agreement with them. On the other hand, his contacts with the Greek cities, especially Athens, may have been a safeguard against aggressive moves also from this side. Undoubtedly Alexander was the creator of Great Macedonia but his objective was not necessarily, at least not completely, achieved by means of conquests. The emergence of larger political structures in response to pressure from the Persian Empire may have been a case of secondary state formation, a phenomenon which was visible in many places, the best example being the Delian League.³⁶

When Alexander was gathering new peoples around him he had to provide the ideological basis of his power. Perhaps this was the aim of the depictions of a horseman on the coins he minted, which drew from earlier local traditions. Perhaps at that time he could have arranged for a new editing of the dynastic legend. His actions may have been aimed at both strengthening his authority among the old and new subjects as well as facilitating contacts with the Greek cities.

6 Alexander I and the Greeks

We cannot say much about Amyntas' and Alexander I's contacts with the Greek cities prior to 479. The already mentioned example of offering Anthemus to the exiled Hippias indicates that there could have been relations of *xenia*, obligating them to give each other help. Herodotus calls Alexander *proxenos* and *euergetes* of the Athenians, which indicates that the friendship with the city survived the exile and the collapse of the Pisistratids tyranny in 510. Perhaps Alexander proved to be a benefactor by helping the Athenians get wood for building ships – wood being a treasure for which Macedonia was later

famous. It seems less likely that Alexander helped to establish contacts between the Athenians and the Persians in 507.³⁷ Alexander could also have had contacts with other Greek cities as is indicated by his envoys sent to the Greek army blocking off Tempe and his support given to the Boeotian cities. After Persian control over Macedonia increased in 492, Alexander's contacts with Greek cities were probably less intensive but they must have been revived in 479. It seems that at that time he was particularly keen on emphasizing his Greek roots and connections with the Greek world. Perhaps this was the aim of his contacts with the great sanctuaries in Delphi and Olympia, one result of which was the foundation of statues in both places.³⁸

Olympia is connected with Herodotus' famous story at 5.22 about Alexander's participation in the furlong race at the Olympic Games. His participation was protested by fellow competitors, who reasoned that as a 'barbarian' he was not allowed to take part. Alexander, however, proved that his family originated from Argos, which was accepted by the Olympic judges. His participation in the Olympic Games is confirmed by the surviving fragments of the Pindaric ode praising 'his pentathlon victory'.³⁹ Finally, Justin 7.2.14 mentions Alexander's participation in various events at the games, although he is not a very reliable source. As is the case with almost all known events of Alexander's life, this one also raises doubts as to its authenticity. Like the assassination of the Persian envoys or his behaviour prior to the Battle of Plataea, it could be regarded as a made-up event, which Alexander himself popularized in order to create his positive image in the Greek world.⁴⁰ The majority of scholars believe it was authentic although there is no agreement as to the date and the result of the king's participation, which Herodotus described using an unclear idiom: 'he contended in the furlong race and ran a dead heat for the first place' (trans. Godley). Although it seems reasonable to assume that Alexander participated in the games at a young age (that is, in 496), political circumstances support a date after 479. The most likely games seem to be the ones in 476 at the time when victory against the Persians was celebrated (Plut., *Themistocles* 17). It could have been a good moment for Alexander to show himself among the victors and emphasize his belonging to the Greek world.⁴¹

We do not know much about the reign of Alexander after 479. What we are left with is pieces of information that give the impression that his Macedonia was a stable country and attractive to refugees. About 468 the king accepted the inhabitants of Mycenae, who had been forced by Argos to leave their country (Paus. 7.25.6). We also know that about 465 Themistocles, running from the Athenians, found shelter in Pydna, which belonged to Alexander, from where he set off

to Persia, hiding his identity (Thuc. 1.137.1, Plut., *Themistocles* 25.2). This fact does not prove that Alexander had a hostile attitude towards Athens and helped a fugitive. At the same time what must have been a serious problem in his relations with the Athenians was their ambitions to control the estuary of the Strymon (the area near the silver mines on Mount Dysoron), a source of great income for Alexander. In 465 Athenian colonists tried to settle in Ennea Hodoi, where Amphipolis later stood. These territories did not belong to Alexander, and the settlers' opponents were the local Edonians, supported by other Thracians. The Athenians supposedly also planned to capture Macedonian territories, which, however, they failed to do. For this reason, in 462 Cimon was accused of having been bribed by Alexander (Thuc. 1.100.3, Plut., *Cimon* 14.2).⁴²

The circumstances of Alexander's death are unknown although there was a tradition indicating that he died a sudden death (Curt. 6.11.26). It probably happened around 454, but the chronology of his rule as well as that of his successors was difficult to establish even for the authors who wrote in the fourth century, which shows that already by that time very little was known about the history of Macedonia in the fifth century.

Alexander I is known in history books as Alexander Philhellene. He was probably given the nickname many years after he died. It appeared for the first time in Dio Chrysostom 2.33, who wrote in the second century AD. The nickname could have been introduced in the works of Alexandrian scholars, on the basis of which the Scholia on Thucydides (1.57.2) and Demosthenes (3.35.7) as well as Harpocration's lexicon (s.v. Alexandros) were written. The nickname had a practical importance since it enabled him to be distinguished from Alexander III, 'the Great'.⁴³ What could have significantly influenced the choice of nickname was the image of Alexander I as benefactor of Greece that appeared in the rhetoric of the fourth century, which emphasized the contributions that Philip II's ancestor had made to the Greek cause.

7 Final Remarks

In conclusion, we know next to nothing about the Macedonians and their dynasts before the coming of the Persians. We can only suppose that Amyntas was the first historical ruler of Macedonia to exercise power over Aegae, the lower part of the Haliacmon valley, and the costal plain at the foot of Mount Bermion. When the Persians conquered the costal part of Thrace Amyntas recognized their

predominance and established family connections with a Persian noble, which helped him to strengthen his position. In the first years of the fifth century he was succeeded by his son Alexander who can be regarded as the real creator of the Macedonian state. After 492 he was possibly included in the empire's administrative structure but his exact status is hard to determine. Alexander as a loyal, although not high-ranking, ally of the Persian king followed him in his invasion of Greece in 480. Despite this, after the collapse of the Persian rule in Europe he not only stayed in power but also enlarged his kingdom, gathering the neighbouring communities and taking control over the gold mines of Dysoron. Though Thucydides describes the beginnings of Macedonia as a process of conquest undertaken by Alexander I and his predecessors, an alternative model of the formation of the Macedonian state is likely. Fear of the return of the Persians and pressure from the newly formed Athenian Naval Confederacy could result in the phenomenon of secondary state formation. The local communities neighbouring Alexander I's realm found it attractive to accept his leadership and to identify themselves as the Macedonians.

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Classical Macedonia to Perdiccas III

Joseph Roisman

1 Introduction

The history of Macedonia from the death of Alexander I in about 454 to the death of Perdiccas III in 360/59 is a story of decline, blurred by the poor quality of the evidence. Material evidence is lacking, and the extant literary sources were written largely by non-natives and often long after the events. They also tend to focus on the Macedonian kings, and even then only when they cross the paths of other Greeks.¹

The Macedonians who lived under the successors of Alexander I must have looked back longingly to his reign, or at least they should have. Alexander left his heirs a strong and rich kingdom, which held sway or influence over its several neighbors, made allies and subjects of the western Macedonians, and managed quite well against the expansionist efforts of Athens in the region. The history of Macedonia following Alexander's death, however, tells of decline and regression on almost all fronts. The blame was not always with the kings as with the challenges they faced, which were often more formidable than the ones met by Alexander I.

The career of Perdiccas II (454–413), Alexander's successor, well illustrates the challenges that confronted the kingdom from both within and without. The king had to deal, at times simultaneously, with rival family members who threatened his throne, with the rulers of Upper Macedonia who strove to assert their independence from Argead Macedonia, with powers much stronger than his own – such as Sitalces' Thracian kingdom and especially Athens – and all of this while trying to enhance his influence and protect his interests in the Chalcidice, the Thraceward region, and Thessaly. To meet these challenges Perdiccas resorted, not always successfully, to diplomacy or calculated aggression. For example, he tried to keep Athens'

friendship, but when he sensed Athenian weakness or faced Athenian aggression he initiated alliances with her enemies and helped them with troops, money and other means. The result was that in the course of his reign Macedonia and Athens were at war at least four times with intervening periods of alliance or of tense relations. Toward the end of his rule Perdiccas seemed to have restored some of his father's power, but this was mostly due to his rivals' weakness. What follows is the history of his reign.²

2 Perdiccas II

When Perdiccas II succeeded to the throne in 454, at least two of his four brothers, Philip and Alcetas, are said to have had their own realms (*arkhai*). It was a recipe for trouble, and Perdiccas is reported to have annexed Alcetas' territory at some unknown date, although he spared his life.³ Philip, who controlled the fertile and strategic Axios valley, posed a greater challenge. In 433, he formed an anti-Perdiccan alliance with Athens and Derdas (I), his cousin, the king of Elimiotis in Upper Macedonia.⁴ Derdas had been an ally, if not a client, of Perdiccas' father, and his alliance with Philip showed his independence from Lower Macedonia. This also appears to have been the case with other Upper Macedonian districts throughout our period. Perdiccas did not consolidate his power in Macedonia without difficulty or with guarantees of future stability.

Much of the history of Macedonia under Perdiccas has to be inferred from the vastly better-documented history of Athens. It seems that up to Athens' alliance with his foes in 433, he was its friend and ally. From the late 450s the Athenians had been searching around the Thermaic Gulf and the Thraceward region for fertile land to settle, minerals, and especially timber and pitch for their navy. Although the Macedonians competed for some of these resources, there are no reports of their reaction to the incursions made by the Athenians. These included Pericles' sending of 1,000 settlers, probably in 451/0, to live alongside the Bisaltae on the Strymon river, possibly at Berge; his allowing the people of Histiae in Euboea to leave their city and settle in Macedonia around 446/5; and the incorporation into the Athenian Empire, some as tribute-paying members, of coastal and inland communities such as (from west to east) Strepsa, Serme, Argilus, Brea and Eion (from 476). Especially significant was the Athenians' foundation of Amphipolis near the mouth of the Strymon in 437/6, which gave them access to timber and other natural resources.⁵ It is tempting to interpret the apparent Macedonian

inaction as a sign of weakness, but Perdiccas may have welcomed the Athenians into the region, particularly since the Thracians were the foes of both.

This changed when the Athenians allied themselves in 433 with Perdiccas' opponents, Philip and Derdas (Thuc. 1.57.2–3). The Athenians probably looked to these new allies to provide them with timber and local cavalry for the upcoming war with Sparta, but Perdiccas rightly viewed their action as a threat to himself. His appeal to both Sparta and Corinth to commence the war with Athens was unsuccessful. Closer to home, he tried to split the expected Athenian offensive against him by inciting cities in the Chalcidice and inland Bottica to rebel against Athens. He urged their residents to leave their coastal settlements because they were too weak to face Athens individually, and he gave them lands in farther Mygdonia as well as to Bottiaean communities to enable them to survive the war. However, he also advised them to move to inland Olynthus, where the Athenians' maritime advantage would be less telling. This synoecism (settling together) of Olynthus gave impetus to its later becoming a strong and prosperous city able to threaten Macedonia itself. Among the cities that Perdiccas courted was the fortified and strategically important city of Potidaea. The Potidaeans did rebel, more because of the Athenians' refusal to relax their pressure on them than to Perdiccas' persuasive efforts. Contemporary Greeks regarded the Potidaean crisis as one of the main causes of the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 1.23.5–6, 56.1–66). Yet from a local Macedonian perspective, the king's efforts at mobilizing allies and forcing Athens to fight on more than one front appeared to bear fruit.⁶

Indeed, the Athenians' force of 40 ships and 1,000 hoplites that arrived in the Gulf was too small to fight the Macedonians and the rebels simultaneously. Unfortunately for Perdiccas, they thought that they had a better chance of defeating him first with the help of Philip and Derdas' brothers, who attacked Macedonia from the west. The Athenians captured Therme in northern Chalcidice, which made it hard for the king to help his Chalcidian allies, and also besieged Pydna on the Macedonian coast of the Thermaic Gulf. Perdiccas' situation became even worse when, following the arrival of a Peloponnesian force to help Potidaea, Athens sent another force of 40 ships and 2,000 hoplites to join the siege of Pydna. What saved the king was the Athenians' eagerness to focus all their efforts on regaining the Chalcidice and Potidaea, which forced them to make peace with him.⁷

It was, however, only a temporary truce. Opportunistic as ever, the Athenians may have tried shortly afterward to capture Beroea in Perdiccas' territory, and they surely made use of the cavalry of his

enemies in the Chalcidice.⁸ No wonder, then, that Perdiccas decided to rejoin the rebels and even came to the aid of Potidaea with 200 cavalry (Thuc. 1.62.1–63.2). Although the opposing Macedonians on his and the Athenian sides did not fight one another, their presence across enemy lines well illustrates how personal loyalty to a leader trumped considerations of ethnic solidarity.

Perdiccas' reversals earned him the reputation in Athens of being a deceitful man, which went back to at least the 420s when the comic poet Hermippus included his lies among goods imported to Athens.⁹ It also informed the depiction of the king by our primary source Thucydides and consequently that of many modern scholars.¹⁰ Yet Perdiccas was no more unreliable than the rulers of many other Greek states, including Athens, which as recently as 433 had gone back on its alliance with him by supporting his brother. It is our Athenocentric sources that regard his efforts to survive in a tough neighborhood as displays of dishonesty. It is also naive to think that the Chalcidians had rebelled solely on account of his instigation, for they had good reasons of their own to resent Athens.

In 431, Athens and Perdiccas renewed their alliance, following complex negotiations facilitated by Sitalces, ruler of a large Odrysian kingdom in northeastern Thrace. At first the Athenians had hoped to use him against both Perdiccas and cities in the Thraceward region. However, thanks to the mediation efforts of Sitalces' brother-in-law, the Thracian promised to provide Athens with cavalry and peltasts for the war in the Chalcidice and not to help Philip against Perdiccas, who subsequently reconciled with the Athenians (Thuc. 2.29.1–5, 95.2). All the parties involved had reason to be content: Sitalces got two important allies in the Thraceward region, Athens isolated the Chalcidian rebels, and Perdiccas did not need to worry about fighting both Athens and Philip. The Athenians also gave Therme back to Perdiccas, and he helped them in their Chalcidian campaign (Thuc. 2.29.1, 4–7). If a scholarly reconstruction of the history of the city of Methone on the Thermaic Gulf is correct, Perdiccas may have surrendered this town also to Athens in 432–431.¹¹

We learn about the next episode in the relationship between Athens and Perdiccas from an inscription of 424/3 that records in chronological order four Athenian decrees regarding the city of Methone on the Macedonian coast of the Thermaic Gulf. The second and perhaps the third of them were moved in 426/5, and the fourth (now lost) in 424/3. Although there is no agreement on the date of the first motion, I subscribe to the view that it was passed in 430/29.¹² After discussing the option of forgiving Methone its debts to the Athenian treasury (or perhaps to that of the Delian League), the first decree ordains the dispatch of three envoys to Perdiccas to tell

him that it behooves him to allow the Methonians free movement of people and goods on land and sea, that he should not march his army across Methonian territory without obtaining permission first, and that the Athenian envoys would negotiate a treaty between the two sides if they agreed. If not, the king and Methone should send delegates to Athens, where the dispute would be decided. Perdiccas was to be told that if the Athenian soldiers at Potidaea were to praise him, the Athenians would think well of him (*IG* 1³ 61.16–29).

We can only guess why Perdiccas was bullying the Methonians (or so they said). Perhaps he was looking for material gains or seeking to show them the limits of Athens' patronage. His not allowing them 'to use the sea' implies that he had a navy or that he sponsored piracy. Conversely, the Athenian instruction not to cross Methonian territory under arms without authorization was an imposition, given that armed traversal of other people's land was common elsewhere in Greece.¹³ Clearly, Athens saw itself as the arbiter of this local dispute, regardless of whether Perdiccas wanted its services. Yet the Athenians were also careful to exert only modest pressure on him, and they even indicated that he stood a fair chance in the arbitration process. Perdiccas would have been right to deduce that they were not looking to fight him on Methone's account. Indeed, a subsequent decree of 426 on the aforementioned stone mentions repeated, although unspecified, Methonian grievances against Perdiccas, which suggests that he ignored the attempts to settle the dispute (*IG* 1³ 61.47–51).

In 429, 'without the Athenians' knowledge', Perdiccas sent 1,000 Macedonians to participate in the Spartan general Cnemus' invasion of pro-Athenian Acarnania (*Thuc.* 2.80.7). This force arrived too late to take part in the campaign, however, which was fortunate for the Macedonians because Cnemus' invasion ended disastrously and the Macedonians' missing it allowed Athens to ignore Perdiccas' unfriendly act. Thucydides, however, takes Perdiccas' dishonesty for granted and ignores his motives, about which we can only speculate. The Athenians had recently suffered a heavy defeat in the Chalcidice and perhaps Perdiccas was encouraged by this to back Sparta; he may also have been pressured to participate in the campaign by neighboring Orestis and Epirus, which had contributed troops to Cnemus' campaign.¹⁴

Also in 429 the Thracian king Sitalces invaded Macedonia. Thucydides says that he came to help Athens against the Chalcidians and because Perdiccas had failed to fulfill his side of the aforementioned agreement between him, Sitalces, and Athens (2.95.1–2). Thucydides does not report what the unkept promise that so irked the Thracian was, but it is doubtful that this was his main impetus. Sitalces appears to have had ambitions to become a major player in

the region, as is evinced by his bringing along 150,000 troops, as well as Amyntas, the son of Philip (now presumably dead), to replace Perdiccas on the throne. Athens' attitude toward Sitalces was ambivalent. It wanted his help against the Chalcidian rebels, and the presence at his court of Athenian envoys and the founder of Amphipolis, Hagnon, indicates that they had planned this joint project in advance. However, Sitalces, with his huge army, proved to be too ambitious and powerful an ally. There was also the unattractive prospect of having a Thracian client occupying the Macedonian throne. The Athenians' failure to come to Sitalces' aid with a fleet as promised suggests that they must have had second thoughts about the wisdom of their partnership. Unlike Perdiccas, however, their reneging on this did not make them unreliable in the eyes of our sources.¹⁵

Except for some ineffective counterattacks by Macedonian and allied cavalry, the Macedonians offered no resistance but took shelter in fortified places. Sitalces focused much of his efforts on what used to be Philip's territory in Lower Macedonia, where some communities surrendered to him and others were besieged or captured. He then turned east to raid Mygdonia and Chalcidian towns, leaving behind him a trail of destruction and pillage.¹⁶ Shortly afterward, he returned home. Thucydides lists several reasons for his retreat, which include his failure to achieve his original objectives, shortage of provisions, the rough winter, and the fact that Perdiccas had secretly bribed Seuthes, Sitalces' nephew (and future successor), to influence Sitalces to withdraw, promising Seuthes his sister Stratonice in marriage and a large dowry.¹⁷

Thucydides appears to have fallen victim here to his own one-dimensional view of Perdiccas as an inveterate plotter, for even aside from the Athenians' failure to show up, he himself assigns the Thracian sufficient reasons to fall back; there was no need for a corrupt adviser and outside influence to persuade him to retreat (cf. Diod. 12.50.2). Moreover, Seuthes' betrothal to Stratonice could have been prearranged by the kings in the negotiations they had held during the invasion (cf. Thuc. 2.101.1). In any case, Sitalces went home, not because of Perdiccas' machinations but because it was in his own interest to do so.

Except for the feud with Methone in 426 discussed above, nothing is heard of Perdiccas until 424, when he was instrumental in changing the tide of the Peloponnesian War. He helped the brilliant Spartan general Brasidas to go to the Thraceward region and gain allies for Sparta there.¹⁸ Perdiccas had always been friendly to Sparta, which, unlike Athens, had no ambitions or vested interests in the region. Now, together with Thracian and Chalcidian towns, he promised to

pay half of the expenses of the expeditionary force and to induce his neighbors to ally with Sparta. One of his Larissan friends also helped Brasidas and his 1,700 Peloponnesian hoplites in their hasty march through not-so-friendly Thessaly (Thuc. 4.78.2, 83.4–6). Perdiccas surely knew that he risked a war with Athens but such an outcome was not inevitable. Perdiccas' primary objective was to use Brasidas' force against Arrhabaeus, the king of Lynceus in western Macedonia. Lynceus was a fertile region that controlled important inland routes and, although it was governed by its own king, the Argeads sought to put it under their control. It is also possible that Arrhabaeus was the aggressor in this conflict.¹⁹ Indeed, there was no certainty that Perdiccas would have supported Brasidas in the Chalcidice after subjugating Arrhabaeus. When Brasidas reached Macedonia, Chalcidian envoys warned him that Perdiccas might lose his enthusiasm for aiding him if Arrhabaeus stopped being his concern (Thuc. 4.79.2, 83.1–6). In any case, a war with Arrhabaeus should have not upset the Athenians.

When Brasidas arrived at Dium, Perdiccas wasted no time in taking him and his hoplites to fight Arrhabaeus. He was outfoxed, however, by Brasidas, who was anxious to get to the Chalcidice in a hurry. Thus, when Brasidas heard from Arrhabaeus that he wished to become his ally, and that he wanted Brasidas to mediate between him and Perdiccas, he told Perdiccas that he preferred this option to war. According to Thucydides, Perdiccas retorted that he had brought Brasidas not to judge disputes but to fight the enemies he would point out to him, and that it was wrong of Brasidas both to take Perdiccas' money and to negotiate with Arrhabaeus (4.83.2–5). In spite of the haughty tone and the posture of a paymaster that Thucydides attributes to Perdiccas, the king was clearly in the right. Fighting Arrhabaeus was part of his original agreement with Sparta, and he could get arbitration from Athens *gratis*. There was not much that he could do, however, because he could not send Brasidas back, and Athens, if it had not already done so, was going to declare war on him (Thuc. 4.82). He settled for cutting his subsidies to Brasidas from one half to a third of his expenses (Thuc. 4.83.6).

Perdiccas' assistance to Brasidas' campaign was fairly limited. Some of his friends in Amphipolis were among the plotters who betrayed the city to Brasidas, and he was personally involved in the defection to Brasidas of Myrcinus on Lake Cercinitis, nearby Drabescus, and Oesime, across from Thasos (Thuc. 4.103.3, 107.3). Brasidas kept supporting rebellions even when it meant violating the Athenian–Spartan truce of 422. Yet instead of staying and preparing his allies for the expected Athenian offensive, in particular against Mende, he left to help Perdiccas fight Arrhabaeus in Lynceus once

again. It is clear that neither his mind nor his heart were in this campaign. Moreover, his taking with him close to 1,000 Peloponnesian hoplites and other Chalcidian troops weakened the anti-Athenian front in the peninsula.²⁰ However, with the prospective arrival of the Athenians, Brasidas became vulnerable to pressure from Perdiccas, whom he wished to keep as an ally.

The combined force numbered close to 3,000 Greek hoplites, 1,000 Macedonian and Chalcidian cavalry, and many other Macedonians and barbarians.²¹ In their first clash, Brasidas and Perdiccas inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, but it was the last time the two leaders cooperated. Perdiccas, who had arranged for Illyrian mercenaries to join him, wanted to press on and take Lyncestian villages, perhaps sensing that the Illyrians would change sides – as indeed happened. Brasidas, however, used the Illyrians' failure to show up as his reason to oppose Perdiccas' plan. He was anxious to return and help his Chalcidian allies against Athens (Thuc. 4.124.1–4).

The Illyrians in fact joined Arrhabaeus and their reputation as warriors and their rumored great numbers induced both Brasidas and Perdiccas to contemplate retreat. Owing to their dispute, the leaders camped with their respective troops away from each other and wasted time on disagreeing on when to fall back. Perdiccas' frightened soldiers did not wait, however. They fled home under cover of night, followed by their king. Thucydides, who seems to include the Upper Macedonian troops among the barbarians, contrasts the panicked retreat of Perdiccas' troops unfavorably with the discipline and superior courage and tactics displayed by Brasidas and his men against a much larger host.²² When Brasidas' troops reached Eordaea in Perdiccas' kingdom, they killed wandering yoked oxen of the fleeing Macedonians in rage and captured their baggage (Thuc. 4.128.4). That they felt betrayed is as clear as the fact that Brasidas did not stop them. This was a grave mistake on the part of the latter because from Perdiccas' perspective Brasidas' conduct was unforgivable. Apart from the fact that he had twice frustrated Perdiccas' Lyncestian campaign, Perdiccas now had to justify to his subjects his introduction of an ally who treated them like enemies. Thanks to Brasidas, the Peloponnesian League lost an important ally, and Perdiccas, as Thucydides puts it, abandoned what was 'by necessity his self-interest.' He approached Athenian generals in Scione in the Chalcidice with a peace offer and later proved his sincerity when he used his influence in Thessaly to prevent Peloponnesian reinforcements from reaching Brasidas (Thuc. 4.128.1–5, 132.1–2).

A highly mutilated Athenian inscription (*IG* 1³ 89) may have recorded this peace agreement with Perdiccas.²³ As is common in such treaties, the two parties agreed to share friends and enemies,

which now surely included the Spartans. The Athenians requested Perdiccas not to allow anyone else to import oars from his territory.²⁴ In return, they promised to recognize his and his children's rule, not to make war on cities in his kingdom, and to lift the closing of Athenian markets to Macedonian traffic. In addition, they initiated a reconciliation between Arrhabaeus and Perdiccas, who had a clear interest in peace with Lyncus in view of his recent defeat there, the Lyncestian-Illyrian cooperation, and Brasidas' enmity. Arrhabaeus, who was equally anxious to prevent future Macedonian invasions, was promised a treaty with them. The inscription concludes with a long list of Macedonian signatories, which includes, first, Perdiccas, followed by his brother Alcetas, Perdiccas' son (and future successor) Archelaus, Perdiccas' other brother Menelaus, his nephew and Philip's son Agerrus, as well as Arrhabaeus, '[De]rdas basileus (king) [A]ntiochus ... [bas]ileu[s] ...,' and other unknown dignitaries.²⁵

Undoubtedly, the Athenians extracted concessions from Perdiccas, but the list of names also indicates the progress he had made since his accession. In the past, he had been forced to defend his throne against Derdas of Elimiotis and his brother Philip as well as Arrhabaeus. Now his opponents in Upper and Lower Macedonia and their descendants, together with other neighboring rulers, such as Antiochus of Orestis, committed themselves to the security of his dynastic rule. The prominent place given to Perdiccas in the inscription – in line 35, there is a reference to 'Perdiccas and the other kings' – reflected his status in the region.²⁶

Around 422, Perdiccas was asked by Cleon, the new Athenian general in the region, to come with an army 'according to the alliance' or according to Cleon's interpretation of it (Thuc. 5.6.2; cf. *IG* 1³ 89.9). Perdiccas was spared the need to comply by the death in battle of Cleon and Brasidas in the same year, and by the subsequent negotiations between Athens and Sparta that culminated in the Peace of Nicias of 421. Following this peace, the Athenians captured Scione and made the coastal cities of Heracleum and Bormiscus into tribute-paying states. Yet their occupation with intrigues in the Peloponnese and central Greece cost them Chalcidian Thysses, which passed to nearby Dium, and later Mecyberna, which fell to its neighbor Olynthus.²⁷ Following the Battle of Mantinea in 418, a new anti-Athenian alliance of Sparta and Argos appealed to the Chalcidian cities and Perdiccas to join it, and he agreed. He must have known that there would be a price to pay because the Athenians were militarily active in the region, and he had already promised to help them in an upcoming campaign against Chalcidian cities and Amphipolis (Thuc. 4.129.2, 132.1, 5.83.4, *IG* 1³ 370). Yet many of his Chalcidian neighbors were allies of Athens' foes, and he apparently

regarded the new Spartan-Argive alliance as a winning combination. Thucydides says that Perdiccas was inclined to break with Athens on account of his ties to Argos, the homeland of the mythical founder of the Argead dynasty (5.80.2). If the king was torn between fear of Athens and pressures and the temptation to join Argos and Sparta, then his purported Argive connection must have had some impact.²⁸ He miscalculated, however. The new Peloponnesian alliance was short-lived, and in the winter of 417/6 the Athenians, who were upset about his changing sides and thus their having to cancel the planned Chalcidian campaign, punished him by blockading his territory. A year later they resumed their old policy of supporting his domestic foes when they dispatched a combined force of Athenian cavalry and (unidentified) Macedonian exiles to Macedonia, which raided his country from Methone. With Argos now democratic and pro-Athenian, Perdiccas appealed to the Spartans for help. They asked the Chalcidian cities, which had a renewable 10-day truce with Athens (or one that could be terminated on a 10-days' notice) to join Perdiccas' war against Athens, but surely few contemporaries were surprised when they refused (Thuc. 5.83.4, 6.7.3–4). Perdiccas, as realistic as ever, renewed his alliance with Athens at some point before the summer of 414. The last attested chapter in the history of his relationship with Athens involved his participation that summer alongside a Thracian force in an unsuccessful Athenian attempt to recapture Amphipolis (Thuc. 7.9).

Perdiccas died in 413 probably of natural causes. There is late evidence of his patronage of the famous physician Hippocrates of Cos, who allegedly cured him of lovesickness, and of the lyric poet Melanippides.²⁹ However, our sources focus mostly on his military and diplomatic maneuvers, which have earned him scholarly condemnation for his inconsistency as well as understanding approval. He was surely a survivor, both personally and as a defender of Macedonia. The fact that he could spoil an Athenian campaign in 417 shows both Athens' decline and the growth of Perdiccas' regional power. Yet success tended to be transient in Macedonia in the classical age.

3 From Archelaus to Amyntas III

Perdiccas' successor, Archelaus (413–399), dealt with some of the challenges faced by his father as well as new ones, but more effectively.³⁰ He might have attained power by violent means. An interlocutor in Plato's *Gorgias* describes him as Perdiccas' bastard child

by a slave woman (Simiche ?) belonging to Perdiccas' brother Alcetas. The speaker then adds that in the course of his accession to the throne Archelaus murdered first Alcetas and his son and then Perdiccas' 7-year-old legitimate son and heir (471a–d; cf. Ael., *Varra Historiae* 12.43). There is no decisive argument in favor of or against this hostile account. Archelaus secured his rule through domestic and foreign patronage and improved the defense of his country by building military installations and roads, maintaining friendship with Athens, and by intervening in Thessaly. There were Greeks who held him in low esteem, but in the period under discussion he was one of the more successful Macedonian kings.

Athens' decline in power, and hence its greater dependence on Macedonia and its timber, continued under Archelaus, who in 410 besieged the Greek city of Pydna with the help of an Athenian fleet (which left later on other missions). The auxiliary role played by Athens is indicative of the changed realities in the region. After capturing Pydna, Archelaus refounded it as a Macedonian settlement about 4 km inland, thus securing his hold on the coast (Diod. 13.49.1–2; cf. Xen., *Hellenica* 1.1.12). Unlike his father, Archelaus appears to have maintained a consistently good relationship with Athens. In 411 he allowed his hereditary guest-friend Andocides, an Athenian exile, to cut and export large quantities of oar spars, which Andocides then sold to the Athenian fleet at Samos, representing this as a public service (Andocides 2.11). This could have been no more than a personal favor to a royal friend, but if a highly fragmentary Athenian inscription is correctly restored, it thanked and honored Archelaus for allowing Athens to build ships in Macedonia in 407/6 and sending them to Ionia.³¹ The contrast between this public appreciation of the king's favor and the earlier 423 treaty that instructed Perdiccas to limit the export of Macedonian oars to Athens alone (see above) is telling.

Archelaus also helped his Thessalian friends. The source for this affair, Pseudo-Herodes' *Peri politeias*, is problematic because of its rhetorical nature and uncertain date and authorship.³² I follow the view that it knowledgeably deals with events in about 400 in the Thessalian city of Larissa, where the oligarchs, led by the aristocratic Aleuadae family, were engaged in a political struggle with a more moderate faction.³³ Fearing defeat, the Aleuad Aristippus appealed to Archelaus for help. The Macedonian royal house had traditionally close ties with Thessalian aristocrats and Archelaus, as we have seen, knew how to cultivate foreign friends. However, his aid to the oligarchs came with a price. In return for putting Aristippus in power and installing a Macedonian garrison in Larissa, Archelaus took territory, perhaps in the strategic district of Perrhaebia, which

controlled the roads to Macedonia, as well as Larissan hostages and citizenship. It is possible that the opposing Larissan party appealed to Sparta, now the hegemonic power in Greece, and that the Spartans promised to expel the Macedonians. Nothing came out of this, however, because Archelaus was assassinated not long afterward.

What enabled Archelaus to succeed both in Pydna and Larissa was his improved army. In describing Sitalces' invasion of Macedonia in 429, Thucydides parenthetically adds that Archelaus built many strong places and 'cut strai[gh]t roads, and otherwise put the kingdom on better footing as regards horses, heavy infantry (hoplites), and other war material than had been done by all eight kings that preceded him' (2.100.2; Crawley's translation). Heavy scholarly constructions have been built on this aside, which is too general, for example, to support the conclusion that Archelaus introduced hoplites into the Macedonian army.³⁴ Yet Archelaus surely improved the defense of his country by adding fortresses and military roads, possibly to Upper Macedonia. His reforms did not guarantee military success, however. We hear that he was hard-pressed in a war against the Lyncestian Arrhibaeus (II?) and the Illyrian Sirras, and sought the help of the king of Elimiotis, to whom he wed his elder daughter (Arist., *Politics* 5.8.11).

Archelaus is almost universally credited with moving the center of the kingdom from Aegae north to Pella on the central Macedonian plain.³⁵ The site was attractive for several reasons. It controlled major passageways from east to west (the later Via Egnatia) and south to north. It was situated on a lake (now gone), had a port that could be probably reached from the sea by a river, and a fertile hinterland to support its population. The city had from its outset a street plan and a cemetery that ceased to be used after the city's expansion in the third quarter of the fourth century. Its agora appears to be developed only in the second half of that century. Aegae retained its status as a ceremonial and religious center but lost a festival and contests in honor of Olympian Zeus to Dium. Some have interpreted Archelaus' organizing an Olympic festival there as an attempt to found a 'counter-Olympics,' but it is likely that the king was thinking more of enhancing his and his nobles' reputations locally than internationally.³⁶

The military projects, the religious celebrations, and the transformation of Pella involved significant expenses. Archelaus' wealth derived from trade in timber, royal possessions, taxes, and other revenues. He evidently attempted to facilitate domestic and foreign commerce by coining money with higher silver content than Perdiccas' coinage (although still inferior to the coins of his neighbors) and by issuing copper coins.³⁷ Archelaus also spent money on

bringing some of the best Greek artists and poets of the day to his court. These included the painter Zeuxis of Ephesus, the musician and poet Timotheus of Miletus, the epic poet Choerilus of Samos, and two Athenian tragedians, Agathon and the famous playwright Euripides. He is also said to have invited Socrates to Pella, but the philosopher declined, pleading inability to return the favor (Arist., *Rhetoric* 2.23.8).

Euripides, however, went to Pella between 410 and 408/7, having probably been commissioned to write plays with Macedonian themes. There he produced his *Archelaus* and possibly *Temenos* and *Temenidae* as well as the *Bacchae*. In the *Archelaus*, the name of the mythical founder of the Argead royal house is changed from Perdiccas to Archelaus, who is portrayed as having left Argos to escape persecution by his evil brothers. He goes to Macedonia, saves it from its belligerent neighbors, and ends up marrying the daughter of the local king and becoming the ruler of the country and the founder of Aegae with Heracles' blessing. If the stories about Archelaus the assassin and illegitimate ruler in Plato's *Gorgias* (see above) circulated at this time, the king must have been pleased with the play. Yet the impact of the tragedy on local and international audiences was more cultural than political and, together with other artworks, it strengthened the Hellenic character of the court and of the Macedonian elite. Archelaus probably sought to use his patronage of arts and the games to enhance his stature in Macedonia; he is also said to have won the chariot races at Olympia and Delphi (Solinus 9.16). However, if he intended to advance his reputation in the Greek world, he must have found the results disappointing. The sophist Thrasymachus questioned Archelaus' and the Macedonians' Greekness on partisan grounds when, in a speech on behalf of the Larissans, possibly in the context of Archelaus' intervention in their affairs, he lamented 'We, being Greeks, shall be slaves to Archelaus, a barbarian.'³⁸

The sources disagree on the manner and the perpetrators of Archelaus' death in 399. A dialogue wrongly attributed to Plato identifies the killer as his lover, who coveted his 'tyranny' and who took power for a few days before he was killed in a plot ([Pl.], *Alcibiades* 2.141d, Ael., *Varra Historiae* 8.9.1). Aristotle names several killers, but insists that they were motivated by personal revenge and not political ambition (*Politics* 5.8.11–3 1311b; cf. Plut., *Moralia* 768f). Diodorus, in contrast, states that Archelaus was killed by his beloved Craterus in a hunting accident (14.37.5). The sources' confusion and partial ignorance discourages speculating about the killers' motives, identity, and the origins of the above traditions. Nevertheless, they suggest the importance of homoerotic love (and hunting) in the relationships between the king and Macedonian and Greek members

reconstructing it a challenge given the paucity of the evidence.⁴² Broadly speaking, Amyntas had to contend with two aggressive neighbors, the Illyrians in the west and the Chalcidian confederacy led by Olynthus in the east. This forced him to resort to Perdiccas II's style of diplomacy of changing alliances and calling in outside powers to intervene on his behalf. His first challenge came from Illyria. The evidence suggests that the Illyrians had not seriously threatened Macedonian territory since the late sixth century, but in 393 a resurgent Illyrian power, possibly under the leadership of the Dardanian king Bardylis, invaded Macedonia, and Amyntas had to abandon his kingdom. He also gave Olynthus rich frontier land, probably in Mygdonia, presumably in return for its support. He was able to return shortly afterward with Thessalian help. Diodorus who reports on this affair also mentions a variant version according to which Amyntas was replaced for two years by one Argaeus, but notwithstanding scholarly efforts it is impossible to argue convincingly for or against this contention.⁴³ Complicating the picture is a second and very similar account by Diodorus of an Illyrian invasion and Amyntas' recovery in 383 (19.15.19.2–3; cf. Isoc. 6.46). Scholars are divided between those who argue for two Illyrian invasions (myself included) and those who argue for a Diodoran doublet of a single invasion in the 380s.⁴⁴

We are slightly better informed about Macedonia's relationship with the Chalcidians. An Olynthian inscription from the 390s–380s records a mutual defensive treaty between Amyntas and the Chalcidian confederacy for 50 years.⁴⁵ It makes the Chalcidians preferred customers for Macedonian timber and pitch for shipbuilding and construction. Finally, the parties agree not to make a separate peace with the Chalcidians' enemies in the region. Toward the late 380s, the relationship between the two parties worsened. Amyntas wanted back the revenueproducing territory he had given Olynthus but the Olynthians refused, probably arguing that it had been a gift. Amyntas then declared war on them and asked Sparta for help (Diod. 15.19.2–3; cf. Isoc. 4.126). According to Xenophon, however, the main appeal to Sparta came from Acanthus and Apollonia, Olynthus' inimical neighbors. An Acanthian envoy told the Spartans that Olynthus was 'liberating' cities in Macedonian territory, Pella included, and that Amyntas was on the brink of fleeing his country.⁴⁶ One hopes that the envoy that tried to scare Sparta by portraying Olynthus as a formidable power did not exaggerate its scope in Macedonia.⁴⁷ The Spartans decided to intervene, and in 382 Agesilaus' brother Teleutias went with 10,000 troops to join a Peloponnesian advance force there. On his way he told Amyntas that if he wanted his kingdom back he should hire mercenaries and

subsidize neighboring kings to make them into allies. The imperious tone of this general reflected the limited expectations the Spartans had of the Macedonian king. Indeed, even though Amyntas joined the Spartans with cavalry, Xenophon assigns the key role in any success the Spartans had in this campaign to the Elemiote ruler Derdas (II) and his horsemen (*Hellenica* 5.2.37–3.2, 3.8–9, 18, Diod. 15.20.3, 21.1). Nevertheless, the Olynthian War, which ended in 379 with the city's surrender and the dissolution of the Chalcidian confederacy, freed Amyntas and his country from a major threat. It is likely that he was able to reclaim his territorial gift to Olynthus and punish its Macedonian friends. Among the latter was probably the exiled Pausanias, who would try to seize the throne by force in about 368/7 (Aes. 2.27, *Suda*, s.v. Caranus).

Like Perdiccas II, Amyntas did not put all his eggs in one basket and maintained a good relationship with important Athenians and their city. At an unknown date he adopted Iphicrates, a distinguished Athenian general, as his son, possibly coveting his forces and hoping to get aid from the powerful Thracian king Cotys, who was Iphicrates' employer and father-in-law between 386 and 375.⁴⁸ Amyntas also benefited Timotheus son of Conon, an equally important general, when he allowed him to export timber to Athens ([Dem.] 49.26). A fragmentary Athenian inscription from the late 370s shows that Amyntas concluded a treaty with Athens, which continued to use Macedonia as its chief timber supplier.⁴⁹ In 371 Amyntas joined his signature to those of many other Greeks in a common peace that promised to help Athens regain Amphipolis or so Aeschines claimed in 346 (2.332–33). An Athenian Amphipolis was hardly in Macedonia's interest, but even if Aeschines was correct the king could surely tell the difference between the practical and declared value of agreements. It is hard to know what he got in return. Years later, Athenian speakers who wished to make his son Philip morally indebted to Athens reminded him of favors done to Amyntas, but without ever specifying what they were (Aes. 2.26, [Dem.] 7.11–12). Between 374 and 371 Amyntas also formed an alliance with the powerful Thessalian ruler Jason of Pherae, who gave him cities in the Perrhaebia region between Thessaly and Macedonia. It is possible that Amyntas bartered timber and his Larissan friends for the security of his southern border.⁵⁰

Amyntas is said to have been a competent general and remarkably energetic. He seems to have practiced polygamy and fathered at least seven children: Alexander II, Perdiccas III, Philip II, and their sister Eurynoe by Eurydice, and Archelaus, Arrhidaeus, and Menelaus by Gygaea, a likely Argead (Justin 7.3–5). We do not really know why Eurydice, the daughter of the Illyrian (?) Sirrhas and the

granddaughter of Arrhabaeus of Lyncus, was preferred as the mother of his successors. A venomous tradition depicts her as a lustful, power-hungry woman who plotted with her son-in-law, who was her lover, to kill Amyntas and to crown the son-in-law in his place, but that her daughter, Euryone, foiled the plot. Amyntas reportedly forgave his wife for the sake of their children. She is said to have later also plotted the murder of her sons Alexander and Perdiccas (who in fact died in battle).⁵¹ It is an unlikely story, which probably originated with rivals of the royal family after Amyntas' death. Yet it implies that Amyntas' turbulent fortunes encompassed his household. His silver coinage, which was debased and lighter in comparison to that of Archelaus, indicated his weakness.⁵²

5 From Alexander II to Perdiccas III

When Amyntas died in 370 the crown went to his eldest son by Eurydice, Alexander II, who was assassinated in 368.⁵³ Alexander bought peace from the Illyrians with a tribute and by giving them his brother Philip as a hostage, and so was free to take advantage of power struggles in Thessaly. The aristocratic Aleuads of Larissa had fled to him and requested his help against the new powerful man in Thessaly, Alexander of Pherae. The king marched to Larissa and took it by betrayal. He then captured Crannon in central Thessaly and garrisoned both cities, claiming them for himself. This did not sit well with the Thessalians, who wanted neither Alexander of Macedonia nor Alexander of Pherae as their overlord and appealed to Thebes, the new hegemonic power in Greece, for help. The Thebans sent them their talented general Pelopidas with an army, which easily took Larissa following the surrender of its Macedonian garrison. Pelopidas was then invited to march into Macedonia by both Alexander II and Ptolemy of Alorus, each vying for his help against the other (368). Ptolemy, who challenged Alexander's rule, and who would assassinate him shortly afterward, is described by Diodorus as the son of Amyntas (II?), and he was possibly married to Alexander's sister.⁵⁴ Pelopidas reconciled the two, allied himself with Alexander, and to ensure their loyalty to Thebes and Thessaly's security, he took as hostages 30 noble youths, including the king's brother Philip (later Philip II). Thus, in the course of a very short reign, Alexander managed to avert one invasion but also to botch an attempt to expand Macedonian power into Thessaly and to invite the most powerful state in Greece to intervene in Macedonian affairs. Perhaps his killers had a case.⁵⁵

A much discussed fragment of Anaximenes, a near contemporary

historian and orator, ascribes significant military reforms to a king named Alexander, who is reported to have trained the aristocracy in cavalry warfare, calling them Companions (*hetairoi*). He similarly organized the commoners into diverse infantry units and called them Foot Companions (*pezhetairoi*) so as to bolster their loyalty by enabling them to share in the king's companionship (Harpocration, s.v. *Pezhetairoi*). Lacking supplementary evidence, scholars have variously identified this king as Alexander I, II, and even III.⁵⁶ They have also generally ignored the fact that Anaximenes was hardly in a position to know what the king's motives were. Yet even if the reformer was Alexander II, the outcome of his program was dismal judging by the army's performance under his successor Perdiccas III (see section 6 below).

Ptolemy and his men murdered Alexander in 368, and evil tongues implicated his mother Eurydice in the murder and made Ptolemy her lover.⁵⁷ For the next three years Ptolemy ruled Macedonia as king and possibly regent for the minor Perdiccas (III). He might have married Eurydice to legitimize his rule, and she may have accepted this to protect her remaining sons.⁵⁸ As often happened in Macedonia, the death of a king opened the field for contenders. The Athenian orator Aeschines reports how, years later, he reminded Philip II of Pausanias, a likely Argead, who had returned from exile in 368/7 with an army, captured cities in northern Chalcidice, and enjoyed considerable support in divided Macedonia. At this crucial moment, the Athenian general Iphicrates showed up at court seeking aid for a campaign against Amphipolis. Queen Eurydice reminded Iphicrates that Amyntas had adopted him as a son and persuaded him to eliminate Pausanias' threat to his adopted brothers Perdiccas and Philip.⁵⁹ In describing the scene to Philip, Aeschines tactfully did not mention Ptolemy, who had killed one of Philip's brothers and would be killed by another. It is unlikely, however, that the regent, who was a major beneficiary of Iphicrates' action, played no role in the affair. Scholars who portray Eurydice as exerting a great influence over Macedonian politics rely on problematic evidence, which includes literary and epigraphic testimonies that, in fact, limit her involvement to educating her sons and contributing statues to two local cults. She was, however, the first Macedonian queen to leave more than a casual impression on our sources.⁶⁰

If Ptolemy had promised to help Athens recover Amphipolis, he quickly changed his mind (Aes. 2.29). Thebes, which had maritime ambitions and a craving for Macedonian timber of its own, was unlikely to favor his cooperation with Athens. Thus, when the Theban general Pelopidas was called to intervene again in Thessalian affairs in 367, he took with him a local mercenary force and marched against

Ptolemy upon the invitation of the friends of the dead Alexander. However, the wily regent bribed the mercenaries not to fight and Pelopidas was forced to make a deal. He disappointed Ptolemy's foes when he recognized his authority as regent for Alexander's brothers and made him a Theban ally. To ensure Ptolemy's best behavior, however, Pelopidas took with him to Thebes 50 additional hostages, including Ptolemy's son. Like his predecessors, Ptolemy switched alliances for the sake of personal and national security.⁶¹

This did not, however, prevent Perdiccas III, son of Amyntas, from getting rid of him in 365 (Diod. 15.77.5). Perdiccas ruled for five years (365–360), apparently with no domestic opposition.⁶² When his younger brother Philip returned from Thebes, where he had been a hostage, Perdiccas gave him territory to rule with his own force, perhaps on the frontier in the Amphaxitis region (Carystius *apud* Athen. 11.506e). The king played a host to a number of Greeks, who provided him with advice and his court with intellectual luster. He increased his revenues by using a scheme of the Athenian political exile Callistratus to double the Macedonian harbor dues ([Arist.], *Oeconomicus* 2.1350a16–22). He also cultivated ties with philosophers in Athens such as Plato and Euphraeus of Oreus. The latter joined Perdiccas' court and is described by one source as a royal adviser and *arbiter intelligentiae*, who forbade the king's companions to join the common mess if they did not know geometry and philosophy.⁶³ Only a self-important, wishful thinking sophist could have come up with a story in which a Macedonian nobleman could not dine with the king because he failed the admission test to the Academy. At most, the tale reflects the dominance of Greek education among the Macedonian elite.⁶⁴

Away from Pella, the king had to deal with resurgent threats to his borders from the Illyrians in the west and the Athenians in the east, who tried to regain Amphipolis and other cities against the opposition of Olynthus and the Chalcidians. The most active of Athenian generals was Timotheus son of Conon. He succeeded in capturing Pydna and Methone on the Macedonian coast as well as Potidaea and Torone in the Chalcidice, but he failed to overcome Olynthus and Amphipolis. The Athenians received aid, especially in money, from Thracians and prominent individuals from Pelagonia in Upper Macedonia.⁶⁵ Perdiccas' policy was predictably inconsistent. Aeschines states that at the beginning of his reign, he fought with Athens' enemies but that he made a truce with Athens following his defeat in 363/2 (2.29–30). Elsewhere, Perdiccas is reported to have given substantial help, including money, to the Athenian general Timotheus in his war against Olynthus sometime between 365 and 363.⁶⁶ It is likely that he switched sides in response to opposite pressures from Athens and

Olynthus, respectively.

Perdiccas' downfall, however, came from the hands of the Illyrians, who under their energetic leader Bardylis invaded Epirus and threatened Macedonia. Perdiccas had fared poorly in one encounter with them, when they captured many Macedonians and the rest became demoralized. In 360/59, the Macedonians clashed with the Illyrians again and left 4,000 dead, including Perdiccas, on the battlefield (Polyaenus 4.10.1, Diod. 16.2.5). The stage was set for predatory neighbors and outsiders to swoop on Macedonia, and for Philip II to conquer them all.⁶⁷

6 Review

It is tempting to conclude from the history of Macedonia discussed in this chapter that little had changed from Perdiccas II to Perdiccas III. The kingdom continued to be destabilized by power struggles among different contenders to the throne and/ or by external powers, whether they were Athenians, Thracians, Spartans, Chalcidians, Thebans, Illyrians, or even neighboring Macedonians. These threats culminated in political and military nadirs such as when Amyntas III fled the country in the face of an Illyrian invasion or when his son fell in battle against an Illyrian king. Yet there were noteworthy accomplishments as well. The Macedonian kings could be astute diplomats. The country had an infrastructure of roads and fortresses, administrative and religious centers in Pella, Aegae and Dium, and brisk trade in timber and pitch. The Hellenization of especially the elite intensified and there was a consensus that the king could come only from the Argead clan. The state of the Macedonian cavalry and infantry was far from satisfactory, but it was not beyond repair. Philip II's transformation of Macedonia into an imperial power did not take place in a vacuum but relied in part on the foundations that his predecessors had laid.

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³ Thuc. 2.100.3, Pl., *Gorgias* 471a-b, IG 1¹ 89; cf. Pl., *Republic* 336a, with Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, pp. 133–5.

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¹⁰ See especially A.W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* 1 (Oxford 1945), p. 201; *contra* Badian, *From Plataea to Potidaea*, pp. 171–215.

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¹² *IG* 1³ 61, Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, p. 125.

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¹⁴ Thuc. 2.79.1–7, 80.5–6. For additional possible reasons, see Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, p. 146. For the following, cf. Badian, *From Plataea to Potidaea*, pp. 179–85.

¹⁵ Thuc. 2.95.1–3, 97.3, 98.3; cf. Diod. 12.50.1–4. Badian, *From Plataea to Potidaea*, pp. 180–1 and 184, however, doubts that Sitalces had ever wished to unseat Perdiccas.

¹⁶ Thuc. 2.100.1–101.1, 5, Diod. 12.50.4–7, Hammond, *History of Macedonia* 1, pp. 197–200, and Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 128–9.

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¹⁸ For Perdiccas and Brasidas, see Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 129–36 and Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, pp. 150–5.

¹⁹ Thuc. 4.79.2, 83.1, 5–6. Lyncus: Thuc. 2.99.1, Hammond, *History of Macedonia* 1, pp. 102–5, Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, p. 36. Arrhabaeus' aggression is implied at Thuc. 4.83.3; cf. Hammond, *History of Macedonia* 1, p. 103, for his power.

²⁰ Thuc. 4.123.4–124.1, 125.4, S. Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides* 2 (Oxford, 1996), p. 390.

²¹ For the campaign and its topography, see Hammond, *History of Macedonia* 1, pp. 104–8.

²² Thuc. 4.124.1, 125.1–127.2, and see P.J. Rhodes, chapter 2.

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²⁴ E.N. Borza, 'Timber and Politics in the Ancient World: Macedon and the Greeks', *PAPS* 131 (1987), p. 38 and his *Shadow of Olympus*, p. 154, followed by J. Whitehorne, *Cleopatra* (London 1994), p. 25, may underestimate the significance of non-Perdiccan sources of timber following Amphipolis' fall.

²⁵ For the etymology and ethnicity of the names in the inscription, see O. Masson, 'Quelques noms macédoniens dans le traité IG I² 71 = IG I³ 89', *ZPE* 123 (1998), pp. 117–20, M.B. Hatzopoulos, "'L'histoire par les noms" in Macedonia', in S. Hornblower and E. Matthews (eds.), *Greek Personal Names: Their Value as Evidence* (Oxford 2000), pp. 99–117.

²⁶ M. Zahrnt, 'Macedonia and Thrace in Thucydides', in A. Rengakos and A. Tsakmakis (eds.), *Brill's Companion to Thucydides* (Leiden 2006), p. 596, ascribes a 422 treaty between Athens and Bottiaean cities south of Lake Bolbe (IG I³ 76) to Perdiccas' good services.

²⁷ Thuc. 5.32.1, 35.1, 39.1, B.D. Meritt, H.T. Wade-Gery and M.F.

McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists* (Cambridge, MA 1939), I A 10.21–2. Scholars disagree on when the Chalcidians were organized in a confederacy centered on Olynthus. I follow Zahrnt, *Olynth und die Chalkidier*, pp. 81–97, who dates the confederacy to the early fourth century.

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⁴⁵ Rhodes and Osborne, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, no. 12. See also P. Millett, chapter 23.

⁴⁶ Xen., *Hellenica* 5.2.13. His account, however, is disputed by V. Parker, ‘Sparta, Amyntas, and the Olynthians in 383 B.C.: A Comparison of Xenophon and Diodorus’, *RhM* 146 (2003), pp. 113–37.

⁴⁷ An anonymous fragmentary source charges Thebes with joining Olynthus in an attempt to expel Amyntas: *FGrH* 153 F 1; cf. Xen., *Hellenica* 5.2.15, with Ian Worthington, ‘Alexander’s Destruction of Thebes’, in W. Heckel and L.A. Tritle (eds.), *Crossroads of History. The Age of Alexander the Great* (Claremont 2003), pp. 69–71.

⁴⁸ Aes. 2.27; cf. F. Geyer, *Makedonien bis zur Thronbesteigung Philipps II* (Munich 1930), pp. 118–19.

⁴⁹ M.N. Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions* 2 (Oxford 1948), no. 129, Xen., *Hellenica* 6.1.11; cf. Aes. 2.32.

⁵⁰ Diod. 15.57.2, 60.2, Xen., *Hellenica* 6.1.11, S. Sprawski, *Jason of Pherae: A Study on History of Thessaly in Years 431–370 BC* (Kraków 1999), pp. 98–9.

⁵¹ Justin 7.4.6–7, 7.5.5–8; cf. *Suda*, s.v. Caranus, which describes her children as spurious. On Amyntas and Eurydice, see K. Mortensen, ‘Eurydice: Demonic or Devoted Mother?’, *AHB* 6 (1992), pp. 156–71, E.D. Carney, *Women and Monarchy in Macedonia* (Norman 2000), pp. 39–46, and C. Saatsoglou-

Paliadeli, 'Queenly Appearances at Vergina-Aegae: Old and New Epigraphic and Literary Evidence', *AA* 3 (2000), pp. 392–403.

⁵² Greenwalt, 'Coinage from Archelaus to Perdiccas III', pp. 120–5, and see also K. Dahmen, chapter 3. Late evidence attests the existence of a Temple of Amyntas in Pydna, but nothing is known about the circumstances that occasioned his cult and there are serious reservations about the quality of our sources for it: see Scholia, Dem.1.5, Aelius Aristides 38.715d, C. Habicht, *Gottmenschen und griechische Städte*² (Munich 1970), pp. 11–12, E. Badian, 'The Deification of Alexander the Great', in H.J. Dell (ed.), *Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honor of Charles F. Edson* (Thessaloniki 1980), p. 39.

⁵³ Alexander's reign: Diod. 15.60.3, 61.2–5, 67.3–4, Plut., *Pelopidas* 26, Justin 7.4.8–5.2, Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 179–84; cf. Diod. 16.2.2.

⁵⁴ Diod. 15.71.1, 77.5, Carney, *Women and Monarchy*, pp. 39–40. On Thebes and Macedonia, see M.B. Hatzopoulos, 'La Béotie et la Macédoine à l'époque de l'hégémonie thébaine', in *La Béotie antique* (Paris 1985), pp. 247–56.

⁵⁵ Diod. 15.60.3, 61.2–5, 67.3–4, Plut., *Pelopidas* 26, Justin 7.4.8–5.2, and N.V. Sekunda, chapter 22.

⁵⁶ See the summary in E.M. Anson, *Eumenes of Cardia* (Leiden 2004), pp. 227–9.

⁵⁷ See above and Diod. 15.71.1, Justin 7.5.4, Marsyas *apud* Athen. 14.629d. Demosthenes 19.194–5 identifies one of the killers as Apollophanes of Pydna (and not of Pella as in Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, p. 183, followed by Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, p. 191). See N.V. Sekunda, chapter 22 for the possibility that Perdiccas reformed his cavalry.

⁵⁸ Diod. 15.71.1, Aes. 2.29, Scholia, Aes. 2.26.

⁵⁹ Aes. 2.27–9, *Suda*, s.v. Caranus; cf. Nepos, *Iphicrates* 3.2.

⁶⁰ Plut., *Moralia* 14b–c, M. Andronikos, 'Vergina', *Ergon* (1990), pp. 83–4, and see n. 51 above. Against Andronikos' identification of 'Eurydice's Tomb' at Vergina, see Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, pp.

⁶¹ Plut., *Pelopidas* 27, J. Buckler, *Ancient Greece in the Fourth Century* (Leiden 2003), pp. 322–4.

⁶² For his reign, see Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 185–8, 207–8.

⁶³ Speusippus, *To Philip* 12, Pl., *Letter* 5, Carystius *apud* Athen. 11.506f, 508d-e.

⁶⁴ See, however, A.F. Natoli, *The Letter of Speusippus to Philip II* (Stuttgart 2004), pp. 31–5.

⁶⁵ Timotheus' campaign: Diod. 15.81.6, Dem. 23.149–51, Isoc. 15.108, 113, Din. 1.14, 3.17, Polyaeus 3.10.7–8, 15, Rhodes and Osborne, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, no. 38; cf. Dem. 4.4 and Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions* 2, no. 146. Aid to Athens: Isoc. 15.113, *IG* 1² 190 (368–365/4), Rhodes and Osborne, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, no. 38. The chronology of Timotheus' Chalcidian campaigns is uncertain: see J. Heskell, *The North Aegean Wars, 371–360 BC* (Stuttgart 1997), pp. 31–5, 49–50.

⁶⁶ For the sources and the uncertain chronology, see conveniently Rhodes and Osborne, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, no. 38.

⁶⁷ For Perdiccas, the Illyrians and the supposition that he arranged for a secret marriage between Philip and Olympias of Epirus, see W.S. Greenwalt, 'Philip and Olympias on Samothrace: A Clue to Macedonian Politics During the 360s', in T. Howe and J. Reames (eds.), *Macedonian Legacies: Studies in Ancient Macedonian History and Culture in Honor of Eugene N. Borza* (Claremont 2008), pp. 79–106, but also Ian Worthington, *Philip II of Macedonia* (New Haven 2008), p. 17.

Philip II

Sabine Müller

In a reign that stretched from 359 to 336, Philip II managed to turn the peripheral, disunited, economically and militarily ruined Macedonia into the dominating political power of the Mediterranean world and had created an empire that extended from mainland Greece to the Danube (see map 3). This chapter will reconstruct the problems he had to face on his way to the establishment of Macedonian hegemonic power and the methods he employed to cope with the various menaces, issues, and limitations of Argead power.

1 The Early Years of Philip's Reign

The exact date and circumstances of Philip's accession remain obscure. Under the reign of his brother Perdiccas III (365–360/59), Philip had returned from Thebes where he had lived in his teens for some years as a hostage after his elder brother Alexander II had been defeated by the Thebans (see J. Roisman, chapter 8). In 360/59, Perdiccas died in a disastrous battle along with 4,000 Macedonian soldiers against the Illyrians under Bardylis. He left an infant son, Amyntas, who was born in about 365. Justin's story that Philip served as regent and guardian for his underage nephew for some years and then took the chance to assume the rule does not deserve credence.¹ In view of the crisis facing Macedonia at this time, the Assembly set aside Amyntas and yielded the throne to Philip, as is confirmed by Diodorus (the other main source for the time of Philip), who mentions no regency (16.1.3).

In addition, the numismatic evidence shows that he began to mint coins bearing his name not that of Amyntas.²

Born in either 383 or 382, Philip was 24 years old when he came

to the throne. Immediately he was faced with an overwhelming number of problems that threatened to bring Macedonia to collapse. These challenges were the 'traditional' ones his predecessors also had been confronted with and did not manage to overcome, but in Philip's case the situation was nearly hopeless as he had to deal with a combination of several external and internal enemies simultaneously. Even worse, he was lacking soldiers, for the surviving troops were in a poor, disorganized condition. Argead rule seems to have been unstable and shakier than ever. In addition to the Illyrian menace, the Paeonians planned to invade Lower Macedonia and Philip also had to overcome challenges from his three half-brothers Archelaus, Menelaus and Arrhidaeus, the sons of Gygaea. Probably, he had Archelaus executed in 359.³ At least, this warning seems to have been effective for the time. Nothing is heard of the two others until 349.

To make matters worse, Philip's claims were challenged by two pretenders to the throne. The Athenians supported the pretender Argaeus who landed at Methone with a force of 3,000 mercenaries. Probably, he was the former ruler installed by the Chalcidians in the 380s or a son of his.⁴ The second pretender, Pausanias, may have been identical with the man who had challenged the throne already in the time of Philip's infancy, perhaps a son of the former Macedonian ruler Pausanias who had been killed by Philip's father Amyntas III (Diod. 14.89.2). He was backed by the Thracian Berisades.

In this critical situation Philip's characteristic ability to combine his military, diplomatic and marrying skills emerged for the first time. Looking back on his career, Diodorus states that Philip established his domination by persuasion and diplomacy as well as intimidation and force (17.3.6). In fact, throughout his reign he proved to be a master of war and a clever politician. He pursued his course with determination and knew how to win people over by his charms.⁵ While bribery certainly played a role, it was not Philip's main strategy as his arch-enemy, the Athenian politician and orator Demosthenes, always alleged. Instead, Philip's art of diplomacy was far more complex and multi-faceted.

Philip immediately bought off the Paeonians and Thracians (Diod. 16.3.4-5), came to an agreement with the Illyrians for the time being, duped the Athenians, and so overcame the challenges posed by the pretenders. Pausanias was abandoned by Thrace and the Athenians ceased to support Argaeus whom Philip defeated and captured.

To achieve this, he had insinuated that he would return the Athenians' former colony Amphipolis to them and withdrew a Macedonian garrison that Perdiccas had installed from it (Diod. 16.3.3). In addition, he gave up any claims to Amphipolis in a peace treaty. It is a matter of controversy whether he made more promises about it for

several years later Demosthenes mentions a secret pact by which Philip had promised Amphipolis in return for Pydna (2.6–7). However, as only the Athenian Assembly could ratify a treaty and it was impossible to keep a matter like this in democratic Athens secret,⁶ the alleged pact might either be identical with the peace treaty itself or, as Theopompus mentions, a group of Athenians tried to persuade Philip to accept such an exchange.⁷

Having secured his shaken realm for the moment, Philip turned to the army as his primary source of power. He had to transform the badly trained troops mainly consisting of Macedonian landowners into a professional and specialist force by reorganizing the troops, reforming training and style of fighting, improving discipline, and introducing new strategies and technological advances. It is not known when he began or completed his military reforms,⁸ but within some months he created an army that was able to beat the Illyrians and Paeonians, although the entire reforms extended over several years.

It is widely discussed whether Philip himself established the formations of the Macedonian army or inherited and developed them. Diodorus reports that ‘having improved the organisation of his forces and equipped the men suitably with weapons of war, he held constant manoeuvres of the men under arms and competitive drills. Indeed he devised the compact order and the equipment of the phalanx [...] and was the first to organise the Macedonian phalanx’ (16.3.2–3; cf. Polyaeus 4.2.10). On the other hand, according to a fragment of Anaximenes’ *History of Philip* (FGrH 72 F 4), the organization of the army’s main parts is attributed to an Alexander who, for chronological reasons, cannot be Alexander III. The fragment has also caused a debate on the date of the introduction of the typical Macedonian weapon, a 14–18 ft (4.25 to 4.50 m) pike called the sarissa.⁹ Traditionally, the introduction of both infantry sarissa and cavalry sarissa is attributed to Philip.¹⁰ However, as Diodorus does not explicitly confirm it, it is debated whether the provision of the weapon is to be dated in the reign of Alexander II or whether a prototype existed already in the days of Alexander I.¹¹

In any case, Philip increased the number of soldiers, especially of the cavalry that became the main striking force on the battlefield. He always led the attack and fought on the frontline risking his life and health. Thus, he was injured many times, which impressed even Demosthenes (11.22, 18.67).

Most probably, Philip’s military reforms owed a lot to the lessons he learned as a hostage in Thebes.¹² He had been there during the period of the short-lived Theban hegemony (371–362) after the defeat of Sparta. Living in the house of Pammenes, he met his friend

Epaminondas, the renowned general who was famous for his strategic innovations. During these years, Philip will have learned about successful military strategy and gained insight into the political structures of the Greek city-states. His dealings with the Greeks in his reign must have profited from this experience.

His military reforms soon bore fruit. Philip started to secure the western frontier of his realm when in 358 he defeated and subjected the Paeonians and expelled the Illyrians from Upper Macedonia. Either on this occasion or in context of their earlier arrangement, Philip married the Illyrian princess Audata, a relative of Bardylis, perhaps his granddaughter.¹³ Political marriages were one of Philip's characteristic strategies to strengthen his position and cement alliances and conquests.¹⁴ To this end, he married six times in his life (his final, seventh marriage could have been for non-military reasons, so Athen. 13.557b–e, but see p. 179). His first wife, Phila from Elimiotis, whom he married either before or after his accession, was a member of the Upper Macedonian aristocracy, perhaps the aunt of Alexander's treasurer Harpalus.¹⁵ Probably polygamy, presumably influenced by the Achaemenid example, was not introduced by Philip to Macedonia but was practised by the royal house before that.¹⁶

Philip's spouses were ranked according to status at his court based on the dynastic prestige of their natal family and on the chances of their male children to inherit the throne. However, in the eyes of the Greeks who lived in a monogamous society and judged from their point of view, polygamy was a symbol of 'barbarians'. Furthermore, they described polygamous spouses incorrectly as a bunch of legal wives bearing legitimate heirs and of concubines bearing illegitimate bastards. For this reason, Philip's son Arrhidaeus was misrepresented as an illegitimate child of a prostitute (Justin 9.8.2, 13.2.11, Plut., Alexander 77.1).

After his success against the Illyrians Philip was able to centralize the country and government by bringing Upper Macedonia under Argead control (cf. map 2).¹⁷ The unification of Macedonia ended the autonomy of the Upper Macedonian rulers whose political ambitions often had weakened the position of the royal house. Their kingdoms were incorporated in the Argead realm. To supervise the influential noble families of both parts of Macedonia, Philip had them entrust their young sons to him. They lived as hostages at his court where they received a Greek education and were trained to hunt, fight, serve and guard the ruler.¹⁸ The ancient writers call them *basilikoi paides*, *nobiles pueri* or *regii pueri*, royal youths. As Philip's leadership were thoroughly personal, he wanted to establish a strong bond between him and the youths who were potential future generals and governors. To this end, they were treated very strictly by the ruler who was

exclusively allowed to flog them. On the other hand, the honour to dine at his table was bestowed upon them.¹⁹ It is disputed whether this kind of training school, influenced by the Achaemenid example,²⁰ originated with Philip (Arr. 4.13.1) or whether he only deprived an old Macedonian custom (Valerius Maximus 3.3.ext.1, Curt. 8.8.3) of its former informal basis.²¹

Having secured the western frontier of his realm, Philip turned to Thessaly, taking advantage of the hostilities between its most powerful cities Larissa and Pherae. As Larissa had appealed for his help, he went there in autumn 358 and reconciled the cities. His alliance with Larissa was cemented by a marriage with a native noble woman, Philinna, who bore a son named Arrhidaeus.

Philip's next marriage was in 357 as part of an alliance with Arybbas, the Molossian king of Epirus. Philip married his niece Myrtale, later in life known as Olympias. According to Plutarch, the couple met for the first time at Samothrace where they both were initiated into the mysteries (see W.S. Greenwalt, chapter 14). Philip supposedly instantly fell in love with her (Plut., *Alexander* 2.1). The historicity of this anecdote is uncertain, and it may have been part of the tradition that connected Olympias with Orphic rites and a passion for serpents hinting at the stories about Alexander's divine father Zeus-Ammon and his appearance as a snake (Plut., *Alexander* 2.3–4).²² In any case the marriage was a political one. As a member of the Aeacidae, the ruling house of Epirus,²³ Olympias possessed considerable dynastic prestige claiming her descent from Achilles (Plut., *Alexander* 2.1). In 356 she gave birth to Alexander, the future successor, and probably in consequence of this she became the most prestigious of Philip's wives.

By 357, Philip had secured the northern, western and southern borders of his realm and could focus on securing a route to the sea by eliminating any Greek influence at the Macedonian coast. There he had to face two major opponents, the Chalcidian League with its remarkable army, and Athens.

2 Philip's Expansion and Athens' Reaction

In the summer of 357 Philip took Amphipolis. The capture put an end to a long story of conflicts between Athens and Macedonia. In 437/6, within a period of Macedonian internal instability, the colony had been established as an 'Athenian thorn in Macedonia's side' causing

the deterioration of already tense relations.²⁴ Amphipolis' position by the Strymon gave access to the gold and silver mines of the Mount Pangaeum region as well as to the forests with finest timber Athens needed for shipbuilding. Ever since Amphipolis declared its independence in the Peloponnesian War in 424 and was later declared autonomous the Athenians wanted to regain it.

As mentioned before, in 349 Demosthenes accused Philip of having deceived Athens by breaking his secret promise to exchange Amphipolis for Pydna. Whatever Philip may have offered in 359 or the Athenians might have expected from him, the situation had changed since then. Athens was now preoccupied with the Social War (357–355) against the rebellious allies Chios, Rhodes, Cos and Byzantium in the Second Athenian Naval Confederacy. Philip did not miss the chance to gain control of Pydna and keep Amphipolis. The Athenian declaration of war on Philip for his capture and retention of Amphipolis that followed was a mere gesture. Philip's next step was the conquest of another Athenian strongpoint, Potidaea. In 356 he took the city, sold the inhabitants into slavery and handed it over to the Chalcidian League as he had promised in a treaty dating from the winter of 357/56. Although Athens was still involved in the Social War, troops were sent to help the Potidaeans but failed to arrive in time (Dem. 4.35).

That year still held more successes in store for Philip, for his general Parmenion defeated the Illyrians. In addition, Philip was invited to take on protectorship of Crenides in the Pangaeum which he later eponymously refounded as Philippi. Being in control of the treasures of the gold and silver mines of the Pangaeum (Diod. 16.8.4), he was able to increase his output of silver coinage and to mint gold staters (see K. Dahmen, chapter 3). When his chariot won a victory at the Olympic Games in the same year, he commemorated the success on a series of tetradrachms showing the head of Zeus on the obverse and the Macedonian rider carrying the victory sign of a branch on the reverse.

As his conquests had opened up a route for him to the sea, Philip sought to gain control over the entire Macedonian coast. Towards the end of 355 he besieged Methone on the Thermaic Gulf, the last Athenian foothold in the north-west Aegean. The campaign proved to be difficult and cost him his right eye when in 354 he was struck by an arrow.²⁵ Obviously longing to get away and nurse his wound Philip treated the defeated inhabitants very generously.²⁶

When the Social War ended in 355 Athens was financially exhausted. To improve their financial situation, the Athenians avoided employment in costly foreign commitments. The politician and financier Eubulus, who had achieved significant political influence in

Athens, in particular tried to place the Athenian finances on a stronger footing by pursuing a course of cautious restraint.²⁷ His policy of protecting the state coffers was later criticized by Demosthenes who believed that Philip profited from the Athenian cautiousness.²⁸

By 354, Philip was in control of the Macedonian coastal region apart from the Chalcidic peninsula. At this point, thanks to his Thessalian connections, he became involved in the Third Sacred War (355–346).²⁹ The war originated in 356 when the Thebans brought charges against the Phocians for unpaid fines, but in response Phocian troops seized Delphi and began to plunder the treasures of the sanctuary. In 355 the Delphic Amphictyonic Council formally declared war on the Phocians on behalf of Apollo. With their booty, the Phocians raised large troops of mercenaries (Diod. 16.30.1–2). As Phocis was an ally of the tyrants of Pherae, Lycophron and Peitholaus, who had claimed the leadership of the Thessalian League, the opposing Thessalians backed Thebes in the Sacred War. In 353 Larissa again appealed for Philip's help against Pherae. He took an army to Thessaly but experienced a setback when he was defeated twice by Lycophron's Phocian allies under their commander-in-chief Onomarchus. Forced to withdraw to Macedonia, Philip was even confronted with disobedience of his troops (Diod. 16.35.2).

However, Philip was able to cope with the situation and returned in 352 to defeat the Phocians at the Thessalian coastal plain at the Battle of the Crocus Field (Diod. 16.35.3–6). Posing as avenger and champion of Apollo, Philip ordered his soldiers to wear crowns of laurel on their heads, the sign of the god (Justin 8.2.3).³⁰ Thus, he had grasped the chance to interfere legitimately in Delphi's affairs. He even tried to enter central Greece by the pretext of carrying the war against the Phocians into their homeland. When he advanced towards the strategically important Pass of Thermopylae providing access from Thessaly, Eubulus at once supported military involvement and an Athenian force arrived in time to block Philip's way (Diod. 16.38.1–2). Without resistance, he withdrew to Thessaly and returned to Macedonia. His victory at the Crocus Field had cleared the Phocians out of Thessaly. As a result, he was elected leader (*archon*) of Thessaly, an office that included the command over the famous Thessalian cavalry as well as an input into the Thessalian seat of the Amphictyonic Council (a religious institution with political power in Greece). To cement the Thessalian alliance, he married Nicesipolis, the niece of Jason, former tyrant of Pherae.

After his return to Macedonia, Philip campaigned against the Thracian ruler Cersebleptes. In the same year, he besieged Heraion Teichos, presumably located on the shore of the Propontis north of the Chersonese. However, he had to retreat as he fell ill, (there were

rumours that he had died).³¹ In 349 he turned against the Chalcidian League by starting to attack its smaller members and ending in 348 with the capture of the chief city, Olynthus.³² According to Justin, the war broke out because the Olynthians had given shelter to Philip's two half-brothers and refused to surrender them to him (8.3.10). It is debated where they had fled after Philip's accession and how long they had already stayed at Olynthus.³³ Demosthenes tried his best to incite the Athenians against Philip in his three *Olynthiac* speeches, in which he portrayed Philip as a ruthless liar and robber who gained power out of greed and wickedness and owed his successes merely to the naivety of his opponents. Passionately, he points out that the steady growth of Philip's power challenged Athenian and Greek freedom and that he had to be stopped. Later, in the aftermaths of the Peace of Philocrates in 346, Demosthenes focused on bribery as Philip's main weapon.³⁴ His contemporary Theopompus seems to have shared his opinion. In the fragments of his *Philippica* he characterized his protagonist as a decadent villain of wanton extravagance whose court was a pool of the dissolute and criminal indulged in drunken debauches and indecent sexual affairs.³⁵

The Athenians failed to respond quickly to the threat Philip posed to Olynthus. In the summer of 348 the king conquered the city that had been surrendered by traitors to him (Diod. 16.53.2) and shocked the Greek public by razing it to the ground and selling the inhabitants into slavery, thereby improving his finances (Diod. 16.53.3). He also captured a number of Athenians in Olynthus and transported them to Macedonia as slaves. With the fall of Olynthus, the Chalcidian League also came to an end. In consequence, Athens tried to call Greece to arms against Philip but the *poleis* responded indifferently.

In 346 diplomatic negotiations between Philip and Athens followed, initiated by the Macedonian ruler. The Athenian politician Philocrates proposed that the Athenians hear what Philip's terms were, and two Athenian embassies of 10 men (including Philocrates, Demosthenes and his later rival Aeschines) went to Pella and one Macedonian embassy (including Antipater and Parmenion) travelled to Athens. The evidence of later speeches by Demosthenes and Aeschines provides insight into the internal quarrels of the ambassadors (not to mention how controversial they are as sources on the whole episode of the peace negotiations).³⁶ The second Athenian embassy had to wait several days for Philip who was campaigning in Thrace where he was trying to break the power of the troublesome Cersebleptes, and the envoys seem to have spent their spare-time quarrelling.

3 The End of the Third Sacred War, the Peace of Philocrates and the Way to Chaeronea

In 346 a peace and alliance that became known as the Peace of Philocrates (the politician who engineered it) was sworn to by Philip and Athens.³⁷ Thus ended the war over Amphipolis (but not the Third Sacred War). The Athenians recognized Philip's conquests on the coast and gave up any hope to regain Amphipolis. In return, Philip released his Athenian prisoners from Olynthus and promised to spare Athens' settlements in the Thracian Chersonese which were crucial to Athenian survival because of the grain supply from the Black Sea. Cersebleptes, Phocis and Thessalian Halus were excluded from the peace. The Athenians were far from happy with the terms, which they thought favoured Philip more than themselves, and the hostile aftermaths of the short-lived peace made it clear that Philip's expectations had been too high. His hopes to establish a working partnership with Athens turned out to be illusions. It is significant of the Athenian mood towards the peace that in 343 Philocrates was put on trial for proposing it and when he fled he was sentenced to death *in absentia*.

During the peace negotiations between Athens and Philip, the Third Sacred War came to an end. Exhausted, Thebes had appealed for help from Philip to liquidate Phocian control from several Boeotian cities. Philip sought to use the chance to improve his situation in Central Greece and managed to gain control of Thermopylae this time. The pass was held by the Phocians under their commander Phalaecus who handed it over to Philip in return for a safe conduct. Thus, he surprised the Spartans and Athenians who had sent help to prevent this, and so we have another example of his diplomatic skills. Thanks to Demosthenes, the Athenians refused to send Philip a force against the Phocians despite their alliance with him. This rebuff did not change anything for Phocis though. The city was taken and entrusted to the Amphictyonic Council for punishment. The temple robbers were executed and thanks to the proposal of the Thessalian League, Philip was given the two Phocian seats in the Amphictyonic Council (Diod. 16.60.1). The Athenians expressed their discontent by refusing to recognize his membership and to attend the Pythian Games over which he presided that year (Dem. 19.128). When Philip to all intents and purposes ordered their attendance Demosthenes delivered his speech *On The Peace* (5), arguing that although the peace was a bad one the Athenians should adhere to it and attend the Pythian games lest Philip call for a sacred war against them.

The image of the Greek attitude to Philip is a hostile one, mainly because of the evidence of Demosthenes' speeches. However, some Greeks did praise Philip. In his *To Philip*, written shortly after the Peace of Philocrates, the Athenian orator Isocrates proposed the Macedonian ruler to be the leader of a Panhellenic campaign to 'liberate' the Greeks in Asia Minor and conquer Persia. However, Isocrates did not consider the political implications for Athens nor did he have a stand in Athenian politics of his day.³⁸ Furthermore, in a letter dating from about 343/2, perhaps a private document, Speusippus, the head of the Academy, justified Philip's conquests of Greek cities by emphasizing his descent from Heracles.³⁹ However, it should be pointed out that both of these men were intellectuals and both had their own agendas in writing as they did: Isocrates wanted to rid Greece of social and economic problems⁴⁰ and Speusippus wanted to gain Philip's support for his Academy.

Over the next few years Philip secured and consolidated his rule in the north where new troubles caused by old acquaintances had occurred. He campaigned in Illyria and in Thessaly; in the latter he solved the constant internecine problems by recreating the tetrarchic administrative system and installing an oligarchy and a garrison at Pherae. In Epirus, Arybbas was deposed and replaced by Olympias's brother Alexander (Diod. 16.72.1, Justin 8.6) and in 342/1, Cersebleptes was deprived of the throne and Thrace was annexed (Diod. 16.71.1-2). This was an important step in the extension of what was now a Macedonian empire eastwards. Without having secured Thrace and the key places at the Hellespont Philip could not think of going to Asia.

Alarmed by Philip's campaigns, the Athenians worried about their grain supply from the Black Sea. In 341 Demosthenes took great pains to incite them against Philip by proposing to send an embassy to Artaxerxes III, Great King of Persia, to ask for financial support. In the past, Philip had made sincere attempts to come to terms with Athens and tried to modify the terms of the Peace of Philocrates, but, after having been rebuffed again and again, he finally realized his efforts were futile. Hence he declared war on Athens.⁴¹ In 341 while defending Cardia, he sent a letter to the Athenians that survived in the Demosthenic corpus. In this, he protested against their infractions of the peace and answered to their complaints about his campaigns in Thrace and the Chersonese that 'having made the gods witnesses, I shall deal with you about these matters' ([Dem.] 12.23). The Athenians had failed to realize that it was a declaration of war until he seized their corn fleet in 340. This event is traditionally believed to have been the warning shot that led to Athens' declaration of war on him in July/August 340.⁴² At this time, Philip had turned to the north

shore of the Propontis where he was besieging Perinthus, which was supported by Persian satraps and Byzantium (Diod. 16.74.2–76). When he failed there he turned to besiege Byzantium, but again without success. Perhaps he would have managed to take the cities as he had knocked down parts of the outer walls already, but instead he chose to return to Pella.⁴³ Hence in early 339, on the way home, he campaigned against the Scythians at the Danube.

The Macedonian war against Athens and its allies lasted two years. Philip entered Central Greece bypassing the Thermopylae and taking the ungarded route leading to Doris and Amphissa in western Locris. The outbreak in 339 of a fourth sacred war against Amphissa (near Delphi), which had cultivated sacred land and refused to pay a fine (Aes. 3.107–129), was the pretext for him to enter Greece at the head of an amphictyonic army to punish Amphissa for sacrilege.⁴⁴ That autumn he entered Locris, seized Elatea and invaded Boeotia threatening Thebes that had expelled a Macedonian garrison from Nicaea at the Pass of Thermopylae in the summer. As fear spread that Philip planned to invade Attica (Dem. 18.177–179), Demosthenes was able to unite Athens and its longstanding enemy Thebes against the Macedonian enemy (Plut., *Demosthenes* 17.4–5). Even at this point, Philip tried to negotiate with the Athenians and Thebans, obviously hoping to come to a diplomatic resolution, but his effort was in vain (Aes. 3.148–151, Plut., *Phocion* 16.1).

Demosthenes formed a coalition of Greek *poleis* consisting of Athens, Thebes, the Euboean cities, Megara, Corinth, Achaea and several islands. This alliance was defeated at the Battle of Chaeronea in August 338 (Diod. 16.84–6, Plut. *Alexander* 9.2–3), a battle in which a young Alexander proved his mettle by defeating the famed Theban Sacred Band. Philip's superior army, the Greek failure to unite and the advancement of Macedonian power⁴⁵ all came together to defeat the Greeks decisively (Athens alone had 1,000 men killed and 2,000 captured, Diod. 16.88.2) and so ended Greek liberty. It marked the pinnacle of Philip's career, for it made him master of Greece and ruler of Europe.

In contrast to his harsh treatment of Thebes, where he installed a Macedonian garrison and a pro-Macedonian oligarchy, Philip treated Athens mildly. The Second Athenian Naval Confederacy was disbanded but Philip released the captured Athenians from the battle, did not abolish Athenian democracy, did not demand the surrender of the anti-Macedonian politicians, and allowed the city to keep Lemnos, Imbros, Scyros and Samos. He concluded a peace treaty with Athens (Diod. 16.87.3) as he did with several other Greek *poleis* after Chaeronea.⁴⁶ This gentle treatment accorded with his interests, for Philip needed to settle matters with the Athenians before moving to

invade Asia. For that campaign he needed their cooperation, goodwill and fleet. Furthermore, he probably intended Athens to block the Theban influence. In addition, his Panhellenic posture as Athens' champion would have lacked credibility had he treated that city harshly. At the same time, Philip also needed to leave behind a secure and passive Greece when he started his Asian venture, and to that end he now turned.

4 The League of Corinth and Philip's Persian Plans

In the winter of 338 (after his individual settlements following Chaeronea and some military and diplomatic intervention in the Peloponnese), Philip summoned deputations from all Greek cities to Corinth to tie them into a new order controlled by the Macedonian hegemony. Only the Spartans stayed away, clinging to the hope they could resist what they regarded as servitude. However, Philip's measures in the Peloponnese led to Sparta's isolation so its defiance meant little to him. At the first meeting at Corinth, a common peace (*koine eirene*) was enforced upon the Greeks to be maintained by a council (*synedrion*) of this new community, known by its modern term as the League of Corinth.⁴⁷ At the second meeting at Corinth in spring 337, the Greek ambassadors had to swear an oath of loyalty to Philip and his successors. Although Macedonia was not a member of the league, it was clear who was in the leading position as Philip was elected *hegemon* of the *synedrion*. Thus, there could be no doubt that the common peace was designed to be an instrument of Macedonian control over Greece. This aspect was a revolutionary new facet of a common peace. Also at this second meeting, Philip spoke of his plan to invade Persia, presenting it as a Panhellenic campaign to seek revenge for what the Greeks (especially Athenians) suffered during the Persian Wars and to liberate the Greek cities of Asia Minor, and requested troops for it. He was elected leader of the campaign (Diod. 16.89.3). The Greeks had no choice but to accept that they were now living under Macedonian hegemony, and despite guarantees in the common peace terms of independence and freedom from garrisons, there were Macedonian forces installed at Thebes, Corinth, Chalcis and Ambracia. On the other hand, Philip had put an end to the internal wars that had plagued the Greeks throughout their history.⁴⁸

It is disputed when Philip started to plan an invasion of Asia.⁴⁹ Diodorus first mentions it at the same time as the Peace of Philocrates (16.60.4–5). Isocrates' *To Philip* was also written to the king at this

time, but it is debated whether his call for Philip's leadership of a Panhellenic campaign stimulated him.⁵⁰ However, Isocrates proposed a war on behalf of Greek interests with an illusionary unselfish Macedonian leader. Philip in contrast prepared a Macedonian war with Greek support to expand his realm. The Panhellenic message served him well to legitimize his campaign in Greek public as *hegemon* of the League of Corinth, but there can be no doubt that it was nothing more than propaganda.⁵¹ Thus, it may well be that Philip first conceived of an invasion about 341/0 when he disturbed the Great King by besieging Perinthus (Diod. 16.75.1–2, Arr. 2.14.5).⁵² Alarmed, he had ordered his satraps on the sea coast of Asia Minor to send mercenaries and supplies to help the Perinthians.⁵³ One may conclude that the consolidation of the Persian Empire and Philip's expansion might have raised fears on both sides that the balance of power in the Aegean might be influenced. In any case, the securing of Thrace in 342 was a precondition for the Asian war even if his plan was not fully revealed until 337.

Philip's reason to attack the Achaemenid Empire was most probably a symbiosis of various motifs. He wanted to expand his empire, profit from Asian wealth, keep his army on campaign, free himself from the control of the powerful noble factions and fulfil the constant need of the charismatic ruler to legitimize by military success. Most scholars assume that he planned to gain control over the Greek cities at the coast of Asia Minor and did not intend to usurp the Achaemenid throne.⁵⁴ This might be confirmed indirectly by the conflict that broke out after the Battle of Issus between Alexander and Parmenion, who acted in the interests of the Macedonian nobles. Darius had offered to grant all land west of the Euphrates to Alexander, but against Parmenion's wishes Alexander refused and insisted on marching further.⁵⁵ Presumably, by this point he disregarded his father's agreement with the nobles.

5 Philip's Last Years and End

Now that Philip had secured Greek support for his Persian campaign, he had to make sure that the influential Macedonian nobles would be loyal to his plans. He employed his characteristic strategy of political marriage, choosing Cleopatra, the young niece and ward of his general Attalus, to be his seventh and last wife.⁵⁶ Certainly, it was no coincidence that shortly after Attalus and his father-in-law Parmenion were sent as leaders of the advanced force into Asia Minor (Diod. 16.91.2, 93.9). Philip's ambitious plan required more than only

military preparations. Thus, the marriage served to gain the loyal support of this obviously influential clan rather than showing that Philip underwent a midlife crisis and fell in love with a girl too young for him as is suggested by ancient sources (Plut., *Alexander* 9.4, Athen. 13.557d–e).

Attalus and his circle soon seemed to think that they were able to interfere in matters of succession. At the wedding feast Attalus plainly voiced his hopes that Philip and his new wife (Attalus' niece) might produce legitimate heirs to the Macedonian throne.⁵⁷ This caused a violent argument with an insulted Alexander, whose emotions were heightened by his father ordering him, not Attalus, to apologize and drawing his sword against him when Alexander refused.

Philip's marriage alliance with Attalus' family certainly had an effect on the social ranking at his court. Alexander, the acknowledged heir, and his mother might have feared that their superior standing was challenged. As a result of the conflict, they both left the court. Olympias headed for her native Epirus and Alexander went with her, and then to the Illyrians. However, Philip never seems to have intended to marginalize or even disinherit his militarily and politically educated son, certainly not on the eve of the Persian invasion. Alexander had proved himself already in 340 as regent of Macedonia when he had put down a Maedian revolt on the upper Strymon (Plut., *Alexander* 9.1) and again at Chaeronea, and Philip made him return to Pella (Plut., *Alexander* 9.6).

Shortly after, the so-called Pixodarus affair caused issues again between father and son and reflects first and foremost the incompatibility of Argead dynastic interests and Macedonian noble interests. Although the focus is on Alexander and Philip, the conflict was not a problem primarily between them. It all started when Pixodarus, Hecatomnid satrap of Caria, initiated marriage negotiations with Philip. The latter offered his son Arrhidaeus to the satrap's daughter Ada. The negotiations formed part of Philip's war preparations for Caria could have been a useful foothold for his operations in Asia Minor. But the alliance never materialized thanks to Alexander's interference. According to Plutarch, the only source for the Pixodarus affair, Alexander was misled by some of his friends and his mother. Disturbed by their warnings that Philip wanted to settle the kingdom on Arrhidaeus by means of a brilliant marriage, he offered himself in his brother's place. As soon as Philip became aware of this, he stopped the negotiations and furiously reproached his son, explaining to him that he wanted a better bride for him, and banished the friends who had been bad advisers. Among them were Ptolemy, Nearchus, and Harpalus who afterwards held important offices when Alexander was king (Plut., *Alexander* 10.1–2).

Probably, despite chronological doubts, the episode is no invention.⁵⁸ Due to the quarrel with Attalus, Alexander felt insecure and marginalized at his father's court. Actually, his faction mainly consisted of sons of less important families like Hephaestion as well as members and friends of his mother's family.⁵⁹ He also seems to have been disturbed by Philip's generous attitude towards Attalus and his faction. Presumably, Alexander did not understand Philip's need for his appeasement policy. It has been well pointed out that a member of the clan of Parmenion (and Attalus) was present when Philip talked to Alexander in his private chamber: Philotas, Parmenion's eldest son, accompanied him, a sign that his family watched over even the dynastic politics.⁶⁰

However, Philip tried to reconcile with Olympias and her faction by publicly honouring her family branch. To this end, he arranged the marriage of their daughter Cleopatra to Olympias' brother, Alexander I of Epirus (Diod. 16.91.1, Justin 9.6.1, 13.6.4). This marital connection served to support Alexander's circle at Philip's court and may have been intended to stop the internal quarrel. Olympias returned to Pella as most probably she was present at her daughter's marriage at Aegae.⁶¹

In addition, the statue group inside the Philippeum at Olympia commissioned by Philip after Chaeronea might provide an insight into the way he shaped the dynastic image at this stage of his reign. A thanks-offering to Zeus for the victory at Chaeronea, the Philippeum was a circular secular building located in the sacred precinct.⁶² It contained a family group by the famous Greek sculptor Leochares fashioned from gilded white marble as archaeological examinations of the excavated plinth cuttings have revealed. Thus, Pausanias was misinformed when he reported that the portraits were fashioned from chryselephantine material that was mainly used for divine statues.⁶³ He might never have seen the statues himself or mistook the gilded marble for gold and ivory. Probably Philip's statue carried along with the statues of the 12 gods showing him as a throned companion (*synthronos*) 'because of the extent of his kingdom' (Diod. 16.95.1, 92.5) at the wedding feast at Aegae in 336 was also fabricated from white gilded marble.⁶⁴ In the Philippeum the statues were those of Philip, his parents Amyntas and Eurydice, his wife Olympias and their son Alexander. The sculptural program was most probably commissioned by Philip. Being a piece of Argead propaganda, the statue group symbolized Argead dynastic quality, unity, and legitimacy stretching from Amyntas III to young Alexander. This being the case, Philip publicly supported his son's claim to the throne. The Philippeum also demonstrates the change that Philip's political self-fashioning underwent during his career, for he had reformed the

Argead dynastic image. Trying to get away from the traditional image of the Macedonian ruler as a *primus inter pares* among his noble companions, Philip emphasized the elevated status, uniqueness, and excellence of his family distinguishing himself and the other Argeads from the nobles. To this end, he also included the female members of his dynasty into the public representation.

In the autumn of 336, amidst the lavish wedding feast of his daughter Cleopatra, Philip was assassinated in the forty-seventh year of his life and the twenty-fifth of his reign. The day after the wedding of Cleopatra games were held in the theatre at Aegae. When Philip entered the theatre after the opening procession his bodyguard (and former lover) Pausanias stabbed him.⁶⁵ Pausanias tried to escape but he tripped and fell, and was killed on the spot (Diod. 16.94.4).⁶⁶ Well might he have shocked the audience in the crowded theatre but he made at least Demosthenes' day: the orator is said to have put on a splendid robe and worn a garland on his head in public when the news of the assassination reached Athens (Plut., *Demosthenes* 22.2).

Although there is ample precedent for regicide in Macedonia and the name of the murderer is known,⁶⁷ Philip's assassination is one of the most famous.⁶⁸ Aristotle attributes it to the personal initiative of Pausanias alone (*Politics* 1311b) as does Diodorus, who explains that Pausanias, Philip's ex-lover, jealously insulted the ruler's new lover who could not stand the abuses and therefore sacrificed his life on the battlefield. His death was revenged by his friend Attalus, Cleopatra's guardian, who invited Pausanias to a dinner party where he made him drunk and victim of a brutal gang rape. As Pausanias did not get justice at Philip's hands, he directed his hostility against him (Diod. 16.93–94.1, Plut., *Alexander* 10.4).

However, according to the official version that Alexander circulated at the start of his reign, Pausanias was part of a conspiracy revolving around the three sons of Aeropus (Arr. 1.25.1–2, Plut., *Moralia* 327c), members or at least affiliates of the former royal house of Upper Macedonian Lyncestis. While two of them were executed immediately, Alexander the Lyncestian was spared for the time thanks to his father-in-law Antipater and his recognition of Alexander as king (Justin 11.2, Curt. 7.1.6–7). During his Asian campaign, Alexander is reported to have accused the Persians of having bribed Pausanias (Arr. 2.14.5, Curt. 4.1.12), but in antiquity as well as in modern scholarly debate Alexander and Olympias are also blamed.⁶⁹ Scholars who suspect Alexander to be part of the plot argue that he wanted to secure his succession and to become the leader of the Asian campaign. Scholars who share the view that he was not guilty point out that the timing was most uncomfortable for him.⁷⁰ In fact, his position was insecure at the time of his father's death and it nearly cost him the

throne, for he owed his accession primarily to Antipater's support and Parmenion's agreement. Perhaps they had even joined his side unexpectedly. In addition, it has to be considered that the story of the estrangement between Philip, Olympias and Alexander was shaped in retrospective in order to explain the assassination.⁷¹

As for alternative suspects, several scholars are inclined to believe Aristotle's version. Concerning the reliability of the story that Pausanias wanted to avenge a crime committed perhaps about eight years earlier, it has been pointed out that a victim of rape suffers from rape trauma syndrome for the rest of his/her life.⁷² Last but not least, it is also assumed that the Upper Macedonian nobility felt marginalized by Philip's last marriage to a member of the Lower Macedonian nobility and wanted to murder him to prevent Macedonia from being ruled by a 'junta from the lower plain'.⁷³

Thus Philip died and Alexander became king (see D.L. Gilley and Ian Worthington, chapter 10). One of the new king's first actions was to arrange the burial of his father at Aegae, which remained the traditional site also for royal burials. In 1977 a tumulus was excavated in the modern village of Vergina (ancient Aegae), and one of the tombs found under it (Tomb II) is believed to be that of Philip.⁷⁴

6 Philip's Impact on Macedonia

Philip elevated a ruined Macedonia to the ruling power in the Mediterranean world. He left a legacy that enabled his son to create a worldwide empire. He had removed any threat posed by Macedonia's neighbours and the Greeks, created a united and centralized empire, reshaped the royal iconography and dynastic image, and developed a firstclass army. Thus in 359 the troops numbered 10,000 infantry and 600 cavalry (Diod. 16.4.3) and in 334 27,600 infantry and about 3,000 cavalry (Diod. 17.17.1–5). He stimulated the Macedonian economy regarding agriculture, trade and mining and ensured stability and prosperity as never before (see in more detail P. Millett, chapter 23). His new standard coinage became the strongest in Europe and his expansions added to the Macedonian holdings and royal revenues. Thus the control of Crenides provided him with a yearly income of 1,000 talents (Diod. 16.8.6–8) and the capture of the Chalcidice enabled him to exploit the mines there. However, he might have been running short of liquid capital at the end of his reign as throughout it he had to pay for the costly army, court and especially bribe money.⁷⁵

Without Philip's achievements Alexander's conquest of the Persian

Empire would have been impossible: he did indeed lay the basis for Alexander's conquests as Justin stated (9.8.21).⁷⁶ It is not a surprise that Diodorus says that he 'made himself the greatest of the kings in Europe in his time' (16.95.1). Compared to Alexander, who depleted Macedonian manpower, became highly unpopular with the Macedonians and whose legacy was a chaos as he left neither heir nor security for his empire, Philip was the one from whose reign Macedonia profited more. In the circles of the Macedonian opposition against Alexander he was remembered well, and that memory lived on into the days of the Successors. Thus, when the Macedonians compared Demetrius Poliorcetes to Philip, the result was not favourable: 'they called to mind, or listened to those who called to mind, how reasonable Philip used to be in such matters, and how accessible' (Plut., *Demetrius* 42.3).

Ironically, throughout his life-time Alexander worked to step out of the shadow of his father, who was more popular among the Macedonians.⁷⁷ It is one of history's ironies that despite Philip's great achievements he still lives in Alexander's shadow because of the spectacular military successes of his son in Asia.

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³⁴ C f. G.L. Cawkwell, 'The End of Greek Liberty', in R.W. Wallace and E.M. Harris (eds.), *Transitions to Empire: Essays in Greco-Roman History, 360–146 B.C., in Honor of E. Badian* (Norman 1996), pp. 101–4.

³⁵ S ee M.A. Flower, *Theopompus of Chios: History and Rhetoric in the Fourth Century B.C.* (Oxford 1994).

³⁶ S ee J. Buckler, 'Demosthenes and Aeschines', in Ian Worthington (ed.) *Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator* (London 2000), pp. 114–58. Another view is presented by P.E. Harding, 'Athenian Foreign Policy in the Fourth Century', *Klio* 77 (1995),

³⁷ H.H. Schmitt, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums* 2 (Munich 1969), 329f. On the peace see Worthington, *Philip II*, pp. 89–104. On Philocrates, see Engels, *Hypereides*, pp. 73–7.

³⁸ Cf. Cawkwell, ‘End of Greek Liberty’, p. 115.

³⁹ See A.F. Natoli, *The Letter of Speusippus to Philip II* (Stuttgart 2004), citing previous bibliography. Isocrates also referred to Philip’s ancestor Heracles in order to represent him as a benefactor of Greece (5.33–4, 105, 106, 115, 127, 132).

⁴⁰ Cf. M. Weißenberger, ‘Isokrates und der Plan eines panhellenischen Perserkrieges’, in W. Orth (ed.), *Isokrates. Neue Ansätze zur Bewertung eines politischen Schriftstellers* (Trier 2003), pp. 99–103.

⁴¹ Cf. Worthington, *Philip II*, pp. 128–9, 132–3, J. Buckler, ‘Philip II’s Designs on Greece’, in R.W. Wallace and E.M. Harris (eds.), *Transitions to Empire. Essays in Greco-Roman History, 360–146 B.C., in Honor of E. Badian* (Norman 1996), pp. 87–9.

⁴² Cf. M. Zahrnt, ‘The Macedonian Background’, in W. Heckel and L.A. Tritle (eds.), *Alexander the Great: A New History* (Oxford 2009), p. 18.

⁴³ Cf. Cawkwell, ‘End of Greek Liberty’, p. 99.

⁴⁴ On the Fourth Sacred War, see J. Roisman, *The Rhetoric of Conspiracy in Ancient Athens* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 2006), pp. 133–45, P. Londey, ‘The Outbreak of the 4th Sacred War’, *Chiron* 20 (1990), pp. 239–60.

⁴⁵ Cf. Cawkwell, ‘End of Greek Liberty’, pp. 108–15. On the battle, see Worthington, *Philip II*, pp. 149–51.

⁴⁶ Cf. Ian Worthington, ‘IG II² 236 and Philip’s Common Peace of 337’, in L. Mitchell and L. Rubinstein (eds.), *Greek History and Epigraphy. Essays in Honour of P.J. Rhodes* (Swansea 2009), pp. 213–23, arguing that the inscription generally regarded as related to the League of Corinth actually records the bilateral peace between Philip and Athens after Chaeronea.

47 Justin 9.5.1–7, Diod. 16.89, H.H. Schmitt, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums* 3 (Munich 1969), no. 403. On the League of Corinth, cf. Worthington, 'IG II2 236', pp. 213–17. On Greek common peace, see M. Jehne, *Koine Eirene* (Stuttgart 1994) and T.T.B. Ryder, *Koine Eirene* (Oxford 1965).

48 C f. G. Wirth, *Diodor und das Ende des Hellenismus. Mutmaßungen zu einem fast unbekannten Historiker* (Vienna 1993), pp. 21–2.

49 For further details, see Worthington, *Philip II*, p. 160 and Zahrnt, 'Macedonian Background', pp. 21–4.

50 C f. Weißenberger, 'Isokrates', pp. 108–10, Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 460–1.

51 O n the Panhellenic propaganda, see J. Seibert, "'Panhellenischer" Kreuzzug, Nationalkrieg, Rachefeldzug oder makedonischer Eroberungskrieg? Überlegungen zu den Ursachen des Krieges gegen Persien', in W. Will (ed.), *Alexander der Große. Eine Welteroberung und ihr Hintergrund* (Bonn 1998), pp. 5–58, S. Perlman, 'Panhellenism, the Polis and Imperialism', *Historia* 25 (1976), pp. 1–30.

52 O n Artaxerxes III and Philip, see P. Briant, *From Cyrus to Alexander*, trans. P.T. Daniels (Winona Lake 2002), pp. 707–9.

53 See Worthington, *Philip II*, pp. 131–2.

54 Cf. Worthington, *Philip II*, p. 170, Wirth, *Philipp II*, pp. 148–50.

55 Diod. 17.54, Curt. 4.11, Arr. 2.25.1–3, Plut., *Alexander* 29.4, *Moralia* 180b, Valerius Maximus 6.4 ext. 3; cf. S. Müller, *Mabnahmen der Herrschaftssicherung gegenüber der makedonischen Opposition bei Alexander dem Großen* (Frankfurt 2003), pp. 66–8.

56 O n the political background of this marriage, cf. E.D. Carney, *Women and Monarchy in Macedonia* (Norman 2000), pp. 73–4.

57 Plut., *Alexander* 9.4–6, Athen. 13.557d, Justin 9.6.1–8.

58 A s suggested by M.B. Hatzopoulos, 'A Reconsideration of the Pixodaros Affair', in B. BarrSharrar and E.N. Borza (eds.)

Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times (Washington 1982), pp. 59–66; *contra* V. French and P. Dixon, ‘The Pixodarus Affair: Another View’, *Anc. World* 13 (1986), pp. 73–86 and ‘The Source Traditions for the Pixodarus Affair’, *Anc. World* 14 (1987), pp. 25–40.

⁵⁹ C f. W. Heckel, ‘The Boyhood Friends of Alexander the Great’, *Emerita* 53 (1985), pp. 285–9.

⁶⁰ Cf. Wirth, *Philipp II*, p. 165.

⁶¹ C f. Carney, *Women and Monarchy*, pp. 203–7, W.S. Greenwalt, chapter 14. See also Plut., *Moralia* 179c.

⁶² O n the Philippeum in general, see E.D. Carney, ‘The Philippeum, Women, and the Formation of Dynastic Image’, in W. Heckel, L. Tritle and P. Wheatley (eds.), *Alexander’s Empire: Formulation to Decay* (Claremont 2007), pp. 27–60, Worthington, *Philip II*, pp. 164–6.

⁶³ P aus. 5.17.4, 20.9–10; cf. P. Schultz, ‘Leochares’ Argead portraits in the Philippeion’, in R. von den Hoff and P. Schultz (eds.), *Early Hellenistic Portraiture: Image, Style, Context* (Cambridge 2007), pp. 205–33. Pausanias calls the images *eikones*, statues of persons with no religious connotation, and not *agalmata*, cult statues; cf. A. Stewart, *Faces of Power: Alexander’s Image and Hellenistic Politics* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1993), p. 208. Occasionally, there is slippage between the terms, but mostly *eikones* in Greek texts do not refer to cult statues.

⁶⁴ D iodoros calls Philip’s image an *eidolon*, a secular statue and does not refer to it as an *agalma*, a cult statue. This suggests that the image intended to show that thanks to his considerable achievements he enjoyed an elevated godlike (*isotheos*) status. See also M. Mari, *Al di là dell’Olimpo. Macedoni e grandi santuari della Grecia dall’età arcaica al primo ellenismo* (Athens 2002), p. 183. On the debate on Philip’s alleged divine aspirations, see Worthington, *Philip II*, pp. 228–33.

⁶⁵ O n Pausanias, see J.R. Fears, ‘Pausanias, the Assassin of Philip II’, *Athenaeum* 53 (1975), pp. 111–35, Heckel, *Who’s Who*, pp. 193–4.

⁶⁶ A fragmentary papyrus epitome dealing with the events immediately after Philip's assassination contradicts Diodorus' version: B.P. Grenfell and A.S. Hunt, *The Oxyrynchus Papyri* 15 (London 1922), no. 1798 = *FGrH* 148 F1. According to this account, Pausanias was arrested and put to death by the Macedonian army assembly. However, the papyrus is very fragmentary and its evidence regarded as unreliable; cf. A.B. Bosworth, 'Philip II and Upper Macedonia', *CQ*² 21 (1971), pp. 93–4.

⁶⁷ On Argead regicide, see E.D. Carney, 'Regicide in Macedonia', *PP* 38 (1983), pp. 260–2.

⁶⁸ On the evidence and theories offered on the subject, see J.R. Ellis, 'The Assassination of Philip II', in H.J. Dell (ed.), *Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honor of C.F. Edson* (Thessaloniki 1981), pp. 99–137, Worthington, *Philip II*, pp. 181–6, E.I. McQueen, *Diodorus Siculus: The Reign of Philip II* (Bristol 1995), pp. 189–97.

⁶⁹ See especially E. Badian, 'The Death of Philip II', *Phoenix* 17 (1963), pp. 249–50.

⁷⁰ Cf. E.D. Carney, 'The Politics of Polygamy: Olympias, Alexander and the Murder of Philip', *Historia* 41 (1992), pp. 185–6.

⁷¹ See A. Tronson, 'Satyrus the Peripatetic and the Marriages of Philip II', *JHS* 104 (1984), pp. 116–26.

⁷² Cf. Carney, 'Politics of Polygamy', pp. 181–2.

⁷³ Bosworth, 'Philip II and Upper Macedonia', p. 102. Perhaps it was another motif that Philip had exiled their father (Polyaenus 4.2.3); cf. Ian Worthington, 'Alexander, Philip, and the Macedonian Background', in J. Roisman (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great* (Leiden 2003), p. 87.

⁷⁴ See Worthington, *Philip II*, pp. 234–41; for arguments that the occupant is not Philip, see E.N. Borza and O. Palagia, 'The Chronology of the Royal Macedonian Tombs at Vergina', *JDAI* 122 (2007), pp. 81–125.

⁷⁵ Cf. Worthington, *Philip II*, pp. 194–200.

⁷⁶ C f. Ian Worthington, 'Worldwide Empire vs. Glorious Enterprise: Diodorus and Justin on Philip II and Alexander the Great', in E.D. Carney and D. Ogden (eds.), *Philip II and Alexander the Great: Lives and Afterlives* (Oxford 2010 forthcoming) and Zahrnt, 'Macedonian Background', pp. 7, 25.

⁷⁷ O n the idealized memory of Philip promoted by the Macedonian opposition against Alexander, see S. Müller, 'In the Shadow of His Father: Alexander, Hermolaus, and Philip', in E.D. Carney and D. Ogden (eds.), *Philip II and Alexander the Great: Lives and Afterlives* (Oxford 2010), pp. 25–32.

Alexander the Great, Macedonia and Asia

Dawn L. Gilley and Ian Worthington

Few kings or generals from the ancient world accomplished and continue to fuel popular imagination as much as Macedonia's most famous king, Alexander III ('the Great').¹ He became king in 336 when his father Philip II was assassinated (see S. Müller, chapter 9), and by the time of his death in Babylon in June 323 he ruled an empire that consisted of Greece, Asia Minor, the Levantine coast, Egypt, the Persian Empire, and parts of what the Greeks called India (modern Pakistan). His campaigns stimulated trade and communication between West and East, recorded valuable information about the places through which he marched, and the East in turn received a large dose of Greek civilization. Further, the Greeks of the mainland acquired a sense of belonging to a larger world, beyond just the Mediterranean, which is especially evident in the period after Alexander's death.

Despite Alexander's spectacular accomplishments, contemporary sources about him exist today only as fragments or minor comments in oratory and we have only a handful of inscriptions. For a narrative of his reign we are dependent on five much later sources.² The earliest of these is Diodorus Siculus (first century BC), followed by Quintus Curtius Rufus (mid- to later first century AD), Arrian (first to second century AD), the biographer Plutarch (first to second century AD), and finally Justin, whose epitome of a first century BC work by Pompeius Trogus (now lost) could date to as late as the fourth century AD. Alongside these literary writers we have works such as Plutarch's *On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander*, which presents an apparently idealized view of Alexander as a man of action and a philosopher/idealist and the *Alexander Romance*, which in the mediaeval period especially attributed to Alexander all manner of deeds that are suspect. As a result, our picture of Alexander is frustratingly

inadequate: it is marred by questions such as whether the later narrative writers and Plutarch in his biography got their facts right, whether they read the earlier (now lost) sources properly, or whether they presented an Alexander that was the product not of his times but of the Roman historical and social backgrounds in which they were writing.³ Nowadays the tendency is to accept Arrian's account over the others, given that he used Ptolemy (Alexander's general) and Aristobulus as his principal sources, but arguably Diodorus comes a close second. The greatest challenge in any study of Alexander is the nature of the source material about him, for all too often we are presented with a legendary Alexander as opposed to a historical one. Getting to the real Alexander is next to impossible.

1 Youth and Upbringing

The background in which Alexander was born and grew up and the social customs of Macedonia that were part of his life and influences are discussed elsewhere.⁴ Alexander was the son of Philip II and his fourth wife Olympias of Epirus.⁵ The two had married in 357, and Alexander was born in roughly July 356.⁶ He had an elder brother by a year or so, Arrhidaeus, the son of Philip and his third wife, Philinna of Larissa in Thessaly. As the eldest, Arrhidaeus was next in line to the throne, but at some point he was set aside, and Alexander became heir. Why and when this happened are not known. Arrhidaeus was believed to have some mental deficiency that would affect his ability to be king (Plut., *Alexander* 77.7–8, Justin 9.8.2, 13.2.11, 14.5.2). Plutarch at *Alexander* 77.8 says that Olympias, who was keen to elevate her son's position at court, poisoned Arrhidaeus, and we cannot discount this, given her ruthlessness in arranging executions after Philip's and Alexander's deaths.⁷ Whatever the reason, Alexander had been made heir by 340, for in that year Philip appointed him regent of Macedonia on the eve of a march as far east as Byzantium (see below).

All sorts of miraculous stories surrounded Alexander's conception and birth, as Plutarch (drawing on accounts of earlier writers) tells us, all of which were meant to show Alexander was no average boy (*Alexander* 2.1–6, 3.5–9). Thus, Zeus supposedly impregnated Olympias (one story says that Philip saw her in bed having sex with a large snake, which was Zeus in disguise), and when Alexander was being born the Temple of Artemis at Ephesus burned down because the goddess had left it to help bring Alexander into the world. The stories did not stop there. The most famous one from Alexander's

earlier youth was the taming of his horse Bucephalas (Plut., *Alexander* 6). Alexander was perhaps 10 or so when a horse-dealer from Thessaly brought the horse to Philip to sell. Because Bucephalas refused to let anyone ride him Philip was not interested, but Alexander pestered his father to let him try. He had noticed that the horse was startled by his own shadow, so Alexander turned him to face the sun; his shadow then fell behind him, and Alexander successfully mounted and rode him.

These stories were not just to show how special Alexander was, for they had a purpose linked to how he saw himself and what he did as king. He would come to call himself the son of Zeus, hence the story about Olympias' divine impregnation. He also brought down the Persian Empire; as part of the burning of the Temple of Artemis story was the prediction of the Magi at that temple that a great disaster would befall Asia, and attached to the Bucephalas story was Philip's prophecy that Alexander would do great things and Macedonia would not be big enough for him. These selfserving stories may well have been circulated when Alexander was king, even at his instigation, to show that he was superhuman and destined for greatness from the moment of conception.

We do not know a great deal about Alexander's earlier life until he was 14 when Philip hired Aristotle to tutor him.⁸ Before then, Alexander would have been raised like other noble Macedonian youths. He was taught to ride, to fight, to read, to play the lyre, and to hunt, something he enjoyed doing even when in Asia (cf. Plut., *Alexander* 23.4, Curt. 8.1.14–16). He was a precocious boy; by the time Aristotle became his tutor Alexander had read much Greek literature, especially Homer and Greek tragedy,⁹ was an accomplished lyre player, and could engage adults in serious conversation (Plut., *Alexander* 4.11–5.4).

Aristotle built on Alexander's intellectual knowledge probably with subjects such as geometry, zoology, philosophy and rhetoric, and even medicine according to Plutarch, until Alexander turned 16. At that point, in 340, Philip intended to march as far as the Bosphorus, where he would besiege Perinthus and Byzantium (cf. S. Müller, chapter 9). He appointed Alexander regent in his absence (Plut., *Alexander* 9.1) probably for two reasons: he needed someone he knew in Pella to keep an eye on things during his absence and he wanted to see how his son and heir would perform in this important role. To be on the safe side, however, he left his generals Antipater and Parmenion with Alexander.

Philip could hardly have been disappointed with his son. At some point during the regency Alexander had to deal with the Maedians, a tribe on the upper Strymon river (Plut., *Alexander* 9.1, Justin 9.1.8). It

is not entirely clear whether the tribe revolted or whether Philip had ordered a campaign against it, given that Antipater and Parmenion engaged other Thracian tribes at the same time, and these three campaigns opened up new communications routes.¹⁰ At any rate, Alexander led an army against the Maedians and defeated them in battle. To keep them in check in the future he founded a military outpost and transferred to their area people from Macedonia. This outpost was not a true city, but a sign of the audacity he would later show is that he named it after himself, Alexandropolis.

Philip must not have been too taken aback by his son's foundation, for two years later, in 338, he gave Alexander command of the left flank of the Macedonian battle line at Chaeronea, the critical battle against a coalition of Greek states that gave Philip mastery of Greece.¹¹ Alexander distinguished himself greatly in the battle, helping to break the Greek right flank and annihilating the crack 300-strong Sacred Band of Thebes (Diod. 16.86.3, Plut., *Alexander* 9.2). After the battle he led a guard of honour to Athens, taking back the 2,000 prisoners and the bodies of the fallen from the battle, and received the Athenians' formal surrender in their war against his father that had broken out in 340 (Diod. 16.86.6–7, 87–88.2, Justin 9.4.4–5). Philip went on to establish Macedonian hegemony over Greece by means of the League of Corinth in 337 and to draw up the plans for an invasion of Asia (see S. Müller, chapter 9). However, deteriorating relations between him and his son soured his taste of success. At the marriage feast of Philip to his seventh wife Cleopatra in 337, Alexander got into a furious exchange with Attalus, the Macedonian nobleman who had adopted Cleopatra and who was now Philip's father-in-law. Attalus prayed that Macedonia might finally have a legitimate heir, a slur on not only Alexander but also his mother Olympias, who was from Epirus, although Attalus may have used his prayer merely to taunt Alexander.¹² The young heir threw his drinking cup at Attalus, but when Philip ordered him to apologize he refused. Philip then unsuccessfully rushed his son, surprisingly with drawn sword, after which Alexander and Olympias left the court (Plut., *Alexander* 9.10–11, Justin 9.7.4–7.). Both went to Epirus, but some time later Alexander left to go to Illyria.

Alexander had been raised in Homeric tradition, in which personal success (*arête*) for the sake of honour (*timê*) and glory (*kudos*) was the most important way to live one's life. His two heroes were Heracles and Achilles, both of whom were ancestors (Plut., *Alexander* 2.1), but Philip had to have been his most immediate and influential role model. He watched his father go out on campaign virtually every year, win victory after victory, ignoring the terrible wounds he received in the process,¹³ and Alexander had fought alongside him at Chaeronea

and shared in that victory. But then relations between father and son changed dramatically for the worse thanks to Philip's reaction to Attalus' taunt. They were also not helped by Olympias' criticisms of her husband that seem to have gone on for all of Alexander's life (Plut., *Alexander* 9.5), and she apparently became concerned that Alexander's succession could be challenged if Philip and his new wife Cleopatra had a son.¹⁴

Alexander and Olympias eventually returned to court from their self-imposed exiles, but the already deteriorating relations between father and son deteriorated further when Philip decided against taking Alexander to Asia with him. Instead, Alexander would be regent of Greece and deputy *hegemon* of the League of Corinth. That Alexander was bitter at this decision and eager to establish his own military reputation are shown by his telling his friends that he would never be able to surpass Philip's achievements at this rate (Plut., *Alexander* 5.4–6). How successful Philip would have been in Asia we shall never know, for in the summer of 336 he was assassinated at Aegae, and it is not beyond the realm of possibility that a bitter Olympias and Alexander had a hand in his murder.¹⁵ Regardless, as soon as Philip was assassinated Antipater proclaimed Alexander king. At an Assembly held shortly afterwards Alexander swore to continue his father's policies and received the oath of loyalty of the people – and so he became Alexander III.¹⁶

2 Early Kingship

Alexander remained in Greece for only two years before he invaded Asia. As soon as the Assembly acclaimed him king he was faced with a number of problems. To begin with, the Greek states that were members of the League of Corinth immediately revolted from it. There were also ominous rumblings from the Illyrians and Paeonians, and there may even have been contenders jockeying for the Macedonian throne including Amyntas, who the Assembly had passed over in 359 in favour of his uncle Philip.¹⁷ Alexander quickly had Philip buried at Aegae (modern Vergina), and then turned to deal with the Greeks. We are told little of this campaign, except that within a few weeks he had forced them to surrender, by diplomacy and military force, and resurrected the League of Corinth.¹⁸ He was elected its *hegemon*, and given full powers to conduct the invasion of Asia as general of the Panhellenic army. At some point he began a series of purges against possible rivals, which continued into the following year (335).¹⁹ Among those put to death were Amyntas and Attalus (in 335). Thus,

Alexander finally had his revenge on Attalus for his contemptuous taunt at the marriage feast of Philip and Cleopatra.

Secure on the Macedonian throne, and with Greece again subservient to Macedonian rule, Alexander turned to campaign against the Thracian tribe of the Triballi, perhaps in revenge for the defeat it had inflicted on Philip in 339, and then against the Illyrians.²⁰ He led a force of 15,000 and 5,000 cavalry (almost all Macedonians) and en route to engaging the Triballi encountered several tribes by a pass over Mount Haemus. Their tactic of rolling wagons on top of his army as he marched through the pass failed miserably when his men opened up their ranks to let the wagons roll through or locked their shields over their heads so they rolled over them. A frontal charge on the tribes led to them fleeing (leaving behind their women and children, who were captured as slaves).

By the Danube Alexander engaged the Triballi and defeated them in a frontal assault that left 3,000 of their number dead. The rest fled to an island called Peuce but surrendered after a short siege. By now news reached Alexander that the Illyrians, led by Cleitus, the king of the Dardani (around Kosovo), were preparing to invade Macedonia. Alexander marched against Cleitus, besieging him at Pelium, on the western border of Macedonia. He was gaining the upper hand when he was told that the Thebans had again revolted. They besieged the Macedonian garrison in their city on the Cadmea, called on the other Greeks to arms against the 'tyrant of Greece', and perhaps even offered asylum to Amyntas with a view to establishing him on the throne.²¹ This was a threat Alexander could not ignore. Cutting short his campaign in the north he marched south at the head of some 30,000 infantry and 300 cavalry, covering the 250 miles in 13 days (Arr. 1.7.5). The Thebans refused to surrender and Alexander besieged their city.

The Thebans had reinforced the southern section of the wall (the Cadmea formed part of it) with a double palisade since Alexander logically would try to breach the walls there to free the Macedonians on the Cadmea. The assault was perhaps preempted by Perdiccas, but the Macedonians were forced back in the space between the two palisades, losing 70 archers. Alexander then led another charge that breached the walls, and once inside the city the Macedonians were able to liberate the garrison. Brutal fighting followed until the Thebans took up a last stand at the Temple of Amphiion where they were cut to pieces. When Thebes fell to Alexander 6,000 Thebans lay dead to the Macedonians' 500 and 30,000 Thebans were taken prisoner.²² Worse was to follow, for Alexander had Thebes razed to the ground, an act that sent a grim warning to any Greek state thinking of defying the king. It did the trick, for apart from a call to

arms by the Spartan king Agis against Macedonia (see section 4), the Greeks remained passive until Alexander died in 323.

In the spring of the following year (334) Alexander led his army to Asia. Antipater was appointed guardian (*epitropos*) of Greece and deputy *hegemon* of the League of Corinth (Arr. 1.11.3). Alexander's army numbered around 48,100 soldiers and 6,100 cavalry, together with a fleet of 120 warships and transport vessels, with a total crew complement of about 38,000.²³ That he intended to conquer the whole of the Persian Empire is shown by his act of throwing a spear into Asian soil before he landed, saying that he accepted Asia as a gift from the gods. It also showed that unlike his father, who put great store in diplomacy rather than actual warfare, Alexander was eager to fight.²⁴ The great disaster prophesied by the Magi at Ephesus was about to befall the Persian Empire.

3 Alexander in Asia

Although the focus of this volume is Macedonia, some mention must be made of Alexander's conquests in Asia. This section deals thematically with his more famous battles and sieges as well as some of the more major controversies associated with his reign. For Alexander's policy towards his subject peoples and motives during his Asian campaign, see in more detail M.J. Olbrycht, chapter 17. For the extent to which he enlarged the Macedonian Empire all the way to what the Greeks called India, see map 4.

Alexander arguably earned the epithet 'great' for his military prowess, given that his strategic abilities as a military commander were unparalleled. Despite being constantly outnumbered by enemy forces he never lost a battle, and his success was a result of his effective use of terrain, deployment of his troops, and bold strategy.²⁵ In his first battle in Asia in 334, at the Granicus river, he sent his troops down the river's steep west bank, across the swift-flowing river, and up its east bank.²⁶ He sent across a small cavalry unit first as a decoy to distract the Persian cavalry, thus allowing the rest of the Macedonian line to cross the river relatively unharmed. Once the army had crossed, the decisive charge of the Companion cavalry effectively split the Persian forces.

Alexander was also a typical Macedonian warrior king who led from the front. In 333 at Issus (where he faced the Great King Darius III for the first time), he led the cavalry charge directly at the Persian middle causing Darius to flee and his army to scatter. In the pursuit, hundreds if not thousands of Persians were mowed down.²⁷

Alexander used the same strategy at Gaugamela in 331, and despite his superior numbers Darius lost the battle decisively and again fled the battlefield, as was Alexander's intention.²⁸

When faced with variant fighting techniques with which he was unfamiliar, Alexander was not the sort of commander who stubbornly refused to change his tactics because of a belief in his own superiority. Thus in Bactria and Sogdiana in 329 (Arr. 3.28.8–30.3, Curt. 7.6.13–24), he quickly adapted his forces to the natives' guerilla style fighting by using his archers and javelin throwers to prevent outflanking movements and massing the cavalry in the centre of his line (Arr. 4.5.4–7; cf. Curt. 7.9.10–13).²⁹ He was also confronted with elephant units at the battle at the Hydaspes river in 326 against Porus, forcing him to rethink his attack strategy.³⁰ Despite fierce fighting and battling the elephant *corps*, the Macedonians were victorious because they opened their ranks to envelop the elephants, which allowed their deadly sarissas to strike upwards and dislodge the elephants' handlers.

Although he was strategically brilliant, Alexander nevertheless failed to recognize when enough was enough, which caused a great deal of resentment among his men. Thus, after his victory at the Hydaspes, Alexander continued moving into the Indian interior, but at the Hyphasis river, a tributary of the Indus, his men defied him.³¹ To the army, Alexander had already accomplished the mandate of the League of Corinth: to conquer the Persian Empire. He controlled all four of the Persian capitals (Susa, Persepolis, Pasargadae, and Ecbatana) and in 330 Darius III had been treacherously killed by some of his satraps at Hecatompylus. The conquest of India was not part of the plan – but then neither had been that of Bactria and Sogdiana. Hence, pushed to the limit, the men mutinied at the Hyphasis (Arr. 5.27.1–29, Curt. 9.3.3–5). Alexander was forced to give in, and the army began what it thought was the long march home.

There was another mutiny in 324 at Opis after Alexander announced that the Macedonian and Greek veterans and wounded were to return home.³² This discharge would leave a high proportion of Persians in the army, and this is probably a large part of the reason why his men mutinied again. When, after three days, he was unable to persuade them to back down, he began to give select Persians commands in the army and Macedonian military titles were conferred on Persian units.³³ The Macedonians and Greeks in the army quickly begged forgiveness, which Alexander accepted – as planned. That evening he held a great banquet attended by several thousand of his men at which they ate together; afterwards, he prayed for concord and harmony between Persians and Macedonians (see below).

There is a consensus that Alexander was a great military leader, however few historians today would agree that his leadership abilities

as king and his personal ambition as a man were also great. Very often the ambitions of Alexander as king and as a man coincided, sometimes for the best, sometimes not. The episode involving the Gordian knot in 333, for example, shows how Alexander as king was consciously aware of legends and the political power they held, and how as a man he manipulated that perception for his own ends.³⁴ The knot bound the yoke to the pole of the wagon supposedly dedicated to the gods by King Midas. Legend had it that the man who untied the knot would become ruler of Asia, and Alexander either cut it or unravelled it.³⁵ Alexander's success in thus 'undoing' the knot would have caused the Persians to lose morale,³⁶ his own men to have taken heart, and added to his own personal mystique since the gods, it seemed, were ordaining him as the conqueror of Asia.

Arguably one of the most contentious aspects of Alexander is his megalomania. For example, events such as the visit to the Oracle of Zeus Ammon at Siwah in 331 and the attempt to introduce *proskynesis* at his court at Bactra in 327 have led some scholars to suggest that he believed he was the living son of Zeus. At Siwah Alexander visited the oracular site of Zeus Ammon,³⁷ perhaps in emulation of his ancestors Perseus and Heracles (Arr. 3.3.2). There, Alexander was met by the priest, but he misinterpreted (perhaps intentionally) the priest's greeting *ô paidion* ('o boy') for *ô pai dios* ('o son of Zeus'). Although much of the visit is a mystery, since Alexander met the priest and heard the god's responses to his questions in private, the sources reveal a change in Alexander for he now openly called himself the son of Zeus (Curt. 4.7.30–31, Plut., *Alexander* 28.1). Once again, the king manipulated a situation for his own ends.

Then in 327 at Bactra Alexander attempted to introduce the Asian practice of *proskynesis* at his court.³⁸ According to this custom, an individual either prostrated himself before the king (Hdt. 1.134) or bowed and blew the king a kiss (as the Persepolis Treasury reliefs indicate). For the Greeks, the procedure was blasphemous since it appeared to be an act of prostration to the gods, and even the posture was not acceptable. Alexander's action could indicate that he now thought he was a god, given that he would have known how his men would critically react to such a religiously charged custom. Ultimately, the attempt was a failure because his court historian, Callisthenes, refused to participate, and because of that defiance the other men followed suit.

Alexander is also said to have had a conscious policy to unite the races (Plut., *Moralia* 329c), hence as king and as a man he was noble, compassionate, and cosmopolitan, and this belief has been taken up by some modern historians.³⁹ Alexander's increasing orientalism, his marriage to the Bactrian princess Roxane in 327, the mass marriage at

Susa in 324, and his prayer for concord following the mutiny at Opis in 324 have been seen in this light. However, Alexander was the type of king who recognized the problems of ruling such culturally disparate peoples in his empire, and these events are more indicative of his pragmatic way of dealing with difficult situations and maintaining his rule. Thus, beginning in 330, Alexander began wearing Persian dress (Eratosthenes, *FGrH* 241 F 30)⁴⁰ and integrating foreign soldiers in his army, who were first used in Bactria and Sogdiana (Arr. 4.17.3).⁴¹ Most likely his adoption of Persian dress and protocol at this time was because Bessus, who was of royal blood, had declared himself Great King after the murder of Darius in 330.⁴² The new clothing was propaganda to appease the conquered Persians and to have them (the Persian aristocracy in particular) accept Alexander over Bessus as king.⁴³ At the same time, the adoption of foreign clothing was to pave the way for his own men to reconcile themselves to *proskynesis* before him, and so allow them to grow accustomed to changes in his everyday life. However, we are told that the Macedonian veterans abhorred Alexander's adoption of Persian dress and vocally objected to it at the mutiny at Opis in 324.⁴⁴

Likewise, Alexander's marriage to Roxane caused derision from his men despite the fact that it was celebrated according to Macedonian custom.⁴⁵ It was also most likely motivated because Alexander needed the support of her father, Oxyartes, who had been an opponent, to maintain the passivity of Bactria and Sogdiana after he ended the revolt in 329.⁴⁶ Moreover, Alexander needed to produce an heir,⁴⁷ and a marriage to a native princess would effectively link his base of power (Macedonia and Greece) to his newly conquered territory (Asia). At Susa in 324 Alexander arranged the marriage of 90 of his men to Persian noblewomen.⁴⁸ He himself took two brides, Stateira, the daughter of Darius, and Parysatis, the daughter of Darius' predecessor, Artaxerxes III, in keeping with the Macedonian custom of polygamy.⁴⁹ The wedding ceremony followed Persian custom (unlike Alexander's marriage to Roxane), but the entire mass marriage was a political move to ensure that the bloodlines of the Persian high aristocracy were compromised with Macedonian blood. This would prevent any Persian from claiming the throne or becoming a rallying point for the people to overthrow Macedonian rule.

Finally, following the resolution of the Opis mutiny, Alexander held a banquet one evening for all, and he prayed for peace among Persians and Macedonians (Arr. 7.11.9). The prayer has also been taken as evidence that Alexander wanted to unite the races, but this is not so. Since Alexander was now intent on invading Arabia, he could not allow any dissatisfaction to exist either between his men or

between them and himself, and so the prayer for unity was a subtle way of offsetting this.⁵⁰ Alexander simply manipulated the events surrounding the mutiny at Opis to keep the peace between the Macedonians/Greeks and foreigners in the army and so enhance his prospects of success in Arabia.

It is to be expected that anyone in a position of power is faced with dissension. Therefore, any threats – whether real or imagined – to Alexander's position were treated with determined patience, thus revealing a more vicious, even paranoid, side of the man and king. For instance, in 328 at Phrada occurred the so-called 'Philotas affair', an apparent plot to murder Alexander led by Dimnus, a minor associate of the king, and Demetrius, a bodyguard.⁵¹ The plot was betrayed to Philotas, Parmenion's son and the commander of the Companion Cavalry, but for some reason he did not inform the king of it. When the conspiracy came to light, Philotas was implicated in it, put on trial, and executed for treason. Alexander used Philotas' connection to the plot to eliminate the family, an old and aristocratic one, and sent orders for Parmenion's execution. Since Philotas and Parmenion had a history of criticizing the king's growing orientalism, Alexander may have taken advantage of this conspiracy to engineer their downfall.⁵²

The so-called 'Pages Conspiracy' in 327 at Bactra involved the Royal Pages, teenage sons of Macedonian noblemen, who were given free access to the king, even protecting him during the night.⁵³ Four of them were reportedly planning to kill Alexander while he slept, but the king stayed up drinking on the night that the assassination was to take place and did not return to bed. Once the plot was brought to his attention, he had the conspirators tried, but he also took the opportunity to implicate Callisthenes in it, although the accused pages even under torture never said anything of his involvement. This was the same Callisthenes whose opposition had caused Alexander to abandon his attempt to introduce *proskynesis* (see above), and evidently he did not forgive him. The suspect pages were executed and Callisthenes was imprisoned for his alleged involvement in the affair — he later died or was killed.⁵⁴

Alexander was also vengeful and reckless as the events at Tyre in 332 and the murder of Cleitus in 328 attest. At Tyre, city leaders surrendered the city to Alexander on his arrival. When he notified them of his intent to sacrifice to a local deity (Melqart) whom he recognized as Heracles, one of his paternal ancestors,⁵⁵ the Tyrians refused to allow any Macedonian within their city walls. They considered his presence in their temple would be blasphemy, although Diodorus 17.40.3 suggests that their refusal was because of their loyalty to Darius. Control of Tyre was essential to protect Alexander's lines of communication and deny the Phoenician fleet the chance to

use Tyre as a base in assisting the Persians against him, so he ordered its siege. We cannot, however, deny that the personal affront he suffered was also a factor in his decision, especially as the siege grew protracted and Alexander suffered reversals and lost much manpower. Eventually, after a six-month siege, Tyre fell.⁵⁶

Then in Maracanda (Samarkand) in 328, Alexander murdered Cleitus, one of his senior generals and the future Satrap of Bactria, at a *symposium* where everyone had consumed a great deal of alcohol, Alexander and Cleitus in particular.⁵⁷ Cleitus had become increasingly offended at the sycophantic praise being bestowed on Alexander, and had finally spoken up against it. For whatever reason, he also felt the need to praise Philip in such a way that Alexander felt ill compared to him and grew enraged.⁵⁸ The two got into a lengthy altercation, which ended when Ptolemy hustled Cleitus from the hall. For some reason Cleitus returned, antagonized Alexander once more, and the furious and drunken king grabbed a weapon (perhaps a spear) from one of his bodyguards and killed Cleitus on the spot with it.

Once crossed, then, Alexander was apparently unforgiving, quick to anger and quick to act without necessarily thinking of the consequences for his position, his relations with his men and indeed the general good of the army.

Alexander's penchant for alcoholic excess, compounded by the various wounds he had received during his Asian campaign, culminated in his death in 323 at Babylon. After a night of heavy drinking, the king became seriously ill. His health deteriorated rapidly, and he died on either the 10 or 11 June, 323. Justin 9.14.9 suggests that he might have been poisoned, but there is no evidence to support his assertion, and he probably died from malaria or pancreatitis.⁵⁹

Alexander's death was so unexpected and even startling in its circumstances that when news of it reached the mainland the Greeks did not immediately believe it.⁶⁰ But Alexander was dead, and his death also signalled the abandonment not only of his invasion of Arabia but also of his so-called final plans, which were contained in his alleged will that Perdicas read out to the army. These plans included the conquest of the entire Mediterranean basin, the circumnavigation of Africa, the building of a memorial to Philip II to rival the greatest pyramid, a huge temple to Athena at Troy, and the transpopulation of people from Asia to Europe and vice versa.⁶¹

4 Macedonia in Alexander's Absence

We know little about events in Macedonia while Alexander was in Asia. If his destruction of Thebes in 335 (see section 2) had been intended to keep the Greeks in check and aid Antipater in administering Macedonia and Greece, it did the job. There was no resistance to the Macedonian hegemony until 331, when the Spartan king Agis III declared war and attempted to unite the Greeks under him. He failed miserably, and Antipater defeated and killed him at the Battle of Megalopolis the following year.⁶²

Antipater's political experience under Philip II (and even earlier under Amyntas III) made him a logical choice to represent the Macedonian crown while Alexander was in Asia.⁶³ He was an older man, in his 60s, at the head of a large family (seven sons and four daughters), and had considerable military as well as diplomatic experience.⁶⁴ The sources are vague, perhaps intentionally, about his duties. Arrian states that Alexander entrusted Antipater with the affairs of Macedonia and Greece (1.11.3); Curtius calls him a governor (4.11), Diodorus labels him a general (17.118.1), and Justin merely says that he was in command of Macedonia (11.7.1). Because of the ambiguity of the sources, Hammond has argued that Antipater was not a regent in the sense that he was in charge of the machinery of the Macedonian state since that machinery travelled with the king when on campaign.⁶⁵ Antipater we know was Alexander's deputy *hegemon* of the League of Corinth, which would have given him the ability to see to Greek affairs and to levy troops in the event of conflict.⁶⁶ Also, he was in charge of an army of some 12,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry when Alexander left for Asia in 334 (Diod. 17.17.3, 5). Presumably he would also have been responsible for recruiting, promoting, paying the soldiers, and sending reinforcements to Alexander. The king's increased demands for troops from 334 to 331 drained Macedonia to no small extent of manpower reserves and put Antipater in the difficult position of trying to maintain a strong military presence in Greece and Macedonia with fewer citizen soldiers (Diod. 18.12.2).⁶⁷

In 331 Antipater was faced with the possibility of a two-front war. On the one hand, Memnon, Alexander's governor in Thrace, was organizing a revolt (Diod. 17.62.4) and, on the other, the Spartan king Agis was mobilizing the Spartans and calling for allies against Macedonian hegemony.⁶⁸ Despite the relative silence of the sources, it appears that Antipater settled the conflict with Memnon diplomatically (Aes. 3.165, Diod. 17.63.1), for in 327 he sent Thracian troops to Alexander in India (Curt. 9.3.21).⁶⁹

This settlement with Memnon in 331 allowed Antipater to focus his attention on the problem brewing in the Peloponnese. He levied an army of 40,000, which included Macedonian, Corinthian, Argive, and

Messenian troops (Diod. 17.63.1),⁷⁰ and at Megalopolis in 331 brought Agis to battle. Agis was killed and his army destroyed although the Macedonians suffered many casualties as well.⁷¹ After Megalopolis, Antipater referred the punishment of Sparta to the League of Corinth, which turned the decision over to Alexander, the league's true *hegemon* (Diod. 17.73.5, Curt. 6.1.19-20). Alexander pardoned the Spartans (though they had to surrender 50 noble hostages), perhaps to create a rift among the Greek *poleis* (who already despised them) so that they would not unite against him. On the other hand, since Sparta was hemmed in by states so opposed to it, Alexander could afford to act as he did, although Sparta probably became a member of the League of Corinth at this time.⁷²

Not only did Antipater's referral of punishment to the league maintain the illusion of its importance in Greek affairs, but also it de-emphasized his own role as the representative of the Macedonian crown. Although he and Alexander remained in close contact by letter, and Alexander must have trusted him to a large extent, relations between the two of them were strained, not least because of Olympias' attitude to Antipater.⁷³ According to Curtius, Antipater's referral was a result of his fear that a jealous Alexander might misunderstand his actions and think that he was making a claim for personal victory (6.1.17).⁷⁴ We are told that Alexander is supposed to have called the war against Agis 'a battle with mice' (Plut., *Agesilaus* 15), to which Antipater more than likely took offence.

Moreover, Antipater also had to deal with Greeks who accepted the Macedonian hegemony only because of the military power of Macedonia and felt no real loyalty to the king. Curtius 6.1.17 suggests that Antipater was aware of the 'true feelings of the Greeks', and this may explain why, despite there being no large-scale Greek support for Agis, he developed a harsher relationship with the Greeks after Megalopolis. For example, he maintained the pro-Macedonian garrisons in Megalopolis, Corinth, Pellene, and at what was left of the Theban Cadmea (Diod. 18.70-71).⁷⁵ He also set up tyrannies such as those at Sicyon, Pellene and Messenia ([Dem.] 17.4, 7, 10, 16),⁷⁶ and tried to rid Greece of anti-Macedonian sentiment by driving his opponents into exile (Diod. 18.56.1-4, 56.7). It is likely that these actions were a result of Alexander's direct orders since regent and king were in constant contact.⁷⁷ Nonetheless, they earned the antipathy of the Greeks and as a result embassies were sent to Alexander to complain about Antipater (Plut., *Alexander* 74.2).

On top of all that, Antipater was forced to deal with Olympias, Alexander's mother, who was not averse to interfering in political affairs and making her views publicly known.⁷⁸ According to the sources, both Antipater and Olympias wrote to Alexander to complain

about the actions of the other, which gives some credence to the idea that Olympias exercised some political influence at court and even over her son.⁷⁹ The conflict between the two appears to have come to a head after Antipater's victory at Megalopolis in 331 because Olympias fled from Macedonia to her native Molossia. Diodorus 18.49.4 suggests that her flight was due to fear of Antipater but as mother of the king Olympias would presumably have been physically safe at Pella. It is more likely that in the aftermath of Megalopolis Antipater's power was at its height and Olympias fled Macedonia to aid her daughter Cleopatra, the wife of Alexander of Epirus who had just died (Plut., *Alexander* 68.3), thereby gaining some power of her own in her native state.⁸⁰ Olympias stayed in Molossia until 325 at which point, according to Plutarch, she and her daughter formed a faction against Antipater (*Alexander* 68.3). The accounts of Diodorus (17.118.1) and Arrian (7.12.4) suggest that Olympias was the reason why Alexander sent Craterus to Macedonia in 324 and requested Antipater join him in Asia. At the same time, we should be cautious about attributing too much power to Olympias because it is unclear how much influence, if any, Alexander granted his mother when he left for Asia.⁸¹ A great deal of her power base, to call it that, was most likely her exploiting the fact she was his mother.

Antipater's actions in this period, then, reflect his precarious political position in that he had to navigate the power vacuum that developed when Alexander left for Asia without appearing to usurp his authority at home. It has been suggested that Alexander may have questioned Antipater's loyalty early since he was the one left behind in Macedonia.⁸² However, Antipater was the first to proclaim Alexander king and it makes no sense for Alexander to leave someone in control of the base of his power whose loyalty was questionable. That is not to say, though, that Alexander did not grow more paranoid as the years passed, especially in light of the evidence that shows the king undermining Antipater's authority when it was at its zenith.

Following the executions of Parmenion and Antipater's own son-in-law, Alexander Lyncestes, in 330, Antipater had every reason to fear his position (Curt. 10.10.15, Plut., *Alexander* 74.1). It is not too far of a stretch to think that he felt threatened by Alexander's execution of Parmenion, who, like him, was part of the older generation or Old Guard that had served Philip.⁸³ That same year Alexander declared that the tyrannies in Greece, some of which Antipater had established, be abolished and he proclaimed Greek freedom (Plut., *Alexander* 34.2). These tyrannies may well have been established on Alexander's orders, hence Alexander had every right to change his policy, but Antipater was using them to tighten Macedonian control over Greece so as to prevent possible future conflict – a conflict that might stretch

his manpower reserves, given Alexander's demands for reinforcements.

Between 330 and 324 little is known of Antipater's actions or of life in Macedonia. What is clear, however, is that he successfully kept the Greeks from revolting from Macedonian rule, and during this time the Greeks enjoyed a period of peace and prosperity – as was especially seen in Athens thanks to Lycurgus⁸⁴ and southern Greece.⁸⁵ Macedonia itself also prospered under Antipater's rule, and he successfully kept traditional enemies of Macedonia, such as the Illyrians and the Paeonians, passive.⁸⁶ In 324, the situation changed dramatically. In that year Alexander decreed that all exiles (except those convicted of sacrilege or murder or the Thebans) were to return to their native *poleis*, making Antipater responsible for enforcing the decree on any unwilling city (Diod. 18.8.4). The Greeks sent embassies to Alexander at Babylon protesting the decree, and in an effort to appease him and so enhance their cases offered to grant him deification,⁸⁷ to which Antipater patently objected (Curt. 10.5.11). In the same year, Antipater (along with Olympias) demanded the surrender of the corrupt imperial treasurer Harpalus when he fled to Athens in an attempt to incite a revolt against Alexander.⁸⁸ Harpalus went on to leave Athens for Crete, although Antipater made no moves against the Athenians for not surrendering Harpalus to him.

In 323 Alexander called Antipater to him in Babylon and to bring with him reinforcements. Craterus was ordered to escort the wounded and veterans to Macedonia. Alexander may have wanted to keep Antipater within closer reach, given his attempts to undermine Antipater's power in Greece coupled with Olympias' constant protestations of his desire for kingly power (Curt. 10.10.14). However, Arrian says that the demotion did little to diminish Antipater's stature (7.12.7),⁸⁹ and the fact that Alexander entrusted him with a force of 10,000 would suggest that any rift between the two men was later conjecture. Nevertheless Antipater refused the king's demand and sent his son Cassander in his place. What reaction Alexander would have had to this in the longer term is unknown, for Cassander arrived in Babylon shortly before the king's death in 323 (Plut., *Alexander* 74.2). Although Olympias blamed Antipater and his sons for poisoning Alexander, and Antipater did benefit from his death, there is no evidence to support the assertion.⁹⁰

Thus Antipater remained in Macedonia. He would play an integral role in the diplomatic and military relations of Alexander's successors until his death in 319, but Macedonia would never be the same again.

5 The Lamian War

Greece as a whole prospered under the Macedonian hegemony thanks to the peace it brought, although this does not mean the Greeks were content with it. Thus, when news of Alexander's death in 323 was confirmed the Greeks (excluding the Boeotian and the Euboean Leagues) revolted from the League of Corinth. The sudden chaos that surrounded the Macedonian dynastic line was in their favour, for Alexander left no undisputed heir to succeed him. Rival groups of his generals supported his half-brother Philip III and Alexander's son Alexander IV, who Roxane bore a few months after his father's death.

The Greek revolt, which was spearheaded by Athens, is commonly called the Lamian War.⁹¹ Antipater was not able to put it down as easily as Alexander had ended the Greek revolt in 336. Thanks to the Athenian general Leosthenes, Antipater was defeated in battle at Thermopylae in 323 (Diod. 18.12.3-4), and escaped by the skin of his teeth to the town of Lamia, where he was besieged throughout the winter of 323 to 322.⁹² Although Leosthenes was killed in an attempt on Lamia,⁹³ the Macedonian hegemony of Greece was clearly in jeopardy. Alexander's repeated calls for reinforcements (see above) may well have contributed to the position in which Antipater now found himself. Diodorus 18.12.2 says that Antipater lacked 'citizen soldiers', that is Macedonians proper, when the Lamian War first broke out, and he had sent urgent word to Craterus and Leonnatus in Asia to bring their armies to him.

Nevertheless, the tide turned in Macedonia's favour when in spring 322 Leonnatus with more than 20,000 troops and 1,500 cavalry was able to march to Lamia and save Antipater. Although Leonnatus was killed in the fighting, Antipater returned to Pella to regroup.⁹⁴ Then in the summer of 322 the Macedonian admiral Cleitus systematically destroyed the Greek fleet, thereby allowing Craterus to lead a force of over 10,000 soldiers from Asia to Macedonia (Diod. 18.16.4-5). In August Antipater led a Macedonian army of some 48,000 soldiers including 5,000 cavalry against the Greek force of about 25,000 infantry and 3,500 cavalry at Crannon in central Thessaly. His victory spelled the end of the Greeks' attempt to regain their autonomy; after a series of individual arrangements with some states (which included the abolition of democracy in Athens), Antipater again established Macedonian hegemony over Greece.⁹⁵

When Antipater died in 319, Macedonia and Greece became a battleground in the wars of Alexander's successors for the Macedonian throne. Moreover, the dual kingship of Philip III and Alexander IV did not last long; both were used as pawns by Alexander's successors, and eventually put to death. These wars are discussed by W.L. Adams in

6 Conclusion

Alexander had been blessed by Philip's brilliant legacy, especially with the army (and the engineering *corps* that had pioneered the development of the torsion catapult) that allowed Alexander to achieve the successes he did.⁹⁶ His own legacy, however, was very different.⁹⁷ Alexander may indeed be Macedonia's most famous king, but that does not mean he was its greatest. That title arguably belongs to Philip. Alexander may have continued to stimulate the Macedonian economy by sending back vast sums of money and facilitating trade with the new areas of his empire, but such things were not enough. His greatest failing as king was probably not providing an undisputed heir, for that more than anything else led to his generals (and his secretary Eumenes) carving up his empire among themselves, and so undoing everything he had achieved – and Philip II too. Alexander was indeed the most powerful individual of his time and he had established an empire that for a time was without parallel. He did record all manner of information about the places through which he marched, and one can argue that his legacy was the Hellenistic period with all of its intellectual and cultural jewels. But Alexander's kingdom suffered greatly in the decades after his death and it became a shadow of its former self once the Romans came onto the scene (see A.M. Eckstein, chapter 12). All of that arguably can be traced back to Alexander.

In his desire to eclipse the exploits of his father and in the pursuit of his *pothos*, his personal longing, Alexander lost touch with his own people (back home and with him), suffered two army mutinies, arguably resorted to engineering the deaths of his opponents, recklessly endangered the lives of his own men, and succumbed to pretensions of personal divinity that were mocked by his men at the Opis mutiny in 324. He sacrificed his empire and his kingdom in contrast to Philip, who united Macedonia and centralized the capital at Pella for the first time in that kingdom's history, developed its mining, agriculture, and trade, created a first-class army and established a dynasty that allowed his son to succeed him without problem (see further, S. Müller, chapter 9). Without Philip, then, no Alexander.

Yet the fascination that Alexander has commanded throughout the centuries, finding its way into books, songs, popular movies, and even names of hotel suites, will continue.⁹⁸ No one can dispute that he

deserves praise and should be admired for the vast empire he created, especially as it was the product of one man's doing (and a young one at that) in a period of only slightly over a decade. As Diodorus rightly says of his empire, Alexander 'accomplished greater deeds than any, not only of the kings who had lived before him but also of those who were to come later down to our time' (17.117.5), though Diodorus is not praising Alexander as a king with his comment.⁹⁹ No one came close to matching what Alexander did, including Philip, who formed the plan to invade Asia, but did not invade it himself because he was assassinated, and not even the Romans whose empire took centuries to grow thanks to numerous generals and emperors. Nevertheless, the downsides to Alexander's character and his abilities as a king and commander must be taken into account when one talks of Alexander 'the Great'.

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¹ For some of the extensive literature on Alexander, see the Bibliographical Essay. Alexander's reign cannot be covered in its entirety in this chapter, and in any case his Asian campaign lies outside the scope of a book on Macedonia, so only some of the more important events pertaining to his life, character, and kingship are discussed.

² On the sources, see N.G.L. Hammond, *Three Historians of Alexander the Great* (Cambridge 1983), A.B. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* (Oxford 1988), N.G.L. Hammond, *Sources for Alexander the Great* (Cambridge 1993); cf. E. Baynham, 'The Ancient Evidence for Alexander the Great', in J. Roisman (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great* (Leiden 2003), pp. 3–29. See too P.J. Rhodes, chapter 2.

³ See J.M. Alonso-Núñez, 'An Augustan World History: The *Historiae Philippicae* of Pompeius Trogus', *G&R²* 34 (1987), pp. 56–72, D. Spencer, *The Roman Alexander* (Exeter 2002); cf. Ian Worthington, 'Worldwide Empire vs Glorious Enterprise: Diodorus and Justin on Philip II and Alexander the Great', in E.D. Carney and D. Ogden (eds.), *Philip II and Alexander the Great: Lives and Afterlives* (Oxford 2010), pp. 165–74.

⁴ See S. Müller, chapter 9, with C.G. Thomas, *Alexander and His World* (Oxford 2006); cf. G.T. Griffith, 'The Macedonian Background', *G&R²* 12 (1965), pp. 125–39, Ian Worthington, 'Alexander, Philip, and the Macedonian Background', in J. Roisman (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great* (Leiden 2003), pp. 69–98 and P. Cartledge, *Alexander the Great: The Hunt for a New Past* (London 2003), pp. 57–80.

⁵ See E. Carney, *Women and Monarchy in Macedonia* (Norman 2000), pp. 62–7 and 79–81, and especially her *Olympias, Mother of Alexander the Great* (New York 2006).

⁶ Athen. 13.557c, Justin 7.6.10–12; cf. Diod. 19.51.1, Plut., *Alexander* 3.8.

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⁸ Plut., *Alexander* 7.4–9; cf. 8.1–2. On Alexander’s physique, appearance, and boyhood in general (including training and education), see further Ian Worthington, *Alexander the Great: Man and God* (rev. edn., London 2004), pp. 30–43; cf. J.R. Hamilton, ‘Alexander’s Early Life’, *G&R*² 12 (1965), pp. 125–39.

⁹ He knew all of Euripides’ works according to Nicobule, *FGrH* 127 F 2.

¹⁰ See Ian Worthington, *Philip II of Macedonia* (New Haven 2008), pp. 130–1.

¹¹ On the battle, see Diod. 16.86, Justin 9.3.4–11, Polyaeus 4.2.2, 7, and for a modern discussion, see especially Griffith in Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 596–603; cf. Worthington, *Philip II*, pp. 149–51, 167.

¹² Plut., *Alexander* 9.6–11, Athen. 13.557d; cf. Justin 9.7.3–4. On the incident, see Worthington, *Philip II*, pp. 176, 177–8.

¹³ In his alleged speech to the mutinous army at Opis in 324, Alexander takes pains to describe the injuries and scars he has received (Arr. 7.10.1–2), given the importance attached to battle wounds.

¹⁴ A thenaeus 13.557d says that Philip intended Cleopatra to replace Olympias, but this seems implausible.

¹⁵ Cf. Worthington, *Philip II*, pp. 181–6.

¹⁶ Diod. 17.2.1–2, Plut., *Alexander* 11.1, Justin 11.1.7–10.

¹⁷ Arr. 1.25.1–2, Curt. 6.9.17, 10.24, Plut., *Alexander* 11, Justin

11.1; see S. Müller, chapter 9.

¹⁸ Diod. 17.3.1–4.9, Arr. 1.1.2–3, Justin 11.2.5–3.5. On the historical background, see A.B. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great* (Cambridge 1988), pp. 188–92 and Worthington, *Alexander the Great*, pp. 50–3.

¹⁹ Diod. 17.2.3–6, 5.1–2, Curt. 7.1.3, Justin 11.5.1–2, and see Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, pp. 25–7, Worthington, *Alexander the Great*, pp. 44–6, J.R. Ellis, ‘The First Months of Alexander’s Reign’, in B. Barr-Sharrar and E.N. Borza (eds.), *Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times* (Washington 1982), pp. 69–73.

²⁰ Diod. 17.8.1–2, Arr. 1.1.4–6.11, Plut., *Alexander* 11.5–6; on the campaigns, see Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, pp. 28–32 and Worthington, *Alexander the Great*, pp. 53–8.

²¹ See Ian Worthington, ‘Alexander’s Destruction of Thebes’, in W. Heckel and L.A. Tritle (eds.), *Crossroads of History: The Age of Alexander the Great* (Claremont 2003), pp. 65–86.

²² Diod. 17.8.2–14, Arr. 1.7.1–9.10, Plut., *Alexander* 11.6–12, Justin 11.3.6–4.8, and on the siege and fall of Thebes, see Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, pp. 32–3 and 194–6, Worthington, *Alexander the Great*, pp. 58–63.

²³ On the numbers, see D. Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1978), pp. 146–7 (table 4).

²⁴ On this aspect of Philip, see T.T.B. Ryder, ‘The Diplomatic Skills of Philip II’, in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Ventures into Greek History: Essays in Honour of N.G.L. Hammond* (Oxford 1994), pp. 228–57 and G.L. Cawkwell, ‘The End of Greek Liberty’, in R.W. Wallace and E.M. Harris (eds.), *Transitions to Empire: Essays in Greco-Roman History, 360–146 B.C., in Honor of E. Badian* (Norman 1996), pp. 98–121.

²⁵ For the size of the Macedonian forces, see Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army*, *passim*, and on Alexander’s generalship see J.F.C. Fuller, *The Generalship of Alexander the Great* (New Brunswick 1960); cf. W.W. Tarn,

Alexander the Great 2 (Cambridge 1948), Appendices 1–6, ‘Military’, pp. 135–98, A.R. Burn, ‘The Generalship of Alexander’, *G&R*² 12 (1965), pp. 140–54 and A.M. Devine, ‘Alexander the Great’, in J. Hackett (ed.), *Warfare in the Ancient World* (New York 1989), pp. 104–29.

²⁶ Diod. 17.19–20, Arr. 1.12.6–16, Plut., *Alexander* 16, Justin 11.6.8–13. For more on the Battle of the Granicus river, see E. Badian, ‘The Battle of the Granicus: A New Look’, *Ancient Macedonia* 2 (Thessaloniki 1977), pp. 271–93, N.G.L. Hammond, ‘The Battle of the Granicus River’, *JHS* 100 (1980), pp. 73–88 and A.M. Devine, ‘A Pawn-Sacrifice at the Battle of the Granicus: The Origins of a Favorite Stratagem of Alexander the Great’, *Anc. World* 18 (1988), pp. 3–20.

²⁷ Diod. 17.34.5–6, Arr. 2.11, Curt. 3.11.27, Justin 11.9.10, Plut., *Alexander* 20.5. On the battle, cf. A.M. Devine, ‘The Strategies of Alexander the Great and Darius III in the Issus Campaign (333 BC)’, *Anc. World* 12 (1985), pp. 25–38 and ‘Grand Tactics at the Battle of Issus’, *Anc. World* 12 (1985), pp. 39–59.

²⁸ Diod. 17.55.3–61.3, Arr. 3.8–15, Curt. 4.12.1–16.33, Justin 11.13.1–14.7, Plut., *Alexander* 31.3–32.7. On the battle, cf. A.M. Devine, ‘Grand Tactics at Gaugamela’, *Phoenix* 29 (1975), pp. 374–85 and ‘The Battle of Gaugamela: A Tactical and Source-Critical Study’, *Anc. World* 13 (1986), pp. 87–115.

²⁹ On Alexander in Bactria, see F. Holt, *Alexander the Great and Bactria: The Formation of a Greek Frontier in Central Asia* (Leiden 1988); cf. his *Thundering Zeus: The Making of Hellenistic Bactria* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1999).

³⁰ Diod. 17.88.2–3, Arr. 5.17.3, Curt. 8.14.16. On the battle, see A.M. Devine, ‘The Battle of Hydaspes; A Tactical and Source-Critical Study’, *Anc. World* 16 (1987), pp. 91–113 and F. Holt, *Alexander the Great and the Mystery of the Elephant Medallions* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 2003), pp. 50–6, 71–5, 77–9, 81–2, 100–11, 126–7, 150–6.

³¹ Diod. 17.94.4, Arr. 5.25.2–29, Curt. 9.2.10–3.19, Justin 12.8.10, Plut., *Alexander* 62.1–3.

³² Diod. 17.109.2–3, Curt. 10.2.8–4.3, Justin 12.11.4–12.6, Plut.,

- ³³ Diod. 17.108.3, Arr. 7.11.1–4, Curt. 10.3.5, Plut., *Alexander* 71.4–6.
- ³⁴ Arr. 2.3.6–7, Curt. 3.1.16, Justin 11.7.4, Plut., *Alexander* 18.2–4.
- ³⁵ Aristobulus, *FGrH* 139 F 7 = Arr. 2.3.7, Plut., *Alexander* 18.4.
- ³⁶ Cf. Worthington, *Alexander the Great*, p. 66.
- ³⁷ Diod. 17.49.2–51.4, Arr. 3.3.–4.5, Curt. 4.7.1–32, Justin 11.11, Plut., *Alexander* 27.3–6, Strabo 17.1.43.
- ³⁸ Arr. 4.9–10, Curt. 8.5.5–22, Justin 12.7.1, Plut., *Alexander* 54.3–6.
- ³⁹ W.W. Tarn, ‘Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind’, *Proceedings of the British Academy* 19 (1933), pp. 123–66 and *Alexander the Great* 2 (Cambridge 1948), pp. 399–449; cf. H. Berve, ‘Die Verschmelzungspolitik Alexanders des Grossen’, *Klio* 31 (1938), pp. 135–68 and F. Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse: Das Problem seiner Persönlichkeit und seines Wirkens* (Vienna 1973), pp. 479–83. Note this belief still emerges today, as Oliver Stone’s 2003 movie *Alexander* attests. Compelling arguments against Alexander having such a policy began with E. Badian, ‘Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind’, *Historia* 7 (1958), pp. 425–44.
- ⁴⁰ E.A. Fredericksmeier, ‘Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Kausia’, *TAPA* 116 (1986), pp. 215–27 and ‘The Kausia: Macedonian or Indian?’, in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Ventures into Greek History: Essays in Honour of N.G.L. Hammond* (Oxford 1994), pp. 135–58.
- ⁴¹ Bactrians and Sogdians were used in conjunction with Alexander’s commander Amyntas’ troops and there were cavalry units from Arachosia and Parapamisadae, in addition to those from Bactria and Sogdiana, at the Battle of the Hydaspes river in 326 (Arr. 5.11.3, 12.2). In 324, a phalanx of Persian troops (the so-called *epigonoí*) was present at Susa following an order in 327 to train 30,000 youths in Macedonian methods of warfare (Diod.

17.108.1–3, Arr. 7.6.1, Curt. 7.5.1, Plut., *Alexander* 71.1). However, this new phalanx was not integrated into existing battalions (Diod. 17.108.3).

⁴² H.W. Ritter, *Diadem und Königsherrschaft* (Munich 1965), pp. 47–9 and A.B. Bosworth, ‘Alexander and the Iranians’, *JHS* 100 (1980), p. 6.

⁴³ On this, cf. Ian Worthington, ‘Alexander the Great, Nation-building, and the Creation and Maintenance of Empire’, in V.D. Hanson (ed.), *Makers of Ancient Strategy: From the Persian Wars to the Fall of Rome* (Princeton 2010), pp. 118–37, citing bibliography. See also M.J. Olbrycht, chapter 17.

⁴⁴ Diod. 17.77.7, Curt. 6.6.9–12, Justin 12.4.1; cf. Arr. 7.6.2, 8.2, Plut., *Alexander* 47.7–12.

⁴⁵ Arr. 4.19.5–6, Curt. 8.4.23–26, Plut., *Alexander* 47.4, Strabo 11.11.

⁴⁶ Cf. Holt, *Alexander the Great and Bactria*, p. 66, Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, p. 117, Worthington, *Alexander the Great*, pp. 188–90.

⁴⁷ Antipater and Parmenion had tried to convince Alexander of the need to produce an heir prior to the Asian expedition (Diod. 17.62.2), but to no avail.

⁴⁸ Diod. 17.107.6, Arr. 7.4.4–8, Curt. 10.3.11–12, Justin 12.10.9–10, Plut., *Alexander* 70.2–3.

⁴⁹ Arr. 7.4. Diodorus (17.107.6), Curtius (10.3.12), Justin (12.10.9) and Plutarch (*Alexander* 70.2) mention only the marriage to Stateira.

⁵⁰ Diod. 17.109.2, Arr. 7.8.3, Justin 12.11.6; cf. Worthington, *Alexander the Great*, p. 250.

⁵¹ Diod. 17.79–80, Arr. 3.26–27, Curt. 6.7.1–8.2.38, Justin 12.5.1–8, Plut., *Alexander* 48–9.

⁵² E. Badian, ‘The Death of Parmenio’, *TAPA* 91 (1960), pp. 324–38 and ‘Conspiracies’, in A.B. Bosworth and E. Baynham (eds.),

Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction (Oxford 2000), pp. 60–92; for a contrary view, see W. Heckel, ‘The Conspiracy against Philotas’, *Phoenix* 31 (1977), pp. 9–21; cf. W.Z. Rubinson, ‘The “Philotas Affair” – A Reconsideration’, *Ancient Macedonia* 2 (Thessaloniki 1977), pp. 409–20.

⁵³ Arr. 4.13.4, Curt. 8.6.11, Plut., *Alexander* 55.9.

⁵⁴ On the conspiracy and Callisthenes’ demise, see E.N. Borza, ‘Anaxagoras and Callisthenes: Academic Intrigue at Alexander’s Court’, in H.J. Dell (ed.), *Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honour of C.F. Edson* (Thessaloniki 1981), pp. 73–86; cf. Badian, ‘Conspiracies’, pp. 71–2.

⁵⁵ Diod. 17.40.2–3, Arr. 2.16.1, Curt. 4.2.2, Justin 11.10.10, Plut., *Alexander* 24.2.

⁵⁶ See further, P. Romane, ‘Alexander’s Siege of Tyre’, *Anc. World* 16 (1987), pp. 79–90.

⁵⁷ Curt. 8.1.29–51, Arr. 4.8.8, Plut., *Alexander* 51.8.

⁵⁸ Curt. 8.1.22–27, Arr. 4.8.4–6. Plutarch at *Alexander* 50.5 and 51.1–2 suggests that Cleitus’ comments were about Alexander’s orientalizing. On the affair, see E.D. Carney, ‘The Death of Clitus’, *GRBS* 22 (1981), pp. 149–60.

⁵⁹ Ephippus, *FGrH* 126 F 3, Diod. 17.117.1–118.2, Arr. 7.27.1–3, Curt. 10.10.14–19, Justin 12.13.7–10, Plut., *Alexander* 75.5. 77.2–5; on Alexander’s death, cf. A.B. Bosworth, ‘The Death of Alexander: Rumor and Propaganda’, *CQ*² 21 (1971), 112–36. The common opinion for the date is 10 June, but see L. Depuydt, ‘The Time of Death of Alexander the Great’, *Welt des Orients* 28 (1997), pp. 117–35, who argues for the next day.

⁶⁰ The Athenian orator Demades said if Alexander were dead the whole world would smell of his corpse: Plut., *Phocion* 22.3.

⁶¹ See further A.B. Bosworth, ‘Ptolemy and the Will of Alexander’, in A.B. Bosworth and E.J. Baynham (eds.), *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction* (Oxford 2000), pp. 207–41.

⁶² Diod. 17.63.1–3, Curt. 6.1, with Bosworth, *Conquest and*

Empire, pp. 198–204, Worthington, *Alexander the Great*, pp. 77–8, 105–6 and 111, and E. Badian, ‘Agis III: Revisions and Reflections’, in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Ventures into Greek History: Essays in Honour of N.G.L. Hammond* (Oxford 1994), pp. 258–92.

⁶³ In 340 while Philip II was on campaign against Perinthus and Byzantium, Alexander was regent (Plut., *Alexander* 9.1), but Antipater may have acted as an advisor (J.R. Hamilton, *Plutarch, Alexander. A Commentary* (Oxford 1969), p. 22, or co-regent (Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 545–6; cf. Worthington, *Philip II*, pp. 130–1). He was also a diplomatic emissary, along with Alexander, to Athens after the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 (Dem. 19.69, Aes. 3.72, Din. 1.28, Justin 9.4.5, Plut., *Demosthenes* 22, Polyb. 5.10). On Antipater, see further E. Baynham, ‘Antipater: Manager of Kings’, in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Ventures into Greek History. Essays in Honour of N.G.L. Hammond* (Oxford 1994), pp. 331–56.

⁶⁴ Baynham, ‘Antipater’, pp. 333–6.

⁶⁵ N.G.L. Hammond, *Alexander the Great: King, Commander and Statesman* (Bristol 1989), p. 242; see too Baynham, ‘Antipater’, pp. 337–8.

⁶⁶ Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, p. 191, suggests that the language of the treaty of the League of Corinth was intentionally left vague in order to allow Alexander the freedom to deputize officials in his absence; cf. Hammond, *Macedonian State*, pp. 171–2.

⁶⁷ A.B. Bosworth, ‘Alexander the Great and the Decline of Macedon’, *JHS* 106 (1986), pp. 7–8. For instance, Arrian records a group of Thracian reinforcements, which arrived in Egypt in 331 (3.5.1). Also, Curtius mentions that the reinforcements Antipater sent to Babylon in 331 were Macedonian, Thracian, and Peloponnesian (5.1.40–41) and the reinforcements received in 330 in Drangiana were Illyrians and Greeks (6.6.35). For arguments that there was no manpower shortage, however, see R. Billows, *Kings and Colonists* (Leiden 1995), pp. 183–212.

⁶⁸ Aeschines 3.165 states that Agis III led Sparta’s traditional allies (the Eleans, the Arcadians, except for the Megalopolitans, and the Achaeans, except for Pellene); cf. Din. 1.34, Curt. 6.1.20,

Paus. 7.27.7. Justin rhetorically embellished those helping the Spartans by stating that Agis was able to mobilize virtually the whole of Greece (12.1.6); see further, E.I. McQueen, 'Some Notes on the Anti-Macedonian Movement in the Peloponnese in 331 BC', *Historia* 27 (1978), pp. 40–51.

⁶⁹ Baynham, 'Antipater', pp. 339–40.

⁷⁰ The Athenians thanks to Demosthenes remained aloof from the war; for reasons why, see Ian Worthington, 'Demosthenes' (In)activity during the Reign of Alexander the Great', in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator* (London 2000), pp. 90–113.

⁷¹ Diod. 17.63.4, Curt. 6.1.1–15, Justin 12.1.6–11, Plut., *Agis* 3.

⁷² McQueen, 'Some Notes on the Anti-Macedonian Movement', pp. 52–9.

⁷³ Cf. Baynham, 'Antipater', pp. 343–6.

⁷⁴ A claim rejected by H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage* 2 (Munich 1926), p. 47.

⁷⁵ See W.L. Adams, 'Antipater and Cassander: Generalships on Restricted Resources in the 4th Century', *Anc. World* 10 (1984), p. 84 n. 32 and R. Sealey, *Demosthenes and His Time: A Study in Defeat* (Oxford 1993), p. 207.

⁷⁶ Hamilton, *Plutarch, Alexander*, p. 91.

⁷⁷ Diod. 18.8.4, Curt. 10.1.43, Plut., *Alexander* 46–7, 55, 57, *Athen.* 2.42d; cf. E. Badian, 'Harpalus', *JHS* 81 (1961), p. 28 and Hamilton, *Plutarch, Alexander*, p. 91.

⁷⁸ Baynham, 'Antipater', pp. 343–6; on Olympias in detail, see Carney, *Olympias, passim*.

⁷⁹ Diod. 17.118.1, Arr. 7.12.5–7, Justin 12.14.3, Plut., *Moralia* 180d, *Alexander* 39.7.

⁸⁰ While in Molossia, Olympias exercised some power as evidenced by her being named the recipient of a grain ship from

Cyrene (*SEG* 9.2). She may have also received similar shipments on behalf of Macedonia: C.W. Blackwell, *In the Absence of Alexander: Harpalus and the Failure of Macedonian Authority* (New York 1999), pp. 89–91.

⁸¹ It has been suggested that she held the status of *prostasia* or the position of a regent: N.G.L. Hammond, ‘Some Macedonian Offices c. 336–309 B.C.’, *JHS* 105 (1985), p. 158 n. 7. Carney, *Women and Monarchy in Macedonia*, 139, however, argues that it was not an official office, but a general term similar to *hêgemon* or *archê*.

⁸² Blackwell, *In the Absence of Alexander*, p. 35.

⁸³ On Alexander’s distancing himself from the Old Guard see the classic study of E. Badian, ‘Alexander the Great and the Loneliness of Power’, in E. Badian, *Studies in Greek and Roman History* (Oxford 1964), pp. 192–205.

⁸⁴ Diod. 16.88.1, Plut., *Moralia* 841b–844a, with F.W. Mitchel, ‘Lykourgan Athens: 338/322’, *Semple Lectures* 2 (Cincinnati 1970), Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, pp. 204–15, and most recently M. Faraguna, *Atene nell’età di Alessandro: Problemi politici, economici, finanziari* (Rome 1992).

⁸⁵ See G. Shipley, ‘Between Macedonia and Rome: Political Landscapes and Social Changes in Southern Greece in the Early Hellenistic Period’, *BSA* 100 (2005), pp. 315–30.

⁸⁶ Baynham, ‘Antipater’, pp. 342–3; cf. Errington, *History of Macedonia*, pp. 92–4.

⁸⁷ D in. 1.94, Hyp. 1.31, Polyb. 12.12b3, Plut., *Moralia* 804b, Ael., *Varra Historiae* 2.19. J.P.V.D. Balsdon, ‘The Divinity of Alexander the Great’, *Historia* 1 (1950), pp. 363–88, argued that the call for Alexander’s deification originated with the Greeks rather than with Alexander; see further G.L. Cawkwell, ‘The Deification of Alexander the Great: A Note’, in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Ventures into Greek History. Essays in Honour of N.G.L. Hammond* (Oxford 1994), pp. 293–306 and E. Badian, ‘Alexander the Great between Two Thrones and Heaven: Variations on an Old Theme’, in A. Small (ed.), *Subject and Ruler: The Cult of the Ruling Power in Classical Antiquity*, *JRA Suppl.* 17 (1996), pp. 11–26.

⁸⁸ Hyp. 1.8, Diod. 17.108.7, Plut., *Moralia* 846b.

⁸⁹ Cf. Plut., *Moralia* 180e. Hammond, *Alexander the Great*, p. 257, suggests that Antipater's recall was a reward for his years of service. Because Craterus' orders to replace Antipater coincided with the discharge of veterans, G.T. Griffith, 'Alexander and Antipater in 323 BC', *PACA* 8 (1965), pp. 12–15, suggests that Alexander needed Antipater out of Macedonia before those veterans returned since he might be able to gain their loyalty.

⁹⁰ Diod. 19.11.8, Curt. 10.10.14, 18, Plut., *Alexander* 77.1; cf. Carney, *Olympias*, pp. 63–4.

⁹¹ See Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, pp. 107–17, for example; cf. N.G. Ashton, 'The Lamian War – stat magni nominis umbra', *JHS* 94 (1984), pp. 152–7 and A.B. Bosworth, 'Why Did Athens Lose the Lamian War?', in O. Palagia and S.V. Tracy (eds.), *The Macedonians in Athens, 322–229 BC* (Oxford 2003), pp. 14–22.

⁹² Diod. 18.12.4–13.5, Plut., *Demosthenes* 27.1, *Phocion* 23.4–5.

⁹³ Diod. 18.13.5, Justin 13.5.12.

⁹⁴ Diod. 18.15.1–7, Plut., *Phocion* 25; cf. Justin 13.5.14–16.

⁹⁵ See E. Baynham, 'Antipater and Athens', in O. Palagia and S.V. Tracy (eds.), *The Macedonians in Athens, 322–229 BC* (Oxford 2003), pp. 23–9.

⁹⁶ Cf. E.W. Marsden, 'Macedonian Military Machinery and Its Designers under Philip and Alexander', *Ancient Macedonia* 2 (Thessaloniki 1977), pp. 211–23.

⁹⁷ For a more detailed comparison of Philip and Alexander, with comments on Alexander's kingship, see Worthington, *Alexander the Great*, pp. 299–303 (cf. 284–98) and *Philip II*, pp. 204–8; cf. Cartledge, *Alexander the Great*, pp. 219–35.

⁹⁸ On Alexander's image and fame throughout history, see Cartledge, *Alexander the Great*, pp. 37–56; cf. 251–66.

⁹⁹ On this passage, however, see Worthington, 'Worldwide

Alexander's Successors to 221 BC

Winthrop Lindsay Adams

1 Introduction

There was nothing certain following Alexander's death. His empire (Persia) and kingdom (Macedonia) each had traditions and rituals for succession, but there was no precedent for a succession to both together as they had only been united in the person of Alexander himself. Worse, there was no clear heir. Alexander had not named a successor, though his wife Roxane was pregnant. He did have an older half-brother, Arrhidaeus, who was present at court, but Arrhidaeus was mentally incompetent.¹ Nevertheless, he was a son of Philip II. Perdiccas had been exercising the authority of *chiliarch* (chief minister) since Hephaestion's death the year before, but had not been confirmed in that post. The senior general was Antipater, still regent in Macedonia, but Craterus (the second most senior commander) was already on his way back to Macedonia with 10,000 veterans and orders to relieve Antipater and send him to Babylon with new troop drafts.

Within a few days, Perdiccas called an officers' council at Babylon, displaying Alexander's signet ring (which he claimed had been given to him personally by the king) as his authority. In addition to some temporary governing measures, the council decided to await the outcome of Roxane's pregnancy before naming an heir. This was not good enough for the phalanx, which proclaimed Arrhidaeus (now renamed Philip III to emphasize his connection) to be king, and attacked the palace. The result was a compromise, with Philip III Arrhidaeus as king and a provision made for a royal colleague if Roxane bore a son, which she did a few months later. He was named Alexander IV after his father. Both were under the regency, ultimately, of Perdiccas.

Meanwhile, rebellion broke out at the extremities of the empire, among the Greek mercenaries in Bactria to the east and among the Greek states in the west. This last directly affected Antipater and Macedonia and points out the perennial problems of the kingdom. The external problems had been perpetual pressure from the barbarians to the north, primarily the Illyrians and Thracians, and their civilized neighbors in Greece to the south. From now until the end of Macedonian independence, the Illyrians were the chief problem in the barbarian north, but the Greek states largely became pawns over time for the ambitions of one or another of the major Hellenistic kingdoms. Macedonia's internal rivalries among the noble families, which had led to a 40-year period of near anarchy before the accession of Philip II, were eventually externalized in the form of these rival Hellenistic kingdoms. For the next 46 years, however, the history of the kingdom reflected the troubles with which Philip II had dealt, and it will be his policies that are employed in Macedonia by Alexander's successors there: Cassander and Antigonos II Gonatas. They will form a *leitmotif* for the history of this period.

2 In the Wake of Alexander (323–319)

While the events at Babylon were unfolding in the summer of 323, as word of Alexander's death spread to the Aegean, revolt broke out when Rhodes declared its independence from the Hellenic League and others followed suit. Led by Athens, many of these cities initiated what was to be called the 'Lamian War.' Antipater moved quickly to suppress the rebellion, but it was an army largely drawn from limited resources, as events would prove.² Antipater was forced to retreat into the Thessalian city of Lamia, where he was besieged and forced to call for aid. A Thracian rebellion under the chieftain Seuthes prevented Lysimachus, the satrap of Thrace (and commander with the nearest Macedonian forces), from sending any direct help, though he did maintain control of Thrace and kept the coast road open.

Help came from Leonnatus, the new satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia in Asia Minor. He marched to Macedonia and then to Thessaly, where he relieved the siege, breaking Antipater and the army out in the spring of 322, though Leonnatus was killed in the process. Antipater then withdrew into Macedonia and waited for Craterus and the 10,000 returning veterans, who crossed over into Thrace in midsummer of 322. It was obvious that things had changed since his original orders, and so Craterus put himself under Antipater's command.³

In August of 322, Antipater moved back into Thessaly with an army of 40,000 foot and 5,000 horse (including Alexander's crack veterans). Late in that month, at Crannon, Antipater won a hard fought battle, which saw the Greek alliance come apart as a consequence. By late September, a Macedonian garrison took over the Munychia fortress in Athens. Antipater had been using garrisons and pro-Macedonian parties to control hostile areas of Greece ever since the rebellion led by Agis III of Sparta in 331. Now he tightened his control and introduced more garrisons. It was to become a standard practice maintained both by his son Cassander and his grandson Antigonus II Gonatas.⁴

In an attempt to present a united front among the leading figures, Antipater proposed a number of marriage alliances. His daughter Nicaea was betrothed to Perdiccas the *chiliarch*. Two of his other daughters were also married to important nobles: Phila to Craterus and Eurydice to Ptolemy, now satrap of Egypt. Olympias encouraged Alexander the Great's sister, Cleopatra, the widow of Alexander of Epirus, to propose the same kind of marriage alliance with Perdiccas to derail Antipater. In a way, this mirrored the coming struggle. The possibility of being regent and royal uncle to Alexander IV, even possibly king-regent, was too much for the ambitious Perdiccas to pass up. Playing for time, and to throw Antipater off, for now Perdiccas married Nicaea.

Perdiccas had crushed the Greek mercenary rebellion ruthlessly, and in the course of it, to determine their loyalty, had summoned all the Asia Minor satraps to join him. Antigonus the One-Eyed, the satrap of Greater Phrygia, refused and was consequently ordered to stand trial. Instead, he fled to Antipater and Craterus. At the same time, another daughter of Philip II, Cynane, proposed that her daughter Adea marry Philip III. To prevent this, Perdiccas murdered Cynane, but the phalanx, sentimentally attached to the children of Philip II, mutinied and forced the marriage. During the winter of 322/1, Antigonus convinced Antipater that action had to be taken: Perdiccas' ruthlessness and ambitions were self-evident; he had pushed aside in humiliating fashion the marriage alliance with Antipater and made overtures to Cleopatra, who was at Sardis.⁵ Worst of all for Antipater, Olympias was using those ambitions to force herself back on the scene.

Antipater, Craterus and Antigonus made common cause (solidifying the most senior of Alexander's generals) and began planning to counter Perdiccas. Meanwhile, Ptolemy had been busy securing his position in Egypt and in the late spring of 321, in a brilliant but risky propaganda ploy, Ptolemy ambushed the funeral cortege bearing Alexander's body back to Aegae for burial and took it

to Memphis. There was no greater image with which to conjure than Alexander's person, nor any more obvious challenge to Perdiccas' authority. Ptolemy now joined the coalition, presenting Perdiccas with a two-front war.

Rather than open Macedonia to invasion by Perdiccas, who after all controlled both the kings and the Grand Army, Antipater decided to invade Asia Minor first. Perdiccas, rather than face a rebel army commanded by the most experienced generals in the empire, choose to knock Ptolemy out of the picture, and then deal with Antipater. Eumenes of Cardia, Alexander's Greek secretary, was told to hold Asia Minor, largely because he was expendable. Though loyal to Alexander, Eumenes was not a Macedonian and had only limited military service, but he could buy time (in the event, he did much more than that). With Antipater's approach, the minor satraps of the region began deserting Perdiccas and joined the coalition.

By July of 321, Perdiccas was in Egypt, but subsequently, while trying to force the Nile line, he proved an unlucky if not incompetent commander. More than 2,000 men were drowned, more men (we are told) than Alexander had lost in all of his pitched battles combined. The Macedonians were used to better. That night some of his officers butchered Perdiccas in his tent. The next day Ptolemy was received by the army and in a joint assembly they outlawed Eumenes and 50 of his followers by name. Meanwhile, Antipater took his main army directly south to support Ptolemy, while Craterus was detailed to take care of Eumenes and secure the flank. But Eumenes defeated and killed Craterus in Cappadocia. This was to no avail as Eumenes' cause was gone: Perdiccas was dead, and the kings had two new guardians. The Grand Army moved on to Triparadeisus in Syria, where Antipater and Antigonus joined it. This proved to be the last meeting of Alexander's Macedonians.

It was a raucous meeting. The army was in arrears for pay, and, faced with the contradictory examples of its own failures under Perdiccas and of Eumenes' victory, it was unsettled. Into that mix, Philip III's teenage wife Adea (now renamed Eurydice) tried to stir them up by promising the men, in his name, to cover their back pay when he had full authority, and the regency ended. In the face of a likely mutiny, the two new guardians, Peithon and Arrhidaeus, resigned their posts even before Antipater arrived. The army named Antipater to be regent. The army remained restless, and Eurydice active, because Antipater no more had the funds to pay them than the previous commanders. With the backing of Antigonus and Seleucus, the commander of the Companion Cavalry, Antipater managed to restore order and suppress Eurydice.

Once in control, Antipater moved quickly to settle affairs. The

supporters of the coalition were confirmed in their satrapies and commands and vacancies were filled with loyal officers. The one remaining problem was Eumenes. Antipater appointed Antigonus the One-Eyed to command the sole remaining field army (the rest of the army being divided among the various satrapies and Macedonia itself), with Antipater's son, Cassander, as his second-in-command probably to keep an eye on Antigonus' ambitions. Antigonus' orders were to finish off Eumenes. In an attempt to cement Antigonus' loyalty, Antipater's daughter, Phila (the widow of Craterus) was married to Antigonus' 16-year-old son Demetrius. Antipater then returned to Macedonia with both the kings.

Antipater was now well into his 80s and infirm. The settlement at Triparadeisus, even for the most optimistic, was only a temporary solution. Indeed, Antigonus almost immediately began acting as an independent agent in the campaign against Eumenes, and Cassander was alarmed enough to return to Macedonia in the winter of 321/0 to warn Antipater of Antigonus' growing ambitions, indeed as he had before the initial campaigns. Cassander found his father's health failing, and took over the running of affairs.

Antipater died early in 319, and his last act was to name a successor as regent. This was unprecedented, as regents had normally been named by kings, and in the aftermath of Alexander's death by the army. But the army that had confirmed Antipater as regent was now scattered, never to be fully reassembled again. Thus, there really was no alternative except allowing Philip III the choice, which was out of the question. Antipater's choice was a careful one, and fell on an old comrade from among Alexander's original commanders: Polyperchon. It was an attempt to avoid another civil war, as Polyperchon was not only a man of unquestioned loyalty to the Argead House, but also genuinely popular among the Macedonians. In doing so, Antipater passed over his own son, Cassander, who had been exercising the regent's authority for over a year, naming him as second in command to Polyperchon. The settlement had two errors. First, it overestimated Polyperchon's ability. Second, it underestimated Cassander's own ambitions and ability.

3 The Struggle for Macedonia (319–316)

In fact, Cassander had begun planning his moves even before Antipater died. He had changed the garrison commanders at key

citadels in Greece, appointing men personally loyal to him. After Polyperchon became regent, Cassander privately urged his friends in Macedonia to make common cause with him and in Greece contacted the garrison commanders to confirm their support. Outside of the Aegean, Cassander appealed to both Ptolemy (his brother in law) and his old commander Antigonus for support. Both Ptolemy and Antigonus were already operating as if they were independent of any regency, so Cassander's plans fell in with their own.

Polyperchon tried to strengthen his position by appealing to Olympias, even offering her the guardianship of Alexander IV. She declined. Amidst these plots and counterplots, Cassander slipped out of Macedonia in late 319, and went to Asia Minor where he raised, with Antigonus' help, a force of 35 ships and 4,000 men to augment those garrisons in Greece that already supported him.

Faced with this, Polyperchon decided to use his chief asset, the kings themselves, and attack Cassander's primary weakness, which was the fact his power in Greece rested on maintaining his control over cities that disliked any Macedonian control at all. Philip III now issued a proclamation declaring the 'freedom of the Greeks cities' and establishing democracies. This undercut the narrow pro-Macedonian oligarchies that Antipater had established and Cassander had inherited. It was an open invitation to throw out Cassander's supporters. Polyperchon followed this up by writing directly to specific cities such as Argos, calling on them to exile all political leaders from the time of Antipater. In the case of Athens, Polyperchon restored the island of Samos outright to the city and even offered the possible restoration of Oropus (the wedge of territory between Attica and Thebes). The Athenians first wanted the removal of the Munychia garrison, and indeed demanded it of Nicanor, its Macedonian commander. Nicanor, loyal to Cassander, seized the harbor and the walls of the Piraeus. Polyperchon's answer was to bring an army of 20,000 infantry, 4000 allies, 1000 cavalry, and 65 war elephants south.

Cassander managed to reach Athens ahead of Polyperchon, and his force, combined with the Munychia garrison, made his position so strong that all Polyperchon could do was besiege the city rather than assault it directly. Since Cassander was not really vulnerable at Athens, Polyperchon left a smaller force to hold Cassander at Athens and moved on to the Peloponnese to attack Cassander's supporters and allies there. Polyperchon's main target was Megalopolis, but the attack proved a complete disaster. He breached the walls, but failed to take the city, while enduring heavy losses himself. At the same time, Cassander's fleet from Athens, under Nicanor, defeated Polyperchon's fleet under Cleitus. After this, even the radical democracy at Athens

asked Cassander for a treaty of friendship and alliance. The Greek cities that had been neutral began to move to Cassander's side.

Polyperchon again appealed to Olympias. She suggested an alliance with Eumenes, who was proving surprisingly resilient, although still struggling against Antigonos. The offer, on behalf of the kings, was a commission as General of Asia and funding. If Eumenes decided to come to Europe, he would share in the guardianship of the kings. Eumenes accepted, but it proved of no help to Polyperchon. By 317, Cassander was ready to march into Macedonia from what was now a secure base in Greece. Seeing the flood of Macedonian opinion switching to Cassander, in the light of Polyperchon's failures, Eurydice saw an opportunity to strike a blow for Philip III and for herself. Philip III issued a proclamation formally transferring his regency from Polyperchon to Cassander, who now returned to Macedonia in triumph. His stay was brief. Cassander left his brother, Nicanor, in charge of Macedonia and returned to Greece, where Polyperchon was still at large.

However, Polyperchon was not in the south but was in Epirus. Once more he appealed to Olympias who, with Antipater's son now as regent, came off the fence. With a combined force of Aetolians, Epirotes and Polyperchon's army, they invaded Macedonia in the autumn of 317. Philip III and Eurydice mustered an army, but in the face of battle it laid down its arms. Olympias killed Philip III outright and forced Eurydice to commit suicide. Once fully in control, Olympias ran amok, killing Cassander's brother, Nicanor, and some 100 other Macedonian nobles against whom she had collected personal grudges over the years. This was excessive, even by Macedonian standards, and it cost Olympias whatever sympathy she might have expected amongst the Macedonians. To justify her actions she destroyed the tomb of Cassander's brother, Iolaus (Alexander's cup-bearer) claiming that he had poisoned Alexander.⁶

Cassander wasted no time in reacting to the crisis. He moved his army so rapidly into Macedonia that he caught Olympias' forces by surprise. The royal party took refuge variously in Amphipolis, Pella and Pydna (where Olympias herself retreated). By the spring of 316, all three cities had surrendered, and Cassander put Olympias on trial for murder. She was convicted and executed by the relatives of her victims.

4 Cassander's Regency (316–310)

Cassander now began to establish his authority within Macedonia.

First, he buried Philip III and Eurydice in the royal cemetery at Aegae with elaborate Homeric funeral rites.⁷ The act of burial is a royal act in itself, as with Alexander's burial of Philip, and it was intended to display Cassander as a supporter of the Argead House as well as exercising traditional royal authority. He followed this up in the same year by marrying a daughter of Philip II, Thessalonica, and thus becoming part of the Argead family. In the same vein, he founded two cities, again a royal prerogative: one was Thessalonica, on the site of Therme, named after his Argead wife, and the second, Casandreia, on the old site of Potidaea, named after himself. Finally, he also ordered the refounding of Thebes, destroyed by Alexander in 335. Internally, over the course of the next few years, Cassander made concerted efforts to develop the kingdom along the lines of Philip II's policies: rigorous defense of the borders, especially in the north, city foundations, population resettlement and economic development.

In terms of the frontiers, for the first time in 20 years Cassander mounted an aggressive policy of campaigns and settlements. In 314, he campaigned west into Acarnania, Aetolia and Epirus and then swung north to the Adriatic where he took Apollonia. He finished by defeating the Illyrian dynast Glaucius somewhere between Apollonia and Epidamnus, which he then took as well. It was the farthest extent of Macedonian power ever in the region. Both cities were garrisoned. It was to be short lived, as Corcyra and Glaucius together retook the cities in 313. Cassander made one more attempt in 312, but was sharply defeated by Glaucius. Two years later, coming to the aid of King Audoleon of Paeonia, Cassander crushed an incursion by the Autariatae. Elements of the defeated tribesmen were settled around Mount Orbelus, in much the same fashion as Philip II had settled Sarnoussi in the Macedonian interior. The founding of Thessalonica and Casandreia was intended to develop economic trade, specifically for the Anthemous area behind the Chalcidice. This even included commissioning the sculptor Lysippus to create a special cup to advertise the local Mendian wine. These were all model activities expected of a Macedonian king, amounting to 'taking care of business', and were also aimed at securing the loyalty of the Macedonian people. Ultimately, they would be successful, but Cassander was still not universally popular, and Polyperchon still had supporters in Macedonia.

By 316 not only were Eurydice, Philip III and Olympias dead, but Antigonos had also destroyed Eumenes. The situation began to clarify itself. Antigonos had a huge army and control of Asia, which he further secured by driving Seleucus out of Babylon. That left Ptolemy in Egypt (but he was too secure to attack at this point), Lysimachus marginalized in Thrace and Cassander in Macedonia. Cassander was

the most dangerous because he held Macedonia itself and Alexander IV, but he was also the most vulnerable because of Polyperchon's forces (based at Corinth) and those Macedonians at home who still supported Polyperchon. As Antipater had done, Cassander now put together an alliance with Lysimachus and Ptolemy, united by their fear of Antigonos' ambitions. They issued an ultimatum in 315, calling on Antigonos to cede territories to all three and restore Seleucus to Babylon.

Antigonos' answer was to target Cassander. He dispatched money and agents to stir things up in Greece, including offering Polyperchon a commission as his general in Europe, which was accepted. Then Antigonos called an assembly (of his own army) at Tyre, before which he denounced Cassander for the murder of Olympias and the incarceration of Roxane and Alexander IV among other things. Failure to submit to Antigonos' authority and surrender the royal family meant that Cassander would be declared a public enemy.

None of this was taken seriously in Macedonia. The next year saw Cassander's borderland campaigns in the Adriatic. Further, the coalition itself, held together out of common fear of Antigonos, was unaffected. The next two years in Greece, which was the cockpit for this struggle, were something of a boxing match, with moves and countermoves, and individuals switching sides to gain advantage. Cassander's policy was to try to maintain control of Greece and keep the conflict as far from Macedonia as possible. But by 312, the Antigonid commanders had managed to free most of the Peloponnese from Cassander's garrisons. It was at this point that Cassander also suffered the loss of Apollonia and Epidamnus as well as a defeat by Glaucias. But it was balanced by Ptolemy's defeat of an invasion by Antigonos' army under Demetrius at Gaza. Both sides were vulnerable and negotiations for peace were opened in the winter of 312/11.

The peace settlement confirmed the status quo: Cassander as General of Europe, Ptolemy in Egypt, Lysimachus in Thrace, and Antigonos as 'first in Asia', all until Alexander IV reached his age of majority. This last was an ominous clause, as they all had much to lose in the face of that event. The wording was practically an invitation to Cassander to insure that it would not happen. Probably over the winter of 311/10, Cassander, acting for all of them, killed Alexander IV in secret, which brought the Argead Dynasty to an end. Still, none dared to claim the kingship as yet and maintained the fiction of ruling in the 'king's name.'⁸

5 The Final Struggle (310–298)

Cassander's action gave him time to consolidate his position. It is marked by his successful campaign in the north against the Autariatae and in the south by the defection of Antigonus' chief commander, his nephew Ptolemaeus, to Cassander in exchange for a commission as Cassander's general in Greece. But Polyperchon had one more surprise of his own. He brought Heracles, the son of Barsine, from Pergamum (probably with the conniving of Antigonus). Heracles claimed to be the illegitimate son of Alexander, and Polyperchon now championed his cause to be king in 309, moving into Epirus. It was aimed at the Argead loyalists in Macedonia, but Cassander marched to face Polyperchon in Epirus. To avoid a civil war, Cassander offered him the restoration Polyperchon's estates and a commission as Cassander's general in the Peloponnese in exchange for Heracles. Polyperchon seized the opportunity and Heracles disappeared. By 309, Cassander once more had the upper hand in Greece, but his prime purpose was still to keep any danger as far from Macedonia as possible.

A serious threat came in 307 when the commander of the Macedonian garrison at Piraeus permitted Antigonus' son, Demetrius, and the Antigonid fleet to enter the harbor under the mistaken impression that it was Ptolemy. Demetrius then took the city. Cassander's response was to besiege Athens. Action by Ptolemy and his fleet, however, drew Demetrius away from Greece in 306 and Demetrius won a major fleet engagement off Salamis on Cyprus. Antigonus took the occasion to have his army proclaim him and Demetrius kings, and Lysimachus and Seleucus quickly followed suit. Antigonus himself followed this up with an invasion of Egypt in late 306, which failed miserably and was probably the occasion for Ptolemy to assume the kingship. Plutarch states that Cassander did not take the title, but that all the others referred to him as king anyway.⁹

The Antigonids frittered away the next two years, first recouping their losses in the Egyptian expedition, which was understandable, and then on Demetrius' year-long unsuccessful siege of Rhodes that ironically gave him his nickname of Poliorcetes ('Sacker of Cities'). Fortunately for Cassander, this presented him a respite of three years to secure his position in Greece. Polyperchon maintained control for him in the Peloponnese while Cassander himself continued to besiege Athens. Ultimately it was this that drew Demetrius back to Greece. He landed in Boeotia in 303 in an attempt to cut Cassander off from Macedonia. But the protection of the kingdom was still Cassander's prime goal and he broke off the siege immediately and withdrew to Macedonia. Demetrius spent the rest of 303 and most of 302 strengthening the Antigonid position in Greece. He drove out

Cassander's garrisons in central Greece and assaulted Cassander's supporters in the Peloponnese. Demetrius then reestablished the Hellenic League with himself and Antigonius as its *hegemons*. With Greece secure, Demetrius began planning an invasion of Macedonia.

The Antigonid invasion force was immense by Greek standards: 56,000 foot (including 8,000 Macedonians, among who were 6,000 deserters from Cassander's forces) and 1,500 horse. To face these, Cassander could only muster 29,000 foot, but he had 2,000 horse, hence superiority in cavalry. He had a number of other advantages. The desertions meant that those who remained were all loyal to Cassander, and he did not hesitate to march them to face Demetrius. It is possible that he chose this moment to take the title of king as he had nothing to lose by it. He also had a 15-year-old record of internal stability, economic development, city founding and protecting the kingdom's borders that demonstrated his ability.

But Cassander's plan was not to fight at all. Instead, once again he appealed for coalition among his former allies, relying on fear of Antigonid power to unite them. Over the winter of 302/1, Cassander contacted Lysimachus, Ptolemy and Seleucus. What he proposed was allied activity that would draw Demetrius back to Asia just as Ptolemy's naval activity around Cyprus had done in 307. Lysimachus was already in Asia Minor and Seleucus joined him in the spring of 301, gathering an army of 64,000 foot, 10,500 horse, 400 war elephants and 120 chariots. It worked. Demetrius' planned invasion was scrapped and he withdrew to join his father's army in Asia Minor. At the Battle of Ipsus the Antigonid army was destroyed, Antigonius the One-Eyed killed and Demetrius forced to withdraw what was left to the Antigonid fleet and its bases.

Cassander was now king and Macedonia (for the time being) at peace. Neither state was to last for long. Cassander developed tuberculosis and sometime over the winter of 298/7 he died, leaving the kingdom to his eldest son, Philip IV. Four months later Philip died of the same disease and the kingship was then divided between Cassander's younger sons, Alexander V and Antipater, under the regency of their mother Thessalonica.

6 Demetrius I Poliorcetes and Limbo (298–277)

With the House of Cassander concerned with succession, Demetrius Poliorcetes took the opportunity to improve his position in Greece,

and he moved to strengthen his hold on the Peloponnese. Then in 295 he besieged Athens, which fell to him in the spring of 294. The old coalition members, Ptolemy and Lysimachus, tried attacking the Asian coastal bases of the Antigonid fleet, hoping to use Cassander's ploy to draw Demetrius from Greece. This time it did not work. Demetrius had been on the verge of taking Macedonia before and was playing for higher stakes.

His break came in a dynastic quarrel in Macedonia that very year. Alexander V and Antipater argued over power in Macedonia and Antipater killed his mother to get it. Alexander appealed to Pyrrhus of Epirus and Lysimachus for aid. Pyrrhus drove Antipater out (he fled to Lysimachus) and took the two westernmost Macedonian districts as his price. Demetrius marched north in late autumn as if on a friendly visit to his nephew. Alexander V entertained his uncle royally, but on the exchange feast in Demetrius' camp he was assassinated as he left the banquet. The Macedonians, who had been disgusted at the death of Thessalonica, chose Demetrius as king. His plan was to use Macedonia as a springboard to put back together the empire, just as Alexander had done to create it.

The practical result was that both Pyrrhus and Lysimachus, for their own reasons, not the least of which was fear of an Antigonid revival, were hostile to Demetrius. For two years he consolidated his position in Macedonia, which included building a naval base for his fleet at the head of the Gulf of Magnesia – this was called Demetrias after himself. But Demetrius also offended the Macedonian court in much the same way Alexander the Great had by introducing into it Asiatic practices and foreigners. He was also annoyed by royal duties such as hearing petitions and sitting in legal cases. Worst of all, he tried to lord it over the Macedonians just as he and his father had treated their subjects in Asia.

In 290, Demetrius was drawn into conflict with Pyrrhus when the latter's Syracusan wife, Lanassa, left him (along with her dowry, the island of Corcyra) and offered her hand (and Corcyra) to Demetrius.¹⁰ For three years a war raged, all the more difficult as Pyrrhus had retrained the Epirote army in the Macedonian fashion. Other than that it was a bloody affair and a debacle in Aetolia for Demetrius, little is known about the conflict, and a lull set in after 289. Demetrius decided to take advantage of this and seize some of his lost territory in Asia Minor from Lysimachus. He failed outright, and the result was an invasion both by Pyrrhus from the west and Lysimachus from the east. The Macedonians decided that it was too high a price and that they had no desire to be pawns in Demetrius' imperial ambitions, given he had not defended the kingdom from external threat nor seen to his duties as king. They withdrew their support and Demetrius sneaked

out of camp disguised as an actor in late 288. As Demetrius once again withdrew to his fleet, Pyrrhus and Lysimachus divided the kingdom between themselves.¹¹ For seven years the kingdom disappeared, submerged in the dynastic and imperial politics of Lysimachus, Pyrrhus and Seleucus.

In 286, Lysimachus drove Pyrrhus out of Macedonia and added it wholly to his kingdom. Lysimachus was caught up in an internal dynastic struggle in the years after this, which made the kingdom vulnerable. When Ptolemy I died in 283, only Lysimachus and Seleucus were left of the Successors to Alexander. In 282, war broke out between them and at Corupedion in Asia Minor Seleucus defeated and killed Lysimachus. He now claimed Thrace and Macedonia.

In 281, shortly after crossing into Thrace, Ptolemy Ceraunus, his aide and the son of Ptolemy I of Egypt by Antipater's daughter Eurydice, assassinated Seleucus. As the grandson of Antipater and the nephew of Cassander, Ptolemy was immediately proclaimed king of Macedonia. But two years later, Ptolemy was killed in a massive Gallic invasion that also swept into Central Greece. A two year interregnum ensued, with Gallic bands running amok throughout the kingdom. Relief came from an unlikely source. Antigonus Gonatas, the son of Demetrius Poliorcetes, who had been living a precarious existence after his father left Macedonia by holding on to scattered Antigoniid bases and the fleet. In 277, he managed to ambush a Gallic band in Thrace, and, as with Ptolemy, as the grandson of Antipater and the nephew of Cassander, he was proclaimed king by the Macedonians. Whether or not he could keep it was not immediately clear.

7 Antigonus II Gonatas (277–239)

Antigonus II did have a brief respite to try to establish his reign in Macedonia. With Lysimachus and Seleucus gone, the other primary claimant to Macedonia was Pyrrhus of Epirus, a cousin of Alexander the Great. Pyrrhus had lacked the physical resources to challenge either Lysimachus or Seleucus and in an attempt to acquire those had gone adventuring in Italy. He accepted the invitation of Tarentum and other southern Italian Greek states to take part in a war against Rome. From 280 until 275 he was out of the picture in terms of Macedonia, and when he returned from these futile campaigns he had suffered considerable losses and had an empty treasury. Knowing that the situation in Macedonia was still unstable, Pyrrhus invaded Macedonia in 274, and when he defeated Antigonus' mercenaries the Macedonians in Antigonus' army deserted to him. Antigonus, like his

father, fled to his few remaining coastal bases and the great Antigonid fleet.

But Pyrrhus' Gallic mercenaries ran amok in Macedonia, destroying and looting the royal cemetery at Aegae,¹² which cost him Macedonian loyalty. Pyrrhus pursued Antigonus into Greece proper, hoping to both establish his own control there and eliminate Antigonus' influence altogether. While Pyrrhus was campaigning in the Peloponnese, Antigonus recaptured Macedonia and then moved on with the fleet to Corinth. The prize was to be Argos, and Pyrrhus rushed to prevent it, but he was killed in the fighting in the city. By the autumn of 272 Antigonus was solidly in control of Macedonia and had regained his control of Greece. He never had cause to doubt Macedonia's loyalty again.

Antigonus labored to maintain that loyalty. Internally he adopted the same policies as Philip II and Cassander, his uncle. Stability and renewal were the keys. It was Antigonus Gonatas who raised the great tumulus at Aegae over the last three Argead graves and interred in that tumulus the relics of the other graves looted in 273. Macedonia was divided into districts (*merides*) rather than the old tribal cantons, each under a governor (*epistates*) responsible directly to Antigonus, which insured good and accessible government to the kingdom. The revenues for Macedonia proper, especially from the mines, were largely played out, but Macedonia still had major assets in the timber trade and naval stores as well as agricultural products for export (wine and grain especially), and Antigonus saw to it that the coin issues maintained a high standard, probably to enhance the trade aspects as well as prestige. Antigonus' personal style avoided the problems Demetrius Poliorcetes had. He took care of business, and unlike his father and grandfather or the Ptolemies and Seleucids there was no hint of ruler cult or royal divinity in Macedonia. He remained 'first among equals' and approachable to his Macedonians.

Antigonus vigorously saw to the defense of the kingdom, building fortresses and roads in Upper Macedonia against the Illyrians. He also, at some point, annexed Paeonia directly into the kingdom. To the south, Antigonus did what he could to maintain pro-Antigonid governments, including tyrannies, at places like Megalopolis, Argos and Sicyon, though limited by both funds and physical resources.¹³ Instead, he concentrated on access and mobility. This he achieved by means of the Antigonid fleet and the control of three great naval fortresses of Demetrias, Chalcis on Euboea and Corinth (the 'Three Fetters of Greece'). As with Macedonia itself, each was governed by an *epistates* and had Macedonian garrison commanders. Troops could take ship at Demetrias, bypass the choke point at Thermopylae by landing on Euboea and cross at Chalcis into central Greece. Corinth kept the

access to the Peloponnese open and the shipyards of Corinth and Chalcis maintained the Antigonid fleet.

Within Greece itself Antigonus also had to contend with the Aetolian League, which had driven the 279 Gallic invasions back from Delphi and grown to incorporate most of central Greece through the Delphic Amphictyony (including Thermopylae). After 251, when Aratus of Sicyon overthrew the Macedonian supported tyranny at Sicyon and joined the Achaean League, there was an openly anti-Macedonian state that came to incorporate most of the Peloponnese. With the growing federal power of the Achaean League, Athens and Sparta, as traditional *poleis* with limited resources, were increasingly irrelevant, but still offered occasions for conflict against Antigonus largely as pawns or foils in the politics of others.

As for the Seleucids and Ptolemies, Antigonus had married Antiochus I's sister, Phila, in 276. Relations between the two kingdoms during his reign were generally peaceful and frequently there existed alliance between them. The policy of Ptolemy II was actively and equally opposed to both the Antigonid and Seleucid kingdoms. A series of Syrian wars over the land-bridge area saw the borders with Seleucid Syria seesaw back and forth from Gaza to the Euphrates. The Ptolemaic fleet, with its naval stations throughout the Aegean, challenged Antigonus Gonatas directly, and indirectly Ptolemy supported Greek activities aimed at undermining Antigonid control.

In 268, Ptolemy's use of agents and funds culminated in an attempt by Athens to free the city from the garrison at the Piraeus, which was instigated by the Athenian Chremonides. Athens then made common cause with the Peloponnesian anti-Macedonian elements, in what was called the Chremonidaean War. But in 265, Antigonus defeated the Peloponnesian arm of the strategy in battle of Corinth. He followed this by besieging Athens and using the Antigonid fleet to stop any attempts by Ptolemy II to relieve it. Off the island of Cos, probably in 261, Antigonus defeated the Ptolemaic fleet, and Athens surrendered by the end of the year. The war with Ptolemy II moved into a different phase when Antigonus allied with Antiochus II, but there were no major actions and Antigonus made peace with Egypt in 255.¹⁴ Antigonus' foreign relations tend to follow Cassander's pattern of preferring diplomacy and coalition to risking confrontation, unless absolutely necessary, and equally were designed to protect Macedonia itself.

In 251, Aratus came to power in Sicyon and the next year Ptolemy II once again interfered in Greece by supporting the revolt of Alexander, the son of Craterus (and also Antigonus Gonatas' nephew), the governor of Corinth and Chalcis. Alexander proclaimed himself

king, and allied with the emerging Achaean League. Antigonus' influence in central and southern Greece waned, and the fleet was materially affected by the loss of the shipyards at Corinth and Chalcis. Alexander died suddenly, probably in late 246, leaving his 'kingdom' to his widow Nicaea. Antigonus proposed a marriage alliance between Nicaea and his son, Demetrius, which she readily accepted. But when the wedding party entered Corinth, Antigonus slipped away, retook the Acrocorinth fortress and abandoned the wedding plans. He also reached out to Aratus, without success, due largely to Antigonus' current actions and Aratus' hostility.

Also in 245, Antigonus entered into an alliance with Seleucus II of Syria, then at war with Ptolemy II, and the renewed Antigonid fleet won a decisive victory off the island of Andros.¹⁵ Its advantages were short lived. In 243, Aratus took the Acrocorinth citadel by surprise attack. Corinth and its shipyards were again lost to Antigonus as the city entered the Achaean League, and in 240, acknowledging the situation, he made peace.

Antigonus died a peaceful death, against all odds, in 239 and the reign passed to his son Demetrius II. It was a Macedonia that was stable internally, at peace, and devoted to the Antigonid Dynasty.

8 Demetrius II (239–229)

It is probable, but not certain, that Demetrius II shared the kingship with his father as this was the Antigonid practice dating back to Antigonus the 'One-Eyed.' The peace made in 240 had altered the relations with the Aetolian League, which had been a Macedonian ally against Aratus. Now Aetolian ambitions turned toward Acarnania and Epirus. Threatened by this, Epirus turned to Demetrius II for aid and Pyrrhus' widow, Olympias, offered a marriage alliance: the hand of her daughter, Phthia. Demetrius accepted, divorcing his current wife, Stratonice, the sister of Antiochus II, ostensibly for her inability to produce a male heir. This signaled an estrangement with the Seleucids, whose association with Macedonia had been a mainstay of Gonatas' policy. Demetrius' policy would solely be taken up in Greece and the north.

Aetolia's reaction was to reverse itself and ally with Aratus and Achaea, both based on common interest in undermining Macedonia and territorial ambitions. In the case of Aetolia, this latter was against Epirus, and for Aratus against Athens and a pro-Macedonian Argos. Demetrius first action was to secure Acarnania, though he lost the Macedonian district of Atintania in doing so. But all Demetrius could

do at this stage was send mercenaries to help Athens and Argos. By late 237 or early 236 events in the north had stabilized, and Demetrius launched an invasion of Boeotia designed to break it away from Aetolian control. It was a popular and successful move. The Boeotians deserted Aetolia and Demetrius was in control of the region by the end of 236.¹⁶

In the south, Demetrius' plans seemed to work at first. Argos was able to repulse Aratus' attacks three times in 235, though the tyrant Aristippus was defeated and killed trying to retake Cleonae that same year. The Macedonian mercenaries were able to put Aristippus' brother, Aristomachus, in power. But the momentum had shifted and Lydiades, the tyrant of Megalopolis, abdicated and brought his city into the Achaean League, which reduced Macedonia's influence in the Peloponnese to Argos.

Power was soon diminished in the north as well. A revolution overturned the monarchy in Epirus and established a *koinon* (republic). This prompted a renewed attack by Aetolia on Acarnania, which appealed to Demetrius for aid. His answer was a desperate one, for he allied with the Illyrian dynast Agron in 232, enlisting him to aid the Acarnanians. The aid came in 231 in the form of 100 vessels filled with Illyrian pirates. For the next three years, the Illyrians raided up and down the coast eventually defeating an Achaean and Aetolian allied fleet off the island of Paxos in 229.

Demetrius, in the meantime was forced to face an Illyrian invasion of his own from the Dardani, and under a dynast named Longarus a Macedonian force was defeated. Shortly after this defeat Demetrius II died, leaving the kingdom to his young son by Phthia, Philip, born in 238 (the future Philip V).

9 Philip V and Antigonus III Doson (229–221)

With the Illyrians in the upland districts and the situation with Greece weakened, it was no time for a child king. A regency was needed, and fortunately there was a good candidate: Antigonus III Doson, the son of Gonatas' half brother (Demetrius the 'Fair'). He was appointed guardian and married Demetrius' widow Phthia. Antigonus III reflected the traditional loyalty of the Antigonid House to the dynasty. He raised Philip V as if he was his own son and he was a sound commander into the bargain. Antigonus Doson's first chore, as always, was the security of the kingdom.

Campaigning vigorously in 229, Antigonos first drove the Illyrians from the kingdom and restored the northern frontier. In the meantime, the Aetolians had taken advantage of Demetrius' death to move further into Thessaly. Antigonos campaigned there in 228; using a ruse, he defeated the Aetolians as they withdrew from a position and drove them out of most of Thessaly. He then renounced all Macedonian claims south of Thermopylae. Antigonos' intention was to stabilize the situation in and around Macedonia itself. The response of the Macedonian army was to demand that Antigonos accept the title of king. This he did, in the process proclaiming Philip V, already king, his heir.

The success in Antigonos' policies can be seen in subsequent events. In 227, he made attempts to reestablish Antigonal naval power. An expedition was sent to Caria, and the Aegean islands. But an opportunity presented itself in the Peloponnese to restore Macedonia's position in Greece and ultimately the Antigonal fleet. With Megalopolis' entry into the Achaean League came its rivalry with Sparta, now resurgent under its reformist king Cleomenes III. Aratus and the Achaean League could only balance this by turning to Antigonos III. Despite a lifetime of animosity for Macedonia, Aratus sent ambassadors to Antigonos in 226. The negotiations were long because Antigonos' price was high: Corinth and its shipyards. But as Spartan power grew, Aratus' options dwindled and he agreed in 225.

The next spring, 224, Antigonos moved south and campaigned against Sparta with success and retook Arcadia. Over the course of the campaign, Antigonos negotiated a grand alliance, a new Hellenic League matching that of his grandfather Demetrius Poliorcetes and that of Philip II of 337. He also enlisted the aid of Illyrian mercenaries under Demetrius of Pharos to round out his numbers.¹⁷ At the Battle of Sellasia in 222 Antigonos crushed Cleomenes III and took Sparta, the first time the city had actually fallen to an enemy. Macedonia's power and prestige were entirely restored in Greece.

But the concentration of forces and activity in the south opened Macedonia to invasion in the north. A new Illyrian invasion forced Antigonos to go from one hard campaign to another and he hurried back to Macedonia. In 221 he decisively defeated the Illyrians somewhere in upland Macedonia. But the strain of all this had caused Antigonos to begin hemorrhaging, possibly from tuberculosis, and he died soon afterward in that same year. His successor, Philip V, had already been proclaimed king. Antigonos III passed on a kingdom restored to stability in the north and real power in the south.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

For the overall period, the Hellenistic Era, the best single volume is P. Green's masterful *Alexander to Actium: The Historical Evolution of the Hellenistic Age* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1990); see more recently A. Erskine (ed.), *Blackwell Companion to the Hellenistic World* (Oxford 2003). For Macedonia specifically, the standard work is N.G.L. Hammond and F.W. Walbank, *A History of Macedonia* 3 (Oxford 1988). A number of biographies exist of the principal figures in the period of the Diadochi including E.M. Anson, *Eumenes of Cardia: A Greek among Macedonians* (Leiden 2004), R.A. Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1997), E.D. Carney, *Olympias: Mother of Alexander the Great* (New York 2006), F.L. Gattinori, *L'arte del potere: Vita et opera di Cassandro di Macedonia* (Stuttgart 2003), the most recent work on Cassander, J.D. Grainger, *Seleukos Nikator: Constructing a Hellenistic Kingdom* (London 1990) and H.S. Lund, *Lysimachus: A Study in Hellenistic Kingship* (London 1992). For the period after the Diadochoi, W.W. Tarn, *Antigonos Gonatas* (Oxford 1913) is dated but still the standard, though recently supplemented by J.J. Gabbert, *Antigonos II Gonatas: A Political Biography* (London 1997). F.W. Walbank, *Aratos of Sicyon* (Cambridge 1933) is still the major monograph on the subject. Athens remained a key element in all of this period, especially in terms of sources, and here C. Habicht, *Athens from Alexander to Antony*, trans. D.L. Schneider (Cambridge 1997), is essential especially for its epigraphical treatment.

¹ It is not clear exactly what the nature of Arrhidaeus' incompetence was. It is generally taken to be retardation because Plutarch refers to him as a 'half-wit' and 'acting as a child' (*Alexander* 77.5 and *Moralia* 337d–e). Diodorus asserts that he had an incurable mental illness (18.22.2) and Plutarch also stated that he was of 'unsound mind' (*Alexander* 10.2). However, Arrhidaeus was capable of acting normally at the court functions (cf. Curt. 8.1, 10.7.13, Plut., *Phocion* 33.5–7, for example). He appears to have had a problem controlling his temper so the real case may be one of emotional instability rather than intelligence.

² Estimates of original troop numbers and reinforcements sent over the campaigns range from 'well over 30,000' according to A.B. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great* (Cambridge 1988), pp. 267–8 to 60,000 according to R.D. Milns, 'The Army of Alexander the Great', in E. Badian (ed.), *Alexandre le Grand. Image et réalité* (Geneva 1976), pp. 87–136. More recently, A.B. Bosworth, *The Legacy of Alexander: Politics, Warfare and Propaganda under the Successors* (Oxford 2002), pp.

64–97, has pointed out the difficulty in estimating the number of Macedonians in these forces throughout Alexander's reign and down through the Battle of Ipsus, but marks a clear decline throughout from the time of Philip. There is also an extensive discussion of Macedonian manpower in R.A. Billows, *Kings and Colonists: Aspects of Macedonian Imperialism* (Leiden 1995), pp. 184–206, which strikes a middle ground between Bosworth and Milns. In any event, resources available to Antipater had been continually drained. Antipater's inability to break out of Lamia or for the commander he left behind in Macedonia, Sippas, to rescue him speak volumes.

³ For reasons of convenience, choice and custom, this chapter follows the 'low chronology' for the period of the Wars of the Successors from 322 to 311. There is a difference of a year between the 'high' chronology and the 'low' caused by a number of factors: inconsistencies in Diodorus, juggling Roman and Greek systems, as well as the reckonings of individual *poleis*, the Babylonian astronomical reckonings, and other factors. The discussion ranges along small points and adjustments, and can be fascinating and even obsessive for scholars engaged in it, but is too extensive and complicated for review here. For an excellent introduction to the problem, see P. Wheatley, 'An Introduction to the Chronological Problems in the Early Diadoch Sources and Scholarship', in W. Heckel, L. Tritle and P. Wheatley (eds.), *Alexander's Empire: Formulation to Decay* (Claremont 2007), pp. 179–92.

⁴ On Antipater, see further E. Baynham, 'Antipater: Manager of Kings', in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Ventures Into Greek History. Essays in Honour of N.G.L. Hammond* (Oxford 1994), pp. 331–56.

⁵ For Perdiccas' gifts and paying court to Cleopatra, see Arr., *Ta Meta Alexandron* 1.26. For a complete discussion of the machinations involved, see W. Heckel, *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire* (London 1992), pp. 153–60. Heckel also notes that Leonnatus had previously received a marriage proposal from Cleopatra and Olympias (Plut., *Eumenes* 3.9), but he had died before anything could be accomplished. Heckel states virtually the same thing in his more recent *Who's Who in the Age of Alexander the Great* (Oxford 2006), pp. 199–201.

⁶ Arrian rejected the story out of hand (7.27.3), but Plutarch went even further and specifically states that it did not circulate until

Olympias' episode with Iolaus' tomb (*Alexander* 77.1–2). There are early charges of a plot either generally against the House of Antipater (Hyperides) or a group of court insiders (Onesicritus), in which, in a later elaboration on the text, there are individuals named but it does not mention Antipater or any of his family. For a discussion of these sources, see W. Heckel, 'The Earliest Evidence for the Plot to Poison Alexander,' in W. Heckel, L. Tritle and P. Wheatley (eds.), *Alexander's Empire: Formulation to Decay* (Claremont 2007), pp. 265–75. Modern scholars, living in a world obsessed with conspiracy theory, have been more accepting of the idea of poisoning and a conspiracy against Alexander: see for example, P. Green, *Alexander of Macedon 356–323 B.C.: A Historical Biography* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1991), pp. 476–8 for a good discussion. That it was a natural death, see E.N. Borza and J. Reames-Zimmerman, 'Some New Thoughts on the Death of Alexander the Great', *Anc. World* 30 (2000), pp. 1–9.

⁷ There has been an ongoing debate about whether Tomb II at Vergina is that of Philip II or Philip III. Evidence points to Philip III and Eurydice as the occupants and Cassander as the builder of the tomb, such as art historical, historical and philological arguments (Diod. 19.52.4, Athen. 4.155a), archaeological evidence (Athenian spool salt cellars dated to between 315 and 295), and now metrological evidence (the weights and measures of the silver vessels meet the Athenian standard that was introduced by Alexander himself). The overall case is best made by E.N. Borza and O. Palagia, 'The Chronology of the Royal Macedonian Tombs at Vergina', *JDAI* 122 (2007), pp. 81–125. For a confirmation of the metrology, see D.W.J. Gill, 'Inscribed Silver Plate from Tomb II at Vergina: Chronological Implications', *Hesperia* 77 (2008), pp. 335–58. For arguments that Tomb II is that of Philip II, see most recently Ian Worthington, *Philip II of Macedonia* (New Haven 2008), pp. 234–41.

⁸ Most authorities place this in 310/09 based on the *Marmor Parium* (FGrH 239 F B18), but this probably reflects the official announcement and burial of Alexander IV by Cassander, undoubtedly in Tomb III at Vergina, rather than the actual date of death. See also W.L. Adams 'Cassander, Alexander IV and the Tombs at Vergina', *Anc. World* 22 (1991), pp. 27–33.

⁹ Plut., *Demetrius* 18.2. At some point Cassander officially adopted the title as is clear from the inscription of a dedicatory statue at Dium: see D. Pandermalis, *Dion: Sacred City of the Macedonians at*

¹⁰ See Plutarch, *Pyrrhus* 9.2 for the marriage with Pyrrhus, and *Pyrrhus* 10.5 for the marriage offer to Demetrius Poliorcetes. All of this was simply strategic maneuvering, from Agathocles offering a marriage alliance to Pyrrhus in the first place to Demetrius seeing an advantage and a naval base in western waters to Lanassa striking a move for independence. See also Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, pp. 212–14 and 223–9.

¹¹ Demetrius was taken prisoner by Seleucus, his son-in-law, in 286 and spent the last three years of his life in captivity.

¹² It was at this point that Tomb I at Vergina was looted; the remaining two tombs remained undiscovered until Andronikos's excavations in the late 1970s.

¹³ By Antigonos Gonatas' time the population of Macedonia had dropped by almost three quarters judging from troop numbers. Philip and Alexander had maintained Macedonian forces of 60,000 or more (see n. 2 above). Based on the size of the field army (those forces taken out of Macedonia on campaign), by Cassander's time these had dropped to 31,000 (Diod. 20.110.4) and in Antigonos III Doson's reign the field army at Sellasia in 221 had 13,300 Macedonians out of a force of 29,200 (Polyb. 2.65). The latter difference was made up made up by mercenaries (6,900) and the rest by allies. For Cassander, the number is based on the size of the army in 302 facing Demetrius Poliorcetes in Thessaly, which undoubtedly had a large force of mercenaries as well, so would be artificially high in terms of Macedonians in the army.

¹⁴ There is some speculation that the Battle of Cos took place in this phase but the circumstances of Antigonos Gonatas making peace do not fit those of a major victory.

¹⁵ As with Cos, there is a debate over the nature and date of the Battle of Andros: see Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, pp. 305–7 and appendix 4, pp. 587–600.

¹⁶ The dating of practically everything during Demetrius II's reign is uncertain and largely dependent on the interpretation of dedicatory inscriptions: see Hammond and Walbank *History of*

Macedonia 3, pp. 321–29.

¹⁷ Speculation that this also may have involved Antigonos III Doson with Rome is largely unfounded and the Illyrians proved the decisive factor in the victory at Sellasia: see H.J. Dell, 'Antigonos III and Rome', *CP* 62 (1967), pp. 94–103.

Macedonia and Rome, 221–146 BC

Arthur M. Eckstein

1 Introduction

The conflict between Macedonia and Rome was of epic proportions. Four wars, fought over a period of 70 years, brought Greece onto the Roman horizon, later established it as a Roman sphere of influence, and later still led Rome to become the direct ruler of large parts of the region – while the power of Macedonia was eventually destroyed. Looking back from the 150s, the Greek historian Polybius concluded that with the destruction of the Macedonian state, Rome became the *de facto* ruler of the entire Mediterranean.¹ But Polybius did not believe that Macedonia was somehow at the forefront of a fight for Greek freedom. He thought that the Antigonid kings descendants of a marshal of Alexander the Great – were as great a threat to Greek freedom as Rome was. We are dealing with a clash between two aggressive, hegemonic states.²

2 Sources

The main ancient literary sources for the conflict between Macedonia and Rome are the Greek historian Polybius and the Roman historian T. Livius (Livy). Polybius was a politician and general in the Achaean League, which in his time controlled all of the Peloponnese, and he was elected to Leagu-wide office in 170/169. He ran afoul of the Romans for not having a strong enough pro-Roman policy during the Third Macedonian War (see below) and was deported to Italy. There he spent his time writing a massive history of Rome's rise to world power in 40 volumes. Only the first five volumes are preserved entire;

with fragments from later volumes, we possess about one-fourth of his total work. Although a deportee, Polybius appears to have written with significant freedom, distributing praise and blame to historical figures according to his own judgment, and he was a subtle analyst; the conflict between Macedonia and Rome was central to his view of Mediterranean history.³

Livy, writing in about 30, says that he often drew upon Polybius for our period, especially about events in the East. He found Polybius dependable and often reflects his basic narrative (30.45.5, 33.10.10), so when Polybius is missing, Livy often functions for us as a substitute. But Livy was also writing a history of Rome with a far vaster scope even than Polybius – from the founding of the city to the rise of the Emperor Augustus – eventually running to 142 volumes. Many areas needed detailed coverage in such a huge project, including internal politics at Rome, and the expansion of Roman power in the West; hence Livy's attention to events in Greece was sometimes sporadic, as he admits (29.12.1). Moreover, when we possess both Polybius' version of events and Livy's version, we see that Livy tends to take Polybian material and put a somewhat more dramatic overlay on it (as in his account of the great battle between Rome and Macedonia at Cynoscephalae in 197, when compared with Polybius' version).⁴ In addition, Livy as a patriotic Roman was not eager to highlight the criticisms of Rome which Polybius sometimes made.⁵ In other words, Livy was an energetic literary intellectual with his own ideas and biases, not a copying machine.⁶ Further, Livy's own narrative is lost after 167, so he cannot help us concerning the final drama of the 140s and the total destruction of Macedonian independence.

Beyond these two major writers, the pickings get slim. Diodorus of Sicily (working in Rome in about 30) wrote an enormous history of the world in many volumes – but only small parts of his text survive for our period. The same deplorable situation exists for the history of Rome's wars with Macedonia written by Appian (about AD 120), and the large history of Rome written by the e-consul Cassius Dio (about AD 220). These sources provide us with some information, but they are fragmentary, Appian and Dio are very late, and sometimes there are disconcerting confusions.

This leaves archaeology, inscriptions, and coinage. Archaeology reveals the palaces of the Antigonid kings, elegant but restrained in scale, pleasant places to work, not opulent pleasure-domes – and this is an indication of the basic character of the monarchs who ruled Macedonia from 276 until 168.⁷ The restrained style of life, so different from the Seleucid kings of Syria and Mesopotamia and the Ptolemies of Egypt, helps to explain why the Antigonids remained relatively popular with the Macedonian population even with the

exhausting wars they imposed on it (see below). Inscriptions occasionally supplement our literary sources, though there are not many. Two are noteworthy: a detailed inscriptional text of the anti-Macedonian alliance of 211 between Rome and the Aetolian League, and a fascinating letter of Philip V to the city of Larissa in about 214, praising Roman inclusiveness as a source of the extraordinary strength of the Romans.⁸ Finally, coinage can be of some value in indicating the propaganda of the monarchical regime (hence the image of Philip V on some coins recalls Alexander the Great).⁹

3 Rome, Macedonia, and Illyria (230–217)

Interstate relations in the Hellenistic Mediterranean were harshly competitive, especially between major powers. International law essentially did not exist, wars were a usual way of resolving serious conflicts of interest, and all the great powers had survived and prevailed, in an environment that was a violent interstate anarchy, due to their bellicose and aggressive characteristics. This was true of the Roman Republic, and it was true of Antigonid Macedonia.¹⁰ Given the grim realities of interstate life, there was little likelihood that an expansionist and militaristic Rome could coexist peacefully with an expansionist and militaristic Macedonia. The only question for modern scholars has been when the confrontation began.

Prominent scholars have argued that it began with the first Roman military interventions east of the Adriatic, in Illyria in 229 and then in 219. Rome supposedly interfered in Illyria to restrict Macedonian influence there; and in that sense, Rome was the aggressor.¹¹ It is far more likely, however, that confrontation between Rome and Macedonia did not begin until later, after 217, and that Macedonia was the initial aggressor. In fact, neither government at first cared strongly about Illyria.

Rome sent forces across the Adriatic in 229 and 219 to suppress intense piracy centered on the Illyrian tribe of the Ardiaei – and the political consequences were minimal. The Ardiaean monarchy, whose warships had caused serious trouble in the Straits of Otranto, was punished and greatly reduced in power; Rome also gained as informal ‘friends’ several Greek cities on the Illyrian coast and a couple of tribes a bit farther inland, all of which had been threatened by the Ardiaei. The number of polities involved was small, only seven even after 219, and these informal friends formed no continuous strip of

territory but were scattered along 400 miles of difficult coast (two of them were in fact islands off the coast).¹² Moreover, polities farther inland that controlled the crucial routes southeast toward Greece or east toward Macedonia were left alone both in 229 and 219 – the Romans were not interested.¹³ Similarly, for a decade after 229/228, and then again after 219, there were no Roman troops or ships in Illyria, nor even any diplomatic interactions there.¹⁴

Did this establishment of informal and sporadic Roman relations with some Illyrian coastal polities infringe on the interests of Macedonia? The answer appears to be no, for Macedonia had never exercised power along the Illyrian coast. Philip II, the father of Alexander the Great, made conquests in Illyria, but never reached that far west (cf. Isoc. 5.21), and Macedonian control soon fell away even in the inland areas, and so things remained for a century.¹⁵ To be sure, when the Ardiaei defeated the army of the Aetolian League in Acarnania in 231 they were acting at the behest of Demetrius II of Macedonia, but as paid mercenaries, not as allies (Polybius 2.2.8 is explicit). And the Antigonid regime did nothing to help the Ardiaei when Rome went against them in 229. Demetrius of Pharos became regent of the Ardiaei in about 226 and brought his Illyrians to fight for Antigonius III of Macedonia in the great victory over Sparta in 222, but whether Demetrius and his Illyrians fought as allies of Antigonius or (again) merely as mercenaries is unclear.¹⁶ In 220 Philip V certainly paid Demetrius for Illyrian military action against Aetolia – just as the Aetolians paid Demetrius' inlaw Scerdilaidas for Illyrian military action against Philip.¹⁷ Nor did Philip help Demetrius when the Romans came against him in 219. Conversely, the Romans did not attack Scerdilaidas, although in 219 he was the one Illyrian dynast who by then *did* have a formal alliance with Macedonia.¹⁸

Thus the modern hypothesis that Roman actions against Ardiaean pirates in 229 and 219 were somehow part of an early rivalry between Rome and Macedonia should not be accepted. It is an over-subtle interpretation of events in the Adriatic, and a retrojection backward into an earlier time of the later conflict between Rome and Macedonia that broke out under far different conditions during the Hannibalic War.¹⁹ In other words, there is no caus-an-effect link between the two Roman interventions in Illyria and the First Macedonian War.

4 The First War Between Rome and Macedonia

When we turn to the first actual confrontation between Macedonia and Rome, it is clear that Macedonia under Philip V was the aggressor and not Rome. Moreover, the origins of Philip's conduct demonstrate all too clearly the harsh nature of interstate relations in the Hellenistic period.

Coming to the throne in 221 at the age of 17, Philip soon faced a challenge from the Aetolian League to the dominant Macedonian position in Greece created by the victories of his uncle and predecessor, the talented Antigonos III. The Aetolians were long-term opponents and rivals of Macedonia, and their leaders thought Philip too young to be an effective ruler; Aetolian forces therefore soon began aggression against Macedonia's allies.²⁰

The result was the Social War of 220–217, fought by the Aetolians and their allies against Philip and the allies of Macedonia. Philip unexpectedly proved to be an outstanding general and by 217 he held the advantage. But when he learned of Hannibal's great victory over Rome at Lake Trasimene in Italy, his thoughts turned from Greece to expansion in the West. Demetrius of Pharos, who had fled to Macedonia after being expelled from Illyria, is alleged to have played a key role in urging that, given Rome's defeat, Philip should end the Social War, gain control of Illyria (and, incidentally, give Demetrius back his domains), and then launch an expedition to Italy (Polyb. 5.101.8). Even world dominion was possible – an idea that Philip found attractive.²¹ Thus just as the Aetolians sought from 221 to take advantage of the young Philip's perceived weakness, so Philip from 217 sought to take advantage of Rome's weakness. That was Hellenistic politics. Philip arranged peace with Aetolia on the basis of the military *status quo* and then turned his forces toward the West.

Polybius views this decision as world-historical in importance. First, it attracted the negative attention of the Romans to Macedonia and Greece (which is why Polybius is critical of it at 7.11–14). Second, a major policy decision in the East was now made for the first time on the basis of events in the West (the Battle of Lake Trasimene). To Polybius, this marked the start of a new 'interconnectedness' (*symplokê*) between the two halves of the Mediterranean world. The eastern and western Mediterranean had long existed as two separate systems of states, with events in one state-system having little or no impact on the other. From 217 the two systems gradually began to merge into the one large and unified Mediterranean world that existed in Polybius' own time. The growth of this *symplokê* is one of the major themes in Polybius' work – the other is the rise of Roman power.²²

There is little reason to doubt that Philip himself had vast ambitions, including even universal rule. Recent scholarship has stressed the bellicosity and aggressiveness of Hellenistic kings,²³ and

world rule was in fact deeply embedded in Antigonid royal ideology, for the family claimed descent from Philip II and Alexander the Great (Plut., *Aemilius Paullus* 12.5) – a falsehood, but one that shows the scale of its ambitions. Philip saw himself as a new Alexander, and a poem of Alcaeus of Messene, written in about 202–200, in which Philip is scaling the walls of Mount Olympus and conquering even the home of the gods (*Anth. Pal.* 9.518), shows that Philip's vast ambitions were well-known and taken seriously at the time.²⁴ The resources of Macedonia were slender for such a project but would increase with conquest. This ferocious expansionism lay at the heart of Philip's confrontations with Rome, both now and later.

Philip's first target was the Illyrian coast. In 216, he led a newly built fleet of 100 light warships around the Peloponnese into the Adriatic, gambling that Rome, deep in the Hannibalic crisis, would not intervene (Polyb. 5.109.2). But Scerdilaidas, now king of the Ardiaei, appealed for help, and the hard-pressed Romans sent 10 heavy quinquiremes from Sicily (Polyb. 5.110.8). Polybius thinks that Philip's ships could have defeated this force, and Rome would then have been too distracted by Hannibal to stop his conquest of Illyria, but instead Philip fled (5.110.10–11). Outright war was thus avoided for the moment.

Nevertheless, after Hannibal's next smashing victory, at Cannae (216), Philip concluded a treaty of alliance with Carthage against Rome. As Livy explains, Philip 'went with the camp of success' (23.33.4); Rome's weakness indicated there were advantages to be gained.²⁵ We have a verbatim text of the Punic–Macedonian treaty in Polybius 7.9, evidently copied from one captured when Philip's envoy to Hannibal fell into Roman hands on his way back home.²⁶ The treaty is primarily concerned with Macedonia gaining Illyria as its share of the spoils after Hannibal's victory. Roman tradition certainly exaggerated its terms: thus Polybius' text has a vague reference to military cooperation between Macedonia and Carthage against Rome (7.9.11), but in Roman versions of the treaty Philip is to invade Italy, and in Livy 23.33.10–34.1 he is coming with 200 warships.²⁷ Yet Polybius stresses the Romans' fear that Philip would soon attack them (5.105.8), and even in his version of the treaty an invasion of Italy is possible.²⁸ Livy stresses the profound worry of the Senate when it learned of the alliance (24.38.5); this is not mere later propaganda, for in autumn 215 the government of Rome took strong defensive action, doubling the size of the fleet on the Adriatic coast of Italy. In 214 its orders to M. Valerius Laevinus, the commander there, were 'to protect the coasts and to be vigilant against any movements of Philip'.²⁹ Thus whatever Philip's actual plans with Hannibal, the Romans clearly feared he would come to Italy.³⁰

Philip soon set about implementing the treaty. In 214 he led a new naval expedition around the Peloponnese into Illyria but was defeated by Laevinus, who responded to desperate pleas for help from the coastal cities.³¹ Rome now formally declared war on Philip on the grounds of unprovoked attack.³² Undeterred, he invaded Illyria overland in 213 and again in 212. His army made significant conquests inland. There was no Roman response, although this changed in 212 when Philip again reached the Adriatic coast, seizing the port and fortress of Lissus (Polyb. 8.13), and began to build a new fleet.³³ Philip in control of a large naval base and fleet in Illyria could again threaten Italy – as he appeared to be planning. Even in 212 the threat could not be discounted: the war with Hannibal was raging, many polities in Greek southern Italy and Sicily – including Syracuse, the greatest Greek city in the West – had gone over to Carthage. Philip was known for his military gambles, and might come to southern Italy as the champion of the Greeks.³⁴ We are even told that the Syracusans, under siege by Rome, asked him to do so.³⁵

The Roman response was to divert Philip from the West by creating a war against him in Greece itself. But because of the terrible struggle with Carthage, Rome's resources for such a war were limited, so the Romans badly needed Greek allies. The only possibility was the Aetolian League; an enemy of Macedonia, it was the only major state in Greece still outside Philip's orbit in 212. Roman envoys urged the Aetolian government to renew the Social War of 220–217 against Philip, this time with Roman support. The Aetolians were hesitant, in view of Roman weakness and Macedonian strength (Livy 26.24.1). It was not until autumn 211, after new Roman victories in Italy and Sicily demonstrated Rome's increasing recovery, that the alliance was struck and joint military operations against Philip began.

The terms of the Roman-Aetolian alliance are known from literary sources and from an inscriptional copy of the treaty found in 1962. Aetolia would provide most of the land forces in the war, Rome at least 25 quinquiremes, and other Greek states could join. Aetolia would get any cities taken from Philip, with Rome merely getting the moveable loot.³⁶ Rome thus completely foreswore territorial expansion in Greece – in contrast to the Aetolians, whose appetite for territorial gain is clear. This continues the lack of Roman interest in territorial dominion east of the Adriatic that we saw in Illyria. The primary gain for Rome in the treaty was of course strategic: the diversion of Philip from the Adriatic to a war in Greece (Livy 26.24.16, 28.1–2). It was part of the larger struggle for survival with Carthage in which Rome was engaged.

But if Philip was the aggressor in the war with Rome, the Aetolians were the aggressors in their new war against Philip. They had sworn

peace in 217 and Philip had not broken it.³⁷ The Aetolians' decision of 211 was simply a ruthless calculation of advantage.³⁸ The war, however, badly disappointed them. Roman efforts were ineffective against Philip, though Roman naval raids against Macedonia's allies gained them an evil reputation for brutality. Meanwhile, Philip repeatedly beat the Aetolians in the field, and when Attalus I of Pergamum intervened on the anti-Macedonian side, Philip beat him as well. In 206 he drove the Aetolians from the war, and in 205 he came to a compromise peace with Rome itself, in which he kept much of his inland conquests in Illyria. The war had stretched Macedonian resources to the limit, but Philip's military reputation was now at its height.³⁹

The peace of 205 may not have been completely satisfactory to either Rome or Macedonia, for Philip had not got what he wanted and the Romans – uniquely – made concessions to an enemy. But neither side swore to peace with the intention of soon renewing the conflict. The increasing revival of Roman power made a western adventure unattractive now to Philip. Nor is it likely that the Senate after 205 was eager to renew conflict with Macedonia.⁴⁰ First, the Senate did not plot long-range strategies: rather, like any ancient government, it lurched from crisis to crisis in a difficult world.⁴¹ And if the *Patres* foresaw another imminent clash with Philip, why allow his army and treasury time to recover, why allow him time to build a larger and more powerful war fleet, all of which occurred? The Roman people were exhausted by the Hannibalic War, and once peace was established with Philip would likely be very reluctant to initiate a new war with him – as (again) actually occurred. The Peace of 205 achieved in its own way the basic Roman goal of preventing Philip's involvement in Italy, and so in 204 the Romans (as in 229/228 and in 219) again withdrew all their forces from east of the Adriatic.⁴²

Several Greek states, including Rhodes and Egypt, had sought to mediate this war. The Rhodians had taken a particularly hostile tone toward Rome (Polyb. 11.4–6), and in 206 had mediated the peace between Philip and Aetolia, which was a blow to Rome (Appian 9.4.2).⁴³ Yet in 201 envoys from Rhodes came to the Senate along with those of three other Greek states, including the Ptolemies, pleading for major Roman military intervention in the East. Moreover, the Senate, having accepted a peace with Philip so as to be free of Greek affairs, pushed for that new war despite the deep reluctance of the Roman people. Something major had occurred to cause these revolutionary diplomatic developments on all sides. What was it?

5 The Crisis in the Greek State– System and the Second War between Rome and Macedonia

Since the 280s a balance of power had existed among the three great Greek monarchies that dominated the eastern Mediterranean: the Antigonids based in Macedonia, the Seleucids based in Syria and Mesopotamia, and the Ptolemies based in Egypt. But this balance was always fragile, not the result of conscious mutual restraint or limited goals.⁴⁴ After 207, one of the three pillars of this system, the Ptolemaic regime, began to fall apart. A massive indigenous rebellion erupted throughout the Nile Valley, complete with the crowning of the rebel leader as pharaoh by Egyptian priests, and the government at Alexandria was unable to put it down. Then Ptolemy IV died prematurely in 204, and a child of 6 succeeded him. The regime fell into the hands of caretakers and prime ministers, none of whom were popular with the Alexandrian populace; there were coups and riots, and the government, having lost control of much of the countryside, was increasingly short of funds and could barely control Alexandria itself.⁴⁵

Macedonia and Syria then compounded the crisis by swearing a treaty of alliance to destroy the Ptolemaic regime utterly, reaping the territorial rewards themselves (winter 203/202). Philip had now turned his huge expansionist ambitions from the West to the East. Polybius condemns the kings for their irresponsible greed, which disrupted the Hellenistic world (15.20). Some scholars have doubted that this treaty existed or went as far as Polybius says it did.⁴⁶ But there is every reason to believe that Polybius was correct, including a newly discovered inscription from western Asia Minor showing the military cooperation of Philip and Antiochus against the Ptolemies.⁴⁷

In 202 Antiochus III invaded Ptolemaic Lebanon and Judaea; Philip followed in 201 with major attacks on Ptolemaic holdings in the southeast Aegean, and Polybius says his ultimate goal was Alexandria (16.10).⁴⁸ The old tripolar balance of power had provided space for the independence of less powerful states, and they resisted the bid for system-wide hegemony by Syria and Macedonia; the severity of the crisis is shown by Pergamum and Rhodes (bitter rivals) joining in war against Philip.⁴⁹ But these governments came to believe, probably correctly, that their efforts would fail against the power of the kings. The old structure in the Greek East was collapsing in violence and would likely be replaced either by a bipolar structure based on the Antigonids and Seleucids, their power swollen by the wealth and territory seized from the destroyed Ptolemies, or even by the

emergence of Philip or Antiochus as the sole system-wide *hegemon*, a new Alexander.

Desperate for help, the weaker states sent envoys to Rome. This was a huge step forward in Polybius' *symplokê*, the growing 'interconnectedness' between the eastern and western halves of the Mediterranean. Envoys from at least four Greek states appeared before the Senate in autumn 201, pleading for Rome to intervene in the warfare now convulsing the Greek world. These embassies – from Pergamum, Rhodes, the Ptolemies, and Athens – were the catalyst that first brought Roman power into the Greek East in a major way.

Certainly, without the arrival of these embassies, Rome would not have got involved. Previous Roman interactions with the Greeks had not been deep, and though the Hannibalic War had ended victoriously, the Roman populace was exhausted. Meanwhile, the Celtic northern frontier of Italy was increasingly restive, and the Senate's attention would normally have focused there.⁵⁰ Polybius indicates that the Greek envoys made their case for intervention by stressing the threatening implications of the Philip–Antiochus alliance not just to themselves but ultimately to Rome.⁵¹ Senatorial opinion was not united, for a tribune belonging to an important senatorial family attacked the proposal for intervention when it came before the people's assembly (the *comitia centuriata*) as being an unnecessary war, and the populace voted it down overwhelmingly. Since it was extremely rare in this period for the assembly to oppose a senatorial motion to go to war, ⁵² this shows how controversial the proposed intervention against Macedonia was. P. Sulpicius Galba, one of the consuls of 200, was forced to plead with the assembly to reconsider. His arguments had nothing to do with Roman glory, or booty, or imperial expansion, but only with the threat posed to Rome by Philip's Macedonia engorged with power.⁵³

The assembly thus reluctantly agreed to warn Philip from further aggression on pain of war with Rome; and this embassy would also go to Antiochus, to warn him away from invading Egypt proper. Although precipitated by appeals from the Greek polities, the Roman action was both voluntary and aggressive, for Philip had not attacked Rome itself, and hence this was a war of choice. But ultimately, this is what political scientists call a 'preventive' war, an aggressive decision taken not out of appetite for gain but to avert a future danger. Philip's history of ferocious expansionist war since coming to the Macedonian throne explains why a majority of the Senate became convinced of that danger.⁵⁴

Antiochus went along with the Romans and for the moment satisfied himself with the conquest of Lebanon and Judaea. Though he soon turned his energies to vast conquests in Asia Minor (see below),

by 196 he was an official 'Friend of the Roman People': *amicus populi Romani*. Philip, on the other hand, when confronted by an envoy with the Roman ultimatum at Abydus on the Hellespont (a city whose population was about to commit suicide rather than surrender to him), sternly rejected the Roman demands – he was not about to let Rome dictate limits to his conduct. The result was war.⁵⁵

The pattern of the war was a Roman offensive against Philip: as Galba told the assembly, it was better to fight him in Macedonia than in Italy (Livy 31.7). But the war was not an easy one. Philip defeated Galba in the Pindus in 199 and defeated a later attempt to approach Macedonia from the south through Thessaly in 198. But Rome soon gained both the Aetolian League and the Achaean League as allies (the latter defecting from Philip), and in the end fought Macedonia at the head of a large coalition of Greeks. Philip's resources became strained, and then at Cynoscephalae in 197, his tactical errors – typically, an over eagerness in attacking – led to his utter defeat at the hands of a Roman army (with significant Aetolian help). Most of the Macedonian infantry phalanx was lost and could not be immediately replaced. Philip had to sue for peace.

The victor of Cynoscephalae was the proconsul T. Quinctius Flaminius, and he engineered a moderate settlement with Philip (against Aetolian objections). Macedonia lost its outlying provinces, including Thessaly and the Pindus passes, but retained its core areas, and Philip remained on the throne. Flaminius also convinced the Senate that the best way to handle the Greeks was to proclaim the freedom of all states and then to withdraw back to Italy. This was an old pattern too. No doubt the Senate expected that, even with the resulting loose arrangements with the Greeks, if the *Patres* expressed their wishes they would be accommodated. Nevertheless, the 'freedom of the Greeks' was proclaimed by Flaminius to what our pro-Roman sources claim was great Greek satisfaction at the Isthmian Games near Corinth in 196 – the Greek states, from their experience with the Hellenistic monarchies, had perhaps expected a more intrusive sort of hegemony. In fact, the Isthmian Declaration mostly shows that Rome's interest in the East, and its interests there, still remained limited. In 194 the Romans withdrew once more completely from east of the Adriatic.⁵⁶

This war – which modern scholars term the Second Macedonian War (a Roman perspective!) – radically changed the balance of power in Greece and the Greek East to Macedonia's disadvantage. The victory of the Rome-led coalition brought to an end to Philip's vast ambitions in the Mediterranean. Those ambitions, and the Macedonian military power on which they rested, had been a dominant factor in Greek geopolitics for the previous 20 years. But the resources of

Macedonia had always been slender, which is why Philip was such a gambler: the Macedonian army at Cynoscephalae, at full stretch, had not numbered more than 30,000. Bitter defeat now reduced Macedonian resources further. But the striking fact is that under Philip's careful stewardship in the last 15 years of his reign, and then under his son Perseus, Macedonian power did recover. Indeed, by the late 170s, Macedonia again represented a challenge to Rome.

6 The Recovery of Macedonia and the Third Macedonian War

The Romans withdrew from Greece despite the advance of the remaining great Greek monarch, Antiochus III. He had come to the Seleucid throne as a young man a couple of years before Philip, and was as bellicose and adventurous as him. He had reconquered much of Iran and Afghanistan for the Seleucid Empire, seized Lebanon and Judaea from the Ptolemies, and then seized much of Asia Minor. After 203, he took to describing himself (Alexander-style) as Antiochus the Great and (Persianstyle) as the Great King. By 196 he controlled most of the west coast of Asia Minor (except for Rome's friend Pergamum), and his army had crossed to Europe and was conquering Thrace. His military reputation was formidable, and he had the resources of all of Asia behind him. The Roman withdrawal from Greece was clearly a major strategic mistake, for it created not a buffer zone of friendly states between Rome and the Great King (as Flamininus had believed) but a power-vacuum into which Antiochus plunged.⁵⁷ Negotiations between Rome and the Seleucid monarch were unavailing.⁵⁸ In autumn 192 Antiochus invaded Greece. He had been called in as champion by the Aetolian League, which was dissatisfied with the territory it had gained from the recent war with Philip. To reiterate: this was typically ruthless Hellenistic conduct.⁵⁹

One might have thought that Antiochus would gain Philip as an ally, for while Philip now had a clear sense of Roman power, here was a chance to renew the Pact between the Kings and take revenge upon Rome and its Greek allies. But by 192 Antiochus the Great had no use for other kings; instead of dealing with Philip, he sought to have him overthrown and replaced by a puppet-ruler.⁶⁰ Thus, when a Roman army arrived in Greece in 191 in response to Antiochus' invasion, Philip sided with Rome. The decision worked out much to his advantage. Antiochus was driven from Greece after a major battle at Thermopylae, and while the Roman army then focused on Philip's old enemies the Aetolians, in 191–189 the king – with Roman

acquiescence – seized for himself many polities in central Greece that had sided with Antiochus.⁶¹

The Romans and their other Greek allies went on to defeat Antiochus in a great battle fought at Magnesia in western Asia Minor in 189. This victory determined the new structure of the Hellenistic East. The period of system-wide crisis and war since 207 came to an end, and what replaced the old tripolar balance of power was Roman military and political preponderance. This was acknowledged in the peace treaty sworn at Apamea in 188 between Antiochus III and Rome and her allies. All great powers naturally seek to organize the world according to their own preferences, and the decisions taken at Apamea were fundamentally Roman ones. Antiochus lost Asia Minor and his war fleet, and he was pushed far to the east. But Rome had fought this war once more at the head of a grand coalition of Greek states (including the Achaean League, Pergamum, Rhodes, and Macedonia), and those states had contributed significantly to the victory. And the Senate, as usual, had no interest in territorial expansion east of the Adriatic. Thus, while the Roman Republic now emerged as the sole remaining superpower in the Mediterranean, with no peers, the territorial spoils of the war fell to Rome's Greek allies, all of whom became more powerful themselves.

Macedonia received a significant expansion as its share, most importantly the city and fortress of Demetrias on the Aegean. But it also received the fewest territorial spoils of any ally. An original agreement had been far more generous, but the Senate received bitter complaints about Philip's tyrannical rule from polities he had seized in the war, and decided to deprive him of those places. It need not have done so: when cities in Asia Minor that had been subordinated to Rhodes at Apamea complained to Rome about tyrannical Rhodian rule, the Rhodians merely got a letter of reprimand.⁶² Philip was infuriated at the Roman action, and, like the Aetolians after the Second Macedonian War, believed he had been cheated. Polybius argues that he now began to plan a war of revenge against Rome, which would be carried out by his son Perseus (22.14.7–12).

Philip was certainly angry about the Roman decision: when he withdrew his forces from the important cities of Aenus and Maronea on the Thracian coast in 184 (in fact he had seized them in violation of Apamea, where they had been declared free), he initiated a massacre in Maronea. But scholars have doubted Polybius' assertion about the war of revenge on the grounds that he was consciously producing a far too elegant and schematic view of Macedonian history: the war that Philip II planned against Persia in the 330s was carried out by his son Alexander and established Macedonian world power (3.6), the war that Philip V planned against Rome in the 180s

was carried out by his son Perseus and, by contrast, led to the destruction of Macedonian power.⁶³ The parallelism here is indeed suspiciously neat. More importantly, not only did the Romans let Philip get away with the Maronea massacre,⁶⁴ but also after 185 Philip made continual war and significant conquests in inland Thrace, and there was no reaction from Rome; so perhaps Philip's anger was somewhat assuaged by Roman indifference to these large conquests. In any case, Philip's Thracian conquests definitely increased Macedonian power, for he brought thousands of new subjects down from the north into Macedonia itself to enlarge the population closely under his control, which helped rebuild the army. He also opened numerous gold mines in the rich Mount Pangaeum region.⁶⁵

Polybius highly disapproves of the tyrannical tenor of Philip's last years. The king's tyrannical actions included the execution of his own younger son Demetrius on the grounds that he was plotting a coup; Demetrius had extensive contacts at Rome, but whether these were an important factor in the tragedy is not clear.⁶⁶ But Polybius simultaneously lavishes praise on Philip for successfully rebuilding Macedonian power (exhausted by Philip's own wars): it was the mark of a statesman in a difficult world (25.3.9–10).

Philip V died suddenly in the summer of 179. His expansionist confrontations with an expansionist Rome had made him the key figure in bringing Roman power into Greece, and he dominates the first half of Polybius' *Histories* almost as much as Hannibal. His eldest son Perseus, whom he had personally trained in generalship and politics (it was the Macedonian royal way), succeeded him. The Senate immediately renewed *amicitia* (friendship) with Perseus, so at the beginning of his reign the *Patres* were not hostile to him.

The problem was that between 179 and 173 Perseus engineered a stunning expansion of Macedonian power and influence. He became popular among the Greeks for the moderate character of his rule (Polyb. 25.3.1–8), and he impressed them with his military victories, first over the Thracian prince Abrupolis, who had seized the vital Pangaeum mining region during the change of regime, then far to the east against the Thracians who were threatening Byzantium.⁶⁷ The Macedonian mines continued to grow, as did the repopulation of Macedonia with Thracians, Gauls, and Illyrians from the north.⁶⁸ And Perseus launched a spectacularly successful diplomatic offensive. In 178 he secured marriage ties to the Seleucids (repairing relations strained by Antiochus III), and with Prusias II of Bithynia. He repaired Macedonian relations with Rhodes and Aetolia (two bitter enemies of his father), as well as with the Thessalians (former subjects of his father), and struck a military alliance with the Boeotians. Even Greek states on the Asia Minor coast became well-disposed toward him

(Livy 42.12.1 and 14.5).⁶⁹

By the late 170s Perseus could also field an army larger than any Philip ever possessed – of some 43,000 soldiers. ‘Except for the army Alexander the Great took to Asia, never had the army of any Macedonian king been as large’ (Livy 42.51.11).⁷⁰ In 174 Perseus used this army to suppress a rebellion against him in Dolopia, southwest of Thessaly; he then brought his forces down to Delphi, and paid a ceremonial visit to the great shrine, and then led the army back home through Thessaly. Many in Thessaly cheered him, a popularity owing much to his cancellation of debts to Macedonia.⁷¹ Greek leaders who were now alarmed turned – significantly – first to Eumenes II of Pergamum, not to Rome (Livy 41.22.5), for the Romans since 188 had shown little interest in Greece.⁷²

In short, it appears that Macedonia under Perseus was emerging as a peer-competitor to Rome in Greece and the Aegean, possessing wealth, military power, and wide diplomatic contacts – see the comment of Appian (9.11.1–3). As Derow says: ‘for those who wished not to look toward Rome, or not to have to look only to Rome, there was to be another focus available.’⁷³

In one sense these were natural developments, given Macedonia’s potential for local power in Greece and its new and vigorous ruler. But they were also likely the conscious result of Perseus’ policies. The growth of Macedonian wealth, power, and influence was as Perseus wished, and although he avoided any direct conflict with Rome, the larger strategic implications – and strategic advantages – of growing Macedonian wealth, power, and influence cannot have been lost on him. In short, he was changing the balance of power. Other kings in this period, notably Ptolemy VI, pursued similarly independent and expansionist policies and got away with them.⁷⁴ But Perseus’ actions finally attracted the negative attention of the Senate. The Roman response was brutal, a new war – sometimes depicted as the result of paranoia, sometimes as the result of ruthless Roman aggression.⁷⁵

Yet the prime mover against Perseus was not Rome but Eumenes of Pergamum. He personally appeared before the Senate in summer 172, depicting Perseus as a severe threat to the stability of the Greek world. Eumenes stressed that Perseus was a dangerous general, with a large army, large financial resources, a hatred of Rome inherited from Philip, and a rapidly growing circle of influence. He listed Perseus’ alleged violations of good faith with Rome: the murder of his pro-Roman brother Demetrius, the attack on the Thracian chief Abrupolis, the suppression of Dolopia, the alliance with Boeotia, the march of his army to Delphi, the summoning of the barbarian Bastarnae from beyond the Danube to be his allies (perhaps to march on Italy), and the threat he posed to Pergamum.⁷⁶ The speech ended with criticism

of Roman passivity: the rise of Perseus had occurred because the Senate was not looking out for its own interests in the Greek world, and was not supporting Rome's Greek friends and allies. This sort of complaint had in fact been made to the Senate as early as 180, and it tells us much about the ambiguities of the post-Apamea situation in the East.⁷⁷

The literary sources say that Eumenes' speech had a profound impact upon the Senate.⁷⁸ This is confirmed by the inscription that the Romans set up in 171/70 at Delphi to justify the war with Macedonia, which repeats most of Eumenes' accusations verbatim. The inscription in turn guarantees the fundamental historicity of Eumenes' speech of 172 as it appears in Livy. Eumenes' speech, then, was indeed a turning point. And then Eumenes came close to being assassinated at Delphi on his way home; he later claimed the plot was concocted by Perseus and produced witnesses. The Senate was appalled.⁷⁹ Rome was again, as in 200, being drawn into a conflict with Macedonia by the pleas and interests of a second-tier state. But, as in 200, there was also a larger issue: Perseus was continuing Philip's intensive buildup of Macedonian military, financial, and diplomatic capabilities, but Rome as the sole remaining superpower (a position achieved through great sacrifice) would not accept Macedonia as a peer competitor or equal. As Livy says in explaining why Roman envoys demanded hostages from Perseus before they would agree to talk to him in 172, the issue was not security but because the king was not to be allowed to meet with them 'on terms of equality' (42.39.7: *ne quaquam ex dignitate pari*). Authority would be reasserted.

Yet in the summer of 172 Rome had no fleets or soldiers east of the Adriatic. Even Rome's friends on the Illyrian coast, the oldest area of contact, were without protection; and their neighbor the Ardiaean prince Genthius was leaning toward Perseus' side. The Senate scrambled to put a scratch force across the Adriatic to secure the area as a bridgehead for operations into Greece. Such a bridgehead did not exist in 172, anymore than in 214, or in 200, or in 191. This was because for almost 20 years the Senate, satisfied with the absence of any threatening power east of the Adriatic, had given no thought to military operations in the Greek world.⁸⁰ Similarly, a senatorial embassy now had to engage in intensive diplomacy with major Greek states in order to persuade and entice them (Livy 42.47.2: *temptare*) to support Rome. That is: Rome could not count on automatic 'obedience' from the Greeks; it had no disciplined alliance-system in Greece, and a coalition of the willing had to be constructed anew, exactly as in previous crises.⁸¹

The Senate in late 172 certainly wanted Perseus humbled, for this

would shift the balance of power and influence in Greece back to Rome; and the negotiating position taken with Perseus was harsh. But Perseus, too, was only willing to negotiate up to a point, and sternly refused to surrender the status of Antigonid Macedonia as a great power, even if that meant war. It was a position typical of a Hellenistic monarch.⁸²

Even so, a new harshness in Roman attitudes is now visible, what the political scientist Christopher Layne terms ‘the hegemon’s temptation’ – the temptation toward harsh unilateral assertiveness that is inherent in any situation of unipolar power such as Rome now had.⁸³ Although Polybius thought the revenge of Philip and Perseus for weakening Macedonia was the ultimate cause of the new war, he also criticized the Roman envoy Q. Marcius Philippus for deceiving Perseus in late 172 into accepting a months-long ‘standstill’ for peace negotiations, which the Senate merely used to complete the Roman military buildup. Perseus made no moves in these months when he had local military superiority, while the Romans hurried forces into Illyria to create the bridgehead they needed (see above). In the spring of 171 the *Patres* went through the motions of hearing Perseus’ peace envoys and then banished them from Italy.⁸⁴

Polybius’ criticism of the new mood at Rome comes out even more strongly in Livy’s depiction of the senatorial debate over Marcius’ deception.⁸⁵ Marcius won the approval of a majority of the Senate, ‘but not that of the older men and those mindful of traditional ways’ (Livy 42.47.4). They argued against deceiving Perseus on the grounds of traditional Roman morality and straightforwardness in dealing with others (42.47.4–8), and they ‘disapproved this new and over-clever wisdom.’⁸⁶ Polybius probably derived his view of the corrupt in the Senate from Cato the Elder, an old-fashioned man, ex-consul and censor, whom he knew personally.⁸⁷

One should note that these older senators who disapproved of deceit toward Perseus were the generation that defeated Hannibal, Philip V and Antiochus III.⁸⁸ They appear to have been men who treated foreign states straightforwardly: their enemies as enemies, to be beaten openly in the field, and their allies as allies, not as subjects (mindful of the allied contributions to victories in the great wars). They were the stern architects of Roman military and political predominance in the Mediterranean – but also of a situation where Greek governments could still talk to Rome ‘more or less on a basis of equality’ (Polyb. 24.10.9), a structure where (as Cato said) *libertas* was possible.⁸⁹ In Polybius’ view, the Senate in winter 172/171 revealed the dawn of a new and harsher period.

That new attitude at Rome – ‘the hegemon’s temptation’ – is evident both in the course of the Third Macedonian War and the

settlement at its end. The war did not go smoothly; Perseus defeated a Roman army in Thessaly in 171 and the campaigns of 170 and 169 were stalemates. The king was finally defeated only in 168 at Pydna, at the southern entrance to Macedonia. The strategic problem for Macedonia had always been that while its army was very formidable, Macedonian resources were too slender to provide for its replacement should the army suffer disaster (unlike the far larger resources available to Rome), and at Pydna the Macedonians suffered disaster, though the Roman commander L. Aemilius Paullus said that the most frightening thing he ever saw was the imposing march of the Macedonian phalanx toward his own troops.⁹⁰ But after Pydna, Perseus was forced to surrender unconditionally.

Hellenistic wars were brutal. Towns resisting Perseus were destroyed and their populations were enslaved (Livy 42.54.1–6, 43.18–19). This is one reason why Polybius criticizes those Greeks who thought Perseus was a champion of Greek freedom – he was only the representative of Antigonid royal imperialism. That was the choice the Greeks faced (27.10). But atrocities on the Roman side were worse, including the destruction of the city of Haliartus and the enslavement of its population (Livy 42.63.3–11, Zonaras 9. 22).⁹¹

Moreover, the Romans relied less in this war on their Greek friends, and treated them with a new arrogance. When Perseus defeated the Romans in Thessaly in 171, the first to flee were the Aetolian allied cavalry, with the rest of the Greek troops following. The consul Crassus had the Aetolian commanders arrested and sent off for trial in Rome, where they languished for years. This was unprecedented Roman treatment of allied troops, a crude assertion of Roman dominance.⁹² Similarly, when the city of Abdera in Thrace, an *amicus populi Romani*, refused a Roman admiral's exorbitant demands for money and grain in 170, he ordered it sacked and its people sold into slavery, thus ignoring the fact that Eumenes II, present with the Pergamene fleet, had guaranteed the Abderans their safety.⁹³ At Chalcis on Euboea, which became the main Roman naval base, Roman soldiers eager for money looted temples and kidnapped citizens and sold them as slaves.⁹⁴ These incidents had a highly negative impact upon Greek opinion.⁹⁵ The Senate, upon receipt of complaints, expressed disapproval and ordered what compensation was possible for the victims (Livy 43.4.11), but this was a feeble response. And meanwhile, Roman commanders, backed by the Senate, interfered intensely for the first time in the internal politics of Greek cities, supporting the Greek politicians they deemed fervent supporters of Rome, and punishing all others. Polybius himself fell victim to one of these Rome– approved purges.⁹⁶

The Senate now sought to crush Macedonia forever. As Polybius

indicated, and as Cato knew, the point of the destruction of Macedonia was to make it impossible for the military power of Rome ever to be balanced in the East.⁹⁷ In 167 the Senate even considered transforming Macedonia into a permanent *provincia* with a Roman governor backed by a Roman army. The idea was dropped because Rome did not have the manpower for a permanent occupation of a state with a long northern frontier with barbarians. Instead, Macedonia was divided into four republics. The abolition of a Greek state was an unprecedented Roman act: the Macedonian monarchy was 500 years old.⁹⁸ In previous Roman victories over Greek kings, the monarchs had been left on their thrones, and no one had thought to destroy the monarchies themselves. Now, all this was commanded by the *Patres*.⁹⁹ Perseus himself was brought to Rome in chains and was led in the triumphal parade of Aemilius Paullus, which was another unprecedented act against a Greek king.¹⁰⁰

The new Macedonian republics were similar to the old administrative *merides* through which the kings had run their realm, but now each *meris* would be an independent state, and ties between the four republics were sternly limited by rules set at Rome. There were obstacles to trade, and even to intermarriage.¹⁰¹ The entire previous administrative stratum – the generals and high officials – was deported to Italy. Timbering and gold and silver mining, the sources of Macedonian wealth (and hence Macedonian power), were forbidden. The Senate also demilitarized the republics, allowing them to field only local frontier forces. And finally the Senate imposed upon the republics a permanent annual tribute to Rome, the first time it had ever forced such an arrangement east of the Adriatic.¹⁰²

Polybius in a certain mood viewed the creation of the four Macedonian republics as a ‘liberation’ of the Macedonian people from the tyrannical rule of the kings (36.17). So, too, the Senate, in its announcement to the Greeks of the regime change in Macedonia: ‘The Macedonians were to be free, so that the world could see that Roman arms brought not slavery to free peoples but liberty to the enslaved.’¹⁰³ But the Macedonian populace thought differently, as we will see.

7 The End of Macedonian Freedom

After 167 we lose the continuous narrative of Livy and the Polybian text is increasingly fragmentary. The Polybian fragments focus on diplomatic interactions, because of the interest of the Byzantine redactor (who worked for the imperial government); but while many

details are lost, the outline of Roman–Greek diplomatic relations is clear.¹⁰⁴

It appears that even after the cataclysm of the Third Macedonian War an ambiguity existed in Roman relations with the Greeks. In 167, all Roman forces were withdrawn from Greece yet again, and returned to Italy.¹⁰⁵ Aside from the annual tax, there was little Roman interaction with the four Macedonian republics during the next two decades (this was true with most Greek states). The exception is that in about 158 the republics received permission from the Senate to reopen the gold and silver mines, which was a significant economic benefit. Lack of Roman involvement was not from lack of power; the power had been demonstrated in 171–168. It was from lack of interest: the Macedonian problem, which had called forth three wars in the East, appeared solved and Greece was peaceful. The governments of the Macedonian republics made certain never to cross any Roman preferences, but few preferences appear to have been expressed.¹⁰⁶

Underneath, however, there must have been bitterness toward Rome over the destruction of the Macedonian state, and desire for reunification and the old monarchy – the monarchy under which Macedonia had dominated Greece.¹⁰⁷ Nothing else can explain the startling events of 150–148. Out of nowhere, ‘dropped from the skies’ as Polybius says (36.9–10), a pretender to the Antigonid throne appeared. His name was Andriscus; he bore a resemblance to Perseus, and he claimed to be his son. He took the royal name Philip and gathered an army from Thracian princes who had ties to the Antigonid family (Diod. 32.15), with which he swept away the local forces of the republics and overthrew their regimes with ease. It turned out they had little legitimacy among the Macedonian people. And Philip VI wanted not merely Macedonia, for his forces were soon threatening Thessaly to the south.¹⁰⁸

There was a Roman attempt to negotiate a peaceful settlement, for an embassy to Macedonia was led by the prominent P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica (consul twice), who had won a triumph over the Dalmatians five years before.¹⁰⁹ Perhaps the Senate hoped to overawe the Macedonians, but it is hard to image that it would ever have accepted Andriscus as ruler of a unified Macedonia, and as often happened in Mediterranean antiquity negotiations came to naught. Scipio ended up commanding Achaean troops in the defense of Thessaly. It was the start of the Fourth Macedonian War.¹¹⁰ The next year a Roman army under the praetor P. Iuventius Thalna arrived in Greece to put down Andriscus, and the result was the greatest victory of Macedonian arms since the Social War 75 years previously. Thalna’s army was annihilated, the praetor himself killed on the

battlefield.¹¹¹

Andriscus was a harsh ruler, and Polybius was stunned that the Macedonians would not only give up their republican freedom but also fight so well for a man he viewed as an imperialist tyrant (36.17.14). The Greek historian was the product of a republican polity and clearly underestimates the drawing power of the Antigonid monarchy.¹¹² But Andriscus' great military victory of 149 sealed the end of Macedonia as any sort of independent state; the Senate was not going to let the Macedonians do such damage to Roman prestige and power ever again.¹¹³ In 148 the praetor Q. Caecilius Metellus brought a much larger Roman army to Greece; Pergamum contributed its war fleet, and the Macedonians were defeated and Andriscus captured (later to be led in Metellus' triumph at Rome). Yet the depth of Macedonian feeling for Antigonid glory is shown by the fact that late in 148 Metellus had to put down another pretender claiming to be a son of Perseus, and in 143 the Romans had to deal with still another pretender, who raised a significant army.¹¹⁴

The *Patres* now concluded that the only way to end the problem posed by Macedonian power was via the permanent presence of a Roman commander backed by an occupation army. This decision was clearly a last resort. The Senate had previously tried to manage the problem of Macedonia in several other ways, through the 'lesson' of military defeat or the 'rewarding' of a cooperative monarch or through imposed cooperative indigenous governments, but all had failed. From now on, a Roman legion was always present in Macedonia along with a high Roman public official (usually a praetor with proconsular *imperium* who served one or two years). Thus almost a century after the Roman military expeditions to Illyria, the Senate for the first time prepared to maintain a legion permanently present east of the Adriatic.¹¹⁵ (On this period in Macedonia's history, see J. Vanderspoel, chapter 13.)

It is too legalistic to say that Macedonia was converted in 148/146 into a Roman province – as if the Senate now issued a charter (*lex provinciae*) that decreed its legal annexation. Such charters are a modern construct, for the term *lex provinciae* does not appear in any ancient text. Roman 'provinces' evidently developed in a more haphazard and gradual fashion.¹¹⁶ Thus, the traditional four Macedonian *merides* were still functioning as administrative units 200 years later under the Flavians, and most places in Macedonia had local self-government according to their traditional laws.¹¹⁷ Nor is it clear that the Roman military-commander assumed from the start all the administrative duties we associate with a Roman governor under the empire. At first, his primary duties were purely military – to protect Macedonia (and hence all of Greece) from barbarian invasion from the

north and to prevent internal Macedonian disorder.¹¹⁸

But over time the permanent presence of a high Roman official in Macedonia, backed by an army, led to that official making administrative decisions, for he was the natural person to whom one turned when appealing about local problems. This was not only true for the Macedonians but also occasionally even for Greeks farther south.¹¹⁹ Previously an appeal to Rome about local problems had meant a journey to Rome itself, an embassy to the Senate – that is, a formal act of traditional interstate relations. But now, for Macedonians and even for Greeks, and despite the absence of structured rules, Roman authority was much closer – in the form of a high official backed by military force. That was a fundamental change. The process by which over time the commander took on more and more administrative duties was natural enough; but it continually reduced the scope of Macedonian freedom.

8 Conclusion

In the 70 years of confrontation and the four wars fought between the kingdom of Macedonia and the republic of Rome (about 217 to 146), we are dealing with a typical tragedy of ancient interstate competition. Both states were bellicose and aggressive in culture, primarily as a result of their successful adaptation to the pressures of the anarchic international environment in which they had to survive.¹²⁰ Because of those very adaptations, which led to power and success, these were states whose confrontations, involving important clashes of real interest, were unlikely to result in mutual coexistence or cooperation.¹²¹

Still, it has been argued here that Rome was not the first in this relationship to be the aggressor. A clash between the two powers was perhaps inevitable in the long term, but as it happened Philip V, with his vast imperial ambitions, was the aggressor against Rome; when he saw the Romans being defeated by Hannibal, he sought his share of the spoils, though there had been no previous Roman–Macedonian hostility or even contact. The Romans fended off Philip's attack, in the end by creating a war against him in Greece, which modern scholars (from a Roman perspective) call the First Macedonian War. Philip's ambitions after 205 turned to the eastern Mediterranean, and he formed an alliance with Antiochus III, the very powerful Seleucid monarch, to destroy the Ptolemaic regime based in Egypt and share the territorial spoils. This unprecedented alliance wrecked the Hellenistic state– system, and resulted in the arrival at Rome in

autumn 201 of four Greek embassies pleading for Roman military intervention in the East. This led to the Second Macedonian War. The Roman intervention was a voluntary and aggressive act, a war of choice, since Rome itself had not been attacked. But it would not have occurred without the pleas of the Greeks for help in a real crisis of the Greek state-system.

Rome at the head of a large coalition of Greek states eventually defeated Philip. But the king was left on his throne, and the core of Macedonia, and hence of Macedonian power, was left intact, and Roman forces soon withdrew back to Italy. The result was not peace but the invasion of Greece by Antiochus III, despite Roman warnings to stay away, which shows once more that analysis of Rome's increasing involvement in the Greek East must be seen in the context of competing hegemonic states.¹²² Macedonia sided with Rome in this war, and benefited territorially from the victory that Rome and its large coalition of Greek states won against Antiochus. The victory established Rome as the sole remaining superpower in the Mediterranean world – a position of predominance that the Senate firmly intended not to give up. But Macedonia received the fewest territorial benefits of any major ally. Whether Philip's anger at this was long lasting is unclear; he certainly spent the rest of his reign in vigorously rebuilding Macedonian wealth and military power. His son Perseus continued that buildup during the 170s, until Macedonia was once more becoming a rival and peer-competitor of Rome. Eventually the Senate, spurred on by Eumenes II of Pergamum, a local rival of Macedonia, intervened harshly to reassert Roman predominance. The result was the Third Macedonian War, and the destruction of the Antigonid monarchy. The Romans then withdrew back to Italy yet again, but in the end the four republics which the Senate had established in Macedonia to replace the monarchy were too weak to withstand even Andriscus, a dubious pretender to the Antigonid throne. Thus, it came about that the Senate solved the Macedonian problem by stationing a legion permanently in Macedonia as an occupying force, and its commander increasingly became the governor of the region. The imposition of direct rule was a last resort. That the Senate concluded this was the only way to control Macedonia is, however, an impressive testimony to Macedonian power.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

The best general introduction to this period of Macedonian history is N.G.L. Hammond and F.W. Walbank, *A History of Macedonia* 3

(Oxford, 1988) – Hammond takes the period of Philip V and Perseus. Both authors are superb scholars and good writers, and the text has good maps and some illustrations. F.W. Walbank's *Philip V of Macedon* (Cambridge 1940) is of course very old now, yet it has not been superseded as a on-volume overview of this crucial monarch's career, and Walbank's judgments are always careful and balanced. Crucial for understanding the expansionist nature of Antigonid royal ideology are Walbank's articles 'Polybius and Macedonia' (of 1970) and 'Η ΤΩΝ ΟΛΩΝ ΕΛΠΙΣ and the Antigonids' (of 1993), which are conveniently collected in his *Polybius, Rome and the Hellenistic World: Essays and Reflections* (Cambridge 2002), at pp. 91–106 and 127–136, respectively. By contrast, W.V. Harris's *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome* (Oxford 1979) is a brilliantly written but one-sided work, in which every problem in the conflict between Macedonia and Rome is blamed on ruthless Roman imperialism. E.S. Gruen's *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome*, 2 vols. (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1984) offers a major reinterpretation of Roman–Greek relations that emphasizes the Greek (and Macedonian) contribution to what was usually a complicated and synergistic interaction. A.M. Eckstein's *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 2006) and *Rome Enters the Greek East: From Anarchy to Hierarchy in the Hellenistic Mediterranean, 230–170 B.C.* (Oxford 2008) interpret Macedonian–Roman confrontations in detail from the point of view of modern international relations theory; that is, with an emphasis on the conflicts and stresses that are the all-too-normal product of an anarchic and highly war-prone system of states when viewed as a system.

¹ Polybius 1.1–5 (the general introduction to his *Histories*) and 3.1–5 (the 'second introduction').

² See F.W. Walbank, 'Polybius and Macedonia', in F.W. Walbank (ed.), *Polybius, Rome, and the Hellenistic World: Essays and Reflections* (Cambridge 2002), pp. 91–106 (originally published 1970).

³ See A.M. Eckstein, *Moral Vision in the Histories of Polybius* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1995), pp. 1–26.

⁴ Eckstein, *Moral Vision*, pp. 183–92.

⁵ Compare Polybius' negative judgment of Roman conduct in seizing the islands of Sardinia and Corsica in 237 (it was outright 'theft' from Carthage, 3.30.4) to the expurgated version of the

crisis which we find in Livy, *Periochae* 20, where there is discussion only of a Sardinian and Corsican native 'rebellion'. Presumably something similar stood in the original Livian text.

⁶ Cf. T.J. Luce, *Livy: The Composition of his History* (Princeton 1977).

⁷ See Hammond in Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, pp. 472–87.

⁸ For the inscriptions, see H.H. Schmitt, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums* 3 (Munich 1969), pp. 258–66, S.M. Burstein (ed.), *The Hellenistic Age from the Battle of Ipsos to the Death of Kleopatra VII* (Cambridge 1985), pp. 87–8.

⁹ See N. Davis and C.M. Kraay, *The Hellenistic Kingdoms: Portrait Coins and History* (London 1973), pp. 221–9.

¹⁰ On the harsh nature of interstate relations in the Hellenistic world, see A.M. Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 2006), pp. 79–117 and *Rome Enters the Greek East: From Anarchy to Hierarchy in the Hellenistic Mediterranean* (Oxford 2008), pp. 3–28. On war as normal under conditions of international anarchy, see K.N. Waltz, 'The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory', *Journ. Interdisc. Hist.* 18 (1988), p. 620.

¹¹ On the confrontation between Rome and Macedonia from 229, see M. Holleaux, *Rome, la Grèce et les monarchies hellénistiques au III^e siècle av. J.-C. (273–205)* (Paris 1935), pp. 131–46 and A. Coppola, *Demetrio di Faro* (Rome 1993), pp. 55–8 and 84. On Rome as the aggressor, see especially W.V. Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome* (Oxford 1979), p. 138, who believes that the ultimate 'target' of Rome in Illyria was always Macedonia.

¹² Despite P.S. Derow, 'Pharos and Rome', *ZPE* 88 (1991), pp. 261–70, it is clear that none of these places ever possessed a formal treaty of alliance with the Romans: see A.M. Eckstein, 'Pharos and the Question of Roman of Roman Treaties of Alliance Overseas in the Third Century B.C.', *CP* 94 (1999), pp. 395–418. On the small number even of informal 'friends', see E. Badian, 'Notes on Roman Policy in Illyria (230–201 B.C.)', in E. Badian (ed.), *Studies in Greek and Roman History* (Oxford 1964), pp. 7 and

¹³ On the importance of the towns of the middle Aous Valley for the route to Central Greece, see N.G.L. Hammond, 'The Illyrian Atintani, the Epirotic Atintanes, and the Roman Protectorate', *JRS* 79 (1989), pp. 16–17 and 19–20. For the importance of the Dassareti and the passes east over the Pindus Range to Macedonia, see N.G.L. Hammond, *Epirus* (Oxford 1967), pp. 232–3.

¹⁴ Discussion in Eckstein, *Rome Enters the Greek East*, pp. 29–76.

¹⁵ See H.J. Dell, 'The Western Frontiers of the Macedonian Monarchy', *Ancient Macedonia* 1 (Thessaloniki 1970), pp. 119–22; cf. H.J. Dell, 'Antigonos III and Rome', *CP* 62 (1967), pp. 98–102; rightly accepted by R.M. Errington, 'Rome and Greece to 205 B.C.', *CAH*² 8 (Cambridge 1989), p. 91.

¹⁶ See Dell, 'Antigonos III and Rome', p. 101 n. 31.

¹⁷ For Demetrius in 220 as a mercenary for Macedonia, see Polybius 4.19.8. Demetrius' in-law Scerdilaidas had his own forces and politics: see Polybius 4.16.8; cf. 4.29.5–6, with E. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae (264–70 B.C.)* (Oxford 1958), p. 45.

¹⁸ On Philip's failure to help Demetrius, see Eckstein, *Rome Enters the Greek East*, pp. 65–6. See Polybius 4.29.7 for Scerdilaidas' formal alliance with Philip. That the Romans left Scerdilaidas alone is stressed by E.S. Gruen, *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome*, 2 vols. (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1984), p. 373.

¹⁹ See, rightly, R.M. Errington, *The Dawn of Empire* (London 1972), pp. 103 and 106, against, for example, Holleaux, *Rome, la Grèce*, pp. 97–172 (and see above, n. 11).

²⁰ See J.B. Scholten, *The Politics of Plunder: The Aetolians and their Koinon in the Early Hellenistic Era, 279–219 B.C.* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 2000), pp. 59–95 and 131–63.

²¹ World conquest: see Polybius 5.101.10, 102.1, 104.7, 108.5, and 15.24.6, with F.W. Walbank, 'Η ΤΩΝ ΟΛΩΝ ΕΛΠΙΣ and the Antigonids', in Walbank (ed.), *Polybius, Rome, and the Hellenistic World*, pp. 127–36 (originally published 1993).

- ²² On Polybius' concept of the *symplokê*, see F.W. Walbank, 'Symplekê: Its Role in Polybius' Histories', in F.W. Walbank (ed.), *Selected Papers in Greek and Roman History and Historiography* (Cambridge 1985), pp. 313–25 (originally published 1975).
- ²³ See the discussion in Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy*, pp. 79–117.
- ²⁴ On the political implications of the Antigonid claim of descent from Philip and Alexander, see Walbank, 'H ΤΩΝ ΟΛΩΝ ΕΛΠΙΣ', pp. 127–8, with p. 128 on the implications of Alcaeus' poem.
- ²⁵ Hieronymus of Syracuse made the same decision to side with Carthage at the same time and for the same reasons (Polyb. 7.3). Of course, both kings turned out to be wrong.
- ²⁶ Capture of the envoy: Livy 23.38.7; cf. 34.9. The Punicisms in Polybius' version attest to its authenticity: see E.J. Bickerman, 'Hannibal's Covenant', *AJP* 73 (1952), pp. 1–23 and M.L. Barré, *The God List in the Treaty between Hannibal and Philip V of Macedon* (Baltimore 1983).
- ²⁷ On the differences between the Roman traditions and Polybius, see N. Mantel, 'Der Bündnisvertrag Hannibals mit Philipp V. von Makedonien: Anmerkungen zur Verknüpfung des zw. Makedonischen Krieges mit dem zw. Punischen Krieg bei Livius', in C. Schubert, K. Brodersen, and U. Huttner (eds.), *Rom und der griechischen Osten, Festschrift H.H. Schmitt* (Stuttgart 1995), pp. 175–80.
- ²⁸ See J. Seibert, 'Invasion aus dem Osten: Trauma, Propaganda, oder Erfindung der Römer?', in C. Schubert, K. Brodersen, and U. Huttner (eds.), *Rom und der griechischen Osten, Festschrift H.H. Schmitt* (Stuttgart 1995), p. 240.
- ²⁹ See Livy 23.38.8–9. For the importance of the Roman military preparations in the Adriatic for our understanding of Roman anxieties after 215, see Seibert, 'Invasion aus dem Osten', pp. 239–41.
- ³⁰ See the comments of Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*, p. 56 n. 4.
- ³¹ Livy 24.40.5 says that Laevinus acted because the Adriatic

towns threatened by Philip would be good bases for an attack on Italy.

³² See Appian 9.1 and Livy 24.40.1, with Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, p. 395.

³³ For the extent of Philip's conquests in Illyria in 213–212, and numismatic evidence showing Philip's building of a war-fleet at Lissus, see Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, pp. 398–9 and 409–10.

³⁴ On the grim situation facing Rome in southern Italy and Sicily in this period, see J.F. Lazenby, 'Was Maharbal Right?', in T.J. Cornell, B. Rankov, and P. Sabin, (eds.), *The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal* (London 1996), pp. 43–4. Philip's reputation as a gambler: see J.W. Rich, 'Roman Aims in the First Macedonian War', *PCPS* 210 (1984), pp. 129–30.

³⁵ Livy 25.32.8-9, with Rich, 'Roman Aims in the First Macedonian War', p. 130, who argues that the story is authentic.

³⁶ On the terms of the Roman-Aetolian alliance, see Schmitt, *Staatsverträge des Altertums* 3, pp. 258–66.

³⁷ See especially Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, p. 390.

³⁸ See Polybius 9.30.8-9, with Rich, 'Roman Aims in the First Macedonian War', p. 145.

³⁹ On the course of the war, see conveniently J.F. Lazenby, *Hannibal's War* (Warminster 1978), pp. 157–92.

⁴⁰ Despite Harris, *War and Imperialism*, pp. 207–9, Rich, 'Roman Aims in the First Macedonian War', p. 151, Errington, 'Rome and Greece', p. 106, and P.S. Derow, 'The Arrival of Rome: From the Illyrian Wars to the Fall of Macedon', in A. Erskine, (ed.), *A Companion to the Hellenistic World* (Oxford 2003), p. 58.

⁴¹ See A.E. Astin, 'Politics and Policies in the Roman Republic', inaugural lecture, Queen's University, Belfast (1968) and A.M. Eckstein, *Senate and General: Individual Decision Making and Roman Foreign Relations, 264–194 B.C.* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1987),

especially pp. xix-xxi and 319–24.

⁴² On the sincerity of the Peace of 205, see Holleaux, *Rome, la Grèce*, pp. 286–97; cf. F.W. Walbank, *Philip V of Macedon* (Cambridge 1940), p. 105.

⁴³ On the anti-Roman tone of Rhodian policy during the First Macedonian War, see A.M. Eckstein, ‘Greek Mediation in the First Macedonian War (209–205 B.C.)’, *Historia* 52 (2002), pp. 268–97.

⁴⁴ See S. Ager, ‘An Uneasy Balance: From the Death of Seleukos to the Battle of Raphia’, in A. Erskine, (ed.), *A Companion to the Hellenistic World* (Oxford 2003), pp. 35–50 against E. Klose, *Die völkerrechtliche Ordnung der hellenistischen Staatenwelt in der Zeit von 289–168 v. Chr.* (Munich 1982).

⁴⁵ On the great Egyptian Revolt, see A.-E. Veisse, *Les ‘révoltes égyptiennes’: Recherches sur les troubles intérieurs en Egypte du règne de Ptolémée III à la conquête romaine* (Paris 2004). On the riots in Alexandria, see P.F. Mittag, ‘Unruhen im hellenistischen Alexandria’, *Historia* 52 (2003), pp. 161–208.

⁴⁶ Formal treaty: see Polybius 16.1.8–9; cf. 24.6. Doubts: see especially R.M. Errington, ‘The Alleged Syro-Macedonian Pact and the Origins of the Second Macedonian War’, *Athenaeum* 49 (1971), pp. 336–54 and ‘Antiochos III., Zeuxis und Euromus’, *Ep. Anat.* 8 (1986), p. 8 n. 5.

⁴⁷ See B. Dreyer, ‘Der “Raubvertrag” des Jahres 203/2 v. Chr.: Das Inschriftenfragment von Bargylia und der Brief von Amyzon’, *Ep. Anat.* 34 (2003), pp. 119–38 and the detailed discussion in Eckstein, *Rome Enters the Greek East*, pp. 121–80.

⁴⁸ On this passage, see H.H. Schmitt, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Antiochos’ des Grossen und seiner Zeit* (Wiesbaden 1964), p. 240.

⁴⁹ On Pergamene-Rhodian rivalry and their unexpected alliance, see Eckstein, *Rome Enters the Greek East*, pp. 195–8.

⁵⁰ Discussion in Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy*, pp. 257–88 and *Rome Enters the Greek East*, pp. 230–70; cf. B. Dreyer, *Die römische Nobilitätsherrschaft und Antiochos III (205 bis 188 v. Chr.)* (Hennef

2007), pp. 101–19.

⁵¹ See Polybius 15.20.5-6, with A.M. Eckstein, ‘The Pact between the Kings, Polybius 15.20.6, and Polybius’ View of the Outbreak of the Second Macedonian War’, *CP* 100 (2005), pp. 228–42.

⁵² On the *auctoritas* of the Senate, see R. Morstein-Marx, *Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic* (Cambridge. 2004), pp. 160–203.

⁵³ See Livy 31.6-7; on the historicity of Galba’s speech, see J.M. Quillin, ‘Information and Empire: Domestic Fear Propaganda in Republican Rome, 200–149 B.C.E.’, *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 160 (2004), pp. 765–85.

⁵⁴ On the theory of ‘preventive’ war, see R. Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge 1981).

⁵⁵ For the scene, see Polybius 16.30-34 and Livy 31.16-19 (summer 200). In 196, Antiochus in fact led his war fleet to Alexandria to seize Egypt, but turned back when he learned that Ptolemy V was still alive.

⁵⁶ Detailed discussion in Eckstein, *Rome Enters the Greek East*, pp. 308–41.

⁵⁷ See T. Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte* 1⁹ (Berlin 1903), p. 721. Note that by 195 Antiochus also had Hannibal as a personal military advisor.

⁵⁸ For recent discussions, see J.D. Grainger, *The Roman War of Antiochos the Great* (Leiden 2002) and Dreyer, *Römische Nobilitätsherrschaft und Antiochos III*, pp. 203–38.

⁵⁹ On Antiochus’ invasion, see Eckstein, *Rome Enters the Greek East*, pp. 322–9.

⁶⁰ On this, see Walbank, *Philip V*, p. 198.

⁶¹ On Philip’s victories, see Walbank, *Philip V*, pp. 200–17.

⁶² The best discussion of the Rhodian incident (of 177) is E.S. Gruen, ‘Rome and Rhodes in the Second Century B.C.: A

Historiographical Inquiry', *CQ*² 25 (1975), pp. 58–81. On the territorial rewards to Macedonia, E.S. Gruen, 'The Last Years of Philip V', *GRBS* 15 (1974), p. 228, presents too sunny a picture, but Walbank, *Philip V*, p. 232, is too grim.

⁶³ Another suspect parallel was with Carthage: Polybius 3.10-12 asserted that the war against Rome carried out by Hannibal had actually been planned by *his* father Hamilcar.

⁶⁴ In fact, by 171 both towns were back under Macedonian control: see the discussion in E.V. Hansen, *The Attalids of Pergamum*² (Ithaca 1971), p. 107.

⁶⁵ The new gold mines: see Livy 39.24.2, with Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, pp. 460–1 (old mines were reopened as well) and pp. 462–4 for the splendid new issue of gold and silver coinage. Philip also engaged in large endeavors to revitalize Demetrias economically: see Walbank, *Philip V*, pp. 229–30.

⁶⁶ On Philip's last years, which Polybius presents darkly, see F.W. Walbank, 'ΦΙΛΙΠΠΟΣ ΤΡΑΓΩΙΔΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ: A Polybian Experiment', *JHS* 58 (1938), pp. 55–68 and Gruen, 'Last Years', pp. 221–46. Too much can be made of Demetrius' ties at Rome in order to fit his death into the larger conflict, when we may be looking only at some particularly vicious Macedonian court politics, including jealousy of Demetrius by Philip's competent elder son Perseus.

⁶⁷ Abrupolis had friendly relations with Rome but no complaint was made at the time (Appian 9.11.2). Byzantium: Livy 42.13.8, 40.6, 42.4, Appian 9.11.1 and 7.

⁶⁸ See Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, p. 497.

⁶⁹ Cf. also Plut., *Aemilius Paullus* 7.3 and 13.3; cf. Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, pp. 494–5.

⁷⁰ On Macedonian numbers, see Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, pp. 484 and 541, and p. 515 for larger than Philip V's army. Since Alexander crossed into Asia with some 37,000 soldiers, Perseus' army was in fact (despite Livy) larger than Alexander's army as well as that of Philip V.

71 Livy 42.13–9, with Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, p. 494.

72 Indeed, aside from the courtesy call in 179 renewing *amicitia*, no Roman embassy visited Macedonia in the 10 years between 183 and 173.

73 P.S. Derow, ‘Rome, the Fall of Macedon, and the Sack of Corinth’, in *CAH*² 8 (Cambridge 1989), p. 301 and Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, pp. 497 and 501.

74 On the independent and expansionist career of Ptolemy VI, who died from wounds received in a cavalry charge in 146 as he was attempting to conquer Seleucid Syria, see A. Lampela, *Rome and the Ptolemies of Egypt: The Development of Their Political Relations, 273–80 B.C.* (Helsinki 1998), pp. 148–95.

75 Harris, *War and Imperialism*, pp. 227–33, Derow, ‘Arrival of Rome’, pp. 67–8; cf. Errington, *History of Macedonia*, pp. 214–15.

76 In actuality, the Bastarnae were to be employed on Macedonia’s northwest frontier against Macedonia’s old enemies the Dardanians: see Hammond and Walbank, *A History of Macedonia* 3, pp. 495–6.

77 Livy 42.13; cf. Appian 9.11.2. Eumenes’ speech in Livy clearly derives from Polybian material: see H. Nissen, *Kritische Untersuchungen über die Quellen der vierten und funften Dekade des Livius* (Berlin 1863), p. 245. For the complaint in 180 by the Achaean politician Callicrates, see Polybius 24.10.9–15.

78 Polyb. 27.7.5–6, Livy 42.6.3, 11–14, Diod. 29.34, Appian 9.11.1–3.

79 On the assassination attempt, see Hansen, *Attalids*, pp. 110–11. Polybius 22.18.8 calls the assassination attempt ‘the actual beginning (*arché*) of the war’.

80 For the lack of Roman bases in Greece, and potential Roman strategic vulnerability should Perseus seize the Illyrian coast, see Hammond and Walbank, *A History of Macedonia* 3, p. 506.

81 See Gruen, *Coming of Rome*, p. 411.

⁸² See evidence and discussion in Hammond and Walbank, *A History of Macedonia* 3, p. 503

⁸³ C. Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* (Ithaca 2006), pp. 152–3; cf. also K.N. Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, *Int. Sec.* 25 (2000), p. 29.

⁸⁴ See Livy 42.40–43 and 47 (from Polybian material); cf. Appian 9.11.5–8.

⁸⁵ On Polybian derivation, see Nissen, *Kritische Untersuchungen*, p. 250, J. Briscoe, ‘Quintus Marcius Philippus and *Nova Sapientia*’, *JRS* 54 (1964), p. 68 and n. 32, F.W. Walbank, ‘Polybius between Greece and Rome’, *Polybe, Entretiens Fondation Hardt* 20 (1974), pp. 10–11 and 23, and E. Gabba, ‘Aspetti culturali dell’imperialismo romano’, *Athenaeum* n.s. 55 (1977), p. 68.

⁸⁶ Livy 42.47.7: *haec seniores, quibus nova ac nimis callida minus placebat sapientia*.

⁸⁷ On Polybius’s friendship with Cato, see A.M. Eckstein, ‘Physis and Nomos: Polybius, Rome, and Cato the Elder’, in P. Cartledge, P. Garnsey, and E.S. Gruen (eds.), *Hellenistic Constructs* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1997), pp. 192–8. Cato was also suspicious of Eumenes’ claims against Perseus, remarking that ‘kings are carnivorous animals’: Plut., *Cato the Elder* 8.

⁸⁸ Cato himself was a veteran both of the Hannibalic War and the war with Antiochus.

⁸⁹ See Cato’s speech of 167, defending recent Rhodian lack of support for Rome: Gellius 6.1.3.

⁹⁰ Polyb. 29.17, Plut., *Aemilius Paullus* 19.2; cf. Livy 44.41.6.

⁹¹ For other Roman atrocities, see Livy 42.44.4, 67.7, 9, 43.4.11.

⁹² Polyb. 25.15.14, Livy 42.60.9, Appian 9.9.12.

⁹³ Livy 43.4.8–13, Diod. 30.6, with R.B. McShane, *The Foreign Policy of the Attalids of Pergamum* (Urbana 1964), p.180 and n. 10. Eumenes may have wanted Abdera for himself, which is why he strove to retain it undamaged, so B. Niese *Geschichte der*

griechischen und makedonischen Staaten seit der Schlacht von Chaeroneia 3 (Gotha 1903), pp. 129–30 n. 7.

⁹⁴ Livy 43.4.8–10, 7.5–11, Diod. 30.6.

⁹⁵ Polybius 27.15.14–16, with J.-L. Ferrary, *Philhellénisme et impérialisme: Aspects idéologiques de la conquête romaine du monde hellénistique* (Rome 1988), pp. 175–6 and Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, pp. 518–20.

⁹⁶ Discussion and sources in Eckstein, *Moral Vision*, pp. 6–7.

⁹⁷ This is why Polybius places the formation of the Roman *arché* (rule in the east) in 168: see, for example, Polybius 1.1.5; for Cato's opinion, see Gellius 6.1.3.

⁹⁸ On the unprecedented nature of the senatorial decision, see E.S. Gruen, 'Macedonia and the Settlement of 167 B.C', in W.L. Adams and E.N. Borza (eds.), *Philip II, Alexander the Great, and the Macedonian Heritage* (Lanham 1982), p. 258.

⁹⁹ See the comments of Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, p. 566.

¹⁰⁰ Livy 45.40.6, Diod. 31.9, Plut., *Aemilius Paullus* 33.3–34.2, 37.1–2. Perseus' ally Genthius of Illyria suffered a similar humiliating fate, on which see Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, p. 563.

¹⁰¹ Discussion in Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, p. 564.

¹⁰² Discussion and sources of all these Roman decisions in Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, pp. 564–7. Gruen, *Coming of Rome*, p. 428 n. 169, doubts the imposition of annual tribute, but see Ferrary, *Philhellénisme et impérialisme*, p. 179 n. 194, D. Baronowski, 'The Provincial Status of Mainland Greece after 146 B.C.', *Klio* 70 (1988), p. 460 (appendix 1) and R. Kallet-Marx, *Hegemony to Empire: The Development of the Roman Imperium in the East from 148 to 62 B.C.* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1995), pp. 13–14.

¹⁰³ Livy 45.18.2; cf. also Livy 45.50.1–2, Diod. 31.8.2 and 4.

- 104 Cf. F.W. Walbank, 'Polybius' Last Ten Books', in F.W. Walbank (ed.), *Selected Papers in Greek and Roman History and Historiography* (Cambridge 1985), pp. 325–43 (originally published 1977).
- 105 On its way home, the Roman army ransacked Epirus and sold most of the population into slavery, one of the worst of all Roman atrocities. Much of Epirus had sided with Perseus. See further, Gruen, *Coming of Rome*, pp. 516–17.
- 106 The overall peacefulness of Greece in this period stands in stark contrast to the constant warfare among states that characterized the third and early second centuries; the Romans were brutal, but they brought the *pax Romana*. On the importance of its early onset, see T.J. Cornell, 'The End of Roman Imperial Expansion', in J. Rich and G. Shipley (eds.), *War and Society in the Roman World* (London 1993), pp. 139–70.
- 107 Gruen, *Coming of Rome*, p. 432, doubts there was much anti-Roman feeling, but see B. McGing, 'Subjection and Resistance', in A. Erskine (ed.), *A Companion to the Hellenistic World* (Oxford 2003), p. 78.
- 108 On Andrisus' background and rise to power, see Gruen, *Coming of Rome*, pp. 431–2.
- 109 On Scipio's career, see T.R.S. Broughton, *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic* 1 (New York 1951), pp. 441–2 and 448.
- 110 Zonaras 9.28; cf. Livy, *Periochae* of book 50.
- 111 Sources in Broughton, *Magistrates* 1, p. 458.
- 112 See the comments of F.W. Walbank *A Historical Commentary on Polybius* 3 (Oxford 1979), p. 680.
- 113 Cf. Gruen, *Coming of Rome*, p. 433.
- 114 On these two separate rebellions, see M.G. Morgan, 'Metellus Macedonicus and the Province Macedonia', *Historia* 18 (1969), pp. 430–1.
- 115 Cf. Kallet-Marx, *Hegemony to Empire*, p. 30.

116 Good discussion in Kallet-Marx, *Hegemony to Empire*, pp. 12–18.

117 Kallet-M arx, *Hegemony to Empire*, p. 14 and n. 20. On local self-government, see SIG³ 700, with R.K. Sherck (ed.), *Translated Documents of Greece and Rome 4, Rome and the Greek East to the Death of Augustus* (Cambridge 1984), pp. 51–3.

118 Kallet-M arx, *Hegemony to Empire*, pp. 19–20.

119 As we see in the case of the appeal of the Athenian Guild of Dionysian Artists (that is, theater people) to the Roman commander in Macedonia to mediate their dispute with their rivals in Corinth in about 118: *Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae* 437; cf. R. Sherck, *Roman Documents from the Greek East: Senatus Consulta and Epistulae to the Age of Augustus* (Baltimore 1969), pp. 88–93.

120 That the internal cultures of states are very strongly influenced by the environments in which they operate is an obvious point made by political scientists: see P. Gourevitch, ‘The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics’, *Int. Org.* 32 (1978), pp. 881–911 and R. Jervis, ‘Variation, Change, and Transitions in International Politics’, *Rev. Int. Studies* 27 (2001), pp. 281–95.

121 On interstate relations under anarchic conditions as inherently tragic, see M. Spirtas, ‘A House Divided: Tragedy and Evil in Realist Theory’, in B. Frankel (ed.), *Realism: Restatements and Renewal* (Portland 1996), pp. 385–423.

122 For this principle of international relations, see R. Hyam, ‘The Primacy of Geopolitics: The Dynamics of British Imperial Policy’, in R.D. King and R.W. Wilson (eds.), *The Statecraft of British Imperialism: Essays in Honour of Wm. Roger Louis* (London 1999), pp. 27–52 or D.B. Abernethy, *The Dynamics of Global Dominance* (New Haven 2000).

Provincia Macedonia

John Vanderspoel

1 Introduction

As the previous chapter has shown, the Roman history of Macedonia began well before the creation of the province. That is typical of the Romans who often created provinces some years after their initial conquest of territory. The key factor was whether a region might voluntarily comply with Roman interests or whether a consular (or pro-consular) army was necessary to maintain stability and control.¹ Thus, the Roman victory over Perseus at Pydna in 168 did not result in the immediate creation of a province by L. Aemilius Paullus. Instead, Macedonia was divided into four parts (*merides*) and was allowed to govern itself on the presumption that victory and subsequent generosity had ensured compliance. That was not to be.² About 149 (while Rome was preoccupied by the third Punic war), Philip Andriscus raised nationalistic hopes and an army. His strength, military and emotional, is difficult to gauge.³ Though he gained control of Macedonia and invaded Thessaly, many Macedonians opposed him from fear of a Roman reprisal, perhaps, or simply from preference for peace and the benefits of cooperation. Initially Rome responded with diplomacy, sending P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, who recognized the need for military forces and collected what he could from the Achaeans, while appealing to Rome for a stiffer response than diplomacy could provide. The praetor P. Iuventius Thalna arrived in Macedonia in 148 but was defeated and killed in battle; the army survived by slipping away to Thessaly at night. Rome responded with greater vigour, sending out, with a larger army and proconsular authority,⁴ the praetor Q. Caecilius Metellus. He defeated Andriscus near Pydna, still in 148, and established direct permanent Roman control of Macedonia. Metellus remained for some time and after his

return to Rome, probably in 146, was granted a triumph and given the cognomen Macedonicus. In passing, it should be noted that the creation of the *provincia* is often linked to the destruction of Corinth in 146, but evidence for dating by provincial, or ‘Macedonian’, era reveals that it came into being in 148.⁵

For the first century and a half of the provincial period Macedonia was the most important area for Rome’s military interests in the region. Subsequently, its role as a military buttress against the north declined because it created new provinces between Macedonia and the Danube; the concentrations of fighting forces were now headquartered in Dalmatia, Moesia and Thrace. Nevertheless, Macedonia remained important and, especially during the second century AD, its cities prospered under the peace of the Antonine period. Afflicted, as much of the empire was, by the third-century crisis, Macedonia re-emerged later in the century as a more important region than it had been for some time. The emperor Galerius’ choice of Thessaloniki as his imperial residence was partly responsible for the renewed prominence, and other emperors (for example Theodosius) maintained winter quarters at Thessaloniki when fighting Goths and others on the Danubian frontier. By then, however, the redivision of provinces under Diocletian and Constantine had changed the geographic unity of the Macedonia that the Romans had known for about 450 years.

2 Sources

As is true for most times and places in antiquity, the sources for Roman Macedonia are varied and variable. Given the emphasis by ancient historians on political and military activities, ancient historical treatments of Roman Macedonia are less available than modern historians would like, for the simple reason that Macedonia lost much of its military significance with the creation of new provinces. The literary and epigraphic source material has been treated by P.J. Rhodes in chapter 2, but some further mention pertinent to this chapter is needed here. More importantly, the most detailed treatment of even the early period has not survived: Livy wrote a history of Rome from Aeneas to Octavian (Augustus) but much of his work does not survive in full. Though the earliest interaction between Rome and Macedonia occurs in an extant portion of Livy’s work, the events surrounding the creation of the province survive only in brief summaries of the books that covered the period. Polybius treated the expansion of Rome in the Mediterranean but only fragments of the portion relevant to this chapter survive; in any case, he ended his

history at 146. Naturally, Macedonia appears in the works of other writers. Most often, these statements are remarks in the context of other topics, not extended treatments of Macedonia. Appian provides an illustrative example. His account of the civil wars of the late Roman Republic discusses Macedonia, since some major events took place in the province, but he does not give a full account of Macedonia even for this period.

That being so, the most important ancient evidence for Roman Macedonia lies in hundreds of inscriptions and the archaeological remains scattered all over the Macedonian landscape. Though Roman remains are often easily accessible in the major cities, that is not always the case elsewhere. Almost inevitably, even at major sites, modern cities and towns are built over, occasionally around, the ancient remains, and frequently building materials were 'borrowed' from ancient sites for newer constructions; both processes began already in antiquity. What tends to survive is the monumental architecture, that is, the public, governmental face of Roman Macedonia, along with some evidence for other aspects of public life. At both Thessaloniki and Philippi, for example, may be found a forum, a market, a theatre, baths, and a basilica or two. Sometimes, their preservation is the result of transformation into Christian places of worship;⁶ by the time these collapsed, a city had built itself around the ancient buildings⁷ and little further demolition (except for the use of building material and the ravages of time) occurred. Far less evident archaeologically is the private life of a city's inhabitants: few residential areas are visible to the modern viewer, because they have been built over and cannot be excavated. The situation is worse outside major cities and towns; most smaller villages had little in the way of Roman public architecture, and farmsteads and similar inhabitations have rarely been a main focus of archaeological investigation.

Inscriptions reside in a great number of museums in Greece and elsewhere but they have not been gathered into a single published collection for Macedonia. At archaeological sites it is not uncommon for inscriptions, or parts of them, to be lying about rather casually; without a geographically extensive and time-consuming study comparing these to the material available in a multitude of publications, it would be impossible to ensure that all the important inscriptions for Roman Macedonia have been considered. The process of collecting the entire corpus of Greek inscriptions, and Latin ones as well, is ongoing; new material appears regularly enough to require constant vigilance to ensure that all important documents have been considered. Most inscriptions concern a specific person or event. Sometimes an inscription will record a judicial or jurisdictional

decision of a proconsul or the Senate or an emperor. Inscriptions might pay tribute to the benevolence of Rome or one of its representatives or record the nature and outcome of embassies and other representations to Rome or its agents. Since inscriptions are regularly dated, at times it is possible to gain some understanding of changes in laws and regulations over time or to see developments in other areas. The career inscription of a soldier or, more usually, an officer might refer to a campaign that is not known, or poorly known, from other evidence. Inevitably, politics, mainly the relationship with Rome, and the activities of the wealthier citizens predominate. The lives of 'ordinary' citizens are usually lost except in the most general terms.

Some preoccupations of the inhabitants of Macedonia during the Roman period may be determined from numismatic evidence. In the eastern part of its empire, Rome usually permitted its subjects to continue to produce local coinage in bronze and, at times, in silver. These local coinages were typically, though not exclusively, produced by cities: in the early period of Roman Macedonia, for example, the *merides* might issue coinages, and some Roman magistrates also minted coins during the republican period. After the middle of the third century AD the imperial administration took control over the production of coinage throughout the empire; naturally, local coinage ceased to exist from that point forward. Local coinages usually, but not always, portrayed the current Roman emperor (in the imperial period) while reverses might depict local foundation rituals, local games and native deities, as cities celebrated their own heritages or Roman deities and Roman themes.⁸ Different cities in the same period and individual cities at different times created too wide a variety of reverses to summarize succinctly here, but the remark that these local coinages reflect local attitudes to themselves and to Rome is safe enough. Naturally, the attitudes are those of the local elites who governed the cities, and the persistence of reverses that depicted local cults (for example) strengthens the conclusion that can also be drawn from archaeological and literary evidence, that local identity continued to be an important part of the Macedonian perspective under Roman rule. Almost certainly, however, the non-elites in the cities shared these attitudes and preoccupations, in regard to Rome, to religion and to local pride.

Thus, the combined evidence from antiquity offers much information about Roman Macedonia. Even if individual dates and sequences are not always entirely secure, about two thirds of the proconsuls of Macedonia during its first century and a half as a province can be identified by name and many can be dated accurately. Given the political climate in republican Rome, where trials for

extortion and other misbehaviour in the provinces were regular occurrences, some information about the activities of proconsuls appears in the evidence for these trials and information about the province inevitably occurs in the accounts of other significant events. Even if specific evidence concerns specific events sometimes the information can be applied more broadly. But the history of Roman Macedonia that can be written is generally the history of the main players on the larger stage.

3 The Creation of the Province

By 148 Rome had already had some experience with the transformation of regions outside the Italian peninsula into provinces. Though it had been about half a century since the last such reorganization (Spain in the 190s), senatorial familiarity with the phenomenon of provincial government provided a backdrop for the creation of the *provincia Macedonia* in 148. Most details of the process, and the reasons for the decision to maintain a permanent Roman presence, are obscure. No evidence now extant indicates whether Metellus, not even of consular status,⁹ had the benefit of a senatorial commission to assist him or whether a law or senatorial resolution defined a new province before his departure or after his return.¹⁰ Some writers do mention his impact, most typically by remarking that he reduced Macedonia to 'slavery' or imposed tribute. Other sources suggest that Macedonia had paid tribute since 167 and that the loss of independence from 148 was merely a restoration of a loss of liberty that had existed since 167, with a brief respite under Philip Andriscus. Since the *merides* ('parts') continued to exist after 148 Rome probably had no intention of making significant changes to the structure of Macedonia, a perspective that may partly explain the choice of a praetor for the task. Rome's preoccupation with Carthage is another reason: consuls and consular proconsuls were otherwise engaged. Yet the decision to send Metellus as a praetorian proconsul was not necessarily a response merely to Andriscus' threat to Macedonia and Thessaly: though he had defeated Iuventius Thalna and was threatening Thessaly, Rome might have chosen to regard this as an internal squabble and defer its resolution until the war with Carthage had ended.

But Rome may not have found that possibility a reassuring thought: during the second Punic war Philip V of Macedonia had cooperated with Hannibal. With this in mind, and given Andriscus' initial success, it can be suggested that Metellus' mandate was not

primarily to eliminate the threat of Andriscus to Macedonia and Thessaly, but to ensure that neither he nor the Macedonians could render assistance to Carthage: on that view, it hardly matters whether the threat was real or imagined. Rome's increasing response, from diplomat to praetor to proconsul, perhaps reveals more than anything else a fear of Macedonian intervention in the conflict with Carthage that increased with Andriscus' successes. It may not be coincidental that Metellus returned to Rome and was granted a triumph in (probably) 146: the war with Carthage had ended, he had done his job well, and his services were no longer required. A new commander was sent to Macedonia while L. Mummius arrived in Achaea to complete the punishment of the Achaeans and Corinth, a task that Metellus had begun but was not permitted to see to its conclusion.

These remarks raise a different question: if Metellus' primary task was to ensure that Macedonia did not interfere in Rome's conflict with Carthage, why did Rome maintain a permanent presence in Macedonia¹¹ after 146 when both Carthage and Corinth had been thoroughly defeated? And, perhaps more intriguingly, why did Achaea not become a province in 146¹² when Africa became Rome's sixth province after its defeat of Carthage? Here a curious coincidence may be noted: all of Rome's first territorial acquisitions occurred as a consequence of its Punic wars. Rome annexed Sicily, as well as Sardinia and Corsica,¹³ between the first two Punic wars; both had been Carthaginian strongholds before the first Punic war and were points of contention (with Roman forces occasionally deployed to them) during the conflict. Sicily was taken first and supervised initially by quaestors, but it and Sardinia and Corsica were governed by proconsuls from 227 and became Rome's first two provinces from that point. During the second Punic war, Rome sent commanders and forces to Spain to prevent it from supplying men and materials to Carthage and to Hannibal's forces in Italy; afterwards, the Roman presence remained, and within a few years Spain became two provinces, most often governed by praetors or praetorian proconsuls.¹⁴ As noted, Philip V had intervened in the second Punic war on the side of Carthage and Rome had had to divert some forces to deal with that threat in the first of a series of Macedonian wars that ended at Pydna (twice).¹⁵ Though Rome was content to leave the region largely to itself the rise of Philip Andriscus posed the real or imagined danger of Macedonian assistance to Carthage; Rome established a presence in response and chose to stay permanently, as it had done in Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica, and Spain, and was soon to do in Africa. By contrast, though it had been a thorn in Rome's side as often as Macedonia, though in a different manner, Achaea never provided any assistance to Carthage; consequently, it retained at least

nominal independence until its support for Mithridates VI in the 80s induced Rome to react strongly. Even then, Sulla restored Achaea to its pre-Mithridatic state; though the Romans perhaps kept a more watchful eye, Achaea did not become a *provincia* except on rare occasions, one of them about 81.¹⁶ Only when Augustus engaged in an extensive reorganization of Rome's territory in 27 was Achaea transformed into a province.

History, of course, is never quite as simple as the interpretation above might seem to imply. Given the destruction of Carthage, Rome could hardly have worried about a threat from Macedonia in a potential future conflict in Africa. The situation thus differs from the dangers posed by Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica, and Spain at earlier periods and further explanation is necessary. The usual view is that the military situation in Macedonia generated a desire for a continued Roman presence.¹⁷ On the view that Rome and Macedonia were allies from at least 168, it was reasonable for Rome to offer its forces as a bulwark against invasions from the north, which had been a problem previously and remained an intermittent threat for some time. The Thracians had given support and supplied forces to Philip Andriscus; a campaign as punishment for their presumption in attacking a Roman ally was not out of the question. Similarly, the Scordisci¹⁸ and others had taken advantage of the instability within Macedonia to engage in plunder and a Roman response was, if not inevitable, at least likely; indeed, Metellus deployed his forces to the north between the death of Philip Andriscus and his actions against the Corinthians in 146. As will become evident, the Scordisci became a regular preoccupation: they managed on several occasions to defeat Roman forces and even to kill their commanders. Other groups from the north and the Thracians from the east also at times attempted to acquire Macedonian territory, or to interfere in Macedonia, or perhaps merely to accumulate plunder.

Yet, the military explanation for continued Roman presence in Macedonia does not tell the full story, for that view depends entirely on a prior decision to stay. If Rome had chosen to stay primarily to ensure the security of Macedonia, it might have withdrawn once its punitive expeditions against the north and east had reached a satisfactory conclusion, returning only when its Macedonian ally was again under threat. It did not, and, to make a long story short, Rome decided to stay because it wanted to for one or more of several reasons. In the first place, Rome had already acquired four provinces and had become accustomed to territorial expansion outside the Italian peninsula. Second, the Macedonians had not been able on their own to oppose Philip Andriscus and various groups that attempted to capitalize. That was partly Rome's fault since the provisions of the

settlement after the Battle of Pydna restricted the Macedonians from raising a significant army even for its own defence. Third, and this should not be discounted (but is not to be over-emphasized either), aristocratic competition within the Roman nobility inevitably required new theatres of military operations so that praetors could distinguish themselves enough to win the consulship or a triumph; consuls who fought enemies would hope to achieve enough to win glory and triumphs. Since a triumph depended on a minimum body count of 5,000 enemy dead, old enemies would eventually fail to offer sufficient opportunities and new enemies were constantly required to satisfy not so much a lust for blood as a thirst for the glory of a triumph.¹⁹ Rome's commercial interests provide a fourth reason, as equestrian entrepreneurs and their senatorial backers sought new opportunities for gain by supplying additional military forces outside Italy and by raking new territories for the profits to be gained from tax contracts. Whatever combination of these reasons (and there may be more) represents the impetus for Rome's decision to stay permanently, that decision is symbolized nowhere more obviously than by the construction of the Via Egnatia (see below): Rome would not have mandated Cn. Egnatius to build a long and expensive road unless it intended to stay.

Given the decision to stay, Rome now faced the issue of the *provincia's* borders. Much has been written about these boundaries and attempts have been made to delineate them as precisely as possible.²⁰ The question is not as relevant as the preoccupations of modern scholars might suggest. Macedonia was a recognized territory and had been one for a long time. The Macedonians and their neighbours, and Rome too, knew what was Macedonia and what was not. More importantly, from the Roman perspective their Macedonia was at this point still the *provincia* of a magistrate with *imperium*. Since magistrates were mandated to keep their *provinciae* secure they might legitimately, and often did, cross the nominal territorial boundaries. Such actions were never a problem until new provinces were created outside the notional borders. To the south, the boundary was not an issue until Achaëa became a province in 27; only then was the southern territorial jurisdiction of the proconsul of Macedonia circumscribed.²¹ To the north and east, the proconsuls of Macedonia had some leeway for a longer period since the provinces of Dalmatia, Moesia were not created until a generation later and Thrace later still. In any case, even the notional borders could change: the eastern limit of the *provincia* was for a time not the traditional boundary at the river Nestos, but extended nearly to the Hebros; the creation of the province of Thrace restored the boundary to the Nestos. A further point can be made: any territorial entity was a conglomeration of

poleis and ethnic regions (where *poleis* were lacking) that owed allegiance, voluntary or compulsory, to a single authority as it was before Rome created its *provincia*. A corollary follows: boundaries shifted as *poleis* and regions shifted allegiances, or as they lost control of some of their own territory. That is true until the creation of new provinces rendered the concept of nominal borders obsolete.

Despite these remarks, a description of the notional boundaries of Macedonia will be useful²² since these were both traditional²³ and the borders of the province for a period (see map 5). In the north, the boundary at the Adriatic Sea lay just south of Lissus (modern Lezhë). From there, the border ran generally east, with northward and southward undulations to include or exclude small regions and to take account of the mountains. After crossing the river Strymon, it followed the valleys until it reached the upper portion of the river Nestos, the traditional boundary of Macedonia. Since the Roman *provincia* included the *merides* and the first *meris* included towns between the Nestos and the river Hebros, the notional boundary of the *provincia* extended nearly to the Hebros: the west bank of the river was outside the province. In the south, the western terminus of the east-west line began at the Adriatic Sea a little to the south of Aulon (modern Vlorë) and, after some excursions southward and northward to include or exclude cities and regions, touched the coast just to the south of Dium and Mount Olympus, about where the river Pinius empties into the Thermaic Gulf. This description includes the north-west portion of Thessaly that seems to have been part of the *provincia* for a time; later redistributions of territory among provinces treated all of Thessaly as a single unit, either entirely within Macedonia or as a province in its own right. To emphasize the fact that this description delineates notional boundaries, it is useful to reiterate an earlier point, this time with the words of Cicero (*Against Piso* 38): ‘for the governors of Macedonia the borders were always the same as those marked by the swords and spears’; in other words, the ability (or inability) of governors to control territory militarily created the borders. In practice, however, that remark applies more to the northern and eastern borders than to the southern.

4 The Province in the Republican Period

Once Rome decided to retain Macedonia as a *provincia* it was obliged to maintain its security, both internal and external. That task was not easy: the activities of groups from the north and east provided the

Roman proconsuls with opportunities for triumphs but also on occasion engendered the ignominy of a serious defeat and death in battle. During the first period of Roman occupation, the most truculent enemy was the Scordisci, a Gallic people who caused problems regularly.²⁴ Indeed, they invaded Macedonia during the instability caused by Philip Andriscus, and Metellus found it necessary to drive them out. His compatriots were not always as successful. Partly because the names of proconsuls do not survive in their entirety,²⁵ partly because detailed sources are lacking, and partly because Rome's attention was sometimes diverted elsewhere, the evidence for specific campaigns is often sparse. What follows is a brief survey of the most important campaigns and other significant events from the inception of the province to the time of the late republican civil wars. The province hardly experienced complete peace between major campaigns since most proconsuls did not devote their entire attention to the judicial activities and civil administration that were part of their duties. Some proconsuls went on the offensive if only in the hope of a triumph; others fought defensive campaigns when the province was threatened from outside. When little or nothing was achieved, the sources do not always record their activities; it is reasonable, but not entirely valid, to suppose that all the most important campaigns are reported in the sources. Even less evident in the sources is the impact of the Roman presence on the Macedonians themselves. Given the fact that the Macedonians were not permitted to raise armies after Pydna (see above), the campaigns outlined below probably had little impact on Macedonian manpower. Presumably, Roman commanders supplemented their forces with Macedonians from time to time but no evidence suggests that this ever happened on a grand scale. They would certainly extract other resources from the native population but this was not always detrimental, for they paid for some of what they needed; even when they did not, the economic cost might well be lower than the impact of depravations of the Scordisci and others. Apart from a few individuals, Macedonians did not support any attempts, by pretenders or Mithridates, for example, to turn them against the Romans. That suggests a basic satisfaction with the Roman presence or at least a recognition that they could do little else with impunity.

During the first few years of the provincial era at least two pretenders to the Macedonian throne appeared. Claiming to be a son of Perseus (as Philip Andriscus had done), a certain Alexander collected military forces, probably Thracian for the most part, and seized territory in the area of the river Nestos. Metellus defeated him, driving him far beyond the borders, but a few years later, in 143 or 142 another pretender, a 'Pseudophilip' or 'Pseudoperseus', managed

to collect an army of considerable size, again most of it Thracian; he was defeated and killed by the quaestor Tremellus Scrofa, who was serving under the praetor Licinius Nerva. The significance of the victory is evident from Licinius' salutation as 'imperator'.²⁶ While that acclamation is a Roman response, Macedonians, including any who might generally be unhappy about Rome's presence, were probably relieved when pretenders were defeated for the simple reason that they destabilized Macedonia and exposed it to the depravations of plunderers. The latter were a problem even in times of stability and during the Roman presence. In 141 the Scordisci inflicted a defeat on the Roman forces and their commander (either P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica or D. Iunius Silanus).²⁷ Little is known about immediate consequences, but Livy recorded an avenging victory over the Scordisci in Thrace, in 135 or shortly thereafter, by the Roman commander M. Cosconius (Livy, *Periochae* 56). The tardiness of the response is a little remarkable: either the Romans could not or chose not to avenge the defeat immediately. The former is more difficult to believe and it seems likely that the Romans preferred to wait.²⁸ Presumably, governors were too busy within Macedonia to pursue the Scordisci. If that is true, one possible preoccupation was the construction of the Via Egnatia, especially if the lack of a good military road to move men and supplies quickly enough was seen as a main reason for the defeat in 141. The lack of specific evidence makes this a far from certain suggestion (see below), but attention to infrastructure that would be invaluable in responding to future invasions (or during excursions by the Romans outside the province) does explain the delayed response.

Be that as it may, the road was certainly built by the end of the 120s and was available for use in 119 when the Romans were once again forced to deal with the Scordisci. As is evident from the outcome, the presence of a new road could not on its own solve all of Rome's difficulties in the region. In the summer of 119 the Scordisci invaded the area around Argos not far from Stobi. The praetor Sextus Pompeius moved his forces to the region but was killed in battle. His quaestor M. Annius brought what reinforcements he could, defeated the Scordisci, and reassembled the remnants of Pompeius' forces; then, when the Scordisci returned soon after, with Thracian support he defeated them again.²⁹ That was not the end of the matter. Though nothing military is recorded for the next few governorships, in 114 Rome sent a consul, C. Porcius Cato, to deal with the problem of the Scordisci. His defeat was more than a little ignominious, and Rome sent three more consuls in rapid succession: C. Caecilius Metellus Caprarius (cos. 113), M. Livius Drusus (cos. 112), and M. Minucius Rufus (cos. 110), who stayed on as proconsul until 107 or 106,

presumably because the consuls for these years were diverted to the war with Jugurtha in Africa and then to the impending war with Germanic (or perhaps Celtic) tribes, the Cimbri and the Teutones, in northern Italy. While Metellus and Drusus concentrated on the Scordisci in the area of Stobi and north, Minucius Rufus fought against both the Scordisci in the north and the Bessi and other Thracians to the east. His achievements won him two equestrian statues at Delphi (with Greek and Latin texts) and an inscription at Europolis. Most likely, he visited Delphi personally; at any rate, his brother Q. Minucius offered a dedication to Apollo at Delphi.³⁰

Though consuls gave way to praetors in succession to M. Minucius Rufus, the Romans continued to engage the Thracians for the next few years. Clearly, with the threat posed by the Scordisci under control, the Romans decided to extend their province eastward beyond the river Hebros. A victory over Thracians is recorded for 104 and in 101 or 100 the praetor T. Didius claimed to have conquered the Caenian Chersonese³¹; he earned a triumph for his achievements. His successor was required by a law (the *lex de Cilicia Macedoniae provinciarum*) to spend no less than two months of his tenure in the Caenian Chersonese to ensure that Rome's friends and allies were not threatened by invasion and to supervise the collection of tax revenues. Presumably, the injunction applied to subsequent proconsuls; if so, Rome had decided that the wars of expansion in this area were done and that administration of conquered territory was now the most important aspect of the governance of the *provincia Macedonia*.

Nevertheless, Rome's Macedonia (now much larger than the region as traditionally defined) was not always at peace. In 97 the Roman commander won a victory over the Thracian Maedi and Dardani;³² the Maedi in turn defeated the proconsul C. Sentius in 92; Sentius, who governed Macedonia from 93 to 87 or later, had some difficulties with Thracians under a king named Sothius in 89, though ultimately he prevailed. More significantly, the war between Rome and Mithridates, King of Pontus, affected Macedonia from 87 onwards as Mithridates' forces and those of his Thracian allies invaded the province (and even Thessaly) and eliminated Roman control over much of it. Despite Sulla's efforts after his recapture of Athens, which had sided with Mithridates, in 86 and through 85, full stability did not return to Macedonia for some time. As an example of the instability, an invasion of a combined force of Scordisci, Maedi and Dardani reached as far as Delphi at some point between 84 and 80, perhaps in 83.³³

In 81 and for some years thereafter³⁴ the *provincia Macedonia* was once again assigned to consuls, a clear indication that the region was deemed to require major military intervention as a consequence of the

Mithridatic and Thracian depredations of the 80s. By 77 the Romans were ready to begin an offensive campaign to the north as the consul Ap. Claudius Pulcher tackled the Maedi and the Dardani with some initial success. In the following year as proconsul he was less successful and died of illness. His replacement was one of the consuls for 76, C. Scribonius Curio, who arrived at the head of five legions, a massive army that he continued to lead as proconsul into 73. He managed to compel the Dardani into submission and became the first Roman commander to take his forces all the way to the Danube; he celebrated a triumph as a reward. His successor M. Terentius Varro Lucullus arrived during his consular year in 73 with, once again, five legions under his command; he continued the offensive against the Bessi and other Thracians and marched through Moesian territory to the Black Sea, taking the cities of the coast as far north as the mouth of the Danube. When he returned to Rome in 71 he too was granted a triumph.

This Roman offensive was not designed to extend Roman control to the Danube. Rather, its purpose was a show of force for two reasons. In the first place, Rome was weary of the constant incursions into its Macedonia and even into Greece, and the movements of its armies through Thrace and Moesia were a visible reminder that Rome could and would respond to attacks. Second, Mithridates was not yet dead. While he largely respected others' territory from the mid-80s through much of the 70s, he became active again in the latter part of the 70s; the Roman campaigns in Thrace and along the Black Sea coast were designed to prevent him from stirring up Moesians and Thracians against the Romans or from using a route from the Black Sea for his own armies in the inevitable clash between the two powers. Perhaps to hold the European shores of the Black Sea against Mithridates, one of the consuls for 65, L. Manlius Torquatus, was sent to Macedonia; he was replaced in 62 by C. Antonius Hybrida, a consul in 63. Macedonia had originally been assigned to Cicero, who traded with Antonius Hybrida and took Cilicia, perhaps to his good fortune. Though Mithridates committed suicide in 63, Antonius Hybrida nevertheless campaigned in the north but with little success: he was defeated by the Bastarnae and lost legionary standards.

The end of the war with Mithridates resulted in more stability in Rome's eastern empire than had been the case for some time. That did not stop the proconsuls of Macedonia from continuing their efforts against those who threatened their province and from slowly placing new territory between Macedonia and the Danube under Roman control, not always with success, as the example of Antonius Hybrida reveals. But the urgency had subsided and Macedonia was relatively quiet for a decade and a half. When it once again became the centre of

attention it was as a focal point of a conflict between two large armies. This time, however, both armies were Roman. That story will be told later, but here one further observation is worth making. The consequence of the wars in the 60 years between 120 and 60 was the creation of a very large *provincia Macedonia*. Its proconsuls now had an *imperium* that extended in the north-east from the Bosphorus to the mouth of the Danube. That *imperium* was, of course, theoretical: only the territory that any proconsul could hold or win with his spears and swords represented the actual limits of his *provincia* at any given time. The concept of boundaries was now almost completely irrelevant, even if there always remained some core territory that was acknowledged to be Macedonia.

5 The Via Egnatia

Though even the date of its construction remains obscure two remarks about the Via Egnatia may serve as starting-points for discussion. First, it was by design and intent a military road, built as a conduit for men and supplies; while its construction benefitted civilians, that happy outcome was coincidental to the road's original purpose. The second point follows from the first: the decision to build the road resulted from a perceived need for a military road, a need that was evident only after Rome's soldiers and commanders had been in Macedonia for some years. Its builder was Cn. Egnatius, whose tenure of the proconsulship cannot be dated; indeed, almost nothing is known about the man. His name survives on a couple of milestones³⁵ and in the name of the road, known from references in the sources; a new modern highway, which traverses a different route at places, also bears his name.³⁶ A number of Egnatii appear in the sources but none from the 140s to 120s can be securely identified as the proconsul who gave his name to the road. This does not rule out the possibility that he was one of those individuals, but since the list of proconsuls of Macedonia is also largely lacking for this period, the date of his magistracy and his precise identity must remain uncertain.

Despite these remarks, reasonable conjecture holds that the road was built during the 130s. It cannot have taken the Romans long to realize, through their various fortunes and misfortunes in their new *provincia*, that their ability to move men and supplies quickly through difficult terrain was a necessity that could not be ignored. It thus seems reasonable to suggest that the decision to build the road followed an occasion when Rome had not been able to move its men and equipment fast enough in a crisis. The defeat in 141 is such a

moment, and the choice not to avenge that defeat until about 135 provides a sufficient lull in the fighting to propose that Cn. Egnatius began the construction of his road during that time. Whether that is true or not, the road could hardly be finished in six years, even with crews working at different locations; presumably the more important sections were completed first. It is unlikely that Cn. Egnatius remained in Macedonia for the entire period of the road's construction but he might well have had his surveyors designate the entire route. Most, if not all, of the route was not new, since it had been used for centuries.³⁷ But when the Roman road was completed it was wider, more level across the terrain, and straighter, since the Roman engineers were fully able and willing to cut through mountains and hills. Either by building up several layers above ground or digging down and filling in several layers, the builders designed the road to offer a solid footing for soldiers and to provide smoother passage for carts, carriages and wagons; most often, it was crowned to permit efficient drainage. In and around towns and cities the road might be as wide as 6 metres, but the usual width was closer to 3 metres and sometimes less in difficult terrain.

Initially, the road extended from Dyrrhachium (modern Durrës) to Cypsela, just beyond the river Hebros. The distance given in the ancient sources varies, but falls between 514 and 591 Roman miles (*milia passuum* = 1,000 paces); Strabo, following Polybius (who was still alive when the road was built), gives a distance of 535 Roman miles (just under 800 km), marked out by mile stones.³⁸ Almost immediately, a road connected a second western terminus at Apollonia to the main Via Egnatia at some distance inland from Dyrrhachium: the sources suggest that this junction was equidistant from Dyrrhachium and Apollonia. Each terminus benefitted the Romans but their combined use resulted in the greatest benefit. Apollonia was due east of Brundisium (Brindisi) and was the shortest sailing distance from the southern terminus of the Appian Way in Italy. Though the distance was greater to Dyrrhachium, its location was further to the north nearer the areas where Roman soldiers were more often needed. On the other hand, by sending part of the fleet to each location, Roman commanders were able to reach the junction of the two roads with a larger number of men and more supplies in a shorter period of time than was possible with only a single road. On its way eastward, the Via Egnatia passed through most of the important towns and cities of Macedonia: Lychnidos, Heraclea Lyncestis, Florina, Edessa, Pella, Thessaloniki, Amphipolis, Philippi and Neapolis. Thessaloniki offered a third point of access to the sea: its harbour was no more than a few hundred metres from the Via Egnatia.³⁹ After the Romans began to send armies into Thrace more

frequently from the late second century onwards, the road was extended from Cypsela to Byzantium at the Bosporus, a further distance of slightly more than 200 Roman miles (about 300 km), along a route that ran through Perinthus. Inevitably, new Roman towns or cities refounded in Roman times appeared along the route; an obvious example is Traianoupolis, named after the emperor Trajan (AD 98–117).

Over time, resting-points and post-stations were built along the route to ensure swifter passage of official dispatches. Commercial development also occurred: inns, for example, and stables, eateries, and other establishments that catered to travellers. Despite the amenities, travel along the road was not always pleasant for civilians and probably not for soldiers either, especially in winter when the weather could be unpleasant. Bandits were a problem and civilians would need to stay off the road during military manoeuvres, either waiting them out or taking a detour. The road was not always properly maintained (thus requiring imperial attention from time to time), since landowners who were responsible for the condition of the road along their properties often preferred to shirk their duties rather than undertake the expense. Moreover, the commercial establishments were not always of a high standard; if Aelius Aristides is to be believed, one was as likely to see five stars through the roof of an inn as a fivestar hotel! This inveterate complainer travelled along the Via Egnatia in December, when he was already ill, during the 140s AD on his way to Rome. The following quotation from his *Sacred Tales* (2.60-61; trans. C.A. Behr) with most details about his ailments omitted, offers a useful, if exaggerated, impression of travel along the road in winter:

I set out for Rome in the middle of winter [...] When I had got as far as the Hellespont, my ears troubled me greatly [...] After this, there was rain, frost, ice and all the winds [...] the fields swampy as far as the eyes could see [...] There was a dearth of inns, and more rain came in through their roofs than from the sky without. And in all this, there was my haste and speed contrary to the season and the strength of my body. For not even the military couriers passed us, to say no more, and the majority of my servants traveled leisurely. I myself sought the guides if there was any need, and this itself was no easy matter. For it was necessary to drag the men, who fled like barbarians, sometimes by persuasion, sometimes by force.

Despite these negative remarks, the Via Egnatia was, from its construction to the end of Roman times and later, the main land route from Asia to Italy for soldier, civil servant and civilian alike. Begun as

a military necessity, it became a vital conduit that was as important as any of the other roads built by the Romans.

6 Macedonia during the Civil Wars

When Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49, Cn. Pompeius Magnus (Pompey), who had been controlling matters at Rome for a few years, fled with many supporters to Brundisium along the Appian Way and set sail to Macedonia.⁴⁰ Once there he established a headquarters at Thessaloniki and began to collect and train an army to oppose Caesar's battle-hardened troops. Since he could have chosen Asia Minor, the location of his most recent military successes, or Spain, his choice is worthy of comment. Macedonia did provide significant advantages. It was the province nearest to Italy, but not under Caesar's control, that had a sizable Roman military force available immediately, provided that the governor was willing to help,⁴¹ and it lay between Italy and Asia Minor. Pompey hoped that many of his veterans now settled in Italy would join him; by choosing Macedonia, Pompey offered the five legions that he pulled out of Italy a shorter distance to travel. At the same time, friendly governors in Asia Minor could readily send forces to Macedonia; eventually, three legions arrived. Moreover, enough veterans were settled within Macedonia itself and on Crete for Pompey to create a legion from these men.

Eventually, Pompey moved his forces to Dyrrhachium, intending to sail to Italy, but was besieged by the forces of Caesar. Pompey broke the siege and repositioned himself and his forces at Pharsalus in Thessaly, where on 9 August, 48 Caesar's forces defeated the Republicans.⁴² Pompey escaped and fled to Egypt where he was killed and beheaded by assassins operating on behalf of Ptolemy XIII. Further battles in Spain and Africa between Caesar's forces and the Republicans quieted the clash sufficiently well to allow Caesar to govern without much further attention to military opposition; he governed Macedonia through legates during his dictatorship. Even though Pompey's son Sextus Pompeius holed up on the Balearic Islands long enough to become a player in the next civil war he posed no danger to Caesar. More dangerous to Caesar were his friends, who stabbed him in the back (and the front and sides) repeatedly on 15 March, 44, thus setting off another civil war. Though Caesar had designated M. Iunius Brutus to succeed Q. Hortensius Hortalus in Macedonia, M. Antonius (Antony) passed a law in April 44 to place Macedonia under his own control and allocated the province to his brother C. Antonius. Hortensius instead turned Macedonia over to

Brutus in autumn 44. Brutus then claimed Macedonia and Illyricum⁴³ for the republic and began to consolidate military forces, including veterans of Pharsalus and new recruits in Macedonia, while obtaining the loyalty of some Thracians and defeating the Bessi, who refused to cooperate willingly. P. Vatinius, the commander in Illyricum, controlled Dyrrhachium for Brutus, submitted himself and his forces to his command, and late in 44 prevented C. Antonius from taking Macedonia through Illyricum. Early in 43, the Senate recognized Brutus' *maius imperium* over Illyricum, Macedonia and Thrace. In response to a fear that Brutus was about to attempt a recapture of Rome, Antony and Octavian (later Augustus) patched up their own differences; they passed a law on 26 November, 43 that declared themselves and M. Aemilius Lepidus triumvirs with responsibility for the Roman world divided among them. Macedonia, and the east generally, fell to Antony.

Naturally, the triumvirs wanted to wrest the province from their republican enemies and did so at Philippi in October 42. The battle at Philippi does not require lengthy discussion here: Brutus, his associates and his armies were defeated, and Brutus himself committed suicide. For the next 12 years, Antony's legates governed Macedonia. Eventually, with Lepidus reduced to political and military impotence, relations between Octavian and Antony worsened and a new civil war followed. After Antony's and Cleopatra's naval forces were defeated at Actium on 2 September, 31, Octavian pursued Antony and Cleopatra to Egypt; in August, they committed suicide. With the death of Antony, Octavian was the undisputed master of the Roman world.

7 Macedonia in the Imperial Period

After his victory at Actium Octavian handed Macedonia to M. Licinius Crassus as proconsul, not as a legate. Crassus faced a huge task, for he was given responsibility for the territory between the southern boundary of Macedonia and the Danube and between the Adriatic and the Black Sea, except where Illyricum remained a separate *provincia*. From 31 to 27, Crassus fought a number of campaigns well enough to be granted a triumph and laid the groundwork for greater Roman control of a *provincia Macedonia* that had never been as large as it was during those few years (cf. map 5). In 27, Octavian, now with the title Augustus, created a new province of Achaëa,⁴⁴ which included Epirus and all of Thessaly,⁴⁵ and firmly fixed the southern boundary of Roman Macedonia for the first time, though the impact was perhaps

more symbolic than real.⁴⁶ In the north and east little changed, except that the very act of drawing boundaries resulted in a more formal division between Macedonia and Illyricum. Somewhat oddly, perhaps, Macedonia was declared '*inermis*' (literally 'unarmed') and handed over to senatorial control,⁴⁷ despite the presence of military forces and active campaigning. By 10 at the latest this had changed as Augustus created a military command for Moesia. Whether this was a response to an incursion by Scordisci and others in 16, or a precursor to campaigns in Thrace by L. Calpurnius Piso from 12 to 10, or a consequence of Piso's actions, cannot be determined with certainty.⁴⁸ In any case, the bulk of what had been Macedonian legions were transferred to the Moesian military command.

Over the next half a century or so a series of provinces was created between Macedonia and the Danube.⁴⁹ Wars in Illyricum during the reign of Augustus, especially in 13 to 11 and AD 6 to 9 enlarged the province as far as the Danube; in AD 9, Illyricum became the two provinces of Dalmatia and Pannonia. The fighting in Moesia took a little longer to reach a conclusion, but early in the reign of Tiberius (AD 14–37) the province of Moesia was created. The southern boundaries of Dalmatia and Moesia naturally established the northern border of Macedonia along the traditional line that had marked the Roman concept of Macedonia (despite geographic extensions of *imperium*) since 148. Some years later, in AD 44 during the reign of Claudius, Rome created the province of Thrace, which included the area between the rivers Nestos and Hebros and a small strip west of the Nestos. These new provinces restored the traditional boundaries of Macedonia.⁵⁰ Once Moesia was divided into two provinces (Upper and Lower Moesia) in the reign of Domitian (AD 81–96) the borders of all the territory that had at one point or another been under the control of proconsuls of Macedonia were firmly established, though revisions did occur occasionally.⁵¹ At some point between the creation of Achaëa and the writings of Ptolemy on geography in the second century AD Thessaly was taken from Achaëa and added to Macedonia; the southern boundary now reached the coast at the Gulf of Malia, went out to the Aegean north of Euboea, then headed north to meet the land boundary just west of the Nestos (Thasos was allocated to Thrace). In the second century AD Epirus was separated from Achaëa and became its own province. To complete this survey of provincial organization in the region, the emperor Trajan (AD 98–117) created the province of Dacia beyond the Danube after Dacian campaigns that resulted in the annihilation of the Dacians and the capture of their king Decebalus.⁵²

Most of the fighting during this period of stabilization occurred outside Macedonia but the province was inevitably involved. Soldiers

and military supplies moved through Macedonia and the infrastructure to support the wars had an impact on the inhabitants, not always negatively, since the Roman military provided markets for goods and services. Inhabitants of Macedonia could, and did, become soldiers and veterans could, and did, settle in the province. Philippi was a favourite place to settle as early as the period of Rome's civil wars. When Augustus removed troublesome veterans from Italy to Philippi, the town was given the status of a colony and renamed *Colonia Iulia Augusta Philippensis*; ⁵³ numerous inscriptions attest to the presence of Latin-speaking inhabitants, veterans, perhaps, or their descendants. Of these, the most famous is surely Tiberius Claudius Maximus, who had captured the Dacian king Decebalus in AD 106; though we do not know whether he originated from Philippi or simply settled there, his career inscription is now on display in the museum at Drama. Since veterans in the republican and triumviral periods agitated for parcels of land, most ex-soldiers who formed the original Latin-speaking element of Roman Philippi presumably farmed the land of the plain.⁵⁴ The presence of others like themselves, the fact that Philippi was a thriving Roman colony and the availability of rich farmland also induced later veterans to settle there.

From the archaeological remains it is evident that Philippi flourished during the first century AD and especially during the Antonine period of the second century AD. It acquired all the buildings of a successful Roman city and a large and impressive forum, lined with small temples, a fountain and other buildings and arches, which showed its wealth and prosperity. Nevertheless, it did not lose its Greek identity: it boasted a palaestra, for example, and a podium for orators. In fact, Philippi was a cosmopolitan town visited by many travellers from all parts of the empire given its location on the Via Egnatia between Byzantium and Thessaloniki. The road, whose remnants may still be seen, ran between the forum and the temples and other buildings that occupied the lower part of the hillside below the acropolis. Across the forum from the road travellers could find a commercial area with shops and other amenities, including the palaestra, a relatively well-preserved latrine that could seat as many as 42 patrons and a bath complex. Another bath complex was located just off the Via Egnatia and (more or less) east of the forum. A few hundred metres away and on the hillside there stands a theatre originally constructed in the fourth century BC; it was extensively refurbished and remodelled to ensure the safety of spectators during gladiatorial contests and the displays of wild beasts.

The cosmopolitan religious identity of the city is evident from the temples and from the rock-cut sanctuaries on the hillside above the forum. The deities worshipped at Philippi include Artemis-Diana,

Aphrodite, Isis, Sarapis, Cybele, Minerva, Silvanus, Horus, Jupiter, Helios, Dionysus, and others. It was also home to a Christian community founded by the apostle Paul during his three visits between AD 49 and 57.⁵⁵ The size and fortunes of that community in the anti-Christian climate of the Roman Empire cannot be determined. It is worth noting, however, that at least one church, on the site of the later Octagonal church, was built (or an earlier building was remodelled) very soon after Constantine and Licinius established toleration for Christianity in AD 313. This suggests that a sizable and economically successful group of Christians survived the Diocletianic persecutions of the early fourth century AD; if that is true, Christianity must have been evident in some manner at Philippi for most of the imperial period.

Philippi was not the only city to prosper in the imperial period, for Thessaloniki also flourished during the Antonine Age.⁵⁶ Though its Roman remains are not quite as visible, enough can be seen to comment on its state during the Roman peace of the first and second centuries AD. Its forum was extensively rebuilt and refurbished in the second century, as was the theatre in the north-east corner of the excavated complex. As at Philippi there were public buildings and shops alongside the forum. The most interesting feature is perhaps the underground stoa, created when sloping ground was levelled to create the forum. Rather than dig the northern and higher part of the slope down to the level of the stoa, shops and road along the south side of the complex, the engineers chose to build the forum at a higher level and covered the existing double stoa with earth and stone to create a surface for the portico at the south side of the forum. They also retained underground chambers below the forum itself, primarily used for storage, because of the lack of adequate lighting. This project must have been an expensive undertaking, the benefits of extra storage notwithstanding, and reveals that considerable wealth was available, even if the state underwrote the largest proportion of the cost to beautify (and Romanize) a city that was the governors' normal residence.

Naturally, Thessaloniki boasted baths, a small one at the south-east corner of the excavated forum complex, and a larger one north of the forum and higher up the slope.⁵⁷ Here and there the remains of temples and other public buildings are evident but many more must lie under the buildings and roads of the modern city. Though it was built after the chronological limit of this chapter, the palace of Galerius and its associated buildings and avenues are a testament to the beauty of the late Roman city. The palace itself was built over a wealthy residential district: the excavators, who had once thought the palace was built on unused property, discovered the remains of houses

dating to the second century AD and furnished with splendid mosaics and wall-paintings; some are visible to visitors to the site. Further evidence of the city's prosperity is on display at the museum: statues of deities and individuals, inscriptions commemorating emperors and inhabitants, mosaics from various sites, and more. Like Philippi, Thessaloniki was a cosmopolitan city. Naturally, the Via Egnatia brought many travellers to the town but so too did its harbour. All these travellers by land and sea, the goods brought into the harbour, and the administration of the province generated economic activity.

These brief accounts of Philippi and Thessaloniki illustrate the fortunes of the province during the Roman imperial period. Similarly at Dium, for example, the archaeological site reveals a number of Roman foundations, including a theatre, bath and other buildings. Further examples could be added almost at will for any significant town or city but the point has perhaps been made sufficiently well. Partly because of the peace and prosperity in the empire during the first two centuries AD, and more specifically because Macedonia was no longer itself a theatre of war or subject to regular incursions, the province flourished during in this period. Because of its location Macedonia nevertheless saw armies regularly, as military units from one part of the empire travelled along the Via Egnatia when the emperors sent them to destinations elsewhere: to problematic frontiers, perhaps, or to deal with revolt, or to defeat a usurper or a rival for the throne (and usurpers and rivals might also send their armies across Macedonia). This is true even though the incorporation of provinces between Macedonia and the Danube provided additional land routes from one part of the empire to another. Yet even these disturbances might be beneficial, for they provided commercial opportunities that generated further wealth for the civilian inhabitants of the province.

In the third century AD the peace of the empire was disrupted and Macedonia was affected no less than many other places. Part of the problem was the instability of the imperial throne from AD 235 (death of Severus Alexander) to AD 284 (accession of Diocletian); frequently, reigning emperors were assassinated by rivals, who themselves faced rivals for the throne. The resulting civil wars tended to divert the military's attention from the frontiers, and peoples from outside the empire's boundaries took advantage of the weakened border defences with some regularity, thereby exacerbating the internal problems. All this created a very different atmosphere in the empire as the prosperity and security of the second century gave way to a sense of insecurity or impending doom. That was an empire-wide phenomenon but some areas experienced more specific consequences, Macedonia among them. From the late 260s, several waves of Goths and Heruli

travelled by land and sea from their homelands north of the Black Sea to Asia Minor and the areas south of the Danube, even reaching Athens. Judging by the speed of their raids they were not primarily interested in territory but rather the accumulation of plunder; inevitably, inhabitants of the affected areas were killed, while others were captured and taken away. Chaos resulted as the remaining inhabitants often abandoned their own destroyed houses and farmsteads and resettled themselves in the houses and on the land of others who had been killed or captured; issues of ownership and entitlement naturally followed, as did all manner of other recriminations.⁵⁸

In short, the stability, prosperity and security that Macedonia had experienced during the first and second centuries AD was shattered in the third. Though an individual raid was often not of long duration, it nevertheless did enough damage to shake the confidence of the province's inhabitants. In addition, the Roman military barely managed to maintain some semblance of a boundary at the Danube through the 270s and Dacia was abandoned. At times the armies were forced to retreat and the fighting against frontier enemies was closer to Macedonia than it had been for many years. Nevertheless, Macedonia recovered more quickly than its provincial neighbours to the north. Once Diocletian became emperor there was greater stability at the imperial level and more order within the military; as a consequence, the fighting returned to the frontiers and sometimes across them. By the late 290s Galerius, still Caesar and fresh from a victory over the Persians, had decided to make his main imperial residence at Thessaloniki and ordered the construction of the arch that spanned the Via Egnatia as well as the rotunda north of the road and the palace complex south of it.

About the same time, Diocletian reorganized the administrative structure of the Roman Empire by creating dioceses and prefectures. This reorganization included the redivision of many provinces, Macedonia among them, into smaller units. Though the details and subsequent history lie beyond the scope of this chapter, it might be noted here that the *provincia Macedonia* as the Romans had known it since 148 became three provinces: Epirus Nova, Macedonia Prima and Macedonia Salutaris.

8 Conclusion

The history of the *provincia Macedonia* clearly falls into two distinct phases with perhaps an interlude between them. The first can be dated

from 148 to the 60s and represents the acquisition, stabilization and expansion of the province. The second is the period of stability and prosperity that followed the first and is roughly coterminous with the imperial period, from 27 BC to the end of the third century AD, with some years of difficulty towards the end of the period. If desired, the interlude between the two phases can be assigned to the second period, since the conflict occurred in Macedonia precisely because a stable Macedonia offered tangible (though ultimately unrealized) benefits to one party to the dispute. Once the civil wars were over, Macedonia was no longer in the front lines of the Roman wars of expansion northwards, though it was often an important staging-point. Under those conditions there was little else it could do but prosper and, from time to time, experience the same difficulties that other parts of the Roman world endured. In the final analysis the Macedonia of this chapter experienced a transformation from a new territory acquired by Rome to a prosperous and important province. With the reorganization of provinces including Macedonia under Diocletian and Constantine, the *provincia Macedonia* ceased to exist in its traditional form, and it is appropriate to leave it now, still whole, but about to be split into several pieces.⁵⁹

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

Given the chronological scope of this chapter the notes have tended to focus on a few main studies rather than scholarly discussion of details. Unfortunately, no full-length treatment of Roman Macedonia is available in any language, but for books about some of the neighbouring provinces, readers might consult S.E. Alcock, *Graecia Capta: The Landscapes of Roman Greece* (Cambridge 1996), A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia* (London 1974) and J.J. Wilkes, *Dalmatia* (London 1969). The best treatment of some aspects of the province (including some of its history, its boundaries and its cities) is F. Papazoglou, *Les villes de Macédoine à l'époque romaine* (Paris 1988); she has also treated selected topics in 'Quelques aspects de l'histoire de la province de Macédoine', in H. Temporini and W. Haase (eds.), *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* II.7.1 (Berlin 1979), pp. 302–69; her very useful work on the central Balkan tribes is available in an English translation, *The Central Balkan Tribes in Pre-Roman Times: Triballi, Autariatae, Dardanians, Scordisci and Moesians*, trans. M. Stansfield-Popovic (Amsterdam 1978). While E.S. Gruen, *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome*, 2 vols. (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1984), treats the earliest Roman interactions with Macedonia and Illyria, the

best English account of Macedonia after 148 is R.M. Kallet-Marx, *Hegemony to Empire: The Development of the Roman Imperium in the East from 148 to 62 B.C.* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1995). All of these books will refer readers to discussions of controversial issues. A good overall treatment of the Via Egnatia is F. O'Sullivan, *The Egnatian Way* (Harrisburg 1972), who discusses many aspects of the road, including its date, construction, route, appearance and use, and also refers readers to the scholarly controversies addressed in many specialized studies. For the imperial period, when Macedonia lost some of its political and military immediacy, the best procedure is to become familiar with the nature of the Roman imperial world more generally. Both M. Goodman, *The Roman World 44 BC-AD 180* (London 1977) and D. Potter, *The Roman Empire at Bay AD 180-395* (London 2004) devote sections of their books to the history of the Roman Empire for their respective periods and to treatments of society, economics, intellectual life, and more. Within these accounts, there is much that will apply, directly or indirectly, to Roman Macedonia in the imperial period.

¹ This is an over-simplification that suits the present purpose. As an illustrative example, Rome took Sicily from Carthage after the first Punic war (ended 241) but 'governed' it with quaestors initially; only in 227 was the term *provincia* applied. *Provincia* initially did not mean 'province' in the sense of a territory with specific boundaries but rather what fell under a magistrate's *imperium* ('jurisdiction', broadly defined). That usually included territory but, essentially, the presence of a magistrate with *imperium* created a *provincia* in the original sense and the permanent presence of magistrates with *imperium* eventually established a province in a territorial sense.

² In addition to the previous chapter, see E.S. Gruen, *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome* 2 (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1984), pp. 429-36.

³ See the remarks of R.M. Kallet-Marx, *Hegemony to Empire: The Development of the Roman Imperium in the East from 148 to 62 B.C.* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1995), pp. 34-5. Kallet-Marx addresses the entire East but he considers Macedonia in the republican period at many points, and the notes in this chapter refer often to the specific pages in his book so that readers may find the relevant material quickly.

⁴ The term 'proconsul' is often employed generically in this

chapter to describe the commanders in Macedonia, at times without distinguishing between men who were actually praetors in their year of office and those who had been praetors previously. See Kallet-Marx, *Hegemony to Empire*, pp. 343–5, for the view that praetors in their years of office were not given authority *pro consule* and only received that designation upon prorogation of office.

⁵ The evidence is collected and interpreted by M.N. Tod, ‘The Macedonian Era’, *BSA* 23 (1918–1919), pp. 206–17, ‘The Macedonian Era II’, *BSA* 24 (1919–1921), pp. 54–7 and ‘The Macedonian Era Reconsidered’, in G.E. Mylonas and D. Raymond (eds.), *Studies Presented to D.M. Robinson* 2 (St Louis 1953), pp. 382–97; his work has not been fully superseded. Though Gruen, *Hellenistic World* 2, p. 435, holds that the date 148 merely represents the victory of Metellus not the creation of the province, Kallet-Marx, *Hegemony to Empire*, pp. 16–18, notes that Metellus was the first of a continuous series of Roman governors from 148. The era thus simply reflects the beginning of the permanent magistrates’ *provincia* if not necessarily the province (see n. 1 above for the distinction).

⁶ For example, the Octagonal Hall of Galerius’ palace at Thessaloniki.

⁷ At Philippi the Roman site was not the location for a newer town.

⁸ S. Kremydi-Sicilianou, “‘Belonging’ to Rome, ‘Remaining’ Greek: Coinage and Identity in Roman Macedonia”, in C. Howgego, V. Heuchert and A. Burnett (eds.), *Coinage and Identity in the Roman Provinces* (Oxford 2005), pp. 95–106, offers, first, a useful survey of the production of coinage in Macedonia under Roman rule, and, second, multiple examples of the variety of coins and the images depicted on them. For Thrace, which was at one point part of the ‘province’ of Macedonia (see below), see U. Peter, ‘Religious-cultural Identity in Thrace and Moesia Inferior’, in C. Howgego, V. Heuchert and A. Burnett (eds.), *Coinage and Identity in the Roman Provinces* (Oxford 2005), pp. 107–14, who focuses a little more specifically on religion. Both articles focus on the issue of identity as their main theme.

⁹ He was praetor in 148 and reached the consulship in 143.

¹⁰ See the remarks of Kallet-Marx, *Hegemony to Empire*, pp. 12–18, who cites the evidence and the work of other scholars.

¹¹ I agree here with Kallet-Marx, *Hegemony to Empire*, pp. 16–18; even if the early proconsuls cannot be identified there is no reason to doubt a permanent proconsular presence in Macedonia from 148 onwards.

¹² The usual suggestion that Rome respected Greek culture and allowed the Greeks their independence for that reason is, in my view, inadequate and simplistic. I follow Kallet-Marx, *Hegemony to Empire*, p. 56, in holding that Achaëa did not fall under the *imperium* of the proconsul of Macedonia from 146–27.

¹³ These two islands represent a single province at this point and for some time subsequently.

¹⁴ From 153 to 151 at least one consul was posted to Spain with a second year as promagistrate, and from 145 to 132 most governors were consuls who remained as promagistrates. These arrangements reflect difficulties with Celtiberians and Lusitanians and problems with the Numantines in these periods.

¹⁵ The war with Andriscus is usually counted as a fourth Macedonian war but the earlier battle at Pydna represents the end of Macedonian full independence from Rome if not the beginning of direct rule.

¹⁶ See Kallet-Marx, *Hegemony to Empire*, p. 50.

¹⁷ See, for example, Kallet-Marx, *Hegemony to Empire*, pp. 30–41.

¹⁸ The Scordisci were an originally Gallic people who at this period were settled along the southern bank of the Danube in the area where the River Savus flows into the Danube; their territory stretched from approximately Mursa (modern Osijek in Croatia) in the west to Viminacium (modern Kostolac in Serbia) in the east. See F. Papazoglou, *The Central Balkan Tribes in Pre-Roman Times. Triballi, Autariatae, Dardanians, Scordisci and Moesians*, trans. M. Stansfield-Popovic (Amsterdam 1978), pp. 271–389, for a full discussion of their origins, settlement and interactions with Macedonia both before and after the creation of the Roman province.

¹⁹ Rome had little trouble meeting the need: about 300 triumphs are recorded between 753 and 19; if the body count was always enforced, the number of enemies slain is 1.5 million just to account for triumphs. On triumphs, see H.S. Versnel, *Triumphus: An Inquiry into the Origin, Development, and Meaning of the Roman Triumph* (Leiden 1970).

²⁰ Most conveniently, see F. Papazoglou, *Les villes de Macédoine à l'époque romaine* (Paris 1988), pp. 81–9, with references to the views of earlier scholars.

²¹ There is little evidence to suggest that the proconsul of Macedonia ever interfered much in Achaëa: see the full discussion at Kallet-Marx, *Hegemony to Empire*, pp. 49–56.

²² Only a general description is given here; scholars disagree about details and much depends on the century, or even decade, to which the demarcation is meant to apply, especially given the realignment of provinces from time to time. Papazoglou, *Villes de Macédoine*, pp. 81–9, offers a more detailed account.

²³ At any rate since Philip II had extended Macedonia proper to include additional territory. On Philip II, see S. Müller, chapter 9.

²⁴ Papazoglou, *Central Balkan Tribes*, offers a full account of the various peoples inhabiting the area north of Macedonia.

²⁵ For one list of governors, see F. Papazoglou, 'Quelques aspects de l'histoire de la province de Macédoine', in H. Temporini and W. Haase (eds.), *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 2.7.1 (Berlin 1979), pp. 310–11; T.R.S. Broughton's list can be compiled from the men listed under various years in his three volume *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic* (Chicago 1984–86). No two scholars have completely matching lists either in the identification of possible governors or in their dates.

²⁶ See Livy, *Periochae* 53; also Varro, *On Agriculture* 2.4.1–2, who claims the quaestor as an ancestor. According to Eutropius 4.15, the rebel army was initially made up of slaves but eventually reached 16,000 men. M.G. Morgan, "Cornelius and the Pannonians": Appian, *Illyrica* 14.41 and Roman History, 143–38 B.C., *Historia* 23 (1974), pp. 194–5, argues that the rebel soldiers were mainly Scordisci but there is little evidence for or against

that view; the prominence of Thracians in the armies of earlier pretenders would suggest that Thracians were a significant portion of this army as well. The date depends on the sequence of events in the summaries of Livy's history; Morgan, "Cornelius and the Pannonians", p. 198, argues for 143, since he prefers to have D. Iunius Silanus as commander in Macedonia in 142 to make room for P. Scipio Cornelius Nasica to suffer a defeat at the hands of the Scordisci in 141. Others, for example, Broughton, *Magistrates* 1, p. 477, make Silanus the commander in 141. For brief discussion, see Kallet-Marx, *Hegemony to Empire*, pp. 33 with nn. 92–3.

27 The event is recorded at Livy, *Periochae* 54. For the commander, see the previous note. For further detail on the events described in the rest of this section, see Papazoglou, *Central Balkan Tribes*, pp. 284–337. Since that discussion is continuous, citations to her treatment of individual incidents are not included below. Kallet-Marx, *Hegemony to Empire*, treats the material at several different points in his book, and individual citations have therefore been provided.

28 Problems with the Numantines in Spain cannot be the reason: that campaign did not end until 134, about the same time as, or after, Cosconius' victory over the Scordisci.

29 Annus was honoured for his achievements, especially for not calling up a Macedonian levy, and for his general behaviour in Macedonia with an inscription (*SIG*³ 700) and an annual equestrian competition at Lete, Macedonia.

30 For these events and those in the rest of this paragraph and the next, see Kallet-Marx, *Hegemony to Empire*, pp. 223–7, who provides reference to sources and scholarship. The inscriptions and dedication at Delphi can be found at *SIG*³ 710 A, C, D; the inscription at Europolis was published by S.V. Kougeas, 'Νίκη Ῥωμαίου στρατηγοῦ τιμωμένη ὑπὸ Μακεδονικῆς πόλεως', *Hellanika* 5 (1932), p. 5.

31 The precise identity of the Caenic Chersonese is in dispute. Given that the Hebros had been the notional boundary as late as 107 or 106 (the end of M. Minucius Rufus' tenure), the name may simply be a general term for Thrace between the Hebros and the Bosphorus, but excluding northern Thrace.

³² See Papazoglou, *Central Balkan Tribes*, pp. 131–269, for a thorough treatment of the Dardani.

³³ See Kallet-Marx, *Hegemony to Empire*, pp. 361–4, for a detailed discussion and reference to earlier work.

³⁴ For these events, see Kallet-Marx, *Hegemony to Empire*, pp. 292–99.

³⁵ The first of these, discovered about 10 km from Thessaloniki, was published in 1974, thus finally verifying not only the builder's name but also his status as proconsul. See C. Romiopoulou, 'Un nouveau milliare de la via Egnatia', *BCH* 98 (1974), pp. 813–18, for the milestone and *SEG* 40.543 for a second milestone. Other milestones had been known for some time; most name emperors who repaired the road.

³⁶ In general the *Egnatia Odos* (still under construction in places in the spring of 2008) takes a more southerly route westwards from Thessaloniki than the Via Egnatia did, with a western terminus at Igoumenitsa. East of Thessaloniki the modern road does not loop northwards through Philippi as the Via Egnatia did but remains nearer the coast between Amphipolis and Kavala.

³⁷ For a good discussion of many aspects of the road's construction, route and use, see F. O'Sullivan, *The Egnatian Way* (Harrisburg 1972).

³⁸ Much has been written about the different figures for distance and the calculations used to reach them but those details are not relevant here. The exact route from Apollonia to the junction with the road from Dyrrhachium and the location of the junction are also still in dispute.

³⁹ The ancient harbour, directly south of Galerius' palace and near the city's east wall, was to the east of the modern one and the shore itself was a little north of the modern sea wall.

⁴⁰ There is no single convenient history of events in Macedonia during the civil wars. Rather, readers might consult, in addition to Julius Caesar's own account (easily accessible in a Penguin translation), biographies of the main figures, for example, M. Gelzer, *Caesar: Politician and Statesman* (Cambridge 1968) and R.

Seager, *Pompey the Great: A Political Biography* (Oxford 2002), for Caesar and Pompey, respectively, and also the easily accessible magisterial work of R. Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford 1939), which covers both the political situation at Rome and events, including military matters, in the provinces, especially for the period after the death of Caesar.

41 His identity is not certain. Papazoglou, 'Quelques aspects', p. 311, suggests Cn. Tremellius Scrofa or M. Nonius Sufenas for 51–50 (the normal two-year term) and T. Antistius, who was quaestor in Macedonia in 50 without receiving a replacement for 49, as *quaestor pro praetore* for 49. According to Cicero (*Letters to Friends* 13.29), Antistius offered as little assistance to Pompey as he could.

42 This word is employed here as traditionally to designate commanders and forces whose stated goal was to restore the republic.

43 In 59 Rome had made Illyricum a *provincia* for Julius Caesar who held it, with Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul, from 59 to 49. Initially, it was the area along the Adriatic coast from Macedonia to Cisalpine Gaul. To avoid too detailed a discussion here, the legal and political manoeuvres have largely been omitted in this section. Syme, *Roman Revolution*, is in many ways still the most useful full treatment.

44 On Achaea under Roman rule, see S.E. Alcock, *Graecia Capta: The Landscapes of Roman Greece* (Cambridge 1996).

45 Some sources and scholars suggest that Thessaly belonged to Macedonia and others that it belonged to Achaea; I follow Papazoglou, 'Quelques aspects', p. 325 with n. 105.

46 As noted, the governors of Macedonia rarely intervened in Greece and the creation of Achaea thus did not take territory from Macedonia, contrary to what is often stated. Though a governor could legally extend his *imperium* southward, a long-standing and traditional consensus on the southern limit of Macedonia seems to have operated from 146 to 27.

47 In general, provinces with small military garrisons were controlled by the Senate while areas with larger military units and active campaigning became imperial provinces under the

emperor's direct control, managed by legates of the emperor. The distinction was more a technical legality than real, for the Senate tended to respect the wishes of the emperor: see for brief discussion, Syme, *Roman Revolution*, pp. 328–30.

48 For discussion of Rome's involvement north of Macedonia proper during the period of the civil wars and the reign of Augustus, see Papazoglou, *Central Balkan Tribes*, pp. 337–45.

49 For much more detail about these provinces, see A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia* (London 1974) and J.J. Wilkes, *Dalmatia* (London 1969).

50 At any rate in the Roman conception, since Macedonia proper excluded the western part of the province.

51 The main reasons initially for establishing and redistributing boundaries were military need and administrative convenience. In the imperial period provinces tended to be divided rather than expanded mainly to limit the military and financial resources available to any individual governor, with a view to preventing possible usurpations.

52 Dacia was given up by the emperor Aurelian in the 270s. There were further redivisions of provinces under Diocletian and Constantine but the details lie beyond the scope of this chapter.

53 Colonies were also established at Dyrrhachium, Pella, Byllis, Dium and Cassandreia.

54 Since some inscriptions were found outside of the town, presumably their dedicators did not live in the urban area. The museum at Drama houses Roman material found north of Philippi, while artifacts found at Philippi (and not in the site museum) or south of the city typically go to the museum at Kavala (according to the staff at the museum in Drama). That being so, Roman material at Drama comes from villages, hamlets and farmsteads in the plain, provided that these items (or at least some of them) were not transported from Philippi as building materials.

55 Beyond guidebooks, available at many museum bookshops in Greece in English translations, books about Philippi tend to focus on early Christianity and the visit of the apostle Paul with

sometimes a chapter on historical background, for example, C. Koukouli-Chrysantaki, 'Colonia Iulia Augusta Philippensis', in C. Bakirtzis and H. Koester (eds.), *Philippi at the Time of Paul and after His Death* (Harrisburg 1998), pp. 5–36. For a more detailed account of the archaeological remains of religious monuments, both pagan and Christian, see V.A. Abrahamsen, *Women and Worship at Philippi: Diana/Artemis and Other Cults in the Early Christian Era* (Portland 1995). Two older works in French are also still valuable: P. Collart, *Philippes: Ville de Macédoine de ses origines jusqu'à la fin de l'époque romaine* (Paris 1937) and P. Lemerle, *Philippes et la Macédoine orientale à l'époque chrétienne et byzantine* (Paris 1945).

⁵⁶ Among the guidebooks to the city, see L. Tsaktsiras et al., *Thessaloniki: The City and Its Monuments* (Thessaloniki 2004), which covers the period from antiquity to the present and treats the history as well. On the city's history from antiquity to modern times, see A.E. Vakalopoulos, *A History of Thessaloniki*, trans. T.F. Carney (Thessaloniki 1972).

⁵⁷ This bath is no more than 150 metres north of the forum but stands on ground at least 15 metres higher: by the time one reached it, one would need a bath!

⁵⁸ The best evidence comes from the sermons of Gregory Thaumaturgus, Bishop of Neocaesarea in Pontus, and the rulings of ecclesiastical councils in that area as they attempted to deal with problems generated by the invasions in this period. Some of the evidence is conveniently collected in P. Heather and J. Matthews, *The Goths in the Fourth Century* (Liverpool 1991). While that evidence is specific to Pontus, the consequences must have been similar elsewhere.

⁵⁹ I am grateful to the University of Calgary Research Grants Committee for a grant to cover the expenses of a research visit to Greece and to be able to employ Ms. D.C. Dean, to whom I am also grateful for expeditious and exemplary research assistance.

PART V

Neighbours

Macedonia, Illyria and Epirus

William S. Greenwalt

1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the political interactions of the Argead realm (which originally encompassed the Lower Macedonian regions of Pieria and Bottiaea), the Illyrians, and the Epirote peoples. For its purposes it will be useful to keep in mind the geographical definition of Macedonia and the delineation of its subdivisions provided by C.G. Thomas in chapter 4. For a more detailed historical treatment of the events discussed below, see part IV ‘History’.

We begin with a consideration of what constituted ‘Illyria’ and ‘Illyrians’. Succinctly defining the limits of Illyria and the peoples who can properly be called Illyrians is even more difficult than defining Macedonia and the Macedonians because the Illyrians left behind no written accounts of self-identification and because they appear for the most part only on the periphery of the Greek and Roman interests. H.J. Dell defines what he calls southern Illyris (that which most influenced the early development of Macedonia) as the territory from Mount Scardus (northwest of Paeonia) to Lake Lychnitis, extending to the west from Macedonia to the Ionian Sea, and as far south along the Adriatic coast as the Acroceraurian promontory.¹ J. Wilkes has more recently provided a very useful introduction to the physical environment of this area as well as some historical review.² Within this region (see map 6) from at least the eighth century lived a number of tribes identified by ancient sources as Illyrian, although not all of the peoples of this region were identified as such (for example, the Brygi). The label Illyrian was one imposed by foreigners, initially Greeks, who first began to have some knowledge of Illyrians when they began to frequent the Adriatic beginning in the eighth century with the colonization of Corcyra (733). The Illyrians certainly never

collectively called themselves Illyrians, and it is unlikely that they had any collective name for themselves. After the eighth century, they mostly lived in distinct and autonomous tribes, although by the late fourth century socio-economic changes saw the exchange of village life for the earlier pastoral existence.

Illyria offered little agricultural wealth.³ In relatively poor lands, the disparate Illyrian tribes eked out their respective livings, supplementing their productivities through predatory actions when opportunities arose. An occasional warlord might consolidate power over multiple tribes, but few names of powerful chieftain/kings made it into our extant sources, and no dynasty developed the more permanent political institutions needed to sustain the transition from tribal power to that of statehood.⁴ It appears from the ancient sources taken as a whole that Illyrian tribes sporadically moved en masse, most frequently after having been displaced by the predations and migrations of other Illyrians or non-Illyrian peoples. When these movements occurred they generally did so (on land) to the south and east with the prevailing folds in the terrain. Macedonia and Epirus (see map 6) eventually lay across these paths of advance although in time some Illyrian migrations and/or raids also became seaborne. The movements of Illyrian tribes became increasingly common and more intensely driven with the arrival of the Celts in the region in the fourth century. The Illyrians with whom we will be most concerned were those who settled within the drainage systems of the Drin rivers and near Lake Lychnitis (modern Ohrid) and its neighbors to the southeast (modern lakes Prespa and Little Prespa). It was in the region of these lakes where Illyrian and Macedonian interests first clashed.

N.G.L. Hammond provides the most extensive introduction to Epirus and its peoples, and he defines well the geographical extent of Epirus proper as contained within lines drawn from the Acroceraurian promontory (near the southwestern Albanian city of Vlore) to Mount Qelqes (near Korce in southeastern Albania), from Mount Qelqes to Mount Gavrovo (in Greece, to the east of the Gulf of Ambracia) in the south, and from Mount Gavrovo to the mouth of the Gulf of Ambracia.⁵ Epirus proper is sliced by four limestone ranges extending from the northwest to the southeast and is largely a continuation of the Illyrian geology.⁶ G.N. Cross reminds us that Epirus simply means 'the Mainland' and that it was so dubbed from the perspective of the Greeks living on the islands off its coast. Hence, those who eventually held themselves to be Epirotes (although more were likely to identify with their individual tribe), like the Illyrians, received their overall designation from the foreign (southern and eastern) Greek navigators who explored the Adriatic coast north of Acarnania and south of Illyria. Strabo 7.7.5 (quoting Theopompus) notes that there were 14

Epirote tribes. Of these, he believed the Chaonians (living primarily along the coast from southern Illyria to the area east of the southern tip of Corcyra), and the Molossians (whose lands were centered inland, between the area around Passaron, down the river Arachthus to the Gulf of Ambracia) to be the most prominent, with the Molossians in time overtaking the earlier status of the Chaonians, as was indicated by the famous oracle at Dodona passing from the domination of one the other. The sources indicate that the Molossians dominated Epirote affairs most of the time from at least the beginning of the fourth century.

2 Early Contacts

The earliest contacts between the Argead Macedonians and the Illyrians appear as hostile in our sources. Polyaeus 4.1 reports that the quasi-historical/mythological king Argaeus once turned back a raid of the Illyrian Taulantini through a religious ruse.⁷ Whatever historical truth is buried in this account, and leaving aside Polyaeus' interest in the anecdote, it indicates that throughout antiquity a significant animosity was thought to have existed between the Macedonians and the Illyrians from an early date – the seventh century if the consensus in dating Argaeus is correct. Concerning another incident (if historical dated to the sixth century), Justin 7.2.6–12 alleges that even at this early date the Macedonians were so continuously at war with the Illyrians and Thracians that the former began to excel in warfare. At a time when Macedonia was ruled by Aeropus, then an infant, the Illyrians (fearing the growing prowess of the Macedonians but disdainful of the infant king) launched an attack on Macedonia that was successful until Aeropus' subjects brought their infant monarch to a battle in which they benefitted from his presence and avenged their initial defeat. Although the specific tribe or tribes raiding into Macedonia are not named here, it has reasonably been suggested that the Illyrians in question would have been either the Encheleioi, who early seem to have controlled the area of the north of Lake Lychnitis (through which the later Via Egnatia would be driven), or the Taulantini, who lived further west along that section of the coast in and around the areas supporting the Greek colonies of Apollonia and Epidamnus.⁸

In both Polyaeus and Justin, the Illyrians are portrayed as the aggressors, but neither source suggests that their goal was anything other than immediate advantage, whether economic or political or both. Regardless of the specific historicity of these accounts, there is

no reason to doubt that they reflect truth that from an early date many Illyrian raids hounded the Argead Macedonians. If the Argeads whose base was at Aegae (modern Vergina) felt the sting of such raids, we can be certain that so did the Upper Macedonian cantons of Lynceus, Orestis and Eordaia, Elimeia, and Tymphaea (some of which were designated as Epirote by Strabo) situated as they were on thoroughways between Illyrian dominated territory and the lands of the Argead house. We will see below, however, that relations between Illyrians and Macedonians were not invariably hostile and it must be assumed that a fair amount of intermarriage took place at least between Illyrian and Macedonian elites. The ancient sources refer to such marriages (in fact Philip II, Alexander the Great, Philip Arrhidaeus and Adea Eurydice all had Illyrians in their ancestry), but we are never informed as to the circumstances of individual unions until the time of Philip. We can categorize the early contacts between Illyrians and Macedonians as being sporadically hostile but the two groups of peoples do not appear to have been mortal enemies until the fourth century. Some Illyrians clearly coveted Macedonia's movable wealth but few appear to have coveted its lands. And, as far as raiding went, the Illyrians appear to have been indiscriminate despoilers, attacking where and when they could, by no means distinguishing non-Illyrians from other Illyrian tribes. At least by 479, the Greeks imagined a possible Illyrian strike on Delphi (Hdt. 9.43), and such a raid probably would have been launched if any Illyrian chieftain thought he could pull it off successfully. The Illyrians appear to have targeted Macedonia frequently, not because of any special enmity, but because Macedonia was defensively weaker than most *poleis* and because (with the exception of cities such as Epidamnus and Apollonia) it was closer to where Illyrians lived than were most *poleis*. It can probably be assumed that the Illyrians preyed upon other victims (for example, Thracians, Paeonians, and even other Illyrian tribes), without leaving any record of their despoliations.

Nothing is known about the relations between Macedonia and Epirus until the fourth century with the exception that, before Upper Macedonia fell definitively under the control of Argead Macedonia (which did not occur until the reign of Philip II), at least for periods such cantons as Orestes and Tymphaea appear to have sought out an affiliation with their neighbors to the southwest, possibly to prevent their being dominated by ambitious Argead monarchs who would have found it difficult to cut off support from the west, at least before Philip II.

3 Contacts to Philip II and Alexander the Great

Thucydides provides the best historical evidence about relatively early Macedonian/ Illyrian relations. In 424, as the Peloponnesian War raged and Brasidas mounted his offensive in the north, Perdiccas II underwrote a portion of the costs associated with the Spartans' campaign in order to secure him as an ally against Arrhabaeus of Lyncus, whom Perdiccas at the time sought to subordinate to Argead control (Thuc. 4.82.3–83.1).⁹ Perdiccas' initial attempt to turn Brasidas against Arrhabaeus failed because the Lyncestian king offered arbitration which Perdiccas rejected but which Brasidas desired in order to focus on his primary reason for being in the north (to attack member states of the Athenian Empire, especially Amphipolis). As a result, Perdiccas subsequently reduced his contribution to Brasidas' war chest (Thuc. 4.83.2–6). During the next year, however, in order to keep Perdiccas as an ally as the promise of an Athenian defensive buildup grew, Brasidas agreed to accompany the Argead in an attack on Lyncus (Thuc. 4.124–128). The armies of Brasidas and Perdiccas defeated the Lycestians in an initial battle but thereafter waited a few days for a band of Illyrian mercenaries to appear, whom Perdiccas had procured against Arrhabaeus. This second expedition, however, ended in failure after Arrhabaeus suborned the Illyrians whom Perdiccas had introduced into the conflict. The Illyrians subsequently served Arrhabaeus against Brasidas and Perdiccas and initially terrified their erstwhile allies. Confronted by these imposing new additions to Arrhabaeus' army, Perdiccas' force panicked and ran, and even Brasidas had some difficulty in extricating himself from the tables-turned predicament. Eventually, however, through superior organization, discipline, and leadership the Spartan contingent won a passage to safety. Thucydides thus reinforced the reputation of the Illyrians' as having military shock-value but in the end he downplayed their effectiveness against a capable opponent, which he clearly recognized in Brasidas but which he did not in the contingent of Perdiccas. Regardless, it is reasonable to deduce that the Illyrians were on the scene for profit not for conquest or loyalty to a cause. Arrhabaeus won their service because he ostensibly offered them more for their services than did Perdiccas. The Illyrians and Macedonians appear not as mortal enemies at this time, merely ones seeking profit and (in)convenience. After this incident, there is no recorded contact between Argead Macedonia and Illyria during Perdiccas' reign. Under Archelaus, hostilities are again attested with Lyncus, probably involving Illyrians. Aristotle (*Politics* 5.8.11) notes that at some time

Archelaus was hard pressed by an alliance between Arrhabaeus and one Sirrhas, who may have been an Illyrian (although he is not so identified, but see below). Of some standing, Sirrhas may even have been the leader of the Illyrian force that turned against Perdiccas. How long this conflict continued is unknown but it caused Archelaus to seek an alliance with Elimea through the marriage of his daughter to its king. This is the first attested example of what was later established as a staple of Argead diplomacy against seemingly perpetual threats: strategic third parties would become allies through marriage diplomacy.¹⁰

Thucydides (2.100.1–2) praises Archelaus and briefly catalogs a series of his military reforms intended to strengthen his kingdom and to consolidate his own royal authority.¹¹ Unfortunately for the kingdom as a whole, Archelaus' reforms never took full effect and his assassination spawned widespread unrest throughout Argead Macedonia that lasted for seven years and guaranteed short reigns for four kings.¹²

Nevertheless, the tenure of these reforms, although intended primarily to exploit Athens' regional decline, ironically probably helped to stimulate changes in Illyria, creating a threat to Macedonia which far exceeded any which had come from that source before.

Several developments arose around the end of the Peloponnesian War in 404 and the time of Archelaus' reforms and death that threatened Macedonian interests, including the rise of the Pheraean tyrants (see D. Graninger, chapter 15) and the expansion of the Chalcidian League. But as these powers squeezed Macedonia from the south and east, there also emerged a powerful Illyrian coalition with its core somewhat to the north of Lake Lychnitis and probably ruled by the Dardanian chieftain named Bardylis.¹³ Associated with this last development, a new and sizable coinage began to be minted, utilizing silver mined at Damastion, a site probably located (but not yet found) not far south of the Dardanian territorial core.¹⁴ The Damastion coinage lasted from the end of the fifth century until about 280 or about the time that the Celtic migrations destabilized the Balkans. It employed types remarkably akin to those issued by the Chalcidian League. Exactly what is to be inferred from the similarities is debatable, but it is indisputable that the first significant consolidation of Illyrian military power in the lake district coincided with the rise of the first significant Illyrian coinage in the same region. Also, that the internecine strife in Argead Macedonia made it impossible for that polity to offer much initial resistance to the growth of Illyria's economic and military clout.

Amyntas III's reign was both long and troubled (see J. Roisman, chapter 8, pp. 158–61), but among his accomplishments was the fact

that when he died of natural causes at a fairly advanced age he passed his realm on to his son and successor, Alexander II, without challenge. Such an uncontested accession was a true rarity among the Argeads.¹⁵ Although his life and reign ended peacefully Amyntas' accession did not begin in that way. Diodorus 14.89.2 reports that Amyntas assassinated his predecessor Pausanias, but Amyntas did not enjoy the fruits of his labor for long. Within a year of his initial accession a massive Illyrian invasion drove Amyntas out of his realm, probably to Larissa in Thessaly. Diodorus 14.92.3 adds that in order to save some of his kingdom from Illyrian ravage Amyntas handed over its eastern territories to the Chalcidian League. According to the same citation, some Thessalians returned Amyntas to his throne two years later. These allies were almost certainly the ancestral friends of the Argead house from Larissa. Diodorus provides us with another historical datum here: during the period of Amyntas' deposition an Argaeus ruled Macedonia (one imagines as an Illyrian puppet.) Although we cannot be certain about the Illyrian motive for this invasion, it looks very much as if the Illyrians again attacked Macedonia in 393 in order to loot and not to conquer, but this time on a massive scale and with the intention of retaining influence there through an agent who knew his place.

After Amyntas returned to the throne the Illyrians left Macedonia alone, at least for a while, probably less for the security Amyntas could impose than for the Dane geld he was forced to pay (Diod. 16.2.2, also – probably – Curt. 10.2.23).¹⁶ Inactivity in Macedonia did not stay the Illyrians' activity elsewhere, and they maintained an aggressive posture by attacking Epirus in 385/4. Dionysius of Syracuse is said to have prompted this invasion in an attempt to expand his political and economic clout in the Adriatic (Diod. 15.13.1–3). Purportedly, Dionysius allied with some Illyrians and Alcetas, a Molossian royal then in exile at Syracuse, to extend his influence and place Alcetas on the Epirote throne. However altruistic this primarily Illyrian incursion may have been, it is alleged that 15,000 Molossians were butchered in attempting to beat it back. Even if this figure is inflated, the Molossians suffered mightily at the hands of the Illyrians – a testimonial to the magnitude of the threat the Illyrians also posed to Macedonia.¹⁷ What happened next is subject to some controversy, for Diodorus reports a second massive Illyrian invasion of Macedon in 383/2 (15.19.2–3; cf. Isoc. 6.46). According to Diodorus, driven from his throne a second time Amyntas again ceded some land to the Chalcidians before making a surprising comeback, thereafter to rule Macedonia until his death. The similarities between Diodorus' accounts for 393 and 383 have led many to suspect that the second report is but a misplaced historical echo of the first and that there was

but one Illyrian invasion of Macedonia, which probably occurred shortly after Amyntas became king.¹⁸ This position is possibly correct, but even with their similarities the accounts are not identical and it is more likely the Illyrians made multiple visits to Macedonia during Amyntas' reign as to assert that Diodorus was guilty of erroneously recording one invasion twice, 10 years apart: see J. Roisman, chapter 8.

War and political maneuvering swirled around Macedonia throughout the reign of Amyntas, but whenever he regained his throne for the final time he strove to maintain peace and to cultivate the economic recovery of Macedonia after the extended period of civil war and foreign invasion (see J. Roisman, chapter 8, pp. 160–1). For at least the last 13 years of his life, he averted more Illyrian pillaging of the Argead realm by making no threatening policy moves and by paying a national ransom. Domestically, his power was secured through adept marriage politics. He had at least two wives, almost certainly concurrently. His (probably) first wife, Gygaea, was herself an Argead. Although Gygaea bore three sons to him (Archelaus, Arrhidaeus, and Menelaus), despite her royal heritage when Amyntas considered the succession, he turned to his (younger?) sons by his second wife, Eurydice, all of whom would eventually become kings: Alexander II, Perdiccas III, and Philip II. The reason for the preference seems to have been Eurydice's status, attendant as it was on her natal connections. Her father was named Sirrhas (perhaps the same Sirrhas mentioned in Aristotle.), who some scholars have argued was an Illyrian by birth (thus making Eurydice an out-and-out Illyrian herself) but others that he was from one or another of the Upper Macedonian cantons but with Illyrian ancestors.¹⁹ The most compelling arguments link Sirrhas to Lyncus (but perhaps only through an alliance with Arrhabaeus). Regardless of her father's origin, Eurydice had strong Illyrian connections and some sources identify her as an Illyrian.²⁰ It seems that Amyntas was able to win peace with the powers in Illyria in part by guaranteeing that an heir with at least a partially Illyrian ancestry would succeed him. Amyntas and Eurydice had domestic support for a policy of Illyrian accommodation at least in the person of the formidable Ptolemy Alorus. Ptolemy seems to have cemented his support for Amyntas and his Illyrian policy when he married Eurynoe, Amyntas' daughter by Eurydice.²¹ When Amyntas died, the sons of Gygaea had every reason to challenge the elevation of Alexander II (after all, contested Macedonian accessions was the kingdom's most popular sport), but the fact that they did not can probably be credited to Ptolemy's initial support of Alexander. It is probably not too much to suggest that Ptolemy Alorus was initially to Alexander II what Parmenion and Antipater were later to Alexander

III.

Yet within a matter of about 18 months after Alexander II's accession (370) he was dead (murdered by the hand of Ptolemy Alorus (Athen. 14.629d = *FGrH* 136 F 11, Plut. *Pelopidas* 26–27), Eurynoe had vanished, and Ptolemy had remarried, this time to Eurydice, his one-time mother-in-law. What had changed to turn an ally into a royal assassin? The answer appears to turn on the rash ambition of Alexander II, who seems to have chafed at his father's willingness to live under the shadow of foreign, especially Illyrian, influence. Justin 7.5.1 reports the outbreak of a new Illyrian conflict immediately after Alexander's accession from which Alexander was allegedly able to extricate himself only through the payment of additional tribute and the rendering of his brother, Philip, as a hostage. Justin says nothing about the cause of this war, but when one considers other initiatives launched during Alexander's short reign there is ample evidence to conclude that the young king was much more aggressive both domestically and internationally than his circumspect father had been over the final years of his reign.²² Others in this volume (see especially D. Graninger, chapter 15, pp. 312–13 and J. Roisman, chapter 8, pp. 161–2) have provided arguments about the broader aims of Alexander's policies, but the cumulative effect of the initiatives which must have been launched shortly after his accession (since Alexander II did not rule long) suggest that he, and not the Illyrians, sought a change in the relationship established during the reign of Amyntas III. The result was not successful from Alexander's point of view, and probably turned the Macedonian partisans of Amyntas' Illyrian policy, including Ptolemy, against the king whom they came to consider dangerous to the well-being of the realm. Alexander's ambitions seem to have convinced Ptolemy that Macedonia's best interests as well as his own (for if Alexander was willing to jettison his father's policies why not also throw overboard his father's advisors?) demanded the removal of Alexander. Although it is but informed speculation (that Eurydice either married Ptolemy after his murder of her son or stayed married to him after that event), it suggests that she at least understood the logic of Ptolemy's position (despite the lurid accusations of Justin 7.4.7) – since what Alexander was attempting was, in fact, dangerous in the extreme – even as Eurydice strove to save the lives of her two younger sons.²³

Perdiccas III's reign of some five years began with his murder of the man who had killed his older brother. During this period there were signs that the economic recovery fostered by Amyntas was bearing some fruit: revenues were up, as was the population of those of military age, the coinage was better, and significantly an infantry had been established, albeit not an effective one as events would

prove.²⁴ Better times were not without their dangers, however, and these arose with a vengeance when in 360 there occurred another massive Illyrian invasion, this time clearly led by the aforementioned Bardylis, who was by then a very old warrior/king.²⁵ What may very well have precipitated the Illyrian assault on Macedonia was the news that Perdiccas had forged a political alliance with the Epirotes (suggesting a return to the more aggressive principals of Alexander II and a rejection of those of Amyntas), guaranteeing the alliance by betrothing his younger brother Philip to the then pre-pubescent Epirote princess now known as Olympias.²⁶ The fact that the Aeacid royal house of the Epirote Molossians considered its first known association with the royal Argead house at this time is testimony to the fear that the Illyrians of the day inspired throughout both Epirus and Macedonia.²⁷ One wonders what the inhabitants of Upper Macedonia thought about this betrothal, especially if, as it has been argued, cantons like that of Orestes had associated themselves with the Epirote kingdom somewhere around the years 370–365, perhaps seeking protection from not only Illyrians but also Argead encroachment.²⁸ In an effort to keep this alliance secret, perhaps even from Eurydice herself (as I have recently argued) the betrothal was arranged (as well as the final political terms of alliance) on the island of Samothrace, far from the prying eyes of the Illyrians who would chafe at a union of Macedonian and Epirote interests.²⁹ If this argument bears consideration, Perdiccas must have known that such a betrothal could not have been kept secret forever, but he probably reckoned that by the time hostile interests learned of the marriage-to-be and the alliance he would be in a strong enough position to weather whatever reaction his secret diplomacy had generated. If he thought along these lines he was terribly wrong. Bardylis invaded Macedonia and after at least two major confrontations killed Perdiccas and 4,000 of his troops in battle (Diod. 16.2.5, Polyaeus 4.10.1).³⁰ In the aftermath of victory, Bardylis may have taken steps to consolidate his victory, but if he did he overlooked or could not put his hands on Perdiccas' younger brother, Philip II.

4 Philip II and Alexander the Great

In 360/59 Upper Macedonia lay under the domination of the Illyrians and Argead Macedonia was awash with barbarian looting by not only Illyrians but also Paeonians and Thracians, who took the opportunity to raid into Macedonia as well (see S. Müller, chapter 9, pp. 166–8). Yet Perdiccas' death and that of so many of his countrymen can be

argued, ironically, as one of the best things ever to happen to Macedonia in the long run. This can be asserted only with the benefit of hindsight, but Philip seems to have had two advantages as he began his reign and promulgated his own reforms to revitalize the Argead realm. First, the massacre of Perdiccas' army, followed by yet another Illyrian plundering of the Macedonian countryside, provoked a longing for a messiah who could secure the realm against all enemies. And second, the heavy loss of life in Perdiccas' debacle seems to have taken an especially heavy toll on the elite. This latter is an inference but in such a time of trouble the elite could not have shirked service when the realm was under so great an attack. Given what we know about the military deeds of the Macedonian elite (including the kings themselves) during the reigns of Philip II and Alexander III, it is more than just a possibility that their numbers were ravaged as were those (one presumes configured as infantry) whom Perdiccas must have enlisted to have an army large enough to sustain the losses attributed to him. Enlightened speculation suggests that many of those who perished were those who had been so wary of the policies of Archelaus and Alexander II. As a result, it appears that Philip simply did not have to stare down any entrenched opposition to the reforms he was about to introduce. As long as he was successful, Macedonia was set to follow wherever he led.

The speed by which Philip transformed himself from younger royal brother to effective monarch was truly remarkable, especially since there initially were alternatives to his rule in Perdiccas' young son Amyntas,³¹ in Argaeus whom Philip quickly and quietly dispatched after he made known his challenge to Philip's leadership, and in his half-brothers, Amyntas III's sons by Gygaia. Security was the issue of the day and Philip acted effectively and with speed to restore order where his word held sway. Vengeance may have been on his mind from the moment he learned of his brother's end, but with chaos unleashed across the Argead realm Philip had first to amass the resources needed to challenge the Illyrians in a rematch. In short order he married Phila to re-secure the loyalty of the royal house of Elimeia,³² quietly removed Argaeus, (a royal pretender), bought off Athens (which had initially thrown its support behind Argaeus) with vague promises of the withdrawal of his troops from Amphipolis and the return of a captured military detachment without ransom, trained a newly drafted army, and built up the morale of his newly reconstituted army by defeating Lypeius of Paeonia, an enemy not nearly so formidable as the Illyrians (see S. Müller, chapter 9, p. 169). Only after about 18 months of scheming and training and successfully accomplishing objectives did he turn his attention to Bardylis. Diodorus 16.3.2 credits Philip at this time with creating the first

Macedonian phalanx, which does not appear to have been true because earlier manifestations of Macedonian infantry can be found under Archelaus, Alexander II, and Perdiccas III. What is likely, however, is that Philip created at this time the famous Macedonian phalanx wielding the sarissa in order to maximize the number of infantry he would field against Bardylis (see N.V. Sekunda, chapter 22, pp. 449–52). Philip may not have had access to the necessary manpower, iron and forges to outfit a reliable infantry in the traditional hoplite manner at this point, but he did have access to the trees from which the new, longer spear was manufactured. Of course, once the sarissa proved effective in battle it became a mainstay in Macedonia, allowing Philip to draft more Macedonians into his armies than he could have if he had to provide the entire hoplite panoply. This is an important example of how Macedonia came to be permanently changed by foreign, especially Illyrian, threats.

Despite Bardylis' attempt to negotiate based on the status quo with an army of 10,000 foot and 600 horse, Philip advanced into Illyria and won a decisive victory, probably in the vicinity of Monastir in 358.³³ Bardylis' losses were catastrophic: allegedly, 7,000 of his 10,000 troops died.³⁴ What happened to Bardylis is unknown, but this was an epochal event.³⁵ When Parmenion defeated another Illyrian army on Philip's behalf two years later (Plut., *Alexander* 3.4.5, Justin 12.16.6 - it is significant in terms of the shift of power that Philip allowed Parmenion to fight this battle), he defeated a Grabus, not Bardylis. Philip's victory had been shattering to Illyrian political aspirations at least as they concerned influence in Macedonia. It also laid the foundations for generations of Macedonian influence to come (see S. Müller, chapter 9, pp. 169–71). One of the most important outcomes of Philip's victory was that it allowed him to push his frontier beyond Lake Lychnitis and lay claim to the loyalties of all the Upper Macedonian cantons (Diod. 16.8.1): see map 3. Also, with his forthcoming marriage to Olympias, it allowed him to overshadow Epirus as no previous Argead king ever had. Never before had Argead power been projected so absolutely throughout the region.

A significant byproduct of Philip's victory was his marriage to Audata, probably a relative of Bardylis, but certainly from a prestigious Illyrian house. Marriages being political acts in these cultures, Audata helped Philip seize control of the frontier through which great devastation had flowed into Macedonia, especially during the previous generation. Although we hear little more about Audata she bore Philip a daughter, Cynnane, who was raised in the Illyrian manner, meaning at least part of her training was military. At a later date, Philip gave Cynnane in marriage to his nephew, Amyntas, the young son Perdiccas III had left behind.³⁶

As noted with the reference to Grabus, Philip's victory did not put an end to tensions along his Illyrian frontier but it did turn the tables of relative strength. Constant vigilance along this border would be the policy for all subsequent kings of merit and some strength. Philip's own Epirus policy would be the keystone in defending what would become Macedonia's backdoor, for his plans after 358 directed his attention virtually everywhere except Illyria for most of the time. But first Grabus, a leader whose origin is uncertain (perhaps with connections with the Dardanians?) and whose power was of unknown extent. Despite all of these unknowns, in the wake of Bardylis' defeat Grabus took steps to protect his interests against those of Philip, first by allying with the Chalcidian League (357), and then with Paeonia, Thrace and Athens (356) after Philip temporarily won the Chalcidians over as allies.³⁷ Because of Grabus' attempt to thwart Philip's policy along their mutual border and to pin Philip down with conflicts against a geographically spread alliance, Philip sent Parmenion against the Illyrian,³⁸ for he was otherwise engaged, a testimony to how the Illyrian threat had at least temporarily diminished. After Parmenion's victory, Philip imposed a peace on Grabus' erstwhile allies and it was probably at that time that he began systematically to fortify his Illyrian frontier (Justin 8.3.8, reflected in Dem. 4.24) and relocate populations (Arr. 7.9–2, Stephanus of Byzantium, s.v. *Sarnous*) in his strategic interests. How far Philip's reach extended into Illyris thereafter is not known but it is doubtful that he held sway all the way to the Adriatic coast. Although cowed, therefore, there remained some Illyrian tribes beyond Philip's regular reach but within striking distance of Macedonia. Thus, Philip made it a cornerstone of his western policy to secure Epirus as a reliable ally or vassal depending on circumstances. Without a reliable Epirus on his western shoulder, Philip simply could not afford to engage in his expansive policies elsewhere.

Philip's Epirote strategy was almost certainly shaped by his brothers' ambition to free Macedonia from Illyrian domination and his own betrothal to Olympias, which can be argued as occurring sometime during the reign of Perdiccas III.³⁹ The essence of this policy was simple: given the geography of the region where Macedonia converged with Illyria and Epirus (to the south of the lake district), as long as Macedonia and Epirus were in alliance any Illyrian sortie into either Macedonia or Epirus could be outflanked by an attack from the party not being attacked. As long as the memory of Illyrian-wrought devastation lingered in both Macedonia and Epirus, and as long as any Illyrian state maintained some autonomy, security (psychological as well as physical) demanded some sort of concord between Macedonia and Epirus, and from Philip's perspective the

more he could dominate the relationship the better. The only alternative to engaging Epirus was the impossible task of conquering and maintaining control over the entirety of Illyris (an impossibility given his ambitions elsewhere) at a time when the Balkans and Aegean were otherwise churning.

Thus, and since Illyrian interests continued to conspire against Macedonian even after Bardylis' defeat, Philip married Olympias in 357. We do not know how long it took for the attested alienation between Philip and Olympias to begin (presumably, they were still on intimate terms as late as 355 since their daughter Cleopatra was probably born in 354),⁴⁰ but by 351 Philip readdressed the issue of his western frontier. It, of course, was not just Philip's relationship with Olympias that determined the loyalty of Epirus and quality of the quiet among nearby Illyrians. As he and Olympias grew farther apart, however, her ability and probably willingness to reconcile the interests of her husband and her uncle Arybbas (the reigning king of Epirus) diminished. Perhaps stimulated by a deteriorating relationship with Olympias or perhaps not, Philip campaigned in Illyria and pressured Arybbas to conform to his worldview (in which Epirus was more a vassal than a peer of Macedonia) for the first time in the late 350s, and then somewhat more heavy-handedly between 346 and 342.⁴¹ In 351 Philip took Alexander, Arybbas' 10-year-old nephew and full brother of Olympias, from Epirus to Pella where he used him as a hostage against his uncle's good behavior and had him educated in the ways of an increasingly ambitious Macedonia (Justin 8.6.5). All of these precautions served Philip's interests against the Illyrians by creating a frontier with a solid front against Illyrian raiding, especially while he was engaged elsewhere. They also, however, served his interests in Upper Macedonia. A.B. Bosworth has pointed to the fact that the Upper Macedonians, at least down to the time of Philip's accession, maintained 'a constant struggle to preserve their independence, and fostered alliances with the peoples to the west and north [in order to do so].'⁴² The traditional Upper Macedonian desire to be as free of the Argeads as possible, and how these fed into the charges and judicial assassinations which followed the death of Philip (involving as they did members of the one-time Lyncestian royal family) are well known (see below). Fostering a tighter and more controlled relationship with Epirus had the effect of denying the Upper Macedonian cantons any appeal to sympathetic Epirote ears as these regions might strive to revive any attempt to win independence from Argead control. Philip was killing several birds with one stone with his Epirote policy – or so he almost certainly thought until the day he died.

Important events elsewhere drew Philip's attention away from his

western frontier until after the Third Sacred War (355–346), but by 344 Philip swept (probably) the region of the upper Black Drin valley and made war on the Ardiaioi (Diod. 16.69.7, Trogus *Prologue* 8). What specifically drew him to the region at that time is not known: perhaps he merely intended to reinforce earlier lessons or perhaps he was heading off intrigues both domestic and foreign. In 342 he returned to the west again to campaign in Epirus, where he deposed Arybbas and installed the then about 20-year-old Alexander as king (Dem. 1.13, Justin 8.6.7).⁴³ He may have campaigned in Illyria again in 336 (Diod. 16.93)⁴⁴ and – a final note about the Illyrian wars during his reign – Curtius 8.1.25 refers to a successful campaign undertaken by Alexander in Illyria without Philip being present (thus, while he was alive). When (or perhaps even if) this war was undertaken (in the early 330s?) is unknown, as are the circumstances that spawned it.

Even if Philip did not campaign against Illyrian enemies at this late date, Illyria was clearly on his mind on the eve of his would-be Persian invasion. The setting of his assassination was an Aegae bedecked both by a desire to launch Philip's Persian crusade and to unite Alexander of Epirus and Cleopatra, the daughter of Philip and Olympias, in marriage. Although dynastic issues were also at stake, Alexander of Epirus' marriage to his niece forged one more tie between Macedonia and Epirus at Philip's instigation. Philip wanted as much assurance as possible that Macedonia and Epirus would remain united as one against Illyria as he assaulted the Persian Empire.

Mention should be made of Philip's last (seventh) marriage in 337 to Cleopatra, the niece of Attalus, whom Philip had come to trust as much as he did Parmenion or Antipater by the end of his reign (Plut., *Alexander* 9.3.6–14). The politics behind this marriage cannot be explored here (see S. Müller, chapter 9, pp. 179–83), but it should be noted that in celebrating the union of Philip and Cleopatra Attalus called into question the legitimacy of the heir Alexander, thus insulting both Philip's only viable heir and Olympias. Fleeing Pella after Philip would not suitably chastise Attalus, Alexander retired somewhere to Illyria after depositing his mother in her native Epirus. With his future as Philip's successor at least temporarily in doubt, Alexander knew exactly where to go both to conjure up demons within the collective Macedonian psyche and to stir up enough trouble to delay or derail Philip's planned invasion of Asia.⁴⁵ It took the diplomacy of a guest-friend to patch things up between father and son although Philip never made it to Asia.

Philip's murder in 336 shocked the known world but Alexander quickly made it clear that he intended to honor his father's dream of

attacking Asia. Before he could do so, however, he had to instill an appropriate respect for his leadership in Europe. After Alexander made a political visit to Greece where he put down a revolt of the Greek states and received the endorsement of all of them bar Sparta. He then returned home to prepare for his first military campaign as king.⁴⁶ In the spring of 335, he launched an operation against the Triballians and Illyrians, whom he had been told were eager to take up arms and return to their pre-Philip, pillaging ways.⁴⁷ After campaigning in Thrace and preparing to advance against the Agrianians and Paeonians, information reached him to the effect that Cleitus (the son of Bardylis and of an unknown tribe) and Glaucias (the king of the Taulantians) were about to rebel against Philip's imposed frontier arrangement (Arr. 1.5.1). In addition, Alexander learned of the intent of the Autariatae to ambush him as he reacted to the developing situation. Langarus, the king of the Agrianians, interceded and told Alexander that he could settle with the Autariatae, so that Alexander should have no worries from that source. Langarus invaded and made waste to the homeland of the Autariatae and was given many honors by Alexander for having done so, including the promise of his half-sister, Cynnane in marriage. This betrothal never came to fruition thanks to Langarus' premature death (Arr. 1.5.1–5).

Escaping one trap, Alexander came to find himself temporarily in difficulty when he moved against Pelium (located somewhere to the west of the Pindus crest which separated Macedonian from Illyrian lands). Alexander's speed of movement, impeccable sense of timing, and the quality of his troops eventually won the day and Glaucias fled back home to the lands of the Taulantians where he quieted down for the rest of Alexander's reign. Cleitus joined Glaucias in what are today the Albanian hinterlands of Epidamnus and Apollonia (Arr. 1.6.11). As had been the case under Philip, the Illyrian/Macedonian frontier under Alexander clearly saw Macedonia with the upper hand.

Alexander brought Illyrian mercenaries to Asia (Diod. 17.17.4; cf. Curt. 4.13.31, although these may have been dispatched later), which strengthened Alexander's army but also acted as hostages for the good behavior of their tribes. Further, they helped to siphon off manpower which otherwise might not have been so peaceful while Alexander was in the East. In addition, among Antipater's reinforcements to Alexander were additional Illyrian troops (for example, Curt. 6.6.35). For the duration of Alexander's campaign in Asia (334–323), Antipater watched over the king's European interests including the Illyrian frontier. This period saw a relatively quiet Illyria (and Epirus), even though during the first half of the 320s Greece and its neighbors knew significant famine. In part to minimize the political and economic fallout of hunger, Cyrene exported grain to a number of states,

including an Illyrian recipient, and to individuals, including Olympias and Cleopatra on behalf of Epirus (SEG 9.2).⁴⁸ Who procured the grain for Illyria is unknown. Perhaps a sign of the docility of Illyria as far as the Macedonians were concerned during this period is Diodorus' mention that among the many ambassadors who made their way to Alexander just before his death to congratulate him on his achievements there were Illyrians (17.113.2).

5 After Alexander

After Alexander's death, Illyria continued under the watch of Antipater until his death in 319 (see W.L. Adams, chapter 11). Diodorus 18.11.1 mentions uprisings on Macedonia's Thracian and Illyrian borders during the Lamian War in 323 but nothing significant seems to have emerged from any fighting there in the short term. After Antipater's death and the ascendancy of Polyperchon and Olympias, Cassander became the *de facto* Macedonian king in 316 (although see Plutarch, *Demetrius* 18.2). The hot and cold wars of Alexander's Successors dominated the waning years of the fourth century, but even before his establishment in Macedonia Cassander faced problems on his Epirote/Illyrian frontier, not the least because of Olympias and Cleopatra's established enmity with Antipater, a rift which threatened a unified Macedonian/Epirote frontier against the renewal of Illyrians raids. Cleopatra's marriage to Alexander of Epirus had been the setting of Philip II's murder. In 334, as Alexander the Great made off for Asia, Alexander of Epirus accepted an invitation to intervene in Italy, where he enjoyed some success until his murder in 331. Thereafter, Alexander's wife Cleopatra and her mother Olympias dominated Epirus until Olympias' death in 315 at the instigation of Cassander. For their roles in the succession after the death of Alexander III, see W.L. Adams, chapter 11, pp. 209–14.

During this period, the Aeacid dynasty's relationship with a developing Epirote tribal alliance was tempestuous at best as was its relationship with Cassander. Aeacides, the son of Olympias' uncle Arybbas, became the nominal king of the Molossian Epirotes after the death of Alexander of Epirus, but he worked closely with Olympias until she was captured and judicially executed at Cassander's command. Aeacides' advocacy on her behalf and against the interests of Cassander (costing his subjects service and money) eventually led to his deposition and exile, endangering the royal future of his son, Pyrrhus,⁴⁹ and, perhaps more importantly, the continued suppression of Illyrian raids. What followed within the Aeacid house (the

Molossians over whom the Aeacids had traditionally ruled throughout the fourth century and the entirety of the Epirote people) was rather convoluted and mostly need not concern us here, but the Epirotes rebelled against their unpopular king and made an alliance with Cassander (Diod. 19.36.4).

Notwithstanding, the young Pyrrhus was removed from Epirus for his own safety and brought to the court of Glaucias of the Taulantini, where Glaucias' wife Beroa, who was herself an Aeacid, raised him (Justin 17.3.18–20). It seems that like the Argeads, the Aeacids tempered their conflicts with the Illyrians by the occasional marriage in the hope (certainly on both sides) of gaining advantage across the frontier. The essential consideration for us, however, is that Cassander's western frontier became even more unsettled with Alexander the Great's old enemy, Glaucias, handed an opportunity he could only have dreamed of earlier. Pyrrhus remained with Glaucias for 10 years and was probably even adopted by the Illyrian king as a son. Understanding the danger Pyrrhus represented in the hands of the Illyrian king, Cassander unsuccessfully offered 200 talents for the boy (Plut., *Pyrrhus* 3.2.3). In the short term, however, Cassander and Epirus became allied, after which Cassander sent Lyciscus to Epirus as the once and future kingdom's 'regent and general' (Diod. 19.36.4–5). Although it would take many years and many fits and starts, this was the beginning of an Epirote constitutional monarchy, which one day would do without the monarchy.

Cassander attempted to regain the initiative on his western frontier by, in effect, intervening in Epirote affairs and by attempting to surround the Taulantini. In the struggle which followed, between 314 and 312, Cassander attempted to assert his control over the Epirote monarchy as had his predecessors going back to the time of Philip II: both he and Glaucias maneuvered to control Epidamnus and Apollonia and the strategic coastal plain which marked the western extent of Glaucias' realm (see W.L. Adams, chapter 11, p. 215). Diodorus 19.67.6-7 reports that Cassander initially won Apollonia in 314 and followed up his victory by a sortie inland where he defeated Glaucias and forced a treaty upon him in which the Illyrian promised not to attack Cassander's allies. Cassander also seized Epidamnus through a ruse and threw garrisons into both coastal cities (Polyaenus 4.11.4). Diodorus 19.70.7 subsequently reports (also of 314) that a Spartan military adventurer named Acrotatus (on his way to Tarentum and the west) stymied an attempt by Glaucias as he was in the process of besieging Apollonia, thereafter persuading the Illyrian to make peace with the city. Most accept this order of events (see W.L. Adams, chapter 11, p. 216), which would have meant that a Macedonian garrison would have been in Apollonia at the time when Acrotatus

successfully intervened to prevent Glaucias' conquest of the city, but an argument (proffered in part by the lack of a reference to any Macedonian presence in Apollonia when Acrotatus came by) suggests that it was only after Glaucias attacked Apollonia that Cassander appeared in the region.⁵⁰ Whoever was the initial aggressor, Corcyra intervened in 313 to drive out Cassander's forces, freeing Apollonia and perhaps turning Epidamnus over to Glaucias (Diod. 19.78.1). In the following year Cassander returned to Epirus in support of Lyciscus and the territories of Epidamnus and Apollonia. Cassander, however, was defeated before Apollonia and forced to return home (Diod. 19.88–89). As far as we know, he never again sought dominance in the area.

As a result, for a time the Taulantini appear to have dominated southern Illyria. Their ascendancy and the peace of the entire region, however, were soon to be adversely affected by the coming of the Celts, whose approach set off a domino effect of tribal movements. On the fringe of Macedonian and Illyrian territories as early as 335 (Arr. 1.4.6–8), the Celts' initial impact on the southern Balkans was minimal for a period. They did, however, begin to displace Illyrian tribes that in turn migrated into areas of strategic concern to Macedonian kings. For example, a significant percentage of the Autariatae was displaced from the region of the upper Narenta valley in about 335, from which they migrated into the Axios basin, threatening Paeonia. These were temporarily checked by Langarus, but by 310 they had broken into his realm and threatened massive destruction until Cassander negotiated a settlement whereby some 20,000 of their number settled around Mount Orbelos (Diod. 20.19.1, Justin 15.2.1, 2).

As threats neared Macedonia from the north and northwest, Demetrius Poliorcetes arrived in the Aegean with a fleet and established himself at Athens in 307, seizing the city from Demetrius of Phalerum and Cassander's garrison, and in the process launching a new era of internecine, Macedonian warfare (Plut., *Demetrius* 8.4, Diod. 20.45.1–46.6). Glaucias took advantage of the situation to establish Pyrrhus on the Epirote throne in 306, where he ruled with Illyrian help until he attended the wedding of one of Glaucias' sons (one of Pyrrhus' 'brothers') in 302. In his absence the Molossians unseated Pyrrhus and replaced him with Neoptolemus, another Aeacid (Plut., *Pyrrhus* 4.1). Pyrrhus thereafter fled to Demetrius (son of Antigonus), who had previously taken as a wife Pyrrhus's sister Deidameia. After the Battle of Ipsus in 301, Pyrrhus was sent to Egypt as a hostage where he remained until after the death of Cassander in 297 when Ptolemy supported his return to Epirus as a co-monarch. So did Pyrrhus rule with Neoptolemus until the former had the latter

murdered (Plut., *Pyrrhus* 5.1–7). Pyrrhus thereafter cemented his position in Epirus through a series of marriages: to Lanassa, the daughter of Agathocles of Syracuse, to Bircenna, the daughter of an Illyrian king (who was probably the grandson of Philip II's enemy, Bardylis), and to the daughter of Audoleon, King of the Paeones (Plut., *Pyrrhus* 9). Pyrrhus' marriage to Lanassa reopened a relationship between the Aeacid house and the tyrants of Syracuse originally established in the 380s by Dionysius I and Alcetas. The marriage to Lanassa did not last, allegedly because she believed Pyrrhus to be more devoted to his barbarian wives than to herself (Plut., *Pyrrhus* 10.5).

Whatever personal affections were involved among Pyrrhus' various marriages, it is probable that he attended more to his barbarian wives than to Lanassa because the natal peoples they represented were more important to him than his relationship with the more distant Syracuse. Plutarch attests that Lanassa retired to Corcyra, which was hers as the dowry she brought to Pyrrhus when they married. Subsequently, Lanassa offered herself (and her island) to Demetrius Poliorcetes, who willingly accepted the offer, which in turn helped to drive a wedge between himself and Pyrrhus (Plut., *Pyrrhus* 10.4–5). As a king, Pyrrhus quickly became a rival of Demetrius (his one-time benefactor) and of Lysimachus, with whom he quarreled over Macedonia as the house of Cassander sank into oblivion. Through the murder of Alexander V (Cassander's youngest son) Demetrius Poliorcetes won the throne of Macedonia in 294 (Plut., *Demetrius* 36), thus temporarily rebounding from the debacle of Ipsus. However, Demetrius was almost immediately assailed from both west and east by Pyrrhus and Lysimachus. After Pyrrhus and Demetrius duelled over influence in Boeotia in 291 (Plut., *Demetrius* 40), and Lanassa's abandonment of Pyrrhus for Demetrius in 290, Demetrius invaded Epirus in 289 (Plut., *Demetrius* 41), but after mutual blows a peace was temporarily arranged. An alliance with Lysimachus and Pyrrhus in 288, however, saw a joint invasion of Macedonia and the ousting of Demetrius. From 288 until 284, Pyrrhus and Lysimachus shared the rule of Macedonia until the latter drove the former back to Epirus (Plut., *Pyrrhus* 7–12). Between 284 and his defeat and death at the Battle of Corupedion in 281 Lysimachus stood alone as king of Macedonia.

During these three years Pyrrhus regained control of Corcyra (as a prelude to his invasion of Italy, which he believed could provide the resources for a return to the Balkans and a greater presence in the East, Paus. 1.12.1, Justin 25.4.8), while Lysimachus established his authority over an increasingly troubled Paeonia (Polyaenus 4.12.3) in an attempt to round off his European possessions and insulate

Macedonia from northern incursions. As more famous events dominated the historical record, throughout the late 290s and the 280s Pyrrhus established his dominance over southern Illyria, made all the easier because of his long and close association with the family of Glaucias and because of his marriage policy. Certainly, he must have been secure in this area before he began his invasion of Italy in 280. Until the day of his death, Pyrrhus seems to have harbored ambitions to return to Macedonia as its king, but from a somewhat different perspective than previous rulers in Macedonia, reuniting strong Illyrian and Macedonian interests.

The ebb and flow of Hellenistic campaigns presented an opportunity for the Celtic tribes which then were situated to the north of the Dardanians.⁵¹ With Pyrrhus off to Italy, and with Seleucus' victory over Lysimachus in 281, the situation in and around Macedonia was unsettled and dire. Lysimachus' domestic crisis leading to the arrest and execution of son Agathocles was a principal contributing factor to the Battle of Corupedium.⁵² In its wake, two figures deeply involved in the political intrigues of both the Ptolemaic and Seleucid courts, Arsinoe and Ptolemy Ceraunus, fled the east for Macedonia to escape the ramifications of previous actions (including Ceraunus' assassination of Seleucus I, Justin 17.2.4) and to seek out new opportunities. Already in control of the 'Fetters of Greece' but not of Macedonia was Antigonus Gonatas, the son of the now deceased Demetrius Poliorcetes.⁵³ Commandeering the fleet of Lysimachus, Ceraunus defeated Gonatas on his way west, married his half-sister Arsinoe, forged an alliance with Pyrrhus, and seized the throne of Macedonia (Justin 24.1.8–3.10, Memnon, *BNJ* 434 F 8.4–6). Almost as soon as he assumed the throne, Ceraunus launched some sort of action against an Illyrian king Mononius but could not have pursued it for long because at about the same time a Gallic coalition unleashed itself on Thrace, northern Illyria⁵⁴, Macedonia, and points south (Justin 24.4.1). Disdaining an offer of the Dardanians for an alliance against the Gauls, and even a peace-feeler from the Gauls themselves, Ceraunus engaged the invaders in battle and was soundly defeated and killed (Diod. 22.3, Justin 24.8.1–5.7). Thereafter, the Gauls devastated Macedonia and much of the Balkans, temporarily replacing the Illyrians as the greatest threat to Macedonian well-being.

It had proven very difficult to provide for an adequate amount of basic security along Macedonia's long barbarian frontier as its kings fought among themselves for either world domination or their little piece of Alexander's pie. Eventually Antigonus (II) Gonatas, in the vicinity of Lysimacheia in the Thracian Chersonese, won a victory against a Gallic army (Justin 25.1–2.7, Diogenes Laertius 141, 142), and enough respect to establish himself as Macedonia's king in 277.

After a minimum of resistance and using some Gallic mercenaries in his force, Antigonus Gonatas consolidated his control of Macedonia (Diod. 22.5, Polyaeus 4.6.17, 18, Justin, *Prologue* 25), where he ruled from 276 to 239, although he was frequently challenged, initially especially by Pyrrhus. Antigonus Gonatas faced no known problems along his Illyrian frontier although he was forced to repel an attack by Pyrrhus' Epirote successor, Alexander II, during the Chremonidean War (Justin 26.2.9–3.1). After his victory, Antigonus Gonatas forced Alexander into temporary exile but did little else to harm Epirote interests or extend his control in the region. His refusal to take more advantage of Alexander's predicament, and his continuing willingness to show some concern for Aeacid interests (short of permitting attacks on Macedonia), argues for the general exhaustion of his realm and for his understanding that he needed as healthy an Epirus as possible to help maintain the defensive line against any threat which might arise from the Illyrians and Celtic peoples who continued to pose strategic difficulties on his northwestern frontier.

Alexander II of Epirus appears to have warred successfully against Mitylus (Frontinus 2.5.10), an Illyrian dynast who for a time controlled Epidamnus and minted there in about 270 (Justin, *Prologue* 25). At least for a time after his accession, Alexander II appears to have maintained his father's sway over southern Illyria (Appian 10.7). How much the war with Mitylus might have weakened his power is unknown but his power did wither. The primary evidence for this is circumstantial, but Alexander withdrew his father's garrison from Tarentum, and the city of Apollonia sent an embassy to establish greater contacts with Rome in the mid-260s (Valerius Maximus 6.6.5). Whether Alexander II approved of this embassy, it is telling that Apollonia found it prudent to seek ties with Rome at this time.

With the death of Alexander II in about 240, the center of gravity along the Illyrian littoral shifted from southern Illyria (and the proximity of the Taulantini) and Epirus northward to the lands of the Ardiaioi. The original home of this Illyrian tribe lay in the upper reaches of the Narenta River, but Celtic pressure drove them to the area around Scodra in Agron's day. This period realized the kind of intermingling between Illyrians and Celts that had for a long time existed between Illyrians, Macedonians and Epirotes (and even Thracians). Also rising at this time was Illyrian maritime brigandage, made all the more possible thanks to the collapse of the Epirote monarchy and its replacement by a republican federation in about 232.⁵⁵

A new phase of Macedonian/Illyrian relations emerged in 231 (in which a Macedonian king attempted to employ a recently ascendant Illyrian power to achieve Macedonian goals) when Demetrius II,

Antigonus II's son and successor (ruling jointly with his father from about 257), employed the Ardeaeen dynast Agron to fight against the Aetolians (themselves anxious to benefit from changing conditions on their northwestern frontier) on his behalf over the city Medeon in Acarnania (Polyb. 2.2.4–5). Agron and his wife Teuta had already amassed the most powerful Illyrian regime yet seen, and they successfully defeated the Aetolians.⁵⁶ In the celebrations that followed, Agron over-imbibed and died, leaving Teuta in control of a waxing Illyrian power (Polyb. 2.4.7). In the following year, reintroduced to the relative wealth and weakness of southern Greece, Teuta authorized a series of raids along the coast as far south as Elis and Messenia, during which the Illyrians colluded with Gallic mercenaries serving Epirote interests in Phoenice. When the newly formed Epirote League mobilized for the relief of Phoenice, a second Illyrian force under Scerdilaidas moved down the Drin valley and attacked Epirus from the north. After the Epirote army split to meet each challenge, the force near Phoenice met a significant defeat (Polyb. 2.5.1–8). Before dealing the rest of Epirus a devastating blow, a defection of a few Illyrian tribes from Teuta's coalition to another dominated by the Dardanians, forced Teuta to withdraw and protect interests further north. An alliance of convenience was thereafter arranged between Teuta, the Epirotes and the Acarnanians (Polyb. 2.6.1–11).

In 229, an even larger Illyrian force moved down the coast to wreak havoc, and even forced Corcyra to accept an Illyrian garrison under Demetrius of Pharos (Polyb. 2.9.1–10.9). This and other raids caught the attention of Rome (the growing economic interests of which in the region were being adversely affected by the Illyrian raiding), and the Republic intervened to fight the First Illyrian war of 229–228: see A.M. Eckstein, chapter 12, pp. 227–9. Rome defeated the Illyrians soundly in this conflict and attempted to forbid Illyrian maritime activity south of Lissus by treaty. In effect, Rome was drawing a line and assuming an authority over a protectorate including the part of southern Illyria around Epidamnus and Apollonia in order to guarantee the peace (upon need) in this region of increasing Roman economic activity when no established state in the region, including Macedonia, had any longer the power to check Illyrian incursions.

As all of this was happening, Demetrius II died, but before he met his end a Dardanian invasion led by a Longarus (Livy 31.28.1–2, Justin, *Prologue* 28) resulted in a Macedonian defeat. Not only were Illyrians on the move generally throughout the Adriatic littoral but also so were Dardanians.⁵⁷ When Demetrius died, his son (later Philip V) was a youth. Under duress, the Macedonians therefore

acknowledged the rule of Antigonos III Doson (king in 227), a cousin of Demetrius II, who was forced to deal not only with the Dardanian threat but also with Thessaly and the Aetolians among others. Antigonos III initially had much to do in the south, but defeated the Dardanians to regain some control over Macedonia's northern border (Justin 28.3.14), and returned there immediately after the Battle of Sellasia upon word that Illyrians had invaded Macedonia in 222. Clearly by this date the threat to Macedonia's northwestern frontier had grown beyond being only an Illyrian one to one which involved several distinct peoples, including Dardanians and Celts. Antigonos III defeated the invaders in a pitched battle but died soon thereafter in 221 of a ruptured blood vessel (Polyb. 2.70).⁵⁸

Back in the Adriatic the maritime raids of Illyrians were renewed. Although the Ardeaeon-led coalition had been a powerful one, the political evolution of Teuta's kingdom was not advanced enough for central authority to dictate unpopular conditions upon subjects for long. Illyrian leaders, even strong ones, could not prevent the raiding of their subjects but only hope to harness it for a while in their own interests. Thus, Rome's treaty restrictions against Illyrian piracy were imposed in vain and raiding gradually increased, this time coordinated by the one-time servant of Agron and Teuta, Demetrius of Pharos. During the First Illyrian War, this Demetrius deserted Teuta before her defeat in order to serve Rome in return for Rome's setting him up as an independent dynast on Pharos (Polyb. 2.11.17). Thus, in the region to the north of Rome's Illyrian protectorate, Demetrius essentially became Rome's primary agent. After the First Illyrian War, Teuta disappeared and Demetrius also became the primary guardian for the under-age Ardeaeon king, Pinnes. When the Romans' became involved in the reduction of Cisalpine Gaul, Demetrius took the opportunity to renew pirate activity (in collusion with the important Scerdilaidas), in part to maintain prestige among the Ardeaeans (Appian 10.7-8, Polyb. 4.29.5-6). At the Battle of Sellasia, Demetrius turned up as a Macedonian ally, probably foreseeing the day when Rome would seek an account with him and he would need powerful friends. Freed of other commitments, the Romans returned again to sweep piracy from the Adriatic and did so in the brief Second Illyrian War of 219, although not before Demetrius had overrun the northern section of the Roman protectorate in southern Illyria (Polyb. 3.16.3). Rome was becoming rather more proprietary in the Adriatic at this time (see A.M. Eckstein, chapter 12, pp. 229-30).

The Macedonian king Philip V (221-179) had his own problems with the Dardanians in 220, against whom he commanded his first military expedition (Justin 29.1.10). Knowing of the renewal of Illyrian piracy and of Demetrius' war with Rome, Philip nevertheless

made common cause with Scerdilaidas against Aetolia because more trouble with the Dardanians threatened in 220/19. Defeated by Rome, Demetrius joined Philip as a friend and ally (against the Dardanians and a both encroaching, and increasingly aggressive, Rome), but Rome had become too preoccupied by Hannibal and the impending Second Punic War to direct much attention to the east. Until 217, Philip V was preoccupied with affairs elsewhere, but in that year he turned to Paeonia, where the Dardanians were making inroads and beginning again to threaten Macedonia anew. Philip improved his northern defenses (Polyb. 5.97.2) and otherwise attempted to settle the region with Macedonians, but when he turned his attention back to central Greece a break with Scerdilaidas occurred when the Illyrian decided that it was more profitable to attack Pelegonia and western Macedonian than to maintain any relationship with Philip. Philip was forced back to his western frontier where he reestablished his control of areas overrun by Scerdilaidas and extended his line of defense (Polyb. 5.108.3-8). In 216, taking a page from the Illyrian playbook, Philip took a fleet of Illyrian style lembi to the Adriatic (Polyb. 5.109.1-2), where he hoped to take advantage of the Roman fleet's supposed removal to Sicily in order to wreak Illyrian-style havoc on enemies, including Apollonia and the renegade Scerdilaidas, who had now made common cause with Rome. He retreated, however, when he learned that there were Roman ships in the vicinity (Polyb. 5.101.8-10). Thus things stood until Philip heard of Hannibal's victories, especially at Cannae, which caused him to believe that Rome could not stand and that he could succeed in asserting a sometime Macedonian dream of controlling all of the territory between Upper Macedonia and the Adriatic coast, with influence perhaps beyond. When Rome learned of the alliance arranged between Philip and Hannibal, it naturally declared war on Macedonia in what is called the First Macedonian War of 215-205.

This is not the place to detail further events, but it should be noted that this conflict saw Philip originally hold his own in the face of the coalition Rome forged against him. Of course, Rome continued to be preoccupied with Hannibal, and returned to take great vengeance upon Philip in the Second Macedonian War of 200-196, which made Macedonia a *de facto* dependency of Rome: see in detail A.M. Eckstein, chapter 12, pp. 234-37. After his defeat in that war, Philip V more or less remained a loyal client of the Republic until his death, even though Macedonia continued to be harassed by its neighbors.⁵⁹ The Macedonian/Illyrian wars, however, were largely over. The 400-year struggle between the Argead Macedonians and a variety of Illyrian nations, however, had left its mark. No threat to Macedonia's security or independence before the coming of Rome was as great as that

posed by the Illyrians (a truth noted by others, including W.L. Adams in chapter 11, pp. 223–4). Not even the Celtic debacle of the third century, ephemeral as it was when compared to the prolonged pressure exerted by the Illyrians, had a bigger impact on Macedonia and its institutions, not the least because the Illyrians were the primary threat (admittedly, among others) against which Philip II launched his reforms. The fear of Illyrians is most dramatically demonstrated in Arrian's rendition of Alexander's speech to his mutinous troops at Opis in Mesopotamia in 324 (7.9.1–5, especially 7.9.2; cf. Curt. 6.3.2), which gives the Illyrians top-billing as the enemy who terrified the Macedonians most as late as this year (if Arrian accurately reflects the psychological states of Alexander's Macedonian troops). Helping to forge Philip's early career as they did, the Illyrians helped to catapult Macedonia to the forefront of world history, for good or bad. By the mid-190s, the Macedonians as a dominant historical phenomenon had been spent. In the future, security from threats emerging from greater Illyria would become a Roman responsibility.

6 Perseus, Epirus and Illyria

Philip V's son Perseus became king on his father's death in 179. Our primary sources for his reign, Polybius and Livy, are manifestly anti-Macedonian. Nevertheless, they reveal that he was more than competent as both a general and a diplomat, especially during the first six years of his reign (see A.M. Eckstein, chapter 12). Perseus helped to rebuild Macedonia's standing with his nearest neighbors during this period (Polyb. 25.3.1), not least because he projected a more benign alternative to an increasingly heavy-handed Roman diplomacy. This was especially so among the lower-classes for whom the Macedonian monarch championed debt relief (Livy 42.13.8–9) at the same time when Rome preferred to back elites in an effort to improve its influence among the region's power-brokers. Perseus thus challenged Rome for the hearts and minds of the Greeks.⁶⁰ He was, however, beset by several ancestral enemies and Rome was unwilling to tolerate a Macedonian revival of any kind (see A.M. Eckstein, chapter 12, pp. 240–6). Although preparing for conflict, Rome came to realize that its reputation had somewhat eroded across the Adriatic since the Second Macedonian War (Livy 42.47.2). The Ardeaeen king/warlord Genthius, who long presented a pro-Roman facade, hovered between loyalty to Rome and the opportunity a renewed Macedonian might have for his own ambitions.⁶¹ For the time being, however, the

Epirote League remained Rome's nominal ally (Polyb. 20.3, 21.6, 23.1). More fear of Rome than sympathy with Macedonia existed throughout the region and this, coupled with internecine strife throughout Greece, stymied any ground swell in favor of Macedonia.

Seeing Rome's war preparations Perseus sought diplomacy. As the Romans led him on with false hope of a possible peace, however, they were simultaneously posting troops along the Adriatic coast in southern Illyria to secure beachheads for the invasion to come. The Third Macedonian War (171–168) did not initially go in their favor (see A.M. Eckstein, chapter 12, pp. 246–8). In the Epirote/Illyrian theater, however, they splayed troops among the Greek cities of the coast and into both Illyria and Epirus (and initially had free access through Epirus to the Macedonian frontier).⁶² Harsh treatment by the Romans alienated many of the elder statesmen of Epirus, most of whom were Molossian. The treatment dealt out by the Romans, and the fear of an emerging pro-Roman, Thesprotian/Epirote named Charops - who seemed bent on exploiting Italian connections to redefine the domestic equilibrium in Epirus away from the Molossians - induced one Theodotus and allies to attempt the kidnapping of the newly appointed Roman commander Aulus Hostilius Mancinus.⁶³ Their intent was to turn the Roman over to Perseus in the hope that a bargaining advantage could be won for the Macedonian side that the Molossians were coming to favor. Yet the attempt failed and Rome demonized the perpetrators and their political allies. One manifest result was the breakup of the Epirote League: the Molossian-controlled eastern part of the kingdom gravitated toward Perseus in the war while the coast (dominated by the Chaonians and Thesprotians) opted to remain allied to Rome (Livy 43.21.4). Amid the ebb and flow of military conflict along the Adriatic coast and its adjacent interior, Rome's behavior stimulated a greater resistance among onetime allies. In 169 Genthius was finally enticed into an alliance with Perseus for the promise of 300 talents of silver, which was never paid (Polyb. 29.47, Livy 44.27.8–9). Rome's reaction against what is considered the treachery of the eastern Epirotes and Genthius was manifested when the war came to an end. Genthius and his family were forcibly removed to Italy (Livy 30.22) and the fate of the Molossians was catastrophic. Aemilius Pallus (the Roman who brought the war to its conclusion with his victory at Pydna), having lulled them into a false sense of security by his treatment of other defeated foes, exacted vengeance upon a one-time ally and helped to pay Rome's war expenses by sacking 70 towns and enslaving an alleged 150,000 Molossians.⁶⁴ Truly, the Romans made a wasteland and called it peace.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

There are no good connected modern accounts of Macedonian and Illyrian relations from the rise of the Argead dynasty to the coming of Rome, primarily because with rare exceptions (including Antipater and the two Marsyases, *FGrH* 114 and 135–6) there was little interest in the subject among the literate in the ancient world. The primarily Greek sources which provided any information about this frontier only did so obliquely and were more preoccupied by Macedonian/Greek or Roman/Macedonian affairs than with Macedonian (or Illyrian) strategic concerns or relations, especially if these were peaceful. Perhaps we would know more if we had more extant material from Theopompus of Chios (*FGrH* 115), but it is arguable that even that historian was interested in the Illyrians versus the Macedonians only because it had some impact on the Greek world.

For the early periods of Macedonian/Illyrian relations, the scholarship of H.J. Dell, primarily his *The Illyrian Frontier to 229 B.C.* (diss. University of Wisconsin-Madison 1964) and 'The Western Frontier of the Macedonian Monarchy,' *Ancient Macedonia* 1 (Thessaloniki 1970), pp. 115–26, and J. Wilkes, *The Illyrians* (Oxford 1992), remain the best and most cogent of what is to be found today. Dell's dissertation, however, may be difficult for some to obtain and Wilkes' work is less a connected history of the Illyrians than a general introduction to ancient Illyrians, their culture, their language and modern antiquarianism. Archaeological reports help to further our understanding of the material culture of the Illyrians (see perhaps most conveniently, *Archaeological Reports for 1999–2000* 46 (2000), pp. 153–9, but these tell us little that has illuminated Macedonian/Illyrian relations. Of special note and interest is the numismatic monograph of J.M.F. May, *The Coinage of Damastion and the Lesser Coinages of the IllyroPaeonian Region* (Oxford 1939). Perhaps these, however, are most useful for revealing how much material culture overlapped the Macedonian/Illyrian frontier, especially during the early periods. N.G.L. Hammond includes much information of value in his three-volume *History of Macedonia* (Oxford 1972, 1979, 2008 – the last two co-authored by G.T. Griffith and Frank Walbank, respectively), as he does in his earlier *Epirus* (Oxford 1967), but nowhere does Hammond focus his attention on Macedonian/Illyrian relations in any systematic way. There is also much useful information in more general accounts such as P. Green, *Alexander to Actium* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1990), but as always Macedonia's Illyrian

concerns play second fiddle to its impact upon Greece, Persia or Rome. Most monographs that focus on Illyria do so upon its language and issues of identity. One notable, if dated, exception is F. Papazoglou, 'Les origines et la destinée de l'état illyrien', *Historia* 11 (1965), pp. 143–79.

For an understanding of Epirus, Hammond's aforementioned work is critical, but difficult to digest because of its organization. Also important if out of date is G.N. Cross, *Epirus: A Study in Greek Constitutional Development* (Cambridge 1932). Cross's historical accounts are much briefer and much more lucidly presented than Hammond's. It was not, however, the intention of either of these scholars to focus on Macedonian/Epirote relations.

¹ H.J. Dell, 'The Western Frontier of the Macedonian Monarchy', *Ancient Macedonia* 1 (Thessaloniki 1970), pp. 115–26, especially p. 115, and see also his *The Illyrian Frontier to 229 B.C.* (diss. University of Wisconsin-Madison 1964). Although dated, Dell's historical analysis of the Macedonian/Illyrian frontier remains the most cogent single account of the problems faced by the Macedonians in this region, at least in English. I occasionally disagree with Dell's conclusions, but honor his work very much and wished he had lived long enough to bring it into more general circulation.

² J. Wilkes, *The Illyrians* (Oxford 1992), pp. 13–25.

³ Wilkes, *Illyrians*, pp. 13–15.

⁴ For a survey of the Illyrian tribes identified in antiquity, see Dell, *Illyrian Frontier*, pp. 9–25, Wilkes, *Illyrians*, pp. 94–104.

⁵ N.G.L. Hammond, *Epirus* (Oxford 1967), p. 7.

⁶ Hammond, *Epirus*, pp. 8–18.

⁷ W.S. Greenwalt, 'Argaeus in the Macedonian Religious Tradition', *AHB* 1 (1987), pp. 51–3.

⁸ Dell, *Illyrian Frontier*, pp. 21–3.

⁹ For the larger context of Perdiccas' diplomacy, see J. Roisman, chapter 8, pp. 146–54.

¹⁰ Herodotus 5.19-21 and Thucydides 2.101.5 refer to earlier marriages intended to placate powerful enemies, but neither of these refers to an alliance with a third party.

¹¹ See J. Roisman, chapter 8, pp. 154–7 and W.S. Greenwalt, ‘Coinage from Archelaus to Perdiccas III’, in Ian Worthington (ed.) *Ventures into Greek History: Essays in Honour of N.G.L. Hammond* (Oxford 1994), pp. 105–19, ‘Why Pella?’, *Historia* 48 (1999), pp. 158-83, and ‘Archelaus the Philhellene’, *Anc. World* 34 (2003), pp. 131–53.

¹² W.S. Greenwalt, ‘The Introduction of Caranus into the Argead King List’, *GRBS* 26 (1985), pp. 43–9.

¹³ Bardylis is not named until Diodorus 16.3.4, but he was an old man when Philip won his decisive victory in 358 (Lucian, *Macrobii* 10), so he could have been active as early as 393.

¹⁴ J.M.F. May, *The Coinage of Damastion and the Lesser Coinages of the Illyro-Paeonian Region* (Oxford 1939), see especially the summary on pp. v-x.

¹⁵ W.S. Greenwalt, ‘Polygamy and Succession in Argead Macedonia’, *Arethusa* 22 (1989), pp. 19–45.

¹⁶ Diodorus also adds that Amyntas’ son, Philip, was required as a hostage at this time. Philip was born in about 383, so he could have been a hostage as an infant, but this assumes that the second Illyrian invasion is factual (see below). Justin 7.5.1 asserts that the Illyrians held Philip for a time under Alexander II before being ransomed back by the same king. Since Alexander ruled for less than two years, if Justin is right, then Philip was not in Illyria for long. If Diodorus here and Justin’s mention of Philip being recovered by Alexander are both true, then Philip was in Illyrian hands for over a decade, which seems implausible but which cannot be proven wrong. Philip subsequently served as a hostage at Thebes: Diod. 15.67.4, Plut., *Pelopidas* 26.4. See also S. Müller, chapter 9.

¹⁷ Diodorus 15.13 reports that in the midst of a plan to dominate the Adriatic Dionysius (the tyrant of Syracuse) among other things allied himself with some Illyrian faction, and unleashed them upon Epirus (along with allies and a substantial amount of ‘Greek’

armor) with the intent of establishing a scion of the Aeacid house, Alcetas, who at the time was exiled from his native land and resident in Syracuse. This led to the Epirote slaughter previously mentioned. G.N. Cross, *Epirus: A Study in Greek Constitutional Development* (Cambridge 1932), pp. 30–3, argues that Diodorus' Alcetas was the son of the Molossian, Tharypas, and that his exile from Epirus was connected with a campaign of the Spartan, Agesilaus in Acarnania in 389/8, one of the results of which was to induce the Epirotes to unseat an unpopular monarchy in the wake of all the political changes happening through Greece after the Peloponnesian War. Seeking refuge in Syracuse, Alcetas provided Dionysius with a tool to extend his influence throughout an important segment of the Adriatic littoral. If this reasonable hypothesis is accepted, then Alcetas' imposition upon his subjects came at a terrible cost to their well-being.

¹⁸ Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, p. 184, Hammond in Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, p. 174

¹⁹ Among those who believe Sirrhas to have been an Illyrian, see F. Papazoglou, 'Les origines et la destinée de l'état illyrien: Illyrii Proprie Dicti', *Historia* 11 (1965), p. 150, A.B. Bosworth, 'Philip II and Upper Macedonia', *CQ*² 21 (1971), p. 99, J.R. Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism* (London, 1976), pp. 42, 249–250, and E. Badian, 'Eurydice', in W.L. Adams and E.N. Borza (eds.), *Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage* (Lanham 1982), p. 103. Among those who lean toward his being a Lyncestian are Greenwalt, 'Polygamy and Succession in Argead Macedonia', pp. 37–44, Hammond, *History of Macedonia* 1, p. 15, and A. Oikonomedes, 'The Epigram on the Tomb of Olympias at Pydna', *Anc. World* 5 (1983), p. 13.

²⁰ *Suda*, s.v. Karanos, Libanius, *Life of Demosthenes* 9, Plut., *Moralia* 14c, E.D. Carney, *Women and Monarchy in Macedonia* (Norman 2000), pp. 40–6. For a reasonable argument as to why Eurydice was Lyncestian not Illyrian, see Ian Worthington, *Philip II of Macedonia* (New Haven 2008), p. 178.

²¹ Ptolemy Alorites is nowhere named as the husband of Eurynoe. Both Diodorus (15.71.1, 77.5) and Marsyas (*FGrH* 136 F 11 = Athen. 14.629d) identify him as a brother of Alexander II (hence, also of Perdiccas III and Philip II) although most today would read this as 'brother-in-law' (since he is not listed among the children of Amyntas). Hence, the assumption that this Ptolemy was

married to Eury noe (the only know daughter of Amyntas): see Carney, *Women and Monarchy*, pp. 39–40. As if the later example of Philip is not clear enough, Aristotle, *Politics* 5.8.11, demonstrates that royal daughters were married only to strategically chosen political allies. Since the last 13 years of Amyntas' reign were associated with his subordination to the Illyrians, it follows that Ptolemy supported this policy and would thus have supported Eurydice and her sons, assuming that this line would continue Amyntas' policy, precisely because Amyntas' marriage to Eurydice gave the Argead a marriage link to Illyrian interests. I posit this later point because of a pattern of evidence argued extensively elsewhere: W.S. Greenwalt, 'Philip and Olympias on Samothrace: A Clue to Macedonian Politics during the 360s', in T. Howe and J. Reames (eds.), *Macedonian Legacies: Studies in Ancient Macedonian History and Culture in Honor of Eugene N. Borza* (Claremont 2008), pp. 79–106.

²² Greenwalt, 'Philip and Olympias on Samothrace', pp. 94–6, for my interpretation of Alexander's domestic military policy.

²³ Greenwalt, 'Philip and Olympias on Samothrace', pp. 91–7. What is especially remarkable about Eurydice's marriage to Ptolemy, the attested murderer of her oldest son, is that she appears in the tradition (leaving aside Justin) to have maintained the reputation of being a good mother. Plutarch, *Moralia* 14c, alleged that she was a model in the education of her children and both Aeschines 2.27 and Nepos, *Iphicrates* 3.2, portray her as a concerned protector of her surviving sons amid political turmoil after the death of Alexander. The fact that Aeschines could bring up this story in the lifetime of Philip II suggests strongly that there was no animosity toward Eurydice on behalf of either Perdiccas III or Philip II. Justin, therefore, cannot be accepted on the reason for Eurydice's marriage to Ptolemy.

²⁴ M. Price, *Coins of the Macedonians* (London 1974), p. 20. Coins of Perdiccas of fine quality are known today, suggesting some economic recovery: see Polyaeus 4.10.2, where it is mentioned that by the end of his reign Perdiccas was issuing token coinage, worthless beyond his realm.

²⁵ Diod 16.2.4–6, Libanius, *Life of Demosthenes* 9. The identification of Bardylis comes from Diodorus 16.4.4.

²⁶ W. Heckel, 'Polyxena, the Mother of Alexander the Great',

²⁷ The dating of the betrothal has not been much discussed in the scholarship. In most works it appears accepted that the betrothal of Olympias to Philip occurred shortly before the marriage: for example, see Worthington, *Philip II*, p. 17, who rejects the whole anecdote, citing Carney, *Women and Monarchy*, p. 63. Carney, however, does not necessarily reject the entire story, but only its ‘love at first sight element’, which Greenwalt, ‘Philip and Olympias on Samothrace’, p. 85 and S.G. Cole, *Theoi Megaloi: The Cult of the Great Gods at Samothrace* (Leiden 1984), p. 17, also reject. I am not the first who has accepted the anecdote as both true and predating the accession of Philip: see J.R. Hamilton, *Plutarch, Alexander. A Commentary* (Oxford 1969), p. 2.

²⁸ Hammond in Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, p. 185, arguing based on *SEG* 23.471.13 in which an inscription found at Dodona mentions the Orestes as having been one of 15 *synarchontes* of the Molossian lead kingdom.

²⁹ Greenwalt, ‘Philip and Olympias on Samothrace’, pp. 91–7.

³⁰ Antipater wrote a lost account of Perdiccas’ Illyrian wars: *Suda*, s.v. Antipatros.

³¹ Amyntas was very young at the time of his father’s death - too young to rule effectively amidst a crisis. It is remarkable, however, given the Argead track record that Philip allowed his young nephew to live, given the potential challenge he might someday prove to be.

³² Although I think he married Phila at this time, others argue differently, for example see Worthington, *Philip II*, p. 19.

³³ Dell, *Illyrian Frontier*, p. 64.

³⁴ Diod. 16.4.3-7, Justin 7.6.7, Frontinus 2.32, Polyaeus 4.2.17.

³⁵ The origin of Bardylis is conjectural. We do not know his tribe for sure but he seems to have had humble origins. Even so, he founded an influential line into which Philip and Pyrrhus married: see Dell, *Illyrian Frontier*, pp. 64–6 and Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 21–2. Dell interestingly suggests

(*Illyrian Frontier*, p. 71) that Bardylis did not die in 358 and that Frontinus anecdote at 2.5.19 depicting one of his raids on Epirus took place subsequent to Philip's crushing victory. On Philip's victory, see Worthington, *Philip II*, pp. 33–5.

³⁶ Carney, *Women and Monarchy*, pp. 57–8, 69–70. Amyntas' marriage to Cynnane probably should be taken to indicate that he played a continuing role under Philip. For a general discussion of Philip's early campaigns, see Worthington, *Philip II*, pp. 20–35. See also S. Müller, chapter 9.

³⁷ Dell, *Illyrian Frontier*, pp. 72–4.

³⁸ Diod. 16.22.3, Plut., *Alexander* 3.4-5 and *Moralia* 6, Justin 12.16.6.

³⁹ Greenwalt, 'Philip and Olympias on Samothrace', p. 97.

⁴⁰ Carney, *Women and Monarchy*, p. 75.

⁴¹ Dem. 1.13, 23, 4.48, Diod 16.69.7, and see Dell, 'Western Frontier', p. 119.

⁴² Bosworth, 'Philip II and Upper Macedonia', p. 100.

⁴³ Diodorus 16.72.1 reports that the deposed Molossian 'Arymbas' died, leaving his son Aeacides (Pyrrhus' father) as a successor, only to have him deposed in favor of Olympias' brother, Alexander. Rather, Arybbas was driven to Athens, where he received citizenship: *Syll.*³ 228.

⁴⁴ This is when Diodorus introduces the lurid love triangle involving Philip and two Pausaniases which climaxed during an Illyrian campaign. Diodorus, however, may have been referring to events which had taken place somewhat earlier, but which were recorded here because of Attalus' tie-in to the matter.

⁴⁵ Since Alexander through his father and possibly through his mother had relatives in Illyria, he probably sought refuge with part of his 'extended' family.

⁴⁶ For a general discussion of Alexander's European campaigns, see Ian Worthington, *Alexander the Great: Man and God* (London

2004), especially pp. 53–9 and D.L. Gilley and Ian Worthington, chapter 10.

⁴⁷ Arr., 1.1.5–6.11, Diod. 17.18.1. Justin 11.1–6 states that many (including Illyrians) in Philip's coalition at the time of his death rejoiced at the news, some, seeking liberty because they felt that they had been coerced into serving Philip, others hoping not to take part in his Asian expedition.

⁴⁸ Rhodes and Osborne, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, no. 96, with bibliography.

⁴⁹ Diod. 19.26.2–3, Plut., *Pyrrhus* 2.3, Justin 17.3.17, Paus. 1.11.4.

⁵⁰ Dell, *Illyrian Frontier*, p. 106.

⁵¹ Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, pp. 251–3.

⁵² H.S. Lund, *Lysimachus* (London 1992), pp. 186–206.

⁵³ The 'Fetters of Greece' were the cities of Corinth, Chalcis, and Demetrias, in which Macedonian garrisons had been placed. These strategically situated cities helped Macedonian kings influence (even control) the affairs of southern Greece, without necessarily directly controlling the entire region.

⁵⁴ Dell, *Illyrian Frontier*, pp. 121–5, who argues from the numismatic evidence that a continuity of leadership existed through this period.

⁵⁵ Hammond, *Epirus*, pp. 648–71.

⁵⁶ Polyb. 2.2.4, Appian 10.3, Strabo 7.5.6.

⁵⁷ How to label the Dardanians is disputed. They may have been at least partially Illyrian in origin but their home seems to have been in what is today Kosovo, along the upper reaches of the Axios river. This region was somewhat to the north and east of where most identifiably Illyrian peoples lived throughout the periods covered in this essay, and the Dardanians themselves appear to have been largely 'Thracianized' by this period.

⁵⁸ Polybius mentions Illyrians but the invasion was perhaps Dardanian.

⁵⁹ But see J.M.F. May, 'Macedonia and Illyria (217–167 B.C.)', *JRS* 36 (1946), pp. 48–56.

⁶⁰ Yet had difficulty maintaining such one-time Macedonian cantons as Orestes: Polyb. 18.47.6, Livy 42.38.1.

⁶¹ After the Second Macedonian War, Philip V ceded some Illyrian districts to Rome: Polyb. 23.18.1, 21.3–4. On the Illyrian relationship with Rome and Macedonia, see Polybius 21.21.34, 23.1, 28.8 (where Genthius requests a fee for aligning against Rome) and 29.11, Livy 40.3–5, 42.26.2–7, 42.29.11–12, 37.2, 40.5, 48.8, and on Illyrian bribes to Romans, Livy 42.45.8

⁶² Polyb. 28.3–5, Livy 37.55.1, 38.18.3, 42.8–9, 43.11.9, 17.

⁶³ Charops: Polyb. 20.3, 27.15, 30.7–12. On the plot against Mancinus, see Polyb. 27.16, Diod. 30.5a.

⁶⁴ Polyb. 30.15, Livy 45.34, Strabo 7.73, Plut., *Aemilius Paullus* 29.

Macedonia and Thessaly

Denver Graninger

They wile away their lives in the presence of dancing girls and flute-girls. Some waste their days at dice, drinking, and similar incontinence. They are more concerned to furnish themselves with tables full of every sort of delicacy than to have their own lives well ordered.

Theopompus, FGrH 115 F 491

Thus the moralizing and occasionally peevish fourth-century historian Theopompus describes Macedonia's southern neighbors, the Thessalians, a far less menacing lot than Illyrians or Thracians at first sight. Famously rich in natural resources and militarily powerful (the Thessalian cavalry is to be numbered alongside the Spartan hoplite phalanx and the triremes of the Athenian navy as the most feared military units of the classical Greek world), yet perennially rent by internal division and civil war, Thessaly offered a unique set of challenges as well as opportunities to Macedonia. Following an introduction to Thessalian institutions and topography, this chapter explores the relationships between Macedonia and Thessaly as they evolved from the Late Bronze Age to the Roman era, with special emphasis on the Classical and Hellenistic periods. A concluding section examines further cultural connections between the two regions, especially in cult. See part IV 'History' for a treatment of the events discussed below in broader Macedonian and Mediterranean perspective.

1 Thessalian Topography, Politics and Society

One must distinguish between Thessaly in a narrow sense and in a

broad sense. Strictly speaking, Thessaly consisted of a pair of capacious plains that extended for some 2,400 square miles; it was as close to Kansas or the Ukraine as any inhabitant of the ancient Greek mainland could get.² Well-watered by the Peneus River and its tributaries, and with comparatively little access to the sea, this vast expanse allowed for the practice of agriculture and stock-rearing on a scale otherwise unknown in the Greek Aegean (see map 7). The inhabitants of these plains were known as *Thessaloi*, ‘Thessalians’, already in the Archaic era, and from them the region took its name *Thessalia*, ‘Thessaly’.

Evidence for the early social and political history of Thessaly is fragmentary and often contradictory. While there is much disagreement among scholars about even the most basic issues, some limited consensus has grown around the following points. The Thessalians may have been organized as a regional state or *koinon*, ‘league’, by the early Classical period, perhaps earlier.³ Initially, the league seems to have been a loose, informal structure that helped to marshal resources to fight wars and conduct alliances. There may have been a representative assembly or council. In the context of this regional government there is persistent reference to a strong executive office held for a life-term.⁴ The institutional prerogatives of the office are likewise uncertain, although the dominant context, like that of the *koinon*, is military. A semi-legendary Aleuas the Red, who wields some form of executive power in our sources, is associated with the sixth-century division of the Thessalian plains into four administrative units or *tetrads*, ‘quarters’, known as Pelasgiotis, Hestiaiotis, Phthiotis and Thessaliotis.⁵ Thessaly thus narrowly conceived will be described as ‘tetradic Thessaly’.

Partially alongside and partially within this regional structure was a plurality of Thessalian city-states, each of which was governed locally and free to administer its affairs. Given our sources’ steady association of specific elite clans with specific cities (for example, the Skopads of Krannon, the Aleuads of Larissa), most were probably governed by restricted oligarchies. In many respects, these elites were well within the cultural mainstream of Archaic and classical Greece. They had interests in poetry (both Simonides and Anacreon had Thessalian patrons), philosophy (the great sophist Gorgias spent time in Thessaly), feasting (as Theopompus reminds us), and, above all else, horses (the Thessalian countryside being exceptionally well-suited to equestrian pursuits). As in central and southern Greece, conflict too was part of this culture. Civil wars within individual cities were endemic and perpetually destabilizing, often finding only temporary solutions; those conducted between cities for control of the Thessalian League and regional hegemony were still more paralyzing.

As Martin aptly observes, ‘the most serious Thessalian political problem was the chronic inability of the aristocrats to get along with one another’.⁶

The elite families of Thessaly drew much of their power from large estates in the countryside that were worked by a dependent population known as *penestai* (the title may be etymologically related to the ancient Greek word for ‘poor’, *penes*).⁷ Unlike the helots of Laconia and Messenia, with whom they are often compared in the ancient sources, the *penestai* were not a labor force that belonged to the state but to the estate owners. In other respects, however, the comparison with the helots is apt. Both groups were likely indigenous populations not imported from abroad. In addition to their agricultural labor, both could on occasion be mobilized for military service. Both were also prone to revolt and contributed to the volatility of their respective regions. The institution of the *penestai* was in decline by the late third century.⁸

Surrounding tetradic Thessaly on three sides lay mountainous, upland regions that were part of Thessaly in the broad sense: Perrhaebia to the north, Magnesia to the east, and Phthiotic Achaea to the southeast.⁹ These three regions are known collectively as the Thessalian *perioikoi* (those who ‘live around’ the Thessalians) or perioikic Thessaly.¹⁰ The *perioikoi* may each have been loosely organized as informal, autonomous states in the Archaic period, but over the course of the sixth century the *perioikoi* submitted to tetradic Thessalian control and were ordered to pay tribute, levy troops for Thessalian military expeditions, and renounce their territorial sovereignty (Xen., *Hellenica* 6.1.19, Hdt. 5.94).¹¹ While broadly dependent upon the Thessalian League as a whole, there is considerable evidence that the three most powerful cities of Thessaly – Larissa, Pherae, and Pharsalus – played a prominent administrative role for those *perioikoi* situated most closely to them: Larissa controlled Perrhaebia, Pherae Magnesia, and Pharsalus Phthiotic Achaea.¹²

Used in a broad sense, the word Thessaly thus covers a single geographic region – the two great plains and surrounding mountainous hinterland – but a plurality of social and political organizations. As much as possible, this chapter will attempt to specify what subset of this geographic region is implicated in a given historical development, whether a particular city, like Larissa or Pharsalus, or region, like Magnesia or tetradic Thessaly. Too often, however, literary sources, upon which the present chapter heavily depends, simply mention ‘Thessalians’, and it is impossible to know who from this rich palette of players is meant.

The Macedonian territories of Elimea and Pieria shared a physical

border with Magnesia and Perrhaebia of perioikic Thessaly and Pelasgiotis of tetradic Thessaly. Three principal land routes crossed this border: the Volustana pass led from Elimeia into northern Perrhaebia, the Petra pass led from northern Pieria into northern Perrhaebia, and the Vale of the Tempe, a spectacular gorge separating Ossa from Lower Olympus and through which the Peneus river flows on its way to the sea, led from southern Pieria to Pelasgiotis, Perrhaebia, and Magnesia.¹³ There were also important routes leading from Tricca and Aeginium in Hestiaeotis into Elimeia, Tymphaea, and the southern Haliacmon corridor.¹⁴ For those traveling south by sea, the first substantial harborage south of the Tempe was in the Pagasitic Gulf. Somewhat unexpectedly, this difficult topography seems to have knit Thessaly and Macedonia together as much as it kept them apart. While there is evidence for a possible Mycenaean-style palace in eastern Thessaly at Dimini (tentatively identified with the Iolcus of early Greek epic), Mycenaean influence waned as one moved beyond the Peneus river and into Macedonia. Contact and influence between the two regions, especially eastern Thessaly and coastal Macedonia, was nevertheless already prevalent in the Protogeometric and Geometric periods and continued unabated into the historical era.¹⁵

2 Before Philip II

Our narrative of the history of Thessalo-Macedonian relations begins in the late Archaic period, continues through the conclusion of the Third Macedonian War in 168, and falls into three distinct periods: from the Persian Wars to Philip II's assumption of the Macedonian kingship, the era of Philip and Alexander, and the later Hellenistic period. Three related themes emerge in 'Before Philip': first, there were clear lines of mutual support extending from the Argead rulers of Macedonia to the Aleuads ensconced at Larissa – the most powerful Thessalian clan for much of the Classical period. It is striking how often the goals of this relationship were in explicit opposition to those of the broader Larissan or tetradic Thessalian community, and indeed the bond between the two clans in this period is better understood in terms of traditional Greek guest-friendship rather than of formal political alliance. That the Argeads cultivated ties with elites based elsewhere in Thessaly is certain, but such relationships are only hinted at in our sources (Thuc. 4.132). Second, this relationship did not exist in a vacuum, but was conditioned by a variety of external factors. Foremost among these were the levels of interest in Thessaly and

Macedonia displayed by the great powers of central and southern Greece, especially Athens, Sparta, and Boeotia. Finally, Macedonian interventions to the south grew more ambitious and territorially acquisitive as the Classical period progressed.

Near the turn of the fifth century, Amyntas I and 'Thessalians', Aleuads most likely, each enjoyed a strong relationship with the Pisistratids of Athens (Hdt. 5.94) and it would not be surprising if the Argeads and Aleuads were at this time networking directly among themselves.¹⁶ A late source mentions strong antipathy between the Thessalians and Macedonians at the time of the Persian Wars (Plut., *Moralia* 868e), but such sentiment is otherwise unattested.¹⁷ By 480, Macedonia had medized and the Aleuads of Larissa were keen to follow suit, although many of their Thessalian countrymen were not (Hdt. 7.172). A coalition of Greeks had elected to take a stand against Xerxes in Thessaly at the Tempe but they turned back almost immediately upon arrival, thanks to the advice of Alexander I, the current king of Macedonia.¹⁸ Undefined, Thessaly medized. Alexander's motives have come in for intense scrutiny.¹⁹ In narrowly Thessalian and Macedonian perspectives, it was Alexander's report that allowed the Aleuads to achieve their goal. Should the Persians have been victorious, the Aleuads would perhaps have found themselves in a privileged position, not just within Thessaly but within all of central Greece; Alexander could only have benefited.

There is evidence of Spartan, and increasingly Athenian, interest in both Macedonia and Thessaly in the post-Persian Wars period, but little is known about the relationship between the two northern Greek states until early in the Peloponnesian War.²⁰ Thucydides' complex description at 4.78 of Brasidas' northern march to Thrace in 424 leaves little doubt that Thessalian and Macedonian fortunes continued to be intertwined throughout these years. Despite a long-standing alliance between Thessaly and Athens, as well as the general pro-Athenian sentiment of tetradic Thessaly as a whole, Brasidas contrived a safe passage through the region with the assistance of some Thessalian elites, including Nikonidas of Larissa, whom Thucydides explicitly describes as a friend of the Macedonian king Perdiccas. Challenging Athenian interests in Thrace and eastern Macedonia was a goal shared by the Spartan general and the Macedonian king. It is more difficult to see how pro-Argead, Thessalian elites would have benefited, other than from seeing their long-standing Argead friends prosper. When Brasidas did not pursue as aggressive a course as Perdiccas would have liked, the Macedonian king again used his influence in Thessaly to hinder the progress of Spartan reinforcements (Thuc. 4.132).²¹

The next recoverable development in Thessalo-Macedonian history

dates to the turn of the fifth century, when civil war gripped Pharsalus and perhaps also Pherae.²² Larissa too has been suspected, largely on the basis of a late and problematic treatise, 'On the Constitution', which has been attributed conventionally to Herodes Atticus, a sophist and great patron of the cities of Roman Greece. The work is a speech that inveighs against the Macedonian king, Archelaus, who is portrayed as meddling in the affairs of an unnamed city, championing a narrow oligarchy, and receiving territorial concessions as a result. The speaker advocates an alliance with the Spartans who would support a broader-based oligarchy. Modern historians have identified the city in question with Larissa and the ceded territory as belonging to the region of Perrhaebia, an area traditionally administered by Larissa but of perennial interest to Macedonia.²³ The circumstances described by the speech would seem to date Archelaus' intervention to the end of the fifth century.²⁴ Such an intervention is otherwise unknown, but supporting evidence is provided by Thrasymachus' fragmentary, late fifth-century speech 'On behalf of the Larissans', which argues against the 'enslavement' of his Greek audience to a 'barbarian' Archelaus.²⁵ A Larissan hostage at Archelaus' court is implicated in the assassination of the Macedonian king in 399 (Arist., *Politics* 1311 b11), and an earlier intervention in Larissa could explain the presence of such a hostage. What could possibly have motivated such activity on Archelaus' part? Given the anti-oligarchic character of the roughly contemporary disturbances in Pherae and Pharsalus, and the observed later tendency of the Aleuads to call on their Argead allies when embattled on the home front, it is possible that the ruling elite of Larissa had been challenged internally or externally and that they were looking to shore up their position. Herodes' work must be used with caution however. It is most likely not a verbatim transcript of a speech delivered in Larissa at this time but a *suasoria*, or rhetorical exercise popular in the Roman Imperial era which required writers to compose arguments supporting or opposing a particular plan of action against a historical back drop that was well-known, if not to modern scholars, at least to ancient audiences.

This Larissan clan reciprocated in the late 390s when Amyntas III was driven from the Macedonian throne. He took shelter with the ascendant Aleuads, then led by the powerful Medius, and was likely restored to power by them in 391 (Diod. 14.92.3). By the 370s, circumstances in Thessaly had again shifted. Pherae had produced a brilliant, charismatic leader in Jason, whose election to an executive office (*tagos*) of Thessaly had brought to a temporary end the civil war that had raged throughout the region for 30 years.²⁶ Jason planned to build a navy with Macedonian timber (Xen., *Hellenica* 6.1.11) and he entered into an alliance with Amyntas in 371 (Diod. 15.60.2).

Epigraphic evidence suggests that he ceded northern Perrhaebia to the Macedonian king as a result – a mysterious transaction, given his power and Amyntas' apparent weakness.²⁷ Perhaps Jason was attempting to pry the Argead king away from his traditional Aleuad allies, who were threatening still.²⁸ The ruling elite of Larissa moreover had long-established administrative interests in Perrhaebia and it is possible that Jason was simultaneously cutting off the Aleuads from a territorial base of their power.

With the death of Jason in 370 and that of Amyntas in 370/69 Thessalian and Macedonian politics devolved. Throughout the 360s, Jason's Pheraeans successors as *tagos* squandered the consensus that he had built and civil war ensued; Amyntas' successor proved little more capable. In 369 the Aleuads approached Alexander II, the new ruler of Macedonia, about lending aid in their struggles with Pherae (Diod. 15.61.3). The Argead king promptly invaded and installed Macedonian garrisons in Larissa and Crannon, while promising to restore the cities to Thessalian rule (Diod. 15.61.4–5). Alexander II reneged, however, and some 'Thessalians' sought aid from a new quarter: Boeotia. The following year, 368, witnessed Pelopidas campaigning with a Theban army in Thessaly, intervening against a still dangerous Pherae, and reorganizing Thessaly into a more formal federal league modeled on the Boeotian. He was active too in Macedonia, where he mediated in a dispute between Alexander and Ptolemy Alorus over the kingship, and the latter was reconciled to the rule of the former as a result (Diod. 15.67, Plut., *Pelopidas* 26). Pelopidas then formed an alliance with Alexander and to ensure a quiescent Macedon, particularly with regard to Thessaly, he took a number of elite youths to Thebes as hostages, including Philip II, Alexander II's younger brother and future king.²⁹

Pelopidas' initial settlement was ephemeral as the events of 367 would demonstrate. Macedonia and Thessaly were convulsed anew by their endemic conflicts: Alexander of Pherae continued his war with the Thessalian League; Alexander II of Macedonia had been assassinated and Ptolemy Alorus was ruling as king despite the opposition of Alexander II's partisans. Pelopidas was able to secure an alliance with Ptolemy in Macedonia and took 50 of his Companions hostage to ensure his continuing complicity (Plut., *Pelopidas* 27.2–3). Thessaly proved more intransigent, and it was there that Pelopidas fell into the hands of Alexander of Pherae and was taken prisoner (Plut., *Pelopidas* 27.6). Two Theban military campaigns sent to retrieve him were unsuccessful but Pelopidas was finally released later that year to Epaminondas (Plut., *Pelopidas* 29.6). While further Boeotian campaigning in Thessaly in 364 resulted in the death of Pelopidas at the Battle of Cynoscephalae, a more formal arrangement in Thessaly

that limited the broader territorial ambitions of Pherae was established.³⁰

With the death of Epaminondas at Mantinea in 362, Thebes' northern aims were effectively tabled. Athens consequently became more active in Thessaly, again mired in civil war fought between the Thessalian League and Pherae, and especially Macedonia, where Perdiccas III had proven to be an adept leader in difficult circumstances since his accession to the throne in 365.³¹ Athenian interests in Thessaly had had little lasting impact on the domestic politics of the region however, and so it is not surprising that when Alexander of Pherae was murdered in 358 some Thessalians, probably Aleuads, looked north to traditional Argead allies to help exploit the crisis *du jour*. The Macedonian king, Philip II, was a leader of different character and aspirations than his predecessors, however, and under his watch Thessalo-Macedonian relations would enter a new, pioneering phase.

3 Philip II and Alexander the Great

It is among the great ironies of Macedonian and Thessalian history that, when viewed from a Greek perspective, Macedonia was heralded as a buffer against the forces of violence and disorder which could be unleashed at a moment's notice from the Balkan north into the Aegean; but, when the perspective is shifted and Macedonia is evaluated as center rather than periphery, it is Thessaly which becomes the buffer, and 'civilized' Greece the ever-menacing source of chaos. Chronic Thessalian instability bred Argead insecurity, and Philip could not allow the civil war that still lingered to the south to bring another Pelopidas to Macedonia. While his solutions to this problem were partly prefigured by the more adventurous southern incursions of his predecessors, Amyntas III and Alexander II, the growing coherence and power of the Macedonian state allowed Philip to formalize traditional Argead interests via native Thessalian institutions. Thessalian concerns become Macedonian, and for the next 160 years the political histories of the two regions cannot be narrated in isolation from one another. Here, as elsewhere, Alexander III ('the Great') followed his father, and it was the formal transmission of Argead stock in Thessaly from one king to another that established a precedent for later Macedonian rulers.

It is likely that Philip campaigned in Thessaly as early as 357, perhaps even earlier.³² Alexander of Pherae's death in 358 may have offered a political opportunity to the Aleuads and Philip will have

played the traditional Argead role of ally. Stability along Macedonia's southern frontier was doubtless a central concern of Philip's, especially defense of the major passes which led from Macedonia into Thessaly and thence to Greece; the new Macedonian king was in great need of allies himself given the fractious climate on Macedonia's western, northern, and eastern borders.³³ The Aleuads were again in the foreground in 353, the probable date of Philip's next intervention, when the Argead king was summoned to assist them in their conflict with Lycophron II of Pherae. Lycophron summarily invited to Thessaly as ally Onomarchus, who hailed from the major offending state in the nascent Third Sacred War, Phocis. This previously regional conflict quickly assumed a Panhellenic dimension as a result. After a pair of initial defeats in 353, Philip won a signal victory in 352 over the Pheraeans and Phocians at the so-called Crocian Field in Phthiotic Achaia. He encouraged his combined Macedonian and Thessalian League forces to don laurel crowns and fight as if avenging the wrongs done to Apollo by the Phocians (Diod. 16.35.4–6). In the aftermath of the battle, Philip quickly brought the tyrants of Pherae to a settlement and forced them to depart from the region together with much of their mercenary army (Diod. 16.37.3, 38.1). Fifty years of Thessalian civil war thus came to an end. Philip had not just won control of Thessaly, but a foothold in central Greece.

During this period of initial interest in Thessaly Philip laid the foundation for a more intensive and broad-based diplomacy. He married women from the two most contentious and powerful city-states of Thessaly, Philinna of Larissa, mother of Philip Arrhidaeus, and Nicesipolis of Pherae, mother of Thessalonice.³⁴ After his success at the Crocian Field, he was probably elected executive (*archon*) of the Thessalian League, likely with strong Aleuad backing (Dem. 18.47–48).³⁵ As Griffith has noted, this was an exceptional moment: 'It is something without precedent or parallel in the affairs of Greek states up to this time [...] For a foreign king to be chosen [...] to be head of a league of Greek cities is truly astonishing, and especially so in Thessaly'.³⁶ The goodwill did not last. By 349, Demosthenes was able to portray the Thessalians as chafing under Philip's rule for several reasons: Philip had taken possession of Pagasae, the port of Pherae and the chief outlet to the sea for the Thessalian League; he was contemplating putting fortifications in Magnesia, and he was collecting harbor and market taxes (Dem. 1.22). Two of Demosthenes' points can be explained within an institutional framework. In the case of the Magnesian fortifications, it has been demonstrated that, while the Thessalian *perioikoi* were usually politically subordinated to a nearby Thessalian city (Pherae in the case of Magnesia), this dependency could also be realized at the level of the League (for

example, Skopas' imposition of tribute on the *perioikoi*).³⁷ As league *archon*, it is likely that Philip tended to league finances, and his access to and use of harbor and market taxes, while undoubtedly odious, was probably not illegal (Justin 11.3). More problematic is the continuing occupation of Pagasae. Perhaps Philip did not relinquish his status as victor at the Crocian Field and master of Pherae when he was elected *archon* and hence did not regard his continuing check on Pheraean power as integrally connected to his new position. It is important to note that legality is not a live issue in Demosthenes' rehearsal of Thessalian unhappiness. Rather more on display are noxious Thessalian 'politics as usual': while the region had a strong tradition of executive authority, it had an even stronger tradition of resisting said authority. And given that each of these three points affected Pherae most gravely, one may even wonder if Demosthenes has generalized a 'Thessalian' perspective from a series of far more local, Pheraean concerns.

Philip may have campaigned briefly against Pherae in 349.³⁸ With the official conclusion of the Third Sacred War in 346, Philip, with strong Thessalian backing, was awarded Phocis' two votes on the Amphictyonic Council and chosen as president of the Pythian Games of that year (Diod. 16.60.1–2). These were stunning honors for the Argead king that symbolically reinforced what his armies were making abundantly clear: Macedonia would be central to the future of the Greek mainland. Philip's next period of major activity in Thessaly dates to 344–342 when he is alleged to have driven tyrants from some Thessalian cities (Diod. 16.69.8) and to have imposed Macedonian garrisons (Dem. 19.260). Pherae and Larissa, ever nettlesome, were targets and, if Philip could impose his will upon those cities, the rest of Thessaly could fare no better.³⁹ There is also attested at this date a reinvigoration of the *tetrads* of Aleuas the Red, but to create a more efficient administrative structure Philip imposed an executive *tetrarch*, 'fourth-part ruler', upon each *tetrad*. These *tetrarchs* were likely direct appointments of Philip and helped to ensure that the cities of the League remained docile.⁴⁰

Philip secured consent for his rule by a variety of less formal means. Most significant when viewed against the backdrop of previous Thessalo-Macedonian history is the inconspicuousness of the Aleuads. Demosthenes, in a passage assailing Philip for casting off allies when they become unneeded, observed that Simus of Larissa virtually handed over Thessaly to Philip – probably a reference to support for his election as *archon* – only to be scorned by the Macedonian king (18.47–48). Aristotle noted that a Simus and the Aleuads fell from power during a revolution in Larissa after the intervention of a third party, perhaps Philip (*Politics* 1306a). Elsewhere there is reference to

Philip playing sick when in Larissa and attempting to have his agents arrest Aleuads as they came to visit him (Polyaenus 4.2.11). Although one may suspect some of the details of this last account, the gist appears accurate: upholding the Argead–Aleuad relationship was no longer the top priority for the Macedonian king.

In the Aleuads' place we find a variety of new players. A *penestes*, Agathocles, was placed in charge of perioikic Perrhaebia, which had previously been administered by Larissa.⁴¹ The elevation of a non-elite to a position of privilege squares well with other accounts of Philip's dealings in Thessaly. In general, Philip seems to have cultivated the *demos* and popular leaders in the region's cities (Polyaenus 4.2.19). In other cases, Philip patronized circles of Thessalian elites but untraditional ones for an Argead king. There is excellent evidence that the city of Pharsalus rose to unprecedented prominence at this time. The career trajectory of Daochus is paradigmatic. One of Philip's new *tetrarchs*, he is impugned by Demosthenes as a venal Thessalian responsible for his countrymen's enslavement (18.295). He was present in Thebes before Chaeronea as a representative of the Thessalians attempting to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the Athenians and Thebans (Dem. 18.211) and had a long career as Thessalian representative to the Amphictyonic Council.⁴² In securing consent for his settlement, Philip thus shifted the balance of social and political power within Thessaly.

'Has he not made the Thessalians [...] so favorably disposed toward him that each of them trusts him more than their own fellow citizens?' asked Isocrates in 346, providing a valuable perspective which is often drowned out by Demosthenes' venom.⁴³ For every disgruntled Pheraean or Larissan there were Thessalians who preferred Philip's rule to what had preceded, and with good reason. If Thessaly in the 350s and 340s cannot be described as truly pacific, it was certainly a far less dangerous place than it had been for much of the fourth century. And while contemporary Athenian rhetoric tends to polarize the political possibilities available to the non-Macedonian Greek world between freedom and slavery, the Thessalian reality was more complex. Macedonians and pro-Macedonian Thessalians certainly occupied key administrative positions within the region but it was at the helm of the 'traditional' machinery of the Thessalian League. Nor was Macedonian rule especially onerous in other respects. It has now been conclusively demonstrated that Philip did not suppress local Thessalian coinages nor does he seem to have made exorbitant requests for Thessalian infantry, cavalry, or perioikic light-armed troops in the run-up to Chaeronea in 338.⁴⁴

Much of Greece was elated at news of Philip's assassination and Polyaenus records a story of Thessalian resistance at the Tempe to

Alexander's initial march south (4.4.1). The force was easily circumvented and Alexander, like his father, won election as *archon* of the Thessalian League (Justin 11.3). The new king made a series of genealogical arguments for his right to the position: like some Thessalians he, an Argead, could claim descent from Heracles (Diod. 17.4.1); moreover, Neoptolemus, son of Achilles, among the most famous Thessalians of myth, was an ancestor of his mother Olympias, a Molossian princess (Justin 11.3). These arguments were skillful politicking, for those local elites whose support would be essential for a relatively easy transition of power between father and son would be satisfied. The Aleuads of Larissa professed descent from Heracles and Philip's recent favorites from Pharsalus had the strongest claim on Achilles of any Thessalian city.

A contingent of 2,000 Thessalian cavalry accompanied Alexander on his eastern campaign. These fought with distinction, especially the contingent from Pharsalus, in Alexander's three major set-piece battles at the Granicus, Issus, and Gaugamela. Some even volunteered to stay on after the League of Corinth's forces were dismissed at Ecbatana in 330 (Curt. 6.6.35). A number of Thessalians ascended to positions of considerable influence with Alexander, [45](#) and veterans returned home, well compensated for their efforts.[46](#)

There are, however, telltale signs of lingering dissatisfaction among some in Thessaly during Alexander's rule, including the service of some Thessalians as mercenaries for Darius (Arr. 2.11.2–3) and a possible revolt in Thessaly and Perrhaebia (Aes. 3.167). While the effects of Alexander's Exiles' Decree of 324 on Thessaly are unknown, it is easy to see how it could have thrown the region into some turmoil. Philip had raised new men to power whose fortunes were tied to those of Macedonia as a whole. The return of exiles, who must have been especially numerous given the scale of civil war in Thessaly over the first half of the fourth century, threatened this new order.[47](#) Unsurprisingly, Antipater's Thessalian cavalry treacherously joined the cause of the Greek rebels in 323 during the Lamian War. Most of Thessaly revolted and Pharsalus emerged as a center of resistance. By 322, however, Antipater had escaped from Lamia, won a victory at Crannon, and effectively splintered the opposition. The sack of several Thessalian cities, including Pharsalus, followed (Diod. 18.17.7). In continued fighting the next year, the most impressive general of the Thessalian resistance, Meno of Pharsalus, was killed (Diod. 18.38.6).[48](#) Thessaly emerged from this war militarily broken, financially exhausted, and firmly under Macedonian control.[49](#)

4 After Alexander the Great

Three central themes characterize Macedonian involvement in Thessaly after the death of Alexander the Great and the Lamian War. First, Philip's Thessalian settlement apparently endured the lengthy transition of royal power in Macedonia from Argeads to Antigonids: a late source suggests that Macedonian kings from Philip III Arrhidaeus to Philip V continued to serve as *archons* of the Thessalian League.⁵⁰ A second theme is the consolidation of Macedonian control over Thessalian territory. As Polybius acidly observed, 'the Thessalians were supposed to enjoy their own constitution, and to have quite a different status to the Macedonians; but in fact they had exactly the same, and obeyed every order of the royal ministers' (4.76).⁵¹ For Polybius, Thessalian self-deception masked the realities of Macedonian hegemony. Finally, this order faced increasingly grave challenges from Epirus, Aetolia, and eventually Rome. This is largely not a story of homegrown, Thessalian resistance to or support for Macedonian rule – although one must continue to assume that there were pro- and anti-Macedonian factions in many Thessalian cities – but of outside powers coveting the region for its military and natural resources, and because, by this time, Thessaly was increasingly regarded as an integral component of Macedonia itself. One could inflict no more severe harm against Macedonia than by attacking along its southern Thessalian frontier.

Upon coming to power in 315, Cassander embraced the legacy of Philip II and reset Macedonian priorities accordingly.⁵² A stable, secure Thessaly was near the top of the list. Cassander married Thessalonice, Philip's daughter by Nicesipolis. That a woman with strong Thessalian connections was again close to the Macedonian throne must have had a palliative effect in some elite Thessalian circles, but Cassander realized as well the need for more direct expressions of Macedonian power and maintained garrisons in a number of strategic Thessalian sites (Diod. 20.110.2, 111.1). Such a policy bore fruit: Cassander conducted Macedonian armies through Thessalian territory without incident (Diod. 19.53.1, 63.3) and was able to utilize Thessalian cavalry in his campaigns (Diod. 20.28.3).⁵³

The death of Cassander in 297 inaugurated a period of uncertainty in Macedonia for which Thessaly would bear the consequences. When conflict broke out in 294 between Cassander's sons, Antipater and Alexander V, who had ruled uneasily as joint kings of Macedonia, they immediately cast about for possible allies. Alexander looked to Pyrrhus and Demetrius Poliorcetes. Pyrrhus responded first, shored up Alexander's position within Macedonia, and received in return control of a host of Macedonian holdings bordering Epirus. It is possible that

Pyrrhus overran Thessaly at this time.⁵⁴ Demetrius too responded to Alexander's request, late and unwelcome, but he contrived a meeting with the newly secure king in Larissa in 294, promptly had him assassinated, and was himself acclaimed king. In 292/1, with Demetrius distracted in Boeotia, Pyrrhus again challenged Macedonian control in Thessaly, but the Argead king drove out the invader. Recognizing the vulnerability of the region to such attacks in the future, Demetrius committed some 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry to Thessaly (Plut., *Demetrius* 40.1–2), probably to guard the passes from Epirus.⁵⁵

Demetrius' next moves were in eastern Thessaly, where he founded a new city on the shores of the Pagasitic Gulf. The settlement, Demetrias, named after the king, marked the most significant development in Thessalo-Macedonian relations since the institutional innovations of Philip II in the 350s and 340s and was arguably more influential over the course of subsequent history. There had recently been other new foundations or refurbishments of older sites in the region like Goritsa, New Halos, or Peuma, but Demetrias was to play a much larger role on the political stage of the Hellenistic and Roman world.⁵⁶ The site was strongly fortified by an extensive and massive circuit wall that likely incorporated the earlier site of Pagasae, the port of Pherae and principal Thessalian outlet to the sea. Although the city would quickly become the most cosmopolitan in Thessaly, the initial population was built up through *synoecism* of neighboring Thessalian and Magnesian villages and the site controlled much of the territory of Classical Magnesia (Strabo 9.5.15), dramatically impacting the subsequent settlement history of the region. A legitimate peer of Aegae and Pella, Demetrias was an emphatically Macedonian city with an important cult in honor of its founder Demetrius, and Macedonian, not Thessalian or Magnesian, political institutions. The primary initial function of the settlement seems to have been as a Macedonian naval base as it was strategically sited closer to Greek and Aegean centers of power. Over the course of the third century the city would acquire a palatial complex fit for royal residence, administration, and ceremony, and would develop into one of the 'fetters' by which Greece was bound to Macedonian hegemony. At the same time, Demetrias looked to the hinterland and can only have tightened Macedonian control over inland Thessaly.

Demetrius was driven from the throne in 287 and Thessaly, like Macedonia, was in subsequent years controlled now by Pyrrhus and now by Lysimachus. Demetrias remained the possession of Antigonus Gonatas, Demetrius' son. These were years of profound confusion, especially from 281, the year of Lysimachus' death, to about 277, the year of Antigonus Gonatas' formal accession to the Macedonian

throne. The Gallic invasions of 279 marked a nadir, and it is not surprising that Macedonian control over Thessaly grew slack. Thessalians appear both supporting (Justin 24.7.2) and hindering the efforts of the Gallic invaders (Paus. 10.23.13–14). Perhaps more significantly, Thessalians are present at the 277 meeting of the Delphic Amphictyony (*Corpus des inscriptions de Delphes* 2, 4.12). Delphi had passed from Macedonian control to Aetolian control in about 290, and it would become common practice for Amphictyonic states subject to Macedonia to not send representatives to the council. Given the rising fortunes of Aetolia at this date, especially in the wake of their defense of Delphi from Brennus and the Gauls, it is possible that this newest power of mainland Greece was attempting to reorient Thessaly away from its longstanding ties with Macedonia to the north. Thessalians are absent from the council in 276 (*Corpus des inscriptions de Delphes* 2, 4.14), however, and do not claim their prior place of authority within it until the early second century. Macedonia, with its new king, Antigonus Gonatas, had again reasserted its control over the region.

In 274, Pyrrhus made his final foray into Thessaly to challenge Macedonian hegemony there. After winning an important victory over Antigonus he dedicated battle spoils at a Thessalian sanctuary of Athena Itonia, who was among the most important divinities of the region. The accompanying dedicatory inscription reveals Pyrrhus claiming descent from the Thessalian house of Achilles, much as Alexander had done over 50 years earlier (Paus. 1.13.2). Coupled with the venue of dedication Pyrrhus' act offers insight into the ideological and propagandistic component of external challenges to Macedonian rule in Thessaly. It was not simply a matter of battlefield supremacy but of persuasion and politics as well. Clearly the Epirote leader believed that Thessaly was 'in play'. Antigonus soon retook Thessaly.⁵⁷

Pyrrhus' death in 272 marked the end of a period of Epirote challenges to Macedonian control in Thessaly but Gonatas' reign witnessed the portentous rise of a new mainland Greek power: the Aetolian League. By the time of Antigonus' death in 239, Aetolia had expanded through much of the Spercheios valley and into Dolopia, extending along the totality of Thessaly's southern border.⁵⁸ When an opportunity presented itself after Antigonus' successor, Demetrius II, died in 229, the Aetolians were prepared to act. Antigonus III Doson, appointed regent for Philip V, was confronted by widespread revolt in Thessaly and subsequent annexation by Aetolia of those regions furthest removed from the Macedonian homeland – the tetrads of Thessaliotis, Hestiaeotis, Phthiotis and perioikic Phthiotic Achaea.⁵⁹ By 228 Doson had suppressed the Thessalian rebellion (Justin

28.3.14), defeated the Aetolians in battle in Phocis and Doris, and forced them to a settlement whereby the Macedonian regent recovered all of his previous holdings in Thessaly save Phthiotic Achaea. The concession of this territory, which had been controlled by Macedonia for over a century, marks a sharp turning point in Thessalo-Macedonian history. The southern frontier of greater Macedonia receded for the first time since Philip II, and with its new acquisition Aetolia was positioned to threaten the major cities of the Thessalian interior and sea-borne traffic bound for Demetrias. Doson continued to recognize the utility of Thessalian representation of Macedonian interests in interstate relations and included them in his Hellenic League of 223.

Trouble in Thessaly did not greet Doson's death in 221 as it had that of Demetrius II, for Philip V ascended the throne without conflict (Polyb. 7.114–115). He soon found himself entangled with a hostile Aetolian League in the Social War. In early 217, while Philip was preoccupied with Dardanian invasions on Macedonia's northern frontier, the Aetolians launched a series of withering raids on the Thessalian countryside from their base at Phthiotic Thebes in Phthiotic Achaea. Larissa, Demetrias, and Pharsalus were hit particularly hard (Polyb. 5.99–100). Philip eventually captured Phthiotic Thebes, sold the population into slavery, and renamed the settlement Philippi or Philippopolis. By the summer of 217 Aetolian fortunes had tumbled on other fronts and the Social War was brought to a swift close.

A famous inscription from Larissa sheds important light not only on the damage inflicted by the Aetolians on Thessaly during the Social War but also on Philip's role and, by extension, the role of Macedonian kings in general in shaping policy in the cities of Thessaly.⁶⁰ The stone records a series of two letters written to Larissa by Philip and two decrees of Larissa in response to those letters. Philip's first letter, dated to September 217, refers to his contact with a Larissan embassy which informed him of a population shortage in Larissa on account of 'the wars'.⁶¹ Philip's remedy was to award citizenship to Thessalians and other Greeks living at Larissa: 'It is my decision that you pass a decree [granting citizenship] [...] I am convinced that many other useful things will accrue both to me and to the city and also that the land will be worked to a great extent'.⁶² The Larissans promptly voted a decree stipulating as much. Soon after it came to Philip's attention that those individuals who were awarded citizenship had been struck from citizen rolls. He addressed the matter in a second letter dated to August 215. Charges of activities counter to the Macedonian throne had been leveled against some new citizens but Philip recognized that local politics were much more likely to

blame. He strongly encouraged the Larissans to re-enroll those citizens, observing that ‘those who advised you have missed the mark regarding what is of benefit for (your) fatherland and regarding my decision’ and enjoining them to ‘get on with the business without rivalry’. A muted warning concludes the letter: Philip would personally come to Larissa after his current campaign to hear cases of treason and the like. A second Larissan decree follows which corresponds with Philip’s wishes. A list of the over 200 new citizens, mostly from the neighboring Thessalian cities of Krannon and Gyrtion, completes the dossier.

Philip emerges from this collection of documents as holding the reins of power in Larissa. He dictates policy and the city implements it. The Polybian analysis of Thessaly under Macedonian rule rings especially true. While the people of Larissa are seen to rely on their native institutions in making decisions, it is an elaborate, if necessary, fiction. Philip will have his way, preferably through his local partisans, but if necessary through direct personal intervention.⁶³ The king also appears very concerned about the cities under his control remaining viable. Other Thessalian evidence suggests that population shortage was a regular problem in the third century: Phalanna (*IG* 9.2 1228) and Pharsalus (*IG* 9.2 234) are also known to have engaged in mass enrollments of new citizens at that time.

Thessaly would see major campaigning in the coming years, particularly during the Second Macedonian War. Separating Thessaly from Macedonia was an explicit priority of the Roman commander, T. Quinctius Flamininus. Livy described his parley with Philip in Epirus in 198: ‘When they came to discuss what states were to be set free, the consul named the Thessalians before all the rest. At this the king became so incensed with rage that he exclaimed, “What heavier command, Titus Quinctius, could you lay upon a beaten foe?”’ (32.10.7).⁶⁴ The next year, Philip was defeated outside of Thessalian Skotussa at Cynoscephalae. Peace followed, with devastating consequences for Macedonia: Tetradic Thessaly, Perrhaebia, Magnesia, and Phthiotic Achaëa were each declared free, subject to no garrison or tribute, and allowed to return to their laws, and the walls of Demetrias were razed (Polyb. 18.46). Macedonian hegemony in greater Thessaly was effectively broken and Flamininus set about reorganizing this territory as a series of pro-Roman federal leagues which could serve as a bulwark against a potentially recidivist Macedonia.

The nimble Philip V maintained his hold on the kingship and an opportunity to recover lost possessions in Thessaly soon presented itself. The Seleucid king Antiochus III formed an alliance with a disgruntled Aetolian League and invaded Greece in 191. They were

handily defeated. For his support of Roman interests, Philip regained Demetrias and its Magnesian hinterland, Perrhaebia, much of Phthiotic Achaia, and western Thessaly. The Thessalians and Perrhaebians complained vigorously at Rome and reclaimed these territories following a conference at the Tempe in 185. Perseus, son of Philip V who ruled as king of Macedonia from 179–168, would subsequently have southern ambitions, as would Andriscus, who claimed to be the son of Perseus and revolted against Rome in 148; both failed miserably. Conditions now favored peaceful Thessalian expansion, and over the next 120 years the Thessalian League would become one of the largest, most powerful, and most emphatically pro-Roman polities on the Greek mainland.

5 Beyond Politics

The deep historical implication of Macedonia and Thessaly sketched in the preceding diachronic narrative has focused primarily on the interactions of a narrow social and political elite. Beyond the politics of these select circles, however, one may glimpse evidence that reflects further the intertwining of the two regions, particularly at the level of religion.⁶⁵

Perioikic Perrhaebia and Magnesia shared a physical border with Macedonia and it is not surprising to find evidence for mutual influence there. A group of three cities in northern Perrhaebia, the so-called ‘Tripolis’, Doliche, Pythion, and Azoros, and another important city in southeastern Perrhaebia, Gonnoi, lie near the major passes connecting Thessaly and Macedonia and for primarily strategic reasons seem to have been integrated more fully within the Macedonian kingdom than tetradic Thessaly or Achaia Phthiotis.⁶⁶ But the northern orientation of these cities was likely traditional and founded on a broader cultural basis. For example, it is noted with some interest that the *onomastica* of Perrhaebia and Macedonia contain names otherwise unknown in the broader Greek world and that the calendars of some Perrhaebian cities used months from the common Macedonian calendar in the later Hellenistic period.⁶⁷ Archaic genealogical myth posited a very close relationship between Magnesians and Macedonians.⁶⁸ Macedonian kings were active participants in some Magnesian cults (Athen. 13.31) ⁶⁹ and the Magnesians and Macedonians appear to have shared a common dance, the *karpaia* (Xen., *Anabasis* 6.1.7, Hesychius, s.v. *karpaia*).

Kynegoi, ‘hunters’, whom Hatzopoulos has provocatively and plausibly argued were the royal Macedonian equivalent of an ephebic

class, are now certainly attested in a recently published inscription from Demetrias dating to about 184; still unpublished inscriptions from Perrhaebia strongly suggest that the institution existed there as well.⁷⁰ Closely associated with the cult of Heracles ‘the hunter’ (*kynagidas*), these *kynegoi* probably underwent some form of military training in late adolescence which included patrolling the neighboring countryside and assisting in royal Macedonian hunts (Polyb. 31.29.5–7).

Tetradic Thessaly, for which a host of mutual influences has been claimed, is equally intriguing.⁷¹ Some basic, mostly superficial, similarities between the constitutions of the Thessalian League and the Macedonian kingdom have been observed.⁷² At the level of cult, however, the interconnections are extensive and significant. An obscure, peculiarly Thessalian epithet for Zeus, Thaulios, whose cult was widespread within tetradic Thessaly, may be elucidated in some measure by late lexicographers, who observe that Thaulios or Thaulos is a Macedonian form of Ares (Hesychius, s.v. Thaulios). It is unclear whether this is mere coincidence or possible evidence of a shared non-Olympian divinity Thaulios, who was later identified by the Thessalians with Zeus and by the Macedonians with Ares. Similarly tantalizing is the case of Themis Ichnaia, attested already at *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* (95), who allegedly received cult in the city of Thessalian Ichnai (Strabo 9.5.14) and Paionian Ichnai, which became Macedonian at a relatively early date (Hesychius, s.v. *Ichnaien choran*). A cult of ‘Macedonian’ Dionysus is attested in Roman Larissa.⁷³ Ennodia, a distinctively Thessalian divinity with an early eighth-century cult center at Pherae, was well known in Hellenistic Macedonia.⁷⁴ It has even been suggested that Macedonia and Thessaly had similar rites of passage for adolescent girls.⁷⁵

That there were religious traditions common to both greater Thessaly and Macedonia is therefore certain. While it is likely that Ennodia cult originated in Thessaly and was introduced later in Macedonia, and that Macedonian Dionysus and the *kynegoi* of Heracles were brought to Thessaly from the north, the circumstances that produced many of these traditions remain oblique. Answers most likely lie in the close, regular contact which the regions enjoyed and which created currents of influence and emulation flowing in both directions across Olympus.

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- ¹ The translation is that of G. Shrimpton, *Theopompus the Historian* (Montreal 1991), p. 222.
- ² H.D. Westlake, *Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C.* (London 1935), p. 2.
- ³ S. Sprawski, *Jason of Pherae: A Study on History of Thessaly in Years 431–370 BC* (Kraków 1999), p. 23.
- ⁴ A contentious issue in the modern historiography of ancient Thessaly. According to B. Helly, *L'État thessalien. Aleuas le Roux, les tétrades et les tagoi* (Lyon 1995), pp. 39–68, this official was known as an *archos* or *archon*, ‘ruler’, or *tetrarchos*, ‘ruler of four (regions)’, already in the late sixth century. Helly has a useful review of previous scholarship. Sprawski, *Jason of Pherae*, pp. 15–23, suggests that an earlier office of *tagos*, ‘commander’, may have existed, which later fourth-century elites like Jason attempted to revive.
- ⁵ For Aleuas’ division, see V. Rose (ed.), *Aristotelis qui Ferebantur Librorum Fragmenta* (Leipzig 1886, repr. Stuttgart 1966), FF 497–8.
- ⁶ T.R. Martin, *Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical Greece* (Princeton 1985), p. 63.
- ⁷ For the *penestai*, see P. Cartledge, ‘Penestai’, in *Brill’s New Pauly* (Leiden 2007), cols. 722–3 and J. Ducat, *Les Pénestes de Thessalie* (Paris 1994).
- ⁸ See IG 9.2 234, a decree of the late third century from Pharsalus, together with Ducat, *Pénestes de Thessalie*, pp. 107–13.
- ⁹ Dolopia to the southwest is occasionally numbered in this group. To the west lay the Pindus mountains.
- ¹⁰ Ancient sources more often refer to these territories as Thessalian *hypekooi*, ‘subjects’, a word that more accurately captures the realities of their status vis-à-vis tetradic Thessaly. I follow scholarly tradition in referring to them as *perioikoi*.

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- 12 Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 540–2.
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- 14 Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, p. 33.
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- 16 M. Sordi, *La lega Tessala fino ad Alessandro Magno* (Rome 1958), p. 77 n. 5.
- 17 Perhaps Plutarch is mistaken, making a purely rhetorical contrast, or even retrojecting later animosity into an earlier period. Perhaps Thessalian hegemony over central Greece in the sixth century, reconstructed by G.A. Lehmann, 'Thessaliens Hegemonie über Mittelgriechenland im 6. Jh. v. Chr.', *Boreas* 6 (1983), pp. 35–43, had extended also to the north; cf. Isoc. 5.20.
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- 19 For example, N. Robertson, 'The Thessalian Expedition of 480 B.C.', *JHS* 96 (1976), p. 118.
- 20 A. Andrewes, 'Two Notes on Lysander', *Phoenix* 25 (1971), pp.

217–26, S. Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides* 1 (Oxford 1991), pp. 149–50, 159–60, 169, 178.

²¹ For this affair and the following, see also J. Roisman, chapter 8.

²² Westlake, *Thessaly in the Fourth Century*, pp. 47–66.

²³ For discussion of concessions in Perrhaebia, see Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 140–1, Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, pp. 164–5.

²⁴ Sprawski, *Jason of Pherae*, pp. 37–8.

²⁵ H. Diels and W. Kranz (eds.), *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*² (Berlin 1951), F 85 B2.

²⁶ Sprawski, *Jason of Pherae*, pp. 49–132.

²⁷ A.J.B. Wace and M.S. Thompson, ‘A Latin Inscription from Perrhaibia’, *BSA* 17 (1910–1911), pp. 193–204, B. Helly, ‘Une liste des cités de Perrhébie dans la première moitié du IV^e siècle avant J.-C.’, in B. Helly (ed.), *La Thessalie* (Paris 1975), pp. 165–200. For general interpretation, see G. Lucas, *Les cités antiques de la haute vallée du Titarèse: Étude de topographie et de géographie historique* (Lyon 1997), pp. 101–8.

²⁸ Sprawski, *Jason of Pherae*, pp. 98–9.

²⁹ Westlake, *Thessaly in the Fourth Century*, pp. 131–8.

³⁰ Westlake, *Thessaly in the Fourth Century*, pp. 151–2.

³¹ For Thessaly, see Rhodes and Osborne, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, no. 44, pp. 218–25; for Macedonia, see Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 186–8.

³² For example, T.R. Martin, ‘A Phantom Fragment of Theopompus and Philip II’s First Campaign in Thessaly’, *HSCP* 86 (1982), pp. 55–78, with reference to earlier literature.

³³ Ian Worthington, *Philip II of Macedonia* (New Haven 2008), p.

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34 E.D. Carney, *Women and Monarchy in Macedonia* (Norman 2000), pp. 60–2.

35 I follow the high chronology of Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia 2*, pp. 220–4.

36 G.T. Griffith, 'Philip of Macedon's Early Interventions in Thessaly (358–352 B.C.)', *CQ*² 20 (1970), p. 78.

37 There is possible archaeological confirmation that Philip did not just ponder these fortifications but in fact initiated such a program. The curious site of Goritsa occupies a strong position over the Pagasitic Gulf on an out-runner of Pelion high above the modern city of Volos. Archaeological survey suggests that the site began to be occupied in about 350 although the circuit of walls was likely not completed until after Philip's death. The site seems to have gone out of use by about 250: see S.G. Bakhuizen, *A Greek City of the Fourth Century BCE* (Rome 1992), the final publication of the site.

38 For the campaign of 349, see Worthington, *Philip II*, pp. 76–7.

39 Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia 2*, p. 527.

40 The *decadarchies*, or 'ten-man rule', allegedly imposed by Philip on the cities of Thessaly (Dem. 6.22) remain mysterious.

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⁵³ Errington, *History of Macedonia*, pp. 136–7.

⁵⁴ Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, p. 221 n. 1 and Errington, *History of Macedonia*, p. 150.

⁵⁵ Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, pp. 220–1.

⁵⁶ For Goritsa, see above, n. 38. For New Halos, founded in Achaia Phthiotis in about 302 by Demetrius Poliorcetes or Cassander, see H. Reinders, *New Halos, a Hellenistic Town in Thessalia, Greece* (Utrecht 1988). Recent intensive survey at the site of ancient Peuma in Phthiotic Achaea has also revealed considerable late fourth-century construction: see A Tziaphalias,

M. Haagsma, S. Karapanou et al., 'Scratching the Surface. A Preliminary Report on the 2004 and 2005 Seasons from the Urban Survey Project at Kastro Kallithea (Peuma), Thessaly', *Mouseion* 6 (2006), pp. 91–135.

⁵⁷ Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, p. 265.

⁵⁸ J. Grainger, *The League of the Aitolians* (Leiden 1999), pp. 105–46, J.B. Scholten, *The Politics of Plunder* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 2000), pp. 59–130.

⁵⁹ Scholten, *Politics of Plunder*, p. 166 n. 5.

⁶⁰ IG 9.2 517. Still unpublished royal decrees of Demetrius II and Antigonos III Doson have been discovered at Pythion in Perrhaebia: A. Tziaphalias, 'Chronika', *AD* 52 B (1997), pp. 499–501.

⁶¹ For the date of the letter and the occasion of the Thessalian embassy, see C. Habicht, 'Epigraphic Evidence for the History of Thessaly under Macedonian Rule', in C. Habicht (ed.), *The Hellenistic Monarchies: Selected Papers* (Ann Arbor 2006), pp. 67–75.

⁶² Translation of R.S. Bagnall and P. Derow, *The Hellenistic Period: Historical Sources in Translation* (Malden 2004), no. 32.

⁶³ The inscription does not mention an epistates or Macedonian 'overseer' of Larissa. For useful recent discussion of the problem of Macedonian *epistatai* in Thessaly, see B.G. Intzesiloglou, 'The Inscription of the Kynegoi of Herakles from the Ancient Theatre of Demetrias', in G.A. Pikoulas (ed.), *Inscriptions and History of Thessaly: New Evidence* (Volos 2006), p. 69 n. 3.

⁶⁴ Translation of E T. Sage, *Livy IX* (Cambridge 1885), p. 181.

⁶⁵ On Macedonian religion, see P. Christesen and S.C. Murray, chapter 21.

⁶⁶ Cf., for example, B. Helly, *Gonnoi* (Amsterdam 1973).

⁶⁷ M.B. Hatzopoulos, "'L'histoire par les noms" in Macedonia', in S. Hornblower and E. Matthews (eds.), *Greek Personal Names: Their*

Value as Evidence (Oxford 2000), pp. 99–117, C. Trümper, *Untersuchungen zu den alt-griechischen Monatsnamen und Monatsfolgen* (Heidelberg 1997), pp. 226–8.

⁶⁸ R. Merkelbach and M.L. West (eds.), *Fragmenta Hesiodica* (Oxford 1967), F 7.

⁶⁹ E. Meyer, ‘Eine Inschrift von Jolkos’, *RhM* 85 (1936), pp. 367–76.

⁷⁰ For discussion of the kynegoi, much of the evidence for which remains uncertain, see M.B. Hatzopoulos, *Cultes et rites de passage en Macédoine* (Athens 1994), pp. 102–11. For the new inscription from Demetrias, see Intzesiloglou, ‘Inscription of the Kynegoi of Herakles’, pp. 67–77, and p. 71 n. 10 for the Perrhaebian inscriptions.

⁷¹ M.B. Hatzopoulos, ‘Thessalie et Macédoine: Affinités et Convergences’, in *La Thessalie. Quinze années de recherches archéologiques, 1975–1990. Bilans et Perspectives* 2 (Athens 1994), pp. 249–54.

⁷² M.B. Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings* 1 (Athens 1996), pp. 477–84.

⁷³ K. Gallis, ‘Chronika’, *AD* 27 B (1972), p. 419.

⁷⁴ P. Chrysostomou, *I thessaliki thea En(n)odia i Pheraia thea* (Athens 1998), pp. 70–84.

⁷⁵ Hatzopoulos, *Cultes et rites*, pp. 25–53, but D. Graninger, ‘Studies in the Cult of Artemis Throsia’, *ZPE* 162 (2007), pp. 151–64, is skeptical.

Macedonia and Thrace

Zosia Archibald

1 Thrace – A Geographical Expression

This chapter focuses on socio-economic aspects to complement the chapters that deal with the political and military history of Macedonia and Thrace (for which see part IV ‘History’).

As a geographical expression the idea of ‘Thrace’ was imprecise throughout antiquity. ‘Thrace’ meant different things depending on the context in which it was used. In the fifth century Athenian Tribute Lists, tribute coming from the ‘Thraceward region’ is referred to as *apo Thraikes phóros*, or simply *Thraĩkios phóros* (‘the Thracian tribute’) without qualification. Thucydides describes the arrival of the Spartan Brasidas in the Thraceward region without making clear where Macedonian control ended and ‘Thrace’ began, although he seems to imply that the Chalcidice and the Chalcidian cities were in ‘Thrace’ (4.78.1, 79. 2–3; cf. 5.18.5). The account he gives earlier (2.99.1), where the Odrysian king Sitalces invaded Macedonia and the Chalcidice, specifies the inhabitants of the area south of Doberus in a detailed way but omits any references to Thrace or the Thracian district in such a context. In his magisterial survey of the epigraphic and historical evidence for the kingdom of Macedonia, Hatzopoulos refers to the ‘Thracians’ in the regions of Bottia or Emathia, that is, along the lower estuaries of the rivers Loudias, Axios, and Echeidorus, as ‘pre-Greek’.¹ This is as an intermediate term, intended to provide a more flexible apparatus, which recognizes the connectedness of local communities to their neighbours without making any specific claims to their wider identity. The inhabitants of the Strymon valley shared an independence from neighbouring powers, which was recognized by various authorities, even if the ‘Thracian’ hinterland above the coast was eventually incorporated in the first *meris* (district) of Macedonia

after the review of Macedonian administration undertaken after the defeat of Perseus (Livy 45.29.5–6).²

‘Thrace’ was also a much bigger territory – the lands described by historians such as Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Diodorus, and geographers like Hecataeus, Pseudo-Scymnus and Strabo extended well outside the purview of most Aegean travellers. These authors seem to have had access to information about distant regions deep into the Continental interior.³ Such references are exceptionally interesting precisely because inland areas feature rarely in narrative histories of antiquity. Most of the events described as taking place in the ‘Thraceward region’, whether in Thucydides or in other sources, refer to coastal areas between the Chalcidic peninsula and the Propontis. Book 7 of Strabo’s *Geography* has substantial gaps in those areas where we might expect an ampler exposition. Thus there is a considerable imbalance between the kind of information available relating to the coastline of the north Aegean on the one hand and inland regions on the other. Research strategies have often favoured locations known from ancient sources, a fact that merely reinforces the gap between coastal fringe and continental heartland.

The rulers of Macedonia and their Thracian peers operated with equal ease in continental as well as coastal locations. It was this factor that provided them with assets not shared by many competing states. The organizational challenges faced by territorial powers such as the Argead kingdom of Macedonia and the Odrysian kingdom of Thrace first become visible historically in the fifth century when we hear of road building and city foundations sponsored by the rulers of both states (Thuc. 1.58, 2.96–98).⁴ Olynthus, so often used as an example of Greek Classical city design, was a re-foundation, a *synoikismos* (or to use Thucydides’ own term *anoikosmos*, 1.58.2), sponsored by Perdiccas II.⁵ Philip II, Alexander III, and their Successors were continuing a process that had been developed long before the expedition to Asia. Philip II’s foundations have sometimes been seen primarily in strategic terms,⁶ but this need not have been the only or even the overriding motivation for encouraging nucleated settlements.

Some of the most revealing evidence of the development process comes from Upper Macedonia. At Petres, south-east of modern Florina, on a low hill above the west bank of Lake Petres, is a settlement that underwent major expansion in about 350 on the initiative of Philip II according to the principal investigator.⁷ The earliest evidence, on the acropolis, has not survived well, but spacious houses, belonging to a re-design of about 300 were terraced into the hillside in *insulae*, with three or four houses per unit. The houses provide rich evidence for daily life and subsistence, including not just tools for agriculture and viticulture, storage facilities, and textile

equipment, but traces of specialist productive enterprises (ceramic and metallurgical). The foundation on the hill was in some respects a successor site to a number of other communities in the locality, best known from Early Iron Age evidence at St Panteleimon (Pateli) on the east side of the lake, closer to nearby Lake Vegoritis. The number of sites in the vicinity that has yielded Hellenistic traces indicates that the population of the area expanded significantly over the course of the third to first centuries.

There is similar evidence from the Thracian Plain, the heartland of the Odrysian kingdom, where a range of sites has been identified with urban features belonging to the fifth and fourth centuries: Vasily Levsky, Adjiyska Vodenitsa (Pistiros), Brezovo, Zlatinitsa-Malomirovo, Stara Zagora, Asara, Mezek, Seuthopolis (see map 8). These are but the most readily identifiable names in a region rich in material data. The locations of coin hoards are likely to indicate further sites of probable settlements where detailed investigation has not yet been conducted on the ground.⁸

The organizational capacity available to complex territorial powers of this kind was qualitatively different from that of states in central and southern Greece. We do not yet know enough about the nature of Macedonian and Thracian urban development in its formative stages to know whether they developed in a similar way to their more southerly counterparts. There are examples, such as Aiane in Elimeia, which show a range of precocious public and private monuments that are fully comparable with many cities of central and southern Greece.⁹ But until this phase is better known from other locations direct comparisons are still difficult. Both kingdoms relied on networks of overland and riverine links, which meant that horse power, mules, and shallow river craft were resources of paramount significance. The success of strategies that favoured the development of farms and ranches in the countryside is reflected in a range of Hellenistic and Roman country residences discovered during the last decade during major road development programmes, enlarging the range of data already available from the study of epigraphic records.¹⁰ Archaeological and epigraphic evidence seems to confirm what recent anthropological investigations have underscored, namely that pastoral strategies (except in certain nomadic populations) normally exist alongside agricultural ones. Herds exist to enhance agricultural resources not as an alternative to them.¹¹ In Macedonia, as in Thrace, herds of cattle and horses were in some cases very large and herding was a significant economic component of wealth in both regions. It comes as no surprise therefore that Pella at some point acquired the epithet *boúnomos* or *bounómeia* ('grazed by cattle', Stephanus of Byzantium 515.9-10). In both kingdoms the imagery of

horses and cattle confirms what we know from other evidence – that horses and cattle were valued not simply as useful forms of transport and traction, but as assets that other states could not match.

The legendary foundation tales of the Argead royal house (outlined by S. Sprawski in chapter 7) need to be revised in the light of what is currently known about pastoral strategies among prehistoric communities of the Pindus region. Herodotus records a tale about three brothers, Gayanes, Aeropus and Perdiccas, descendants of Temenus, who were expelled from Argos and went to Illyria, whence they found their way into Macedonia, with the youngest brother, Perdiccas, becoming the founder of the Argead kings (8.137–139). The story contains narrative elements typical of folk tales. It is a foundation myth that is both more than a symbolic tale and less than a historical narrative. Although there have been attempts to connect it with pastoral strategies,¹² the movements traced by the three brothers in Herodotus' tale were intended to create or to explain to a fifth-century audience the supposed connection between the house of Temenus in Argos and the Macedonian royal family, and do not correspond either with any known ecological pattern of herding or with any historical (or indeed prehistoric) evidence of population movements.¹³ The story admits to a symbiotic relationship between agriculturalists and herdsman, as ethnographers and archaeologists have argued. So the shepherding activities of the three brothers either represent the mechanism of social mobility utilized by the brothers, or the necessary qualifications for leadership or a combination of these.

Herodotus' tale has sometimes been connected with the pastoral origins of the Macedonians referred to, in a rhetorical flourish, in the reported speech of Alexander the Great at Opis in 324 (Arr. 7.9.2). As with Herodotus' story, this is not history but a powerful metaphor. It derives its strength from the central importance of stock breeding to Macedonian society.

Interest in the origin myth embedded in Herodotus' story has turned attention away from an equally important aspect of Macedonian society, namely the emergence of a ruling social order, which has clear parallels in the Thracian kingdom of the Odrysians. The question that historians need to answer is how the social elites of Macedonia and Thrace that become clearly visible in fifth century narrative sources differentiated themselves from their peers. The officers of Philip II's and Alexander III's armies about whom we have specific information were wealthy landowners and were exactly the sorts of people who would have managed the kinds of country properties that have been investigated in recent archaeological rescue operations.¹⁴ The patterns of property holding documented in the fourth century are likely to be extensions of earlier subsistence

strategies. This is what the archaeological and ethnographic studies of pastoral practices would suggest. More attention needs therefore to be given to social rather than ethnic distinctions among the inhabitants of sites around the Thermaic Gulf. The traditional focus of ancient historians on the military organization of Macedonia has in the past led to misunderstandings of the state's social and economic foundations, which are now becoming better appreciated with the growing number of inscriptions dating from the era of the kings.¹⁵ Similarly, the interest of the principal historical narratives in the military affairs of Odrysian Thrace has led to an under-appreciation of the kingdom's agricultural and pastoral foundations. Fortunately, the material record provides a fruitful source of new information about social relations in the two kingdoms.

2 Macedonians and Thracians: Competitive and Competing Societies

Four images encapsulate relations between these two neighbouring states of the east Balkan landmass during one especially prominent phase in the ancient history of the region. The first image dwells on a brace of burials; the second is a treaty; the third is a centre of exchange; while the fourth is an inscription documenting the winners of athletic competitions in Ptolemaic Egypt.

Wealth Underground

One of the two burials that I am choosing to isolate for comparative purposes comes from Archondiko, Giannitsa district, in Lower Macedonia. Here, a man was buried in a pit grave around the mid-sixth century, accompanied by a rich array of grave goods including, besides a bronze helmet and iron sword (decorated with gold foil) remains of a shield and a selection of iron knives and spearheads; a gold sheet destined to cover his mouth, ornamented with rosettes and lions; a double iron dress pin with a gilded head; a gold sheet that originally adorned his footwear; and elaborate tableware, including as many as seven vessels in bronze, an imported Ionian cup, and a onehanded bowl of a characteristic local form. There were some additional items of more specialized type including three miniature jugs (*oinochoai*) made of glass or a glazed material (for perfumed oils), eight terracotta female figurines, together with miniature iron furniture and an iron cart (Tomb 443).¹⁶

The other burial is from Mushovitza Mogila, Duvanli, north of Plovdiv, in central Bulgaria. The incomplete remains of a woman were disposed in a supine position at the bottom of a rectangular pit cut into the ground, which had originally also contained a wooden coffin encasing the body. She had been buried wearing a rich set of jewellery, including a gold sheet stamped with stylised birds, which would have been pinned with gold dress pins of a characteristic 'Thracian' form, from which acornshaped pendants hung in groups of three on the front of her dress. Around her head were several pairs of elaborate gold earrings; a gold pendant necklace; miniature glass vases, together with seven alabaster vessels, which may well all have contained perfumed oils; a bronze water jar (*kalpis*); a quality imported Attic Black Figure amphora showing Theseus wrestling with Prokrustes; a black-gloss cup; and a splendid heirloom – a silver phiale resembling a Persian form, which could have been made around the beginning of the fifth century, and therefore perhaps half a century before the owner was laid to rest.¹⁷

Perhaps a century separates the burial of the man at Archondiko from the woman at Duvanli. Yet these two individuals have a surprising number of things in common. They were both members of wealthy families, undoubtedly among the ruling elite families in their respective regions. The organization of the extensive cemetery at Archondiko, which lies approximately 1 km west of Trapeza hill where the ancient settlement was located, seems to have been in family groups delineated by paths. The burials were not placed in elaborate built tombs like succeeding generations of Macedonia's ruling families. Instead, they were simply interred in earth-cut pits. Similarly, the Thracian woman was placed in an earthen pit whilst later individuals of comparable status were frequently laid in masonry tombs of various designs. A large earthen mound was raised over the burial. This practice was much more common in Thrace than in Macedonia but it always remained an option for certain persons of status. Local and regional variations, as well as changes of fashion or nuance over time, account in part for the differences between the two areas.

There are numerous similarities in the style and provenance of the grave goods within the two burials. The ornaments and jewellery belong to a shared repertoire of styles and motifs. The use of sheet gold, often stamped with floral and zoomorphic patterns to cover the face and other extremities, is a characteristic feature of the wealthiest caste in both regions. The liberal provision of individual grave goods, including weapons and armour, and of additional personal items, particularly perfume flasks and jewellery, in a period when such lavish and conspicuous disposal is far less evident in burials in other

parts of the Aegean, makes the ranked burials of men and women in Macedonia and Thrace distinctive. These external symbols and signals of material wealth and social power were designed to be taken out of circulation because the deceased continued to retain an association with power even after death. Women were accorded the trappings of this symbolism as were men, and the presence of similar items in children's graves suggests that the same expressions attached to them also. The range and variety of grave goods accorded to different individuals constitutes a language in its own right. The number of burials excavated at Archondiko between 2000 and 2006 (872) demonstrates this graphically. Full analysis of the evidence is still in progress, but it is already clear that the very rich burials of the kind described form a tiny minority, although pottery was very common in the majority of tombs and other items – iron knives for men, jewellery for women – occurred in many of the middle-ranking graves. The cemetery at Archondiko has clear similarities with similar material from Aegeae, Sindos, Ayios Athanasios (Thessaloniki), Ayia Paraskevi (Anthemous), and elsewhere in Lower Macedonia and the Chalcidice.¹⁸ In Thrace burials of the ruling elite also form a tiny minority though many individuals were given mound burial, which suggests a broadly inclusive tradition, motivated as much by rites of commemoration after burial as it was by the grammar of status, whether during life or after death.¹⁹

The disposal of weapons and of precious metals in general with the dead had ceased to be a norm in central and southern Greece by the fifth century.²⁰ But there is no compelling reason to believe that the persistence of these practices in Thrace, Macedonia, and in some other parts of the Balkan region, reflects a more warlike attitude in these societies. The persistence of disposal is connected with social attitudes to the use of resources. In many parts of Greece, moveable objects, particularly metallic items, were recycled rather than buried with the dead, irrespective of the age or status of the deceased.²¹ This was not the case in Macedonia and Thrace (and to some extent in neighbouring regions such as Epirus). Although our own, twenty-first century perceptions are limited by the subsequent histories of burials, many of which were looted, either soon after the burials took place, or in subsequent centuries, there are marked differences amongst northern communities. At Acanthus, for example, a wealthy city (Hdt. 7.116120) on the eastern coast of the Chalcidic peninsula, of 405 burials from among the late-sixth-century settlers (whose predecessors originally came from Andros) only 163 (about 40 per cent) contained grave goods of any kind.²² The fact that metallic and other precious artefacts were buried with the dead and taken out of normal circulation in Thracian as in Macedonian societies shows that metals

and other movable resources had social as well as economic prominence. These Thracians and Macedonians, or their families, could not only afford to dispose of these possessions but also chose to do so in ways that underlined the symbolic equivalence between the individuality and precious value of the objects on the one hand and of their dead relatives on the other.

Competition for Resources

The treaty that forms the second of my examples is recorded on a stone in Athens.²³ An alliance was formed between the kings of Paeonia, Illyria, the three sons of king Berisades of western Thrace, Cetriporis, Monounius, and Scostocus, and the Athenians, albeit belatedly, in 356. It came about just at the time that Philip II was beginning to extend his political control east of the territories of the 'Old' Macedonian kingdom into western Thrace. Hatzopoulos has argued that, although the words of Strabo (7.7.4, C323, FF 33, 35) have been taken to mean that Philip extended the boundaries of the Macedonian kingdom as far as the River Nestos during his lifetime, since Macedonian control extended in any case as far as the Propontis the implied distinction must be understood differently. He uses the extension of Macedonian administrative institutions, including the application of the Macedonian as opposed to local calendars, as an indicator of true Macedonian political consolidation in the region, with the outpost of Acontisma, east of Neapolis (modern Kavalla) as the easternmost limit of state territory as such, and the limit of what later became the eastern boundary of the Roman province of Macedonia.²⁴

Macedonian intervention in Crenides, the Thasian foundation that was to become Philippi, was the principal provocation that triggered the quadruple alliance of 356. Philip was successful in lodging a Macedonian garrison there, which provided the primary launch pad for a series of military initiatives and campaigns, under himself, his son Alexander, and in the reigns of their successors. But Philippi remained outside Macedonia proper until the second century at least. Macedonian territory never truly extended to the banks of the River Nestos.

The grand alliance of 356 did not last long but it was more than a marriage of convenience, for the sons of Berisades held power over territories west of the middle and lower Nestos. It is not clear whether their possessions neighboured those of their Paeonian peers. The political alliance represents an agreement between the leading power holders within the region, that is, those who had the capacity to

oppose Philip's territorial ambitions. It does not necessarily represent all regional interest groups. What we know of the background to these events is largely indirect evidence. Diodorus (16.3.7–8, 22.3) and Justin (8.3.14ff.; 12.16.6; cf. Plut., *Alexander* 3.5) focus primarily on the transformation of Crenides into the first of Philip's extra-territorial foundations.²⁵ They are less interested in the other parties. As a result it is not easy to evaluate a situation that in other respects looks like the inexorable progress of an unstoppable genius in the shape of Philip. The later history of the region suggests that the military successes of 356, which temporarily eliminated the Illyrian, Paeonian, and Thracian forces, leaving the Athenian menace for a future occasion, succeeded in embedding effective Macedonian political control in a region that had previously been a bone of contention between most if not all of these entities, and that although Macedonian officials subsequently had to negotiate with local interest groups, no other power effectively challenged Macedonian dominance in the region until the arrival of Roman legions in the 180s.

The whole region between the lower estuary of the river Strymon and the Plain of Philippi had been for several centuries a magnet for newcomers as well as communities from within the region. The primary attractions consisted of metals, particularly the gold and silver of Mount Pangaeum, as well as good quality timber for shipbuilding. Until the arrival of Philip II no community had monopolized these resources.²⁶ Whilst some key locations (notably Amphipolis) were keenly contested because of their strategic advantages, there was sufficient resource to allow newcomers from Paros, Thasos, and elsewhere to appropriate territory and exploit it for extensive cultivation on the coastal fringe south and east of the Pangaeum massif and in some cases north of it (Eion, Galepsus, Oesyme, Crenides, perhaps Berge). Colonists from Andros similarly acquired resource at Argilus and Tragilus. Narrative sources, and occasionally even poetry, give colour to contested territories and underplay the ways in which such disputes were resolved. When we consider Thasos and its possessions on the mainland, we think of Archilochus and his unhappy encounters that obliged him to leave his shield behind.²⁷ The poet was mocking military propriety. But the emotional dimensions of such incidents need not have been typical of colonial life. Indeed, we may have misunderstood the true object of Archilochus' words. Many of his poems are not just fragmentary but ambiguous – perhaps deliberately so. It has proved hard to extract historical kernels from such verses and the alleged reference to 'Thracian dogs' in one of his poems,²⁸ reproduced on the commemorative stone known as the *Monumentum Archilochi* inscribed in the first century, which has been shown to be a wilful

misreading.²⁹

Recent fieldwork in the Rhodopes and the coastal strip of Aegean Thrace has helped to re-evaluate the range and frequency of sites that have no ancient labels. It has become clear that indigenous settlements, which preceded and continued to exist alongside colonial ones, occupied a range of ecological niches. The settlement pattern in the early first millennium between the Thermaic Gulf and the Thracian Chersonese included upland sites often enclosed with dry-stone walls, and lowland sites, some of which were on the coastline. This extensive pattern of landscape exploitation can only be understood through systematic surveys, which have rarely been adopted in academic or professional archaeological research strategies. What is true of the coastal hinterland is even more relevant for continental areas, where the remains of upland habitation is sometimes easier to identify and where preservation conditions may be more favourable.³⁰ This research demonstrates that surviving literary sources and historical accounts provide only a partial view of the population of this area.

The survival of indigenous Thracians on the island of Thasos before and after the arrival of Parian colonists has been recognized following a re-evaluation of the evidence in one of the main excavation trenches at Limenas, the harbour and civic centre of Thasos.³¹ The early Thracian inhabitants of Thasos (Odonis) may have used copper from the mainland for their tools, but the early first millennium inhabitants of the inland site of Kastri made their own iron tools and could also have been the first to explore the island's gold mines.³² There is now evidence that the Thracians of Odonis were also mining iron and copper near the harbour of the city of Thasos. These activities could well have stimulated the interest of other communities searching for new metal sources, perhaps the Phoenicians, to whom Herodotus ascribes an active role (although this is still hard to demonstrate) at 6.47, and undoubtedly the Parians and Naxians, who eventually competed actively with the Thracians of Odonis, and may finally have found a *modus vivendi* with them. The evidence from Samothrace provides one relevant analogy.³³

The mines of Mount Pangaeum were also exploited by native miners who developed the expertise to recognize seams of ore and to extract lead, silver, copper, and gold from them.³⁴ Although the extraction of precious metals has attracted the attention of historians, not least because of the close connection between the control of mines and the production of coined metal in the fifth and particularly from the fourth century onwards, the development of iron technology deserves at least as much notice. Iron tools and weapons became essential pre-requisites of all European societies. In accounting for the

development of iron technology in early first millennium Europe, Pleiner has outlined how bars of iron circulated in many parts of Europe as a commodity.³⁵ The demand for iron tools and weapons developed progressively in the first centuries of the first millennium as production techniques evolved. Whilst it would eventually provide a much more efficient material in the form of true steel, the production of iron for tool-making purposes in antiquity involved a more complex process than those required for lead, silver, and copper alloys, particularly in the manufacture of blades and high precision tools. Pre-modern iron, made from ingots of the refined ore, was intrinsically brittle and required further treatment, usually by means of re-heating and forging, in order to produce a stronger and sharper edge. There was no single process that could be learned. Miners and smiths had to discover the properties of different iron-bearing ores by a process of trial and error. This locally derived expertise could not easily be superseded by newcomers and recent research suggests that native experts continued to dominate these technologies well into the Roman Empire. Analyses of samples taken from iron tools found at three locations in Aegean Thrace, namely Abdera, 'Messimvria'-Zone (the excavated walled settlement between ancient Maroneia and modern Macri), and the fortress of Kalyva, in the foothills of the Rhodopes, north-west of Xanthi, dating between the sixth century BC and the second century AD, have revealed that different ores were used in each of these locations and different processing and finishing methods adopted in each case.³⁶ The incidence of cast iron at 'Messimvria'-Zone is a rare example of a particularly demanding technology prior to the early modern period. It seems that at Zone, a Samothracian outpost in eastern Thrace, native miners and smiths dominated iron technology, establishing their own forges in the south-eastern part of the city. At Abdera on the other hand the quality of iron working was comparatively poor. Evidently the Klazomenian, later Teian, colonists were less successful than the inhabitants of Zone in developing effective links with native miners and smiths. The contrast between Abdera's very fine gold coinage and its poor ironwork is particularly striking.³⁷

As yet we know comparatively little about the wider exploitation of metals in the lower Strymon, Nestos, and Hebros valleys. Yet the proliferation of tools and weapons in Thracian and Macedonian elite burials shows that metals were in plentiful supply whilst the dominance of native craftsmen in the extraction and production industries meant that these metals could not be monopolized by military leaders. The successful establishment of a new level of political control in the region channelled precious metal reserves into the hands of the Macedonian kings and were destined for strategic

purposes.³⁸ Access to an enlarged pool of miners and smiths processing base metals was at least equally important, particularly at a time of military expansion. The same act deprived other communities in the region of access to the same resources. Philip II's principal rivals, who attempted to combine against him in the alliance of 356, either lacked a comparable geographical base from which to operate or (in the case of the Athenians at Amphipolis) had already lost such a base.³⁹

Pistiros: A Story of Commercial Pioneers

During the third quarter of the fifth century, the native ruler of the Thracian Plain, perhaps Sitalces (since it is not certain when he inherited the crown from his father Teres), provided the resources for the construction of a fortified settlement close to the banks of the River Maritsa (Hebros) at a point where a river crossing linked a convenient route from the western Rhodopes to locations further north. Historical preferences for this particular node are reflected, on the one hand, in the close proximity of a Roman road station or *mansio* (Bona Mansio, later Lissae) on the principal road from Constantinople to Belgrade and, on the other, by the town of Septemvri, a major railway junction of routes west–east (Sofia–Istanbul) and north–south. The well constructed masonry defences and ample provision within for storage, coupled with a wide range of metallic finds, including numerous coins of native rulers, point to a commercial trans-shipment centre.⁴⁰ The historical context of this centre was enhanced by the discovery of a 45-line inscription in Greek, dated to about 350, which records guarantees offered to Maronitans, Thasians, and people from Apollonia (on the Black Sea or in the Chalcidice?), at Pistiros, one of several *emporía* evidently under the control of the Odrysian princes.⁴¹ The repeated references to Pistiros in the text, coupled with the close proximity of the stone to the site, make it likely that this was the Pistiros of the inscription. This interpretation has not been universally accepted, particularly by authors who prefer to connect the named *emporion* with a location nearer to the Aegean coast.⁴² Controversy attaches to the name rather than to the archaeologically attested exchange centre.

Macedonian influence in this centre is reflected in a variety of ways. Most prominent is the presence of Macedonian coins, principally, but not exclusively, dating to the first two decades of the third century, including a pot hoard buried at the latest in 280/79. The conflagration that destroyed the main eastern gateway in the early third century, which may be contemporary with the secretion of the pot hoard, may have had no connection with Macedonian military

activities but rather with other military groups operating in the area (including those of Celtic origin). What is clear is that the commercial capacity of this centre was reduced in the wake of the Macedonian conquest of Thrace. The greatest volume of long-distance traffic in the form of wine and oil amphorae occurred in the two middle quarters of the fourth century. Thereafter the orientation of trade changed. Arrian's reference to traders opposing Alexander the Great at the Haimos mountains during the latter's invasion of Thrace in 335 seems therefore to reflect real objections to the effects of Macedonian political control in the region, whatever the longer-term pattern of mutual relations was to become (1.1.6).⁴³

Thracians in Ptolemaic Egypt

Whilst the political narrative of fourth century history highlights the conflicts between Macedonian rulers and their Thracian peers, once Alexander the Great launched his expedition to Asia in 334 Thracian troops joined the Macedonian armies in increasing numbers. Arrian refers to the javelin throwers led by Sitalces, perhaps a scion of the Odrysian royal house, who took part in the main expedition forces (3.26.3–4; cf. Curt. 7.2.27). Infantry as well as cavalry reinforcements followed in due course, beginning in 331 (Arr. 3.5.1: 500 men; cf. Curt. 5.1.41: 3,500 infantry and 600 cavalry; Diod. 17.95.4 and Curt. 9.3.21: 5,000 cavalry). Some of these forces helped to man the satrapal armies in the former Achaemenid satrapies of Media and Parthyaia (Arr. 3.19.7, 5.20.7) or in India (Arr. 6.15.2, Curt. 9.3.21). Even if the political circumstances of the 330s created problems of trust between Alexander or his immediate officers on the one hand and Thracian troops on the other,⁴⁴ there is every reason to believe that under the Successors at least some Thracian mercenaries and skilled immigrants enjoyed a relatively high status. The best evidence comes from Egypt. The salt tax register for the period 254–231 from the village of Trikomia, in the Arsinoite *nome*, lists a number of Thracians (identifiable by their names) in a settlement with a recognizably Thracian name of Maron.⁴⁵ Many of the inhabitants of Maron were Jews but some were Thracians. For tax purposes, these individuals enjoyed 'Hellenic' status – in other words, they were exempted from the obol tax in the period 254–231. Men listed as 'Hellenes' for tax purposes included Jews, Thracians, Persians and Egyptians as well as Greeks. It is fair to say that the number of those granted exemption seems to have increased progressively each time the registers were amended, a process that is especially noticeable in the records after 254.⁴⁶

There are, however, additional reasons for believing that some of

the Thracian settlers in Egypt, particularly in the Fayum and in Alexandria, were hand-picked wealthy individuals and their families. Among the most interesting is an inscription on a block of polished black basalt that records the winners in an athletic contest at Alexandria.⁴⁷ The competitors were taking part in the birthday celebrations in honour of Ptolemy II Philadelphus on 8 March, 267. The names include Macedonians, Greeks, and some Thracians: Chrysermis, son of Amadocus, Thracian and Bastakilas, also son of Amadocus, Thracian. Perhaps these were brothers. Amadocus was a royal name among the Odrysians of the fifth and fourth centuries. Since leading Odrysians were among the loyal officers selected to join the forces of Alexander on his eastern venture, it looks as if the tradition was continued among his Successors.

What did Macedonians and Thracians have to offer the new Ptolemaic administration? Macedonians and Thracians who had served in Asia had competitive fighting skills. But those recruited directly from Europe, in the course of the third and second centuries, had other vital assets attractive to the new administration. As farmers and herdsmen, with experience of cultivation, sometimes at considerable distances from coastlines, they had the right kinds of experience to develop the rural resources of the Fayum, including new crop varieties, such as vines, and to enhance stockbreeding, particularly pigs.⁴⁸

3 Conclusions

It is not easy to characterize the relationship between Macedonians and Thracians. The political narrative of the period between the sixth and fourth centuries, represented in the surviving prose histories of Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon, highlights selected events that throw little light on relationships between local ethnic groups. Although historians often refer to 'Thracians' in a rather general way, the Thracians with whom the Macedonians had close contacts belonged to many different groups. Until Philip II penetrated east of the Chalcidic peninsula with his armies, there was a number of independent communities that separated the inhabitants of Lower Macedonia and the Chalcidice from the territories ruled over by the Odrysian dynasty, whose princes acquired power over an extensive region between the Danube and the north Aegean coast in the course of the fifth century.

In cultural terms, the material evidence suggests that there are some close analogies between Macedonian and Thracian societies.

This is apparent both in the external symbolism associated with elite groups, including men as well as women, and reflected in elaborate funerary accoutrements, and in the organization of rural settlement life. A well-watered environment and extensive pastureland enabled the inhabitants of both regions to develop a strong focus on pastoral practices alongside agriculture. These similarities can be detected in urban centres in the midst of the countryside, such as Petres, near Florina in Macedonia, and Pistiros in central Thrace. This explains why horse rearing and horsemanship, as well as the herding of cattle and sheep, became significant assets in Macedonia and in Thrace and provided the basis for successful cavalry forces. Metal artefacts attest the importance of mining and metalworking in both regions. Base and precious metals, exploited primarily for the manufacture of tools and decorative items before the second millennium, became key strategic resources in the second half of the first millennium. The capture of the Pangaeum mines by Philip II is the most celebrated case of resource acquisition. The expansion of Macedonian power into Aegean Thrace and north of the Rhodopes into the Thracian Plain allowed the new rulers access to similar resources.

The competition between Macedonians and Thracians over land assets represents one dimension of relationships between the two regions. Cooperation is reflected in the presence of Thracian soldiers and officers in the Macedonian armies of Alexander the Great and his Successors in Europe and in the new dominions.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

Many of the spectacular discoveries that have been made in Thrace during recent decades, and which have contributed substantially to the re-evaluation of this region within the south-east European-Aegean area, have been published only in a preliminary form. The display of an increasing range of new artefacts in travelling exhibitions (beginning with that at the British Museum in London in 1976), shown worldwide, have made a good deal of material accessible to a broad public. The catalogues of these exhibitions are a good starting point for considering the artefacts and their places of origin; for example, I. Venedikov and R.A. Higgins (eds.), *Thracian Treasures from Bulgaria* (London 1976). There are essential monographs and some of the most important sites have been published in English, particularly the key site in the south-western Rhodopes, close to the modern Greek border at Koprivlen: A. Božkova and P. Delev (eds.), *Koprivlen 1* (Sofia 2002). There is also the river port at Adjiyska Vodenitsa, close to

which the Greek inscription referring to *emporía*, including Pistiros, was found; the first three monographs provide fundamental evidence of interest to historians as well as archaeologists: J. Bouzek, M. Domaradzki and Z.H. Archibald (eds.), *Pistiros 1, Excavations and Studies* (Prague 1996), J. Bouzek, L. Domaradzka, and Z.H. Archibald (eds.), *Pistiros 2, Excavations and Studies* (Prague 2002), and J. Bouzek, L. Domaradzka, and Z.H. Archibald (eds.), *Pistiros 3, Excavations and Studies* (Prague 2007). There is an introductory essay by Z.H. Archibald, 'The Central and North Balkan Peninsula', in K. Kinzl (ed.), *A Companion to the Classical Greek World* (Oxford 2006), pp. 115–36, with further literature, and J. Bouzek, *The Thracians and Their Neighbours: Their Destiny, Art, and Heritage* (Prague 2005), provides a general introduction to Thrace and Thracians with much that is useful for historians.

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³ There is more detailed discussion of travel across the east Balkans in Z.H. Archibald, 'The Central and North Balkan Peninsula', in K. Kinzl (ed.), *A Companion to the Classical Greek World* (Oxford 2006), especially pp. 115–20.

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Macedonia and Persia

Marek Jan Olbrycht

The historical paths of Macedonia and Achaemenid Persia crossed about the years 512/511 when Persian armies made extensive conquests in the Balkans and Amyntas I of Macedonia was made to accept Persian dominance. Subsequent defeats of Achaemenid troops in Greece in 480–479 forced the Persians to leave the Balkans. After three decades of Persian dominance Macedonia then became independent of the Asian superpower. The tables were turned after more than a century later when, late in Philip II's reign (359–336), Macedonian forces attacked Persian satrapies in western Anatolia. The reign of Alexander III (336–323) brought about a final military confrontation between Macedonia and Achaemenid Persia in which the latter dynasty was deposed. Although Alexander's rule in the Iranian world was brief (331/330–323) and the conqueror did not succeed in building a coherent empire, still the Macedonian conquests in Asia overturned the existing political order in Iranian lands and left a deep mark on their later history. One of history's great paradoxes is that the victorious Alexander within just a few years of invading Persia became a proponent of Iranization in many dimensions and strove to make Iranians the mainstay of his army.

For Macedonia itself, the situation in faraway Iran shrank to little importance after 323 since the kingdoms the Diadochi built on what had remained of Alexander's state became regional in nature and the Balkans and Iran followed their own distinct paths. However, even then there remained in Macedonia some important elements of Iranian cultural heritage that had found their way to the Balkans along with representatives of elites (for example, Craterus, Roxane and her son Alexander IV, Philip Arrhidaeus) or with soldiers coming home from Asia. On Persian attitudes to Macedonia and especially Alexander the Great, see S.R. Asirvatham, chapter 6.

1 Persian Rule in Macedonia (about 512/511–479)

Ever since the Macedonian king Amyntas I surrendered his country to the Persians in about 512–511,¹ Macedonians and Iranians were strangers no more. Subjugation of Macedonia was part of Persian military operations initiated by the Great King Darius I (521–486) in 513 when – after immense preparations – a huge Achaemenid army invaded the Balkans and tried to defeat the European Scythians roaming to the north of the Danube river. Darius' army subjugated several Thracian peoples before it returned to Asia Minor. The Great King left in Europe one of his commanders named Megabazus whose task was to accomplish conquests in the Balkans. The Persian troops subjugated gold-rich Thrace, the coastal Greek cities including strategically important Perinthus, and defeated the powerful Paeonians (Hdt. 5.1–2, 15–16). Finally, Megabazus sent envoys to Amyntas I demanding earth and water for Darius I and the Macedonian accepted Persian domination (Hdt. 5.17–21). The transaction was often documented among Achaemenid political practices since Darius I, and it was tantamount to a demand for a country to submit fully, although in most cases it was not direct control but rather the Great King's hegemony over the local ruler.² Rulers who became the Persian king's vassals by sending him earth and water shouldered certain obligations: in practice they had to field troops for the Achaemenids and to assure the Great King's army supplies (Hdt. 7.32, 8.46).

As a Persian vassal, Amyntas I retained a broad scope of autonomy.³ Blood ties between Persian and Macedonian elites enhanced the mutual cooperation – the Persian official Bubares, Megabazus' own son (Hdt. 7.22), married Amyntas' daughter named Gygaea.⁴ Amyntas II, born of that marriage, received from Xerxes the Phrygian city Alabanda (Hdt. 8.136). Family ties the Macedonian rulers Amyntas and Alexander enjoyed with Bubares ensured them good relations with the Great Kings Darius and Xerxes (Justin 7.3.9, 4.1).

In Achaemenid royal inscriptions appear the names of peoples conquered by the Persians. The term 'Macedonians' is missing from them. Possibly they were considered as belonging to a group of peoples in western Anatolia and the Aegean basin who the Persians called *Yaunā*.⁵ Moreover, it seems probable that the Macedonians were specifically referred to as *Yaunā takabarā*, a term which first appears in a trilingual inscription on the tomb of Darius I (521–486) at Naqsh-e Rostam and recurs several times in some later Achaemenid

inscriptions. Such inscriptions were accompanied by reliefs showing representatives of the empire's peoples on four tombs at Naqsh-e Rostam and on two at Persepolis.⁶ A representative of *Yaunā takabarā* is shown wearing a flat headdress while that of *Yaunā* is hatless. The word *takabarā* means 'wearing shields on their heads', which brings to mind the Macedonian *kausia* (hat) and Thessalian *petasos*. The Persians must have been so surprised by the shape of *kausia* that they compared it to a shield.⁷ Persian reliefs show *Yaunā takabarā* in broad, flat berets that do not look exactly like the Macedonian *kausia* or the Greek *petasos*, but this may be because of space being too limited to do justice to broad hats and because of a graphic convention.

Following the Ionian Revolt (499–494/3), Persian hold on Macedonia became illusory. After suppressing the revolt in Ionia, the Persian authority in the Balkans was restored by Mardonius in 492, for Herodotus claims that he 'added Macedonians to the slaves (of the Persians) that they had already' (6.44.1). The new Macedonian king Alexander I (about 498–454) proved to be a shrewd politician, willing to recognize Persian hegemony,⁸ but cunningly taking advantage of Persian support which enabled him to make substantial territorial gains at the expense of Macedonia's neighbors.⁹ The Persian invasion led indirectly to Macedonia's rise of power for Macedonia and Persia had some common interests in the Balkans: with Persian aid, Macedonian kings stood to gain much at the expense of some Balkan tribes (such as the Paeonians) and Greeks. Telling is Justin's statement at 7.4.2 that Alexander I extended his kingdom 'as much through his own valor as through Persian generosity'. All in all, the Macedonians were 'willing and useful Persian allies'.¹⁰

Xerxes' stay in Macedonia in 480 must have helped tighten the relation between Alexander I and the Great King. It is possible that this occasioned Macedonia's coins showing its king with a short sword of Persian type.¹¹ Macedonian soldiers fought against Athens and Sparta in Xerxes' army in 480–479 (Hdt. 7.185, 9.31) while Macedonian dignitaries were entrusted to oversee the loyalty of some pro-Persian Boeotian city centers (Hdt. 8.34).

Although Persian rule in the Balkans was overthrown following the failure of Xerxes' invasion, the Macedonians and their Balkan neighbors (especially Thracians) borrowed heavily from the Achaemenid Empire's tradition in culture and economy in the fifth to mid fourth centuries.¹² Some artifacts, excavated in graves at Sindos and at Vergina, may be treated as influenced by Asian practices or even imported from Persia in late sixth and early fifth centuries.¹³

2 Macedonia Under Philip II versus Persia under Artaxerxes III Ochus

To Macedonian rulers, Achaemenid Persia stood as an example of statehood and *mores*. This is especially true of Philip II as he built his power and created many institutions to imitate those known from the Achaemenid Empire. Thus, inspired by Persian achievements, Philip established a Royal Secretary and Archive and aimed at the elevation of the political as well as religious position of the king,¹⁴ and he used a special throne (*thronos*) borrowed from the Achaemenid court to demonstrate his elevated rank.¹⁵ The institution of the Royal Pages (*paidēs basilikoi*) was probably inspired by Achaemenid prototype – among their duties, Arrian 4.13.1 mentions mounting the king on his horse ‘in the Persian style’.¹⁶ It is also tempting to see in the Companions (*hetairoi*) a formation modeled after Achaemenid ‘Kinsmen’ (*syngeneis*).¹⁷ The status of Thrace in 342–334 as a kind of regular satrapy resembled Achaemenid administrative practices,¹⁸ and the organization of the royal court, generally, followed in a fashion of the Achaemenid tradition.¹⁹ That Philip was interested in the Persian state and administration is documented by the fact that Aristotle cautioned him against Persian monarchy (*basileia*) and Persian succession (*diadoche*).²⁰ Some scholars deny Philip’s intentional borrowings from Persian tradition,²¹ but it must be said that states do not develop in a vacuum. For an increasingly powerful Macedonia, the most immediate model of a great monarchy was Persia.

Apart from the mentioned borrowings and the following of Persian patterns, an important factor was the mutual political relations between Macedonia under Philip II and Persia under Artaxerxes III Ochus (359–338), who energetically proceeded to ensure consolidation in the rebellion-weakened empire and to regain lost territories.²² In order to prevent increasingly harmful palace intrigues, the young monarch had many members of the royal family put to death. The Persian army effectively quelled a rebellion of the Cadusians (a major part in the campaign against the uprising was played by Artashata/Codoman, who was later Darius III, Diod. 17.6.1, Justin 10.3.3–4). The greatest problem would be the mutinies of satraps in Asia Minor. Since governors’ armies were made up largely of mercenaries, Artaxerxes ordered Anatolian satraps to dismiss them from service in 356. Satrapal rebellions in Anatolia had been quelled by 350, the Levant had, with small exceptions, been pacified by 344, and Egypt was conquered in winter 343/342. Generally, the reign of Artaxerxes III brought in a restoration of the empire. His figure was

later appreciated in Iran as is supported by the fact that Alexander chose to marry one of his daughters, Parysatis, in 324. Nor is it immaterial that Alexander's opponent Bessus, when he declared himself Great King in 330, took the name of Artaxerxes (see below).

In Persian politics in the last decades of the empire, an important role was played by the brothers Mentor and Memnon of Rhodes.²³ At first they supported the Persian noble Artabazus in his struggle to succeed his father Pharnabazus, the satrap of Hellespontic Phrygia (Dascylium). Artabazus married their sister and gave his daughter Barsine in marriage to Mentor, and after his death probably to Memnon. When Artabazus rebelled against Artaxerxes III in about 356 and was defeated, he and Memnon fled to Macedonia (Diod. 16.52.3, Athen. 6.256c–e), while Mentor found refuge in Egypt. The latter betrayed the Egyptian king Nectanebo, also contributing to the quelling of a Phoenician rebellion in Sidon and the city's surrender to the Persians. With such service, Mentor won recognition from Ochus and from the then powerful eunuch Bagoas at the court. He also succeeded in obtaining an amnesty for his brother and for Artabazus, who had returned to Persia with a good knowledge of the situation in Macedonia under Philip II in about 345.

During the reign of Philip II (359–336), after a period of political instability, Macedonia quickly rose from the doldrums to gain the status of an influential Balkan power. This did not go unnoticed by the Persians, as is indicated by the fact that in about 352 it was Macedonia that was chosen by Artabazus and Mentor of Rhodes to flee to after their defeat by the Great King. It seems that Macedonia was a safe haven for the enemies of the Great King, who could not have been pleased with Philip's actions. In exile, Artabazus was accompanied by his family (including Barsine, who after 333 became Alexander's mistress) and harem. Another émigré was Sisines, who stayed at the Macedonian court and accompanied Alexander's invasion army in 334 (Curt. 3.7.11). Yet another notable guest was Amminapes, an émigré from the rule of Artaxerxes Ochus (Curt. 6.4.25, Arr. 3.22.1). The presence of these Iranians at Philip's court was an excellent opportunity to learn Iranian customs and realities. As a result, Macedonia and the Achaemenid Empire were not totally alien to one another and 'they shared some points (though the emphasis could differ) of contact'.²⁴

Consequent to Persia's consolidation policies under Artaxerxes III and simultaneous rise in power of Macedonia, a fundamental conflict of interests loomed between Philip's monarchy and the Achaemenid Empire. The conflict made itself manifest sharply in Thrace and the northern Aegean shore, which were tied to northwestern Asia Minor (Hellespontic Phrygia, Troas and the Aeolis). A strong ruler

controlling Anatolia was a threat to Macedonia and vice versa: a strong Macedonia holding Thrace had to, at some point, expand onto Anatolia. In all certainty, Philip's progress in Thrace and mainland Greece could not be missed by the Persian king. In the 340s and early 330s, Philip actively tried to win over local rulers in Asia Minor by supporting them against the Great King or inciting them to rebel. In this context, two of such rulers should be mentioned: Hermias in Atarneus and Pixodarus in Caria.²⁵

Hermias, a disciple of Plato and a friend of Aristotle, deserves special attention as his life tragically combines momentous events of his time. A freed slave, Hermias came into the possession of the cities Atarneus (in the Aeolis) and Assus (in Troas) in northwestern Asia Minor (Theopompus, *FGrH* 115 F 291, Diod. 16.52). It is surprising that Hermias should be called by Demosthenes in 341 'the agent and confidant of all Philip's preparations against the King' (that is, Artaxerxes III).²⁶ What is unclear is the role of Aristotle. Philip's conquest of Olynthus in 348 led to an outbreak of anti-Macedonian sentiments in Athens. It seems that Aristotle, at the time a Macedonian resident in Athens and possibly engaged in pro-Macedonian activities, had to leave the city for political reasons. Whether it happened just before Plato's death in 347 or soon after remains debatable. Aristotle made his way to Hermias where he married Pythias, the niece and adoptive daughter of the tyrant, and received the city of Assus as his domicile. Aristotle's choice of place to live was not only prompted by the tyrant and some of his friends belonging to Plato's circle, but was also likely inspired by Philip, who intended to use Aristotle's help to reconnoiter the situation in Persia.²⁷

Meanwhile, Artaxerxes III appointed Mentor satrap of the Asiatic coast and 'designated him supreme general in the war against those in revolt' (Diod. 16.52.2). Mentor treacherously captured Hermias, sent him to the Great King, where he was interrogated under torture and executed in about 341.²⁸ This cruel treatment might explain Aristotle's sentiments toward Persians as 'barbarians'. Possibly, too, we can trust a note by Strabo to the effect that Aristotle and his comrades, the philosophers Erastus and Coriscus, fled from the Persians to Mytilene on Lesbos, separated from Assus by a narrow channel (Strabo 13.1.57). The episode need not have occurred after Hermias' final downfall, but might have involved some previous Persian pressures of which we know nothing certain.

Considering the contacts between Philip II and Hermias, it can hardly be doubted that the Macedonian king pursued an active Persian policy long before the siege of Perinthus in 341/340. Consequently, there is much probability in the words of Diodorus 16.60.4–5 that after the Peace of Philocrates (346) the Macedonian king dreamed

that he would be recognized as ruler of Hellas (*strategos autokrator*) and 'leader of the Persian war'. After his success in central Greece at this time, Philip withdrew from there, leaving behind only a garrison at Thermopylae. He had not finished Athens off militarily nor had he entered the Peloponnese.²⁹ At the time, Isocrates lobbied for a Panhellenic campaign against Persia, encouraging Philip 'to destroy the so-called Great King'.³⁰ Not just Isocrates' urging, but primarily military calculations and requirements of political strategy (cf. Isoc., *Epistle* 3.3 of 338, pointing to Philip's own designs on Persia), persuaded Philip to adopt anti-Persian plans in the 340s. After conquering Thrace, securing the Illyrian frontier and pacifying Greece, the Macedonian king's next main objective was Persian Asia Minor.³¹

By subjugating the territories up to the Hellespont and the Bosphorus, Philip not only intended to reduce Thrace but also to prevent any direct Persian threat in the Balkans and by 341 Thrace had been conquered. An open clash between Persia and Macedonia erupted when Philip tried to subjugate Perinthus and Byzantium in 341–340 (or 340–339, for the dating is not certain). Both cities received help from Achaemenid satraps, including Arsites, the satrap of Hellespontic Phrygia and Pixodarus, the satrap of Caria, who blocked the Macedonian offensive at Perinthus and raided Thrace.³² Before proceeding to describe these operations, Diodorus points to an important factor: Philip's 'growth in power had been reported in Asia, and the Persian king, viewing this power with alarm, wrote to his satraps on the coast to give all possible assistance to the Perinthians' (16.75.1–2).³³ Thus the Great King was closely following Philip's actions and took steps to neutralize them. And effective they were indeed, for after the relief of Perinthus the Persians conducted similar action in support of Byzantium, which received help from Chios, Cos and Rhodes (Diod. 16.77, *IG* 2² 234). The operation was initiated by the Carian satrap Pixodarus and the Great King.³⁴

The lenient treatment of Athens immediately after 346 and even after the Battle of Chaeronea (in 338) suggests that this state, unable to launch any large-scale military offensive, was receding into the background in Philip's policy; nor did Thebes or Sparta pose a significant threat to Macedonia. Athens, still with a strong fleet, could be relatively dangerous only in a close alliance with Persia. Under Artaxerxes III and at the beginning of Darius III's reign (336–330), Persia remained an essential political factor in mainland Greece. In 344/3, Artaxerxes dispatched envoys to the Greek states, hoping for their support for his planned campaign against Egypt. Thebes and Argos sent troops while Athens and Sparta reaffirmed their friendship with the Great King but 'were opposed to sending troops as allies'.³⁵ Interestingly, the Persians did not send a mission to Philip. Since by

342 Artaxerxes had succeeded in extinguishing rebellions in Anatolia (only small pockets of resistance remained) and Phoenicia and had regained Egypt, a strengthened Persia was visible in the Greek world. It is indicative of the time's political situation that Demosthenes saw Persia as a potential ally of Athens against Macedonia in 341; the orator urged that an Athenian mission should be sent to Persia asking for help against Philip, and he stressed that 'those whom the King trusts and regards as his benefactors are at enmity and war with Philip' (9.71; cf. 12.6). He was alluding not only to the conflict over Perinthus but also to a broader political constellation. Demosthenes' remark proves that a fundamental conflict of interest between Macedonia and Persia in 341 was apparent to Greek politicians. The fighting for Perinthus emphasized what was then a natural alliance between Athens and Persia. After his defeat at Perinthus, Philip II managed to capture the Athenian corn fleet operating in the straits by taking advantage of the absence of the Athenian admiral Chares, who was at the time (characteristically) conferring with the Persians.³⁶ The Athenian envoy Ephialtes tried to persuade Artaxerxes to help Athens against Philip, but the Great King would not pay any money to Athens as a *polis* but handed sums to some politicians including Demosthenes and Hyperides.³⁷

According to Arrian 2.14.2, in 333 Darius III sent a letter to Alexander in which he mentioned 'friendship and alliance' between Philip II and Persia. This information suggests an actual coalition between the Great King and the Macedonian ruler and has been repeatedly debated. Some scholars deny its historicity altogether,³⁸ but perhaps such an alliance was in place in about 351 when the Great King strove to eliminate possible disputes in the face of the invasion of rebellious Egypt. The supposition is confirmed by Demosthenes' mention of rumors about 351 that Philip 'sent an embassy to the King' (10.48). Philip was likely trying to allay a diplomatic conflict with Persia after he offered refuge to Artabazus and other fugitives from Anatolia who had been defeated by the Great King.

The defeat of Athens and Thebes at Chaeronea in 338 finally altered the balance of powers in the Balkans; characteristically, upon breaking the Greeks' resistance, Philip immediately concentrated on preparations for an invasion of Persia. The peace settlement of 338/37 in Greece, called by modern scholars the 'League of Corinth' and uniting most of the Greek states under Macedonian hegemony,³⁹ was directed against Persia.

Artaxerxes III Ochus proved a worthy partner of Philip II in the great political scheme in the Balkans and Anatolia. He restored the empire and effectively blocked Philip in the Straits area. But fate

proved gracious for the Macedonian in that, at the same time as Philip crushed the Greeks at Chaeronea, in Persia Artaxerxes was murdered by Bagoas. Also Ochus' successor, Arses (Artaxerxes IV), died two years into his reign by Bagoas' hand. It took the next king, Darius III, who ascended the throne in 336, to eliminate the crafty eunuch and attend to the Macedonian question (Diod. 17.5–6).

Philip II's successes and the unstable Persian throne encouraged the satrap of Caria Pixodarus to aim for closer contact with Macedonia: in 337 or 336, he approached Philip, intending to marry his daughter Ada II to Philip's son Arrhidaeus. The negotiations were disrupted by Alexander, who offered himself as suitor to Ada in place of Arrhidaeus (Plut., *Alexander* 10.1–2).⁴⁰ By 337, having defeated Athens and Thebes, Philip II had put matters in order in southern Greece and gained freedom of action vis-à-vis Persia. In 336, a Macedonian army of 10,000 sent to Anatolia under Parmenion and Attalos caused some Greek cities to defect from the Great King, but it was defeated by the Persian commander Memnon near Magnesia.⁴¹ The Persians had therefore effectively thwarted Macedonian attempts. We do not know whether all Macedonian survivors retreated to the Balkans, or, as some scholars suggest, managed to keep some bases on the Hellespont which would help Alexander easily cross the strait. Philip planned to invade Asia Minor in full force, but his assassination in 336 temporarily halted Macedonian actions.

What led Philip II to contemplate an invasion of Asia Minor? Doubtless, the wealth of Asia was an attractive lure, for Anatolian satrapies brought a tribute of almost 2,000 talents (cf. Hdt. 3.90) to the Persian king, much more than the Balkan peoples together would yield if they were made tributary.⁴² The Panhellenic aspects, often raised in sources and scholarship, were merely a pretext to win over Greeks (cf. Polyb. 3.6.12–13). Strategically, the control of the whole Aegean became, in fact, an essential objective of the Macedonian king.⁴³

It is possible that Artaxerxes III at first viewed Philip II's intentions much like the plans of the Spartan king Agesilaus in 400–394.⁴⁴ But the Great King actively tried to block Philip already in the Balkans, as is indicated by his operations at Perinthus and Byzantium. Artaxerxes III's policy toward Philip II proves that the Great King feared Macedonia with its rapidly growing strength more than the relatively weak Greek states. Darius III tried to counteract the Macedonian menace but in doing so ran into many obstacles including a rebellion in Egypt. Faced with the new Aegean power that was Macedonia, the Achaemenid Empire found itself under great pressure which was difficult to neutralize if only for logistical reasons. Persian forces had to disperse between many fronts from Egypt to the Bosphorus, and a

theater of war in Anatolia and in the Aegean put Alexander, Philip's successor, in a much more favorable position than the Great King, given the relatively short communication routes the Macedonian army had to travel. Alexander's main bases, including Pella, lay near the sea and close to Anatolia, but by contrast Persia's main land forces were deep in Asia and required time to mobilize. The same applies to the Persian fleet: although several times stronger than the Macedonian navy, it was deployed in bases far from the Straits and the northern Aegean.

3 Alexander III and Darius III – The Great War (334–330)

As Alexander III (336–323) crossed the Hellespont to Anatolia in 334, a new chapter had begun in the history of the Balkans as well as Western and Central Asia. Macedonia and Persia rose to fight for hegemony, a fight that would, for the Achaemenid Empire, become a struggle for survival. Alexander's early interest in Persia is documented by an often cited episode: in 340, the prince interrogated Persian envoys about their homeland (Plut., *Alexander* 5.1, 9.1, *Moralia* 342b–c). Undoubtedly, he knew Herodotus' *Histories*,⁴⁵ and it can almost be taken for granted that he read Xenophon.⁴⁶ The latter wrote about Persia and the ideal of monarchy, both questions of much importance to Alexander. The Roman historian Eunapius (who died in about AD 420) was on the mark when he observed: 'Alexander the Great would not have become great had Xenophon never been'.⁴⁷

For Alexander, an invasion against the Achaemenid state was to be primarily a conquest. He had possibly contemplated from the start a complete subjugation of Persia, but for obvious reasons he could not draw a detailed plan of the war, nor could he estimate the time it would take. On Alexander's invasion, see also D.L. Gilley and Ian Worthington, chapter 10; cf. map 4.

In battles at the Granicus river (334) and at Issus (333), Alexander's forces defeated Achaemenid armies. Macedonian thrusts broke the resistance of strongholds such as Halicarnassus, Tyre and Gaza. By 331, Alexander had subjugated most of Anatolia, Syria, Palestine and Egypt. Yet he would not stop here but drove further into Asia. Before Gaugamela in 331, it was not yet clear if the Macedonians could maintain their gains in Western Asia. The Persians, their errors notwithstanding (they failed to prevent Alexander crossing from Sestos to Abydos) had an excellent strategy in which they tried to shift

the main front of fighting to Alexander's rear in Anatolia and mainland Greece, and even Macedonia itself (Arr. 2.1.1, 17.2), and Memnon's successes of 333–332 inspired Greek hopes for Alexander's defeat (Diod. 17.29.3). The struggle was continued by Pharnabazus the younger, son of Artabazus. Persian money fueled resistance in Greece, where Sparta under its king Agis III joined in the fray (331–330). Yet Alexander's daredevil strategy brought him success; he was gambling all when he rejected Darius III's peace proposals at Tyre and decided on an all-out confrontation with his army. Darius, although not lacking in courage, proved a poor tactician, failing to utilize properly his chief assets: cavalry and light infantry. At Gaugamela, a newly mobilized Achaemenid army was defeated in October 331.

All those events are well known from ample source accounts and many subsequent studies. What deserves closer scrutiny is the question of Alexander's political and systemic concepts that would be incorporated in his empire thus to be created. For Alexander, the campaign after the Battle of Issus was fought 'for the rule over Asia' (Arr. 2.12.5, 4.11.7). But an official proclamation ensued after Gaugamela that was indicative of Alexander's newly developed concept of rule over conquered territories when he introduced the title of 'King of Asia' (Plut., *Alexander* 34.1), which suggested a claim to a greater rule than the Achaemenid monarchy ever embraced. Alexander might have used the title of the King of Asia even before 331, as is suggested by his letter to Darius III sent after Issus (Arr. 2.14.8–9). But after the victory at Gaugamela, when Darius' troops were shattered, Babylonia stood open, and Persis commanded only a minor covering force, the outcome of the war with the Achaemenid kingdom seemed decided. That was the appropriate moment to make an official proclamation. Still, Alexander did not receive any new insignia of power on that occasion.

Alexander's assumption of power in Babylon can be seen as a test of his political plans after the victory of Gaugamela. Babylon was an Achaemenid capital and retained close links with western Iran and its metropolies Susa, Persepolis and Ecbatana. Classical sources relate that the city surrendered offering no resistance as its inhabitants enthusiastically welcomed Alexander (Curt. 5.1.19–23, Arr. 3.16.3–4). Apparently, faced with Alexander's prevailing force, the Persian dignitary Mazaeus and the Babylonians agreed to surrender the city without a struggle.⁴⁸ There is no evidence that the Babylonians welcomed Alexander as a liberator from the Persian yoke. Alexander's entry into Babylon was staged after the Persian ceremonial – like the arrival of Persia's Great King (Curt. 5.1.17–23).⁴⁹

After Darius' defeat at Gaugamela, when Alexander stood at the gates of Babylonia, Susiana and Persis, heretofore implacably hostile

attitudes of Persians and other Iranians began to change. At that point, many Iranians concluded that Darius was bound to lose and that continued resistance was pointless. The Persian Mazaeus, who had not long before valiantly fought against Alexander at Gaugamela, was appointed satrap of Babylon. He was the first notable Iranian to go over to Alexander's side, receiving a high rank from him (another example is that of Mithrines of Sardes, who was made satrap of Armenia in 331).

In the satrapies from Babylonia to Bactria-Sogdiana Alexander appointed almost exclusively Iranians in 331–329. Besides Mazaeus, they were: Abulites in Susiana, Oxathres in Paraitakene, Phrasaortes in Persis, Astaspes in Carmania, Oxydates in Media, Amminaspes and Phrataphernes in Parthia-Hyrcania, Autophradates in Tapuria, Satibarzanes and Arsaces in Areia, Arsames in Drangiana, Amedines in the Ariaspian country, Proexes in Paropamisadae, and Artabazus in Bactria-Sogdiana.

When Alexander was leaving Babylon, he was aware of the grave challenges awaiting him. The Achaemenid forces could still put up resistance and the Macedonians were now entering Iran's heartland, the cradle of the Achaemenids. A new stage in the grand expedition was about to begin. The old capital of Susa was taken without any resistance but the following weeks saw heavy fighting.⁵⁰ Near the end of 331, Alexander departed from Susa and attacked the Uxians who put up fierce resistance. From there, he launched an attack on Persis (later renamed Fars), and as he crossed the frontier at what was called the Persian Gates, he encountered strong resistance of a Persian army led by Ariobarzanes. After a hard-won victory here, he encountered strong resistance points in Persis.⁵¹ He was anxious to reach Persepolis (Parsa) to capture the royal treasury there. Although the city of Persepolis surrendered without a fight it was still looted and many Persians were killed or committed suicide (Diod. 17.70.1–6, Curt. 5.6.4–8). Plutarch (*Alexander* 37.3) speaks of 'a terrible massacre of prisoners' in Persis that was conducted on Alexander's orders. Thus, Alexander arrived in Persis intending to pacify the country brutally, and so began the stay of Alexander's army in Persis from January to May 330 (Plut., *Alexander* 37.6).

At the end of his stay in the Achaemenid cradle, Alexander burned down the royal palace at Persepolis,⁵² the motive for which is controversial. In my opinion, the burning fits well with his policies in Persis at this time and was not accidental, for the city had already been plundered. Remarkably Alexander resorted to massacre and terror in Persis but not in other western Iranian satrapies.⁵³ Apparently his aim was to break the spirit of resistance among Persians and to destroy the original centers of Achaemenid power.

By and large, while in Persis in 330, Alexander did not make any breakthrough vis-à-vis the Persians and the Iranians. He did visit Pasargadae and see the tomb of Cyrus the Great,⁵⁴ but did not take any positive decision on a succession after the defeated Darius – the character of the emerging Alexander's empire remained vague. Pasargadae was, after all, the religious and cultural keystone, the traditional Achaemenid coronation place,⁵⁵ but the Iranian royal insignia were not accepted by Alexander until 330 in Parthia. At Issus, Alexander captured Darius' shield, bow, mantle (*kandys*), and chariot (Arr. 2.11.5–7). Then, at Gaugamela, he again seized the Great King's regalia and weapons, including shield, bow, arrows and Darius' chariot (Arr. 3.15.5). In 333, Alexander also captured members of Darius' family, including the king's mother Sisygambis.⁵⁶ But the Macedonian did not make use of his spoils and did not proclaim himself another Achaemenid. It is therefore difficult to consider Alexander as the 'last of the Achaemenids,' as P. Briant put it,⁵⁷ and Diodorus (17.71.3) has a clear opinion of Alexander's intentions: 'He felt bitter enmity to the inhabitants (of Persis). He did not trust them, and he meant to destroy Persepolis utterly' (trans. Welles).

From Persepolis, Alexander moved on to Media, there finally to subdue Darius III. Hearing of Alexander's advance on Media, Darius and his forces, including the troops led by the powerful Bactrian-Sogdian satrap Bessus, hurriedly marched to eastern Iran. However, opposition to Darius, headed by Bessus and Nabarzanes, potentates from eastern Iran, grew. When Darius was probably desperate and ready to surrender to Alexander in 330, Bessus' minions, Satibarzanes and Barzaentes, mortally wounded him, and soon after Bessus declared himself Artaxerxes V and assumed the Achaemenid upright tiara, which indicates that he was thinking of saving the Achaemenid Empire.⁵⁸ Now from being Darius' persecutor Alexander suddenly turned his avenger. In the subsequent elimination of Bessus (in 329), the 'revenge' motive was pure propaganda with the defeated ruler serving as the victor's scapegoat. Alexander's next target was the satrapy Parthia-Hyrcania, located in northeastern Iran.

4 Breakthrough Political Reforms in Parthia – Alexander and Iranian Ways (330)

In the years 334–330 (when war was launched in eastern Iran), Alexander figured primarily as a conqueror. He repeatedly showed

respect to local religious cults and diligently took over the Persian administrative system (with only minor modifications). On occasion, he practiced chivalrous gestures toward the Iranians (to wit, honorary captivity of Darius III's family after Issus, respect for Sisygambis, and the sending away of the body of Darius III to Persis). It was only the reform in Parthia (Parthyaia) in 330 that marked a decisive change in his political concept and opened a new stage in his reign.

In the late summer or early autumn of 330, Alexander ostentatiously stood up as 'an admirer of 'Persian ways' (Diod. 18.48.5). So far, he had concentrated on military conquest of Asia, but his empire needed institutions, court, ceremonies, and a defined concept of monarchy. He had not taken any major steps to that end in the old Achaemenid centers of Persis, Susiana, or Media, but he did in eastern Iranian Parthia.

The available sources offer a lot of details about Alexander's Iranization of his court and ceremonial and the origins of his deliberate pro-Iranian policies.⁵⁹ This program involved the ruler's adoption of essential elements of Iranian dress (including a *chiton mesoleukos*; that is, an upper garment with a vertical white stripe woven into the center and a *kandys*; that is, a kind of mantle) and Achaemenid insignia (the diadem, tiara and royal seal), Iranian court ceremonies, and other innovations.⁶⁰ Most records place Alexander's reforms in eastern Parthia, but Arrian paints a different picture with references to Alexander's new 'barbarian' dress and insignia not appearing until Arrian digresses on the capture of Bessus in 329 (4.7.4).

The adoption of Iranian dress and regalia proceeded hand in hand with structural changes in Alexander's court and its ceremonial. The king introduced obeisance called *proskynesis*, although probably at the time limited to Asians (Curt. 6.6.3, Plut., *Alexander* 45.1). Iranian chamberlains were introduced to organize audiences, headed by Chares of Mytilene, who held the Persian office of *eisangeleus* (royal usher)⁶¹ The choice of Chares was no accident: he came from Mytilene, like Laomedon, a trusted companion of Alexander who spoke Persian (Arr. 3.6.6). That Chares must have been well acquainted with Iranian customs and the Persian language is implied by the fact that his works preserved unique detailed summaries of Iranian legends, including the story of Zariadres and Odatis (*FGrH* 125 F 5 = Athen. 13.575a-f).⁶² Another court office of Persian provenance was the taster (*edeatros*) given to Ptolemy, the royal bodyguard.⁶³ In the king's entourage appeared Iranians who exerted their influence on the ruler; one of them was the eunuch Bagoas, formerly Darius' favorite and now Alexander's.⁶⁴ Another of Alexander's introductions in 330 was the harem. It numbered 360 or

perhaps rather 365 concubines attended to by eunuchs.⁶⁵ The harem, clearly associated with Persian splendor and the Achaemenid monarchy, was not part of Macedonian tradition. Iranian aristocrats who had surrendered to Alexander after Darius III's death made up an elite guard fashioned after the Achaemenid model (*doryphoroi* or spear-bearers) and *rhabdophoroi* (rods-bearers) or Iranian court guards were employed. No later than at that point did recruitment begin of Iranians into Alexander's frontline army: the mounted Iranian javelinmen (*hippakontistai*), first attested in the Hyrcania campaign of 330.⁶⁶

In addition to literary records confirming Alexander's use of an Iranian tiara and diadem, more evidence is found in the royal iconography on his coins. Some of his monetary issues in Asia Minor (Sardes), Egypt (Memphis), and Syria (Bambyke/Hierapolis) bear his likeness in an upright tiara and diadem.⁶⁷ Moreover, Alexander persuaded his companions (*hetairoi*) to wear Iranian dress.⁶⁸ This included the *kandys* cloaks and double chitons seen worn by mounted Macedonians; that is, *hetairoi*, shown on the Alexander Sarcophagus. Moreover, the *hetairoi*'s horses received 'Persian' trappings from the king (Diod. 17.77.5).

The reforms in Parthia (Parthyaia), followed by other novelties in Central Asia, at Susa and at Opis, demonstrate that Alexander formulated a comprehensive pro-Iranian policy that he implemented from 330 up to his death. His position on the Iranians, proclaimed in 330 and implemented in subsequent years, is in many ways reminiscent of that taken by Cyrus the Great and his successors toward the Medes. In the Achaemenid state, Medes had occupied a status almost equal to that of Persians. We know that Alexander revered Cyrus' memory,⁶⁹ and it is highly likely that his concept of equal right for Iranians was modeled after the pro-Median policies of Cyrus and his successors.⁷⁰ Alexander, who imitated Cyrus the Great in many instances, was even called philo-Cyrus (*philokyros*, Strabo 11.11.4).

It was in Parthia-Hyrcania that Alexander introduced new rules in building his imperial administration and in the satraps' status. After the death of Darius III, the satrap of Parthia and Hyrcania, Phrataphernes, surrendered to Alexander and was granted clemency. The new satrap was the Parthian Amminapes, who had lived a long time at the court of Philip II as an émigré. His appointment came as no surprise, but what is surprising is that Alexander did not leave behind – unlike in Babylonia, Persis, and Media – any Macedonian holding an army in Parthia-Hyrcania. All he did was to attach to Amminapes, a royal overseer (*episkopos*), Tlepolemos (Arr. 3.22.1). As it happens, it was Parthia that saw Alexander's first foundation in Asia: Alexandropolis (Pliny, *Natural History* 6.113).

In Areia (on the Harirud river between Parthia, Bactria and Drangiana) Alexander approved the incumbent satrap Satibarzanes in 330, attaching to him Anaxippus as an overseer (*episkopos*) with 40 mounted javelin throwers (Arr. 3.25.1, Curt. 6.6.20). Without leaving behind any large garrison, the king marched on toward Bactria, knowing that Satibarzanes commanded a large force numbering thousands. The move proved a mistake in Areia (where a rebellion took a long time to quell), but it illustrates Alexander's policy toward the satraps and their military forces at the time. Afterwards, even Satibarzanes' successor as satrap, the Iranian governor Arsaces, was not burdened with a powerful garrison under a Macedonian commander to control his satrapy. It should be underscored that in Areia two of Alexander's foundations, Heraclea and Alexandria, which were established in 330, were apparently intended to stabilize the new administration.

Meanwhile, Amminapes, long an expatriate, was unable to govern Parthia-Hyrcania efficiently, causing Alexander to replace him in autumn 330 with the previous satrap, Phrataphernes (Arr. 3.28.4). His loyalty was assured by the inclusion of his two sons Sisines and Pharismanes in the companion cavalry. In all his military missions, Phrataphernes acted on his own, with no Macedonian commander present, and was among the most active governors.

Contrary to Alexander's expectations, in eastern Iran (mainly Areia) and Iranian lands in Central Asia, he ran into fierce resistance. This intractable stand was, most probably, due to several factors including local cultures and customs; eastern Iranian traditions emphasized military valor, even more so than was the case in the western part of the country. Respect for eastern Iranians' gallantry, observed under the Achaemenids and Alexander, can be compared to recognition of the martial prowess of modern Afghans which stems from their age-old fighter ethos cultivated among Afghan Pashtuns as *pashtunwali*.⁷¹ Another significant fact is that eastern Iran and Central Asia were the homeland of Zoroaster. As he entered that world, Alexander must have been aware of its realities and peculiarities, a fact that influenced his political change. This awareness is clearly indicated by his respectful treatment of the Ariaspi on the river Etymandrus (in western Afghanistan) who dwelled in the area considered the cradle of Zoroastrianism.⁷²

The pro-Iranian reforms Alexander introduced in Parthia spurred a fierce conflict between him and the Macedonian military. It was then that Macedonians first thought that their king was succumbing to 'barbarity' and adopting the *mores* of the defeated 'Persians.' The king's 'Persian resplendence' was sharply criticized, and the core of Alexander's army, Philip's veterans, openly opposed the innovations

(Curt. 6.6.9–12, 11.22–26, Justin 12.4.1). It was the beginning of a fundamental rift between the Macedonian army and its king – a conflict about Alexander’s attitude to the Iranians, organization of the army, nature of the monarchy and the empire. A significant example of this is a passage in Lucian of Samosata’s imaginary but well informed *The Dialogues of the Dead*, in which Philip blames Alexander for taking barbarian costume, and expected Macedonians, free men, to bow down before him (*proskynesis*), where Philip says: ‘And most ridiculous thing of all, you aped the habits of your defeated enemies’ (12 (14).3 = 396–7).

No open repression from the king followed in Parthia – Alexander won over his opponents with gifts (Diod. 17.78.1, Curt. 6.6.11). The crisis was to be temporarily patched up as confrontation loomed with Bessus and his allies (Curt. 6.6.12). Not incidentally, the conflict resurfaced with renewed force as soon as the heaviest fighting in Areia was over and an opportune moment came for the king to retaliate. In Phrada, the capital of Drangiana, Alexander had Philotas put to death and many alleged conspirators punished. The main point of contention now lay in Alexander’s Iranization and in the role the Iranians played. Justin makes it quite clear writing that Alexander was ‘especially irritated when his close associates profaned his good name, believing him a destroyer of the ways of his father Philip and his entire fatherland’ (Justin 12.5.2; cf 5.1).

Beginning with the Philotas affair, in all major court scandals as in real or alleged conspiracies against Alexander (the Cleitus affair, the Callisthenes affair, the royal pages), an important if not crucial point raised was the king’s ‘barbarization’ – opposition was voiced to Alexander’s adoption of Iranian items in dress, insignia and ceremonial, and to heavy Iranian presence in the army and the king’s immediate circle. This bottom-line conflict proves that Alexander’s pro-Iranian reforms were not a display of spoils as is sometimes assumed.⁷³ A contributing factor was a desire to go home voiced by most Macedonians, who were growing increasingly weary of the campaign.

5 Alexander’s Policies vis-à-vis the Iranians in Central Asia (329–327)

The Macedonian hunt for Bessus in Central Asia initially did not incur an active resistance by local peoples against Alexander’s army.⁷⁴ Only after Bessus’ capture do sources report the first large confrontations

between Macedonians and Iranians, the latter headed by Spitamenes and Catanes. It seems that the Macedonian king had miscalculated the readiness of Central Asian Iranians to cooperate and neglected to put up a good image of the Macedonian army, which kept perpetrating plunder and excesses. The response was fierce resistance that spread far and wide across Central Asia. Against this implacable attitude by the local populations, Alexander resorted to a practice that he had frequently employed before: he introduced cruel and massive terror to quell the opponents' resistance.⁷⁵

Alexander's Central Asian policies underwent a complete alteration between 329 and the spring of 327. The policy of terror proved ineffectual. True, Alexander had from the beginning attempted diplomatic action but had not always met with understanding when he had tried to be generous to his adversaries. With time, the policy of appeasement bore fruit. As early as 329 Alexander pardoned 30 Sogdian nobles and some of them he admitted to his personal guard (Curt. 7.10.9). In late 328 he made a compromise treaty with the powerful prince Oxyartes.⁷⁶ This breakthrough step was more effective with the Sogdians and Bactrians than military terror, for the example set by Oxyartes was followed by other princes, including Sisimithres. The latter, like Oxyartes, maintained rule over his estates (Arr. 4.21.1–10). Rather than punish the Central Asian leaders, Alexander now actually approved their rule under his own suzerainty.

Faced with relentless resistance in Central Asia, Alexander was persuaded to make an unprecedented compromise: he married an Iranian princess. Among the prisoners taken on Ariamazes' rock was Roxane, the daughter of Oxyartes (Arr. 4.20.4), and her beauty greatly impressed the Macedonian king.⁷⁷ For the Iranians, the marriage was proof that Alexander had changed his policy toward them to a more conciliatory and peace-minded stance (Plut., *Alexander* 47.5–8, Curt. 8.4.25). A number of Macedonian companions were opposed to Alexander's marriage with a woman from a conquered tribe, yet after Cleitus' murder no one dared to oppose the king openly (Curt. 8.4.30). Moreover, many of Alexander's Macedonian companions married Iranian aristocratic women at the time (Diod. 17, *arg. λ'*, *Metz Epitome* 31). It was becoming increasingly clear that Alexander's empire was to be governed by Iranians next to Macedonians.

The Macedonians' attitudes toward the Iranians varied. Most, especially among the infantry troops, were apprehensive of Alexander's pro-Iranian policy and insulted by what they perceived as his changing the traditional kingship, but those who openly criticized the king for his 'barbarization' were usually ruthlessly eliminated. The moderate resistance to Alexander's pro-Iranian policies was personified in Craterus, whose criticism of the 'barbarization' was common. But

the Macedonians also included admirers of pro-Iranian policies who were clearly favored by the king from 330. Among them was Hephaestion. It is therefore hardly surprising that by Alexander's order Hephaestion was responsible at the court for matters involving 'barbarians', just as the traditionalist Craterus dealt with Macedonians and Greeks. Both Macedonians, by the way, were deeply at odds with each other (Plut., *Alexander* 47.9–12), a personal conflict reflecting the division in the Macedonian elite over attitudes toward Asians, especially Iranians. Incidentally, this division among Macedonians reached a peak after Alexander's death at Babylon.

6 Macedonian–Iranian Cooperation in the Indian War (327–325): Politics and Propaganda Images

Alexander's campaign in India (327–325) was not a military necessity: no Indian ruler at that time threatened either Iran or Central Asia (a possible threat to Arachosia was a local affair). The battle at the Hydaspes river, fought against the Indian ruler Porus in 326 demonstrates how Alexander's army operated after the reforms he introduced in its composition and tactics during the struggles in the Iranian Plateau and the Central Asian satrapies in the years 331–327. Alexander's key formations engaged at the Hydaspes – cavalry and archers – were mostly Iranian and it was they who acquitted themselves admirably and signally contributed to his victory. The battle, therefore, should be seen as a Macedonian–Iranian victory. It was of fundamental significance for Alexander's policies, for in the Hyphasis mutiny of 326 a rise in status of Iranians in Alexander's army is patently reflected. The king pointed out emphatically that the 'Scythians and Bactrians' would follow him if his own countrymen deserted him (Curt. 9.2.33).

The campaign in India was a turning point for the status of Iranians in the king's army. It was a war in which Iranians who joined Alexander no longer fought against their countrymen (as in Sogdiana) but faced new challenges arm in arm with Macedonians. It is little wonder, then, that Alexander eagerly referred to the Indian war in his propaganda, such as in his decadrachm issues and other coins with iconography containing themes addressed to the Iranians.⁷⁸ Containing clear references to the war in India, decadrachm issues are interpreted as commemorating Alexander's victory over Porus. Alexander's headgear on decadrachms seems to be a combination of

the Iranian upright tiara with elements of a Macedonian helmet. It seems that the twin meaning of the iconography of decadrachms and other coins reflects a deliberate move: the renditions on coins were meant to appeal to Macedonians and Iranians alike. The winged figure crowning Alexander may be treated as a personification of the Iranian 'royal glory' (*khvarenah*) a powerful message to the Iranians.

Some of Alexander's tetradrachms are known bearing the figure of a soldier shooting a large bow on the obverse and an elephant on the reverse. Several known tetradrachms feature an archer in a quadriga with an elephant and two soldiers on the reverse. An archer figure appealed to Iranians since proficiency with the bow was a highly valued skill among them. It seems to have been the issuer's intention to refer to Iranian tradition to emphasize the Iranian contribution to the Indian campaign. An archer in a chariot, known from some of Alexander's coins, is another borrowing from Iranian tradition. All in all, it seems that decadrachms and tetradrachms with an elephant and standing archer (or elephant and charioted archer) were special issues struck in 324–323 on Alexander's orders after his return from India and intended mainly for Iranians.

7 The Political Reforms in Persis, Susa and Opis (324)

After returning from India, Alexander decided to introduce sweeping reforms in the army and further changes in his policy toward Iranians. Both processes were closely interlocked. Alexander's attitude to Iranians was also a corollary of his relations with Macedonians and Greeks. The latter, present in his army, occupation garrisons, and colonies as mercenaries and settlers, had begun to cause increasing trouble. Macedonian masses, too were growing restive, but anti-Macedonian attitudes amongst Iranians did not give the king too many headaches as their impact was limited. This is best illustrated by the subsequent course of events, for after Alexander's death, no large Iranian rebellion followed anywhere. What did erupt was a powerful revolt by Greeks in the Upper Satrapies, chiefly in Bactria and Sogdiana (323).

From Carmania Alexander made his way with selected troops to Persis. His first destination was Pasargadae, the former capital of Cyrus the Great. There he had Cyrus' tomb opened 'to pay his funerary respects to the body there interred' (Curt. 10.1.30). Alexander's attitude toward native Persians had changed completely since he had

had Persepolis pillaged and destroyed in 330, for now he had regrets (Arr. 6.30.1). His visit to Cyrus' burial site was his homage to a figure esteemed not only in Persis but also in all of Iran and across the Greek world.

Meanwhile, Persis needed its political and administrative affairs put in order. Alexander chose a trusted candidate for the post of the satrap of the country: Peucestas, a hypaspist officer in the king's personal guard. The choice was a conscious one and he was ardently and ostentatiously supported by the king and quickly won recognition among the Persians for holding their traditions above Macedonian ones: he learned to speak Persian, wore Iranian dress, and 'in all matters followed Persian ways' (Diod. 19.14.5; cf. Arr. 6.30.3, 7.6.3).

In connection with Alexander's stay at Susa and his reforms instituted there, Arrian explicitly acknowledges acceptance of Iranians in the companions, listing seven Iranian lands in the process (7.6.3). But the integration of Iranians in the ranks of the companions was a lengthy process that started already in 330. At Susa, Alexander took further steps that defined his policies and monarchical concept. A sumptuous wedding was held in which he and about 90 companions married aristocratic Iranian women. Alexander's brides were Barsine, Darius' eldest daughter, and Parysatis, the youngest daughter of Artaxerxes III Ochus, although Roxane continued to be his wife. The ceremony included only Macedonians and Iranians and the only notable Greeks in the company – Nearchus and Eumenes – had long been closely associated with Macedonia and could be described as 'naturalized Macedonians'. Of nine known women, most were Persian. The only Central Asian Iranian woman in the assemblage was Apame, the daughter of Spitamenes. She would win the greatest distinction among them as the mother of Seleucus' dynasty. The Susa nuptials were unions of Macedonians with Iranians not just Persians (Justin 12.10.10), and the weddings were celebrated in the Persian style (Arr. 7.4.7). The king ordered at Susa that Macedonians legalize their unions with Asiatic women, and their number ran to more than 10,000 (Arr. 7.4.8).

Susa saw an open confrontation of Alexander with Macedonian traditionalists. It was triggered mainly by the arrival in the city of the *epigonoi* or youths trained in Macedonian tactics.⁷⁹ Alexander took delight in the skill of that Macedonian-trained Iranian phalanx formation that totaled 30,000 soldiers: the *epigonoi* 'were warmly commended by the king after demonstrating their skill and discipline in the use of their weapons' (Diod. 17.108.2) and they 'displayed remarkable skill and agility' (Plut., *Alexander* 71.1). The name *epigonoi* ('descendants') was given to the new formation – Arrian 7.6.1 relates – by Alexander himself, and it most obviously indicates that they were

to replace the Macedonian phalanx. Diodorus 17.108.3 calls the new phalanx *antitagma*, which contrasts the Iranian phalanx with the Macedonian forces so far constituting Alexander's *tagma*. Plutarch, *Alexander* 47.3, uses the term *paides* or 'boys', a label often reused in the Diadochi period to emphasize the young age of Iranian recruits.

In agitation, Macedonians now openly criticized the rising importance of Iranians in the army and any signs of the court and ceremonial becoming Iranized. Peucestas also caused similar displeasure when he appeared in Persian dress. Alexander was accused of utter barbarization and rejection of Macedonian ways (Arr. 7.6.1–5). Rank-and-file Macedonians finally realized they were not irreplaceable, and Alexander's threat at the Hyphasis that he would be followed by barbarians if his countrymen failed him could now be fulfilled. Interestingly, the king did not launch repressions against the Macedonian opposition, perhaps deliberately postponing the confrontation until Opis in 324 where another open revolt was staged.⁸⁰

By then, however, Alexander had built a perfect substitute for the rebellious Macedonians in the form of the Iranian phalanx called *epigonoi* or *antitagma*. Events developed in a rapid succession. First he declared his decision to dismiss 10,000 Macedonian veterans, which met with staunch opposition from Macedonians – first those who were to stay in Asia and later from others who feared that he would establish a permanent residence in Asia. Everyone wanted to be dismissed from service, deriding Alexander and Amon, a fact that made Alexander furious. The army had long harbored discontent with the king's 'Persian' dress, creation of the *epigonoi* and admission of barbarians to the companions (Arr. 7.8.2). Alexander put down the mutiny by executing a number of Macedonian ringleaders and exploiting the Iranian troops by selecting 1,000 young Iranians to join his bodyguard and entrusted them next to Macedonians his personal protection (Diod. 17.110.1, Justin 12.12.3–4). Plutarch, *Alexander* 71.4, maintains that he went so far as to dismiss his former guards, and brought in 'Persians' for that position, using them to make up his units of bodyguards and attendants. Hence a new royal Iranian infantry guard (*agema*)⁸¹ and the separate Iranian cavalry formations of companions and *agema basilike* (Arr. 7.11.3) were established. The Iranians were given high military commands of the royal brigades (Arr. 7.11.1, 3, Diod. 17.109.3).⁸² The king created the Iranian formations of *pezhetairoi*, *asthetairoi* and *argyraspides*, labeling them with names hitherto reserved for Macedonian units (Arr. 7.11.3), and he made the rule that only those Iranians whom he proclaimed his kinsmen (*syngeneis*) should have the honor of saluting him with a kiss (Arr. 7.11.1).

The Macedonians pleaded for forgiveness and Alexander now staged the end of the mutiny for the greatest effect. Callines, a spokesman for the rebels, spoke of Macedonian envy at the king's calling Persians his 'kinsmen' and granting them the privilege to kiss him. Alexander then called Macedonians his 'kinsmen' and allowed them to offer him the same greeting (Arr. 7.11.7). This apparent concession cost him nothing and gave the Macedonians no actual privileges; indeed, it was another form of *proskynesis*, a custom once fiercely opposed by them. He then held a public banquet for thousands of people chiefly including Macedonians and Iranians (Arr. 7.11.8–9). Recent scholarly descriptions of the feast as a reconciliation find no basis in source accounts, for Alexander prayed for harmony (*homonoia*) and a sense of community in one state and in the exercise of power (*koinonia tes arches*) for Macedonians and Persians.

The Opis reforms are often alleged to have been ephemeral,⁸³ but in truth there is no record that they were ever withdrawn. On the contrary, the nature of Alexander's later reforms in Babylon implies that resting the strength of the army on Iranians was an enduring and consistently implemented concept. None of his principal pro-Iranian innovations begun in 330 and implemented in successive years was ever reversed. What is more, in Babylon, just days before his death, the king was supervising the creation of a military formation that was numerically dominated by Iranians.

8 Iranians in Alexander's Army and City Foundations

Alexander's monarchy, like its successor states, was military by nature and had the army for its chief support. The composition and character of the armed forces, therefore, reflected the nature of the empire. In this respect, a meaningful indicator is the rapid promotions of Iranians who from 330 on were increasingly recruited for the king's armed forces.⁸⁴

Admissions of Iranians to Alexander's army occurred in northern Iran (Parthia and Hyrcania) in 330 (*hippakontistai*, *hetairoi* cavalry units). The process was intensified in subsequent years, especially in 328–327, when in Central Asia Alexander enrolled thousands of Bactrians and Sogdians in his army's ranks. Shortly before the Indian campaign, he reformed his companion cavalry, the key formation in his army. It can be inferred that he had in his army a total of at least 4,000 of the companions in 327–326; more than a half of them were

Iranians. At the time, the Iranian phalanx (*epigonoï* or *antitagma*) was established.

This integrating tendency continued during the Indian campaign, in which Alexander led a vast army of about 120,000 men with the Iranians forming an essential part. The last stage in the Iranization of Alexander's army came after he returned from India and continued until his death. At Babylon in 323, he created a new mixed combat infantry formation intended for action in Arabia. The new formation was composed of files called 'decads' (*dekai*), each of which comprised 4 Macedonians and 12 Persians (Arr. 7.23.3–4, Diod. 17.110.2). Alexander's Babylon reform welded together Macedonian heavy infantry and Iranian missile troops (archers and javelin throwers) and was a combination of the best infantry arms the Macedonians and Iranians possessed.

At Babylon in 323, Alexander headed a field army of about 7,000 Macedonians, several thousands of Anatolians, and about 75,000 Iranians, the latter including elite units equal to Macedonian counterparts in training (*epigonoï*) and battle experience (Iranian companion cavalry). In military terms, Macedonians (and other troops coming from the northern Balkan area including Thracians) had lost their dominant status in the army. At the same time, Greek mercenaries practically disappeared from the king's field forces; they were replaced as auxiliary units with recruits from Asia Minor, Syria and the Iranian lands. On the eve of the planned Arabian war, the Iranian supremacy in the army was unmistakable.

Alexander needed loyal Iranian satraps who would be able to form provincial armies based on local conscription and effectively lead them in combat. The Iranian *epigonoï* were led to Alexander at Susa in 324 by the satraps themselves (Arr. 7.6.1). It was they, therefore, who must have supervised their training and recruited them from among the inhabitants of the new royal colonies established in the Iranian satrapies.

How modest Macedonian forces and how strong satrapal Iranian corps were in Asia in 323 (after Alexander's death) is indicated by the composition of Peithon's army that ended a Greek rebellion in the Upper Satrapies. Perdikkas gave him 3,000 infantry and 800 cavalry drawn by lot from Macedonians, and the satraps in Iran were instructed to contribute 8,000 horse and 10,000 foot, most of them Iranian (Diod. 18.7.3). It was the satrapal armies that were now to decide the fate of Iranian countries.

An essential element in our understanding of Alexander's reign is his colonization program that should be seen in closer connection with his policy toward various population segments, especially the Iranians.

Alexander counted on his colonies as the mainstay – with the field army and occupation forces – of his power in the empire (Curt. 10.2.8). The importance of colonies in empire building was stressed by Aristotle in his letter to the king which could have provided a decisive stimulus for the colonization program begun in Asia.⁸⁵

In 330, Alexander initiated a large colonization program in Iran and Central Asia, extended thereafter into India and Babylonia. Overall, each satrapy in northern Iran from Parthia to Paropamisos acquired at least one urban colony. One each was founded in Parthia (Alexandropolis in Parthia), Margiana (here, apart from the metropolis called Alexandria, there were six fortified settlements), Drangiana including the country of the Ariaspi (Alexandria in Sakastan), and Arachosia (Alexandria or Alexandropolis). Two colonies are known to have existed in Areia (Alexandria and Heraclea) and three in Paropamisos (Alexandria, a colony near Alexandria, and Nicaea), which suggests the strategic importance of those regions. A similar colonization pattern is seen in the lower Indus valley, southern Iran and Babylonia, where no satrapy was left that did not have a colony. Those created there included Alexandria in Babylonia, Alexandria in Susiana (later renamed Charax), Alexandria in Persis, Alexandria in Carmania, Alexandria in Gedrosia or Macarene, Alexandria in the land of the Oreites, Rhambacia, and Arbis oppidum (on the borders of India).

In the sources three groups of settlers in Alexander's foundations in Iran and Central Asia are attested: Iranians, Greeks and Macedonians. Iranian settlers possessed formally equal rights with Macedonians and Hellenes, as was the case of Alexandria Eschate (Arr. 4.4.1, Curt. 7.6.27). The high status of Iranian colonists emerged as a result of Alexander's Iranian policies proclaimed in 330. This position became even more evident when Alexander recruited in new foundations the young Iranians for his new royal phalanx (Arr. 7.6.1).

9 Between Macedonia and Iran: Alexander and the New Empire

An assessment of Alexander's policies toward Iranians and generally Asians run a full gamut. To some he remains a ruthless conqueror with little understanding for the traditions of the peoples he conquered,⁸⁶ whereas others see him as a conscious successor of the Achaemenids.⁸⁷ Neither position addresses the heart of the matter.

A biased picture of Alexander as a limited, brutal invader is

contradicted by sources. While it is true that he was mainly a leader and conqueror, in many situations – chiefly from 330 – he attempted coalition-based solutions that he attained through diplomatic means. Nor was his political program limited simply to succeeding the Achaemenids. He did not rise to the throne of Cyrus, did not use the title ‘king of kings’ (so explicitly Plut., *Demosthenes* 25.3), did not take a dynastic name, and never announced himself successor of Darius III. Instead, he titled himself as ‘king of Asia’. From 330 he was busy creating his own imperial concept that was neither strictly Achaemenid or solely Macedonian: it was an amalgam of Iranian, including Achaemenid, elements with Macedonian notions.⁸⁸

Alexander’s Asian policies should be seen as two distinct areas: local and imperial. In respective lands Alexander fell back on local traditions as was the case in Lydia, Egypt and Babylonia. That said, such traditions had no bearing on the imperial sphere. In building his empire, Alexander followed the Achaemenid model, Iranian traditions, and an elite composed not only of Macedonians but also Iranians.

Alexander’s new concept was proclaimed in eastern Iran shortly after Darius III’s death and first applied to Iranians in that region, later to embrace the Bactrians and Sogdians. Eventually, it was extended to all Iranian peoples. Neither the place nor the time for a proclamation of a new policy was chosen at random. Eastern Iran and Central Asia loomed as a powerful and menacing challenge, but it was there that he began laying foundations for his empire. The area’s demographic and military potential (confirmed in no uncertain terms at Gaugamela) was immense, and Alexander was too good a leader and too shrewd a politician not to appreciate that aspect. He consciously styled himself as an Iranian ruler rather than just a Persian one; his court and ceremony reforms and the colonization he initiated were not in Persis but in northeastern Iran (Parthia). The years 331–330 marked the end of the old order in Asia and Europe, and matters to do with Greece or even his native Macedonia must have seemed peripheral to Alexander.

One cannot help noticing in Alexander’s Iranian policy a component of admiration. The Iranian world must have fascinated him, as it had politicians and commanders of the stature of Themistocles, Pausanias, or Alcibiades in the fifth century. It seems certain too that Alexander, as a commander and a man thoroughly familiar with things military, had much respect for the prowess and aristocratic *ethos* of the Iranians. Some Iranian customs had their equivalents in Macedonian tradition, including appreciation of the ruler’s military valor. Persia had exerted influence on the institutional development of Philip II’s monarchy; similar influences on Macedonia are visible under his predecessors beginning with Amyntas I and Alexander I. Now Alexander the Great was in the heart of the

Achaemenid Empire and interaction with the refined civilization of Iran favored borrowing from its rich heritage.

This fact should be given due recognition that the ambitious Alexander, ever eager to search for new forms of monarchy – forms reaching beyond the Macedonian tradition, where the king's role was quite limited – had discovered in royal Persian traditions those elements that best suited his need to build and strengthen the new empire. Alexander's idea was for an empire that would be organized to a large extent along Achaemenid lines: their state was the only model of a multinational monarchy familiar, and in many ways one deserving admiration for Alexander to fall back on.

In contemporary research, Alexander's pro-Iranian policies are often viewed as merely 'pragmatic'.⁸⁹ Nonetheless, claims for narrow pragmatism fall short of explaining many of Alexander's fundamental and far-reaching moves such as his marriage to Roxane, the Iranian princess from Central Asia (it would have been more 'pragmatic' to place her at the court as a concubine) or the creation of an Iranian phalanx (*epigonoi*) to replace the existing Macedonian force. The complete dominance of Iranians in Alexander's army in 324–323 is another move overstepping the boundaries of simple necessity. Failure to recognize the chief aims of Alexander's policies in the Iranian world leads to false historical reconstructions.⁹⁰

Iranian traditions by and large show an ambivalent attitude toward Alexander.⁹¹ A complimentary picture of Alexander as a hero or even a sage is seen in the tradition based on the so-called *Alexander Romance*, discussed in S.R. Asirvatham, chapter 6. By contrast, the priestly Pahlavi tradition portrays Alexander as 'accursed' or a 'devil' and numbers him, together with Afrasiab and Zahhak, among Iran's greatest enemies. This ambivalence takes its origin from the time of his reign. Later, the figure of Alexander accrued numerous legends that combined inextricably with historical facts. This phenomenon can be compared to later historical breakthroughs in Iran: similarly ambivalent were the Iranians to the Seljuks and to the Mongols who conquered Iran. The same duality, again, is reflected in today's still discernible Iranian attitudes to Arabs.

Alexander's conquests in Asia led to the creation of a new empire combining – as once the state of Cyrus the Great and Darius the Great had – many peoples with their varied cultures and traditions. Like the first Achaemenids before him, Alexander contributed – partly by deliberate action (his images on coins, in painting and sculpture) – to the creation of a royal iconography and an 'imperial style'.⁹² His pro-Iranian policy was opposed by a multitude of dissatisfied Macedonians and Greeks, and faced by this and resistance from some Iranians Alexander was unable to ensure his empire had coherence and long

life. Yet, while some of Alexander's pro-Iranian innovations were abandoned after he died, others could not be obliterated. Moreover, Iranians had secured such a strong a footing that they continued to be a major political-military force in Western Asia in the Diadochi era (323–281) and each Macedonian satrap and the Diadochi wishing to rule on Iranian soil had to solicit support from them. This applied in particular to Peithon, Peucestas and Eumenes and it helped to secure the rule of Seleucus and his wife Apame, the daughter of Spitamenes, in Western and Central Asia and to create the Macedonian–Iranian Empire of the Seleucids.⁹³

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- ¹⁷ See also N.V. Sekunda, chapter 22, pp. 447–8.

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- ²¹ See, for example, R. Lane Fox, 'Alexander the Great: "Last of the Achaemenids"?' in C. Tuplin, (ed.), *Persian Responses: Political and Cultural Interaction with(in) the Achaemenid Empire* (Swansea 2007), p. 269, who points to 'a broad parallelism, not actual derivation' between Persia and Macedonia.
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³⁷ Worthington, *Philip II*, p. 127.

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³⁹ Details in Worthington, *Philip II*, pp. 158–63.

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⁴² Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, p. 460. The economic motives for Philip's plans to invade Asia are rightly underscored by Worthington, *Philip II*, pp. 168–9.

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⁸² M. Brosius, ‘Alexander and the Persians’, in J. Roisman (ed.), *Brill’s Companion to Alexander the Great* (Leiden 2003), p. 175, is in error to believe that the Persians ‘were never given political power of any degree, and certainly no military power.’

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⁸⁵ J. Bielawski and M. Plezia, *Lettre d’Aristote à Alexandre sur la politique envers les cités* (Wrocław 1970); see further, Worthington, ‘Alexander the Great, Nation-building’, pp. 118–37.

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⁸⁹ E.A. Fredricksmeyer, ‘Alexander and the Kingship of Asia’, in A.B. Bosworth and E.J. Baynham (eds.), *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction* (Oxford 2000), pp. 165–6.

⁹⁰ One can hardly agree with Lane Fox, ‘Alexander the Great: “Last of the Achaemenids”?’, pp. 290 and 293, who believes that Alexander’s pro-Iranian gestures, his Iranian applebearers, and the ‘purple tunics’ for courtiers were ‘superficial bricolage.’

⁹¹ See S.R. Asirvatham, chapter 6.

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⁹³ M.J. Olbrycht, ‘Creating an Empire: Iran and Middle Asia in the Policy of Seleukos I’, in V.P. Nikonorov (ed.), *Central Asia from the Achaemenids to the Timurids. Archaeology, History, Ethnology, Culture* (St Petersburg 2005), pp. 231–5.

PART VI

Politics, Society, Economy and Culture

Macedonian Kingship and Other Political Institutions¹

Carol J. King

Kingship is the earliest attested political structure in ancient Macedonia. Legend has it firmly established before recorded history and it continued to be the political heart of Macedonia until the Roman settlement in 167. This much is understood from sources such as political treatises, narrative histories, speeches, inscriptions, and other material remains. However, by no means does the evidence give a comprehensive picture of how kingship functioned in relation to other identifiable political bodies. Even Aristotle, who was in a position to know the inner workings, in his extant writings refers to the Macedonians and their kingship only in general terms. A dearth of sources for some periods and for others ambiguous accounts have led to much theorizing with no consensus among scholars on the overall structure of the state. Close examination of the evidence, encumbered as it is by difficulties of interpretation, may leave as many questions as answers. Those questions, however, can and should be pointed and informed.

The nature of the evidence has shaped all scholarly debate. Evidence for the period before Philip II is scarce and non-Macedonian.² It consists chiefly of comments in Herodotus, Thucydides, Diodorus and Justin, and also a few inscriptions from Greek *poleis*. For the reign of Philip II there is considerable contemporary evidence but this too is non-Macedonian and largely hostile. The later *sine ira* universal history of Diodorus thus may be preferred over Demosthenes' contemporary vitriolic oratory.³ Evidence for the reign of Alexander III ('the Great') is copious, but the five surviving narrative histories are all late; the earliest, Diodorus, was written 300 years after Alexander's death. However, Diodorus' account and those of Curtius, Plutarch, Arrian and Justin are largely based on lost accounts of Macedonians and others who campaigned

with Alexander. Diodorus' narrative survives into the wars of the Successors. Then narrative sources peter out for nearly a century. For the later period of Macedonian independence we have the contemporary – though again non-Macedonian – narrative of Polybius, and where he fails Livy, alongside a larger body of epigraphic evidence from Macedonia as well as from Greek *poleis*. These sources suffice to confirm hereditary kingship and the existence of several other institutions, 'institution' herein qualified as being an established law, custom, or practice, which may or may not be part of a constitutional framework.

Along with the *basileus* (king), from the time of Philip II sources refer to the *basilikoi paides* (royal pages), the *somatophylakes* (bodyguards), the *hetairoi* (companions) or *philoï* (friends), to an assembly usually of the army, and especially in the Hellenistic period to several magistracies. Evidence is insufficient, however, to confirm the origins of the various institutions, their longevity, or their authority relative to the king. Moreover, mere mention of such bodies with supposed political functions does not prove that they were institutions with constitutional authority. On this point hinges an ongoing debate questioning the nature of kingship and also the degree of political participation of other bodies.

Admittedly one can only theorize about the functions or even existence of institutions apart from kingship before Philip II. Therefore, in order to reflect the limitations of our sources as well as those major changes brought about first by the grand expansion in the third quarter of the fourth century and subsequently by the fragmentation of the empire (cf. Livy 45.9), the present discussion observes three chronological divisions: (1) the period before Philip II, (2) the period of Philip II and Alexander III and (3) the period after Alexander III. But first, background for the ongoing scholarly debate must be outlined in brief.⁴

1 Constitution versus Autocracy

Scholarly views on the structure of the Macedonian state fall generally into two schools of thought: the 'constitutionalist' position and that of monarchic 'autocracy'. The 'constitutionalist' position, first proposed by Granier in 1931 and subsequently revised by many scholars (see bibliographical essay), holds that the Macedonian state from before Philip II was run according to established traditions or laws that granted customary rights to groups within the state. Granier proposed an evolution from a Homeric society of many minor 'kings' of

relatively equal authority, with a dominant nobility, to a sovereign military state in which an army of citizen soldiers supported the central king against a rival class of nobles.⁵ The army had the right to choose the king (or regent) and to judge cases of treason. All ‘constitutionalists’ following Granier insist on the latter two ‘rights’. The chief weakness of this position is that the bulk of evidence for the army choosing a new king and judging cases of treason comes from the reign of Alexander III. And that evidence is not conclusive that these were in fact ‘rights’.

The position of ‘autocracy’ put forward by de Francisci in 1948 and again followed by many (see bibliographical essay) holds that the monarch ruled supreme and that the perceived authority of any other body, such as the army assembly, was only conferred by the whim of the ruler.⁶ The arguments are largely refutations of the constitutionalist position so again much of the evidence comes from the reign of Alexander III. If in the East it does appear to have been Alexander’s whim that ruled supreme, we should keep in mind the anomaly of his army court traveling far from Macedonia. In Macedonia proper Antipater ruled as regent from 334 until 319 (four years after Alexander’s death).

The scholarly debate has subsided since the publication in 1996 of Hatzopoulos’ epigraphic study *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings*. Nevertheless, the few reactions to his work indicate that the questions, both major and minor, are not definitively settled (see bibliographical essay).

2 Kingship before Philip II (about 510–359)

The only political institution positively attested before the reign of Philip II is the kingship. Our earliest sources use the title *basileus*,⁷ a Greek term for a non-descript lord, prince, or king. The title alone offers no precise view to the duties or powers of the Macedonian kings since it can denote positions of varying authority. Greek historians of the Classical period apply the term not only to the kings of Macedonia but also to the autocratic ‘great king’ of Persia, to the dual military kings of oligarchic Sparta, and to one of the nine archons in democratic Athens. There is virtually no evidence, however, for Macedonian kings calling themselves *basileus* before Alexander III.⁸ The title appears to be imposed from outside Macedonia yet with welcome connotations.

The position held by the *basileus* derives from the tribal system of early times when it represented an office granted to an individual of a prominent family deemed sufficiently worthy by virtue of skill or wisdom to lead the tribe especially in warfare. In many ancient (and medieval) societies the office evolved into a hereditary position, and this may be how kingship evolved in Macedonia too; at any rate, by the archaic period kingship was hereditary. How much the Macedonians were influenced by Mycenaean civilization is questionable, yet early Macedonian kingship does evoke Homeric aristocratic structures. According to Thucydides 2.99, in early times several Macedonian tribes, those in Lower Macedonia in the region of Pieria and Mount Olympus near the sea, as well as the Lyncestae and Elimiotae of Upper (inland) Macedonia, were all ruled by *basileis*. Eventually, though they retained a local *basileus*, the Lyncestae, Elimiotae, and other inland tribes became subject to the *basileus* of Lower Macedonia. One cannot avoid the echo of Homer's Agamemnon as overlord of Menelaus of Sparta, Odysseus of Ithaca, Achilles of Phthia, and so on.

Hereditary kingship in Macedonia followed one family line descending from the archaic king Perdiccas I down to Alexander IV, the posthumous son and co-successor of Alexander III 'the Great'. In the Hellenistic period the Antigonids established another royal dynasty. The kings of the earlier dynasty are variously called Temenids (Temenidae) or Argeads (Argeadae). Both Herodotus (8.137–139) and Thucydides (2.99.3) claim that the Macedonian kings were descended from Temenus of Argos. As Herodotus tells the story, three brothers, descendants of Temenus, as exiles from Argos came to Upper Macedonia through Illyria. They worked as servants for the local *basileus* until an omen involving the youngest brother, Perdiccas, warned the king and he expelled all three men. They moved on to another part of Macedonia and settled near the Gardens of Midas under Mount Bermium (Vermion in Lower Macedonia), and from there gradually took control of all Macedonia (as it was known in Herodotus' day).

Some scholars regard Herodotus' story about the Temenids – through Temenus descendants also of Heracles and Zeus – as a foundation myth to provide the ruling house of Macedonia with Greek ancestry.⁹ Yet it is a story not without weight for in the fifth century it seems to have been generally believed. We hear of the officials at Olympia allowing Alexander I to compete in the footrace (Hdt. 5.22) and the usually skeptical Thucydides accepts the Argive connection without reserve (2.99.3, 5.80.2). Those who reject the Argive origin of the Macedonian royal house prefer the term Argeads, descendants of Argeas son of Macedon son of Zeus from Orestis (Hesiod, *Eoëae* F 7,

Appian 11.63). Both origin stories take the royal house back to Zeus, thus establishing divine ancestry and, by implication, a divine right to rule. Homeric echoes are apparent both in the association with Agamemnon's Argos and with Zeus, from whose divine will kings derived their authority.

As background to the Persian invasion of Greece via Macedonia Herodotus establishes seven generations of royal lineage in father-to-son succession from Perdiccas I of Argos to Alexander I, who fought with Mardonius against the Greeks at Plataea in 479. We know little else but the names of the first five Argead kings (Justin 7.2 gives a slightly different succession). Hence our understanding of Macedonian political structure does not begin to emerge until the Classical period with Amyntas I and Alexander I. Thucydides, Diodorus and Justin continue our record of the Argead royal line from Alexander I through Perdiccas II to Archelaus' minor successor Orestes, who was murdered in 396. Then a number of dynastic disputes interrupt father-to-son succession. These challenges for the throne – some certainly and perhaps all – by members of the extended Argead house, coupled with outside intervention and arbitration (Plut., *Pelopidas* 26–7), confound an answer to the question of whether succession was based on primogeniture or on some other criterion, perhaps merit or the king's choice.¹⁰ The question is important for it bears on the larger question of the Macedonian constitution: was the choice of a new king the 'right' of an assembly of the army or people, or was there merely public approval for a predetermined choice?

Evidence for established rules of succession is weak. Most often sons succeeded fathers but primogeniture is far from confirmed by the sources. Amyntas III (about 392–370) is said to have been succeeded by his 'eldest' son, Alexander II (so Diod. 16.2.4, Justin 7.4.8), who is named along with his father in a treaty between Amyntas and the Athenians.¹¹ This strongly suggests that he was designated heir before his father's death. But Amyntas had six sons by two wives and Alexander was eldest by the second wife. An attempt to reconcile this with primogeniture proposes that when a king had several sons, one or more being born before he came to power, that succession fell to the eldest son born *after* the king came to the throne.¹² When Perdiccas III (about 365–360) was killed in battle, succession probably, but not certainly, fell to his (only) infant son Amyntas IV (Justin 7.5.8–9) rather than to a capable adult. In such cases the designated regent seems to have been the nearest male relative – the deceased king's brother if he had one. But herein lays a spawning ground for dynastic rivalry since the child or youth was at the mercy of his guardian-regent and, in practice, more vulnerable than one might expect if constitutional law was in place. Archelaus' successor-

son Orestes is said to have been murdered by his regent Aeropos II (Diod. 14.37.6). Another theory proposes that the ruling king chose from his sons the one best suited to rule, which is inspired by the succession of Philip II.¹³

Other questions regarding succession remain unanswered. What constituted 'legitimate' male offspring? Archelaus is said by a contemporary source (Pl., *Gorgias* 471), to have been Perdiccas II's son by a slave woman and to have seized the throne from 'Perdiccas' legitimate son, a child of seven' whom he threw down a well. The Macedonian kings' practice of polygamy may have been, in part, for the purpose of securing succession through male offspring, but as is evident from the many wives of Philip II the practice of polygamy had other important political significance since most marriages sealed foreign alliances.¹⁴ Whatever the benefits reaped from the practice it could well have complicated succession more than aided it. Problems of succession tell against a highly developed infrastructure in Macedonia before Philip II's reign. Nevertheless, the Macedonian throne did remain in the same line for at least 300 years, from Perdiccas I in the mid-seventh century until the murder by Cassander of Alexander IV in about 310.

The Macedonian kings of the classical period appear most often in the historical record as constituting the 'state'. This perception is due to the tendency of historians when describing political developments in the north Aegean region to use the name of the current king rather than the ethnic designation as is typically used for Greek citystates (for example, the Athenians, the Lacedaemonians) and other peoples, both Greek and non-Greek (for example, the Thessalians, the Thracians – the latter also ruled by monarchs). Bearing in mind that before Alexander we have an almost entirely nonMacedonian viewpoint, and that Greeks recorded information about a people *they* perceived as foreign (even if the ruling house of Macedonia claimed Greek ancestry), this usage may have had no political connotation. Hammond points to some references to the kings that also include the 'Macedones' whom he claims are citizens and concludes that the state consisted of the king and the Macedonians equally.¹⁵ But arguments from the 'constitutionalist' position that the king alone does not constitute the state are not conclusive. In support of Hammond's conclusion Hatzopoulos has brought to attention considerable epigraphic evidence. However, Hammond's evidence – much of it literary – and nearly all the inscriptions cited by Hatzopoulos are later than the fifth century. One exception, an inscription concerning Perdiccas II's alliance with Athens perhaps during the Peloponnesian War (*IG* 1³ 89), lists some of the king's relatives and many other leading men, at least 85 in total, as oath-takers together with

Perdiccas.¹⁶ Errington, arguing a date in the 440s for the treaty, suggests that the reason for so many witnesses to Perdiccas II's alliance with Athens was the weakness of his position in the early years of his reign.¹⁷ Further confusion arises from inconsistency within the epigraphic evidence for a treaty between Amyntas III and the Chalcidians (dated to 393 or 391) names only 'Amyntas son of Arrhidaeus' in its preamble.¹⁸

In foreign relations the king, if he is not himself 'the state', appears to be at the head of it. From earliest times it was his prerogative to entertain foreign envoys (Hdt. 5.17–22) and he also negotiated foreign policy and alliances, both on his own behalf (for example, Thuc. 4.132) and, in the case of Alexander I, for the Persians (Hdt. 8.136, 140–4). Following the Persian defeat at Salamis, Mardonius sent the Macedonian king to Athens to negotiate a Persian-Athenian alliance for two reasons: Alexander I had a formal relationship with Athens and he was related by marriage to a prominent Persian. Both of these suggest that the kingship had a strong personal nature. The marriage confirms the early establishment of the policy of Macedonian kings to form alliances through marriage, a policy that would be continued throughout their history. Macedonian kings gained much through diplomacy. However, Perdiccas' many alliances made – and broken – with Athens (for example, Thuc. 2.29, 2.80), Sparta (for example, Thuc. 4.78–83) and others earned him a reputation for perfidy, or at least this is the Athenian perspective (Thuc. 1.57–63). Indeed, Perdiccas' backroom deals with Sparta and Argos in the midst of the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 5.80, 83) hardly seem the result of a vote in the assembly – and could have provoked the need for many witnesses to his treaties.

The king controlled and owned the natural resources of the Macedonian territory such as timber, silver and gold as well as royal land.¹⁹ Thus he was able to grant sizable gifts of land and money and offer bribes to win support both domestic and foreign (for example, Xen., *Hellenica* 5.2.38, Diod. 14.92.3, 15.19.2, Plut., *Pelopidas* 27). Alexander I made a kingly display of wealth by dedicating a gold statue at Delphi (Hdt. 8.121, Dem. 12.21). Most important, wealth financed military activity. From earliest times the Macedonian king served as the supreme commander in warfare. Tradition holds that the archaic infant king Aeropus I was placed at the rear of the Macedonian battle-line so as to inspire the troops and to bring good auspices (Justin 7.2.5–12) and Alexander I was 'king and commander' of the Macedonian forces with Mardonius at Plataea (Hdt. 9.44). During the revolt of Potidaea from the Delian League the allies supporting Potidaea chose Perdiccas II as 'overall commander' of the cavalry (though not of the infantry, Thuc. 1.62). Archelaus'

innovations to both cavalry and infantry strengthened Macedonia's own military capacity (Thuc. 2.100), this at a time when most of the Greek *poleis* were embroiled in or still reeling from the Peloponnesian War at the close of the fifth century. Thus, the military aspect of Macedonian kingship, so well-known from the reigns of Philip II and Alexander III, is a point of continuity in all periods.

If there were any political institutions other than kingship before the reign of Philip II they are not firmly attested by the sources. Hammond would trace institutions attested in the fourth century back to the fifth but he admits that this is only an assumption.²⁰ One reference to a body of attendees on the king, the *paredroi* (literally, 'those who sit beside', Hdt. 8.138.1), suggests the early (archaic) existence of a council of advisors. No similar body is heard of again until Alexander III. We have no evidence for the function of assemblies, either civic or army, before Philip II. The king's role as military commander would necessitate appointing a deputy in charge of other affairs (Thuc. 1.62), but otherwise the evidence, perhaps misleadingly, since it is an argument from silence, suggests that the king acted according to his own inclination.

3 Institutions under Philip II and Alexander III (359–323)

If the early Argeads, looking for Hellenic favor, 'invented' Argive ancestry, it is ironic that by the time it emerges from the murk of pre-history the principal Macedonian political institution, kingship, is fundamentally objectionable to most Greeks. In the fifth century, when the Athenians were fiercely protecting their democracy through the practice of ostracism and the Spartans continued to elect five annual ephors to keep their two kings in check, Macedonian kingship appears extremely outdated. For some Greeks kingship held a greater appeal in the fourth century when its virtues found expression in political theory, particularly in Plato's philosopher kings and in Aristotle's favorable discussion. Aristotle (*Politics* 5.1310b) distinguishes between two kinds of monarchy or 'the rule of one': tyranny, usually established and maintained by force, is an ignoble rule, whereas kingship is a position of merit, either by virtue or birth or good deeds or the capacity to do good deeds. He refers explicitly to the Macedonians as an example of kingship-monarchy – in other words Macedonian kingship was not a rule by force (cf. Arr. 4.11.6). Of Aristotle's five subcategories of kingship (*Politics* 3.1284b35–1285b33), heroic kingship fits closely with our literary view of the

Macedonians (Arr. 7.9.1–10.7). Aristotle was intimately acquainted with Macedonian kings, having educated one successor to the throne, Alexander III (and perhaps also at the same time several future Hellenistic kings). But how much his discussion of kingship was influenced by his time at the Macedonian court, or how much Alexander might have been influenced by Aristotle's political views, is unknown. It has been theorized that Philip II's rule was influenced by Plato's Academy,²¹ but this too is a matter of speculation.

Kingship under Philip II and Alexander III was much more inclined toward the heroic warrior than to the philosopher king although both kept philosophers at court. Coming to power at a time of serious external threat, Philip revitalized the military organization and in one campaign after another led the army in conquest and expansion, fighting in the van (Diod. 16.4.5) and suffering the same risks as his men (Diod. 16.34.5). It was a style of kingship that was most effective for winning the loyalty of the soldiers whom he generously rewarded (for example, Diod. 16.53.2–3). Diodorus (16.60.3) claims he won a reputation for both excellent generalship and piety. The Macedonian kingship was in part a priesthood, for the king offered daily sacrifices and presided over religious festivals. Alexander emulated his father's style of kingship, and not until after his defeat of Darius and the adoption of aspects of Persian kingship – unpalatable to Macedonians because they were accustomed to a king who was their comrade-in-arms rather than their lord and master did he meet with serious discontent.²²

Both kings through gift giving and land grants sought support among the most prominent families of what is generally regarded an aristocratic society. Through several institutions these leading families were closely associated with the royal court and dominated the high posts. Arrian 4.13.1 states that 'from Philip's [II] time' sons of leading Macedonians, when they reached adolescence, were conscripted for service to the king as royal pages (*basilikoi paides*). Whether Arrian means *beginning* with Philip or *at least from the time of* Philip is open to interpretation,²³ and Curtius' language at 8.6.2 may suggest that this 'custom' (*mos*) was longstanding. At any rate, there are no certain references to the institution prior to Alexander's Asian campaign. The royal pages are discussed by N. Sawada in chapter 19, and there is no need to duplicate her discussion here except to say that ultimately the pages were more in training for political life than actively participating in it.

An elite body of adult men held the prestigious honor of being appointed the king's bodyguards and were called *somatophylakes*. Two categories of bodyguards are mentioned in the sources: the elite *agema* of the *hypaspists* (for example, Arr. 3.17.2, 4.3.2, 30.3) and the smaller

group of highborn contemporaries of Alexander who belonged to his innermost court circle.²⁴ The former was a 'special forces' military unit numbering in the hundreds. The latter was evidently only seven until 325 when Alexander appointed an eighth honorary bodyguard for having saved his life in India. Of the bodyguards named at this time by Arrian (6.28.4) two, significantly, were of royal blood (Leonnatus and Perdikkas), and also significantly three were from Orestis and Eordaea, the two most powerful cantons in the territory of Macedonia. By selecting his elite bodyguards from the most influential Macedonian families in the kingdom the king paid due respect to their birth (and perhaps diffused potential rivalry). It was also at the king's discretion to remove (Arr. 3.27.5) or reappoint (Arr. 2.12.2) bodyguards and to replace them with other men of high birth.

The royal bodyguards held some of the highest military commands in Alexander's army. But because they commanded individual units they could not, as a group, physically shield the king at all times. When Alexander came under heavy fire in an attack on a Mallian town along the Indus (Arr. 6.9–11, Curt. 9.4.26–5.30, Plut., *Alexander* 63), only two or three men were there to protect him, and of these possibly only one, Leonnatus, was a bodyguard. In practice, then, the role of the bodyguards was more a mark of honor for the highest born men than an effective unit for protecting the king's life. On the night that Cleitus was murdered in 328 in Maracanda several bodyguards intervened trying to separate Alexander and Cleitus (Arr. 4.8.8–9, Curt. 8.1.45, 48, Plut., *Alexander* 51.8), but since in the end they did not prevent the king from killing his cavalry commander, one wonders how they could have prevented the reverse outcome. And as with the pages, the king was somewhat vulnerable. In Bactria a bodyguard was implicated in an alleged plot on Alexander's life and was either dismissed or executed (Arr. 3.27.5, Curt. 6.11.35–8, 7.15, 9.5) and Philip II's assassin Pausanias was one of his own bodyguards (Diod. 16.93.3).

The bodyguards were only a small number of the king's court circle. Companions (*hetairoi*) or friends (*philoï*) in large number, by invitation, attended the king at home in Macedonia and on campaign. Although the two terms are used somewhat interchangeably in the late sources (where they clearly indicate the same group),²⁵ technically speaking 'friends' is a later Hellenistic designation, which under the monarchs in Egypt and Syria took on some different characteristics. For the period of Philip II and Alexander III 'companions' is the more appropriate term. It is doubtless an archaic designation for the king's highborn associates, akin to the *hetairoi* of Achilles (Homer, *Iliad* 1.345), but evidence does not reveal how early the institution was established.²⁶ *Hetairoi* came to be applied as well

to the elite Macedonian Companion Cavalry (for example, Arr. 3.11.8) and to some of the Macedonian foot, the *pezhetairoi* (for example, Dem. 2.17). That the designation 'companion' was not restricted to Macedonians – Philip II cultivated foreign *hetairoi* (Polyb. 8.9.6–13) and Alexander III admitted Greeks (Arr. 7.4.6) as well as Orientals (Plut., *Alexander* 47.3) – is a factor telling against the companions being a constitutional institution.

However, references to Alexander III's Council of Companions (for example, *ho syllogos ton hetairon*, Arr. 2.25.2; *consilium amicorum*, Curt. 6.8.1) indicates that some at least served as an advisory body to the king. Probably this was a much smaller group of men than the whole companionate. At Susa in 324 Alexander took two royal Persian wives and at least 80 of his companions were also married to Persian high noble women (Arr. 7.4.6; cf. Athen. 12.538b–539, 92), a number suggestively comparable to the approximately 85 'oath-takers' named in Perdiccas II's treaty with Athens (*IG* 1³ 89). The companions together with military commanders (many companions were themselves commanders) were summoned before engagements either to hear the king's speeches or for consultation (for example, Arr. 2.16.8, 3.9.3–4). On other political matters they met with the king alone and were summoned and dismissed by him. They evidently had the right to speak freely (Diod. 17.54.3, Polyb. 5.27.6) but there is no indication that they held a formal vote or that the king was bound to heed their opinions.²⁷ Reports of their meetings leave no clear picture. When evidence surfaced in 334 implicating Alexander of Lyncestis in a treasonous plot the summoned companions opined that they distrusted the Lyncestian and the king had him arrested (Arr. 1.25.4–5). But the fact that the Lyncestian's two brothers had been executed for involvement in the assassination of Philip II may have been a greater determinant than the opinions of the companions; in other words, Alexander may have been seeking support for a decision toward which he already inclined. When Alexander reported to the Council of Companions the settlement offered by Darius following the battle at Issus in 333 (Arr. 2.25.2, Curt. 4.11.1, Plut., *Alexander* 29.8, Diod. 17.54.2), he is reported as *not* taking the advice offered by his second-in-command Parmenion. This conflict of opinion appears as a *topos*, yet it would seem that Alexander was not bound to heed advice given in council. But when in 330 Alexander summoned the council for consultation in the 'Philotas affair', although according to one source the king formally forgave Philotas his failure to inform on an alleged plot, several prominent fellow companions of Philotas aggressively pressed the accusation, arrest, torture and prosecution (Curt. 6.8.1–15, 17, 11.9–10). Does this mean that Alexander, because of his council's opinion, was effectively coerced into condemning the

commander of the Companion Cavalry? As doubtful as this is,²⁸ the opinions of those companions dearest to him, such as Craterus and Hephaestion, surely were not inconsequential. The episode, at any rate, suggests fierce rivalry within the circle of Alexander's closest companions.

As a counterpoint, Justin's comment at 12.6.12 that Alexander had caused fear and resentment of himself among his friends with the murder of Cleitus – all the more horrific because it occurred when king and companions were conversing freely at dinner – ought not to be dismissed. It seems that the companions did speak less freely thereafter (Arr. 5.27.1) and their advisory body may have lost some political influence. Alexander's reprimand of the quarrelling Hephaestion and Craterus, his two dearest companions (Plut., *Alexander* 47), shows the king in complete control. More than slight is the evidence for an increasingly autocratic king, who became more difficult of access.

It was nonetheless the companions acting as a council who took command of the situation in the turmoil immediately after Alexander's death, albeit very briefly. That council quickly dissolved in dispute and rivalry while the highest ranking companions soon scattered to their allotted satrapies. Later Eumenes would subject his authority to a council of sorts when he, a non-Macedonian, became general of the royal army in the war against Antigonos (Diod. 18.60.4–61.2. Plut., *Eumenes* 13.3–4), but this was a concession to the Macedonian commanders not contented under his authority. So whether the Council of Companions by tradition held political power counter to the king remains an open question.²⁹ One must consider also the role of the larger body of the populace, both the rank and file of the army and the common people at home: did they come together for the purpose of decision-making and did they serve as counter-balance to the kingship by forming half of the Macedonian state as Hammond claims?³⁰

Assemblies are not attested before Philip II's accession to the kingship in 359.³¹ After the Macedonians were seriously defeated in battle by the Illyrians and more than 4,000 of their ranks along with king Perdiccas III lay dead, Philip called them together in a number of assemblies and made speeches in order to rebuild their morale (Diod. 16.3.5, 4.3). Perhaps we should take this much at face value. The majority of the assemblies called by Alexander III during the Asian campaign were likewise for the purpose of encouragement, which went hand-in-hand with popular support, and for broadcasting information.³² Despite a lack of evidence it is reasonable to suppose that Philip was not the first Macedonian king to assemble his army and make encouraging speeches; no less would be expected of a king

who serves as military commander. Thus I would posit that the traditional purpose of an assembly of Macedonian soldiers was so that the king, through speeches of persuasion, could boost morale and win popular support for his enterprises as well as disseminate information. However, scholars who argue for a 'constitutionalist' Macedonian state believe that in times of war an 'Army Assembly' or in times of peace a 'People's Assembly' held specific rights, chiefly (as mentioned above) the right to choose the successor to the throne, whether king or regent, and the right to judge in cases of treason.³³ For the reigns of Philip II and Alexander III there is some evidence to support this claim, but a look at three situations will suffice to demonstrate the problems of interpretation.

At Alexander III's accession to the throne in 336 it seems that some form of assembly met. But the literary evidence is hardly explicit about the rights of that assembly in the selection of the king and far from proves Hammond's generalization that 'we know that the Assembly [that is, of 'Macedones'] elected a king, deposed a king, and chose the guardian of a king who was a minor.'³⁴ Justin, the poorest and latest of the five extant Alexander historians, states at 11.1.8 that Alexander alleviated the fears of Philip's army when he addressed 'the entire army' in an assembly after Philip's murder. Surely 'alleviating fears' constitutes persuasion. And if Alexander had not already succeeded before an assembly met, why was he addressing it in such a manner? Justin adds at 11.2.2 that Alexander of Lyncestis was spared whereas two of his brothers were executed in the purge of Philip's alleged assassins because he had been first 'to acknowledge' Alexander as king. Curtius 7.1.6, perhaps following the same (unidentifiable) source as Justin, makes the same claim. Arrian 1.25.2 says the Lyncestian was 'among the first of Alexander's friends' to support him, and putting on his cuirass he accompanied Alexander into the palace. Diodorus 17.2.1-2 states that Alexander 'succeeded to the kingship' and that he won over 'the mass of people' with befitting words. In order to infer that an assembly *chose* Alexander as Philip's successor one must stretch these sources and ignore the fact that Alexander had been groomed for succession! But if one takes Diodorus at face value again then Alexander used persuasion to win popular support for what had been his father's choice. Those military men who made a public display of their support for Alexander as Philip's (already established) successor perhaps did so, as in the case of Alexander of Lyncestis, because their loyalty might have been in question.

Hammond's inference leans heavily on the succession clash following the death of Alexander III in Babylon in June 323. It must be emphasized that this situation is exceptional since in point of fact Alexander had no legitimate living son or brother capable of ruling at

the time of his death. Curtius 10.6.1 claims that when Alexander died the king's bodyguards summoned to the royal quarters two groups of people, 'the most eminent of [Alexander's] friends' and 'the commanders of the troops'. A 'throng of soldiers' followed desiring 'to know' – not 'to decide' – to whom the fortune (that is, empire) of Alexander would be transferred. By this account the initial gathering was not an assembly of the entire army for only the leading companions and officers of the king were summoned while those soldiers who could crowded into the royal quarters in disregard of the invitation-only order (Curt. 10.6.2) – natural enough given their vested interest. The elite group of officers, which then proceeded in the presence of some of the rank and file to debate the succession, appears synonymous with the council of advisors. In a series of speeches put into the mouths of the leading men,³⁵ the 'contenders' for the throne are proposed: Roxane's unborn child should it be male, Heracles, Alexander's illegitimate son by the captive Barsine, and Arrhidaeus, a reputedly mentally deficient son of Philip, Alexander's half brother (Curt. 10.6.8–7.2, Justin 13.2.4–14). These were the Argead males, notably all requiring a regent. It was also suggested that the council of advisors assume rule on the authority of Alexander's throne. If this council had been a constitutional body, surely the suggestion was sound, at least as a temporary measure in the given circumstances. That it was rejected is telling.

One may infer from Curtius' account that the choice of succession was traditionally the king's (as argued above). But upon Alexander's untimely death it fell to the high command because the late king had broken with tradition by not naming a 'next of kin' successor. And how could he since there was no realistic 'legitimate' successor to be named prior to Roxane giving birth? Thus on his deathbed Alexander very likely had handed his royal seal to Perdikkas, a man of proven ability and evidently descended from another branch of the Argeads.³⁶ However, Justin claims at 13.3.1 that the infantry, furious 'at being left no say in the matter', declared Arrhidaeus king. Should we infer from this that the infantry was enforcing a constitutional right, which had been denied, in the process of selecting a king? Anson has argued that we should rather see in the succession clash evidence for the army's progressive assumption of power in decision making, which was *not* constitutional, toward the end of Alexander's reign, apparent also at the Hyphasis river mutiny in 326, when Alexander was forced to turn back, and in the mutiny at Opis in 324.³⁷

Although the ancient sources are clear that the leading men were in serious disagreement on the question of Alexander's succession and that the infantry backed Arrhidaeus, they are not explicit about who

had the 'right' to make a choice. When Perdikkas says to those assembled 'it is in your power to name a head' (Curt. 10.6.8), the meaning of 'power' (*potestas*) is ambiguous: is it 'right' or 'ability'? The fact is that if an army assembly at Babylon enforced a tradition in choosing the adult male next of kin,³⁸ it did so only with threat of violence (Curt. 10.7.16–20, Diod. 18.2.2). Moreover, given Arrhidaeus' mental incapacity for leadership and blatant reluctance to take up the crown the choice was unwise. Perhaps Alexander's succession was volatile and anomalous for the very reason that tradition *had* to be reinvented. Ultimately, once Roxane gave birth to a male, for the first time two successors were acknowledged.

As for Hammond's evidence for the army assembly's 'acclamation' of the king by the clashing of spears on shields,³⁹ this too is inconclusive. When Meleager donned his cuirass in chief support of Arrhidaeus, the phalanx soldiers approved by clashing spears on shields as a sign that they stood ready to shed the blood of any 'illegitimate' challenger to the throne (Curt. 10.7.14). The cuirass was evidently a symbolic gesture, for Alexander of Lyncestis similarly donned his cuirass in support of Alexander III in 336 (Arr. 1.25.2). However, at Babylon the phalanx soldiers also clashed their shields when Barsine's son Heracles was proposed (Curt. 10.6.12), in this case clearly indicating the army's *disapproval*.

The third situation is that of the trials for treason conducted during Alexander's Bactrian campaign, of Philotas in 330 and the pages in 327. Here the difficulties of interpreting the texts are compound. The 'constitutionalist' position rests heavily on a statement of Curtius 6.8.25 that it was an ancient Macedonian custom (*vetusto Macedonum modo*) for the king (*rex*) to investigate (*inquirebat*) in capital cases and for the army (*exercitus*) – in peace time the people (*vulgus*) – to pass judgment (*iudicabat*), and that the power (*potestas*) of the king had no influence unless his prior personal authority (*auctoritas*) had been influential. Is this proof that the army assembly held the constitutional right to judge in cases of treason? It is not. Most editors have accepted an emendation and added *rex* and *iudicabat*. If one does not emend the text (and rather follows most manuscripts) then we should read that it was an ancient Macedonian custom for the army to investigate in capital cases; the right 'to judge' does not enter into the statement (although Curtius uses this verb later at 9.34).⁴⁰ However, sources leave little doubt but that some form of army assembly was gathered to hear Philotas' case and again three years later to hear the case of Hermolaus and the pages. Advocates of the 'autocracy' position argue that Curtius cannot be trusted, that these trials were the exception rather than the rule, or simply show pieces whereby Alexander could test his power.⁴¹ The trial of Philotas in particular was extremely

controversial because of his position of high command and his loyal following not to mention the authority of his father Parmenion. The trial of the pages was perhaps in part a smoke screen for the elimination of Callisthenes and others vehemently opposed to Alexander's 'orientalization'— chiefly to changes in the nature of kingship.

Curtius' terminology also presents a difficulty. His no doubt well-considered use of *potestas* and *auctoritas*, potent terms in the early Principate, reveal a contemporary bias in his writing, a bias evident in his descriptions of the treason trials in general. Errington's interpretation of Curtius' text is that Alexander needed to test his authority (*auctoritas*) before exercising his power (*potestas*).⁴² And the power rested with the king. Moreover, if Curtius was referring to a constitutional 'law' (*lex*), why did he use a term for 'tradition' or 'practice' (*modus*)? Or was tradition as good as written law in ancient Macedonia? If one were to accept Aymard's arguments for *nomos*,⁴³ one still must reconcile this with practice: the king could and did act without the army's judgment (Diod. 17.2.4–4.2, 5.1). The execution without trial of Attalus, and arguably of Parmenion (though Curtius suggests he was tried *in absentia* with Philotas), was carried out on the orders of a king acting autocratically. And, in the case of Parmenion, soldiers who expressed objection to the execution (after the fact) were disciplined (Curt. 7.2.35–38, Diod. 17.80.4, Justin 12.5.3–8). It seems the only recourse for the army or people in the case of the king overturning a tradition, even if it was as good as law, was verbal objection.

These situations should make clear the complexity of the source problems, which leave open to debate the important question of the authority of the Macedonian king relative to an assembly of soldiers or citizens. Most assemblies we hear about in the extant historians were not decision-making gatherings; the treason trials appear to be exceptions, whereas generally the king called assemblies for the purpose of making speeches of encouragement or disseminating information. And we are still left with the crucial question of the composition of these assemblies. We are told that 6,000 gathered for the trial of Philotas (Curt. 6.8.23), but these were evidently not all Macedonians since both Alexander and Philotas are said to have addressed the assembly in Greek rather than Macedonian (Curt. 6.9.35, albeit Attic Greek seems to have been the *lingua franca* of the Macedonian court).⁴⁴ And who does Perdikkas address in Babylon: only the summoned companions and officers or the 'uninvited' soldiers as well? How many were gathered we do not know. By this time many Persians had been admitted into Alexander's circle of friends and officer class while Persian youths trained in Macedonian tactics had

been incorporated into the ranks (Arr. 7.6.1–2). Would not, therefore, a Macedonian army assembly have included a number of Persians and how would they fit into a Macedonian constitution? One must conclude that Alexander's traveling court necessitated changes to Macedonian traditions whatever they had been when the army set out in 334 and whatever remained intact in Macedonia itself under Antipater's regency.

4 Institutions after Alexander III (323–167)

After the death of Alexander III kingship was necessarily altered. As Mooren puts it, 'in Alexander the Macedonian, Achaemenid and Pharaonic legacies had been briefly united.'⁴⁵ This brief union, resulting in Alexander's 'orientalization' of his kingship, left a lasting mark on the Successors outside Macedonia. Macedonians were still to be found in the courts and armies of the Hellenistic rulers, but since the latter were ruling mostly foreign peoples kingship needed to be adapted to its context. The process was gradual. In 306 Antigonos Monophthalmus and his son Demetrius Poliorcetes assumed the title *basileus* in Asia Minor, and other Successors outside Macedonia soon adopted the title themselves. These self-styled *basileis*, as Aymard argues, developed 'personal' kingships in their respective territories in contrast to what he describes as a 'national' kingship of the homeland.⁴⁶ Neither the Ptolemies nor the Attalids adopted traditional Macedonian institutions, and the Seleucids did so only in part.⁴⁷ Within Macedonia, however, some traditions held a strong political force. The Argead dynasty survived another dozen years, although Arrhidaeus-Philip III was never more than a pawn and the juvenile Alexander IV, following the death of Olympias in 316, was kept under house arrest. Then Cassander's extinction of the Argead line by his murder of Alexander IV left no one, not even himself (though he did marry Alexander's half sister), with a 'legitimate' claim to the Macedonian kingship. Cassander therefore may have avoided the title *basileus* or perhaps used it only in a domestic context.⁴⁸ Clearly he intended succession to continue to be hereditary (Justin 16.1.1–6, Plut., *Pyrrhus* 6), but it was not until 277, when Antigonos Gonatas secured the Macedonian throne, that a new dynasty was established and the kingship restored in that traditional sense.

Meantime, between Cassander's death in 297 and the accession of Gonatus, Macedonian kingship changed hands nearly a dozen times. Those who held the throne, however briefly, did so by exploiting the

nature of kingship, namely the close relationship between the king and his chosen companions: in addition to force of arms, they relied heavily on the cultivation of 'friends' or the 'first men' (*protoi*, Plut., *Pyrrhus* 12.10) – that is, men of birth and worth. As an indication of just how important the 'first men' were to a bid for the throne, in her attempt to destroy Cassander's rising power Olympias struck at the heart of his support system by killing 100 of the most eminent Macedonians from among his 'friends' (Diod. 19.11.8).

Antigonus Gonatas' evident consolidation and foreign policy suggest that he was the author of significant reforms in Macedonia. Unfortunately, a dearth of sources for his reign leaves us guessing. Errington sees in Gonatas' reign a return to authoritarian kingship, which he claims had been interrupted by the heirless death of Alexander and continued through the succession struggles of the Diadochi.⁴⁹ Hatzopoulos favors continuity from the days of the Argeads.⁵⁰ He proceeds on the assumption that a Macedonian 'commonwealth' existed. In his view, before Philip II political power was shared between the king and companions. The latter were the king's counselors and comrades-in-arms. Philip expanded the number of companions, who as an advisory body formed a council. We have seen the council in action during the reign of Alexander III. Hatzopoulos ascribes to the council a probouleutic role; whatever it decided had to be ratified by the assembly, which he argues developed as a counterbalance to the political authority of the aristocratic companions. He insists that the assembly was civilian and that an assembly meeting was *mandatory* to try cases of treason and to appoint a new king or regent; he infers that consultation on matters of foreign policy, such as the declaration of war and the conclusion of treaties, was optional. In the contexts in which we have observed the assemblies, however, they are clearly military and summoned *ad hoc*.

Evidence for trials and succession in the period following Alexander III does not settle our questions. In 218 Philip V, evidently without trial, executed Leontius, commander of the *peltasts* (Polyb. 5.27.4–8). Leontius' troops requested that the king not try the case until they were present, but he ignored their request to hear the charge and executed their commander before they could arrive. Was this a 'slight' as Polybius says, or an infringement of their right? The question has been argued on both sides.⁵¹ As for succession, Demetrius I is said to have been acclaimed king by the royal army upon the death of Cassander's son Alexander V in 294 (Plut., *Demetrius* 37.3–2, Justin 16.1.8–18). However, Demetrius had been the one responsible for Alexander's death and the royal army had little choice in their present circumstance with Demetrius' forces having the upper hand. Livy's detailed account (40.9.8–16.1) of the rivalry between

Perseus and his brother Demetrius for the succession to Philip V suggests three factors determining succession: rules of succession, the will of the previous king, and, lastly, the will of the Macedonians.⁵² From this Hatzopoulos concludes that the 'right' of the Macedonians to elect a king was mostly theoretical – or a last resort. The record of Antigonus III Doson's 'will' (Polyb. 4.87.6–8) also points to the king's right to name his successor. The evidence is inconclusive on these important questions regarding the relative powers of king and council or assembly.

Other institutions identified during the reign of Alexander III are also attested in the later period. Pages were attending Demetrius I at the time when he was seeking the throne (Plut., *Demetrius* 36), and bodyguards appear as late as 182 (Livy 40.6, 8). Apart from these bodies of the royal court, under the Antigonids a complex network of magistracies efficiently ran the state. At the regional level, the epigraphic evidence reveals the administration of individual Macedonian cities and provides the titles and roles of many city magistrates: *strategos*, *gymnasiarch*, *politarch*, *exetastai* and, most important, the *epistates*, eponymous alongside or in lieu of a priest.⁵³ These positions, though of political weight in their own context, could not collectively pull down the king from his throne. It was left to the Romans to do this. Their eventual abolition of the kingship in 167 speaks to the longevity as well as to the authority vested in Macedonian kingship as the principal political institution of the state.

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¹ I wish to express my gratitude to Ian Worthington and Joseph Roisman for their kind invitation to contribute to this volume. Also I am indebted to James Greenlee whose close reading of an early draft of the chapter led me to greater clarity in thought and phrasing. Any shortcomings remaining are entirely my own.

² On the literary and epigraphic source material, see P.J. Rhodes, chapter 2.

³ On the pitfalls of oratory as a historical source, see Ian Worthington, *Philip II of Macedonia* (New Haven 2008), appendix 1, pp. 213–14.

⁴ On the history of the periods discussed in this chapter, see part IV 'History'.

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9.4.19, 10.3.6, 5.10), while those for trials are the exception (cf. 6.9.1, 7.1.5).

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⁴⁹ Errington, 'Nature of the Macedonian State', pp. 132–3.

⁵⁰ For the arguments here presented see Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions* 1, pp. 261–98.

⁵¹ For trials after the reign of Alexander III, see Lock, 'Army Assembly', p. 93, Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions* 1, pp. 271–6 and Anson, 'Judicial Assemblies', especially pp. 139–43, 145–6, 148–9.

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⁵³ Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions* 1, p. 156; for a detailed

discussion of these magistracies, see especially pp. 372–429.

Social Customs and Institutions: Aspects of Macedonian Elite Society

Noriko Sawada

The overwhelming majority of original literary sources of information about Macedonian society comes from the reigns of Philip II and Alexander III.¹ Indeed, Philip's reign was a period of great change in Macedonian history.² His conquests provided Macedonia with a dramatic increase in both territory and prosperity and led to rapid urbanization; his court at Pella became a venue for international diplomacy, and Hellenization proceeded much faster than ever before. Thus, we must be cautious about applying the picture of Macedonian society provided by these sources to prePhilip Macedonia. In addition, most of the information is about the royals and elites, the upper strata of Macedonian society. Naturally, their way of life and their customs differed fundamentally from those of the common people. Those who comprised the Macedonian elite were usually called 'Companions' (*hetairoi*).³ They served as the retinue and primary associates of the king and enjoyed power at court. They had grown up with him through the institution of the *paides*, or royal pages, in which the sons of the elite lived with and served the king.⁴ The Companions accompanied the king in fighting, hunting, and feasting, and were often given lavish tracts of land as a reward for faithful service.

Given the limitations of the sources, this chapter deals with Macedonian elite society during the monarchical period, with special emphasis on the reigns of Philip and Alexander.⁵ I focus on three features that provided a venue for regular interaction between the king and his Companions and that characterized Macedonian elite society: court *symposia*, royal hunting, and the institution of the *paides*.

1 Court *Symposia*⁶

Participation in communal eating and drinking is an essential part of social life in many societies. The *symposia* in Greek *poleis* have been well studied, and scholars generally agree that they gave the world of archaic Greece its characteristic qualities.⁷ Murray asserted that without the *symposia*, we could not begin to understand early Greek society.⁸ They offer the key to an understanding of Macedonian elite society as well. Indeed, as we shall see, Macedonian court *symposia* embodied the elite society and culture.

An investigation of Macedonian *symposia* is handicapped by the limitations of relevant sources. Not only do the great majority of the surviving literary accounts of them come from the reigns of Philip and Alexander, but political and personal prejudices permeate the sources, making analysis of Macedonian drinking practices sometimes difficult. Writers contemporary with Philip, such as Demosthenes and Theopompus, make frequent reference to the Macedonian *symposium*, emphasizing it as a symbol of barbaric tyranny.⁹ Although literary accounts of Alexander's *symposia* abound, the writers were much more likely to recount those at which traumatic events occurred and to exaggerate the degree of disorder and violence; thus, this propensity distorts our understanding of what was normal for and at Macedonian *symposia*. Archaeological evidence, especially the extraordinary number and variety of drinking vessels from the royal and elite tombs, confirms the picture drawn from literary sources that the Macedonian kings and elite were truly heavy drinkers,¹⁰ and the remains of the banquet rooms (for example, in the Vergina palace) provide valuable information about the architectural setting of court *symposia*.

Any discussion of *symposia* before Philip's reign is mostly speculative. Hegesander's account (*apud* Athen. 1.18a), which is often cited as evidence for early Macedonian *symposia*, states that Macedonians were not permitted to recline at them until they had killed a wild boar without using a net, and that Cassander allegedly remained seated at *symposia* at the age of 35. This account has usually been taken to mean that both *symposia* and hunting were the major activities of the elite in early Macedonia. Hegesander's language, however, reveals only that the custom existed in the days of Cassander, and it is entirely unclear how far back it can be traced.

Literary sources preserve two well-known stories about early court *symposia*, both of which are probably fictional. The earliest one is from Herodotus (5.17–21), who told a tale about a *symposium* held by Amyntas I for the Persian ambassadors, which ended with their murder by the king's son. His account of the *symposium*, however dubious, offers some evidence that it was an important court

activity.¹¹ The second one is from Plato (*Gorgias* 471a–c), who claimed that Archelaus entertained his uncle Alcetas and his uncle's son Alexander at his court *symposium*, got them drunk, and killed them in order to gain the throne. Although the historicity of this claim is often doubted,¹² it suggests that regicide and conspiracy were possible in a sympotic context, as in the reigns of Philip and Alexander.

In addition, Aelian (*Varra Historiae* 13.4) told a tale about a *symposium* held by Archelaus at which Euripides drank too much and kissed Agathon. Archelaus is known to have attracted many leading Greek writers and artists to his court (see below), and Aelian's story shows that these Greek intellectuals were often invited to court *symposia*. Carystius of Pergamon (*apud* Athen. 11.508e) reports that in the reign of Perdiccas III Euphraeus, a pupil of Plato, stayed at the Macedonian court as a political adviser and permitted only those who practiced geometry and philosophy to dine with the king. Although it is hard to believe that such a rigid sympotic criterion was enforced at the Macedonian court,¹³ this story suggests that court *symposia* had an intellectual tone to them, as did those in Greece (south of Mount Olympus).

We have more evidence from Philip's reign showing that the Macedonian kings and elite were heavy drinkers and that drinking and court *symposia* were their major activities. From his reign on, literary sources emphasize, sometimes with exaggeration, the excessive drinking of the kings and elite. As proof of their excessive drinking, it has usually been argued that Macedonians, unlike Greeks, drank their wine unmixed (*akratos*) and that this custom was regarded as a sign of barbaric excess by Greeks. Although there are in fact no general assertions in the sources that Macedonians drank pure wine,¹⁴ it seems at least clear that it was much more common for the Macedonian kings and elite to drink unmixed wine than others.¹⁵

We know of four specific *symposia* held by Philip: the state banquet held after the fall of Olynthus in 348 (Dem. 19.192, Diod. 16.55.1–2), the *symposium* where he entertained the Greek ambassadors during the peace negotiations in 347/6 (Aes. 1.168–169, 2.41–42, 51–52), the drinking party held after the Macedonian victory at Chaeronea (for example, Theopompus, *FGrH* 115 F 236, Diod. 16.86.6–87.1), and the wedding banquet celebrating the marriage of Philip and his last wife Cleopatra in 337 (Plut., *Alexander* 9.6–10, Athen. 13.557d–e). Brief literary accounts of these *symposia* do not clarify their actual significance for the king and the elite, the latter being rarely mentioned in the accounts of Philip's *symposia*.

Alexander's *symposia* are much more frequently described in the literary sources, especially the very large ones with hundreds or even

thousands of guests. For example, there is the great celebration at Dium on the eve of his departure for Asia in 334, where he used a dining tent holding 100 couches, meaning that there were probably 200 guests (Diod. 17.16.3–4). At the famous mass wedding banquet at Susa in 324, Alexander invited 9,000 guests and spent 9,800 talents (Plut., *Alexander* 70.3, Athen. 12.538b–539a) and at the reconciliation banquet after the mutiny at Opis in 324, he again invited 9,000 guests (Arr. 7.11.8–9). Also recounted are his *symposia* where there were sympotic disorder and violence, including the famous drinking party that led to the destruction of Persepolis in 330, the drunken brawl that ended with Alexander stabbing Cleitus to death in 328, the defiance of Callisthenes to Alexander's attempt to introduce *proskynesis* at court in 327 that alienated Callisthenes from Alexander, the *symposium* in India at which Meleager publicly criticized Alexander's behavior in 326, that at Ecbatana in which Hephaestion consumed great quantities of wine, fell sick, and finally died in 324, and Alexander's final drinking party in Babylon in 323, which caused his ultimate demise.¹⁶ It was the Companions who regularly attended *symposia*, and they were major events both for them and the king. As we shall see later, the sons of the Companions, the *paidai* or pages (hence the future Companions) were brought up at court and were also present at *symposia*, for one of their duties was to serve the king at them.

The *symposium* had several important functions.¹⁷ For one thing, it was a relief from the rigors of a march, particularly during Alexander's campaigns, and no doubt a wide variety of entertainment was offered at it that contributed to the relief. The entertainment took the form of singing, dancing, and conjuring, as evidenced by the mass wedding banquet at Susa (Athen. 12.538e–539a). Dramatic and literary performances were among the most popular entertainment at *symposia*; Alexander is known to have held a dramatic contest in Phoenicia in 331, and he particularly enjoyed a comparison of favorite verses from Homer (Plut., *Moralia* 331d, 334e). Also common were sophisticated debates among the court intellectuals, involving his Companions and which often had a professional, competitive edge.

The *symposia* also provided a structure and venue for regular interaction between the king and the elite. For the king, a *symposium* was an excellent platform for him to display his power and superiority, particularly through his drinking prowess, the luxurious furnishings of his banquet rooms, and the lavishness of his entertainment. For the Companions, it was an arena in which they had to compete with one another for the king's attention and favor and to struggle to maintain or improve their position at court, since he was in complete control of promoting or demoting them. As the Macedonian court became a venue for international diplomacy from Philip's reign

on, court *symposia* possibly came to assume a further role – international display.

Moreover, and more importantly, the *symposium* served a quasi-constitutional function in the decision-making process, at least during Alexander's reign.¹⁸ We have no evidence to suggest the existence of a formal royal advisory council or assembly in Macedonia. In fact, the sources provide a number of indications that Alexander carefully discussed matters of policy and strategy with his Companions during his campaigns and held what could be called a council with them.¹⁹ Although there was no obligation on his part to follow their advice, the Companions did play an informal advisory role. The king sometimes tried out new policies on them, using the *symposia* as a testing ground. In this sense, they were a regular social gathering for the king and his Companions and informally a context for decision making at court. For the Companions, the *symposia* were vital to their welfare, all the more so because they had a quasi-constitutional function.

Macedonian *symposia* had several similarities with those of Greece.²⁰ Greek *symposia*, which are thought to have evolved from the Homeric feasting tradition under the influence of the Near East, had four characteristic features: (1) they were a largely male elite activity, (2) there was egalitarianism in a sympotic context, (3) there was a clear distinction between the activities of feasting and drinking, with an emphasis on the latter, and (4) the guests generally reclined on couches, rather than sitting on them.²¹ Of these features, the first two were attested already in Homeric feasts, and the last was apparently imported from the Near East in the eighth or seventh century. In fact, the introduction of couches represented a fundamental change in Greek commensality as it determined the size of the sympotic group. The typical Greek *symposium* thus involved between 14 and 30 male guests in a comparatively small banquet room (*andron*) of the private house of a member of the elite, with two guests reclining on each couch, which were positioned along the walls of the room. Both Greek and Macedonian *symposia* were often a setting for erotic relationships between male guests; both provided venues for dramatic performances and intellectual debates, and, as evidenced by the Vergina palace, they were held in a traditional Greek-style *andron*, a square and closed room with couches along the walls.

Given these similarities, can we identify any Greek influences on Macedonian *symposia*? Of course, one should not automatically assume that similarity signifies influence. Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that the Greek-style *andron* was imported from Greece, together with the practice of reclining on couches, and probably the

forms of entertainment were also imported from Greece through the Hellenization of the court. Since a *symposium* was a court event, where Greek intellectuals were present, Greek influences on the sympotic performances are undeniable.

Additionally, the principle of egalitarianism, which was found in Homeric feasts and strengthened in Greek *symposia*, is also found in Macedonian *symposia* in the form of sympotic freedom of speech (*parrhesia*); for instance, Cleitus, Callisthenes, and Meleager criticized Alexander in sympotic situations. Since egalitarianism intrinsically contradicts monarchy, the tradition of *parrhesia* at Macedonian *symposia* was likely the result of reconciling the Greek tradition of equality among participants at *symposia* with the realities of a royal court.²² The king, who was the ‘chief drinker’, also assumed the role of fellow drinker under the principle of equality.²³ In fact, this dual role often led to cases of sympotic disorder and violence (see below).

There were, however, also marked differences between Greek and Macedonian *symposia*, one being related to their size. Those held in the banquet rooms of the palace of Vergina (each accommodating 15–19 couches²⁴) were probably closer to Greek norms. However, during Alexander’s campaigns there were a number of huge *symposia* with thousands of guests. They were usually held in the royal pavilion or in the open air, such as the mass wedding banquet at Susa mentioned above. In addition to this gigantic scale, sympotic extravagance and material excess were characteristics of the Macedonian *symposia*. Given that banquets in a monarchy are always an excellent stage for the display of royal power and distinction, it is no wonder that Macedonian *symposia* were markedly different from those of the Greek democratic *poleis*. Indeed, the Macedonian kings and elite demonstrated a taste for conspicuous display through their luxurious couches and splendid drinking vessels. In the later years of Alexander’s reign, unlike in Greek *symposia* that idealized order and moderation, gold and silver were used extravagantly at *symposia*, as attested by both literary and archaeological evidence.²⁵ This sympotic gigantism and extravagant luxury indicate possible Persian influence following Alexander’s campaigns.²⁶

Another significant difference is the political and social importance of *symposia* for the participants. Since the Macedonian ones served as a context for the Companions to compete for the king’s favor and to advance their welfare, they served as a locus for the competition vitally important in their life.

Moreover, unlike the peaceful *symposia* of Greek *poleis*, Macedonian ones are known to have been arenas in which quarrels, drunken brawls, and even murders frequently occurred (though we should always bear in mind the great propensity of the sources to

recount the more unruly banquets). What caused this sympotic violence? First, the excessive, disorderly drinking. The potential for physical violence is naturally increased by the consumption of great quantities of wine. For instance, it was the intoxicated Alexander who stabbed Cleitus to death. Second, the agonistic element was particularly strong in Macedonian *symposia*, even in the entertainment. The egalitarian ethos at *symposia* provided opportunities for the participants to assert themselves, whether against the king or others, and made *symposia* a venue for competition not only among the elite but also between the king and his Companions. The uneasy coexistence of egalitarianism and keen competitiveness increased the potential for violence.²⁷ These factors are not found in the *symposia* of Greek *poleis*, hence the Macedonian ones represented a world of feasting very different from the Greek ones.

Violence and conspiracy at *symposia* did not end with the Argeads, for Demetrius Poliorcetes and Alexander V, son of Cassander, plotted to murder each other at a *symposium* (Plut., *Demetrius* 36.3–5). Antigonus Gonatas, who is known to have loved banquets, enjoyed drinking with Persaeus of Cition, a pupil of Zeno and the author of *Sympotika Hypomnemata* (Athen. 13.603e, 607b–f). Since Antigonus Gonatas, like Archelaus and Philip, attracted many Greek intellectuals to his court (see further below), they must have frequently attended his court *symposia*, and so it seems certain that the highly intellectual mood of Argead court *symposia* survived at least until the reign of Antigonus Gonatas. Although we have little information for evaluating which functions of Argead *symposia* discussed above endured in the Antigonid period, they undoubtedly formed part of the royal court life there. In addition, Hippolochus (*apud* Athen. 4.128e–130d) gives a detailed account of the Macedonian marriage feast of Caranus in the early third century, though not of a court *symposium* but of a private one with 20 guests.²⁸ His vivid description of an amazingly splendid feast provides us with valuable information about the sympotic luxury of the Macedonian elite in the Hellenistic period. Macedonian sympotic extravagance, which characterized the later years of Alexander's reign, continued in the other Hellenic dynasties as well, as attested by the detailed accounts of the pavilion of Ptolemy Philadelphus at Alexandria (Athen. 5.196a–197c).

2 Hunting

Most of the characteristics of Macedonian elite society that we have

observed in a sympotic context apply also to hunting, although the evidence is more limited. Direct literary accounts of hunting do not pre-date Alexander, and almost all of the extant iconographic evidence for royal hunts comes from the period of Alexander and the Successors. Since these sources provide information about only royal hunting, we have no way of knowing what hunting meant for Macedonians in general or how we should place hunting in Macedonian society.

Evidence for royal hunting before Alexander's reign is minimal. The custom described by Hegesander (*apud* Athen. 1.18a), already referred to, might provide evidence that puts it into the context of court life, but the origin of the custom remains uncertain. The evidence begins with the royal coinage of the fifth century: a magnificent octadrachm of Alexander I shows a horseman, probably the king himself, allegedly riding to the hunt, though disagreement persists about whether the rider represents a hunter.²⁹ A silver stater of Amyntas III also portrays on the obverse a horseman with a spear and on the reverse a lion pierced by a broken spear.³⁰ In addition, two passages contain allusions to hunting prior to Alexander's reign: Diodorus 14.37.6 reports that Archelaus was accidentally killed by his lover Craterus during a hunting expedition,³¹ and Polyaeus 4.2.16 tells a story of Philip using hunting dogs to find enemies in hiding (which suggests hunting). Although we have no direct information about hunting during Philip's reign, one of the duties of the *paides* at his court was to attend him while hunting (see below). It is thus certain that he and the elite did hunt during his reign.

In contrast, both iconographic and literary evidence of royal hunting abounds for Alexander's love of hunting. Plutarch recounts many episodes of his hunts (for example, *Alexander* 4.11, 23.3–4), and he often sponsored big hunting competitions during his campaigns: for instance, a hunt in Syria, where Lysimachus distinguished himself by killing a large lion though he was severely wounded; a hunt in Syria, where Craterus saved Alexander from the charge of a lion; a big hunt in a game park of Bazeira in Sogdiana, where Alexander shoved Lysimachus aside and killed a charging lion with a single blow; and a hunt where Hermolaus struck a wild boar before Alexander could do so and was flogged by the outraged king.³²

The sources on Alexander emphasize his lion hunts, however the motif of most of the extant hunting iconography is lion hunting: for instance, the relief frieze of the so-called Alexander Sarcophagus from Sidon; the Craterus monument at Delphi in commemoration of the lion hunt in Syria where Craterus saved Alexander; a floor mosaic in a private house in Pella of the late fourth century showing two Macedonians (probably Alexander and Craterus) hunting a lion on

foot; and the Messene relief depicting a lion hunt of the late fourth or early third century, possibly dedicated by one of the Successors, which was the last of the monumental representations of Alexander's lion hunts.³³

The most intriguing of the lion-hunt iconography is the hunting fresco on the facade of Tomb II at Vergina.³⁴ It shows three hunters on horseback and seven on foot and scenes of the hunting of two deer, a wild boar, a bear, and a lion, probably in a large game park. It is suggested that images of lion hunting disappear from Greek art after the seventh century until its revival after Alexander's campaigns, with the exception of Heracles' killing of the Nemean lion.³⁵ In addition, mounted hunting was completely unheard of in Greece.³⁶ The fresco thus represents elements unknown in contemporary Greece: lion hunting, mounted hunting and a large game park.

The identification of the male occupant of Tomb II is a hotly debated issue.³⁷ The long controversy about whether Tomb II is the burial place of Philip (buried in 336) or of Philip III Arrhidaeus (buried in 316) has been connected to a debate about when the elements depicted in the hunting fresco (among other things lion hunting) were introduced in Macedonia, namely before or after Alexander's campaigns.³⁸ In fact, the origin of lion hunting in Macedonia is not known. Herodotus (7.126), Aristotle (*Hist. an.* 579b6, 606b14), and Pausanias (6.5.4–5), report that lions existed in Macedonia in the classical period, and some scholars see the disputed rider coins of Amyntas III as proof that Macedonian kings hunted lions at least starting in his reign. Even if lion hunting was not new to Macedonia, it seems reasonable to suppose that only in Alexander's reign did it acquire a symbolic significance. In the Near East, lions were symbols of kingship and royalty, and Persian kings are known to have engaged in lion hunts and have depicted themselves hunting lions in their royal art.³⁹ Alexander, determined to become the successor to Persian kings and to rule the Near East, was likely to have borrowed the symbolic significance of the lion hunt and its iconography from the East. The disputed hunting fresco of Tomb II aside, the lion-hunt motif was in fact first used by Alexander himself, for Diodorus 17.115.1–5 tells us that the elaborate funeral monument Alexander ordered for his closest friend Hephaestion, who died at Ecbatana in 324, included a hunting scene.⁴⁰ The lion-hunt theme gained sudden popularity during the struggles of the Successors, who were eager to justify their legitimacy as successors to Alexander.⁴¹ Undoubtedly, it is the symbolic significance conferred on lion hunting by Alexander himself that explains why several of them emphasized the lion-hunt theme.⁴² The enthusiasm of the Macedonian elite for hunting survived the period of the Successors, for we know Cassander

and Demetrius Poliorcetes hunted on a number of occasions (Diod. 18.49.3, Plut., *Demetrius* 3.1, 50.5, 52.1), however it was never as popular as during the earlier period of the Successors.

What were the functions of the royal hunt?⁴³ First, it was a court event for the king, his Companions, and the *paides*, and like the *symposia* it was a relief from the rigors of the campaigns. It was also a good way to train for warfare during periods of peace, as Xenophon claims (*Cyn.* 1.18, *Eq.* 8.10). Moreover, it provided another venue for interaction between the king and the elite. Hunting promoted egalitarian values in the form of comradeship among fellow hunters and cooperation in pursuing a common quarry. In the egalitarian context of hunting, the king himself was a fellow hunter, but, as the 'chief hunter', he had to show himself the best at the hunt and to display his individualistic distinction. The royal wrath bestowed on Lysimachus and Hermolaus for anticipating Alexander's strikes exemplifies this. For the Companions, hunting with the king signaled their privileged status. Indeed, royal hunting was a locus for their intense competition as they pursued both the king's favor and hunting success, which conferred on them the mark of excellence.

These observations reveal several similarities between *symposia* and royal hunting. Both were major social events that provided entertainment and comradeship for the king, his Companions, and the *paides*. In both, the elite competed for the king's favor and for distinction. The king, while demonstrating his personal excellence, played the dual role of chief and fellow. This ambivalence – during *symposia* with the tradition of *parrhesia* and during royal hunting in pursuit of a common prey – caused vicious competition not only among the elite but also between the king and his Companions, which had the potential for creating clashes and ultimately led to explosions of violence.⁴⁴ In fact, the intense enthusiasm for the pursuit of personal prowess was an enduring feature of the Macedonian kings and elite, who were highly competitive in virtually everything. *Symposia* and royal hunting, I believe, embodied this hardy, tough, and intimate world of the Macedonian elite, characterized by agonistic Homeric values.

As mentioned above, several of the Successors eagerly associated themselves with Alexander's famous royal hunts, with particular stress on lion hunts, to emphasize their intimacy with Alexander and to confer legitimacy on their aspirations to rule. That is why the lion tales of Craterus and Lysimachus survived well as did the lionhunt iconography. Craterus commissioned a great bronze group erected at Delphi while Lysimachus commemorated his daring against lions on his coins when he was a king.⁴⁵ The Argead hunting tradition endured in the Antigonid period, for the royal cult of Heracles

Kynagidas (Heracles the Hunter) was practiced throughout Macedonia,⁴⁶ and Philip V's hunting prowess was praised by the poets (*Anth. Pal.* 6.114–116). Polybius' account of how the Romans found game parks in Macedonia after the Battle of Pydna in 168 shows that the Antigonid kings maintained royal game parks until the end of their dynasty (31.29.3–5). In fact, evidence for the Antigonid hunting is focused on the king, and we have little information about the elite's competition or interaction with the king in the context of hunting.⁴⁷ Quite possibly, the Macedonian enthusiasm for hunting continued in the other two major Hellenistic dynasties as well, as is shown by the many anecdotes about the enthusiasm displayed by Ptolemaic and Seleucid rulers for hunting.⁴⁸

Although hunting was more important as a locus for competition in the life of the Macedonian elite than athletics, a quick look at athletics is suggestive because it provided one of the main contexts for competition in Greece. Athletics apparently did not become a major activity of the Macedonian elite until the Hellenistic period.⁴⁹ In fact, we know almost nothing about the elite's interest in competitive athletics prior to Alexander's reign. Both Alexander I and Archelaus may have participated in the Olympic Games (Hdt. 5.22, Solinus 9.16), and Philip did, for he won at least three equestrian victories at Olympia and commemorated them by issuing coinage (Plut., *Alexander* 3.8, 4.9). For their reigns, however, all we find is evidence of royal interest in international competition, mainly equestrian, not of elite interest in athletics. Alexander himself was physically strong and muscular, but he is known to have disdained athletics and never competed in the Olympics. During his campaigns, however, he regularly sponsored athletic contests for his troops, some of his courtiers, Craterus, Leonnatus, and Perdikkas, are said to have been athletic enthusiasts,⁵⁰ and Alexander's action led to the spread of Greek athletics to the east. It seems likely that during Alexander's campaigns athletics became an important pastime and, at the same time, began to provide another locus for competition among the elite.

3 The Institution of the *paides*

The institution of the *paides*, the third feature that characterized Macedonian elite society, provided the context for early indoctrination of young males in the distinctive practices and values of Macedonian elite society, including those discussed above. The *paides* were the sons of the elite, who were brought up at court in the immediate entourage of the king to become Companions in due course. Since

they played a prominent role in the so-called ‘Pages Conspiracy’ in 327 (Curt. 8.6.1–8.23, Arr. 4.12.7–14.4), when Hermolaus, one of their number, was publicly flogged by Alexander for anticipating the king’s strike against a wild boar during a hunt and plotted to kill Alexander in revenge,⁵¹ most of the surviving literary evidence comes from Alexander’s reign.

The origin of the institution of the *paides* is not clear. Arrian 4.13.1 says, in recounting their duties, that it was a practice going back to Philip’s reign, but it remains unclear whether Philip himself established the institution. Curtius’ language (8.6.2, 8.3), as well as that of Valerius Maximus (3.3. ext. 1), may mean that it was a custom of long standing. The circumstances of the death of Archelaus, whose killers might have been members of the *paides*,⁵² seem to suggest that the institution existed already in his reign. Although we have no certain knowledge about its origin, it seems reasonable to suppose that Philip extended or systematized an existing practice.⁵³ In fact, the elite stratum was dramatically increased by Philip when he enlarged the scope of his Companions to include the nobility of the cantons of Upper Macedonia and many able Greeks. It is thus likely that, along with the increase in the number of Companions, the number of *paides* was also increased and that the institution was redefined. Since the sons of Persian nobles were raised at the court of the Great King, as Xenophon remarks (*Anabasis* 1.9.2–5), their institution may have, to some degree, been inspired by a similar practice at the Persian court.⁵⁴

Only two *paides* from Philip’s reign are known by name. Aelian (*Varra Historiae* 14.48) mentions that Philip flogged Aphthonetus and executed Archedamus for infractions of military discipline. Alexander of Epirus, who was brought up at Philip’s court, and Pausanias of Orestis, who assassinated Philip, could have been among his *paides*, both of whom are alleged to have had sexual relationships with him. His *paides* also included those who are said to have been Alexander’s *syntrophoi* (foster-brothers), such as Hephaestion, Marsyas of Pella, and Leonnatus.⁵⁵ Lysimachus, Craterus, Perdikkas, Ptolemy, and Seleucus, who all distinguished themselves in the age of Alexander and the Successors, were probably *paides* as well.⁵⁶

We are well informed about the duties of the *paides*. Curtius (8.6.2–6) and Arrian (4.13.1) give detailed accounts of them in their description of the Pages Conspiracy, and there is little contradiction between their accounts. According to them, their duties included attending to the king’s personal needs and keeping him company; they guarded him while he slept, served him at *symposia*, handed him his horse and helped him to mount, and accompanied him on the hunt. Curtius (5.1.42, 8.6.4) also described them accompanying the king in

battle. Yet there is no actual record of the *paides* being present in battle though Aelian's account (*Varra Historiae* 14.48) indicates they had military training.⁵⁷

Although no source clearly states their age range, it is generally agreed that they were in their mid-to-late teens. It is unlikely that they were any younger because their duties included the defense of the person of the king and because both Philip and Alexander treated them like adults.⁵⁸ We also lack certainty about their number. It is not known whether all sons of the Companions served as *paides* or whether they were selected from the entire body of the elite. Nor are we told whether the number was fixed.⁵⁹ It seems safe to assume that, during the reigns of Philip and Alexander, a period of great change in Macedonia, the number fluctuated over time, just like the number of Companions.

The institution of the *paides* was significant, first of all, because it was a kind of training school for future generals and governors, as Curtius observed (5.1.42, 8.6.6), and it served as an institutionalized rite of passage for the young elite.⁶⁰ The *paides'* regular participation in court *symposia* and royal hunting led to their early indoctrination in the values of elite Macedonians. In short, the institution constituted the beginning of the *paides'* lifelong paths as members of the elite. The institution also served to tie them securely to the king, and, in particular, those who became the *syntrophoi* of the king's son developed intimate personal ties with him. The early attachment of the elite boys to the king and the prince resulted in the close interdependence between the king and his Companions. Moreover, the *paides* were instructed in all branches of a liberal education and met and conversed with the leading Greek intellectuals who stayed at court. As a result, the Macedonian elite was fully integrated into the cultural development at court. Among the former *paides* of Philip are several distinguished men of letters, such as Ptolemy and Marsyas. Furthermore, the *paides* served as hostages to an extent so as to ensure their fathers' good behavior, especially after the nobility of the cantons of Upper Macedonia became Companions during Philip's reign. The institution of the *paides* thus further strengthened the loyalty of the elite to the king.

Significantly, the institution of the *paides*, just like the *symposia* and royal hunting, was marked by contradictory elements.⁶¹ On the one hand, the *paides* were distinguished by their prominent background and their closeness to the king and his son. On the other hand, their duties were not much different from those of slaves, as Curtius specifically notes (8.6.2), and as is exemplified by the fact that punishment for misconduct was usually flogging. Archelaus' death (if Decamnichus was a member of the *paides*) and certainly Hermolaus'

conspiracy were triggered by revenge for having been flogged. It appears that the king, who alone had the right to flog them (Curt. 8.6.5), sought to imbue the sons of the elite with the idea of his superiority through this demeaning and humiliating punishment.

In addition, the institution of the *paides* often provided a locus for erotic relationships at the Macedonian court where homosexuality was common. We know that there were pairs of lovers among the *paides*, or involving *paides* and older members of the elite, and sometimes the king himself. Examples of these include the two couples in the conspiracy of Hermolaus (Hermolaus and Sostratus, Epimenes and Charicles), Dimnus and Nicomachus in the Philotas affair (they were probably alumni), Archelaus and Crataeus (or Craterus), Archelaus and Hellanocrates, Philip and Alexander of Epirus,⁶² and Philip and Pausanias of Orestis. The alleged sexual relationship between Alexander and Hephaestion may have begun when they were *syntrophoi*. In fact, the somewhat institutionalized homosexuality at the Macedonian court, which began when the elite were *paides* and was maintained later in sympotic situations, sometimes formed the background for regicide and conspiracy.⁶³

In the later years of Alexander's reign, evidence about the *paides* is poorer. After Hermolaus' conspiracy, nothing more is heard of them individually or collectively until they re-emerge in Babylon after Alexander's death (Curt. 10.5.8, 7.16), and it may well be that they were greatly reduced in number after the conspiracy.⁶⁴ During the period of the Successors, each general recruited his own guards in imitation of Alexander and probably had his own system of *paides* as well, for Eumenes, Alcetas, Seleucus, and Antigonus are known to have had their own *paides*.⁶⁵ Although we have scant direct information about the *paides* in the Antigonid period, the institution seems to have endured until the end of the dynasty, as is shown by Livy's account of Perseus being accompanied by *paides* when he fled to Samothrace after the Battle of Pydna (45.6.7).⁶⁶

4 Conclusion

The life of the Macedonian elite was highly agonistic. It has been frequently observed that the Macedonian monarchy was very personal in nature, that the king's power was conceived as personal rather than institutional, and that personal relationships with the king determined almost everything. For the Companions status, wealth and fame came from the king only. While he lavishly entertained them at *symposia* and engaged with them in hunting he also fostered intense

competition among them for his favor.

The Macedonian court, which provided a stage for their regular interaction and competition, is known to have been increasingly integrated into the cultural life of Greece. Argead kings attracted many leading Greek intellectuals to their court, and it was Archelaus who promoted its intense Hellenization, although he was not the first king to invite Greek intellectuals. Alexander I's connections with Herodotus and Pindar are well known and Perdiccas II probably entertained Melanippides and Hippocrates at his court. Archelaus invited a number of major Greek artists and intellectuals to his court including Euripides, Agathon, Zeuxis, Choerilus, and Timotheus, and he sought to make his court a focus for Greek intellectual life. Royal interest in Hellenic high culture continued in the fourth century as Amyntas III employed Nicomachus, father of Aristotle, as his court doctor, and Perdiccas III, whose devotion to philosophy is well known, used the Platonic philosopher Euphraeus as his political adviser. Philip II continued this tradition on an even larger scale by attracting a great number of Greek intellectuals to Pella, among whom were Aristotle, Anaximenes, Theopompus, and Python. During his reign, which was characterized by growing Hellenization, these intellectuals competed for royal patronage. At the court of Alexander, who himself had grown up under the tutelage of Aristotle and was a lover of Greek culture, Callisthenes and Anaxarchus were major figures. Indeed, Hellenization and royal patronage did not cease with the end of the Argead dynasty. In the period of the Successors both Antipater, who himself was a distinguished man of letters, and Cassander, who was known as a patron of fine arts, had intimate connections with the Peripatetic school at Athens. In the Antigonid period, Pella once more became a center of Greek culture under Antigonus Gonatas, who himself had been a pupil of Menedemus and of Zeno. In Gonatas' reign, Greek intellectuals again frequented the Macedonian court, including Hieronymus, Aratus, Persaeus, and Timon. As a result of this ongoing Hellenization of the court, not only the kings but also the Companions and the *paides* were imbued with Hellenic culture and were fully integrated into the Greek intellectual world.⁶⁷

It is thus clear that the upper strata of Macedonian society were highly Hellenized. The fact that the Macedonian kings and elite nevertheless retained their own distinctive practices and values discussed above at least until Alexander's reign is noteworthy. Although we have little evidence about how the Macedonian kings and elite saw themselves because of the lack of Macedonian literary accounts, their retention of distinctive practices and values provides hints for exploring their self-perceptions.⁶⁸

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

A good starting point for the study of the Macedonian *symposium* is E.N. Borza, 'The Symposium at Alexander's Court', *Ancient Macedonia* 3 (Thessaloniki 1983), pp. 45–55, which emphasizes the significance of the *symposium* as a social institution at the Macedonian court. The most recent and fullest treatment is E.D. Carney, 'Symposia and the Macedonian Elite: The Unmixed Life', *Syllecta Classica* 18 (2007), pp. 129–80. Also useful and suggestive are O. Murray, 'Hellenistic Royal Symposia', in P. Bilde et al. (eds.), *Aspects of Hellenistic Kingships* (Aarhus 1996), pp. 15–27 and A. Kottaridi, 'The Symposium', in D. Pandermalis (ed.), *Alexander the Great* (New York 2004), pp. 65–87. Important studies of the physical setting of *symposia* are R.A. Tomlinson, 'Ancient Macedonian Symposia', *Ancient Macedonia* 1 (Thessaloniki 1970), pp. 308–15 and I. Nielsen, 'Royal Banquets: The Development of Royal Banquets and Banqueting Halls from Alexander to the Tetrarchs', in I. Nielsen and H.S. Nielsen (eds.), *Meals in a Social Context: Aspects of the Communal Meal in the Hellenistic and Roman World* (Aarhus 1998), pp. 102–33. K.A. Wardle et al., 'The Symposium in Macedonia: A Prehistoric Perspective', *AEMTH* 15 (2003), pp. 631–43, offers a valuable survey of the archaeological evidence for Macedonian drinking practices in pre-Argead times.

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2001), also contain fine treatments of the Macedonian hunting tradition.

On the institution of the *paides*, the most comprehensive study is N.G.L. Hammond, 'Royal Pages, Personal Pages, and Boys Trained in the Macedonian Manner during the Period of the Temenid Monarchy', *Historia* 39 (1990), pp. 261–90. W. Heckel, *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire* (London 1992), provides a useful overview of *paides* in Alexander's reign on pp. 237–44. Most recently there is E.D. Carney, 'The Role of the *Basilikoi Paides* at the Argead Court', in T. Howe and J. Reames (eds.), *Macedonian Legacies: Studies in Ancient Macedonian History and Culture in Honor of Eugene N. Borza* (Claremont 2008) pp. 145–64. All of these topics are also suggestively treated by J. Roisman, 'Honor in Alexander's Campaign', in J. Roisman (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great* (Leiden 2003), pp. 279–321.

¹ On these sources, see P.J. Rhodes, chapter 2.

² On Philip II, see S. Müller, chapter 9.

³ On the Companions, see Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 395–400, Hammond, *Macedonian State*, pp. 53–7, 140–7, and W. Heckel, 'King and "Companions"', in J. Roisman (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great* (Leiden 2003), pp. 197–225.

⁴ In the Alexander–historians these youths are officially called *paides* or *paides basilikoi*: W. Heckel, *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire* (London 1992), p. 241. The usual English label for them is 'pages', although this is misleading given its medieval context, as E.D. Carney, 'The Conspiracy of Hermolaus', *CJ* 76 (1980–1), p. 227, and 'The Role of the *Basilikoi Paides* at the Argead Court', in T. Howe and J. Reames (eds.), *Macedonian Legacies: Studies in Ancient Macedonian History and Culture in Honor of Eugene N. Borza* (Claremont 2008), pp. 145–6, notes, so I tend to use the term *paides* in this chapter.

⁵ On Alexander, see D.L. Gilley and Ian Worthington, chapter 10.

⁶ On the usage of the term *symposium*, see E.N. Borza, 'The Symposium at Alexander's Court', *Ancient Macedonia* 3 (Thessaloniki 1983), pp. 45–6.

⁷ On the culture of Greek *symposia*, see, for example, O. Murray,

‘The Symposion as Social Organization’, in R. Hägg (ed.), *The Greek Renaissance of the Eighth Century B.C.* (Stockholm 1983), pp. 195–9, ‘Symptotic History’, in O. Murray (ed.), *Symptotica* (Oxford 1990), pp. 3–13, and ‘Forms of Sociality’, in J.-P. Vernant (ed.), *The Greeks* (Chicago 1995), pp. 218–53.

⁸ Murray, ‘Symposion as Social Organization’, p. 196.

⁹ For example, Dem. 2.18–19, Theopompus, *FGrH* 115 FF 81, 224, 225, 236, 282.

¹⁰ Many of the tombs of the female elites also contain drinking items. Although female sympotic activity has been controversial, material evidence certainly associates women with drinking: see A. Kottaridi, ‘The Symposium’, in D. Pandermalis (ed.), *Alexander the Great* (New York 2004), p. 69 and E.D. Carney, ‘Symposia and the Macedonian Elite: The Unmixed Life’, *Syllecta Classica* 18 (2007), pp. 143–4. On Macedonian women, see E.D. Carney, chapter 20.

¹¹ On the dubious historicity of this tale, see R.M. Errington, ‘Alexander the Philhellene and Persia’, in H.J. Dell (ed.), *Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honor of Charles F. Edson* (Thessaloniki 1981), pp. 139–43 and Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, pp. 101–3.

¹² F. Geyer, *Makedonien bis zur Thronbesteigung Philipps II* (Munich 1930), pp. 84–5, Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 135–7, and Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, pp. 161–2.

¹³ On the inaccuracy of Carystius on Euphraeus, see Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, p. 206; see also J. Roisman, chapter 8, p. 163.

¹⁴ This point is made by O. Murray, ‘Hellenistic Royal Symposia’, in P. Bilde et al. (eds.), *Aspects of Hellenistic Kingships* (Aarhus 1996), p. 18; see Carney, ‘Symposia and the Macedonian Elite’, pp. 153–9, for full discussion.

¹⁵ For a discussion of why Greeks needed to dilute their wine with water and why the Macedonians did not, see Borza, ‘Symposium at Alexander’s Court’, pp. 48–9 and J. Davidson, *Courtesans and Fishcakes: The Consuming Passions of Classical Athens* (London 1997), pp. 46–8.

- 16 For discussion and references on these unruly banquets, see J. Roisman, 'Honor in Alexander's Campaign', in J. Roisman (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great* (Leiden 2003), pp. 318–21 and Carney, 'Symposia and the Macedonian Elite', pp. 167–9.
- 17 On the functions of the *symposia*, see Borza, 'Symposium at Alexander's Court', pp. 54–5, *Shadow of Olympus*, pp. 241–2, and Carney, 'Symposia and the Macedonian Elite', pp. 161–2, 172–3.
- 18 See Borza, 'Symposium at Alexander's Court', p. 55 and *Shadow of Olympus*, p. 242.
- 19 See references in Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 397–8 and Hammond, *Macedonian State*, pp. 143–4.
- 20 See Murray, 'Hellenistic Royal Symposia', pp. 16–18 and Carney, 'Symposia and the Macedonian Elite', pp. 142–63, for general discussion.
- 21 Murray, 'Symptotic History', pp. 6–7 and 'Forms of Sociality', pp. 224–34.
- 22 Murray, 'Forms of Sociality', p. 243 and 'Hellenistic Royal Symposia', p. 25.
- 23 See Roisman, 'Honor in Alexander's Campaign', p. 317 and Carney, 'Symposia and the Macedonian Elite', p. 173.
- 24 I. Nielsen, 'Royal Palaces and Type of Monarchy', *Hephaistos* 15 (1997), pp. 157–8.
- 25 For example, Plut., *Alexander* 70.3, Curt. 9.7.15, Athen. 1.17f, 12.537d, 538c–d, and see Carney, 'Symposia and the Macedonian Elite', pp. 148–51.
- 26 Persian official banquets were quite splendid and luxurious, sometimes with as many as 15,000 guests (Athen. 4.145a–146c): see Murray, 'Hellenistic Royal Symposia', pp. 18–19.
- 27 For a discussion of these contradictory elements in the Macedonian *symposia*, see Roisman, 'Honor in Alexander's Campaign', pp. 316–18.

²⁸ See the discussion and references in A. Dalby, 'The Wedding Feast of Caranus the Macedonian by Hippolochus', *Petits Propos Culinaires* 29 (1988), pp. 37–45.

²⁹ See Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, p. 156, Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, p. 130, and E.D. Carney, 'Hunting and the Macedonian Elite', in D. Ogden (ed.), *The Hellenistic World* (Swansea 2002), pp. 60–1.

³⁰ See W.S. Greenwalt, 'The Iconographical Significance of Amyntas III's Mounted Hunter Stater', *Ancient Macedonia* 5 (Thessaloniki 1993), p. 515 and Carney, 'Hunting and the Macedonian Elite', p. 61. The same hunting motif appears on the coins of Perdiccas III and Cassander.

³¹ Aristotle (*Politics* 1311b) claims that Archelaus was intentionally killed by his lover 'Crataeus', in cooperation with Decamnichus (who had been flogged by the king) and Hellanocrates; cf. Ael., *Varra Historiae* 8.9. Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 167–8, prefers Aristotle's account.

³² See the evidence collected by P. Briant, 'Les chasses d'Alexandre', *Ancient Macedonia* 5 (Thessaloniki 1993), pp. 267–70.

³³ On these representations of Alexander's lion hunts, see A. Stewart, *Faces of Power* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1993), pp. 270–7, 294–306, O. Palagia, 'Hephaestion's Pyre and the Royal Hunt of Alexander', in A.B. Bosworth and E.J. Baynham (eds.), *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction* (Oxford 2000), pp. 184–9, 202–6, and J.M. Barringer, *The Hunt in Ancient Greece* (Baltimore 2001), pp. 185–7.

³⁴ See P. Briant, 'Chasses royales macédoniennes et chasses royales perses', *DHA* 17 (1991), pp. 211–14 and Palagia, 'Hephaestion's Pyre', pp. 189–200.

³⁵ Palagia, 'Hephaestion's Pyre', p. 167 and Barringer, *Hunt in Ancient Greece*, p. 1.

³⁶ Palagia, 'Hephaestion's Pyre', p. 177 and Carney, 'Hunting and the Macedonian Elite', p. 62.

³⁷ For convenient summaries of this controversy and arguments for and against the occupant being Philip II, see E.N. Borza and O. Palagia, 'The Chronology of the Macedonian Royal Tombs at Vergina', *JDAI* 122 (2007), pp. 81–125 and Ian Worthington, *Philip II of Macedonia* (New Haven 2008), pp. 234–41.

³⁸ Since there is no evidence to suggest that game parks existed in Macedonia before Alexander, they may well have been introduced after his campaigns. On the vast game parks in the Persian Empire, see Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* 1.4.5–11, 6.28–29. Briant, 'Chasses royales macédoniennes', pp. 232–4 and 'Chasses d'Alexandre', pp. 272–3, assumes that they were introduced from Thrace during Philip's reign.

³⁹ See J.K. Anderson, *Hunting in the Ancient World* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1985), pp. 63–70, Briant, 'Chasses royales macédoniennes', pp. 217–22, and Palagia, 'Hephaestion's Pyre', p. 181.

⁴⁰ On Hephaestion's pyre, which has been the subject of controversy, see Palagia, 'Hephaestion's Pyre', pp. 167–75.

⁴¹ On the struggles, see W.L. Adams, chapter 11.

⁴² See Briant, 'Chasses royales macédoniennes', p. 241, Palagia, 'Hephaestion's Pyre', pp. 167, 183–4, Carney, 'Hunting and the Macedonian Elite', pp. 65, 67.

⁴³ On the functions of the royal hunt, see Greenwalt, 'Iconographical Significance', p. 518, R. Lane Fox, 'Ancient Hunting', in G. Shipley and J. Salmon (eds.), *Human Landscapes in Classical Antiquity* (London 1996), pp. 141–3, Carney, 'Hunting and the Macedonian Elite', pp. 59, 62, 68, and Roisman, 'Honor in Alexander's Campaign', pp. 313–16.

⁴⁴ The ambivalence between egalitarian and competitive values in Alexander's *symposia* and hunting is discussed by Roisman, 'Honor in Alexander's Campaign', pp. 313–21, especially pp. 314 and 317.

⁴⁵ H.S. Lund, *Lysimachus* (London 1992), pp. 160–1.

⁴⁶ C.F. Edson, 'The Antigonids, Heracles and Beroea', *HSCP* 45

(1934), pp. 226–9 and ‘Macedonica’, *HSCP* 51 (1940), pp. 125–6, Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, p. 155 n. 4.

⁴⁷ Carney, ‘Hunting and the Macedonian Elite’, p. 68.

⁴⁸ For references, see Anderson, *Hunting in the Ancient World*, pp. 81–2, Lane Fox, ‘Ancient Hunting’, p. 144.

⁴⁹ See E.D. Carney, ‘Elite Education and High Culture in Macedonia’, in W. Heckel and L. Tritle (eds.), *Crossroads of History* (Claremont 2003), p. 60 n. 44 and p. 62.

⁵⁰ Plut., *Alexander* 40.1, Athen. 13.539c, Ael., *Varra Historiae* 9.3.

⁵¹ On the conspiracy of Hermolaus, see Carney, ‘Conspiracy of Hermolaus’, pp. 223–31 and ‘Role of the *Basilikoi Paidēs*’, pp. 150–7, A.B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian’s History of Alexander* 2 (Oxford 1995), pp. 90–101, E. Badian, ‘Conspiracies’, in A.B. Bosworth and E. Baynham (eds.), *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction* (Oxford 2000), pp. 70–2.

⁵² Those who are said to have killed Archelaus (Arist., *Politics* 1311b, Diod. 14.37.6; see also n. 31 above), Crataeus (or Craterus), Decamnichus and Hellanocrates, may have been among his *paidēs*: Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 167–8 and N.G.L. Hammond, ‘Royal Pages, Personal Pages, and Boys Trained in the Macedonian Manner during the Period of the Temenid Monarchy’, *Historia* 39 (1990), p. 263, despite the skeptical remarks of Heckel, *Marshals of Alexander’s Empire*, p. 239 and Bosworth, *Commentary on Arrian* 2, p. 94.

⁵³ See Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, p. 401, Hammond, ‘Royal Pages, Personal Pages, and Boys’, pp. 261–4, Heckel, *Marshals of Alexander’s Empire*, pp. 239–40, Bosworth, *Commentary on Arrian* 2, p. 91, Worthington, *Philip II*, p. 30.

⁵⁴ Heckel, *Marshals of Alexander’s Empire*, p. 239 and ‘King and “Companions”’, p. 205, Carney, ‘Role of the *Basilikoi Paidēs*’, p. 146.

⁵⁵ Carney, ‘Elite Education and High Culture in Macedonia’, pp. 57–9, cautions against considering *syntrophoi* as synonymous with *paidēs*.

⁵⁶ See Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 401–2, Heckel, *Marshals of Alexander's Empire*, p. 238.

⁵⁷ See Bosworth, *Commentary on Arrian* 2, p. 93.

⁵⁸ Carney, 'Conspiracy of Hermolaus', p. 228 and 'Role of the *Basilikoi Paidēs*', pp. 147–8.

⁵⁹ H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage* 1 (Munich 1926), p. 37 n. 3, assumes a figure of about 100, Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, p. 401, about 85, and Hammond, 'Royal Pages, Personal Pages, and Boys', p. 266, some 200. None of their assertions is warranted by the evidence.

⁶⁰ On the significance of the institution, see Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, p. 401, Heckel, 'King and "Companions"', p. 206, Roisman, 'Honor in Alexander's Campaign', p. 303, Carney, 'Role of the *Basilikoi Paidēs*', p. 147.

⁶¹ On the ambiguity of their status, see Roisman, 'Honor in Alexander's Campaign', pp. 302–3.

⁶² It is doubtful that Philip had this sort of liaison with Alexander of Epirus, which is based on a hostile tradition: see Worthington, *Philip II*, p. 70.

⁶³ See E.D. Carney, 'Regicide in Macedonia', *PP* 38 (1983), p. 272.

⁶⁴ Carney, 'Conspiracy of Hermolaus', p. 231, Bosworth, *Commentary on Arrian* 2, p. 92.

⁶⁵ For references, see Hammond, 'Royal Pages, Personal Pages, and Boys', pp. 270–1, Heckel, *Marshals of Alexander's Empire*, pp. 240–1. See also Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, p. 195 n. 2.

⁶⁶ On Perseus' flight, see Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, p. 558, Hammond, *Macedonian State*, p. 378.

⁶⁷ For discussion and references, see Carney, 'Elite Education and High Culture in Macedonia', pp. 50–7. See also F.W. Walbank, 'Macedonia and Greece', *CAH*² 7.1 (Cambridge 1984) pp. 228–9.

⁶⁸ This is related to the vexed question of Macedonian ethnic identity. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see J. Engels, chapter 5.

Macedonian Women

Elizabeth Carney

No chapter in this book bears the title ‘Macedonian Men’ primarily because nearly all the other chapters will largely deal with men. The evidence available about the lives of Macedonian women compared to that about men goes far to explain this asymmetrical coverage. In addition, the assumption that women had no regular role in the political life of Macedonia has led either to their exclusion from political history or to a tendency to treat politically active women as exceptional personalities rather than as participants in an interlocking web of relationships that dominated the public life of Macedonia, at least during the period of the monarchy.

Lack of easy access to existing material evidence relevant to the study of women contributes to this scarcity of information. Greek Macedonia has experienced an explosion in archaeological activity since the late 1970s. Inscriptions, tombs, and new or expanded excavations have produced a dizzying amount of potentially useful material. Currently, however, much of this material is difficult to reach because it is unpublished or published only in Greek language archaeological journals, not searchable by computer, and is not organized in any centralized way.

Despite all the limitations of the current evidence base, ‘Macedonian Women’ remains a broad category. This chapter will focus on the period of the monarchy (seventh century to 168/7), during which time Macedonian culture was most distinct from that of central and southern Greece. Ancient Macedonia was always a hierarchical society with great disparities in wealth, power and privilege. The poor lived bio-degradable lives, and most information is about royal and elite women, although this is somewhat less true in later periods. Royal women’s lives bore little resemblance to those of slaves. Nonetheless, political events precipitated many social, economic and legal changes that affected women of all classes.

Attempting to pay attention to the interplay of class and gender in Macedonia leads to the problem of the context of Macedonian women in the supposedly wider category of women in the Hellenic world. In the study of women in antiquity, far too often the category 'Greek Women' has meant, in practice, Athenian citizen women in the fifth century. The situation of women in Macedonia did, at times, resemble that of women in central and southern Greece (even Athens) in the same time period, but often it was closer to the role of women in those regions during an earlier era or to contemporary cultures in northern Greece.

1 The Argead Era (seventh century to c.316)

Reflecting the importance of the monarchy and elite in Macedonian society, throughout the Argead era the role of both royal and elite women was more like that of royal women in Homeric epic and aristocratic women in the Archaic period than that of contemporary Greece. Macedonian burials for all classes in the Argead period, however, demonstrate the construction of a gender ideal that fits that of Hellenic culture generally. Male burials often contained weapons and armor (or images of them) and, in the upper classes, might also have housed sets of drinking vessels and items associated with athletic activity. Jewelry was the most frequent grave good in female burials (often accompanied by other toilet items like mirrors) though terracotta figurines and protomes (mold made images of a female head and upper body) relating to various cults popular with women were also common. Even in burials with little or no grave goods, men and women were buried facing in different ways. Some items did figure in both male and female burials: vessels used in funerary ritual, gilded or gold wreaths (worn at *symposia*, festivals, weddings, not simply for funerary purposes), and gold mouth coverings, apparently reflecting membership in cults connected to the afterlife. Nonetheless, throughout the Argead era burials presented a familiar Hellenic stereotype: men were commemorated, whenever possible, as warriors and women were associated with feminine beauty, household and family duties, particularly religious ones.¹

We cannot, however, uncritically assume that the gender stereotyping of Macedonian burials reflects the actual roles of men and women in that ancient society. There are exceptions to the stereotypes. Archaic female burials at Paliomelissa and Veria contained daggers as well as jewelry. Literary evidence confirms that a

few royal women played some sort of military role.² Moreover, burials were affected by beliefs about the afterlife.³ Imported grave goods reflected the gender constructions of the culture that produced them. Athenian pots found in a woman's burial in Macedonia do not guarantee that she lived a life like that of a woman in Athens. More importantly, the gender stereotypes apparent in Macedonian burials clearly speak to conventional ideals. Ideals are not necessarily lived reality.

A tomb at Aineia provides an excellent example of the limitations inherent in using burials to understand the lived reality of Macedonian women. The painted plaster walls of this cist tomb imitated the walls of a woman's room. Painted objects 'hang' from the walls: a mirror, head covering, ribbons, wreaths, a box, and a protome of Aphrodite. Grave offerings (including a number of alabastra and a gilded bronze wreath) were deposited around a wooden *larnax* (box) containing the bones of a young woman and a new born.⁴ Almost certainly this is the burial of a young wife who died in childbirth, an aspect of the burial closely tied to reality because the evidence is in the bones. But what does the conventionally feminine decoration signify? It tells us what was considered appropriate for the burial of a young woman by whoever buried her (likely her husband), but not whether she went out in public unaccompanied, veiled or unveiled, was able to own property, chose the man she married, or ran a household on her own or with the help of many servants. While this was hardly the burial of a poor woman, what should we make of the elaborate painted decoration but comparative lack of expensive grave goods, especially jewelry? Was this the burial of a member of the local elite or the burial of a woman of somewhat more modest means whose grieving husband had access to skilled craftsmen?

Some commonalities affected women of all classes and resembled the situation of many women throughout the Greek peninsula. As the burial at Aineia exemplifies, thanks to the dangers of childbirth, women generally lived shorter lives than men, whatever their class.⁵ Family was the center of women's lives. Since women's tasks – domestic duties, care of family members – centered on the home, we know that they spent much of their time in their houses. What these houses were like varied, of course, across classes and periods. Greek houses, at least in the Classical period, did not have architecturally separate women's areas, but the entry of outsiders into houses was closely controlled. For instance, a large house at Argilos, probably belonging to a member of the *hetairoi* (companions of the king), had a good sized central courtyard but only one entrance.⁶ Generally, Greek houses were closed to outside view so the dividing line between outside and inside firmly drawn. As we shall see, however, a few royal

and elite houses in Macedonia blurred this typical public/private division.

This focus on domestic life does not mean that Macedonian women, at least free women, were rarely outside. Throughout the Greek world, women participated in many public religious festivals, some all female, and ordinary women performed ritual for their family (and with their family) at shrines and at tombs. The CybeleAphrodite sanctuary at Pella had dining rooms, and, since this cult was largely patronized by women, the occupants of these dining rooms were probably women. Women left the home for these occasions and for meetings in preparation for some of these festivities. Elite women, who often held priesthoods, frequently participated in public ritual and traveled to distant sanctuaries.⁷ Rural and lower-class women had to go outside to work. For urban women of the middle and upper classes it is harder to say. Anecdotes give at least older women freedom of movement, no fear of talking to non-family men, and an ability to petition the king in person.⁸ Perhaps significantly, inscriptional evidence refers to citizen women.⁹ Macedonian women, like women elsewhere in Greece, wore veils of varying degrees of coverage, in effect functioning as substitute houses that enabled a woman to move in public but stay private.¹⁰ Female dress in Macedonia conformed to general Hellenic patterns, although Macedonian women may have been particularly inclined to wear gold or 'gold-appearing' jewelry and jewel-like decoration on their clothing.¹¹ The primary purpose of such glittering collections was display, thus indicating that women were, at least some of the time, in places where the wealth of jewelry could actually be displayed. In general, Macedonian women of all classes may have been out and about a bit more than women in Greece. This would be particularly true of the upper and lower extremes of the social scale.

Not only burials but also votives at sanctuaries at a number of Macedonian sites indicate that, as elsewhere in Greece, while some cults attracted both men and women certain kinds of cults and experiences were particularly appealing to women. In Macedonia, as elsewhere, curse tablets and some literary references tell us that women of all classes employed forms of magic to protect themselves and their children against hostile forces.¹² Women's religious experience centered on female deities, on cults that promised healing or fertility and offered protection for themselves in childbirth and for their children once born, and on cults and rituals that enabled them to cope with the stressful transitions of their lives.¹³ In keeping with this general pattern, Macedonians dedicated a number of sanctuaries in whole or in part to the Mother of the Gods, to Demeter and Persephone, to Aphrodite and to Artemis (later Isis). Indeed, in some

places, objects related to several of these deities were found in the same sanctuary. In the agora at Vergina (ancient Aegae), the sanctuary to the Mother of the Gods and to Eucleia were both patronized by women: loom weight offerings (symbolizing traditional women's work) were found at the former and statues dedicated by Eurydice, mother of Philip II, at the latter. Many of the women-centered cult sanctuaries (for example, Pella's to Demeter, Kore, and Artemis) were placed near but outside city walls.¹⁴ This sanctuary had a clay floor and may have been unroofed; the Demeter temple at Dium and the Mother of the Gods sanctuary at Vergina were similarly simple in construction, although the nearby Eucleia temple entailed more expensive construction and its royal votives were costly.¹⁵

Evidence for the legal position of women in this period is minimal. Macedonians, like Athenians, displayed a reluctance to inscribe a respectable woman's name in any public place other than her funerary monument; royal women and priestesses were exceptions.¹⁶ Evidence hints that Macedonian women may well have had somewhat broader legal rights than Athenian women, as did women in other central and northern Greek communities.¹⁷ It would appear that single women and widows (acting conjointly with their children) were able to buy and sell landed property, possibly without a *kurios* (legal guardian).¹⁸ As we shall see, royal women who were widows appear to have had a more independent situation as well. As yet, particularly for the Argead period, too little evidence survives to justify any further generalization.¹⁹

One can only make a gesture at class by class analysis before the Hellenistic period. Poor women who did heavy physical labor, like men of their class, usually lived shorter lives than those with greater wealth. Poverty would have compelled them to greater activity outside the house. While most of the inscriptional evidence for female slaves in Macedonia comes from the Hellenistic and Roman eras, their numbers must have been on the increase from the reign of Philip II, augmented by the supply of war captives that his victories and those of his son made possible. The number of urban women was presumably also on the increase as the fourth century progressed thanks to the rapid spread of urban life.

The upper class of Macedonia during the period of the monarchy is roughly connected to if not exactly equivalent to the *hetairoi*. Families in this category were significant landowners and dominated the officer corps and cavalry. New families joined the elite, particularly from the period of Philip II and following. Even in the Archaic period, some female burials were very rich indeed (for example, Sindos, Archontiko Giannitson, Vergina);²⁰ wealth and its conspicuous display were not new to Macedonia in the fourth century. As urbanism intensified,

many elite families developed or increased ties to urban centers. Women in this class probably held priesthoods in the cults we have mentioned; this was certainly the pattern elsewhere in Greece and is attested somewhat later in Macedonia. Argead kings sometimes took many wives, but this was probably a uniquely royal prerogative, not imitated by the elite.²¹ The companion class certainly did, like the Argeads themselves, engage in marriage alliances, establishing kin networks with others in the class in and outside Macedonia and with the royal family. Women in this group were, to some degree, involved in and knowledgeable about the political struggles of their clans. They may well, at least by the fourth century, have had some education.²² We know that Eurydice, mother of Philip II, received education, but later in life; she thanked the Muses and, possibly, her female citizens for gaining this education.²³ Some women functioned as patrons of the women of groups allied with or associated with their families. Elite families in the Greek world typically employed their female members to display family wealth. In Greece, as less aristocratic forms of government developed, this sort of display began to be limited by law, but Macedonia remained through the Classical period and past, a culture dominated by the court and elite. Elite women throughout the period of monarchy often had remarkably rich burials, similar in size and expenditure to those of males, whether they were buried alone or with other family members. A striking number of rich female burials belong to young girls.²⁴

2 Royal Women in the Argead Era

Philip II and Alexander III had multiple wives and it is likely that some earlier kings did as well. The wives, mothers, daughters, and sisters of Argead kings had no title; they appeared in inscriptions with a personal name and patronymic only. There was no institutionalized chief wife.²⁵ Mothers often acted as succession advocates for their sons (or grandsons).²⁶ Consequently, in many cases, the currently dominant woman at court may have been the mother of the king and not one of his wives. Being the mother of the heir (and later king) was the primary source of status and dominance, but other factors like family and ethnicity could affect a woman's place at court.

Like other women, royal women likely spent most of their time within the *oikos* (house, dynasty, household), though they were hardly confined to it. Early on, they may well have done considerable domestic work themselves, but by the fourth century, as the palaces grew in size and luxury and the number of slaves increased, royal

women were domestic supervisors of a staff, perhaps doing some fine weaving themselves.²⁷ Very young children were in their personal care, though they had wet nurses. The education of royal children seems to have been individualized in a way that honored their mothers' families and backgrounds. Royal women may all have lived in the same palace complex or in individual houses, but, whatever the architectural situation, they maintained separate households.

Kings arranged marriages for their daughters, sometimes with foreigners and other times with Macedonians, as part of the establishment of networks of *philia* (friendship) to confirm or establish political alliances. Alexander tried to arrange the remarriage of his widowed half-sister Cynnane with a political ally; the sudden death of the prospective groom prevented the plan, but clearly royal fathers and brothers functioned as *kurioi* (guardians) for these women. Widowed royal women sometimes arranged or tried to arrange marriages for themselves or their daughters; some preferred not to remarry. Occasionally would-be successors married the widow of the previous occupant of throne, either because they were royal widows or royal mothers.²⁸

Royal women controlled or had access to disposable wealth. Philip II's mother Eurydice made two dedications at the shrine of Eucleia, one of them a marble statue of the goddess and/or Eurydice herself. Olympias, mother of Alexander, made dedications at shrines in Athens and Olympia (*SIG* 1.252n 5ff., Hyp. 4.19). They had a staff of some sort, for slaves, musicians, secretaries, and others are known.²⁹ Cynnane, Alexander's half-sister, had enough wealth to finance a trip to Sardis with an armed escort or small military force (Polyaenus 8.60). The source of the wealth they demonstrably commanded is not clear; some of it probably came from their dowries and some from royal gifts – Alexander, for example, sent both his mother and sister plunder from the Asian expedition (Plut., *Alexander* 25.4). Much of this wealth was in the form of land or income from land.³⁰

It is extremely likely that Argead women functioned as priestesses of cults. Rich late archaic/early classical burials from Vergina have been interpreted as the burials of royal women associated with the reign of Alexander I. The excavators think that one, the 'Lady of Aegae', functioned as a priestess: the remains of what appears to be a scepter and many vessels for sacrifice and banqueting were found in her tomb. They think some of the other burials in this burial cluster suggest a similar picture.³¹ Olympias offered to sell to her son a slave she owned who could perform rites both Bacchic and Argead (Athen. 659f); obviously this implies that she had reason to own such a slave. Olympias was probably a priestess of Dionysus; certainly she functioned as a patron of a woman's Dionysiac festival (Plut.,

Alexander 2.6). Eurydice was likely a priestess of the Eucleia temple to which she was so generous.

The role of Argead women was in a number of respects a public one, particularly following the reign of Philip II. He turned his daughter Cleopatra's wedding into an international wedding festival (Diod. 16.91.4–93.2, Justin 9.6.1–3), a model followed by many of his successors including his son (Alexander staged his wedding to the daughter of the Persian king at Susa as part of a grand wedding festival).³² Royal women may have functioned as patrons of ordinary women, which is certainly true later in Macedonian history. Philip II included images of Olympias and his mother Eurydice in the dynastic group he put up in his Philippeion at Olympia, images which apparently imitated those of the gods since they appeared to be chryselephantine (Paus. 5.17.4). Only the statue base now survives, but Eurydice's image once stood in some monumental context not far from Vergina.³³ Toward the end of the dynasty, royal women increasingly appeared in public themselves – Olympias, Cynnane, and Adea Eurydice in front of armies and Cleopatra, sister of Alexander, in confrontation and conversation with several members of the elite. The evidence is scant and indirect but Argead women probably appeared on some occasions at court and for banquets.³⁴

Although the palace at Aegae resembled a very large Greek house in many respects, it differed in two important ways: the grandiose entrance and the veranda. Greek houses, as we have seen, ordinarily kept people from seeing in whereas a veranda (the one at Aegae ran the length of one of the long sides of the palace and looked out down the valley toward the theater, tombs, and town) was constructed as a place to be seen and see out. Given my own view of the public role and appearance of royal women, the notion that they and other family members may have appeared on the veranda at Aegae is not surprising, but it is intriguing to note that verandas have been found on other Macedonian domestic sites.³⁵ This does suggest a less black and white dividing line between public and private, at least for the elite and royal.

Argead women sometimes participated in power politics. They became more active as advocates for their sons' successions or when there was an absence of adult males. Eurydice summoned a *philos* (friend) of her dead husband, the Athenian admiral Iphicrates, to help her safeguard the throne for her sons (Aes. 2.26–29). Olympias became part of her son Alexander's quarrel with his father, apparently because she believed that his ability to succeed to the throne had been called into question by his father's actions. Years later, after her son's death, she appeared at the head of an army that invaded Macedonia in an apparent attempt to safeguard the throne for her young grandson.

Before it failed, she administered a siege, perhaps acted as a kind of regent, and attempted to build various political alliances. When her efforts failed, she wanted to speak to the assembled Macedonians to defend herself; instead armed men killed her.³⁶ Alexander's sister tried to arrange her own marriage alliance (Plut., *Eumenes* 3.5); in the end she was murdered for her pains (Diod. 20.37.3–6), as was Cynnane, Alexander's half-sister, because she was trying to arrange a royal marriage for her daughter (Arr., *FGrH* 156 F 9.22–23). Adea Eurydice nearly wooed the Macedonian army away from allegiance to the male commanders and may have helped to lead a Macedonian army into the field.³⁷

These events were hardly the norm. Probably most royal women of the Argead dynasty were, like most women in the Greek peninsula, pawns in their family's marriage plans and largely limited to domestic tasks. It may well be, however, that more women than the ones we know about took an active role in court life. Ironically, exactly because women were often prevented from having careers and identities of their own, they had an ability to stand for the *oikos* and so symbolize the family and their absent male kin.

3 The Transitional Period (c.316–c.277/6)

Alexander the Great died in June of 323, and his Argead dynasty outlived him by only a few years. Briefly the women of the dynasty, as already discussed, were quite active and prominent but, with the exception of Thessalonice, another half-sister of Alexander's, they were all murdered by about 308, by which time Alexander IV, the young son of the famous Alexander, had been murdered as well. The spring of 316, when Cassander defeated the forces of Olympias and had her killed, married Thessalonice, and deprived Alexander IV of his designations of royal status (Diod. 19.52.1–2, Justin 14.6.13), was really when the Argead era ended.

At this point Cassander ruled Macedonia in fact, if not yet in name, and began to act like a king.³⁸ Like the other Successors, toward the end of the century he started to employ a royal title. The Argead dynasty might simply have been replaced by the Antipatrid, had not this dynasty also foundered and vanished in the early third century (about 294). Roughly 20 years of political chaos and invasion followed before Antigonus Gonatas firmly established the Antigonid dynasty on the throne (about 277/6). Thus the transitional period

divides into two sections. The early period was one of comparative peace and prosperity, during which many veterans came home with great wealth to a Macedonia with a smaller population and to a familiar if newly royal family on the throne. Nonetheless, the disappearance of the Argeads was culturally and psychologically disturbing and the fact that Cassander himself had caused the deaths of three members of the old dynasty may have, long term, contributed to the collapse of his own. In any case, after the brief rule of several of his sons, Macedonia ricocheted from the control of one Successor to that of another; not all of who even claimed to be kings of Macedonia. It must have seemed that monarchy itself might vanish. These fluctuations in leadership were accompanied by invading armies that did material damage to the country by destroying property and traditional practice. For example, Aïdonochorion, a site showing cult activity relating to Leda-Aphrodite from the late sixth century, was violently destroyed in the early third century. More strikingly, Pyrrhus' Gaulic mercenaries plundered the royal tombs at Aegae (Plut., *Pyrrhus* 26.6).

This was for all Macedonians a period of change and instability. Poorer families' horizons had already begun to expand in the late Argead period, with Philip II's land grants and the wealth gained from Alexander's conquests, and many must have left Macedonia for the wars of the Successors and colonial life. Cassander abolished some cities and founded others, the most successful being Cassandreia and Thessaloniki, which were foundations that generated new prosperity but necessarily broke many traditions. Thanks to the wars, doubtless more slaves entered Macedonia. Our evidence for ordinary life is better for this period and the Antigonid one primarily because many more inscriptions survive.³⁹ This improvement in the amount of the evidence, however, makes it difficult to determine when change has happened and when we simply have the first evidence for a long-existing phenomenon.

For ordinary women, urban life was increasing and so, almost certainly, was access to minimal education. Many scholars believe that the greater mobility of the Hellenistic period and the break with tradition led to wider possibilities for women all across the eastern Mediterranean. In the first part of this period, during the rule of Cassander, the palace at Pella was much expanded and some of the most luxurious of the private houses at Pella were built. In all likelihood, this is the period of many of the Macedonian-type tombs (vaulted tombs, typically with two chambers and a temple like facade), into which went an impressive array of goods. It may be that, as political clouds darkened in the early third century, members of the elite considered an investment in an impressive tomb (and the

afterlife) more practical than anything else.⁴⁰

For royal women, it was a period of great change. In some cases what happened to them in Macedonia replicates or influenced the practice of the other emerging Hellenistic dynasties as the Successors feverishly imitated each other, but, in others, Macedonian practice was distinctive. Macedonia was the last region of Alexander's former empire to acquire an enduring royal dynasty. By the time the Antigonids established lasting control of Macedonia, the Seleucids and Ptolemies were two generations further down the path to dynasty identity and stability.

Perhaps the most important development is that sometime soon after 306 royal women began to appear with the title *basilissa*. Since 306 is the year in which the first of the Successors, Antigonus and Demetrius Poliorcetes, were given a royal title and the first woman attested with the female title is Phila, wife of Demetrius, one must conclude that the two changes are connected. The male Successors used military victory to justify the assumption of the title – they could not claim to be kings by right of descent – but that is hardly the explanation for the use of a female title. It was one of many tools the Successors used to legitimize first their own rule and later that of their heirs. What did *basilissa* mean and who could use it? The wives of kings used the title and we know that the unmarried daughters of Ptolemaic kings did as well. It is likely that any king's daughter could use the title and that a widowed royal wife could continue to use it; it was not a term limited to one woman.⁴¹

The title was part of a collection of symbolic/ideological developments that used royal women to aid in legitimizing individual and dynastic rule. Female cult for royal women developed in this period, and Phila is again the first attested. Some cults are only private, others civic, and a few are dynastic. In Macedonia proper, so far as we know, no royal woman would receive cult of any sort and certainly there is no evidence for a dynastic cult, but outside Macedonia wives and daughters of Macedonian rulers did sometimes have cults established.⁴² Philip and later Alexander had made eponymous foundations. The successors would emulate this practice, long before they dared to employ a royal title. Cassander, however, made an addition to the set of king-like, dynasty-building practices: in addition to the city he founded and named after himself, he established another named after his wife Thessalonice, the daughter of Philip, the sister of Alexander, and the mother of his heirs. Eponymous female foundations increased the public role of dynastic women and suggested that the entire family was godlike. There is no evidence that eponymous women received cult in the cities named after them but it is possible, particularly as the passage of time obscured the identity of

the literal founder of the city.⁴³

During the transitional period some royal women played a political role for familiar reasons. Thessalonice was murdered by one of her sons because he believed that she was supporting his brother's claim to the throne against his own.⁴⁴ Phila, wife of Demetrius Poliorcetes, acted as a patron for the families of her husband's forces (Diod. 19.59.4), as a go-between for her husband and her brother Cassander (Plut., *Demetrius* 32.3), and as a legitimizer of her husband's brief rule of Macedonia (Plut., *Demetrius* 37.3). Arsinoë was involved in the succession struggle between her husband Lysimachus' son by an earlier wife and her own sons as well as a second contest between those same sons and her half-brother Ptolemy Ceraunus.⁴⁵

In other respects, practices that had appeared in the Argead era became more prominent. Arsinoë, almost certainly while married to Lysimachus, paid for a large and elaborate building, the Arsinoeum, at the sanctuary of the Great Gods on Samothrace (*IG* 12 227). Other royal women made dedications or had them made in their honor at major shrines. Wedding festivals increased in scale as brides journeyed from the seat of one dynasty to another. Eurydice, mother of Ptolemy Ceraunus, at one point controlled the city of Cassandreia and was given an eponymous festival because of her euergetism for the city.⁴⁶

Royal polygamy continued to be practiced by the Successors, doubtless because it was associated with the kingship to which they were all laying claim. Cassander did not, apparently, practice it, but Lysimachus seems to have and Demetrius Poliorcetes certainly did. Arsinoë's Macedonian career, however, suggests that the practice had begun to seem problematic to some royal women; indeed the collapse of Lysimachus' rule in Macedonia and Thrace might have seemed to demonstrate that polygamy was no longer an advantageous royal strategy.⁴⁷

4 The Antigonid Era (c.277/6–169/8)

The Antigonids ruled Macedonia until the Romans defeated Perseus, the last of them, and abolished the Macedonian monarchy. The Antigonid era certainly was one with many continuities with earlier Macedonia. On the other hand, during this same period life in Macedonia grew more like that elsewhere on the Greek peninsula and eastern Mediterranean, more generic and less distinctively Macedonian. Women in Macedonia acquired more education and, judging by the evidence for their ownership of slaves, more property. Some inscriptional evidence from this period refers to the parents of

military recruits, not just the father.⁴⁸ This may be suggestive of the changing nature of women's role.

The Macedonian elite continued to bury the dead in tombs of the Macedonian type. However, tombs apparently constructed for the burial of one person or for a couple were often transformed into multi-generational family tombs⁴⁹ and some Macedonian-type tombs were purpose-built for large numbers. That of Lyson and Callicles, for instance, had niches for 22 cremation burials. The niches that were actually used had name labels, with the ashes of men placed in the upper ones and those of women in the lower. If the tomb was intended from the beginning to include the ashes of both men and women, as seems likely, it signifies that the decoration of the tomb focuses on the males: painted images of armor and weapons, not feminine toiletries, adorn the walls. At Pella, an unusual Macedonian tomb with eight rooms (a central ante-room and seven chambers for burials) was recently found. Though it was looted in antiquity, surviving inscriptions from the tomb are all for women. This presumably was a tomb for elite or royal women sharing some unknown but common category. Another Macedonian-type tomb at Pella, this one with a single female burial, quite possibly a royal woman, reflects an unchanged funerary ideology but more modest means, for the facade and interior are largely undecorated and, instead of the golden *larnax* of the Vergina burials, there is only a wooden one. The cremated bones, however, are wrapped like the earlier Vergina ones in purple and gold fabric.⁵⁰ Though this type of tomb endured as long as the monarchy, the more modest burials of the Antigonid period suggest that even the elite had less disposable wealth than in the boom era just after the conquests of Alexander the Great.

Compared to the other two major Hellenistic dynasties, Antigonid royal women were far less prominent and politically active. None of them were murdered probably because none of them are known to have been involved in a succession struggle. While the Antigonids did not practice endogamous marriage to the degree that the other dynasties did, they did mute their polygamy. As we have seen, there is no evidence for female cult in Macedonia. Almost certainly, there were images of royal women in Macedonia,⁵¹ just as there had been in earlier times, but the only Antigonid dynastic monument we know about almost certainly did not include images of women.⁵² Because kingship and monarchy had to be reconstituted by Antigonus Gonatas after the period of chaos and interregnum, though it retained and borrowed aspects of Argead monarchy, it was different. Whereas Argead monarchy entailed rule of a clan, Antigonid monarchy was much more focused on the current monarch alone. In keeping with this, only one serious succession dispute is known and even that

could, in part, be blamed on Roman interference.

At the moment, though, two inscriptions demonstrate that royal women in the Antigonid era, however limited their public political action was, nonetheless had an official role in monarchy not previously attested. A decree from Cassandreia refers to a courtier who worked for the king's wife and was, apparently, her representative to the city on public and private matters. An enfranchisement document from Veria includes the name of the king's wife and son with that of the king as guarantors of an oath.⁵³ Queenship (that is, the role of the wife of the king) was not an office in the sense that it had regular duties but queens were, judging by these documents, seen as officials of a sort and their public position was to some degree institutionalized. At the moment, available evidence suggests that royal women were, if anything, limited by this institutionalization, but it is too early to be certain. They continued to act as pious dedicators and benefactors, and so the implication that they were functioning as overall patrons for cults and causes popular with women is strong. A *basilissa* (Phthia or Phila) dedicated a statue of Aphrodite in Thessaloniki and Laodice, the last Macedonian *basilissa*, made some sort of dedication at Dion;⁵⁴ Chryseis, wife of Antigonus Doson, made a contribution in grain and lead to the Rhodian earthquake relief (Polyb. 5.89.7). Her husband also contributed to Rhodian relief, and their paired but not equal gifts imply a somewhat dualistic understanding of monarchy and euergetism (the other contributors were all male rulers or city populations) that involved both royal males and females.

Before we turn to the era of Roman rule in Macedonia it is necessary to reflect on the relationship between royal women and the general female population. There seem to be three possibilities: the actions and images of royal women may simply have reflected the typical role of women in a society, they may have been expected to embody admirable female traits and they may have influenced or inspired ordinary women.⁵⁵ These are not mutually exclusive propositions and all of them are, in a sense, unprovable because they are so general. Of the three possibilities, the first is probably the least important. Royal women tended not to be typical, for they were often of foreign birth and were, to some degree, allowed to retain and pass on to their children different traditions. Matters of state often distinguished their lives from those of ordinary women so they might marry earlier or later than the norm for political reasons for instance. Circumstance might force them to do things ordinary women did not have to do.

Understanding or expecting royal women to embody some sort of feminine principle is a more compelling and more provable notion.

Many cults for royal women involved seeing them as aspects of Aphrodite, the goddess who more than any other was the female ideal.⁵⁶ Royal women often functioned as patronesses for ordinary women and as intercessors for them and their families with their less accessible husbands and sons.⁵⁷ Benefactions done by royal women and dedications at sanctuaries, apart from advertising the wealth and power of their dynasties, signified the same thing.

Perhaps the hardest thing to prove is that royal women's role influenced that of ordinary women. For instance, did Eurydice's access to education facilitate the education of other women? Were the actions of someone like Olympias or her daughter seen in any way as creating a new and more independent avenue for women, at least widows with sons? As we have seen, the roles of elite and royal women were often parallel; at least in terms of euergetism, it does seem possible that the royal female model began to influence the elite model.⁵⁸

5 The Roman Period

Whereas the Antigonid era had been characterized by real and fabricated continuity with the Argead past, the period of Roman rule, at least ostensibly, was not. Many sites suggest widespread destruction. When the Romans defeated and imprisoned Perseus, they took a significant part of the Macedonian elite back to Italy (Liv 45.32.3–6). The disappearance of the Macedonian type of tomb, the form that had for several centuries been the preferred burial form for the elite, appears to confirm the departure of many of the families that had used such tombs. (Of course, this may simply mean that the families could no longer afford this sort of burial.) Archaeological evidence, however, suggests some continuity.⁵⁹ Naturally Roman organization and reorganization of the former kingdom brought some areas new prominence and reduced others. Roman citizens moved to Macedonia.

Over centuries, Roman citizenship spread through the free population of Macedonia, and more and more women were subject to Roman law. There is, however, some evidence to suggest that local custom that enabled women to act without their *kurioi* mattered more than Roman citizenship.⁶⁰ Women conducting business, practicing some trades, selling and buying slaves and other goods, getting honorific statues all increase in number. The ruling class of Roman Macedonia formed part of the imperial ruling class.

As elsewhere, women accomplished benefactions, improvements in

civic amenities or public entertainment, held high office, and in return received honorary statues and inscriptions.⁶¹ Some of these benefactors and office holders were women, sometimes acting alone, other times with spouses or other family members. At Terpni Nigritas, for instance, a woman paid for a basilica with an exedra and three porticoes. In Thessaloniki, women paid for several different sanctuary buildings and another woman funded games.⁶² Claudia Ammia, the daughter of a city official, together with her sons constructed an aqueduct for Veria, at her own expense, bringing water from her own apparently extensive lands.⁶³ Also in Veria, Flavia Isidora, Makedoniarchissa, in accordance with a decision of the *sunhedrion* (council), put up a monument for her daughter.⁶⁴ Particular prominence went to the woman who was high priestess of the imperial cult. Female patronage tended to be concentrated in the realm of religion. New cults entered Macedonia, probably primarily through the great port of Thessaloniki. The cult of the Egyptian gods became important, especially for women, and at Dium the earlier cult to Artemis, largely patronized by women, was subsumed in an Isis cult and a new and impressive temple rose on the site.⁶⁵

Some see such female euergetism as indicative only of the power of the family of the female patrons⁶⁶ or at least usually indicative of that, whereas others see it as proof of the greater independence and agency of better off women.⁶⁷ This kind of oppositional analysis does not fit the historical context.⁶⁸ Moreover, it seems to conflate reality with the ideology of commemoration perhaps because most of our evidence is for the latter. Family both limited and empowered women particularly because they so often seemed to symbolize or embody it. Male members of a family might finance a statue or a building to increase their own prestige and name recognition but the women of their family might convince them to do those things on those very grounds. The society pages of newspapers used to be full of references to the social yet civic doings of ‘society women’ – benefit dinners, charity auctions, and the like – and many of these women would appear in the pages of newspapers with names like ‘Mrs James Abbot’ or ‘Mrs John Jones’. The use of husbands’ names when referring to the actions of their wives certainly contributed to the name recognition of husbands (doubtless good for business or political life), but it hardly signified that the women did not want and/or gain publicity themselves or that they were not heavily involved in these actions, even if their financial support came entirely from the men of their family. Whether the statue that commemorated a woman for her benefits to the city listed the actions or offices that had led to the recognition, as a few did, or whether the statue base referred only to the actions of her husband or other male kin, she was receiving civic

recognition either way. One might say the same of monuments put up by women honoring male kin.

The third century was a period of revival of interest in Alexander and his family all over the Roman Empire but especially in Macedonia itself. A statue group of members of his family, including one of Thessalonice, was placed on the second terrace of the forum in Thessaloniki, perhaps a sign of a revived cult of Alexander and even the Argeads.⁶⁹ The personal name 'Olympias' appears in inscriptions at Veria in the third century, which is more testimony to the Alexander revival. Apart from such artificial archaism Macedonia, after centuries of Roman rule, was no longer was a place with a culture significantly distinct from the rest of the Greek East. The role of women in Roman Macedonia simply followed a common regional model.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

Little has been written on Macedonian women in general, but S. Le Bohec-Bouhet's 'Réflexions sur la place de la femme dans la Macédoine antique', in A.M. Guimier-Sorbets, M.B. Hatzopoulos and Y. Morizot (eds.), *Rois, cités, nécropoles: Institutions, rites et monuments en Macédoine* (Athens 2006), pp. 187–98 and A.B. Tataki, *Ancient Beroea: Prosopography and Society* (Paris 1988), are invaluable. M. Lilimpaki-Akamati, 'Women in Macedonia', in D. Pandermalis (ed.), *Alexander the Great: Treasures from an Epic Era of Hellenism* (New York 2004), pp. 89–113, is chronologically less specific but helpful, particularly about dress. S. Le Bohec, 'Les reines de Macédoine de la mort d'Alexandre à celle de Persée', *Cahiers du centre G. Glotz* 4 (1993), pp. 229–45, E.D. Carney, *Women and Monarchy in Macedonia* (Norman 2000), and E.D. Carney, *Olympias: Mother of Alexander the Great* (New York 2006), provide overviews of the role of royal women in both Macedonian dynasties, as does M.D. Mirón Pérez, 'Transmitters and Representatives of Power: Royal Women in Ancient Macedonia', *Anc. Society* 30 (2000), pp. 35–52. There are a number of useful articles on individual royal women, which will be found in the bibliographies of Carney's books.

I. Savalli-Lestrade, 'Il ruolo pubblico delle regine ellenistiche', in S. Allessandrì (ed.), *Istorie. Studi offerti dagli allievi a Giuseppe Nenci in occasione del suo settantesimo compleanno* (Galatina 1994), pp. 415–32 and 'La place des reines à la cour et dans le royaume à l'époque hellénistique', in R. Frei-Stolba, A. Bielman and O. Bianchi (eds.), *Les*

femmes antiques entre sphere privée et sphere publiques: Actes du diplôme d'études avancées (Bern 2003), pp. 59–76, discuss Hellenistic queenship with limited attention to the Antigonids. The boom in Macedonian archaeology since the late 1970s has led to the discovery of a number of female burials likely, though not certain, to be royal.

¹ See a brief, general discussion in P. Themelis and I. Touratsoglou, *Hoi Taphoi Tou Derveniou* (Athens 1997), p. 203.

² Polyaeus 8.60, Arr., *FGrH* 156, FF 9.22–24, 30–33, Duris *apud* Athen. 560f, Diod. 18.39.1–4, 19.52.5. For the Paliomelissa and Veria burials, see *Archaeological Reports* 52 (2005–6), pp. 88–9. Under the Great Tumulus at Vergina, the female burial in the antechamber of Tomb II contained little jewelry but numerous arms and armor, possibly the property of the male in the main chamber, but more likely that of the woman: see E.D. Carney, 'Women and Military Leadership in Macedonia', *Anc. World* 35 (2004), pp. 184–95.

³ See P. Christesen and S.C. Murray, chapter 21, pp. 431–5.

⁴ J. Vokotopoulou, *Guide to the Archaeological Museum of Thessalonike* (Athens 1996), pp. 196–8. Tombs at Pella, Agios Athanasios, and Stagira from the late fourth and early third century display similar painted wall decoration.

⁵ Osteological studies of 80 graves at Stagira confirm this generalization: *Archaeological Reports* 50 (2003–4), p. 56.

⁶ *Archaeological Reports* 47 (2000–1), p. 101, L. Nevett, *House and Society in the Ancient Greek World* (Cambridge 1999), N. Cahill, *Household and City Organization at Olynthus* (New Haven 2002). For Macedonia, see E. Adam-Veleni, E. Poulaki, and K. Tzanavari, *Ancient Country Houses on Modern Roads: Central Macedonia* (Athens 2003).

⁷ M. Dillon, *Girls and Women in Classical Greek Religion* (London 2002) and J.B. Connelly, *Portrait of a Priestess* (Princeton 2007).

⁸ Plut., *Demetrius* 42.3–4, *Moralia* 179c, Valerius Maximus 6.2, ext. 1, S. Le Bohec-Bouhet, 'Réflexions sur la place de la femme dans la Macédoine antique', in A.M. Guimier-Sorbets, M.B. Hatzopoulos and Y. Morizot (eds.), *Rois, cités, nécropoles: Institutions, rites et*

monuments en Macédoine (Athens 2006), pp. 187–98.

⁹ Le Bohec-Bouhet, ‘Réflexions sur la place de la femme’, pp. 191–2.

¹⁰ L. Llwelllyn-Jones, *Aphrodite’s Tortoise: The Veiled Women of Ancient Greece* (Swansea 2003), R. Lane Fox, *The Making of Alexander* (Oxford 2004), p. 127, M. Lilibaki-Akamati, ‘Women in Macedonia’, in D. Pandermalis (ed.), *Alexander the Great: Treasures from an Epic Era of Hellenism* (New York 2004), p. 93.

¹¹ E. Trakosopoulou, ‘Jewelry in Macedonia’, in D. Pandermalis (ed.), *Alexander the Great: Treasures from an Epic Era of Hellenism* (New York 2004), pp. 115–38 and Lilibaki-Akamati, ‘Women in Macedonia’, p. 94. Macedonian burials often contain a number of small gold or ‘gold-appearing’ circular decorations; many were attached to garments worn in life, not simply for burial: Vokotopolou, *Guide to the Archaeological Museum of Thessalonike*, p. 187.

¹² On a curse tablet, see Le Bohec-Bouhet, ‘Réflexions sur la place de la femme’, p. 196, E. Voutiras, *Dionysophontos Gamoi: Marital Life and Magic in Fourth Century Pella* (Amsterdam 1998). On Olympias’ possible use of magic, see Plut., *Alexander* 77.5 and D. Ogden, ‘A War of Witches at the Court of Philip II?’, *Ancient Macedonia* 7 (Thessaloniki 2007), pp. 357–69. See also P. Christesen and S.C. Murray, chapter 21, pp. 431–5.

¹³ See, for instance, the discussion of the role of young girls in the cult of Demeter at Lete in M.B. Hatzopoulos, *Cultes et rites de passage en Macédoine* (Athens 1994), pp. 42–8, S. Psoma, ‘Entre l’armée et l’oikos: l’éducation dans le royaume de Macédoine’, in A.-M. GuimierSorbets, M.B. Hatzopoulos, and Y. Morizot (eds.), *Rois, cités, nécropoles: Institutions, rites et monuments en Macédoine* (Athens 2006), p. 297.

¹⁴ On the Pella sanctuary, see *Archaeological Reports* 28 (1981–2), p. 36; on shrine locations, see Hatzopoulos, *Cultes et rites de passage en Macédoine*, p. 43.

¹⁵ See P. Christesen and S.C. Murray, chapter 21.

¹⁶ Le Bohec-Bouhet, ‘Réflexions sur la place de la femme’, p. 194.

For the general tendency, see D. Schaps, 'The Woman Least Mentioned: Etiquette and Women's Names', *CQ*² 27 (1977), pp. 323–30.

¹⁷ P. Cabanes, 'La femme dans les inscriptions antiques de Bouthrôtos', *L'Ethnographie* 85 (1989), pp. 13–22, A. Bielman Sánchez, *Femmes en public dans le monde hellénistique IV^e-I^{er} s. av. J.-C.* (Paris 2002), pp. 110–15.

¹⁸ Bielman Sánchez, *Femmes en public*, pp. 142–4, Le Bohec-Bouhet, 'Réflexions sur la place de la femme', pp. 194–5. In the case of the widows, the property involved seems to be patrimonial and include the dowry of the widow. P. Cabanes, 'Société et institutions dans les monarchies de Grèce septentrionale au IV^e siècle', *REG* 113 (1980), pp. 324–51, notes a similar situation for women in Epirus.

¹⁹ Le Bohec-Bouhet, 'Réflexions sur la place de la femme', p. 196.

²⁰ For Sindos burials, see Vokotopoulou, *Guide to the Archaeological Museum of Thessalonike*, pp. 103–47; for Archontiko Giannitson, see *Archaeological Reports* 51 (2004–5) p. 70, and for Vergina, see A. Kottaridi, 'The Lady of Aegae', in D. Pandermalis (ed.), *Alexander the Great: Treasures from an Epic Era of Hellenism* (New York 2004), pp. 139–47.

²¹ A. Bielman Sánchez, 'Régner au féminin. Réflexions sur les reines attalides et séleucides', in F. Prost (ed.), *L'Orient méditerranéen de la mort d'Alexandre aux compagnes de Pompée: Cités et royaumes à la époque hellénistique* (Rennes 2003), p. 49.

²² E.D. Carney, *Women and Monarchy in Macedonia* (Norman 2000), pp. 28–9 and Psoma, 'Entre l'armée et l'oïkos', pp. 297–98. Voutiras, *Dionysophontos Gamoi*, pp. 21–5, considers that the Pella curse tablet was composed by the woman herself and that she was familiar with some literary forms.

²³ Plut., *Moralia* 14b, Le Bohec-Bouhet, 'Réflexions sur la place de la femme', pp. 190–1.

²⁴ For example, at Pydna and Archontiko Giannitson. At ancient Acanthus, a cemetery used from the Iron Age through Roman times, at least 50 percent of burials were lavish child burials:

²⁵ *Contra* A. Kottaridi, ‘The Symposium’, in D. Pandermalis (ed.), *Alexander the Great: Treasures from an Epic Era of Hellenism* (New York 2004), p. 140, who assumes that priestly duties could only have been performed by one woman.

²⁶ On royal women as succession advocates, see Carney, *Women and Monarchy*, pp. 31–2. The careers of Eurydice, mother of Philip II, and Olympias, mother of Alexander III and grandmother of Alexander IV, are examples. Often succession struggles pitted all the children of one mother, as well as the mother herself, against all the children of another and that woman: D. Ogden, *Polygamy, Prostitutes and Death: The Hellenistic Dynasties* (London 1999), pp. 3–40, has termed such struggles ‘amphimetric’.

²⁷ See Carney, *Women and Monarchy*, p. 264 n. 117 and *Olympias: Mother of Alexander the Great* (New York 2006), p. 152 n. 72. See also D.M. Mirón Pérez, ‘Realeza y labor doméstica en Macedonia antigua’, *Geri* 1 (1999), pp. 213–22.

²⁸ Ogden, *Polygamy, Prostitutes and Death*, pp. xix, 8–10, 23–4, 174–5, Carney, *Women and Monarchy*, pp. 21–2, 43, 191.

²⁹ Athen. 14.359f, Paus. 1.44.6, Diod. 20.37.5, Arr., *FGrH* 156 F 9.33.

³⁰ Carney, *Women and Monarchy*, p. 174 n. 86. Le Bohec-Bouhet, ‘Réflexions sur la place de la femme’, p. 194, points out that Chryseis’ earthquake relief gift (Polyb. 5.89.7) took the form of grain, just as earlier Alexander’s sister Cleopatra had given grain relief (Lycurgus 1.26), implying the women had land or income from land.

³¹ Kottaridi, ‘Lady of Aegae’, pp. 139–40.

³² Plut., *Alexander* 70.2, *Moralia* 329e, 338d–e, Arr. 7.4.4–6, Justin 12.10.9–10, Curt. 10.3.12, Diod. 17.107.6.

³³ C. Saatsoglou-Paliadeli, ‘Queenly Appearances at Vergina-Aegae: Old and New Epigraphic and Literary Evidence’, *AA* 3 (2000), pp. 397–400. On the Philippeum and that the statues were not chryselephantine, see now P. Schultz, ‘Leochares’ Argead

Portraits in the Philippeion', in P. Schultz and R. von den Hoff (eds.), *Early Hellenistic Portraiture: Image, Style, Context* (Cambridge: 2007), pp. 205–33.

³⁴ Kottaridi, 'Symposium', p. 69 and Lilibaki-Akamati, 'Women in Macedonia', p. 91. On Macedonian *symposia* in general, see N. Sawada, chapter 19, pp. 393–9.

³⁵ Late classical/early Hellenistic houses with both courtyards and verandas, like the Vergina palace, have been found at Petres and possibly Aiane; the pattern may be of Macedonian origin: see *Archaeological Reports* 43 (1996–7), p. 79.

³⁶ Carney, *Women and Monarchy*, pp. 119–23.

³⁷ Diod. 18.39.1–4, Arr., *FGrH* 156 FF 9.30–33, Polyaeus 4.6.4, Duris *apud* Athen. 13.560f.

³⁸ See W.L. Adams, chapter 11.

³⁹ On these sources, see P.J. Rhodes, chapter 2, pp. 32–9.

⁴⁰ See P. Christesen and S.C. Murray, chapter 21, pp. 436–40, for reasons other than this practical one for the size and luxury of Macedonian tombs.

⁴¹ *Contra* Bielman Sánchez, 'Régner au féminin', p. 51. On the development and meaning of the female title, see E.D. Carney, "'What's in a Name?': The Emergence of a Title for Royal Women in the Hellenistic Period', in S.B. Pomeroy (ed.), *Women's History and Ancient History* (Chapel Hill 1991), pp. 154–72 and *Women and Monarchy*, pp. 225–8.

⁴² On the development of cult for royal women, see M.D. Mirón Pérez, 'Olimpia, Eurídice y el origen del culto dinástico en la Grecia helenística', *Flor. Ilib.* 9 (1998), pp. 215–35 and E.D. Carney, 'The Initiation of Cult for Royal Macedonian Women', *CP* 95 (2000), pp. 21–43.

⁴³ E.D. Carney, 'Eponymous Women: Royal Women and City Names', *AHB* 2 (1988), pp. 134–42 and *Women and Monarchy*, pp. 207–9.

⁴⁴ Diod. 21.7.1, Plut., *Demetrius* 36.1, Justin 16.1.1–4, Paus. 9.7.3–4.

⁴⁵ Carney, *Women and Monarchy*, pp. 173–7.

⁴⁶ Polyaeus 6.7.2, Mirón Pérez, ‘Olimpia, Eurídice y el origen del culto dinástico’, pp. 229–30.

⁴⁷ Carney, *Women and Monarchy*, pp. 228–32. For a somewhat different view, see Ogden, *Polygamy, Prostitutes and Death*, especially pp. 171–98.

⁴⁸ Le Bohec-Bouhet, ‘Réflexions sur la place de la femme’, p. 195.

⁴⁹ For instance, the Macedonian tomb in the *hetairos* tumulus in the southern cemetery at Pydna included a Macedonian-type tomb built late in the fourth or early third century, but it was used for all subsequent members of the family until after the fall of the monarchy: *Archaeological Reports* 41 (1994–5), p. 44.

⁵⁰ *Archaeological Reports* 43 (1996–7), pp. 77–8. The tomb dates to the early second century and the suggestion is made that the more modest material standard of the burial reflects straitened conditions after the Roman defeat of the Macedonians in 197.

⁵¹ A.B. Tataki, *Ancient Beroea: Prosopography and Society* (Paris 1988), p. 433, discusses a statue base from Veria that likely supported a statue of Stratonice, the founding mother of the Antigonid dynasty.

⁵² The *progonoi* (ancestors) monument at Delos erected by (probably) Antigonus Gonatas: see the discussion and references in E.D. Carney, ‘The Philippeum, Women, and the Formation of a Dynastic Image’, in W. Heckel, L. Tritle, and P. Wheatley (eds.), *Alexander’s Empire: Formulation to Decay* (Claremont 2007), pp. 56–8.

⁵³ See Le Bohec-Bouhet, ‘Réflexions sur la place de la femme’, pp. 188–9.

⁵⁴ For the Thessaloniki inscription, see Le Bohec-Bouhet, ‘Réflexions sur la place de la femme’, p. 190; for the fragmentary Dium inscription, see Saatsoglou-Paliadeli, ‘Queenly Appearances

at Vergina-Aegae', pp. 389–92.

⁵⁵ S.B. Pomeroy, *Women in Hellenistic Egypt from Alexander to Cleopatra* (New York 1984), p. 40 and Bielman Sánchez, 'Régner au féminin', p. 43, favor the notion that queens inspire.

⁵⁶ Carney, *Women and Monarchy*, pp. 218–25 and 'Initiation of Cult for Royal Macedonian Women', pp. 21–43.

⁵⁷ Le Bohec-Bouhet, 'Réflexions sur la place de la femme', pp. 188–9, makes this important point. Supporting evidence is stronger for the Antigonid era, but it may have been common practice throughout the period of Macedonian monarchy.

⁵⁸ See Bielman Sánchez, 'Régner au féminin', pp. 59–60.

⁵⁹ Tataki, *Ancient Beroea*, p. 435, notes that while many names disappear from Veria at this time others endure. A tumulus in the southern cemetery at Pydna, apparently that of a *hetairos* family, contained graves from the mid-fourth to the end of the second century; the latest (post monarchy) graves were more modest: see *Archaeological Reports* 41 (1994–5), p. 44. Livy 54.32.3 specifies that those exiled were adult male members of the elite and their sons over 15; presumably wives, daughters, and younger male children remained behind.

⁶⁰ Tataki, *Ancient Beroea*, p. 478, takes the influence of Roman law at Veria seriously, whereas M.B. Hatzopoulos, 'La société provinciale de Macédoine sous l'empire à la lumière des inscriptions du sanctuaire de Leukopétrā', in S. Follet (ed.), *L'hellénisme d'époque romaine: Nouveaux documents, nouvelles approches, (I^{er} s. a. C–III^e s. p. C)* (Paris 2004), p. 51, on the basis of the Leukopetra inscriptions, considers local law and practice more important.

⁶¹ J. Bartels, *Städtische Eliten im römischen Makedoniane: Untersuchungen zur Formierung und Struktur* (Berlin 2008), p. 177, points out that no woman is honored for her education, quite possibly because rhetorical training, held in high regard for males, was not useful for females who did not generally speak in public.

⁶² See references in Bartels, *Städtische Eliten im römischen Makedoniane*, p. 151.

- ⁶³ Tataki, *Ancient Beroea*, pp. 191, 457.
- ⁶⁴ Tataki, *Ancient Beroea*, pp. 293, 460.
- ⁶⁵ See P. Christesen and S.C. Murray, chapter 21, on the cult of Isis and other foreign cults in Macedonia.
- ⁶⁶ R. van Bremen, *The Limits of Participation: Women and Civic Life in the Greek East in the Hellenistic and Roman Periods* (Amsterdam 1996). For Macedonia, Tataki, *Ancient Beroea*, pp. 461–2, comments that at the honorary monuments at Veria women were not typically honored for their own position but, even when they had titles like high priestess, were described in terms of their relationship to some important male member of the elite, the cause, as she sees it, of their honors. Lucia Aureliana Alexandra, on the other hand, was honored by the city for the way in which she carried out her tasks as priestess of Artemis Agrotera; her father is mentioned, but the monument honors her (Tataki, *Ancient Beroea*, p. 123).
- ⁶⁷ U. Kron, ‘Priesthoods, Dedications and Euergetism. What Part Did Religion Play in the Political and Social Status of Greek Women?’, in P. Helström and B. Alroth (eds.), *Religion and Power in the Ancient Greek World* (Uppsala 1996), pp. 139–82 and C. Hayward, ‘Les grandes-prêtresses du culte impérial provincial en Asie Mineure, état de la question’, *Études de lettres* 1 (1998), pp. 117–30, tend to see female euergetism and office holding as evidence for a wider role for women. On female euergetism, see also P. Gauthier, *Les cités grecques et leurs bienfaiteurs (IV^e–I^{er} siècle avant J.-C.)* (Paris 1985).
- ⁶⁸ J. Nollé, ‘Frauen wie Omphale?: Überlegungen zu “politischen” Ämtern von Frauen im kaiserzeitlichen Kleinasien. Reine Männersache?’, in M.H. Dettenhofer (ed.), *Frauen in Männerdomänen der antiken Welt* (Cologne 1994), pp. 229–59, sees these women as working for the advancement of their families.
- ⁶⁹ IG 10.2.1, nos. 275–8, 933.

Macedonian Religion

Paul Christesen and Sarah C. Murray

Perhaps the best place to begin a survey of Macedonian religion is with an appreciation of its immense complexity. Polytheism, the great expanse of the Macedonian state, ethnic diversity within the boundaries of that state, openness to foreign influences, and change over time all contributed to the creation of an unusually diverse religious life. The city of Stobi offers an illustrative example. Stobi was located 125 km northwest of the Macedonian capital at Pella and was inhabited primarily by Paionians, a Thracian people who spoke their own, non-Greek language. The city was conquered by Macedonia in the third century and later became a Roman colony. In the Roman period Stobi was the site of religious activity that was specifically Paionian, such as the worship of the sun in the form of a small, round disk on top of a pole. During the same period Greek deities were also worshipped in considerable numbers. Cults of Aphrodite, Apollo Clarios, Apollo Soter, Artemis Ephesia, Artemis Locheia, Asclepius, Dionysus, the Dioscuri, Hera Basileia, Heracles, Hygieia, Nemesis, the nymphs, Pan, the river gods Axios and Erigon, Telesphorus, Tyche, and Zeus Olympios are all attested. Influences from outside the Greek world were also present, in the form of the worship of the Roman gods Jupiter Dolichenus, Liber, Ultrix Augusta, and the Lares, of the Egyptian god Sarapis, and of the Anatolian goddess Cybele.¹ The rich texture of the religious life of Stobi was repeated, with endless variation, throughout the entirety of the Macedonian state.

This chapter will not attempt to explore Macedonian religion in all its complexity, a task that would require a multi-volume series of its own, but will instead focus on the religious activity of the Macedonian people (rather than of all the peoples within the fluctuating borders of the Macedonian state). Since it is now widely acknowledged that Macedonians were from the outset linguistically and culturally Greek and since there is already a vast literature on Greek religion, it is

those religious practices in which the Macedonians diverged from their fellow Greeks that will be highlighted.²

Macedonian religion was distinctive in a number of ways, six of which will be discussed in detail. Greek religion was by no means a monolithic phenomenon; there was considerable variation within the Greek world in regard to which deities were objects of cult and how they were worshipped. This definitely held true for the Macedonians who were typically Greek in pursuing a unique collection of religious practices. The six aspects of Macedonian religion that will be addressed are (1) deities of particular significance to Macedonians, (2) an understanding of death as passage into an afterlife, (3) openness to foreign cults, (4) the tendency to expend resources on the construction of tombs rather than temples, (5) the role of the king as chief intermediary between the gods and the Macedonian people, and (6) the deification of rulers.

Before proceeding a few cautionary notes are in order. Due to the nature of the relevant evidence, the discussion that follows will focus on the period from the fourth century onward, will pursue a generally synchronic approach, and will treat the religious activity of elites in much greater depth than that of non-elites. Evidence for Macedonian religious practices comes from literary texts, inscriptions, coins, art (especially votive reliefs and tomb paintings), and material remains (especially sanctuaries and dedications). These sources provide very little information for the period before the fifth century, and the vast majority of the relevant inscriptions, perhaps the single most abundant source, date to the Hellenistic and Roman periods.³ As a result, it is only with the fourth century that the evidence becomes sufficient to discuss Macedonian religion in any detail.

The approach adopted here is cautiously synchronic, in that it is based on the assumption that much of Macedonian religious practice remained unchanged from roughly the fourth century BC to the third century AD. The lacunose nature of the available evidence makes it difficult to trace changes in cult practice among Macedonians over the course of time. Significant changes that are clearly reflected in the sources, such as the introduction of important new cults, will of course be given due weight, and every effort will be made to avoid unjustifiable extrapolations backward in time on the basis of later evidence. Nonetheless, some elision of ongoing evolution in Macedonian religious practice is inevitable.

Finally, the discussion that follows concentrates on the religious activities of those who possessed wealth and power. Here again, the nature of the relevant evidence is the crux of the matter. Material remains such as sculptured gravestones and lead tablets with magical spells cut into them offer glimpses of the devotional practices of non-

elites, but the majority of the available materials – literary texts, inscriptions, coins, and art – primarily reflect elite concerns.

1 Deities of Particular Significance to Macedonians

Macedonians had a particular and lasting attachment to the worship of Zeus, Heracles, Artemis, Dionysus, and Isis and Sarapis. Other deities were of course objects of cult. Aphrodite, Apollo, Asclepius, Athena, the Cabiri, the Dioscuri, Draco (a snake god), Eucleia, Helios, the Mother of the Gods, the Muses, various river gods, the nymphs, and Selene all merit mention but not detailed discussion. Some gods and goddesses popular elsewhere in the Greek world – most notably Hephaestus and Poseidon – seem to have received only minimal attention from Macedonians.

From an early period Zeus was the single most important deity in the Macedonian pantheon. Macedon, a mythical individual from whom all Macedonians were ostensibly descended, was widely believed to be the son of Zeus,⁴ and a head of Zeus featured prominently on Macedonian coinage beginning with the reign of Philip II. Zeus Hysistos (Highest) was worshipped throughout Macedonia, including the ancient capital at Vergina. Zeus was also worshipped under a number of other epithets, including Agoraios (of the Marketplace), Hyperairetes (on High), Eleutherios (the Deliverer), Hetaireios (of the Companions), Cronides (son of Cronos), Ctesios (Protector of House and Property), and Olympios (from Olympos). Roman soldiers and settlers brought with them the worship of Zeus' counterpart Jupiter. The most important cult site for Zeus in Macedonia was located at Dium, the spiritual center of the Macedonian kingdom. Sometime around 400 King Archelaus established there an annual festival in honor of Zeus and the Muses that included lavish sacrifices and contests (Diod. 17.16.3–4),⁵ and important treaties were displayed in the sanctuary of Zeus Olympios there.⁶ A sanctuary of Zeus Hysistos with remains from the Hellenistic and Roman periods was recently uncovered at Dium;⁷ an inscription found at the sanctuary shows that the cult was active well into the third century AD.⁸

Zeus' son Heracles also played a prominent role in Macedonian religious practice. A head of Heracles and associated attributes (e.g., lion skin or club) appear regularly on Macedonian coins beginning in the fifth century. This was in large part because Macedonian kings

traced their lineage back to Heracles (Satyrus, *FGrH* 631 F 1). As one might expect, he was worshipped at Vergina and Pella, where the kings made regular sacrifices to Heracles Patroos as their ancestor. Alexander the Great was especially devoted to Heracles, making sacrifices to him in places ranging from the Danube to the Hydaspes (the river Jhelum in India). Heracles was also worshipped with the epithets Augustus, Cynagidas (Hunter), Phylakos (Guardian), and Propylaios (Guardian of the Gate). The cult of Heracles Cynagidas was particularly important. Hellenistic- and Roman-era dedications to him have been found throughout Macedonia. Young men from elite Macedonian families who were attached to the royal court took Heracles Cynagidas as their tutelary deity from ages 18–20 when they served as *basilikoi kynegoi* (royal hunters). This may explain why Demetrius II took the trouble to intervene on behalf of a priest of Heracles Cynagidas at Beroia after a portion of the cult's revenues had been inappropriately taken over by the city (*SEG* 12.311).⁹

An abundant collection of votive reliefs and dedications attests to the importance of the worship of Artemis. The cult of Artemis had a long history in Macedonia, as is evident from the fact that Philip II issued small coins (intended for local usage) with a head of Artemis and from Herodotus' statement that Paionian women sacrificed to Artemis Basileia (4.33). Alexander took steps to enrich the cult of Artemis at Ephesus during his time in that city (Arr. 1.17.10) and seems to have had it in mind to build a massive temple to Artemis Tauropolos (Worshipped at Tauros or Hunter of Bulls) at Amphipolis (Diod. 18.4.5). Artemis was most frequently depicted as a huntress and, like Heracles Cynagidas, served as a tutelary deity in the coming of age process, though for young girls entering the process rather than young men finishing it. A related practice was the worship of Artemis Eileithyia (the goddess of childbirth) at Dium. There appears to have been a great deal of local variation within Macedonia in regard to the fashion in which Artemis was named, depicted, and worshipped, which suggests that a number of local deities were gradually syncretized with Artemis. This is most apparent in regard to Bendis, the Thracian goddess of the moon and the hunt, whose cult practices significantly influenced the nature of Artemis' worship in areas of Macedonia that bordered on Thrace. Bendis' functions as a chthonic, fertility, and vegetation deity were in some cases transferred to Artemis.¹⁰

2 Death as a Passage into an Afterlife

An expectation of a meaningful existence after death was not part of standard Greek religious practice. At least some Macedonians stood apart from other Greeks in seeing death not as the extinguishing of life but as a passage into an afterlife. This is apparent from the importance and nature of the cult of Dionysus in Macedonia, from the contents and decoration of tombs, and from the inscriptions on and iconography of gravestones.

The cult of Dionysus was extraordinarily popular in Macedonia. Each year the Macedonian king sacrificed to Dionysus on a specific day that was sacred to the god (Arr. 4.8.1). The single most famous piece of ancient Greek literature with a Dionysiac theme, Euripides' *Bacchae*, was written and performed for the first time in Macedonia in the late fifth century. Among the most spectacular objects excavated in Macedonia in the past century is a large, fourth-century gilded-bronze vessel for mixing wine called the Derveni krater, which is covered in embossed panels that depict episodes from Dionysiac myth.¹¹

Macedonian worship of Dionysus seems to have begun at a very early period and continued for centuries. According to the second century AD Macedonian author Polyaeus, Argaeus, the first king of the Macedonians, tricked a numerically superior enemy force by having women pose as men wearing wreaths and carrying *thyrsi*, both of which were closely associated with Dionysus (*Stratagems* 4.1). To celebrate the success of this ruse, Argaeus erected a Temple of Dionysus Pseudanor (False Man). However one assesses the veracity of this story, it shows that Macedonians in Polyaeus' time believed that they had long worshipped Dionysus. A wide range of finds such as votive reliefs show that the worship of Dionysus flourished through the Roman period.

The popularity of Dionysus' cult in part derived from the fact that he served as the tutelary deity for boys beginning their coming-of-age process, probably because his uncertain and shifting sexuality echoed that of young males. Another, more important, reason for the enthusiasm with which the Macedonians worshipped Dionysus was the close link between his cult and belief in an afterlife. Alongside public sacrifices to Dionysus, itinerant devotees of the god conducted private rituals (*teletai*) that introduced participants to secret practices and knowledge and thus initiated them into what modern scholars call the Dionysiac mysteries. The nature of these rites is largely unknown but it is clear that an ecstatic union with the god (*mania*) was an essential component. Initiates gathered together in private associations (*thiasoi*), each of which was an independent, local organization with its own priests and officials. One of the primary functions of *thiasoi* was to ensure proper burials for their members.

The connection between the Dionysiac mysteries and an afterlife is most immediately evident from small, inscribed gold tablets that were deposited in tombs. These have been found primarily in Thessaly/Macedonia, western Crete, and Sicily/southern Italy. The examples from Macedonia mostly date from the fourth to the second centuries. They were intended for the use of initiates into Dionysiac mysteries who expected to be recognized as such on their arrival in the underworld and to meet Persephone, Hades' queen. The texts contain information that would be useful to the initiates in navigating the transition from life to death to afterlife. The precise texts vary quite a bit but there are repeated themes: expectation of a journey to the underworld, an encounter with a gatekeeper, movement through a landscape dominated by trees and water, and formulaic responses for expected questions.

Two tombs from Vergina suggest that, as one might expect, Macedonians had a special reverence for Persephone. The so-called Tomb of Eurydice (built about 350–340) contained a 2-meter high, elaborately decorated marble throne. A painted panel on the throne shows Hades and Persephone standing in a four-horse chariot. A closely related scene was found in the nearby and contemporaneous Tomb of Persephone (Tomb I). The paintings on the interior walls of this tomb show the abduction of Persephone by Hades, which was the myth around which the Eleusinian mysteries were built. Those mysteries, which were celebrated in Athens and which welcomed devotees from all over the Greek world, promised initiates a happy afterlife. It is likely that there was a certain amount of cross-fertilization over the course of time between the Eleusinian and Dionysiac mysteries.


Parts of Dionysiac rituals and beliefs are also likely to have been taken from a body of mystic literature associated with the mythical singer Orpheus, whose grave was ostensibly located in Macedonia (Paus. 9.30.7). That body of literature was built around theogonies (stories about the origins of the gods) according to which Dionysus was the son of Zeus and Persephone and was intended to become ruler of the cosmos. However, malicious intervention by the Titans left that design unfulfilled. Dionysus was killed by the Titans but was reborn because Zeus had saved his heart. The similarities with Dionysiac mysteries are evident, though the precise relationship between Orphism and Dionysiac beliefs remains unclear. The Derveni papyrus, a fourth-century religious and philosophical tract found at Derveni in Macedonia, contains a lengthy commentary on an Orphic theogony.¹²

The texts on some of the aforementioned inscribed gold tablets strongly suggest that Dionysiac initiates expected to attain heroic or divine status after death. By the end of the Hellenistic period this

belief seems to have become widespread in Macedonia even among those who were not obviously initiates of a cult promising an afterlife. This is apparent from inscriptions and reliefs on gravestones. An inscription from northern Macedonia that dates to the first half of the third century AD records a dedication by two women to their daughter/sister Ariste.¹³ Ariste is described as a *sunnaos* (someone sharing the same temple) of Aphrodite, which strongly implies that she had achieved something akin to divine status after her death. A number of Hellenistic- and Roman-era gravestones from Macedonia show deities such as Heracles and Aphrodite either alongside the deceased or alone. The implication is that, as was the case with Ariste, the deceased had in some sense become like the deity in question.¹⁴

The preceding discussion of underworld deities and inscribed tablets found in graves points in the direction of a related but quite distinct dimension of Macedonian religion: magic. Magic is of particular interest in the present context because it has much more to do with popular religion than the practices of Macedonian elites. For a considerable period of time scholars made a strict division between religion, which was seen as based on a belief in the power of divine entities, and magic, which was seen as based on the notional ability of human beings to manipulate natural forces. Due in large part to the fact that extant literary sources have much more to say about religion than magic, scholars tended to dismiss the latter as insignificant and to focus on the former. However, ongoing excavation has produced a large and rapidly growing body of physical evidence, such as inscribed curse tablets, which shows that magic was widely practiced in ancient Greek communities. Moreover, the division between religion and magic is no longer considered to be valid for the study of ancient Greek religion primarily because careful examination of the relevant materials showed that belief in the power of divine entities played an essential role in Greek magic. That said, magic did differ from standard Greek religious practice in that it was conducted largely in secret by people who were in many ways on the margins of society. A further valence of obscurity was provided by the strong association between magic on one hand and the underworld and *daimones* (supernatural beings whose status was somewhere between that of gods and humans) on the other.

Figure 21.1 Drawing of the Lead Curse Tablet from Pella



Greek magic embraced a wide variety of beliefs and practices. Greek magicians claimed to be able to control the actions of other humans and natural elements such as wind and rain, to cure sickness, to offer protection against old age and death, and, at least in some cases, to bring back the dead. They cast spells, spoke incantations, engaged in divination, handled snakes, and created illusions. Spells were normally written on thin sheets of lead that were placed in the sanctuary of a deity or deposited with a recently buried body (so that they would be carried to the underworld along with the corpse). A lead spell tablet that was discovered in Pella in 1986 offers a glimpse into the practice of magic by Macedonians (see [figure 21.1](#) and plate 15), as well as having relevance for a Macedonian language as J. Engels discusses in chapter 5. The tablet was found in a grave alongside a skeleton; it dates to the middle of the fourth century. Here is the text:¹⁵

Of Thetima and Dionysophon the ritual wedding and the marriage I bind by a written spell, as well as (the marriage) of all other women (to him), both widows and maidens, but above all of Thetima; and I entrust this spell to Macron and to the *daimones*. And were I ever to unfold and read these words again after digging (the tablet) up, only then should Dionysophon marry, not before; may he indeed not take another woman than myself, but let me alone grow old by the side of Dionysophon and no one else. I implore you: have pity for [Phila?], dear *daimones*, [for I am bereft] of all my dear ones and abandoned. But please keep this (piece of writing) for my sake so that these events do not happen and wretched Thetima perishes miserably [short section of text lost] but let me become happy and blessed.

Phila, the person casting the spell, seeks to prevent the marriage of Dionysophon (with whom she evidently cohabited as wife or concubine) and Thetima and more broadly to ensure that she will lead a long and happy existence with Dionysophon. Macron seems to be the name of the deceased person to whose corpse the spell tablet was entrusted.

The fact that in Pella in the fourth century one could find kings

making elaborate sacrifices to Heracles Patroos as well as people such as Phila casting magic spells serves as a reminder of the diversity of Macedonian religious practice.¹⁶

3 Openness to Foreign Influences

Macedonians showed themselves to be unusually open to foreign religious influences, particularly in the period beginning with the reign of Alexander the Great. Alexander himself was an omnivore when it came to religion and over the course of his lifetime became increasingly attached to non-Greek deities and practices. He sacrificed to the Egyptian gods while in Egypt, organized the rebuilding of the temple of the god Bel in Babylon, and placed a considerable amount of faith in Egyptian, Persian, and Babylonian priests and diviners. A pivotal moment seems to have been the pilgrimage he undertook in 331 to the oracular site of the Libyan-Egyptian god Amun at the oasis of Siwah in the desert in western Egypt. Greeks became familiar with Amun via the Greek colony of Cyrene, which was located on the coast of North Africa and which was founded in the seventh century. Amun's name was Hellenized to Ammon, and he was syncretized with Zeus. By the middle of the fifth century Zeus Ammon was being worshipped in a number of Greek communities, and Greeks regularly went to Siwah to consult his oracle. Since the Greek city of Aphytis, which was under Macedonian control during Alexander's lifetime, had a prominent shrine of Zeus Ammon, Alexander was almost certainly aware of the existence of Ammon before arriving in Egypt. After capturing Egypt, Alexander undertook a journey to consult Ammon's oracle at Siwah. Exactly what transpired during Alexander's visit remains unclear, but there is little doubt that Alexander afterward began to think of himself as the son of Ammon.¹⁷

Alexander's conquests brought Greek soldiers and settlers into much closer contact than ever before with the cultures of the Near East. One result was the gradual spread of the worship of the Egyptian deities Isis and Sarapis to most Greek communities. Isis was worshipped in Egypt from a very early date but the beliefs and practices associated with her cult evolved markedly during the Hellenistic period. One major change was the development of a set of secret rites that promised some sort of happy afterlife. Isis was initially closely identified with Demeter and Artemis, but over the course of time the powers ascribed to her grew considerably. By the Roman period some of her devotees had abandoned the worship of all other deities. Sarapis was originally an Egyptian god whose name and

cult practices underwent significant alterations under the guidance of the Ptolemies. The Hellenized version of the god achieved considerable popularity as a healing deity, and his worship spread throughout the Aegean during the Hellenistic period. The Sarapis cult was gradually submerged by and into the worship of Isis.

The worship of Isis and Sarapis attained great importance among Macedonians. Isis became the tutelary deity of the city of Philippi, and she was worshipped in Dium under the name Isis Locheia (Protector of Women in Childbirth). Statuettes of Isis assimilated to the personification of Tyche (Fortune) are the single most numerous kind of religious dedication found in excavations in northern Macedonia. One of the most famous sanctuaries of Sarapis (and other Egyptian deities including Isis) in the Greek world flourished in Thessaloniki from the third century BC to the third century AD. The significance of this sanctuary is apparent from the fact that in 187 Philip V sent a letter to officials in Thessaloniki forbidding the use of its revenues for non-cultic purposes and spelling out penalties for any attempt to do so (*IG* 10 2, 1.3). Evidently the cult had become wealthy enough to make it a tempting target.¹⁸ The popularity of Egyptian deities among Macedonians can be attributed to a number of factors, including the fact that Macedonians as a group were much more deeply involved in the Near East than other Greeks, the connection between the Isis cult and the hope of a happy afterlife, and an openness to foreign religious beliefs and practices.

4 Tombs not Temples

A distinctive feature of Macedonian religious practice was a preference for expending resources on tombs rather than temples. In most Greek communities, tombs were relatively modest while the construction of monumental temples was a major focus of civic activity. An important, often central, feature of many Greek cities was an acropolis dominated by one or more impressively large temples. Greek religious sanctuaries are likewise usually focused around one or more major temples. In Macedonia, however, archaeological evidence for monumental temples is sparse, while elaborate tombs built for private individuals and filled with expensive grave goods have been found in considerable numbers.

Both sociopolitical factors and religious convictions were responsible for the impoverishment of Macedonian temples and the opulence of Macedonian tombs. Many Greek *poleis* were small, largely autonomous communities with a strong inward orientation and an

equally strong sense of civic-mindedness among their inhabitants. These *poleis* frequently restricted the size and richness of family tombs by means of sumptuary laws while simultaneously emphasizing communal building projects. Macedonia, on the other hand, was a large kingdom dominated by an aristocracy that had the wealth, desire and freedom to invest in familial rather than civic monuments. In addition, as we have seen, a deep-seated belief in an afterlife set Macedonians apart from other Greeks. That belief clearly served as a powerful incentive for Macedonians to invest their wealth in tombs and grave goods rather than in temples. A connection between Macedonians' special interest in tombs and a belief in the afterlife is evident in the design of tombs, the nature of grave goods and the iconographic content of the decoration of tombs. For obvious reasons the focus of discussion here will be on religious rather than sociopolitical issues.

Monumental religious architecture in the form of grand temples is conspicuously absent in Macedonian cities and religious sanctuaries. The major excavated cities of Macedonia are Vergina and Pella. Vergina was the capital of the Macedonian kingdom from the mid-seventh century until the seat of power was moved to Pella at the start of the fourth century. Both cities have extensive urban remains and prominent acropoleis, which are capped by sprawling royal palace complexes rather than temples. Even the main Macedonian sanctuary at Dium has yet to yield remains of any major temples. The only notable temples excavated so far there are in the sanctuary of Demeter to the south of the city. Here two small megaron-like structures dating to the late sixth century were replaced at the end of the fourth century by two larger, but still modest, temples (7 ´ 11 m) with no exterior colonnades.¹⁹

Simple temples such as these are typical of Macedonian religious architecture. At Pella no temples have come to light on the acropolis, but small sanctuaries to Aphrodite, Demeter, Dionysus, and the Mother of the Gods have been excavated in the lower town. A small Temple of Eucleia and a sanctuary to the Mother of the Gods were found in Vergina.²⁰ Literary references and reused blocks built into later fortification walls testify to the existence of shrines for Asclepius, Athena, Dionysus and Heracles in Beroia (one of the more important cities in the Macedonian heartland).²¹ However, the lack of *in situ* material remains of temples indicates that the structures associated with these cults were not of a monumental nature. Other major Macedonian cities such as Edessa, Pydna, and Thessaloniki have likewise yielded only scattered epigraphic or literary references to various cults.

Given the power and wealth that Macedonians accrued starting in

the fourth century and the abundance of material remains from Macedonia, the lack of monumental temples in Macedonian cities and sanctuaries is striking. Scholars have in the past tended to assume that the limited amount of archaeological work that was done in northern Greece during the twentieth century was to blame for the lack of known, large-scale temples in Macedonia.²² However, the pace of archaeological exploration has increased markedly during the recent past, and as the archaeological record becomes gradually more complete it seems more likely that the underrepresentation of temples in Macedonia is reflective of a real lack of monumental religious architecture of the type common elsewhere in the Greek world.

The relatively minimal amount of resources expended on temple building stands in stark contrast to the enormous investment that Macedonians made in tombs. Excavations at Sindos, a suburb of Thessaloniki, have uncovered a rich archaic and classical cemetery. The tombs there contained large amounts of gold and silver artifacts ranging from gold death masks to weapons and jewelry as well as iron models of everyday objects. Early archaeological remains from non-mortuary contexts in Macedonia are notoriously poor, which makes the amount of wealth invested in the burials at Sindos all the more remarkable.²³ The abundance, expense, and nature of the objects used as grave goods there strongly suggest a desire to prepare the deceased for the afterlife.²⁴

The opulence of the Sindos tombs was eventually superseded by an even richer form of burial that developed in the Hellenistic period. From the fourth through the second centuries Macedonians built elaborate sepulchers, the so-called 'Macedonian tombs'. These tombs consist of a built burial chamber, square or rectangular in shape, with a barrel-vaulted roof. After the tomb was finished and the deceased had been interred the entire structure was covered by an earthen tumulus. The exterior facades of the more impressive examples are made from plaster moulded and painted to mimic temples. It need hardly be said that these tombs were expensive to build and were as a result the preserve of the elite. Macedonian tombs are abundant; over 70 have been excavated to date, and many known tumuli have yet to be explored.²⁵

The appearance of these tombs, the finds they contain, and the iconographic content of their decoration all suggest that the Macedonians' priorities in regard to religious architecture were shaped by their concern with an afterlife. To begin with, the resemblance of Macedonian tomb facades to temple facades is unlikely to be a coincidence. The Dionysiac rites, epitaphs, and sculptured gravestones discussed above, as well as the tendency of Macedonian kings to expect and receive ruler cults (to be discussed below), make it clear

that Macedonians believed that human beings could attain heroic or divine status after death. It is worth recalling the case of the Macedonian woman Ariste who was considered by her family to have become the *sunnaos* of Aphrodite. The Macedonian dead, or at least those fortunate or accomplished enough to warrant elaborate burial, were literally sent to the afterlife already enshrined in a *naos* (temple).

The anticipation of life after death also helps explain the incredible wealth expended on the grave goods placed in Macedonian tombs. While the categories of finds – vessels, weapons, jewelry – are largely the same as those found in the tombs of other Greek communities, the volume and quality are truly of another order. The so-called Tomb of Philip (Tomb II) at Vergina is the most lavishly equipped Macedonian tomb discovered to date. The tomb contained two burials. The remains of both of the dead were cremated and wrapped in purple cloths and then placed in gold chests. The offerings found within the tomb and amongst the remains of the funeral pyre that was burnt at the time of burial were rich and abundant, including a gold wreath of oak leaves and acorns; four swords; a dagger; several spears; three cuirasses; an iron helmet; three pectorals; two golden diadems; four pairs of greaves; silver, bronze and terracotta vessels of various shapes and sizes; a silver spoon; a silver ladle; one bronze tripod; one iron tripod; a bronze lantern; a basin with a sponge; the glass, gilded silver, and ivory remains of a massive chryselephantine shield; a bronze cover for the shield; a bow with a case and 74 arrowheads; silver rings and rosettes; and a gold *gorgoneia* (a mask carved in imitation of a Gorgon's head).²⁶ The abundance of precious objects mixed together with the sorts of things needed for everyday life suggests that the contents of the tomb were intended for the enjoyment of the deceased in the afterlife.

The decoration of some Macedonian tombs lends further support to the idea that Macedonians invested substantial resources in the construction of tombs because of a belief in life after death. The most salient example is the Great Tomb (or Tomb of the Judgement), which was built at Lefkadia in the late fourth century (see plate 16, discussed also by C.I. Hardiman in chapter 24). The facade features a frieze showing a battle between Macedonians and Persians, 11 painted metopes decorated with scenes from the legendary battle between Centaurs and Lapiths, and 4 painted panels.²⁷ The panels show the descent of the occupant of the tomb (in the leftmost panel) to the underworld, guided by Hermes in his guise of escort to the dead. The figures to the right of the doorway show two famous judges from myth, Rhadamanthys and Aiacos (the figures are labeled). According to Greek myth, most clearly recounted in Plato's *Gorgias* (523e–524e), Rhadamanthys and Aiacos decided the fate of the dead, whether they

were sent to the Isles of the Blessed or punished in perpetuity in Tartaros. The Tomb of Persephone (Tomb I) from Vergina is decorated with a painting of the abduction of Persephone by Hades, another mythological theme closely tied to death and afterlife (see above).²⁸

The idea that belief in life after death and preparation for the afterlife were at the very heart of Macedonian religious practice is therefore strongly supported by the characteristics of Macedonian tombs.

5 Role of the King

The sociopolitical structure of the Macedonian kingdom was quite different from the *polis* model common in much of the Greek world. While the religious personnel of *poleis* were usually selected from the populace and did not typically play a major role in the governance of the community, in Macedonia the king was not only the head of the army and of the state, but also the chief priest of the kingdom.²⁹ Likewise, there is evidence that in individual Macedonian cities such as Amphipolis and Cassandreia the chief priest of the tutelary deity was simultaneously the nominal head of state (*IG* 10 2, 1028, *Syll*³ 332, 380). A distinctive trait of Macedonian religion is, therefore, the investment of religious power in political authorities, especially the king. Macedonian kings served as the chief intermediaries between the Macedonian people and the gods and between the Macedonian people and religious centers in the Greek homeland.

The ritual duties of the king both within and outside of Macedonia were varied. At home, it was the king's responsibility to sacrifice on a daily basis in order to ensure the favor of the gods in activities as diverse as agriculture and warfare (*Arr.* 7.25.2, *Curt.* 4.6.10). It may have been customary in at least some Macedonian cities for the king to pour a libation from a special type of goblet (a *guala*) upon entering (*Marysas*, *FGrH* 135–136 F 21). When a new city was founded, the king marked the limits of its territory with a sprinkling of barley meal (*Curt.* 4.8.6). Furthermore, it was incumbent upon the king to be present at both local and national festivals in order to sacrifice to the relevant gods (*Diod.* 17.16.3–4, *Arr.* 1.11.1).

As commander of the army, the king was often away on military campaigns, and here too he had religious duties to perform. If the army was in need of purification (as happened after the death of Alexander in 323 for instance) the monarch presided over a ritual involving the sacrifice of a dog (*Curt.* 10.9.11–12). The dog sacrifice in these purificatory instances was probably related to the Xandika, a

festival held in the spring at which the king mustered the army, purified it by having it march between two halves of a sacrificed dog, and mobilized it for the upcoming campaign (Livy 40.6.1–7.9). The army kept multiple seers on hand, and another religious role of the king was to consult them in the interpretation of dreams and omens (Arr. 7.26.2).

Macedonian rulers also served as the kingdom's chief representative in dealings with important sanctuaries outside of Macedonia and in that role carried out sacrifices and made dedications. Though the Macedonian kings did not build large temples in the Macedonian homeland, they were often involved in the sponsorship of elaborate religious dedications at various locations and to a varied array of gods throughout the Greek world. Philip II sacrificed at Delphi, constructed a temple-like building for the display of statues of himself and other members of the royal family at Olympia, and spearheaded a surge of building at the sanctuary of the Great Gods on Samothrace (where the Cabiri, an enigmatic group of deities that enjoyed some popularity in Macedonia, may also have been worshipped). Alexander the Great offered sacrifices at many important religious sites in the Near East and had a hand in a number of farflung temple projects (Artemis at Ephesus, Athena Polias at Priene, Bel at Babylon).³⁰ Philip V made an offering of a statue at Olympia (Paus. 6.16.3) and a stoa at Delos (*IG* 11 4, 1099). Antigonos Gonatas likewise built a stoa dedicated to Apollo at Delos (*IG* 11 4, 1095). Interestingly, none of the dedications made by the kings was credited to the Macedonian people but to the individual benefactor king himself. This is a major point of divergence from the dedications made by *poleis*, which were usually credited to the community as a whole, and recalls the interest in familial rather than civic monuments observable in regard to expenditures on temples and tombs by Macedonians.

6 Divine Rulers

One of the major innovations in Greek religion during the Hellenistic period was the widespread granting of divine honors to monarchs and members of their families, which was the direct result of the actions and initiatives of Macedonian kings. Greek religion generally might be characterized as the way in which the ancient Greeks recognized the power of the gods over various aspects of their lives that they saw as being beyond their control. Macedonian monarchs exercised great political, military, and religious power, both within Macedonia and in

the Greek world as a whole. More particularly, the improbable feats accomplished by Philip II (leading a small, marginal kingdom to hegemony over all of Greece in 25 years) and especially by Alexander III (defeating the Persian king and conquering most of the known world) made these men seem to possess the sort of power over human life that made the gods worthy of worship. In addition, Philip and Alexander appear to have encouraged others to assign them godlike status. This combination of factors induced many Greek communities to create cults in which the kings of Macedonia were worshipped as gods.

This is not to say that the Macedonians were the first among the Greeks to heroize or divinize outstanding men. From an early period great athletes and founders of colonies were often posthumously worshipped as heroes or gods. The first clearly attested instance of the deification of a living individual dates to the end of the Peloponnesian War when Samos renamed its annual festival after the Spartan general Lysander and feted him with rites, games, and songs formerly dedicated to the goddess Hera. When the Syracusan general Dion freed the people of Syracuse from 50 years of tyranny in 357, he too was honored as though he were a god.³¹

The examples of Lysander and Dion show that there was precedent in Greek culture for the elevation of particularly prominent humans to heroic or divine status when the Macedonian kings began to experiment with self-divination in the later fourth century. The worship of Macedonian kings was not, therefore, a total break with traditional Greek religious beliefs. However, there is no doubt that with the Macedonian kings of the fourth century, and Alexander the Great in particular, there was a turning point in the history of Greek religion. The worship of living rulers as gods became an ordinary feature of the post-Alexandrian world.

Though Alexander is generally considered to be the prime mover behind the trend toward royal deification, some of the credit for divine aspiration may perhaps go to Philip II. Amyntas III, Philip's father, was said to have had a shrine (the Amynteion) dedicated to him at Pydna (Aelius Aristides 38.480), but the first reliable testimony for a king having a dedicated cult during his lifetime comes from Philippi (*SEG* 38.658). Since Philip was also the founder of Philippi, it is perhaps not entirely surprising to find that he was worshipped as a god there (though in southern Greece the worship of the founder of a city was never instituted prior to his death). However, there is evidence that Philip's cult was not limited to Philippi. Literary sources point to Philip cults at Amphipolis, Ephesus, and Eresus. Furthermore, the Philippeion, a building at Olympia in which stood statues of Philip and his family, may be evidence of Philip's desire for deification, as is

the fact that on the day of his assassination he had a statue of himself paraded alongside statues of the 12 Olympian deities. The path may have been paved for the development of a cult of Alexander in the years after Philip's death.³²

Alexander played a major role in the institution and growth of his own cult. His visit to the oracle of Amun at Siwah had a great effect on his actions throughout the rest of his life. In the years after visiting the oracle, Alexander considered himself worthy of being worshipped as a god (Arr. 7.20.1), tried to require *proskynesis* (a gesture of reverence usually reserved by Greeks for the gods but granted by Persians to their king) from Greeks (Arr. 4.10.5), and there is a belief that he solicited divine honors from Greek communities on at least one occasion (Din. 1.94, Hyp. 5 *Demosthenes* 31).³³

While the worship of Macedonian kings preceding Alexander had been relatively contained both geographically and chronologically, Alexander cults spread rapidly and took a more lasting hold on their adherents. Cults to Alexander were established in many cities in Asia Minor during his lifetime and the worship of Alexander persisted: new games and buildings were being dedicated to him as late as the second half of the second century (at Priene).³⁴ The enduring nature of the worship of Alexander and the profusion of ruler cults that grew up in the wake of his rule can be attributed in part to his charisma, his untimely death and his incredible achievements. The political chaos that followed his reign was also a contributing factor. The successors to Alexander quarreled over access to his corpse and their relative legitimacies as heirs to his kingdom. They had much to gain by worshipping their former leader, as well as by establishing their own cults (or encouraging cities who wished to gain their favor to do so) in order to emphasize their similarity to and relationship with the divine Alexander. Thus it is no surprise that one of the distinctive features of the Hellenistic period was the increasing worship of living rulers alongside the traditional Olympian gods. After Alexander, Macedonian kings such as Demetrius Poliorcetes and Antigonus Gonatas were the subject of cult worship as a matter of course.

7 Conclusion

This chapter has focused on a number of ways in which the religious beliefs and practices of Macedonians differed from those found in other Greek communities. By necessity, the relevant material has been treated in a selective fashion, and the views offered here represent only one of many possible interpretations of the extant evidence for

Macedonian religion. Though the study of and excavations in Macedonia have become increasingly common during the last several decades, Macedonian religion has never been the subject of a comprehensive work, and so there remain major gaps in the collective knowledge of this subject. For instance, it is possible that Macedonian religion was heavily influenced by Near Eastern cult practices at a relatively early date. Macedonia became a vassal kingdom of Persia in the last quarter of the sixth century BC and Macedonia's sociopolitical structure resembled a Persian monarchy more closely than a Greek polity. The potential was therefore certainly present for Macedonians to absorb Persian ideas and customs. It may not be coincidental that Macedonian architectural remains, which skew toward palaces and tombs rather than temples, have more in common with Persian sites than Greek ones. However, at the moment there is not enough evidence to draw a causal connection.

Even the points about Macedonian religion that emerge readily from existing evidence should be treated with caution. Interpreting a set of data that is at least partially fragmentary and that relates to the religious beliefs of a group of people is always a complex matter. Moreover, it is always possible that further excavations may uncover major evidence about Macedonian religion that could dramatically change the state of knowledge on this topic. The clearest conclusion that can be drawn at this juncture is that religion is an aspect of Macedonian studies that will benefit greatly from further study and, especially, from further archaeological work.

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⁵ See further, E.N. Borza, 'The Philhellenism of Archelaus', *Ancient Macedonia* 5 (Thessaloniki 1993), pp. 237–44.

⁶ Rhodes and Osborne, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, no. 50 line 9,

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The Macedonian Army

Nicholas Victor Sekunda

This chapter is divided into two parts: in the first (I), the organization of Macedonian military forces is given in chronological order; in the second (II), some idea is given of the social conditions of the soldier.

As far as the army before Philip II is concerned, we have a few pieces of literary evidence that are frequently difficult to interpret and to place chronologically. None of these go back into the Archaic period, which remains *terra incognita*. The age of Philip II, as in so many areas of Macedonian history, is crucial. Although Philip's reforms are reasonably well documented, afterwards we hear little of the army itself. It seems reasonable to presume that many institutions we find later on in the army under Alexander and later rulers emerged in the reign of Philip, but we can rarely prove these suspicions.

The campaigns of Alexander are perhaps the best documented military actions in the whole of ancient history, and are described in no fewer than four major sources: Arrian, Curtius, Diodorus and Plutarch's *Life of Alexander*, with further details added by Justin.¹ To this we can add the evidence provided by two magnificent archaeological monuments, the 'Alexander Sarcophagus' in particular and the 'Alexander Mosaic'.² Consequently, we have a practically complete picture of how the army functioned – not only of the units that constituted it but also of the command elements. The situation after the death of Alexander in 323 becomes confused. It is frequently difficult to be certain which forces mentioned as fighting in the armies of the various kings of the 'Age of the Successors' are Macedonian and which are not. The picture only starts to become clearer when the successors of Antigonos Monophthalmus seize power in Macedonia (his son Demetrius Poliorcetes in 294 and then, more permanently, his grandson Antigonos Gonatas in 277/6).

In the case of the Antigonid army, we have good sources for the 223 campaign against Cleomenes III of Sparta until its final defeat at

Pydna in 168. The main sources are the historical narratives of Polybius and Livy (fragmentary in the first case, and with an annoying lacuna of two manuscript folios in the description of the Battle of Pydna in the second case). Valuable additional details are occasionally supplied by Diodorus and Plutarch, and by a series of inscriptions preserving sections of two sets of army regulations issued by Philip V. Once again, then, we have a relatively complete picture of the Antigonid army from the last quarter of the third century onwards, notwithstanding a few gaps in our knowledge, which we can project earlier into the third century.

The Macedonian rulers of both the Argead and Antigonid dynasties made use of large numbers of non-Macedonian troops, allies, mercenaries and subject peoples, to supplement the Macedonian ‘national’ army. The emphasis in this chapter is the Macedonian national forces only, given this is a companion to ancient Macedonia.

On the historical background to all of the following discussion see part IV, ‘History’.

I MACEDONIAN MILITARY ORGANIZATION

1 *Hetairoi* and *Pezhetairoi*

The two fundamental structures of the Argead army were the *hetairoi* or ‘Companions’ and *pezhetairoi* or ‘Foot Companions’. The entry for *pezhetairoi* in the *Lexicon* of Harpocration tells us that Anaximenes (FGrH 72 F 4) in his first book of *Philippica*

when talking of Alexander states: ‘Then, after making the most renowned men accustomed to serving as cavalry, he gave them the name of *hetairoi*; but the majority, that is the foot, he divided into *lochoi* and *dekades* and other commands, and designated them *pezhetairoi*. He did this in order that each of the two groups, by sharing in the royal Companionship, should be always exceedingly loyal to him’.³

The evidence given by Anaximenes should logically refer to the same Macedonian king called Alexander. As Demosthenes first mentions the *pezhetairoi* in about 350 (16.3, 13), Alexander III can be ruled out as their creator. There remain Alexander I ‘the Philhellene’ (495–450) and Alexander II (369–368). It is hard to credit Alexander II with such a far-reaching reform during his short reign, which leaves

Alexander I as the most probable candidate.

At the turn of the sixth century Macedonia was a province of the Persian Empire. The first we hear of Macedonian troops is of them fighting on the Persian side at the Battle of Plataea in 479 BC (Hdt. 9.31.5). The Macedonian institution of the *hetairoi* has many features in common with the Achaemenid royal institution of the 'Friends', so it would be plausible to think of them being formed then. Perhaps the title for this Achaemenid-inspired institution may have been borrowed from the contemporary Sicilian tyrant Gelon, who attracted distinguished Arcadians into his service as his *hetairoi*.⁴

The *pezhetairoi* may have first been raised as a satrapal contingent of infantry demanded by the Persian king. Theopompos (*FGrH* 115 F 348) says that they were the tallest and strongest chosen from all the Macedonians who were 'spearbearers' (*doryphoroi*) of the king. This term is frequently given to the guard of a thousand 'spearbearers' that only those favoured by the Persian king could maintain for their personal defence (for example, Hdt. 3.128). Anaximenes mentions the *pezhetairoi* organized into *lochoi* and *dekades*: *dekas* being a term for a file of ten men, which is never attested for any Greek army and is completely Achaemenid. We do not know whether the Macedonian infantry were equipped as hoplites or not in this early stage. The term *dekas* remained in use down to the reign of Alexander III even though the file was increased to 16 men along with normal Greek practice. The original strength of the *lochos* was perhaps 100 men.

2 Macedonian Forces between Alexander I and Philip II

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian War in 431, 600 Macedonian cavalry are mentioned fighting on the Athenian side for the pretenders to the throne Philip and Pausanias, while 200 remained with Perdiccas II (Thuc. 1.61.4, 62.3). Perdiccas later sent 1,000 Macedonians, presumably hoplites, to help the Spartans in Acarnania, but they arrived too late (Thuc. 2.80.7), and soon after Macedonian cavalry only are mentioned resisting a Thracian invasion by Seuthes. Thucydides 2.100.5-6 tells us that the Macedonians were good horsemen protected by cuirasses and that they did not even think of defending themselves with infantry against the invaders. The infantry mentioned by Thucydides were presumably supplied by the Greek cities in the kingdom. In 423, Brasidas campaigned with Perdiccas in Lyncestis against Arrhabaeus. The allied side had a little under 1,000 Macedonian and Chalcidian cavalry. Arrhabaeus commanded a force of Macedonians and of Greek hoplites raised from the Greek cities

within the Macedonian kingdom (Thuc. 4.124.1).⁵

Following the death of Perdiccas II, his son Archelaus came to the throne (r. 413–399). According to Thucydides 2.100.2, he built a new system of fortifications, cut straight roads, and organized the country for war by providing cavalry, arms and other equipment ‘beyond anything achieved by all the eight kings before him’. Archaeological work has so far cast no light on the achievements of Archelaus as far as fortification and road building are concerned.⁶

It seems there had been a decline in the systems in place for fielding infantry. Macedonian cavalry is mentioned in 394 as being sent to oppose the passage of the Spartan king Agesilaus through the country (Polyaenus 2.1.17), but the infantry are not mentioned. In 382 the Spartans urged their ally the Macedonian king Amyntas to hire mercenaries to fight the Olynthians (Xen., *Hellenica* 5.2.38) and it may be that the Macedonians relied principally on mercenaries for their infantry. Amyntas sent cavalry to fight with the Spartans, as did Derdas of Elimia, sending 400 who were especially honoured by the Spartans and performed well (Xen., *Hellenica* 5.2.40, 3.2).

The organization of the infantry may have improved. A relief from Pella shows an infantryman wearing a *pilos* helmet and short sword which would be typical for the acme of Spartan influence between 394 and 371, and a tomb from Katerini, possibly dating to the reign of Amyntas III (381–369) is decorated with a sculpture of a hoplite shield with the shield-device of a dog.⁷

3 The Army under Philip II

After succeeding to the throne in 359, Philip II managed to assemble a force of 10,000 infantry and 600 cavalry (Diod. 16.4.3). Earlier that year more than 4,000 men had been lost in a disastrous battle against the Illyrians (Diod. 16.2.5) and so modern historians have suggested that many of these troops must have been mercenaries. As the Macedonian kingdom did not yet enjoy the revenues of the mines at Crenides, it is difficult to see from where the money would have come to employ them. Rather the majority would have been Macedonians. The strength of the cavalry concurs with earlier numbers given for Macedonian cavalry strengths.

The infantry were probably raised by general mobilization of the Macedonians. A passage from Polyaenus (4.2.10) probably refers to their original equipping and training over the winter of 359 / 8. Philip took them on forced marches of 300 stades carrying their helmets, *peltai* (shields lacking the distinct offset rim of the hoplite shield), greaves, *sarissai* (pikes) and, in addition to their arms, rations and

equipment for their daily lives. They do not carry the standard weapons of the hoplite: no cuirasses, lighter *peltai* instead of the normal hoplite shields, and no greaves, hence a cheaper range of weapons improvised during a crisis. Philip equipped his infantry as ‘peltasts’ of the ‘Iphicratean’ type.⁸ Their equipment may have improved after the crisis when more money was available, for in the third *Philippic* of 341 Demosthenes specifically calls them ‘hoplites’ rather than ‘peltasts’ (9.49). The ‘Alexander Sarcophagus’ shows Alexander’s phalangites equipped as hoplites. We have no representations of infantrymen preserved from the reign of Philip either equipped as peltasts or hoplites. The word *sarissa* was a dialect word in Macedonian, having a general meaning of ‘hafted weapon’,⁹ which passed into general Greek usage to mean the long pike typically used by the Macedonian phalanx. The *sarissa* was an infantry weapon, its haft made of ash, with a small iron head, and its length varied over time.¹⁰

In his first battle against the Illyrians in 358 Philip fights on the right flank with ‘the best’ of the infantry (Diod. 16.4.6, Frontinus 2.3.2). This elite group has been interpreted in various ways: can we see in them the origins of the *hypaspistai* or ‘shield-bearers’ or is this a reference to *pezhetairoi* with the *hypaspistai* only appearing as an elite force later in Philip’s reign? The *hypaspistai* must have been formed before the end of his reign, for they are present in the campaigns at the very beginning of that of Alexander.¹¹ According to Athenaeus 11.506e–f, before ascending to the throne Philip had been permitted to keep a force in the territory portioned off to him by Perdiccas upon the advice of Euphraneus of Oreus, and these troops may have been the genesis of the *hypaspistai*, chosen from among the *pezhetairoi* to constitute the royal guard. At this stage they may have been the only troops permanently maintained.¹² Perhaps the *doryphoroi* mentioned as having been dismissed by Philip immediately before his assassination (Diod. 16.93.1) were *hypaspistai*.¹³

The main body of the infantry continued to be called *pezhetairoi*. In his second *Olynthiac* of 349 Demosthenes first mentions the *pezhetairoi* (and mercenaries of Philip) in a firm historical context (2.17). They ‘have the reputation of being remarkably well trained in military matters’. In a Scholion to this passage, a fragment of Theopompus informs us that those chosen from all the Macedonians, the tallest and strongest, served as *doryphoroi* of the king, and were called *pezhetairoi* (FGrH 115 F 348) Theopompus, therefore, describes the *pezhetairoi* as an elite, selected unit, and this presumably dates to before the creation of the *hypaspistai*. Demosthenes also stresses that Philip’s army was able to take the field both in summer and in winter (9.50). The Macedonian army gradually became a professional army, under

arms virtually all the time (Dem. 8.11).¹⁴ The key factor was that, starting from the acquisition of the mines at Crenides, Philip had the financial resources to keep his forces permanently under arms (Dem. 18.235). Another extremely important element of the Macedonian army's success was the discipline he is credited with instilling in it (Frontinus 4.2.4) and punishment included being forced to stay on guard in full armour, flogging, and even execution (Ael., *Varra Hitoriae* 14.48).¹⁵

Philip's reign was not one of unbroken military success. During the unsuccessful Scythian campaign of 339 Philip feared that his troops would not withstand the Scythians, and he stationed his elite cavalry in the rear ordering them to kill anyone leaving the battle (Frontinus 2.8.14). It was probably after these experiences that he borrowed the wedge (*embolon*) formation from the Scythians (Arr., *Tactica* 16.6). Earlier Macedonian cavalry was probably drawn up in linear formations typical for the time. The new formation allowed cavalry to change its direction rapidly and so to exploit any gap that might appear in the enemy line. Cavalry only then became the decisive arm in Greek warfare for the first time, and infantry came to fear the cavalry charge delivered against them.

The finances generated by Philip's cycle of imperial expansion allowed him to develop other branches: light infantry, archers, and mercenaries (Dem. 9.49). Archers were of enormous benefit to any army, not only in battle but also in siege warfare. They needed to be regularly trained, however, in order to maintain their archery skills. Cretans were renowned as archers, and Philip probably employed some as mercenaries (Athen. 10.421c). It may have been Philip who decided to train a unit of Macedonians to fight as archers (see section 7 below), bearing in mind the scarcity of troops of this type. He invested heavily in the potential new technology offered to increase the efficiency of siege techniques, and shortly before 350 he started to attract a group of engineers to his court, who were responsible for the development of new siege engines.¹⁶ These engineers first developed the 'scorpion', and bolt heads inscribed with Philip's name testify to the first usage during the siege of Olynthus in 348. By late spring of 341, Philip's new siege techniques had made such an impression that Demosthenes remarks on them (9.50). Philip's chief engineer was Polyeidus the Thessalian, who may only have joined him for the siege of Byzantium in 340. His successor was Diades, responsible for constructing the machines that Alexander used to take Halicarnassus, Tyre and Gaza. The enemy could no longer retire safely behind his city walls and the improved siege techniques meant a complete change in strategy. The increased funds available to Philip also enabled him to build the first Macedonian fleet, and Demosthenes

remarks on Philip's activity in 342 in building triremes and ship sheds, shortly after Philip had seized Halonessus from pirates (8.16).

Moreover, Philip improved the command staff of the army. Staff-officers known as 'bodyguards' or *sōmatophylakes* are first mentioned by Diodorus during his account of Philip's death (16.93.3). Finally, Philip also founded the institution of the Royal Pages or *basilikoi paides* (Arr. 4.13.1).¹⁷

4 Cavalry under Alexander the Great

During the reign of Alexander III ('the Great') we only have undisputable evidence for the existence of one Macedonian cavalry regiment: the Companion Cavalry. The 'Royal Squadron' was probably selected from all the Companions,¹⁸ while the other seven squadrons were organized on a territorial basis. It took its place in the vanguard if the regiment was marching in column or on the right if the squadrons were formed in line of battle. The other seven squadrons would take up their position in the line according to the order of precedence of the day (Arr. 1.14.6). We hear of the squadrons of Bottiaea, Amphipolis, Apollonia, Anthemus and the 'Leugaeon' squadron (Arr. 1.2.5, 1.12.7, 2.9.3), but the territorial organization of the Companion Cavalry and the appointment of local officers to command the squadrons ceased at Sittacene in 331. Henceforward Alexander appointed officers of his own choice (Curt. 5.2.6; cf. Diod. 17.65.3).

The squadron or *ilē*, commanded by an *ilarchēs* (Arr. 1.12.7), numbered 200 Companions (Arr. 1.18.1; cf. 4.17.3, 22.1).¹⁹ When the army crossed into Asia the Macedonian cavalry numbered 1,800 (Diod. 17.17.4), and there were eight *ilai*, so we must presume that the 'Royal Squadron' (*basilike ilē*) was double-strength – for which we might compare the Thessalian cavalry. The Pharsalian squadron is described as the 'finest and most numerous' (Arr. 3.11.8). By the time Alexander entered India in 327 the Royal Squadron is also termed the 'vanguard' or *agēma* (Arr. 4.24.1). When Alexander sailed down the Hydaspes the strength of the Companions is given as 1,700 (Arr. 6.14.4), so it seems that the strength of the *agēma* may have fallen to 300, perhaps necessitated by detachments from the squadron to postings in the provinces of the newly conquered empire. At the Battle of Paraetacene in 316 the armies of Antigonos (Diod. 19.29.5) and Eumenes (Diod. 19.28.3) both possessed *agēmata* of 300 men,²⁰ which could reflect the strength of the *agēma* of Alexander's army in the latter part of his reign.

The principal cavalry formation continued to be the wedge, but

one of 200 horsemen would be extremely unwieldy and would negate its advantage as a tactical formation, so the *ilē* would have been divided into a number of sub-units drawn up as wedges. Arrian 3.18.5 mentions a *tetrarchia* of cavalry, likely to be a troop of cavalry, four in a standard squadron of 200 men. The *tetrarchia* might have numbered 49, drawn up as a wedge with a base line of 13 'by rank and by file', that is with the horsemen of each line being drawn up directly behind those of the previous line rather than the lines being staggered (this suggested reconstruction is admittedly speculative).²¹ Campaigning in Central Asia, Alexander was surrounded by Sacae horsemen wheeling around the Macedonian army in a circle. Arrian 4.4.7 mentions that he led a cavalry charge against the circle 'with his *ilai* in straight lines', and we are left to suppose that this formation was exceptionally adopted reacting to the specific tactical situation.

In the 331 Sittacene reforms the *ilē* was divided into two *lochoi*, each commanded by a *lochagos* (Arr. 3.16.11). Later we hear of the cavalry 'hundred' (*hekatostuas*) when supplies are distributed by *ilē* and by *hekatostuas* (Arr. 6.27.6, 7.24.4), and the name has presumably been changed to avoid confusion with the infantry *lochos*. The fact that the later *ilē* is divided into two *hekatostuai* confirms that the original strength of the *ilē* must have been 200, remaining unchanged throughout the Asian Campaign.

Throughout the army the *ilai* of cavalry were organized into *hipparchiai* or 'brigades' of cavalry. A *hipparchia* of Companion Cavalry is first mentioned accompanying Parmenion to Sardis from Halicarnassus (Arr. 1.24.3). The number of *ilai* in a *hipparchia* could be flexible, but in the case of the Companions it seems that the eight *ilai* were 'brigaded' into four *hipparchiai* of two *ilai* each (Arr. 4.24.1). From the assumption of the rule of Asia onwards, Alexander granted the status of Companion to an increasing number of Iranian noblemen, and these would have fought in the *agēma*. Before Susa in spring 324 Alexander had created a fifth *hipparchia* of Companions composed entirely of Iranians (Arr. 7.6.3–4). This confirms that down to the last years of his reign the number of Companion *hipparchiai* had remained at four and the number of squadrons at eight, despite the huge volume of academic work seeking to prove that there were fundamental organizational changes during this period. It is true that more than four *hipparchoi* are mentioned in the later stages of Alexander's campaigns, but not all of these would have been commanders of formations of Companion Cavalry.²² At first overall command of the Companions was given to Philotas but it was later split between Cleitus and Hephaestion.

Just before his death in 324 Hephaestion is mentioned as commanding 'the most distinguished *hipparchia*' (Diod. 18.3.4). Arrian

7.14.10 tells us that after Hephaestion's death Alexander never appointed anyone in his place as *chiliarchos* over the Companion Cavalry and that his *chiliarchia* continued to be called Hephaestion's. But *chiliarchos* is a court title derived from Achaemenid usage,²³ which has been misunderstood by Arrian or his source, and this evidence does not imply the existence of a late reorganization of the cavalry into *chiliarchai*.

No other cavalry accompanying Alexander is known to have been Macedonian. Diodorus 17.17 mentions that when he crossed to Asia he had 1,800 Macedonian cavalry, 1,800 Thessalian cavalry, 600 other Greek allied cavalry and 900 Thracian *prodromoi* and Paeonians. The language used suggests the *prodromoi* were Thracian cavalry.²⁴ We also hear of the cavalry of Upper Macedonia early in the reign of Alexander (Arr. 1.2.5), but it is uncertain from the context whether they are a squadron of the Companion Cavalry, like the Bottiaean and Amphipolitan under Heracleides and Sopolis who are mentioned immediately afterwards, or a different entity. They are not mentioned during the course of the Asian campaign and may have been left behind in Europe.

A total of 1,500 cavalry were left behind in Europe with Antipater (Diod. 17.17.5). Their nationality is unknown but there is no compelling reason to consider them Macedonian.²⁵ In 323 on the outbreak of the Lamian War Antipater was only able to raise 600 Macedonian cavalry, and it is clear that they were a hasty levy.²⁶ In 317 we have mention of cavalry 'both those who were called *asthippoi* and "the men from the up-country settlers", being together 800 strong' (Diod. 19.29.2). It is possible that Antipater transferred either or both of these groups of cavalry from Macedonia to the army in Asia. The name *asthippoi* could either be derived from *astea-hippoi* 'city cavalry' or *asista-hippoi* 'closest cavalry' and they may have been recruited from Upper Macedonia.²⁷

5 The *Hypaspistai*

The name of the regiment is once given as 'The Hypaspists of the Companions' (Arr. 1.14.2) so it may have originated in the personal 'shield-bearers' of the Companions. This role continued in a literal sense, for the leading *hypaspistai* carried the king's personal weapons, including the sacred Shield of Troy, before him in battle. Being an elite infantry regiment the *hypaspistai* would not have been recruited on a territorial basis but from the army as a whole.²⁸

The term 'royal *hypaspistai*' was an official title for the regiment as a whole and the *agēma* was an elite subunit within the regiment. At

the Hydaspes Arrian 5.13.4 seems to mention the ‘royal *hypaspistai*’ and then the ‘royal *agēma*’ together with ‘the other *hypaspistai*’ as if separate, but this is probably due to a false duplication in the transmission of our sources.²⁹ The other *hypaspistai* are to take their place according to the precedence of the commanders for that day, which is an arrangement one would also expect of the *pezhetairoi* battalions.

The strength of the *hypaspistai* is given as three *chiliarchiai* at Arrian 5.23.7. It is probable that Curtius 5.2.3 is referring to the *hypaspistai* when, in his account of the military reforms carried out at Sittacene in 331, he states that *chiliarchoi* were appointed for the first time, and that previously they had been divided into *lochoi* of 500. Thus the six *lochoi* of *hypaspistai* would correspond to the six *taxeis* of *pezhetairoi*. Prior to this reform, then, the *agēma* seems to have been an elite *lochos* of 500 men, and there is no reason to think that its strength was expanded to 1,000 later in Alexander’s reign. This is presumably the *cohors* on guard at the king’s tent (Curt. 3.12.3). The *chiliarchoi* were appointed on account of their bravery according to a vote of the soldiery, and the winning three were Atarrhias, Antigenes and Philotas of Augaea (Curt. 5.2.5). Following Sittacene Arrian mentions both *chiliarchiai* of *hypaspistai* (3.29.7) and units of 500 (4.21.9) though 700 bodyguards and *hypaspistai* are mentioned at 4.30.3. The number of *chiliarchiai* remained at three. Antiochus is mentioned as a *chiliarchos* of *hypaspistai*, who is given his own *chiliarchia* and two others as well (Arr. 4.30.5–6). The ‘third of the *hypaspistai*’ allotted to Ptolemy is presumably a *chiliarchia* (Arr. 4.24.10).

In Arrian 1.27.8 there are references to the lighter or heavier armed units of the hoplites or infantry, and at 2.4.3 the ‘heavier armed’ *taxeis* of infantry are contrasted to the *hypaspistai*. Thus it seems that the *hypaspistai* were more lightly armed than the *pezhetairoi*. The figure on the ‘Alexander Sarcophagus’ with hoplite shield and helmet, but with a tunic and no cuirass, may be a *hypaspistēs*.³⁰ He wears boots to allow him to ride with comfort on the cruppers of cavalry horses.

The term *argyraspides* (‘silver shields’) first appears as an alternative title for the *hypaspistai* at the Battle of Gaugamela (331) in Diodorus 17.57.2 and Curtius 4.13.27. Justin 12.7.5 (cf. Curt. 8.5.4) tells us that before the Indian campaign Alexander had the men’s arms overlaid with silver and he called the army the *argyraspides* after their silver shields, so the change in regimental title came, in fact, later. At Opis in 324 we first of all have mention of *hypaspistai* (Arr. 7.8.3); then Alexander is mentioned as having created a *taxis* of Persian *argyraspides* (Arr. 7.11.3). These same Persians, 1,000 in number, are

called *hypaspistai* by Diodorus (17.110.1). At this stage, then, it seems that the two terms were still used interchangeably for the same regiment.³¹

After the death of Alexander the *argyraspides*, commanded by Antigenes and Teutamus (Plut., *Eumenes* 13.2) are given the strength of 3,000 (Diod. 18.58.1, 59.3). Antigenes is first mentioned as a commander of the *hypaspistai* after the promotions of Sittacene in 331. It is mentioned that at the battle fought in Gabiene in 317 most of the *argyraspides* were aged 70 (Diod. 19.41.2, Plut., *Eumenes* 16.4), which would make them born about 387, and so aged 43 when the army crossed over to Asia in 334.³² This confirms that we are dealing with the same unit that changed its regimental title.

In the battle in Paraetacenae which took place in 317 / 6 between Eumenes and Antigonus, Eumenes stationed the Macedonian *argyraspides*, more than 3,000 in number, next to 'the men from the *hypaspistai*', more than 3,000, the whole force being commanded by Antigenes and Teutamus (Diod. 19.28.1, 40.3). It is evident from this passage that a new and numerically equivalent force of *hypaspistai* has been set up, which was quite separate from the *argyraspides*. It has been suggested that the Greek should be understood to mean that they are the sons of the *hypaspistai*, and further that these can be identified with the *hypaspistai* mentioned earlier as being disastrously defeated in Egypt in 321 under the command of Perdiccas (Diod. 18.33.6, 34.2).³³ It has also been suggested that they are Asian recruits.³⁴

6 The *Pezhetairoi*

When the army crossed over to Asia the phalanx numbered 12,000 (Diod. 17.17.1) so the *pezhetairoi* numbered 9,000. They were divided into six *taxeis*, levied from separate districts of Macedonia, so each numbered 1,500.³⁵ When reinforcements from Macedonia reached Alexander after Gaugamela the infantry were assigned to the *taxeis* 'by tribe' (Arr. 3.16.11). The *taxis* could be referred to either by the name of its commander or from the region where it was levied. Thus in the description of the Battle of Gaugamela in Curtius (4.13.7, 28) and Diodorus (17.57.2) we are thus informed that the *taxeis* of Elimeia, Orestis and Lyncestis with Stymphaea (= Tymphaea) were commanded (respectively) by Coenus, Perdiccas and Polyperchon.

Of the *taxeis* left behind in Macedonia, one, that of Philotas, was transferred to the king's army, arriving after Gaugamela. It has been argued that the *taxis* of Cleitus, which first appears in India in 327 (Arr. 4.22.7), may also be a new formation. There seem to have been seven commanders of the *taxeis* of the phalanx in India, however:

Gorgias, Cleitus, Meleager, Coenus, Polyperchon, Alcetas and Attalus, so the difference may be best explained by changes in the *taxis* commanders.

At the siege of Tyre, the *taxis* of Coenus is for the first time called ‘those who are called the *asthetairoi*’ (Arr. 2.23.2) and later on it is clear that at least one other *taxis* has been granted this title (Arr. 4.23.1), and that the *taxis* of Pithon is numbered amongst them (Arr. 6.6.1). In all there may have been four *taxeis* that held this title, the Elimeiot *taxis* under Coenus, the Tymphaians under Philippus, the Orestians and Lyncestians under Perdiccas, and the *taxis* of Amyntas.³⁶

The meaning of the term is disputed. Griffith argued that it is a contraction of *arist-hetairoi* or ‘best Companions’ and so would be an honorific title applied to individual *taxeis*. Bosworth suggested it was a contraction of *asista-hetairoi* or ‘closest Companions’ and was a term reserved for the *taxeis* of Upper Macedonia. Heckel has argued the term is a contraction of *aster-hetairoi* or ‘star-Companions’ that was given to troops carrying shields decorated with the Macedonian star. The term was perhaps first given to these *taxeis* upon their incorporation into the army of Philip.³⁷

We know nothing of the infantry (presumably Macedonian and presumably *pezhetairoi*, for it is unlikely that any of the hypaspists would have been left behind) left in Macedon under Antipater other than that they numbered 12,000 representing ‘the rest of the national levy’, in which case they would have been organized into eight *taxeis*. This would imply the territorial division of Argead Macedonia into 12 recruiting districts.³⁸ The potential size of the Macedonian infantry after full mobilization may have been higher, for Justin 11.6.4 tells us that the men Alexander took with him to Asia were all veterans.

All foot soldiers shown on the ‘Alexander Sarcophagus’ wear tunics and ‘Phrygian’ helmets and carry swords and shields of the traditional hoplite type. It is frequently suggested that the *sarissa* could not be used in conjunction with the hoplite shield, but the hoplite shield is not much larger than the later ‘Macedonian’ shields, and it would be rash to reject the evidence of the Alexander Sarcophagus as ‘artistic license’. Thus it would seem that the ‘peltast’ equipment issued by Philip at the beginning of his reign was later replaced by the full hoplite panoply. The *pezhetairoi* also wear composite cuirasses and greaves, and each *taxis* seems to have had a different shield device painted in a medallion in the centre of the shield. Perhaps the single phalangite shown with a purple tunic belonged to a battalion of *asthetairoi*.³⁹

Two fundamental changes in military equipment seem to have

taken place in the infantry before the death of Alexander. The 'shield / helmet bronze coinage' that was issued by Alexander's immediate successors, Philip Arrhidaeus and Alexander IV, show a *pilos* helmet on one side and a 'Macedonian' shield on the other.⁴⁰ The Macedonian shield does not have the rim of the hoplite shield, is slightly shorter, with a diameter of two Macedonian feet (64cm), is very concave and the outside bronze plating is decorated with an embossed geometric pattern of circles, semicircles and stars and thunderbolts. Alexander is known to have issued *pilos*-type helmets of the Laconian type to his army from other sources (Sextus Iulius Africanus, *Kestoi* 1.1.45–50). Distributions of new weapons to the army took place both before the Indian campaign (Curt. 8.5.4; cf. Justin 12.7.5) and during it (Diod. 17.95.4), and the switch to the new helmets and shields could have taken place during one of these re-armaments if not earlier.⁴¹

7 The Macedonian Archers

The only Macedonian infantry unit not belonging to the phalanx mentioned in our sources is the Macedonian archers.⁴² It is hard to establish their strength or even their existence with certainty, for there was also a regiment of mercenary Cretan archers in the army, and our sources do not always make it clear which unit is meant.

Archers without ethnic are mentioned at the capture of Thebes, where about 70 of them fell, including Eurybotas the Cretan, the *toxarchēs* (Arr. 1.8.3–4). At the Battle of Issus Arrian 2.9.2–4 first mentions that the archers (no ethnic given) commanded by Antiochus were placed on the right and the Cretan archers on the left. According to Curtius 3.9.9, the archers and the Cretans were in the vanguard, but it is uncertain whether they are to be understood as the same force or different troops. The Cretans are mentioned earlier during the march to Issus (Curt. 3.7.12–15). Antiochus, the *archōn* of the archers, later died, and in Egypt Alexander appointed Ombrion the Cretan as his successor (Arr. 3.5.6). At Gaugamela the Macedonian archers under Brison, together with half the Agrianians under Attalus, are stationed on the right wing (Arr. 3.12.2). This is the only place in our sources where any archers are specifically mentioned as Macedonian. Then we have mention of half the Agrianians and archers posted with the Companions (Arr. 3.12.3). Curtius 4.13.31 mentions the Agrianians commanded by Attalus and the Cretan archers joined to them on the left wing. Diodorus 17.57.4 placed the Cretan archers on the left wing. Thus, our sources are confused.

Diodorus 17.17.4 lists 1,000 archers and Agrianians among the

non-Macedonian troops who crossed into Asia with Alexander. It would be reasonable to presume that there would have been about 500 each of them, and one might envisage there to have been 250 Cretans and 250 Macedonians.

After Gaugamela oriental archers suddenly became easy to recruit and neither Cretan or Macedonian archers are mentioned in our sources. By contrast, the number of archers in the army, organized into chiliarchies, expands dramatically.

8 Antigonid Army Staff

As in the Argead army, the king was assisted in the running of the army by a body of staff officers called *sōmatophylakes* or ‘bodyguards’. In Alexander’s army there were seven, later rising to eight. During his description of the ritual purification of the army which took place in 182, Livy 40.6.3 tells us that the *regia cohors* (*agēma*) marched at its head, followed by the *custodies corporis*: clearly a semantic translation of *sōmatophylakes*. *Sōmatophylakes* are mentioned twice by Diodorus (30.10.2, 11.1) during the closing stages of the Pydna campaign, the final unsuccessful campaign fought by Perseus against the Romans in 168. At Diium a *sōmatophylax* burst into the king’s bath announcing that the enemy were upon them. After the battle Perseus sent the *sōmatophylax* Andronicus to Thessalonika to burn the fleet. In his description of Flamininus’ triumph in Rome Livy 34.52.5 mentions ten shields (*clipea*) of silver. These were presumably specific badges of rank, limited to a small group of high-ranking military officers: the *sōmatophylakoi* for example. Unfortunately we do not know how many *sōmatophylakes* there were in the Antigonid army.

There also seems to have existed a corps of *hypaspistai*, perhaps properly termed ‘royal *hypaspistai*’, and in 218 Philip V sailed from Cirrha to Sicyon accompanied by the *hypaspistai* (Polyb. 5.27.3) In the Amphipolis inscription (see below), the quarters of the *hypaspistai* are to be put up immediately after those of the king and his immediate circle (by which is meant, presumably, the king’s ‘friends’ and the *sōmatophylakes*), and the *hypaspistai* can be the first to bring information to the king. After the Battle of Cynoscephalae, where Philip V suffered decisive defeat at the hands of the Romans in 197, the king sent one of the *hypaspistai* to Larissa to burn his state papers (Polyb. 18.33.2). It is uncertain whether the Antigonid *hypaspistai* were a formed body of troops, which seems unlikely, or acted as assistants to the *sōmatophylakes*, which seems more probable.

9 Antigoniid Cavalry

Livy (42.58.9, 66.5, 44.42.2) calls the elite squadron of the Macedonian cavalry the 'sacred squadron' (*sacra ala*), thus reflecting an original Greek *hiera ilē*. Polybius tells us that of the 800 Macedonian cavalry with whom Philip V entered the Social War in 219 (4.37.7), about 400 were cavalry 'about the Court' (4.67.6), a generic term Polybius uses elsewhere of elite cavalry units (5.65.5), and so here probably meaning the 'sacred squadron'. Thus it had the same strength as the 'Royal Squadron' of Companions in Alexander's early reign. Livy 42.66.5 tells us that during the Battle of Callinicus, successfully fought against the Romans in Thessaly in 171, Antimachus the squadron commander died. In Latin he is termed *praefectus alae*, behind which lies the Greek *ilarchēs*. After the decisive defeat by the Romans at Pydna in 168, Livy 44.42.2–3 mentions that the Macedonian squadrons (*alae*) retreated in an orderly formation. Hence Macedonian cavalry still operated in *ilai* commanded by *ilarchai*. The strength of the other *ilai* of the army is unknown.

At the Battle of Callinicus the Macedonian cavalry was on the right wing (Livy 42.58.8). Its strength has earlier been given as 3,000 during the military review held in 171 at the beginning of the campaign (Livy 42.51.9). Next came the royal cavalry (*regii equites*) and then the sacred squadron (Livy 42.58.8–9). The relationship between the royal cavalry and the sacred squadron is not clear.

10 Antigoniid Infantry Organization

We have a quite detailed knowledge of Antigoniid infantry organization thanks to two fragments of an inscription from Amphipolis,⁴³ which record regulations probably issued by Philip V perhaps around 218.⁴⁴ A military formation called a *stratēgia* is mentioned first, then officers called *tetrarchai* are mentioned together with *grammateis* (secretaries / clerks), and then *hypaspistai* later. The *tetrarchia* would have consisted of 64 men, comprising four files of 16 men, as in the tactical manuals of Asclepiodotus (2.8) and Aelian (9.2), which also mention the file called a *lochos* commanded by a *lochagos*.

A separate inscription from the city of Greia dating to 181 records a petition for land made to Philip V by a group of soldiers 'with Nicanor the *tetrarchēs*'.⁴⁵ At its end comes a list of names, headed by Nicanor the *tetrarchēs*, Theoxenus the *hypaspistēs*, Bilos the *lochagos*, 'and of those fighting in the first *lochos*' at least six individuals (the inscription is incomplete). The *hypaspistēs* is thought to be a member of the army staff, perhaps delegated to keep watch over the garrison

stationed at Greia. The mention of the ‘first *lochos*’ suggests that the *lochoi* in the *tetrarchia* were numbered one to four. The *tetrarchēs* would belong to the ‘first’ *lochos*, drawn up on the right of the *tetrarchia* in battle.

The second fragment of the Amphipolis inscription mentions the *stratēgoi* (generals) and the *speirarchai* and the *tetrarchiai* in sequence of rank, then ‘the other *hēgemonēs* (officers)’, and then later on the *hypēretai* and the *archypēretai* (sergeantmajors). The *speira* is mentioned as a subdivision of the Macedonian phalanx by Plutarch (*Philopoemen* 9.4) and Polybius (2.66.5; cf. 5.4.9), and seems to have numbered 256, composed of four *tetrarchiai*. The *hypēretēs* acted as a kind of ‘sergeantmajor’ to the *speira*. Less certain is the status of the *archypēretēs* and the *grammateus*, but Ptolemaic texts link the *archypēretēs* with the *stratēgos* and *stratēgiai* and this may have been the case in the Antigonid army too. The *grammateis* were probably found at a higher level than the *speira*, one for each branch of service.⁴⁶

No formation is mentioned in the inscription between the *speira* and the *stratēgia* but the fact that the *corps* of peltasts, for one, is always mentioned in thousands suggest that it was organized into *chiliarchiai*, as in the age of Alexander. Menander’s *Perikeiromenē*, written about 302 / 1 and set in Corinth, then occupied by a Macedonian garrison, mentions a ‘feather-crested’ *chiliarchos* at line 174 and the ‘*dioikētēs* of the armies’ at line 160. The phalanx was mobilized up to a strength of 16,000 before Cynoscephalae, which corresponds to the 16,384 given as the ‘ideal’ strength of an ancient phalanx in the ancient tactical writers. It has been suggested that four *chiliarchiai* may have been grouped into a *stratēgia*, ‘an army corps of something over 4000 men, under a *stratēgos*’. Perhaps at Cynoscephalae the phalanx was organized into two *stratēgiai* of *chalkaspides*, and two of *leukaspides*.

11 Antigonid Peltasts

There were at least two sizes of Macedonian shields.⁴⁷ This conclusion has been confirmed by three recent finds of bronze shields in Macedonia with diameters of 74, 73.6 and 66 cm.⁴⁸ Asclepiodotus 5.1 describes the smaller type when he recommends ‘the Macedonian bronze shield of eight palms width and not too concave’.⁴⁹ These smaller shields were used by the peltasts, the elite infantry regiment of the Antigonid army. Livy 33.4.4 calls them *caetrati*, an Iberian term for soldiers using smaller-sized shields, which was more familiar to his readers. During his description of the Battle of Pydna, Plutarch

mentions the peltasts bringing down the *peltai* they carried from their shoulders and placing their *sarissas* in place (*Aemilius Paullus* 19.1). At *Aemilius Paullus* 20.5, Plutarch emphasizes the small size of the weapons they carried by calling their swords ‘small *encheiridia*’ and their shields ‘*peltarioi*’. In Flamininus’ triumph in Rome following his victory at Cynoscephalae, Plutarch mentions Greek helmets and Macedonian *peltai* and *sarissai* being on display (*Flamininus* 14.1). Although the peltasts could and did fight in the phalanx on occasion, as at Pydna, their equipment was lighter than that of the phalangites: their bronze *peltai* shields were smaller, and they did not wear a cuirass, at least not a metal one, which enabled them to be used ‘for special action, particularly in conjunction with light troops and mercenaries’.⁵⁰

Within the peltasts the *agēma* or ‘vanguard’ constituted an elite.⁵¹ At the army review in 171, Livy 42.51.4–5 mentions that the *agēma* consisted of 2,000 men chosen from all the peltasts ‘for their strength and the enduring energy of their age’ (*et viribus et robore aetatis*): the ‘other peltasts’ numbered about 3,000 men. At Pydna Plutarch mentions ‘the *agēma*, picked men, the purest of the Macedonians on account of their virtue and age, gleaming with gilded weapons and newly-dyed crimson tunics’ (*Aemilius Paullus* 18.3). Thus the *agēma* consisted of more senior men selected out of the ranks of the peltasts. The mobilization *diagramma* of Philip V extends the maximum age for service in the *agēma* from 45 to 50, while that for service in the peltasts remained at 35.

During his description of the siege of Oaeneum, which took place during one of the short campaigns carried on outside the western borders of Macedonia against the allies of the Romans during the winter of 169, Livy 43.19.11 says that the city was taken by a siege mound, which was used as a base of attack by ‘the royal company’ (*cohors regia*) whom they call the ‘Conquerors’ (*nicatorias*). From the siege context it is clear that Livy must be referring to an elite infantry unit, presumably the *agēma*. ‘Conquerors’ must be a nickname, but behind *cohors regia* may lie an alternative official title for the unit not preserved in Greek. The *regia cohors* is also mentioned during the description of the ritual purification of the army that took place in 182 (Livy 40.6.3). The unit is generally identified with the ‘Royal Pages’,⁵² but at Livy 44.43.5 the royal pages are called the *regii pueri*, and it is clear that he is referring to the *agēma*, for the *regia cohors* marches at the army’s head, a role which would befit its title of ‘vanguard’ regiment.

The *agēma* is never listed separately in the ancient sources but always as part of the peltasts. The strength at which the peltasts were deployed varied over time, according to the circumstances of the

particular campaign. Doso had 3,000 of them at the Battle of Sellasia in 223 (Polyb. 2.65). At the start of the Social War in 219 they had a total strength of 5,000 (Polyb. 4.29.1), but during the winter campaign later that year Philip takes only 2,000 peltasts with him (Polyb. 4.67.6). At Cynoscephalae in 197 the peltasts numbered 2,000 (Livy. 33.4.4-5). In the army review of 171 the *agēma* numbered 2,000 and the 'other peltasts' 3,000; the same total strength the peltasts had in 219. Hence it can reasonably be assumed that the *agēma* had a strength of 2,000 and the 'other peltasts' 3,000 throughout the Antigonid age. The peltasts fought in the second line behind the phalanx at Pydna (Livy 44.41.1-2), presumably at their full strength of 5,000.

12 The Antigonid Phalanx

In 228, Cleomenes III of Sparta armed his phalanx in the Macedonian manner. They held a *sarissa* in both hands and carried their shields (*aspides*) by an strap (*ochane*) rather than the hoplite shield's *porpax* (Plut., *Cleomenes* 11.2). The Macedonian phalangites are also mentioned as carrying their *sarissai* in both hands at the battle of Pydna (Plut., *Aemilius Paullus* 20.2). Experimental archaeology has shown that it is possible to use shields of this type in conjunction with a 5.8 m long *sarissa* carried underarm.⁵³ The infantrymen of the phalanx carried the larger version of the convex 'Macedonian' shield about 74 cm in diameter, covered in bronze ornately decorated with geometric patterns of stars, crescents, balls, whirligigs, and so forth.

The two regiments of phalangites (or frequently 'hoplites' in the texts) were named after the colour of their shields: the *chalkaspides* (bronze-shields) and the *leukaspides* (white-shields). The *leukaspides* were only deployed in the major battles. Although not mentioned at the Battle of Sellasia fought against Cleomenes III king of Sparta in 222, they were probably present for before the battle Cleomenes created a second phalanx by arming 2,000 freed hoplites 'in Macedonian fashion as a counter to the *leukaspides*' (Plut., *Cleomenes* 23.1). At Sellasia the Macedonian phalanx numbered 10,000 (Polyb. 2.65.2). The *chalkaspides* were drawn up on the Euas, on the right, in alternate *speirai* along with the Illyrians (Polyb. 2.66.5), who numbered 1,600 (Polyb. 2.65.4). On the opposite flank the mercenaries were placed in front and then 'the rest of the Macedonians' in a double phalanx (Polyb. 2.66.8-9), which presumably included the *leukaspides*, as well as the *agēma* and the other peltasts. They are not mentioned at Cynoscephalae, but the account of Livy is lacking in detail. He tells us at 33.4.4 that the peltasts numbered 2,000 and the phalanx 'the enduring strength of all

the men of the kingdom' 16,000. Such strength presumably included the *leukaspides* as well as the *chalkaspides*. The *leukaspides* are specifically mentioned as present at Pydna (Livy 44.41.2, Diod. 31.8.10).

The *chalkaspides* are mentioned more frequently in our sources and so may have been easier to mobilize and deploy. When Philip V first moved out of Macedonia at the beginning of 219 to take part in the Social War, he took with him 800 cavalry, 5,000 peltasts and 10,000 phalangites all Macedonian (Polyb. 4.37.7). The latter presumably included both *chalkaspides* and *leukaspides*. Later on in the winter he resumed the campaign with a greatly reduced force, taking about 400 elite cavalry, 300 Cretans, 2,000 peltasts and 3,000 *chalkaspides* (Polyb. 4.67.6). No mention is made of the *leukaspides* in this second campaign, so presumably they were not mobilized.

The size of the formations of *chalkaspides* or *leukaspides* mobilized for any particular campaign varied according to the level of military threat and the manpower available but the two phalanxes were probably of equal strength. Diodorus 31.8.10 tells us that in the triumph of Aemilius Paullus after the Battle of Pydna there were 1,200 wagons filled with white shields then a further 1,200 wagons filled with bronze shields, and the number of wagons might well be proportional to the strength of the two regiments at Pydna, with each numbering 12,000 men.⁵⁴ This would represent their maximum strength ever reached.

II THE MACEDONIAN SOLDIER

13 The Infantryman

In the Antigonid period the recruiting districts seem to have been based on the cities of Macedonia (Livy 33.19.3), where the young men received their military training. A decree dating to the early second century from the city of Beroia concerning the election and duties of the city's *gymnasiarchos* throws some light on these matters. The *gymnasiarchos* had to be aged between 30 and 60. Boys (*paides*) and young men (*neoi*, *neaniskoi*) up to the age of 30 could use the *gymnasion* but older men had to use private facilities. The *epheboi* and those up to 22 years old had to train in throwing the javelin and in the bow every day. How much of this would have applied in the Argead period is unknown. In the Argead period the *taxeis* were embodied on a territorial basis but in the Antigonid period the male population

subject to military service seems to have been mobilized and concentrated for ritual purification before the formations and units of the army were constituted. Each 'hearth' supplied one adult male for service.

The daily life of the infantry soldier revolved around the file of 16 men to which he belonged called the *dekas* in the Classical period and the *lochos* in the Hellenistic. The file slept together in 'tent-parties'. Rations were distributed by tent (Arr. 4.21.10), which was perhaps divided into compartments each accommodating two men (Diod. 17.952). The tents were held in place with small iron pegs (Arr. 4.19.1). Philip allocated each *dekas* one servant to carry the mills and 'ropes' (perhaps for the tents) as well as sufficient grain for 30 days (Frontinus 4.1.6). Elsewhere we hear of Philip ordering his allies to carry 40 days of food (Dem. 18.157). Fire was carried in jars (Diod. 19.38.3), and the equipment of the *dekas* was carried by a donkey (Plut., *Moralia* 177a, 790b).

14 Military Pay

At the end of Alexander's reign we are told that the *dekas* was led by a *dekadarchos*, then by a 'double-portion man' and then by a 'ten stater man' who earned more than the common soldier (Arr. 7.23.3). It is generally assumed that an Attic stater of four drachmas is being referred to and that the payments mentioned are monthly. The common soldier may have been paid 30 drachmas.⁵⁵ These rates of pay at the end of Alexander's reign may have been higher than at other periods. Most scholars accept the evidence of *IG* 2² 329 that at the beginning of Alexander's reign hypaspists were paid a drachma a day.⁵⁶ Menander's *Perikeiromenē* 261–2 gives the rate of pay for the *chiliarchos* Polemon in 302 / 1 as four drachmas a day instead of four obols (two-thirds of a drachma), which may be presumed to be the wage of a common soldier. The rates of pay that later applied in the Antigonid army are unknown. These military rates of pay compare well with what we know of other civilian rates of pay for their respective periods, but can hardly be described as lavish.

Pay was not, however, paid regularly but as funds became available. After the capture of Persian treasure at Babylon each Macedonian horseman was paid 600 drachmae, foreign cavalry 500, Macedonian infantry 200, and the mercenaries pay for two months (Curt 5.1.45, Diod. 17.64.6). We can perhaps assume from this that Macedonian cavalry were paid three times the pay of an infantryman.

Both Philip and Alexander used discretionary grants to create great loyalty in the ranks of the army. Frontinus 4.7.37 mentions a grant to

a certain Pythias, an excellent warrior who had become estranged from Philip. Diodorus 16.93.9 records the ‘considerable grants’ made to Pausanias by Philip. Alexander also waived normal procedures to reward his best soldiers. When he paid off the debts of his soldiers, Antigenes, who falsely declared his debt, was forgiven and allowed to keep the money (Plut., *Alexander* 70).

Another important source of income was booty. The plundering of the Persian camp after Issus and the capture of the Persian women accompanying their army are poignantly described at Diodorus 17.35. It seems that in the Amphipolis regulations Philip V introduced new military regulations stipulating the way in which booty was to be collected. In fact long-standing grievances over the ownership of booty, fanned by disloyal officers, led to mutiny in 218 early in Philip’s reign (Polyb. 5.25.1–3).⁵⁷

There can be no doubt that the cycle of Macedonian military imperialism enriched the Macedonian soldiery. At the end of his reign Alexander reminded his soldiers that when Philip took them over they were in skins, but Philip had given them cloaks and settled them in cities (Arr. 7.9.2). Thanks to the conquest of Asia, a huge amount of bullion was put into circulation, most spectacularly evidenced by the large numbers of coins minted in the last years of Alexander’s reign.⁵⁸

15 Macedonian Military Manpower

The recruiting base of the total Macedonian male population fluctuated in war as in peace. According to some estimates, between 359 and the end of Philip II’s reign the total size of the infantry that could be mobilized had risen nearly fourfold thanks to the policies of Philip to expand the territory and manpower of the kingdom.⁵⁹ It seems that the kingdom was now in a position to supply 3,000 infantry and 300 horsemen per year.⁶⁰ Thus the effects of Macedonian military imperialism upon the Macedonian population may be considered as beneficial.

The effect of imperialism under Alexander the Great is more debateable. It has been calculated that during Alexander’s campaigns more than 42,000 infantry and 5,600 cavalry were sent from Macedonia to join him in Asia.⁶¹ Few of them ever came back. Diodorus 18.12.2 reports that in 323 Macedonia was short of citizen soldiers because of the number of those who had been sent to Asia as replacements for the army. Some modern scholars conclude that the reign of Alexander brought about a decline in Macedonian manpower and military and political power,⁶² but others have doubted these statistics.⁶³

The phalanx was mobilized up to a strength of 10,000 for both Sellasia and the Social War but up to 16,000 men for Cynoscephalae. This latter strength probably represents a maximum effort only achieved by the lowering of the minimum age of service to 15, as enacted in the famous ‘mobilization’ decree specifically for this campaign. Following the disastrous losses of Cynoscephalae, where the Macedonians lost 8,000 killed and 5,000 captured (Polyb. 18.27.6, Livy 33.10.7), Philip V was nevertheless able to raise an adequate force to counter the subsequent Dardanian invasion. He rapidly levied troops ‘in the cities of Macedonia’ up to a strength of 6,000 infantry and 500 cavalry (Livy 33.19.3).

After Cynoscephalae the rest of Philip V’s reign was an era of peace, in which he did much to expand the Macedonian population (Livy 39.24.3–4) passing on to his successor Perseus a greatly expanded recruiting base (Livy 42.11.6). The expansion in manpower was most noticeable in the strength of the phalanx.

Before the outbreak of the war Eumenes of Pergamum, a long-standing enemy of Macedonia, reported to the Roman Senate that Perseus had laid aside a sufficient store of grain to feed 30,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry (Livy 42.12.8). If we accept Hatzopoulos’ figure of 24,000 phalangites plus 5,000 men in the *agēma* and the other peltasts,⁶⁴ then we reach a total of 29,000 men or 29,694 if the *chiliarchia* numbered exactly 1,024, which is close to Eumenes’ reported strength of 30,000 infantry. In the review of the army in 171, Livy 42.51.3–11 says that there were 43,000 men under arms of whom ‘about half’ were phalangites. Livy then lists the individual units of infantry other than the phalangites, 5,000 of the *agēma* and the other peltasts, 12,000 non-Macedonian mercenary or allied troops, and 1,000 Odrissian allied infantry, totalling 39,000 infantry. This leaves a strength of 21,000 men for the two phalanx regiments, not too far away from the suggested figure of 24,000. Of the 4,000 cavalry 3,000 are Macedonians and 1,000 are Odrissian allies. For the 168 Pydna campaign Perseus had 4,000 horsemen and ‘not much fewer than’ 40,000 infantry for the phalanx (Plut., *Aemilius Paullus* 13.3). The latter figure can be reconciled with the other sources if it is a total figure for the infantry, including the allied and mercenary infantry as well as the phalangites.

16 The Cavalryman

A possible representation of a Macedonian cavalryman in the age of Philip is on a grave *stele* from Pelinna, which was colonized by Macedonians. The horseman is cuirassed and wears a Macedonian

cloak and a Phrygian helmet.⁶⁵

At first it seems that the Macedonian *hetairoi* were required 'to ride in battle' along with the king as part of their duty to the monarch: as yet there seems to have been no financial provision to reimburse the cavalymen for their outgoings on fodder or to compensate for the loss of the horse on campaign. This could only be organized when state revenues became more regularly developed.

Thucydides 2.100.2 suggests that there was a re-organization of the cavalry during the reign of Archelaus (413–399), and that he 'provided cavalry [...] beyond anything achieved by all the eight kings before him'. Presumably this means the introduction of a new system enabling the *hetairoi* to supply their own horses as well as some form of compensation for horses lost in battle. The Thessalian cavalry, after demobilization at Ecbatana, sold their horses (Arr. 3.19.5). This was presumably true of the Macedonians as well. Thus it seems that in the reign of Alexander III the cavalymen themselves, rather than the state, still owned their own horses.

The Macedonian system seems to have been to allocate crown lands to the *hetairoi*, who in return had to furnish themselves with a mount from the usufruct of the estate. Frontinus 4.1.6 tells us that Philip II permitted each cavalryman to have only one attendant, but this meant that grooms / attendants also had to be supplied from the revenues of the estate. In battle they were left behind in camp (Arr. 3.13.6). Philip II granted estates to Companions on newly conquered land,⁶⁶ as is confirmed by later epigraphic evidence recording a series of grants of estates made by later kings such as Cassander and Lysimachus. In at least one case a grant of Cassander to Perdikkas son of Coenus confirms one made to his ancestors of estates within the territory of Olynthus during the reign of Philip II.⁶⁷

In 359 / 8 Philip had been able to raise 600 cavalry, presumably all *hetairoi*. A fragment of the forty-ninth book of the *Philippica* of Theopompus (Athen. 6.261a = *FGrH* 155 F 225b), dating to around 340, tells us that the *hetairoi* numbered not more than 800 (a rise of only 200 in their strength), and yet they enjoyed the profits of as much land as any 10,000 Greeks possessing the richest and most extensive territory. At Chaeronea in 338 Philip's army only had 2,000 cavalry (Diod. 16.85.5) and many of these must have been Thessalians and perhaps other allied contingents, such as Thracians or Paeonians. Therefore the suggestion that Philip greatly increased the number of Macedonian cavalry seems exaggerated.

By 334 the number of *hetairoi* had risen from 800 to 1,800. This may have taken place at the end of Philip's reign or more likely during the first years of Alexander's reign. Plutarch tells us that Alexander

would not set foot upon his ship until he had enquired into the circumstances of his Companions and allotted to one a farm, to another a village and to another the revenue from some hamlet or Harbour (*Alexander* 15). In at least three cases the territorial titles given to the squadrons of the Companions make it likely that they had been settled on lands of conquered Greek cities which had fallen into the royal estate, but which were subsequently donated to Companions,⁶⁸ though Anthemus, for one, was part of Macedon before Philip's reign.⁶⁹

If the horse was lost on campaign, however, it seems to have been the responsibility of the state to provide the cavalryman with a remount. Curtius 7.1.15 reports that Antiphanes, the secretary (*grammateus*) of the cavalry, ordered Amyntas son of Andromenes to hand over some of his spare horses to those who had lost theirs. Alexander is known to have generally walked his horses when on the march rather than to have ridden them (Curt. 6.5.5), which would have quickly worn them out, and this was probably general practice among the cavalry.

The principal cavalry weapon under Alexander was the lance (*xyston*) of cornel-wood (Arr. 1.15.5). During the fourth century Macedonian cavalry did not carry shields (despite the rhetoric of Curtius 8.1.20), which interfered too much with the management of the horse. Greek cavalry only started to use shields in the 270s, which were borrowed from the Galatian invaders.⁷⁰ The Companions sometimes wore cuirasses (Plut., *Alexander* 16.6) and the Boeotian helmet, recommended by Xenophon, replaced the 'Phrygian' helmet.

The 'Alexander Sarcophagus' was commissioned for Abdalonymus of Sidon and was probably executed shortly after his accession to the throne in 333 / 2. It shows Companions wearing saffron-coloured Macedonian cloaks and long-sleeved purple tunics with gold bracelets at the wrist. This is purely Persian. We do not know when these Persian elements of dress were adopted, but the long-sleeved tunic continued to be worn by the Companions as a badge of their status for some time after the death of Alexander.⁷¹

All military systems requiring military service in return for land are likely to perish with time. The land becomes broken up by inheritance or sale and it becomes impossible to enforce the requirement for military service. Thus the numbers of cavalry the Antigonids could field may have declined in the second half of the third century, as we know was the case with the Ptolemaic cleruchic cavalry. The opening lines of the Cassandreia example of Philip V's 'mobilization' *diagramma*, although heavily damaged, seem to be concerned with the inspection of cavalry horses. Line 7 seems to lay down regulations in the event of the *hipparchos* rejecting a cavalry

mount as unfit for service and the action that the *grammateus* should take. Leon, the commander of the Macedonian cavalry at Cynoscephalae, is called ‘the *hipparchos* of the Macedonians’ (Polyb. 18.22.2): an official title for the head of the Macedonian cavalry, and presumably the same individual as mentioned in the decree. Presumably the *grammateus* mentioned, name unknown, is the *grammateus* of the cavalry: the position occupied by Antiphanes during the reign of Alexander. The ‘mobilization’ *diagramma* probably details emergency efforts made by Philip V to expand the size of the army on the eve of the Second Macedonian War. The inspection of horses may have taken place as the basis upon which individuals were admitted into the cavalry. In line 3 the figure of a thousand drachmas for each horse is mentioned, and perhaps they were paid this sum if the horse passed the inspection: in effect the state bought the horse from the cavalryman.

Despite these efforts, the cavalry force available to Philip V at Cynoscephalae was only 2,000 (Livy 33.4.4–5), including the Thessalian cavalry commanded by Heracleides of Gyrton.⁷² Following the losses suffered in the battle, Philip V was only able to raise 500 cavalry to oppose the Dardanian invasion that followed the defeat (Livy 33.19.3). Thanks to the efforts Philip V made afterwards, the strength of the Macedonian cavalry during the Third Macedonian War was 3,000 men: the highest for the whole Antigonid period for which we have good records.

A law from Amphipolis concerning the *ephebarchos* dating from the Roman period (24 / 3) contains information on the training carried out in the *gymnasia* in Amphipolis, including both riding and throwing the javelin from horseback. A horse-breaker was attached to the service of the *epheboi*.⁷³ It would probably be unsound to believe that this cavalry training was given to all *epheboi* in the *gymnasia* in all the cities of Antigonid Macedonia. The regulations are specific to Amphipolis, and date to a period long after, when ephebic service had ceased to be universal and compulsory but had become restricted to the rich elite of the citizenry.

17 Conclusion

Under Philip II and Alexander the Great the Macedonian state experienced a dramatic expansion, first taking over much of the Balkans, and then extending Macedonian power over most of western Asia. The Macedonian military forces played a key role in this expansion but it cannot be doubted that an excellent level of command played a key role in military success – not just the

generalship of Philip II and Alexander but the superb levels of military skills achieved by unit and formation commanders who had spent their whole lives under arms. However well thought out the plans of the commanders may have been they depended on the feel for battle displayed by the lower level commanders to seize the correct moment on the battlefield. In all of this process the voice of the common man was seldom heard. Macedonia was not a democracy but an absolute monarchy, and although the army sometimes met in assembly it was only to approve the plans of the king and condemn his enemies to death.⁷⁴ Only when the unexpected death of Alexander, leaving no certain heir or undisputed regent, paralyzed the normal channel of decision-making did the army assembly make its voice felt, thereby ensuring chaos in the immediate future. It is questionable whether the temporary gains of Philip and Alexander were worth the suffering and deaths experienced by the common soldiery.

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⁴⁰ R.W. Mathisen, 'The Shield/Helmet Bronze Coinage of Macedonia: A Preliminary Analysis', *Journal of the Society of Ancient Numismatics* 10 (1979), pp. 2–6.

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⁴³ P. Roussel, 'Un règlement militaire de l'époque macédonienne', *RA* 1 (1934), pp. 39–47, G. de Sanctis, 'Epigraphica XII. Il regolamento militare dei Macedoni', *Riv. Fil.* 12 (1934), pp. 515–21, M. Feyel, 'Un nouveau fragment du règlement militaire trouvé

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⁴⁴ M.B. Hatzopoulos, *L'organisation de l'armée macédonienne sous les Antigonides* (Athens 2001), p. 144.

⁴⁵ C.B. Welles, 'New Texts from the Chancery of Philip V of Macedonia and the Problem of the "Diagramma"', *AJA* 42 (1938), pp. 245–60.

⁴⁶ Noguera Borel, 'Recrutement de l'armée macédonienne', p. 234, suggested that the *grammateis* of the army may have been supervised by an *archigrammateus* for the army as a whole, as was the case in the Ptolemaic and Seleucid monarchies.

⁴⁷ Liampi, *Der makedonische Schild, passim*, M.M. Markle, 'A Shield Monument from Veria and the Chronology of Macedonian Shield Types', *Hesperia* 68 (1999), pp. 219–54, P. Juhel, 'Fragments de "boucliers macédoniens" au nom de Roi Démétrios trouvés à Staro Bonče (République de Macédoine)', *ZPE* 162 (2007), pp. 165–80.

⁴⁸ D. Pandermalis, 'Βασιλέ[ως Δημητρ]ίου', in D. Pandermalis (ed.), *Μύρτος. Μνήμη Ιουλίας Βοκοτοπολου* (Thessaloniki 2000), pp. xviii–xxii.

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⁵⁰ F.W. Walbank, *Philip V of Macedon* (Cambridge 1940), pp. 292–3.

⁵¹ Walbank, *Philip V*, p. 289 n. 6, and see P. Juhel and N. V. Secunda, 'The *agema* and "the other peltasts" in the late Antigonid Army and in the Drama/Cassandraia Conscription *diagramma*', *ZPE* 170 (2009), pp. 104–8.

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⁵⁹ Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia 3*, p. 87.

⁶⁰ Noguera Borel, 'Recrutement de l'armée macédonienne', p. 231.

⁶¹ Brunt, 'Alexander's Macedonian Cavalry', pp. 37 and 39.

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- ⁶⁵ Sekunda and McBride, *Army of Alexander the Great*, p. 5.
- ⁶⁶ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia 2*, pp. 411–12.
- ⁶⁷ M.B. Hatzopoulos, *Une donation du Roi Lysimaque* (Athens 1988), p. 23.
- ⁶⁸ J. Rzepka, ‘The Units of Alexander’s Army and the District Divisions of Late Argead Macedonia’, *GRBS* 48 (2008), pp. 39–56, has argued that the same territorial system was used for recruiting the cavalry as the infantry. This is unlikely, for it would require the Companions to have been granted land in equal amounts throughout all the recruiting districts of Macedonia.
- ⁶⁹ Brunt, ‘Alexander’s Macedonian Cavalry’, p. 42.
- ⁷⁰ M.B. Hatzopoulos and P. Juhel, ‘Four Hellenistic Funerary Stelae from Gephyra, Macedonia’, *AJA* 113 (2009), p. 432, interpret, incorrectly in my view, a relief earlier than the Galatian invasions as showing a cavalry shield.
- ⁷¹ N.V. Sekunda, ‘A Macedonian Companion in a Pompeian Fresco’, *Archeologia* 54 (Warsaw 2003), pp. 29–33 pls. x–xi.
- ⁷² F.W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius 2* (Oxford 1967), p. 581.
- ⁷³ P. Gauthier and M.B. Hatzopoulos, *La loi gymnasiarchique de Béroia* (Athens 1993), p. 162.
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The Political Economy of Macedonia

Paul Millett

1 The Way Ahead

In the Kunsthistorisches Museum in Vienna is a *stele*, found in the ruins of Olynthus, recording an alliance from the earlier fourth century between Amyntas III of Macedonia and the *koinon* or league of the Chalcidians.¹ It provides several pointers in the exploration that follows of the political economy (more accurately, politicomilitary economy) of ancient Macedonia. The text divides into four parts:

1 Agreement with Amyntas son of Errhidaeus. Agreement between Amyntas son of Errhidaeus and the Chalcidians. They shall be allies of one another in respect of all men for fifty years. If anyone goes against Amyntas, into his land for war, or against the Chalcidians, the Chalcidians shall go to support Amyntas, and Amyntas the Chalcidians.

2 There shall be export of pitch and of all building timbers, and of shipbuilding timbers, except firs, whatever is not needed by the *koinon*, and for the *koinon* there shall be export even of these, on telling Amyntas before exporting them and paying the dues that have been written. There shall be export and transport of the other things on paying dues, both for the Chalcidians from Macedon, and for the Macedonians from the Chalcidians.

3 With the Amphipolitans, Bottiaeans, Acanthians and Mendaeanes, friendship shall not be made by Amyntas nor by the Chalcidians apart from the others; but with a single opinion, if it is resolved by both, they shall attack them jointly.

4 Oath of the alliance: I shall guard what has been established by the Chalcidians; and if any one goes against Amyntas, into his land for war, I shall go to support Amyntas.

What has this inscription to tell us? Its fractured, incomplete state and uncertain date are sadly symbolic of surviving information about economic realities involving ancient Macedonia. The find spot of Olynthus reflects much of our written knowledge of Macedonian economy and society seen firmly from the outside. Here the perspective is from the Chalcidic peninsula, a mini-world of *polis* states, on the fringe of the Macedonian homeland. This lop-sided perception of Macedonia is partly the result of less intensive excavation of the Macedonian interior combined with the slow process of publication. But there is also absent from earlier Macedonia the 'epigraphic habit' that was a feature of mainstream *poleis*.²

On the positive side, a plausible context can be supplied for the alliance. In 393/2, Amyntas was expelled from Macedonia by the Illyrians under Bardylis (see W.S. Greenwalt, chapter 14). According to Diodorus 14.92.3–4, Amyntas sought support from the Olynthians in return for a gift of borderland, though it was the Thessalians who eventually restored him to power. For 383/2, Diodorus records a second defeat by the Illyrians (15.19.2–3), with borderlands plus revenues again transferred to the Olynthians, who, on Amyntas' unexpected recovery, refused to return them. Xenophon, *Hellenica* 5.2.12–14, has one Cleigenes of Acanthus (also under threat from Olynthus) advise the Spartan assembly that the Olynthians had occupied various Macedonian cities (including Pella), virtually excluding Amyntas from Macedonia. The Spartans duly sent help (Xen., *Hellenica* 5.2.20–3.27). It seems likely that our alliance, with terms favouring the Chalcidians, reflects Amyntas' efforts to stabilise his kingdom.³

In the opening, defensive alliance (1) and the concluding oath (4), Amyntas appears in his own person, representing the Macedonian state. Demosthenes referred in the Assembly to his semi-frustration at how Amyntas' son, Philip II, was 'the sole director of his own policy, open or secret, uniting the functions of general, ruler, and treasurer (*tamias*)' (1.4). Apart from the implied, ongoing threat from the Illyrians, the alliance also testifies to the unstable interaction between Macedonian kings and the would-be-independent Greek cities around the periphery of their kingdom. Amphipolis, though 50 miles to the east, through its economically strategic location, cast a long shadow over Greco-Macedonian relations. Siting of the *stele* at Olynthus reflects Olynthian aspirations as head of the *sympoliteia* of the *koine* (Xen., *Hellenica* 5.11–19), but this primacy provoked later, less amicable contacts with the Macedonians. In 348 Philip II chose to obliterate the city of Olynthus, enslaving the population.

The section of the agreement on 'terms of trade' (2) introduces the economic imperative, the demand for timber that shaped much of

Macedonia's relationship with the wider Greek world. According to Theophrastus, in his *Enquiry into Plants* (5.2.1), 'the best timber that comes into Greece for the carpenter's use is Macedonian, for it is smooth and of straight grain, and contains resin'. He records in detail the process whereby the Macedonians extracted pitch, vital for waterproofing ships' hulls (9.3.1–3). Overall, Theophrastus' comprehensive knowledge of Macedonian flora, listing 34 varieties of mountain trees (3.3.1–8; cf. 1.9.2), suggests he wrote as a rare eyewitness.⁴

Underlying the trading agreement is the assumption that Macedonian timber and its by-products are in the gift of the king. A distinction is drawn between timber for shipbuilding and for general construction. Save for firs (best for triremes, says Theophrastus at *Enquiry into Plants* 5.7.1), the Chalcidians are permitted to import and re-export as much Macedonian timber and pitch as they like without paying dues. Importing of fir is allowed only on application to Amyntas and payment of dues 'that have been written'. The implication is that the king wished to monitor and benefit financially from the export of such a strategic material. Other commodities are to be freely 'exported and transported' on payment of dues; this phrase (*exagoge kai diagoge*) suggests both harbour taxes and transit dues. They foreshadow the harbour and market dues that occupy a prominent place in our meagre knowledge of the fiscal side of Macedonian public economy.⁵

The exceptional nature for Macedonia of this inscription with its conjunction of warfare, diplomacy, trade and finance helps explain the absence to date of any sustained analysis of the Macedonian economy. The monumental *Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World* contains only passing references to Macedonian matters.⁶ The technique is typically to catalogue the kingdom's well attested natural advantages, balanced against the failure systematically to utilize them, until (after false starts under Alexander I and Archelaus) the remarkable mobilization of resources by Philip II, subsequently exploited by Alexander the Great. This minimalist approach is hardly surprising given the disheartening collection of battered inscriptions, occasional hints and distant assertions (chiefly from hostile Athenian sources) that make up much of the available testimony (cf. P.J. Rhodes, chapter 2). Such was Demosthenes' claim that from Macedonia could not be bought 'even a decent slave' (9.31); ironic, in that one of the very few Greek slaves attested from Athens was a Macedonian woman. Most obviously absent from the Macedonian scene is anything resembling the Attic orators, making possible extensive reconstruction of, and debate over, key aspects of Athenian economy and society.⁷

It might be argued that Macedonian studies have benefited from their exclusion from the long-running debate over the ‘Greek economy’, and ‘Macedonia’ does not appear in the index to M.I. Finley’s *Ancient Economy*.⁸ But where so little evidence survives it might seem all the more pressing to think hard about approaches, assumptions, concepts and parameters. The conclusion seems unavoidable that thinking to date about the Macedonian economy has been somewhat under-theorized. Admittedly at the extreme are Hammond’s heroic assertions that, under Philip II, ‘the economy of Macedonia became fully monetary, and Alexander inherited the strongest currency in Europe’; and how, ‘the economic prosperity Alexander brought by opening the east to the capitalist system of the west: introduce[ed] a full monetary economy’.⁹ The problematic relationship between issuing of coinage and the wider economy invites the fundamental question how ‘the economy’ in Macedonia is to be conceived – surely not as an autonomous entity? To anticipate, it will be argued that Macedonian economic processes were embedded in the matrix of the warrior society that was peculiar to the kingdom of Macedonia, even more firmly than was the case with classical Athens, hence the ‘political economy’ of my title.

In the following section, the approach will be broadly ‘substantivist’, trying to establish what we can hope to know and to guess about economic activity involving Macedonia. The subsequent section will attempt to construct a simple socio-economic model for Macedonia during the reigns of Philip II and Alexander the Great. The final part, by way of conclusion, briefly builds on the Philip-cum-Alexander material to assess socio-economic developments in Hellenistic Macedonia. At each stage will be introduced just as much economic theorizing as seems helpful, and no more.

2 At the Edge of the World?

Let us begin with the classical economist’s distinction between land, labour and capital. These are conceived as the factors of production that interact to generate a disposable, economic surplus, hopefully beyond what is needed to feed, clothe and house the population at a basic level of subsistence; what Glaucon in Plato’s *Republic* dismissed as a *polis* fit for pigs (372d). The destination of any surplus production is dictated by the socially and politically determined processes of distribution and exchange.¹⁰

The factors of production are flexible enough to accommodate the circumstances of Macedonia. Land and its produce (pasture, crops,

timber, and animals, both wild and domesticated) may be extended to include all naturally occurring commodities like minerals (notably, base and precious metals), and even 'liquid land' in terms of valuable water resources: wetland, lakes and navigable rivers running all the year round. Proper names hint at the perceived abundance of resources: the Macedonian heartland was called *Pieira* or 'plentiful'; *Edessa* meant in Phrygian 'water-place' (Diod. 7.16) and *Xylopolis* in Greek 'timber-town' (Pliny, *Natural History* 4.10). The Argead dynasty was retrospectively associated with the goats (*aiges*) that were such a feature of the landscape, also appearing on the coinage of Alexander I.¹¹ The fine silver octodrachms issued by Alexander depict a mounted huntsman, complete with hunting-dog: symbolic of the significant role of hunting in Macedonian economy and society.¹² It is a commonplace that the enlarged kingdom of Macedonia incorporated both mountains and plains, combining Continental with Mediterranean climates.¹³ All general treatments of Macedonia comment on its comparative fertility and the relative richness of natural resources, resulting in something approaching self-sufficiency (see C.G. Thomas, chapter 4).¹⁴

But 'Macedonia' as a political concept was flexible in terms of physical extent. By way of illustration, there is the massive, though temporary, expansion of the kingdom under Alexander I, taking advantage of the Persian retreat to quadruple the territory under his control to almost as far west as Lake Ochrid, to Upper Paeonia in the north, and to the Strymon river in the east.¹⁵ Incorporation of mountainous land from Upper Macedonia, though adding a complementary eco-system, may, in formal economic terms, have lowered the overall level of productivity as marginal land was included within the kingdom. The idea receives support from the straitened lifestyle of the *Saraksatani*: transhumant shepherds from the Pindus Mountains, whose post-war world was so memorably captured by J.K. Campbell.¹⁶ Against that, eastward expansion gave Alexander control over silver deposits by Lake Prasias. According to Herodotus 5.17, the mine there produced for the king a daily talent of silver; which might mean simply 'a great deal of silver'. In any case, the figure may be gross rather than net: mining was potentially costly in terms of labour and capital. The increase in royal revenues is plausibly connected with Alexander being the first Macedonian king to mint coins. But the gold statue of himself that Alexander dedicated at Delphi (Hdt. 8.121.1) is a reminder that by no means all precious metals ended up as coin.

Like land, the extent of labour power within Macedonia varied with its political boundaries. The impressive increase in military manpower under Philip II from about 10,000 to about 30,000 was

partly the result of incorporating additional territories with their populations. Combining the theoretical carrying capacity of 'Greater Macedonia' with surviving figures for infantry and cavalry suggests a total, possible population in excess of 500,000. That is an order of magnitude greater than anything other than the most populous *polis*: Athens with perhaps 250,000 was, according to Cohen, effectively a nation-state. By contrast, the Chalcidic peninsula contained, in just 3,000 km², 9 fully fledged *poleis* and up to 70 *polismata* or lesser urban communities.¹⁷

There was scope for change in the overall productivity of labour through switching between economic activities (almost all potentially overlapping): pastoralism, settled agriculture, hunting, fishing, extraction of natural resources, craft-production, marketing, domestic and military service. To a considerable extent, economic activity was geographically determined by climate and terrain; notably, the transhumance, historically such a feature of the northern Balkans.¹⁸ Over time may reasonably be assumed a shift towards settled farming as opposed to semi-nomadic pastoralism, and towards a population living in larger villages, towns and eventually cities. The changing scale and tempo of these secular tendencies depended in large measure on the energy and inclinations of individual kings: reaching a sustained climax under Philip II, but patchily in evidence before his reign. Alexander I had about 468 received and settled refugees from Mycenae, displaced by Argos (Paus. 7.25.6), and Perdiccas II in about 446 took in Histiaeans from Euboea, driven out by the Athenians (Thuc. 1.114.3). Archelaus later captured the Greek city of Pydna and transplanted the population from the coast to a site four kilometres inland (Diod. 13.49.2).

Even Philip's determined attempts at socio-demographic engineering were a matter of emphasis. Overall, the mass of the population continued to devote the bulk of its labour power to the production of food: a fact of pre-industrial economic life. But further investigation only exposes our ignorance over a central aspect of Macedonian economy and society. What was the status of the landworkers on whose labour everyone ultimately depended: landowning elites, town-and city-dwellers, army, royal court, and all others not labouring on the land? We simply do not know. It seems unlikely that many (if any) of these landworkers were chattel slaves. Attica was possibly unique in the Greek world in the extent of its dependence on slaves in agriculture: robust democratic institutions (hardly present in Macedonia) protected even the poorest citizen-peasants from exploitation. Even so, Hammond assumes for Macedonia, in absence of evidence to the contrary, that the entire agricultural workforce was free, as were subsequent forced additions

from outside the frontiers. That would make Macedonia unique within the Greco-Roman world: a large-scale community not agriculturally dependent on compulsory labour.¹⁹

It seems inherently unlikely that rural egalitarianism would prevail in a society where hierarchy was so much in evidence elsewhere. Peasants characteristically constitute a ‘part society’, directly affected by the wider community of which they partake, in terms of military service, payment of taxes, performance of *corvée* labour, or other enforceable obligations.²⁰ Ellis suggests that in Macedonia, ‘there must certainly have been a substantial body of sub-citizens [...] like the Spartan *helotai* and the Thessalian *penestai*, whose labours on the land made economically and socially possible the operation of large citizen armies over long periods’. He further suggests that these ‘sub-citizens’ supplied the grooms, attendants and wagon drivers attested on campaign with Philip and Alexander.²¹ That seems plausible. These ‘servants’ accompanying the army presumably caught the attention of contemporary writers: the tip of a submerged iceberg of unnoticed, unfree rural labour.²²

Bridging the concepts of ‘labour’ and ‘capital’ in production is the sub-category of ‘human capital’, representing the stock of skills and knowledge inherent in the labour force, playing a crucial role in economic development. Here is one area where Macedonia might seem less than self-sufficient: there are hints about the importing of technical expertise. An Athenian inscription records an assembly decree for 407/6 which mentions Athenian shipbuilders (*naupegoi*) travelling to Macedonia to construct triremes on the spot.²³ Callistratus, an experienced, exiled Athenian politician, visiting Macedonia in about 360, allegedly supplied advice that doubled the king’s income from harbour dues to 40 talents ([Arist.], *Oeconomicus* 2.2.22). As with landworkers, our surviving sources may reflect the perspective of contemporary writers, more attentive to ‘buying in’ by Macedonian kings of cultural than technical expertise.²⁴

The final factor of ‘capital’ refers to the role in the productive process of the fixed capital of roads, cities, fortifications, harbours, shipping, mine workings, metal refineries, logging-camps, manufacturies and miscellaneous public works. What today might loosely be labelled ‘infrastructure’. From a *polis* perspective, Pausanias supplies a checklist of what might be expected: the public buildings, gymnasium, agora and public water supply that he failed to find in Panopeus in Phocis (10.4.1). Traditionally, early Macedonia has been seen as ‘undercapitalized’ in terms of urban fixed assets, but Hatzopoulos has sought to challenge this ‘primitivist’ presentation.²⁵ He cites the Copenhagen Polis Centre as having identified in Macedonia approximately 30 cities by the end of the Classical period;

epigraphic evidence boosts the number by the Roman conquest to 60, and all apparently enjoying a degree of autonomy. As Hatzopoulos also points out, excavation is adding to the cumulative sense of urban development in terms of Pausanias' city walls, theatres, gymnasia, sanctuaries and harbours.²⁶

But for Macedonia down to about 400, apart from the *polis*-states along the coast (Pydna, Methone, Dicaea, Amphipolis) and the designated Macedonian centres of Dium (religious ritual), Argeae (royal ritual) and Pella (royal court), there remains a relative absence of established, urban communities.²⁷ Such is the implication of Thucydides' singling out from the late fifth century Archelaus' seemingly modest programme of public works (2.100), including the building of 'straight roads through the country' and construction of 'strongholds and fortresses', of which there were still 'not many'. Plausibly attributed to Archelaus is relocation of the royal capital to the strategically superior site at Pella. Xenophon has Cleigenes inform his Spartan audience that Pella was the biggest city in Macedonia (*Hellenica* 5.2.13). But for Strabo it counted as 'small' until developed by Philip II (7 F 20).²⁸

Although Philip added appreciably to the urban built environment, it seems realistic to think of Macedonia through antiquity as housing most of its population in thousands of *komai* or village-like, nucleated settlements. Such communities hardly impinge on the literary or even the epigraphic record; not until the Roman era, when they are regularly associated with cities.²⁹ If settlements like this are not entirely invisible archaeologically (potsherds and roof tiles typically remain), rediscovery calls for intensive regional survey, aiming to plot scale and spatial distribution.³⁰ Although the process is under way for the southern mainland, archaeological attention further north has concentrated on urban and ceremonial centres.³¹ To give an impression of scale, the *Map by Map Directory* for Macedonia lists approximately 450 pre-Roman communities, of which some 100 have been located.³² Findings of the Cambridge/Bradford Boeotian Expedition suggest that between known and rediscovered sites, a multiplier of 50 might seem appropriate.

Socio-economic realities of life in these rural settlements remain elusive.³³ Herodotus may preserve an indirect glimpse of 'everyday life' in one such community. In recounting the 'foundation myth' of the Argead dynasty (8.137–8), he explains how, in those remote times, everyone was poor, as inferred from the detail that the king's wife baked the bread. The setting is not the ancient capital at Aegae, but Lebaea or 'Cauldron-town' (otherwise unknown). The 'royal palace' resembles a farmhouse writ large, complete with smoke-hole in the roof. Three sons, refugees from Argos, worked for the king as *thetes*

(wage labourers), tending the horses, cattle, and 'lesser animals' (sheep and goats), respectively. Things turned awkward when they demanded their wages. Presuming Herodotus visited Macedonia, and the myth as told to him represents a backward projection of the life of the rural poor, it may convey some fleeting impression of life outside the cities.³⁴ But the fragility of the argument will be apparent. Better, perhaps, to embrace comparative material, as encountered with the Sarakatsani.

Hesiod in his *Works and Days* offers his perspective on socio-economic relations within the village of Ascra in seventh-century Boeotia. The aim of independence for the individual household (364–7) is tempered by cooperative connexions between neighbours (352–63). In the background are largely negative relationships with the local elite: 'gift-devouring lords' (35–6, 220–4). Snodgrass cautiously labels the *Works and Days* a 'universalizing' text, but the supposed 'timelessness' of the peasant lifestyle (small-scale producers, broadly aiming at subsistence) is compromised by their role as part-societies.³⁵ Entirely absent from the 'world of Hesiod' is any hint of warfare. We can only speculate on the extent to which the warrior culture of the Macedonian elite impinged on everyday existence in local communities save for the extraction of some surplus.³⁶

In his study of *Macedonian Institutions* (1, p. 41), Hatzopoulos suggests that for most Macedonians the political horizon was effectively imposed by their village or nearby city; for which the *Works and Days* supplies support. Although Hesiod's emphasis is on the local community, his censorious attitude towards the nearby *polis* of Thespieae (189, 222, 227, 240, 269) warning off his brother (927–34) presupposes that links did exist. Economic relations extended further afield. Hesiod's advice about sea trading presumes more than local exchange of commodities (618–94). His recommendations about the size of boat and stowing of cargo (642–3, 689–90) would not be out of place for Macedonia, with its extensive waterways. Just as independence within the community had to be buttressed by cooperation, so economic self-sufficiency was an impossibility; least of all, at the level of individual households. Food was needed for resident craft workers and specialist producers. Apart from exchange to correct temporary imbalances in food supply (*Works and Days*, 236–7), there were ongoing needs for commodities not produced in the immediate vicinity; notably, base metals for practical use, gold and silver for rents, taxes and tribute. Presumably, these wants were supplied by local markets or travelling tradesmen.

Although it is impossible to establish for Macedonia the likely balance between barter and monetary exchange, two observations are pertinent. Comparative experience suggests that barter, with the

possibility of postponed 'repayment' and transferring of obligation, need not be more 'primitive' than monetary exchange. Also, retail marketing presumes the existence of sufficient coins suitable for everyday purchases: either bronze or 'fractional' silver coinages. It was only with the reign of Archelaus in the later fifth century that bronze coins began to be issued.³⁷

Acquisition of commodities involved their movement within Macedonia from centres of production or distribution either to local markets or directly to individual consumers. Although Macedonia as a whole may effectively have achieved material self-sufficiency, there was still the need for extensive transport within its frontiers. The journey overland from the coast at Pella to the northern frontier of Upper Macedonia was roughly equivalent to travelling from Athens to Sparta. Here are three cases, apparently calling for widespread redistribution: tin, salt and olives.

Tin was essential for bronze founding. According to Hammond, deposits of copper are widespread within Macedonia, but tin has been found at only one ancient site in the Saletska valley, north-east of Lake Ochrid.³⁸ If so, tin was presumably imported by sea and distributed inland. Similarly, salt produced from pans along the coast would have been transported inland along Macedonian equivalents of the Roman Via Salaria. It is significant that peace terms imposed on the Macedonians after Pydna in 167 prohibited the exchanging of salt between three of the four regions into which the kingdom was divided (Livy 45.29.4-14). The fourth (Paeonia), without access to the coast, was permitted to import salt from the region based on Pella at a fixed price.³⁹ Olive oil production resembled salt: olives grew only in climatically favoured, coastal areas of Macedonia. Theopompus cites as a sign of Philip II's good fortune that olive trees in Crestonia (north of Thessalonica) bore fruit in the spring (*FGrH* 115 F47).⁴⁰

All this presumes an extensive network of distribution into the Macedonian interior. Although rivers no doubt played their part, land transport was unavoidable; not just along the paved precursor of the Via Egnatia, as uncovered in Albania, or major routes explored by Hammond and Hatzopoulos, but by paths and tracks suitable for donkeys or mules or just people.⁴¹ Their capacity should not be underestimated. For the Corinthian Gulf, Snodgrass identifies a coastal path between Aigosthena and Kreusis 'so precipitous that the guerrillas in World War II could, with a modest expenditure of gelignite close it for long periods' as the route taken in antiquity by sizeable armies.⁴²

The presumption of large-scale land transport connecting interdependent regions within Macedonia ties in with the Mediterranean-wide 'connectivities' between microregions presented

by P. Horden and N. Purcell. Given their emphasis on 'history in the Mediterranean', it is not surprising that 'Macedonia' finds no place in their index. But there are, in addition to the enhanced emphasis on land travel and transport, key correspondences. Essential to Horden and Purcell's emphasis on microecologies is a reassessment of urban centres as defining features of Mediterranean history. Macedonia, with its scattered cities, might well respond to a microregional approach. However, present knowledge of Macedonian microenvironments does not permit the detailed analyses that Horden and Purcell present of, for example, South Etruria or Melos.⁴³ They comment that, without the development of 'landscape archaeology' (incorporating regional survey), their book could hardly have been written. But their discussion of the 'marginal environments' of forest and wetland has obvious implications for Macedonia.

The forest with associated scrublands is conceived not as a hostile, uncultivated environment but as 'a tremendous resource that can be used to sustain a whole range of intensities according to human needs'. Apart from timber for construction, there is provision of fuel for domestic and productive purposes: 65 cubic metres of wood were needed to produce one ton of iron. To woodland as the habitat of the hunter can be added shepherd, charcoal burner and beekeeper. Highlighting 'The underestimated Mediterranean wetland' in terms of complex patterns of production and exchange has obvious affinities with the massive area of ancient marshland formed by the four major rivers flowing into the Thermaic Gulf. The instability of this environment, with shifting water courses, is well attested, as is its potential as pastureland. Hammond, citing Procopius and Colonel Leake, acknowledges the fertility of the Macedonian wetlands with cattle and sheep, grain, honey, wax, silk and timber.⁴⁴ He also envisages the area as something of a backwater: shifting coastlines meant that harbour towns were limited to Methone and Therme at its western and eastern extremities. But that unpromising picture may be modified by Horden and Purcell's insistence on the importance of small-scale *cabotage*, with its use of numerous natural anchorages, varying according to wind, current and personal preference. They conclude that 'the informal harbour [...] is of greater overall significance than the great naturally endowed port, a Piraeus or a Marseille' (p. 142).

Trade in timber did not necessarily benefit from harbours; better to have access to rivers for ease of transport and coastal lagoons for storage and loading. It seems unlikely that all stands of timber for export from Macedonia would have bordered on rivers or tributaries: the fir favoured for triremes grows towards the upper limit of the tree line, rarely below 800 metres. To be envisaged is some appropriate

infrastructure for logging.⁴⁵ The consensus is that Macedonian forests were all, or substantially, in royal ownership: an assumption supported by gifts of timber made by kings. Royal agents presumably contracted out exploitation to private individuals.⁴⁶

Theophrastus in his *Enquiry into Plants* (4.5.5) comments on the limited areas producing timber for naval construction: within Europe, only Macedonia, parts of Thrace and Italy.⁴⁷ The *polis* states to the south were effectively competing for a limited, strategic resource. The scale of demand from Athens seems prodigious, with the construction between 480 and 410 of some 1,500 triremes, requiring up to 300,000 oars.⁴⁸ In this confrontation of a scarce, natural resource by insistent, external demand, ancient Macedonia might resemble the modern Middle East, with its oil reserves so desperately sought after by the industrial West. The analogy may be pressed further in light of the ongoing involvement of Athenians and others with their repeated colonial, diplomatic and military interventions in Macedonia and its environs. The remainder of this section traces some implications for Macedonia of efforts by others to appropriate its raw materials.

Telling of the Ionian Revolt, Herodotus causes the Persian commander Megabazus to confront Darius with the risk in allowing Histiaeus of Miletus to fortify Myrcinus on the River Strymon: 'The site, with its silver mines, and abundance of timber for building ships and making oars, is a very valuable one' (5.23). The dramatic date of the conversation is about 500, but Herodotus presumably transfers into the past the concerns of Athenian contemporaries.⁴⁹ In 424/3, the Athenian city of Amphipolis, a near neighbour of Myrcinus, was captured by the Spartans. According to Thucydides the Athenians were greatly alarmed: 'The place was [...] useful because it supplied timber for shipbuilding and brought in revenue' (4.108). That usefulness might be projected back to the foundation of Amphipolis in 437/6, and possibly its failed predecessor Ennea Hodoi (about 465). Cimon, the local Athenian commander, was supposedly prosecuted in 462, though acquitted, for having failed to seize Macedonian territory (Plut., *Cimon*. 14.2-3).⁵⁰

A dossier of inscriptions from the Peloponnesian War testifies to ongoing Athenian concern over supplies from Macedonia. In 426/5 the Assembly passed a decree involving Methone, one of Macedonia's major ports and a member of Athens' empire.⁵¹ Envoys were to be dispatched to Perdiccas II warning him that the Methonians were to be allowed free access to the sea and 'to enter the territory and trade just as formerly'. Commodities being exchanged are not stated but probably included timber. By a treaty of 423/2, Perdiccas undertook to sell oars exclusively to Athens (*IG* 1³ 89 = *SEG* 10.86). Perdiccas was presumably reacting to a Spartan army in the Chalcidice: part of

his prolonged balancing act to preserve his kingdom with its resources intact.⁵² Athenian popular frustration may be inferred from a joke by the playwright Hermippus in his *Phormophoroi* (426) where a character listing ‘cargoes of delight’ arriving in the Piraeus slips in ‘and from Macedonia – boatloads of lies’ (F 63.8). The implication is that boatloads of *something* were arriving from Macedonia, but not for the duration. For the winter of 417/16, Thucydides records an Athenian naval blockade of Macedon on the grounds that Perdiccas had failed to support a projected attack to recover Amphipolis (5.83.4).

Thereafter sight is lost of the Macedonian timber connection for a decade by which time events in Sicily had undermined Athenian ability to coerce.⁵³ Appearing in an Athenian court in 408, Andocides curried favour by telling how, during the oligarchic interlude in 411, through family connections with Perdiccas’ successor Archelaus, he had supplied the democratic-fleet-in-exile at Samos with oars at cost price, as opposed to five drachmas apiece (2.11). Changed Athenian circumstances are apparent in the conciliatory tone of the decree involving Archelaus from 407/6, concerning arrangements for conveying to Athens triremes built in Macedonia by Athenian shipwrights. Archelaus and his sons are hailed as ‘friends and benefactors’ for Archelaus’ past and present cooperation and for supplying oars (and possibly timber) as required.

Athenian dependence on Macedonian timber continued into the fourth century. Such is the implication of the programme for the Mediterranean equivalent of world domination attributed by Xenophon to Jason of Pherae for 375 (*Hellenica* 6.1.11). It would be simple to subdue Athens by gaining control of Macedonia since ‘it is from Macedonia that the Athenians get their timber’. There survives from about 375 a fragmentary alliance between the Athenians and Amyntas III.⁵⁴ Although nothing remains of any terms of agreement, Amyntas did make in about 370 a grant of shipbuilding timber to the Athenian commander Timotheus (Dem. 49.26-30) and the freight charge of 1,750 drachmas implies a substantial amount.⁵⁵ The reign of Amyntas (393–370) conceivably represents the more positive phase of Atheno-Macedonian relations described in the Demosthenic speech *On Halonnesus* (7.11-13) from 342. The speaker (probably Hegesippus) reflects on the past when Athenians and Macedonians ‘used one another’s markets (*tois emporiois*) more freely than at present’. No formal agreement (*symbola*), as latterly proposed by Philip, was needed, because disputes were settled according to local law. An associated claim that tribute was, until recently, paid over by the Macedonians ‘under our power’ is universally rejected.⁵⁶ There does seem to have been a deterioration in relations under Amyntas’

successor Perdiccas III. Hostility with Athens had arisen out of Timotheus' activities in command of a fleet in the Thermaic Gulf. Perdiccas secured an alliance with Thebes and possibly supplied timber for a new fleet being built by Epaminondas.⁵⁷

The accession of Philip II in 359 marked a phase of increasingly direct action against Athenian interests as represented by his capture and annexation of Amphipolis and Pydna in 357 and Methone in 354.⁵⁸ In Athens, receipt of timber from Macedon became grounds for accusation: in about 350 Demosthenes attacked Leosthenes in court for having roofed his house with wood from Macedonia (19.265).⁵⁹ In another Demosthenic speech (possibly by Hyperides), the speaker contrasts shortage of shipbuilding timber at Athens 'where we import it with difficulty from far off' with the abundant supply available in Macedonia (17.28). The speech probably dates from 335; perhaps not coincidentally the year of a *diagramma* by Alexander prohibiting sale of timber from Mount Dyroson.⁶⁰ After Alexander's death it remained a point of honour for Theophrastus' 'Boastful Man' to claim to have declined an offer from Antipater, allowing him to export timber duty-free (23.5) 'so that not a soul can bring a trumped-up charge against him'.

It is impossible to plot through time the changing impact of timber and associated exports on Macedonian economy and society: revenue raising was compromised by diplomatic and military manoeuvring. So Demosthenes spoke in 349 of the inability of the Macedonians to dispose of their produce, 'since all the markets in their territory have been closed by the war [with Olynthus]' (2.16). Hinting at the scale of export operations is the claim by Pseudo-Aristotle (above, p. 000) that, before the intervention of Callistratus (in about 370), harbour taxes annually contributed only 20 talents to the Macedonian treasury. On this reckoning, 'export-led growth' does not seem likely; nothing comparable with the massive and rapid increases in wealth for modern oil-states.

Overall, economic growth as formally defined (sustained annual increase in income per head) seems unlikely for Macedonia at least down to Philip II. The factors conventionally held to promote growth in the industrial world (intensification of capital, both fixed and human, and technical and technological innovation) are not prominent features of the Macedonian socio-economic scene. Inbuilt tendencies for long-term growth, as have been postulated for pre-industrial societies, would have been disrupted by the demands and potentially damaging effects of warfare.⁶¹ The tradition that Macedonian kings did not wage war during the month of Daesius (May/June), corresponding to the harvest (Plut., *Alexander* 16.2), indicates the 'opportunity cost' of military service.⁶² The defeat of

Perdiccas by the Illyrians at Lake Ochrid in 359, with the massacre of 4,000 Macedonians, starkly demonstrates the destructiveness of war in terms of human capital. In 358, the Illyrians were to lose 7,000 (Diod. 16.4.3–7).

Glaucon in Plato's *Republic* dismissed a *polis* offering only a basic standard of living as 'fit for pigs'. Socrates causes him to agree that the quest for increased wealth calls for detailed division of labour, necessitating a substantial increase in population. This in turn means occupying the territory of neighbouring states. Socrates implicitly invokes the idea of the 'limited good'; how all good things (including land and produce) exist in finite quantity. The way to prosperity therefore lay in acquiring the resources of others. Having discovered what Socrates terms 'the origin of war' (Pl., *Republic* 373e), all present agree that the ideal state needs the strongest possible army to protect what has been taken from others. Hence their rejection of part-time soldiering, training instead full-time *phulakes* or 'Guardians' (Pl., *Republic* 374d). Once the state has acquired its optimum size for self-sufficiency, the Guardians will ensure that conquest ceases and all plunder is handed over to less enlightened allies (Pl., *Republic* 421c–423c). Whereas Philip and Alexander conformed to the Socratic model with their full-time armies and appetite for conquest, they differed drastically in the scale of their war-making and acquisitive attitude towards plunder.

3 Philip's Military, Alexander's Moral Economy

In his *Third Philippic* from 341 Demosthenes warned of Philip II's unprecedented waging of war (11.47–50):

But now you hear of Philip marching where the fancy takes him. He is followed, not by a phalanx of hoplites, but by light-armed troops, cavalry, archers and mercenaries [...] When, relying on this force, he attacks some people that is at variance with itself, and when through distrust no one goes forth to fight for his territory, then he brings up his artillery and lays siege. I need hardly tell you that he makes no difference between summer and winter, and has no season set aside for inaction.

Demosthenes' presentation of the Macedonian way in warfare sounds expensive: a standing army (up to 30,000), including cavalry, mercenaries and siege-train. By comparison, Athenian scope for military expenditure was modest. In the previous year Demosthenes

defended some creative revenue-raising by Diopeithes, Athens' underfunded commander in the Chersonese (8.212–9; cf. 19.89–91) – small wonder that in his *Third Philippic* Demosthenes advised against risking a pitched battle with Philip, for which he was far better prepared.⁶³

How was this massive army acquired and maintained and with what socio-economic consequences? The original impulse came from the defeat at Lake Ochrid. There is no need to rehearse the range and scale of the threats confronting Philip II on his succession (Diod. 16.2.4–6, with S. Müller, chapter 9). The crisis of 359 represented in extreme form problems perennially facing kings of Macedonia encircled by potential or actual enemies. The unparalleled success of Philip lay in his consolidating then expanding his kingdom in the face of these dangers, and passing on this enhanced power to Alexander as designated successor. By the time of Philip's death in 336, Macedonia was the ancient equivalent of a superpower with matching, mobilized resources.

The essential instrument of Philip's success, and the subsequent achievements of Alexander, was the army described by Demosthenes. It is claimed that Macedonia under Philip experienced an 'economic revolution'. If so, it was incidental to the imperative of military mobilization. Discussion of this revolution has focused on the speech attributed by Arrian to Alexander at Opis (7.9.2–5; cf. Curt. 10.2.15–29). The Macedonians are berated for forgetting how Philip transformed their lives with settled agriculture, city dwelling, civilized clothing and easy access to markets and mines. The speech should be seen as an essentially rhetorical construct.⁶⁴ It also seems appropriate to move away from imprecise expressions of the economy 'growing' or 'booming' under Philip towards a clearer appreciation of the process of change in Macedonian economy and society.

A rudimentary model may be constructed of Macedonia's transformation under Philip II, reminiscent of the famous flow-chart that Keith Hopkins drew up for the process of Roman expansion under the later Republic.⁶⁵ Of course, there are major divergences in the Macedonian experience. The timescale is compressed: 25 years, compared with two-and-a-half centuries for Rome; there is also the agency of an individual king as opposed to the collectivity of an elite. Above all, there are dissimilar directions taken in the distribution of the profits of conquest and empire. But these differences serve to highlight what was distinctive about the Macedonian process. Models are abstractions that systematically (and paradoxically) misrepresent realities in order to facilitate understanding.⁶⁶ In the case of Macedonian expansion, it is necessary artificially to separate out interrelated strands of conquest, acquisition and redistribution. But

the point of departure is identical for both Rome and Macedonia: 'continuous wars of imperial conquest' with transformatory economic consequences in terms of resources and their reallocation.⁶⁷

Plundering of moveable property (including people) is the most direct method of redistributing resources. Illyrians and Paeonians are presented as habitual plunderers of Macedonia. For three decades prior to Philip, the Illyrians had been bought off by tribute (Diod. 16.2.2). The Macedonians, having gained supremacy, returned the compliment: '[Philip] invaded Illyria with a large force, devastated the countryside, captured many towns, and returned to Macedonia laden with booty' (Diod. 16.69.7). Since plundering was part of military routine it tended to escape notice unless circumstances were exceptional. Such was the campaign of 339 against the Scythian king Atheas as told by Justin 9.2–3. Philip was victorious, allegedly carrying off 20,000 women and children, with great herds and flocks (possibly including 20,000 'wellbred mares'). On the return journey, the plunder was replundered by the Triballi. No details are forthcoming of plunder taken from the 32 cities that Philip allegedly destroyed in Thrace (Dem. 9.26), but Greek authors were more interested in the sufferings of their fellow-Greeks: 'After plundering Olynthus and enslaving the inhabitants, [Philip] sold both men and property as booty. By doing so he procured large sums for prosecuting the war' (Diod. 16.53.3; cf. Dem. 4.34). Potidaea was taken and the population enslaved (Diod. 16.8.5). At Methone, the inhabitants escaped with their freedom and a single item of clothing apiece and their territory was distributed among the Macedonians (Diod. 16.34.5). There is no information about the plundering presumed for Philip's capture of Abdera, Galepsus, Maroneia, Neapolis, Oesyne, Pagae, Pydna, Stagira and Zereia.⁶⁸

By its nature plundering is hardly quantifiable but two figures indicate the scale of possible gains. While besieging Byzantium in 340 Philip detained at nearby Hieron 230 ships carrying grain to Athens, seizing 180 Athenian ships with their cargoes. The ships' timbers served to construct siege-engines and the cargoes (and possibly crews) were sold for a massive 700 talents.⁶⁹ As a consequence of Alexander's destruction of Thebes in 335 (see D.L. Gilley and Ian Worthington, chapter 10), 'more than 30,000 were captured, and the amount of property plundered was unbelievable', writes Diodorus at 17.14.1–4, who also tells of 440 talents raised by the sale of prisoners. Plutarch's anecdote at *Alexander* 12 of a Theban woman, raped by Thracian soldiers searching her house for gold and silver, tells of the potential for personal enrichment.⁷⁰ The fate of Thebes also prefigures accounts of Alexander's army in Asia where plundering is a recurring theme on a scale reminiscent of the Roman triumph.

Plunder, however extensive, was an unpredictable one-off. Stories from Alexander's campaigns suggest practical problems in terms of storage (guards were needed), transport (scant allowance of wagons) and profitable disposal (flooding the market).⁷¹ Taxes and other imposts provided a more reliable stream of income. For internal revenues, apart from duties on the movements of goods, there are the exemptions granted to families of those falling in the Granicus battle (Arr. 1.16.5; cf. 7.10.4): 'their parents and children were granted immunity from tax on land, personal liturgies (*leitourgeiai*) and levies on property (*eisphorai*)'. None of this is unproblematic. Was tax levied on all or just on royal land? Was military service one of the liturgies and what were the rest? Was the *eisphora* irregular and ad hoc as in Athens?⁷² The 'ownership' of revenues has also been debated, with claims that they belonged to the Macedonians as a whole. But the ability of kings to grant tax exemptions and bestow assets on supporters (Plut., *Alexander* 15.3) demonstrates their fiscal authority.⁷³

External revenues are patchily attested. Philip as archon of Thessaly received Thessalian market and customs dues (Dem. 1.22; cf. Justin 11.3.2), and apparently tribute levied on neighbouring communities of *perioikoi* (Xen., *Hellenica* 6.1.12). The presumption was that these revenues would be spent in the interests of the Thessalians but he apparently appropriated them for his general fund. For payments imposed by the Macedonians on those they defeated there is surprisingly little evidence. The clearest case is the tithes (plural) levied by Philip on the Thracians (Diod. 16.71.2). Other payments made by those at the mercy of the Macedonians have to be presumed.⁷⁴ Absent from the fiscal record is any direct impression of scale. For what it is worth, 150 years later (before Pydna), 'the tax the Macedonians paid their king' was said to total a modest 200 talents (Plut., *Aemilianus* 28.6). The rich resources of Thrace were a commonplace (Hdt. 5.3); from the fifth century, Thucydides cites an annual internal tribute paid to King Seuthes of 400 talents of gold and silver, with as much again in 'gifts' of precious metals and in kind (2.97). But nothing is known of the take of Philip's tithes or the logistics of payment. It is possible that the *strategos* of Thrace, though not attested until Alexander (Arr. 1.25.2), oversaw collection.⁷⁵

Direct acquisition of resources through annexation need not have led to growth per head but did increase manpower available for mobilization, best attested for the army. According to Justin 2.1.1, 'there was a range of races in Philip's army': the soldiers implicated in the atrocity at Thebes were Thracians and the Thessalian cavalry serving with Philip and Alexander is well documented. Three of Alexander's six infantry battalions were recruited from Upper

Macedonia and at least one cavalry squadron from a conquered Greek city, Amphipolis (Arr. 1.2.5). Also serving with Alexander were Illyrian, Odrysian, Agrianian and Triballian infantry: a total of 7,500, slightly more than the Greek infantry supplied by the League of Corinth.⁷⁶

Non-military manpower might also be 'redirected'. The key text is from Justin 8.5.7–6.2, thought to refer to after the Illyrian campaign of 345:

Philip returned to his kingdom and, just as shepherds drive their flocks at different times into winter and summer pastures, so he now capriciously transplanted whole people and cities as he felt regions needed to be populated or depopulated [...] Some of these peoples settled right on his borders as a bulwark against his enemies, others he set on remote frontiers of the empire, and some, who were prisoners-of-war, he distributed to supplement the populations of his cities. Doing this he made one kingdom and one people from large numbers of different clans and tribes.

Against the striking image drawn from transhumance, the scope and purpose of these transplantations are debated: maximised by Hammond, applying to the greater kingdom; minimised by Bosworth, restricting the creation of communities to Thrace. Either way, the emphasis seems to be military with possible settlements along the Paeonian and Illyrian frontiers.⁷⁷ In Thrace, 'Philip founded important towns in appropriate places and put an end to the unruly ways of the Thracians' (Diod. 16.71.2); Philippopolis (Plovdiv), Beroe, Cabyle and (later) Alexandropolis are the best attested. Territory confiscated in the Chalcidice (Olynthus, Potidaea, Methone) seems to have been granted mainly to Macedonians, some of whom subsequently served as Alexander's Companion Cavalry.⁷⁸

Philip's first colony at Crenides (in 356), east of Amphipolis, deserves closer attention. According to Diodorus 16.8.6:

After this [capturing Potidaea], he went to the city of Crenides, and having increased its size with a large number of inhabitants, changed its name to Philippi, giving it his own name, and then, turning to the gold mines in its territory, which were very scanty and insignificant, he increased their output so much by his improvements that they could bring him a revenue of more than 1,000 talents. And because from these mines he had soon amassed a fortune, with the abundance of money he raised the Macedonian kingdom higher and higher to a greatly superior position, for the gold coins which he struck, which came to be known from his name as *Philippeioi* ('Philips') he organized a large force of mercenaries, and by using these coins for bribes

induced many Greeks to become betrayers of their native lands. The passage is quoted in full as Diodorus seems here to present Philippi as programmatic for a more complex, drawn-out process of acquisition, exploitation and distribution. The renaming of Crenides suggests its importance for Philip ('more than 1,000 talents' may do duty for 'a very large sum'), as does the draining and cultivation of neighbouring plain. But established sources of precious metals were already available: mines at Damastium east of Lake Lychnitis and at Stratonici in eastern Chalcidice.⁷⁹ In fact, the timing of coin-issues from the Philippi mines is open to debate: the golden *Philippeioi* singled out by Diodorus may date from the end of Philip's reign and after his death.⁸⁰

Apart from problems of chronology, writing of socio-economic history from the coinages of Philip and Alexander is fraught with difficulties (see further, K. Dahmen, chapter 3). Reasons for issuing coinage (all overlapping) are rarely explicit: noneconomic purpose of publicity through coin types; economic functions as a store of value or medium of exchange (subdivided between local and external use). Although choice of design 'must mean something' how much store was set by coin types remains unclear as does responsibility for selecting designs. Historically, ancient coinages have been seen as a badge of autonomy and a vehicle for propaganda. But this has been questioned specifically with respect to Thessalian coinage, which continued long after Philip II's 'domination'.⁸¹ Coins intended primarily as a store of value might be of relatively large denominations: Hammond suggests that late Archaic silver tetradrachms from Macedonia were intended as 'bullion' to meet Persian demand.⁸² Intended internal use might be indicated by smaller denominations and specifically by bronze, which was first attested for Macedonia under Archelaus. The argument is made for a Greek-wide tendency towards two categories of coinage reinforced by the conquests of Philip and Alexander with different fabrics and weight-standards for internal and external use.⁸³

Historians have given clear expression to the socio-economic implications of Macedonian coinage: how plentiful supplies of precious metals make for an abundant coinage leading to a 'strong' economy. Implicit in this line of reasoning, linking coining to economic activity, are at least four assumptions that invite qualification:

- 1 Money need not consist solely of coinage: payments might be made in kind. De Callatay concludes from his quantitative survey of Hellenistic coinages that even substantial upward revision of numbers of coins minted seems inadequate within the hypothetical context of a fully monetized economy.⁸⁴

2 Extensive coinages might be issued without direct access to metal deposits; Thessalian coinage is a case in point. There was presumably a sizable inflow of bullion into Macedonia through export of raw materials.

3 Not all precious metals would be converted into coinage as is demonstrated by the abundance of items in gold and silver from the tombs at Vergina.⁸⁵

4 Not all coinage entered the economy or remained in circulation as is apparent from the hoards that make up much of our numismatic evidence.

An increase in coinage is economically advantageous insofar as it extends command over goods or services. Its impact depends primarily on the variables that constitute the so-called 'quantity theory of money' (conventionally $MV = PT$). The effect of a given quantity of Money (M) circulating around the economy will depend on its 'velocity of circulation' (V): the frequency with which it is 'spent on' during a given period. A coin that after being minted was spent only once and then hoarded would have a very low velocity. For modern times it has been assumed that V has been in the short run more-or-less constant. For antiquity it might be thought to vary according to perceived instability with 'emergency' hoards being added to normal 'savings' hoards. Assuming a stable V in a closed economy, an increase in M will result in a rise in either the price level (P) or the number of exchange transactions (T) or both. If the economy is running at full capacity the overall price level will rise; provided there is sufficient slack (in terms of raw materials, labour, expertise and capital), there may be an increase in the intensity of economic activity. As 'bottlenecks' are encountered, increases in production will be offset by higher prices.⁸⁶

How might these considerations apply to the monetary situation in Macedonia under Philip? That a great deal of coinage was produced, of which a sizable proportion passed into circulation, is not disputed.⁸⁷ The increasing money supply may have combined with Macedonia's abundant raw materials and the underemployment characteristic of pre-industrial societies to intensify economic activity rather than raise prices. The obvious bottleneck might seem to be the supply of men for the enlarging army. But that would be eased by extending the area of recruitment and by hiring mercenaries. Demosthenes envisaged Philip funding mercenaries through his revenues from Thessaly (1.22).⁸⁸ Payment for mercenaries reminds us that the Macedonian economy was not 'closed': outsiders were willing to accept Macedonian currency for their goods and services. Provided the king or his advisers were in overall control of coining, bringing minting and other sources of income broadly into balance with

expenditure on available resources, inflation could be contained. There are pointers (no more) in this direction. The pseudo-Aristotelian *Oeconomicus* singles out coinage (*nomisma*) as the first responsibility of the 'royal' economy (1345b 20ff), with the king overseeing kinds of coins and when to strike them.⁸⁹ Demosthenes claimed that Philip was his own treasurer (1.4), but Theopompus was unimpressed (*FGrH* 115 F 115; cf. Justin 9.8.6):

When Philip came to be very rich he did not spend his money quickly, he really hurled it and threw it away. He was quite hopeless at finance both himself and his immediate circle. The fact was, not one of them had any idea of living an orderly life or 'management'. For this Philip himself was to blame. He did everything on impulse, ever ready to gain wealth and to give away. Of course he was really a soldier: he had no time for keeping an account of income and expenditure.

Theopompus receives apparent support from the allegedly near-empty treasury, with just 70 talents, and 200 talents of debt inherited by Alexander, who supposedly had to borrow 800 to fund his campaigning.⁹⁰ But other readings are possible with Philip deliberately spending up to the limit (anticipating Keynesian principles) to build up the army Alexander was to take to Asia. Apart from precious metals still buried in the earth, uncoined gold and silver (plate and the like) formed an effective reserve, and Philip's credit was presumably as good as his son's. Far from acting always on impulse Philip, 'was effective simply by knowing where he was going'.⁹¹

Crucial here is a divergence from the Roman Republican process whereby profits of conquest and empire were shared among the ruling elite and subsequently expended on conspicuous consumption, buying support and the purchase of land and slaves. In the Macedonian case, increased resources were largely funnelled through the king into military and paramilitary purposes: the process of distribution was correspondingly more focused. Most obvious was maintenance of a standing army (Dem. 8.11); annual pay for the field army Alexander took to Asia is estimated at nearly 3,000 talents.⁹² Additional burdens were imposed through Philip's introduction of a specialist siege-train and the beginnings of a Macedonian fleet.⁹³ Concerning paramilitary expenditure, substantial sums were disbursed in the bribe-gifts which ancient authors identify as characteristic of Philip's reign. Diodorus records how, having plundered Olynthus, Philip distributed money to men of influence in various cities, saying that: 'it was far more by the use of gold than of arms that he had enlarged his kingdom'.⁹⁴ He also notes how Philip rewarded those soldiers who fought bravely.⁹⁵ Theopompus tells how, later in Philip's reign, his Companions

numbered 800 and enjoyed the profits of as much land as 10,000 of the wealthiest Greeks (*FGrH* 15 F 225b). Insofar as the figures can be trusted, documented grants of land seem to have been concentrated in Chalcidice and around Amphipolis.⁹⁶

The end-product of Philip's efforts was the amassing of military human capital. The phenomenon was apparently appreciated in Athens. A Macedonian character at a symposium in Mnesimachus' comic play *Philip*, from the mid-fourth century, is made to say (Athen. 10.421b-c):

Don't you know that you've got to fight against us men who dine on swords freshly sharpened, and who, instead of a starter, eat up lighted torches? Immediately after that the slave, after dinner, brings on a dessert in the form of Cretan arrows instead of chickpeas, broken remnants of javelins besides; and we have shields and breastplates for cushions, slings and bows ready at our feet, and wreath ourselves with catapults.

The politico-military economy developed by Philip had to contend with Alexander's absenteeism as the focus of getting and spending shifted eastwards away from Macedonia. Preoccupation of ancient writers with Alexander's campaigning explains our almost complete ignorance of adjustments to the Macedonian economy. Presumably collection of revenues continued, as under Philip, which were expended in part on the army of 12,000 left with Antipater (Diod. 17.17.5). It is inappropriate here to analyze in detail economic aspects of Alexander's Asian conquests; in any case, surviving sources are more concerned with moral economizing than building balance sheets. But general tendencies may be sketched in with possible repercussions for economy and society in Macedonia.⁹⁷

Alexander's conquests had a massive impact on manpower (killed, captured, redirected) and on fixed capital (cities founded and destroyed), also unlocking unprecedented quantities of precious metals, coined and uncoined. Tribute continued to be collected in Alexander's empire approximately as under the Persians. Egypt supplies a possible model (Arr. 3.3.5), with the nomarchs or local governors instructed to collect the tribute as before but to hand it over to Cleomenes, Alexander's agent and effectively a satrap. A disapproving Arrian preserves some detail of the activities of Cleomenes on his own behalf and at the behest of Alexander (7.23.6–8): provided Cleomenes appropriately commemorates Hephaestion, any past (and future) financial irregularities will be overlooked. Alexander is presented elsewhere as intervening in local fiscal regimes on the basis of moral sentiment rather than economic rationality. The tribute Mallus had paid the Persians was remitted on the grounds that

the city was a colony of Argos, hometown of the Argeads (Arr. 2.5.9). In response to an appeal from Darius' mother Alexander allowed the Uxians to cultivate their lands tax free (Curt.. 5.3.10–15). The Arimaspi were generously rewarded by Alexander because of their past loyalty to Cyrus (Curt. 7.3.1–3). The autonomy of Nysa in India was allegedly confirmed because of a tradition it had been founded by Dionysus (Arr. 5.1.3–2.7).

Alexander could afford to be quixotic in his attitude to tribute: any shortfall was presumably a problem for the local satrap or his equivalent. As is suggested, accumulated booty made tribute payments a less-than-pressing concern.⁹⁸ The scale of plundering was breathtaking. From Sardis, Damascus, Susa and Persepolis (and lesser named places), approximately 180,000 talents were accumulated in Alexander's treasury at Ecbatana (Strabo 731, Diod. 17.80.3). 'Mobile plunder' looms large: enslavement in batches of tens of thousands of prisoners of war and the pillaging of hundreds of thousands of livestock. Small wonder the whole expedition has been regarded as a 'booty raid on an epic scale'.⁹⁹ Again, the testimony tends to be morally charged. Ancient authors dwell on the thousands of talents changing hands, contrasting the extravagant wealth of the Persian king (and the mounting greed of the Macedonian rank and file) with the resolute austerity of Alexander, refusing to claim his share of the spoils (Arr. 7.9, Curt. 4.14.6). Alexander even intervenes to insist that Persian women prisoners have their plundered finery returned to them (Curt. 3.12.23).

A substantial amount of booty would have been siphoned off at source to support the campaign. According to Curtius 6.2.10, from 26,000 talents of recent plunder 12,000 were disbursed as bonuses for the troops and a similar sum embezzled by those with charge over it. This was obviously the tip of an iceberg but it is impossible to determine the proportions of plunder consumed on the spot and sent on to Ecbatana (later Babylon) into the charge of Harpalus then his successor Antimenes.¹⁰⁰ Minting of coins seems to have followed on Alexander's conquests, shifting from Pella to Amphipolis and thence to mints in the Levant and Babylon.¹⁰¹ Although Harpalus is presumed to have overseen minting operations, he is shown dispatching eastwards to Alexander a mercenary army, weapons, medicine, and even books, but not coinage (Diod. 17.95.4, Curt 9.3.21, Plut., *Alexander* 8.2–3).

If the destination of newly minted coin is unclear its scale is not in doubt. It has been estimated that, over an 18-year period, the Amphipolis mint produced 13,000,000 silver tetradrachms.¹⁰² Maynard Keynes in his *Treatise on Money* pondered on 'how far the dispersal by Alexander of the bank reserves of Persia [...] was

responsible for the outburst of economic progress in the Mediterranean basin, of which Carthage attempted and Rome ultimately succeeded to reap the fruits'.¹⁰³ But Keynes says nothing about possible mechanisms whereby all this wealth found its way back to the West. Our sources are strangely silent about bullion being sent directly back to Macedonia. It may be significant that Arrian 3.16.10 singles out the 3,000 talents Alexander instructed be sent money to support Antipater (only if needed) in his war with Agis III of Sparta. The impression is that relatively little gold and silver was funnelled westwards, at least until fighting in Asia was over. Diodorus 18.12.2 records that shortly before Alexander's death a fleet of 110 triremes had been sent to convey money to the royal treasury in Macedonia.¹⁰⁴

Alexander on campaign presumably exercised first call over the profits of victory. Anecdote suggests that once launched on his Asian campaign he was rarely short of resources; testimony centres on related areas of conspicuous consumption and gift giving. Lavish expenditure on hospitality and ostentatious display and funerals for his followers (including Darius' queen) reinforced Alexander's position as leader of this community-on-the-move.¹⁰⁵ The gift economy, apart from redistributing resources, highlighted personal obligation and dependence. The theme of Alexander's giftgiving (less frequently receiving) is prominent in all three ancient accounts from the initial bestowing of estates, villages, and revenues of ports and other communities on his friends (Plut., *Alexander* 15; cf. 34.1), to settling his soldiers' debts shortly before his death.¹⁰⁶ Here and elsewhere more is at stake than Alexander's generosity. Plutarch devotes a lengthy section of his *Life of Alexander* (39) to the wit, wisdom and implications of Alexander's gift giving to individuals, among them the commander of the Paeonians, a common soldier, his friends and companions (including Parmenion), and his mother.

There are regular references to gifts and gratuities made to troops *en masse* at key stages in the campaign and to individuals for distinguished service. These, along with personal plunder, were seemingly on a scale to be economically significant: a potential mechanism whereby rank and file (as opposed to the military elite) might transfer wealth back to Macedonia.¹⁰⁷ But how literally are stories of the practical problems individuals faced in transporting plunder or of widespread indebtedness back in Susa to be taken? In any case it seems possible that relatively few of those setting out with Alexander returned home. In a paper strikingly entitled, 'Alexander the Great and the decline of Macedon', Bosworth argues persuasively that the overwhelming majority of the army eventually died outside their homeland.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, the demands made by Alexander on

Macedonian manpower during the course of his campaigning (perhaps 30,000 to 40,000 men) were disabling. Diodorus 18.12.2 wrote that immediately after Alexander's death 'Macedonia was short of citizen-soldiers because of the numbers who had been sent to Asia as replacements for the army'. Bosworth brings the known figures together and points to the difficulties initially faced by Antipater in raising sufficient troops to confront the Spartans, and then the Greek coalition in the Lamian War. He looks further into the future: 'in the heyday of the hellenistic monarchies, the homeland of Macedon became increasingly feeble as the human price of Alexander's conquests was paid'.

4 Return to the Edge of the World?

The remaining story of the Macedonian economy down to its dismemberment by the Romans may be briefly told. Although the dynamics of decline and fall have their own inherent interest, in the case of Hellenistic Macedonia our information is too sparse for detailed reconstruction. For Rostovtzeff, Macedonia was not only the least powerful of the three successor kingdoms but also it was that of which least was known.¹⁰⁹ The centre of gravity of economic and military power had permanently shifted eastwards leaving Macedonia exposed on the north-western periphery of the Greek world. The migration of Macedonian manpower to Asia and Egypt, instituted by Alexander, continued under his successors.¹¹⁰ Macedonia reverted to approximately its position before Philip: a Balkan kingdom under constant pressure from its neighbours.

With hindsight, the threat posed by surrounding tribes had never been completely eradicated, not even by Philip as was demonstrated by Alexander's initial campaigning against the Triballi. Continuing dangers were evident in events shortly before Alexander's death, as told by Curtius (10.1.44–5; cf. Justin 12.2.16–17):

Zopyron, who governed Thrace, had been lost with his entire army [of 30,000] with the sudden onset of stormy weather and squalls while he was on an expedition against the Getae. On learning of this set-back, Seuthes had driven his subjects, the Odrysians, to rebellion. Thrace had almost been lost and not even Greece [...]

The lacuna in which the text ends seems prophetic in that the Antigonids were regularly to be at odds with Greeks to the south resisting Macedonian supremacy: Spartans, Athenians, Achaean and Aetolian Leagues. Additional fluctuating threats were posed by the

other successor kingdoms as Alexander's commanders, then their descendants, sought violently to redivide their territorial inheritance.¹¹¹ Success depended on possessing the resources to underwrite preponderant military manpower. According to Diodorus 19.56.5, Antigonos' annual revenue totalled 11,000 talents, chiefly from tribute-paying territories in Asia. His accumulated reserve was some 35,000 talents held in treasuries in the East. Expenditures on war and preparation for war were on a corresponding scale with which those in Macedonia struggled and failed to compete.¹¹² Macedonian inadequacy was ruthlessly exposed in the earlier third century (287–284) when the kingdom was briefly but effectively partitioned between two 'outsiders', Pyrrhus of Epirus and Lysimachus in Thrace. Four years later it proved impossible at least initially to repel invasions by bands of Celts.¹¹³

Of course, Macedonian weakness was relative. Shortly after the Celtic debacle Antigonos managed to meet, and eventually defeat, a Greek coalition though supported by Ptolemy in the Chremonidean War (268–262). The Antigonids retained control over rich resources of timber and other raw materials, which were in part deployed in what J. Ma has labelled the 'symbolical game of reciprocity'.¹¹⁴ Polybius tells how in 227 Antigonos Doson (appropriately, 'the man who will give') sent 15,000 timbers to help re-roof the city of Rhodes, devastated by an earthquake (5.89). It is also possible that timber from Macedonia was used in the sanctuaries at Delos, Delphi and Epidauros.¹¹⁵ Rival sources of timber were now available: by 313 Antigonos had built up an enormous fleet from the cypresses and cedars of Mount Lebanon (Diod. 19.58.6). But the continuing importance of Macedonian lumber is apparent in the Roman prohibition of felling of shipbuilding timber after the Battle of Pydna (Livy 45.29.11, 14).

Antigonos readopted Pella as the royal capital. The peristyle houses excavated there, with their fine mosaics, testify to the prosperity of at least the Macedonian elite. The luxurious lifestyle at court of Demetrius Poliorcetes verged on the notorious (Plut., *Demetrius* 41.3–4). Excavation of material evidence may one day indicate whether any of this increased wealth 'trickled down' to the mass of the population.¹¹⁶ The Macedonian kings continued their predecessors' programme of city-founding within and outside the kingdom following Philip and Alexander in exploiting naming opportunities. Cassander created by synoecism Cassandreia and Thessalonica in the Chalcidice (Diod. 19.52.2–3, Strabo FF 21, 34); Demetrius created, again by synoecism, Demetrias in Magnesia (Diod. 20.102.2–4); Lysimachus founded Lysimacheia in the Thracian Chersonese. An inscription from Cassandreia (*Syll*³ 332) shows

Cassander excusing Perdiccas, son of Coinos, from harbour dues: a reminder that city building gave scope for raising revenue. There were also prestige building-works outside Macedonia, for example the stoas of Antigonos Gonatas and of Philip V on Delos and a range of buildings in the Sanctuary of the Great Gods at Samothrace.¹¹⁷

The military concerns of Hellenistic kingship may be sampled in regulations on army discipline issued by Philip V (see n. 70).

The politico-economic activities of Philip V demonstrate the enduring potential of Macedonia as a major power. According to Polybius 22.10 and Livy 39.24 Philip increased agricultural revenues and harbour dues, opened new mines and reopened old ones. Like Philip II, he also seems to have rebalanced manpower within the kingdom by transplanting populations from Thrace into Macedonia. There were apparent efforts to increase the birth rate (Polyb. 23.10.6-7, Livy 39.24.1-4). Even so, he was able to scrape together only 18,000 Macedonian infantry against the Romans at the Battle of Cynoscephalae in 197 (Livy 33.3.1-5, 4.4-6). His son Perseus, after some 20 years of conserving Macedonian manpower, confronted the Romans at Pydna with an army of 26,000 Macedonians (Livy 42.51.3-11, 51.11).

The scale of Perseus' achievement may be reflected in the decisive action by the Romans in the aftermath of the Battle of Pydna in their partitioning of Macedonia (see A.M. Eckstein, chapter 12). Apart from the division into four economically insulated districts (no purchasing of real property across frontiers), gold and silver mines were closed (iron and copper mining was permitted), production of timber for shipbuilding was prohibited, and an annual tribute of 100 talents was to be paid over to Rome. Livy has those now banned from inter-regional trade compare the country to a dismembered animal (5.30.2). The monarchy, embodiment of Macedonian economy and society, was abolished.¹¹⁸

The relatively recent subdiscipline of 'fiscal history' attempts to construct a developmental model of state formation for modern Europe based on collection and redistribution of public resources. Leading exponents of this approach, M. Ormrod and R. Bonney, have identified four stages in European fiscal history from Tribute (premedieval) state through Domain (medieval) state and Tax (pre-modern) state to the modern Fiscal state.¹¹⁹ Criteria for the four categories (good for classicists and ancient historians to think with) include contemporary financial theory, status of financial administrators, types of finance, destination of expenditures, availability of credit, nature of public works, and causes of instability. Although Ormrod and Bonney extend their analysis back to the

Roman Empire, where they identify overlapping aspects of Tribute, Doman and Taxation states, the value to the historian of Macedonia of this fiscal sociology resides in the questions it raises. Bonney has identified what he terms the 'predatory principle': the power of the state to coerce, depending ultimately on sufficient fiscal strength adequate to support its armed forces. Warfare repeatedly emerges as the financial climacteric, forcing the remodelling of fiscal regimes for better or worse.¹²⁰

With hindsight, Alexander in the East appears as a lost opportunity for Macedonia, decoupling the kingdom from the tremendous fiscal opportunities offered by Asia and Egypt. The contrast with Rome's empire is instructive with its range of mechanisms formal and informal for ongoing transference of resources back to Rome and Italy: plunder and indemnities, then tribute, taxes and extortion. Comparison has been drawn between the scale of the booty paraded in triumphs at Rome and the extent of Alexander's plundering in Asia. The difference is that relatively few of these Asian resources were paraded (or deployed) back in Macedon. The Roman elite, ever alert to the predatory principle, knew better. The 6,000 talents of gold and silver, confiscated from the Macedonian royal treasuries (Polyb. 18.35.4), contributed towards the unprecedented quantity of booty set by Velleius Paterculus at 210,000,000 sesterces (1.9.6), carried in the triumph of Aemilius Paullus. The impact on the Roman fiscal system was immediate and obvious. On the strength of this westward redistribution of resources, the Senate abolished future payment by Roman citizens of the *tributum* throughout Italy.¹²¹

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

E.N. Borza's collection of previously published articles in C.G. Thomas (ed.), *Makedonika* (Claremont 1995) and *In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon* (Princeton 1990) both contain much material helpful for the economic historian; likewise M.B. Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings*, 2 vols. (Athens 1966). N.G.L. Hammond, *A History of Macedonia* 1 (Oxford 1972), N.G.L. Hammond and G.T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia* 2 (Oxford 1979) and N.G.L. Hammond and F.W. Walbank, *A History of Macedonia* 3 (Oxford 1988), though tending to treat the economy anachronistically, remain an essential resource. Ian Worthington, *Philip II of Macedonia* (New Haven 2008) and A.B. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great* (Cambridge 1988) are always alert to economic factors. There is thoughtful economic analysis in R. Billows, *Kings and*

Colonists: Aspects of Macedonian Imperialism (Leiden 1995) and *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1990). G. Reger, 'The Economy', in A. Erskine (ed.), *A Companion to the Hellenistic World* (Oxford 2003), pp. 331–53, gives remarkable coverage. There are relevant essays in two volumes edited by Z.H. Archibald et al. (eds.), *Hellenistic Economies* (London 2001) and *Making, Moving and Managing: The New World of Ancient Economies, 323–31 B.C.* (Oxford 2005), pp. 117–35. More important for theory and approaches than material about Macedonia is W. Scheidel, I. Morris and R. Saller (eds.), *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World* (Cambridge 2007). For illustrated accounts of material remains, see M.B. Hatzopoulos and L.D. Loukopoulou (eds.), *Philip of Macedon* (Athens 1992) and R. Ginouvès (ed.), *Macedonia from Philip II to the Roman Conquest* (Athens 1993).

1 Rhodes and Osborne, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, no. 12; translated as if two treaties in P.E. Harding (ed.), *From the End of the Peloponnesian War to the Battle of Ipsus* (Cambridge 1985), no. 21; text, photograph and bibliography: M.B. Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings 2* (Athens 1996), no. 1.

2 Delays in publication: E.N. Borza, 'The History and Archaeology of Macedonia: Retrospect and Prospect', in C.G. Thomas (ed.), *Makedonika* (Claremont 1995), pp. 27–9; cf. M.B. Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings 1* (Athens 1996), pp. 12–13. On epigraphic sources, see P.J. Rhodes, chapter 2. Summaries of site-by-site excavations from 1960 to late 1970s: D. Leekley and N. Efstratiou, *Archaeological Excavations in Central and Northern Greece* (Park Ridge 1980), pp. 74–107; sites and museums excellently combined in C. Mee and A. Spawforth (eds.), *Greece: An Oxford Archaeological Guide* (Oxford 2001), pp. 394–445. Citations in *Archaeological Reports* provide tantalizing glimpses of work in progress. For the spread to Hellenistic cities of the 'epigraphic habit' (a tendency to inscribe in stone public and semi-public decisions), see R. Billows, 'Cities', in A. Erskine (ed.), *A Companion to the Hellenistic World* (Oxford 2003), p. 209. For a detailed treatment of the historical background to this chapter, see part IV, 'History'.

3 Detailed reconstruction of events and chronology: D.A. March, 'The Kings of Makedon: 399–369 B.C.', *Historia* 44 (1995), pp. 257–82, and see J. Roisman, chapter 8.

4 Theophrastus' autopsy: Hammond, *History of Macedonia* 1, pp.

157–8; cf. *Causes of Plants* 9.8.1 for the Macedonian practice of digging in bean plants as a green manure.

⁵ On the Mediterranean-wide importance of harbour dues and taxes on movement: N. Purcell, 'The Ancient Mediterranean: The View from the Customs House', in W.V. Harris (ed.), *Rethinking the Mediterranean* (Oxford 2005), pp. 201–32.

⁶ Edited by W. Scheidel, I. Morris and R. Saller (Cambridge 2007).

⁷ A 'Macedonian slave in Athens: R. Meiggs and D.M. Lewis (eds.), *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* (Oxford 1988), no. 79. Attic orators and the economy: P. Millett, 'The Economy', in R. Osborne (ed.), *Classical Greece 500–323 BC* (Oxford 2000), pp. 23–51.

⁸ M.I. Finley, *The Ancient Economy* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1984). For Macedonia's fleeting appearance in the second edition of this book (in 1985 at p. 183), see J.K. Davies' quotation and comment in 'Hellenistic Economies in the Post-Finley Era', in Z.H. Archibald et al. (eds.), *Hellenistic Economies* (London 2001), pp. 11–12.

⁹ N.G.L. Hammond, *The Genius of Alexander the Great* (London 1997), p. 54 and *Alexander the Great: King, Commander and Statesman*² (Bristol 1989), pp. 163–4.

¹⁰ Davies, 'Hellenistic Economies', pp. 20–1, warns about the need to distinguish between (and then re-integrate) the processes of production, exchange and consumption from taxation and redistribution.

¹¹ Hammond, *Macedonian State*, pp. 4–5; illustration at R. Ginouvès (ed.), *Macedonia from Philip II to the Roman Conquest* (Athens 1993), p. 28. Attribution of these coins to Alexander I is not quite secure: Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, pp. 127–9; see K. Dahmen, chapter 3.

¹² Illustration at Ginouvès, *Macedonia from Philip II*, p. 28. Hunting as 'an essential form of livelihood': Hammond, *History of Macedonia* 1, p. 209; cf. pp. 155–6 for Heracles Cynagidas (Heracles the Hunter) as a royal cult and hunting as an elite preoccupation, on which see too N. Sawada, chapter 19.

¹³ For implications of rainfall and temperature: Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, pp. 25–6.

¹⁴ Cf. Hammond, *History of Macedonia* 1, pp. 12–18, R. Billows, *Kings and Colonists: Aspects of Macedonian Imperialism* (Leiden 1995), pp. 1–11. Malaria may have blighted life for those in coastal areas: E.N. Borza, ‘Some Observations on Malaria and the Ecology of Central Macedonia in Antiquity’, in C.G. Thomas (ed.), *Makedonika* (Claremont 1995), pp. 57–83.

¹⁵ Strikingly depicted in the map in M.B. Hatzopoulos and L.D. Loukopoulou (eds.), *Philip of Macedon* (Athens 1980), p. 22.

¹⁶ J.K. Campbell, *Honour, Family and Patronage. A Study of Institutions and Moral Values in a Greek Mountain Community* (Oxford 1964); cf. F. Braudel’s observation: ‘The plains aimed at progress, the hills for survival’, in R. De Ayala and P. Braudel (eds.), *The Mediterranean in the Ancient World*, trans. S. Reynolds (London 2001), p. 15.

¹⁷ E. Cohen, *The Athenian Nation* (Princeton 2000). For the figure of about 500,000 for Macedonia, see J.R. Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism* (London 1976), p. 34; cf. Ian Worthington, *Philip II of Macedonia* (New Haven 2008), p. 7. Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, pp. 202–4, drawing on proxy-date from late-nineteenth-century Macedonia, sets the figure as high as 1.5 million.

¹⁸ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 23–4, 659–60.

¹⁹ Hammond, *Macedonian State*, pp. 10, 94, 159–60, 195. Hammond is insistent that ‘it was essentially a free society (there being no trace in Macedonia of the slave base on which Greek city-states rested)’: Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, p. 13. His argument is based on court practices (Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 154–5), whereby women of the royal household and ‘royal pages’ performed menial tasks (Curt. 5.2.20), but that is not evidence for the absence of unfree labour.

²⁰ Peasants as ‘part societies’: R. Redfield, *The Primitive World and its Transformation* (New York 1953), p. 31 (the city), E.R. Wolf, *Peasants* (New York 1966), p. 11 (the state).

²¹ Ellis, *Philip II*, p. 27; cf. his 'Macedon and North-west Greece', *CAH*² 6 (Cambridge 1994), pp. 728–9. Ellis' suggestion, including his tentative mention of 'serfdom' for Macedonia (with potentially misleading feudal associations), is echoed by Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, pp. 9–10, 136–7. The 2,000 Greek mercenaries captured at Granicus and sent in chains to forced labour in Macedonia were presumably equivalent to slaves (Arr. 1.16–17). There were surely chattel slaves in the *polis* states on the fringes of Macedonian territory. From Beroia (in about 280 or 235) comes a detailed inscription concerning manumission of (presumably household) slaves: *SEG* 12 (1955) 314, Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions* 2, no. 93 = S.M. Burstein, *The Hellenistic Age from the Battle of Ipsos to the Death of Kleopatra VII* (Cambridge 1985), no. 54.

²² M.I. Finley, 'Between Slavery and Freedom', in B.D. Shaw and R.P. Saller (eds.), *Economy and Society in Ancient Greece* (London 1981), pp. 116–32. Concerning Thessaly, were it not for a few chance references we would be unaware of the *penestai*.

²³ Meiggs and Lewis, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, no. 91 = C.W. Fornara, *Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War*² (Cambridge 1983), no. 161.

²⁴ Were the contractors for public building projects who, according to Justin 8.3.9, left without being paid non-Macedonians? Demosthenes 19.286 reports Macedonian importing of ships' gear. For 'intellectual' visitors to the Macedonian court: Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 149, 206–7, G.L. Cawkwell, *Philip of Macedon* (London 1978), pp. 50–3. There were also non-Macedonians among Alexander's entourage, such as Nearchus from Crete as admiral and Antimenes from Rhodes as financial expert ([Arist.], *Oeconomicus* 132b28–53a4). Hammond in Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, pp. 184–6, cites excavations at Vergina as evidence for Macedonian technical skills; cf. Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, pp. 266–76.

²⁵ Hatzopoulos, M.B., 'L'état Macédonien antique: un nouveau visage', *CRAI* (1997), pp. 7–25. For the 'primitivist' view: Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 145–6.

²⁶ The previous references are to Hatzopoulos, 'L'état Macédonien antique: un nouveau visage', pp. 12–13, 16, 17–21. To the five settlements overlooking the coastal plain (Aegae, Beroea, Mieza, Edessa, Pella) may be added a range of urban communities:

Hammond, *Macedonian State*, pp. 93–5. For excavation of cities and sanctuaries, see the following in Ginouvès, *Macedonia from Philip II*, A. Despinis, ‘The Tombs of Sindos’, pp. 33–5, I. Akamatis, ‘The Cities: Pella’, pp. 91–6, D. Pandermalis, ‘The Cities: Dion’, pp. 97–101, K.D. Lazaridou, ‘The Cities: Amphipolis’, pp. 101–6, M.B. Hatzopoulos, ‘The Sanctuaries’, pp. 106–9, A.-M. Guimier-Sorbets, ‘The Setting of Everyday Life’, pp. 117–43.

²⁷ For Thucydides at 4.78.6, Dium was a *polis*; urban development seems to be a fourth-century phenomenon: Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions* 1, pp. 129–30. P.J. Rhodes, ‘The *Polis* and the Alternatives’, *CAH*² 6 (Cambridge 1994), p. 586, notes that from the mid-fourth century a Macedonian might be identified by his city.

²⁸ Testimony in Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, pp. 166–71, exploring the meaning of ‘capital’. A votive deposit of terracotta models of domesticated animals from Pella might suggest that this and other cities ‘were inhabited not by a sophisticated population but by simple agricultural workers who went out daily into the fields and to raise livestock’: Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, p. 482.

²⁹ Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions* 1, pp. 47–123; cf. Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, pp. 474–5. The existence of small-scale communities is explicit in the 26 *polismata* brought together by Cassander to create Thessalonica (Strabo 7 FF 21, 24).

³⁰ As exemplified by A.M. Snodgrass, ‘Survey Archaeology and the Rural Landscape of Greek Cities’, in O. Murray and S. Price (eds.), *The Greek City from Homer to Alexander* (Oxford 1990), pp. 113–36.

³¹ Survey in the Strymon delta seems to have been discontinued after a single season (1982): A. Dunn, ‘The Strymon Delta Project’, in D.R. Keller and D.W. Rupp (eds.), *Archaeological Survey in the Mediterranean Area*, BAR International Series 155 (1983), pp. 211–12. The Carleton and Minnesota Grevena Survey, covering Tymphaea in the Pindus Mountains, seems not to have resulted in any synoptic publication.

³² Vol. 2, map 50, compiled by E.N. Borza for R.J.A. Talbert (ed.),

Barrington Atlas of the Greek and Roman World (Princeton 2000), pp. 762–70, who suggests that isolated tombs dotting the landscape may indicate as yet undiscovered settlements.

³³ Later inscriptions shed a little light. Hatzopoulos, ‘L’état Macédonien antique’, pp. 17–18, reproduces an inscription of the late third century from the town of Morrylos in Crestonia (‘ce Clochmerle Macédonien’), honouring Paramonos (‘un brave bourgeois-paysan’) for having given a cow to the city and its patron-deity Asclepius.

³⁴ There are Homeric precedents for defrauding *thetes* (*Iliad* 31.441–452); cf. M.I. Finley, *The World of Odysseus* (London 1999), pp. 57–8. Detailed discussion of the myth and its implications: Hammond, *History of Macedonia* 1, pp. 5–10.

³⁵ P. Millett, ‘Hesiod and his World’, *PCPS* 210 (1984), pp. 84–115; see now A.T. Edwards, *Hesiod’s Ascra* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 2004), C.G. Thomas, *Finding People in Early Greece* (Columbia 2005), A.M. Snodgrass, *An Archaeology of Greece: The Present and Future State of a Discipline* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1987), p. 91.

³⁶ Parallels between Homeric and Macedonian society have been identified (Rhodes, ‘*Polis* and the Alternatives’, p. 586) and denied (Errington, *History of Macedonia*, p. 220). The modified reconstruction by H. van Wees, *Status Warriors: War, Violence and Society in Homer and History* (Amsterdam 1992), pp. 25–58, might serve to reopen the debate.

³⁷ Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, p. 173, who notes the exceptionally large denominations minted by Alexander I (pp. 129–30).

³⁸ Hammond, *History of Macedonia* 1, pp. 13 (with map 1) and 94.

³⁹ For thoughts on salt in the Hellenistic economy (including Macedonia): Davies, ‘Hellenistic Economies’, pp. 24–7.

⁴⁰ E.N. Borza, ‘The Natural Resources of Early Macedonia’, in C.G. Thomas (ed.), *Makedonika* (Claremont 1995), pp. 46–47, notes there is no explicit evidence that wine was produced in ancient Macedonia; it was, however, imported into Pella from

Mende, Torne and Thasos. Exotic luxuries (silk, ivory) naturally had to be imported. Bucephalus was a luxury Thessalian import, allegedly on offer at 13 talents (Plut., *Alexander* 6.1).

⁴¹ Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, p. 52, Hammond, *History of Macedonia* 1, pp. 19–78, M.B. Hatzopoulos, *Two Studies in Ancient Macedonian Topography* (Athens 1987), pp. 17–60. Borza, *Map by Map Directory* 2, p. 761: ‘The methods by which such roads are reconstructed in this part of the Balkans – with varying degrees of confidence often depend on a multiplicity of interlocking evidence, including archaeological remains of roads, stations, bridges and milestones, as well as literary references’.

⁴² Snodgrass, *Archaeology of Greece*, p. 73.

⁴³ P. Horden and N. Purcell, *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History* (Oxford 2000), pp. 123–72, 176–7, 178–90; for South Etruria, see pp. 59–65 and for Melos pp. 74–7. See too their ‘Four Years of Corruption: A Response to Critics’, in W.V. Harris (ed.), *Rethinking the Mediterranean* (Oxford 2005), pp. 348–75.

⁴⁴ Hammond, *History of Macedonia* 1, pp. 205–6. Now largely drained, its extent in antiquity is disputed. Theophrastus, *Enquiry into Plants* 5.14.5, singles out a species of water chestnut, local to the Strymon delta as ‘food for free’.

⁴⁵ Scarcity of firs: R. Meiggs, *Trees and Timber in the Ancient Mediterranean World* (Oxford 1982), p. 119, E.N. Borza, ‘Timber and Politics in the Ancient World: Macedon and the Greeks’, in C.G. Thomas (ed.), *Makedonika* (Claremont 1995), pp. 88–9, supplies what can be inferred about logging.

⁴⁶ Borza, ‘Timber and Politics’, pp. 91–2, Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions* 1, pp. 434–5. For renting out of a royal brickworks: Errington, *History of Macedonia*, p. 222 with n. 14.

⁴⁷ On the chronic shortage of timber in antiquity: Davies, ‘Hellenistic Economies’, pp. 23–4.

⁴⁸ Borza, ‘Timber and Politics’, pp. 86–7.

⁴⁹ Meiggs, *Trees and Timber*, pp. 357–8. Arguing for Persian purchasing of Macedonian timber: Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, p. 68. Whether Alexander I was regarded by the Athenians as ‘friend and benefactor’ (Hdt. 8.136.1) through supplying ships’ timber is disputed: Borza, ‘Timber and Politics’, pp. 93–4.

⁵⁰ For tribute-paying *poleis* (in Athens’ empire) within the Macedonian domain: Errington, *History of Macedonia*, p. 28; in detail: B. Isaac, *The Greek Settlements in Thrace until the Macedonian Conquest* (Leiden 1986), pp. 18–48.

⁵¹ Meiggs and Lewis, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, no. 65 = Fornara, *Archaic Times*, no. 128.

⁵² Errington, *History of Macedonia*, pp. 15–24, Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, pp. 158–9. For Perdiccas as at this stage effectively a ‘client’ of the Athenians: Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 133–6; cf. J. Roisman, chapter 8.

⁵³ Timber for the fleet sailing to Sicily may have been Macedonian: Borza, ‘Timber and Politics’, p. 96.

⁵⁴ M.N. Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* 2 (Oxford 1948), no. 129.

⁵⁵ Sufficient for 10 triremes according to Meiggs, *Trees and Timber*, p. 364. For Timotheus as a commander blending public with private: P. Millett, ‘Warfare, Economy and Democracy in Classical Athens’, in J. Rich and G. Shipley (eds.), *War and Society in the Greek World* (London 1993), pp. 191–4.

⁵⁶ Borza, ‘Timber and Politics’, p. 92 with n. 38.

⁵⁷ The evidence is circumstantial: Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 185–6, P. Roesch, ‘Un décret inédit de la Ligue thébaine et la flotte d’Épaminondas’, *REG* 98 (1984), pp. 45–60.

⁵⁸ Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, pp. 213–14.

⁵⁹ Demand for long lengths of timber for non-naval construction should not be underestimated: Borza, ‘Timber and Politics’, p. 87.

⁶⁰ See L. Missitzis, 'A Royal Decree of Alexander the Great on the Lands of Philippi', *Anc. World* 12 (1985), pp. 3–14, with Borza, 'Timber and Politics', p. 111 n. 62, N.G.L. Hammond, 'The King and the Land in the Macedonian Kingdom', *CQ*² 38 (1988), pp. 382–91.

⁶¹ P. Millett, 'Productive to Some Purpose? The Problem of Ancient Economic Growth', in D.J. Mattingly and J. Salmon (eds.), *Economies beyond Agriculture in the Classical World* (London 2001), pp. 17–48, attempts to assess the possibilities (not many) for sustained growth through antiquity.

⁶² In 219 according to Polybius 4.66.7, Philip V sent home his infantry soldiers for the harvest.

⁶³ Contrasting Philip's embarrassment of riches with Athenian embarrassment: A.B. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great* (Cambridge 1988), pp. 8–9; cf. Worthington, *Philip II*, pp. 50–1 on Athenian resources.

⁶⁴ G.L. Cawkwell introduces his *Philip of Macedon* (London 1978) as 'largely a gloss on this speech' (pp. 17–18); cf. Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions* 1, pp. 49–50. The archexponent of the 'Opis speech as history' is Hammond in Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 657–61, opposed by H. Montgomery, 'The Economic Revolution of Philip II – Myth or Reality?', *SO* 60 (1985), pp. 37–47 with Hammond's rejoinder: 'Philip's Innovations in Macedonian Economy', *SO* 70 (1995), pp. 22–9. A.B. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* (Oxford 1988), pp. 101–13, decisively reassesses the speech and says that 'as basic evidence for the early history of the kingdom [...] it is an absurdity' (p. 108). D.B. Nagle, 'The Cultural Context of Alexander's Speech at Opis', *TAPA* 126 (1996), pp. 151–72, reads it as Macedonian royal propaganda and possibly contemporary with Alexander.

⁶⁵ K. Hopkins, *Conquerors and Slaves* (Cambridge 1978), pp. 1–98, especially, pp. 11–12.

⁶⁶ On models in ancient history: M.I. Finley, *Ancient History: Evidence and Models* (London 1987).

⁶⁷ The range of views on Macedonian expansion echoes the

debate on Rome's imperialism. For Hammond in Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, p. 51, 'the wars of Philip and Alexander had a constructive purpose, to enforce peace and develop prosperity'. Errington, *History of Macedonia*, p. 51, sees a blurred line between 'offensive security policy and the open building of a position of domination'. The hypothesis of Ellis, 'Macedon and North-west Greece', p. 751, is attractive in that a great warrior-king, having created a great army, needed to occupy it 'with the kinds of campaign that provide self-respect, incentive and profit to its members' (cf. Ellis, *Philip II*, p.231), coupled with Billows' emphasis on Macedonia as effectively 'an army which had a state' (*Kings and Colonists*, pp. 11–20).

⁶⁸ On Theopompus' claim (*FGrH* 115 F 27) that Philip 'enslaved and took by treachery a large number of cities through deceit and violence', see M.A. Flower, *Theopompus of Chios: History and Rhetoric in the Fourth Century B.C.* (Oxford 1994), pp. 112–14.

⁶⁹ Theopompus *FGrH* 115 F 115, Philochorus, *FGrH* 328 F 162. For the possible sale or ransom of the ships' crews: Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, p. 576 n. 3.

⁷⁰ Alexander may have needed the ready money; see p. 496. For a *diagramma* of Philip V on military discipline, including procedure for plunder, see Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions* 2, no. 12 = M.M. Austin, *The Hellenistic World from Alexander to The Roman Conquest*² (Cambridge 2006), no. 90.

⁷¹ Problems of transportation: overburdened mules (Plut., *Alexander* 39.3); more plunder than could be carried (Curt. 3.11.20, 13.10-11, 9.10.12); 20,000 mules and 5,000 camels needed to carry plunder from Persepolis (Plut., *Alexander* 37.20); booty as threatening fighting efficiency so burnt (Plut., *Alexander* 57.1-2, Curt. 6.6.14; cf. 9.2.10, 4.14.6, 5.1.6, 2.8); Macedonians fight over spoils at Persepolis (Curt. 5.6.2-6); Alexander obliged to make good loss of plunder (Curt. 4.9.19-20; cf. 8.4.18). On the distraction of guarding prisoners, see Curtius 4.11.11; cf. 13.35.

⁷² A.B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander* 1 (Oxford 1980), ad loc.: the terminology is elusive, liturgies and *eisphora* have strong Athenian resonances. With regard to *eisphora*, Bosworth ingeniously suggests the hand of Callistratus. Other possibilities are canvassed by Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions* 1, pp. 437–40 and Hammond, *Macedonian*

- 73 Revenues 'owned' by Macedonians: Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions* 1, pp. 431–4, Hammond, *Macedonian State*, pp. 58–9.
- 74 Isocrates 5.5 refers to revenues received by Philip from Amphipolis; later evidence for civic revenues: Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions* 1, p. 441. Griffith in Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 261–3, argues forcefully that Philip, being a realist, can have had no illusions about raising any significant revenue from the mainland Greeks. K. Hopkins, 'Taxes and Trade in the Roman Empire (200 BC-AD 400)', *JRS* 70 (1980), pp. 101–25, argues for the Roman Empire that increased taxation might stimulate productive economic activity, which has general significance.
- 75 Errington, *History of Macedonia*, pp. 53–4. On possible archaeological tie-ins with Thucydides on Thracian tribute, see Z.H. Archibald, 'Thracians and Scythians', *CAH*² 6 (Cambridge 1994), pp. 450, 461–3.
- 76 Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, p. 6, Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, p. 53.
- 77 Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 659–62, Hammond, *Macedonian State*, pp. 158–60, A.B. Bosworth, 'ASTHETAIROI', *CQ*² 23 (1973), p. 250.
- 78 The evidence is carefully assessed by Griffith in Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 352–3, 366–71.
- 79 Drainage: Theophrastus, *Causes of Plants* 5.14.5. Borza, 'Natural Resources of Early Macedonia', p. 47, notes there is no direct evidence to support the claim that Philip carried through drainage projects in the Emathian plain. Mines elsewhere: Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 189–93, 668–70. It may be that expertise in mining for metals was transferred directly by Philip and Alexander to undermining of city walls (Curt. 4.6.9); compare the use of Welsh miners on the Western Front in World War I.
- 80 Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 358–61. G. Le Rider, *Le monnayage d'argent et d'or de Philippe II frappé en*

Macédoine de 359 à 294 (Paris 1977), *passim*, argues that the earliest *Philippeioi* date from the late 340s (and only in limited quantity) and the substantial increase in silver coinage from the mid-340s; both were minted posthumously until about 328. His arguments are conveniently summarized in ‘The Coinage of Philip and the Pangaion Mines’, in M.B. Hatzopoulos and L.D. Loukopoulou (eds.), *Philip of Macedon* (London 1980), pp. 48–57. His chronology is opposed by T.R. Martin, *Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical Greece* (Princeton 1985), pp. 271–92, who does however accept a substantial increase in coining towards the end of Philip’s reign to meet military expenditure; cf. also K. Dahmen, chapter 3.

⁸¹ *Sovereignty and Coinage*, pp. 1–14, 219–48.

⁸² Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 74–9.

⁸³ O. Picard, ‘Philippe II et le monnayage des cités grecques’ *REG* 103 (1990), pp. 1–15. The identification of overlapping weight standards and motives for choosing between them are necessarily speculative: Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, p. 129. Griffith is commendably cautious: Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 300–1; cf. A.R. Bellinger’s scepticism in *Essays on the Coinage of Alexander the Great* (New York 1963), pp. 45–8. Similarly precarious are attempts to identify ‘trading areas’ on the basis of coin distribution. J.K. Davies, ‘Cultural, Social and Economic Features of the Hellenistic World’, *CAH*² 7.1 (Cambridge 1984), pp. 279–82, lists trading as only one of five ways in which coins might travel.

⁸⁴ F. de Callataj, ‘A Quantitative Survey of Hellenistic Coinages: Recent Achievements’, in Z.H. Archibald et al. (eds.), *Making, Moving and Managing: The New World of Ancient Economies, 323–31 B.C.* (Oxford 2005), p. 88.

⁸⁵ Hatzopoulos and Loukopoulou, *Philip II*, pp. 188–231.

⁸⁶ Beyond this its simplest formulation quantity theory becomes increasingly complex and controversial: M. Friedman, ‘Quantity Theory of Money’, in S.N. Durlauf and L.E. Blume (eds.), *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics* (London 2008) (accessed electronically, no page reference). The ‘famine prices’ allegedly paid by Alexander’s troops for honey and wine (Curt. 7.4.3)

represent an extreme form of bottleneck.

⁸⁷ See A. Bresson, 'Coinage and Money Supply in the Hellenistic Age', in Z.H. Archibald et al. (eds.), *Making, Moving and Managing: The New World of Ancient Economies, 323–31 B.C.* (Oxford 2005), pp. 44–72; cf. Worthington, *Philip II*, *passim*.

⁸⁸ Philip's use of mercenaries: H.W. Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers from the Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus* (Oxford 1933), pp. 162–4; cf. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, pp. 8–9, with Demosthenes 9.58.

⁸⁹ See Bresson, 'Coinage and Money Supply', pp. 45–7.

⁹⁰ Plut., *Alexander* 15.2, *Moralia* 327d, Arr. 7.9.6, Curt. 10.2.24.

⁹¹ The phrase is that of S. Hornblower, 'Epilogue', *CAH*² 6 (Cambridge 1994), p. 876, who considers this: 'the secret of political power and success in all periods and under all forms of government'. Philip's financial arrangements are generally judged effective: Griffith in Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 442–3, Worthington, *Philip II*, pp. 196–7. For Philip's possession (and giving) of gold and silver plate: Diod. 16.55.2, 19.139; for Alexander, short of cash, paying with plate (and clothing): Plut., *Alexander* 48.1.

⁹² G.T. Griffith, 'The Macedonian Background', *GR*² 12 (1965), p. 127 n. 4.

⁹³ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 310–12, 444–9, Hammond, *Macedonian State*, pp. 127–8.

⁹⁴ 16.53.3; cf. 16.3.3–4, 54.3. Associated with Philip's gifts was his lavish expenditure on entertaining at Pella 'in traditional Homeric hospitality' (Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, p. 9). The outstanding example of Philip's 'conspicuous expenditure' outside Macedonia is the Philippeum at Olympia: Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 691–3, R.F. Townsend, 'The Philippeion and Fourth-century Athenian Architecture', in O. Palagia and S.V. Tracy (eds.), *The Macedonians in Athens 322–229 B.C.* (Oxford 2003), pp. 93–101, Worthington, *Philip II*, pp. 164–6.

⁹⁵ For Philip's creation of a 'career-structure' for his army, see

Ellis, 'Macedon and North-west Greece', pp. 735–6, Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, pp. 11–20.

⁹⁶ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia* 2, pp. 352–3, 361–7, 661.

⁹⁷ On the impossibility of reconstructing Alexander's finances: R. Lane Fox, *Alexander the Great* (London 1973), p. 529; for what can be known: Bellinger, *Essays on the Coinage of Alexander*, pp. 35–79; brief but exemplary: Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, pp. 241–5.

⁹⁸ Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, pp. 241–2.

⁹⁹ M.M. Austin, quoted by Hornblower, 'Epilogue', p. 881. Scale of plunder from Susa: Plut., *Alexander* 36.1 (40,000 talents, furniture and luxuries); cf. Arr. 3.16.7; from Damascus: Plut., *Alexander* 24.1–2, 48.3; cf. Curt. 3.8.12, 13.5; from Persepolis: Plut., *Alexander* 37.2 (20,000 mules and 5,000 camels to carry plunder); cf. Curt. 5.6.2–10 (120,000 talents). Plunder from Persepolis is deployed by Diodorus at 16.56.7 as the measure of an extreme. Mass enslavements and pillaging: Arr. 2.24.5 (30,000 Tyranians), Arr. 2.27.7 (Gaza), Arr. 3.15.6 (30,000 prisoners from Gaugamela), Arr. 4.25.4 (40,000 + Indian prisoners and 230,000 oxen), Curt. 8.4.20 (30,000 cattle). The alleged presentation of 3,000 talents in coin in lieu of requisitioned provisions suggests the likely scale of payments in kind (Plut., *Alexander* 68.3).

¹⁰⁰ Curtius 3.1.19 tells incidentally of 500 talents earmarked for the capture of Lesbos, Chios and Cos. The sieges of Halicarnassus, Tyre and Gaza may be singled out as especially expensive operations: A.B. Bosworth, 'Alexander the Great Part 1: The Events of the Reign', *CAH*² 6 (Cambridge 1994), pp. 801–2, 808–9.

¹⁰¹ Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, pp. 244–5.

¹⁰² Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, pp. 91–2. Whether Alexander intended to establish an empire-wide coinage is disputed: yes, according to Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, pp. 244–5, but no according to Martin, *Sovereignty and Coinage*, pp. 122–30.

¹⁰³ J.M. Keynes, *A Treatise on Money* 2 (London 1930), pp. 150–

1, stressing the need for enterprise to accompany the supposed virtue of thrift. I here reluctantly differ from Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, pp. 214–17, who sees the transfer of wealth as ‘very considerable’. But I cannot find concrete evidence for an overall ‘demand-pull’ increase in price levels (too much money chasing too few goods) to be associated with such massive injections of bullion; M. Rostovtzeff, *Economic and Social History of the Hellenistic World* 1 (Oxford 1941), pp. 165–8, seems unspecific.

104 Only 600 talents according to Curtius 3.1.20. Otherwise, apart from the money sent with Clearchus to hire mercenaries in the Peloponnese (Curt. 3.1.1), moral economizing is again to the fore: spoils from Gaza to Olympias, Cleopatra and friends, and myrrh and frankincense to Alexander’s tutor Leonidas (Plut., *Alexander* 4–5), spoils from Gaugamela to Croton in honour of the fifth-century Persian-fighter Phayllus (Plut., *Alexander* 34.2) and supposedly superior cattle from India to work Macedonian land (Curt. 8.4.20).

105 Adornments to troops’ arms and armour (Curt. 8.5.4). Construction projects: plans for temple at Delphi costing 1,500 talents and offer to rebuild Plataea (Plut., *Alexander* 34.10) and unspecified plans allegedly rivalling conversion of Mount Athos into a likeness of Alexander (Plut., *Alexander* 72.4). Extensive hospitality: dinners costing 10,000 drachmas (Plut., *Alexander* 23.6), entertaining 9,000 diners (Arr. 7.11.9) and a 100-couch marquee commissioned for Dium (Diod. 17.16.4). Lavish expenditure on funerals for the son of Parmenion (Curt. 4.8.9), Darius’ queen (Plut., *Alexander* 30.1-3), Demaratus of Corinth (Plut., *Alexander* 56), Calanus (Arr. 7.3.2-6), Hephaestion (Arr. 7.14.2-10, Plut., *Alexander* 2–3). According to Arrian 1.16.4 (cf. Plut., *Alexander* 16.7-8), 25 *hetairoi* who fell at the Battle of Granicus were commemorated with bronze statues by Lysippus.

106 Curt. 10.2.8-11, Plut., *Alexander* 70.3, Arr. 7.5, Diod. 17.109.2. Gift-giving could prove problematic, generating resentment, especially if a barbarian were the beneficiary (Curt. 8.12.15-17).

107 Bounties of 6,000 and 1,000 denarii for cavalry and infantry respectively (Curt. 6.2.17; cf. Arr. 6.16.2), money awards for distinguished conduct (Arr. 7.4-6) and ‘magnificent gifts’ for discharged veterans (Plut., *Alexander* 71.5). The Thessalian cavalry was especially well rewarded; in addition to plunder and

pay, each man received one talent (Plut., *Alexander* 24.1, 42.3). Although the 11,500 veterans discharged at Opis received back-pay plus one talent (Arr. 7.12.1-2), they seem not to have settled back in Macedonia (Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, p. 194).

108 Bosworth, 'Alexander the Great and the Decline of Macedon', *JHS* 106 (1986), p. 9 (the quotation below is from p. 2). Bosworth restates his case in *The Legacy of Alexander: Politics, Warfare, and Propaganda under the Successors* (Oxford 2002), pp. 64–97, meeting the contrary assessment shared by N.G.L. Hammond, 'Casualties and Reinforcements of Citizen Soldiers in Greece and Macedonia', *JHS* 109 (1989), pp. 56–68 and Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, pp. 183–212.

109 Rostovtzeff, *Economic and Social History of the Hellenistic World* 1, pp. 250–5, to which G. Reger, 'The Economy', in A. Erskine (ed.), *A Companion to the Hellenistic World* (Oxford 2003), pp. 331–53, provides an excellent supplement.

110 F.W. Walbank, 'Macedonia and Greece', *CAH*² 7.1 (Cambridge 1984), p. 225, places the cumulative loss at approaching half the men of military age, a figure disputed downwards by Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, pp. 146–57, 206–12, who sees colonies in Asia labelled 'Macedonian' as referring to fighting technique rather than ethnic origins. Overall economic impact of emigration would depend on the extent to which those leaving were involved in agricultural production; Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, pp. 201–2, suggests this 'military class' was drawn from an 'upper stratum'.

111 As emphasized by M.M. Austin, 'Hellenistic Kings, War, and the Economy', *CQ*² 36 (1986), pp. 450–66; cf. Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, pp. 20–3.

112 R.A. Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1990), pp. 256–9, 286–92. The economic implications of Hellenistic warfare are acutely assessed by A. Chaniotis, *War in the Hellenistic World* (Oxford 2005), pp. 115–42.

113 Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, p. 210, sees damage done by the Celts (not earlier losses of manpower) as weakening Macedonia through the third century.

114 J. Ma, 'Kings', in A. Erskine (ed.), *A Companion to the Hellenistic World* (Oxford 2003), p. 181.

115 Borza, 'Timber and Politics', p. 92 with n. 33.

116 Pella: Akamatis, 'The Cities: Pella', pp. 91–6. An apparent eye-witness account of an admittedly over-the-top Macedonian wedding-feast is preserved by Athenaeus at 4.128a-130d. The economic implications of conspicuous consumption (*truphe*) at court and of the construction of the palaces themselves are considered by J.K. Davies in (respectively) 'Hellenistic Economies', p. 33, and 'The Economic Consequences of Hellenistic Palaces', in Z.H. Archibald et al. (eds.), *Making, Moving and Managing: The New World of Ancient Economies, 323-31 B.C.* (Oxford 2005), pp. 117–35.

117 R. Ginouvès, 'Macedonian Dedications Outside Macedonia', in R. Ginouvès (ed.), *Macedonia from Philip II to the Roman Conquest* (Athens 1993), pp. 197–213.

118 Detailed references and implications in Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia* 3, pp. 566-7; testimonia collected in T. Frank, *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome* 4 (Baltimore 1940), pp. 290–9. Davies, 'Hellenistic Economies', p. 32, asks pertinent questions about the economic (as opposed to political) consequences of the suppression of the Macedonian court.

119 R. Bonney and W.M. Ormrod, *Crises, Revolutions and Self-Sustained Growth: Essays in European Fiscal History, 1130–1830* (Stamford 1999), pp. 1–21.

120 R. Bonney, *The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c.1200-1815* (Oxford 1999), p. iv. Implications of the new fiscal history for antiquity are briefly addressed by P. Millett, 'Finance and Resources: Public, Private and Personal', in A. Erskine (ed.), *A Companion to Ancient History* (Oxford 2009), pp. 474–85.

121 Cicero, *de Officiis* 2.76, Pliny, *Natural History* 33.56. Detailed analysis: E.S. Gruen, 'Macedonia and the Settlement of 167 B.C.', in W.L. Adams and E.N. Borza (eds.), *Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage* (Lanham 1982), pp. 257–67.

Classical Art to 221 BC

Craig I. Hardiman

Definitions are important, as one clearly sees in the debate, both ancient and modern, surrounding the ‘Greekness’ of the ancient Macedonians. Yet such definitions can often be constraining in the assumptions and the categorizations that they engender. The title of this chapter implies that the art of Macedonia was similar enough to other types of art as to be easily recognized as ‘Classical’ but that such art had a longer heyday in Macedonia as it lasted until the arrival of Philip V (221–179), a date that is traditionally viewed as belonging in the Hellenistic period. Is ‘Classical’ in this sense a term that relates to a definable temporal period, and if so is that time period different for the region of Macedonia than for accepted dates further south, or is it a term whose referent is to a style of art? Such questions are important as one attempts to come to grips with what precisely constitutes the material at hand – what, if anything, was ‘Macedonian’ about the art in question? Such issues of stylistic and regional definitions have become standard in the literature on ancient art and yet, perhaps because of the history of material culture studies from northern Greece, have not been applied as regularly to the art of ancient Macedonia.¹ Certainly part of the reason is the spectacular nature of some of the finds that have been unearthed over the past 50 years, several of which have fundamentally changed our own views of certain categories of ancient art. Given the isolation that Macedonian archaeology had for so many years and the singular nature of the finds for especially the fourth century, it is no wonder that much of the material culture has been analyzed in and of itself and only recently has been examined with a broader view to contemporary art elsewhere.² This naturally brings to mind the question of how unique Macedonian art was. Such a question could easily be subsumed in the arguments concerning the Hellenism of the ancient Macedonians – for example, what was their ethnicity, what was the nature of their

language, how does it relate to contemporary politics. And yet with the art, or at least the attitude towards art, among the Macedonian elite, we are on much firmer ground than in most areas to see how the rulers of the land attempted to frame their culture within the general artistic *koinai* (common traditions) of the age.

1 Patronage³


As with most other areas of Hellas and the Aegean, the end of the Persian Wars marked a definite change in the attitudes and culture of the Macedonians. After the Battle of Plataea (479) and the loss of their Persian overlords the Macedonians realized who the emerging power was and so the fifth century marks the beginning of the Argead dynasty's rebranding of itself within a general Hellenic cultural matrix. Perhaps beginning with Alexander I, the Macedonians now embarked on a clear course of more fully involving themselves with the mainstream of Greek culture.⁴ Indeed Alexander I was to become known as the 'Philhellene' not only for his general support of the Greeks during the Persian Wars, but for his several attempts to paint the Macedonians with an Hellenic brush. Not only did he mount a successful campaign to be admitted to the Olympics and thus ensure his Hellenic credentials, but also he began the trend among Macedonian kings of entertaining top Greek artists and thinkers at court.⁵ While he may have begun this interest in Hellenic culture, the vicissitudes and political situations of the moment allowed for more or less involvement by any particular Macedonian monarch over time. So it is that after this initial foray, the next major ruler to popularize these new cultural contacts was Archelaus, who was king from 413–399.

Archelaus not only sought cultural ties with the Greeks to the south but also actively brought such culture up north to the Macedonian capital. Most notable among his pursuits was his desire to bring several important artists to his court that they then establish the Macedonians as part of the common cultural heritage of the Hellenes. He seems to have been particularly interested in drama, bringing the playwrights Agathon and Euripides to court, the latter helped to establish the royal decent of the Macedonian kings from the Temenids of Argos in his play *Archelaus*, along perhaps with his other 'Macedonian' plays that highlighted the connections between the Argeads and the Greeks – *Alcmene*, *Temenos* and *Temenidai*.⁶ Most important for our purposes, however, was the arrival to court of the great fifth-century painter Zeuxis. Already famous throughout the

south for his numerous works, Zeuxis was brought to the new capital of Pella to decorate Archelaus' palace. Working as a panel painter, it is likely that this was the primary decoration he offered for the palace and we know that he also offered a painting of the god Pan, a deity of particular interest to the Macedonian royal house, as a gift to the king (Ael. 14.17, Pliny, *Natural History* 35.62). Having spent a significant time in Athens, Zeuxis would have encountered, if not studied, the great fifth-century painters Apollodorus and Polygnotus. Of the two, the pictorial illusion of Apollodorus seems to have had the greater impact, for Zeuxis' work seems to have been one of form (*pathos*) and not one of character (*ethos*), as was Polygnotus' (Arist., *Poetics* 1450a). This quality of lifelike illusion is well illustrated in the famed story of the contest between Zeuxis and Parrhasius (Pliny, *Natural History* 35.65), where Zeuxis' grapes were so true to life that birds attempted to land on the painting to eat them (though he did lose the contest as Parrhasius duped Zeuxis with his illusionism), and it may well be that these qualities were to form the foundations for much of the pictorial illusionism found in the famed Macedonian tomb paintings, discussed below.⁷

Archelaus then formed the paradigm for a pattern of royal artistic patronage that was to be continued by later Macedonian monarchs. While there is little evidence for the kings of the early fourth century, this blueprint was furthered and expanded by Philip II. Like his predecessors, Philip hired such artists as Euphranor, Chares, Leochares and Lysippus to create works to commemorate and celebrate the royal family, but as he began his policy of expansion he also started to understand the power that art could have in celebrating his interests abroad as well as at home. Philip strongly focused his political messages through a religious lens (Diod. 16.60.3). Thus he used art in ways to stretch this religious message across the Hellenic landscape – he placed the heads of various deities on his coinage, he erected the Philippeum at Olympia, and had let a statue of himself be erected in the famous temple to Artemis at Ephesus (Arr. 1.17.9).⁸ Most famous of all his artistic endeavours in this area was the Philippeum at Olympia (see [figure 24.1](#)).

Figure 24.1 Reconstruction drawing of the Philippeum at Olympia



This particular monument is important for several reasons and recent re-examinations of the building have shed new light on some old problems. This round monument was likely erected to celebrate Philip's victory at the Battle of Chaeronea and contained portrait statues of Philip, his wife Olympias, his son Alexander and his parents Amyntas and Eurydice (Paus, 5.17.4, 5.20.9–10). Originally thought to be gold and ivory (chryselephantine – materials reserved for the gods), it is now thought that these statues were in marble, but may have been gilded. What is noteworthy is the unique nature of this building, its decoration and form, that all point to a grand public monument that fused several artistic traditions. The decoration, with elements that suggest Attic, Argolid and Asiatic origins, illustrates one of the key concepts that developed over the course of the fourth century and later in Greek art – the fusion of multiple styles and borrowings of several traditions to create something both new and familiar.⁹ In the heart of the *altis* (Sanctuary of Zeus) at Olympia, this monument could thus reference multiple precedents and geographic areas that would reinforce Philip's rule over these areas and traditions, but tellingly the monument would celebrate the royal family specifically and not just the Macedonian state. Certainly this monument is part of a new growth in the fourth century on the part of Hellenic leaders celebrating their rule and Philip fully utilized this ruler imagery to further his political ends. This was typical of Philip and one can see how all of these elements, the religious, the political and the artistic,

come together in the famous case of the parade of statues just prior to Philip's assassination (Diod 16.92.5, 95.1). Whether Philip was putting forth the idea that he was divine is immaterial, it is clear that he associated himself (*sunthronos*) with the Olympians in the procession, stressing his associations and leaving the interpretations (piety? equality?) to the viewer. The statues were of the highest art and expense and the again illustrate the growing sense of the power of art and how that could then be used by the state, in the form of the head of state, to further any general sense of power or any specific desired messages.¹⁰ This idea was to be fully explored and expanded upon by the next Macedonian monarch, Alexander (III) the Great.

Among the more frustrating aspects of Alexander's reign is the paucity of direct evidence concerning his patronage of the arts. While we know much about the artists with whom he surrounded himself and the ways in which he utilized art for his own propaganda, the sources that directly discuss his role as patron, let alone any surviving material, are few.¹¹ Chief among them is Plutarch's essay *On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander* (*Moralia* 326d–345b). In this work, Plutarch discusses Alexander's relation to fortune, how he was used by it and rose above it and how all of this was only possible for his many virtues, one of the most noteworthy being his patronage of the arts (333d–333f). Alexander was said to have let the arts flourish under his reign and the sources certainly attest to a host of artistic activities sponsored by the king. In sculpture there were monuments like the Granicus monument at Dium and in painting there was the portrait of Zeus/Alexander seated on a throne holding a thunderbolt (*keraunophoros*) erected in the Temple of Artemis at Ephesus (perhaps following his father). Temples were erected at his behest, including those to Athena in Priene and again to Artemis at Ephesus, as were other architectural monuments such as the (planned at any rate) funerary monument of Hephæstion. With this monument at least, it seems that Alexander admired the qualities of 'ingenuity, novelty, magnificence, boldness and ostentation' (Plut. *Alexander* 72.5), giving a sense of what traits he sought in the art he commissioned. Certainly the artists with whom he surrounded himself, Lysippos, Apelles, and Pyrgoteles, were famed for being the best and most innovative artists of the day and so worthy of the monarch's high standards.¹² These artists were charged with creating a succession of images, especially of the monarch himself, which would fully encapsulate the psychological power that Alexander wished to communicate. This power could be shown through a divine image (*Alexander Keraunophoros*), a historical image (coins of Alexander victorious in India) or through the physiognomic traits associated with his portraiture.

The thought of acting as a patron of the arts and using the material

to glorify the state and the individual leader was not a new phenomenon in Greece. Most monarchies functioned in this way and one can point to any number of absolute leaders from Sicily, Caria or the Near East that may have provided a template, but the Macedonian monarchs certainly set the standard in Greece for artistic patronage. It was then through them that Hellenic art dispersed among the various Hellenistic kings and, ultimately, to Rome. But while this remains an important aspect of Macedonian art, it remains true that the art in question was largely imported. The monarchs brought the cream of non-Macedonian, Greek artists from the south to create their works, so is it enough that the art was to be found within Macedonian borders?

2 The Material: Painting

Artistically, Macedonia may be most famous currently for the large scale paintings that have been uncovered in a series of magnificent tombs excavated in several locales. These tombs were richly decorated with a host of grave goods that not only tell us much about the wealth and burial practices of the Macedonian elites but also fundamentally altered our understanding of Greek painting.¹³ Prior to the discovery of these tombs, our knowledge of Greek painting was largely limited to painted pottery. Larger panel paintings, a major form of Greek art, are known largely from the literary sources as they were painted on panels of wood which have perished over time. Thus scholars were left to suggest what these paintings may have looked like from the surviving complementary sources. With the excavations of the tombs, however, the discovery of the magnificent painted frescos gave us our first opportunity to fully examine large-scale painting.

First excavated in the 1970s, the tombs at Vergina (the ancient capital of Aegae) represent the final burial places for the Macedonian kings and elite. It is therefore not surprising that these chamber tombs were found with a multitude of rich material and decoration. Of the tombs uncovered the most important were Tombs I (Tomb of Persephone) and II (arguably that of Philip II, see below), both of which have monumental frescos. Both tombs are dateable to the last half of the fourth century, with likely dates of about 340 for Tomb I and 336–317 for Tomb II. Tomb I was robbed in antiquity and so was found bare of any artefacts other than the frescos on the wall, but these images have given us a window into the abilities and technique of the ancient painter. The most noteworthy of the images in this tomb is the image of Hades abducting Persephone found on the north wall (plate 17). Remarkably well preserved, the artist has used an

almost impressionistic tone with rapid and sketchy brush strokes to fill the image with life and movement. Coupled with this highly expressive style is the compositional excellence of the painting – the multiple foreshortening on the chariot, horse and figures, the cross hatching for the drapery, the use of colour and the manner in which all the figures interact with one another.¹⁴ Such technical expertise is also visible on the frieze from Tomb II.

Tomb II has largely become famous given the debate over its (intended) occupant, but equally important is the painting that adorns the facade of the tomb.¹⁵ The Doric facade that clearly imitates public architecture is surmounted by a large frieze, as opposed to a pediment, that is painted with a vibrant scene of Macedonians hunting lions, bears and other wildlife in an outdoor landscape (plate 18). The landscape itself is noteworthy for the level of detail and the reality of the space, with receding diagonals that echo the foreshortening from Tomb I. All in all the effect is to create a believable and illusionistic space that may be the descendant of the illusionism of Zeuxis from his decorations in the palace of Archelaus. The figures too illustrate this penchant for illusionism with horses and men drawn at frontal, profile, three-quarter and rear views, adding a sense of dynamism and convincing distinction matched by the expert use of colour and shading variation. While illusionistic, however, the images cannot be described as ‘real’ or realistic. The abduction of Persephone obviously belongs to the mythological/religious realm, while the slightly barren forest of the hunt scene, along with multiple prey, suggests the idea of, rather than an actual, hunt. In this sense, these paintings are clearly on a continuum from earlier Greek painting where figures are front and centre with minimal attention paid to the backdrop. Little more may be said given the state of preservation, but while these paintings may be similar in composition to Greek art they still form our best evidence for monumental painting and may differ significantly in the subject matter, as opposed to the style, from what has come before.

Other tombs have been located at Vergina, but may have also been found outside the ancient capital and include the great tomb at Lefkadia (the Tomb of Judgement) and the tomb of Lyson and Callicles. These tombs are dated to between the end of the fourth to the end of the third centuries and all were discovered with some painted decoration (see plate 16)¹⁶ The Tomb of Judgement has three bands of art that survive on the facade of the large chamber tomb. Again, the Doric architecture mirrors public buildings and here a triglyph and metope frieze contains traditional images of a centauromachy. Above this is a stucco frieze that depicts another battle, here of cavalry versus infantry, possibly Macedonians versus

Persians. The largest paintings that survive are images placed between the four half-columns on the facade and represent images associated with the afterlife. These include (left to right) the deceased, Hermes the leader of souls to the underworld, an enthroned Aeacus and a standing Rhadamanthus, these last two being judges of the dead. These last figures, with their variations in pose, attention to detail and an emphasis on volumetric forms, can be called illusionistic, but with no background to the figures they seem to be acting as if they were unconnected images on a stage. The themes form a curious blend of the generic and the specific the centauromachy was a standard image, almost clichéd, in Greek art and is found on public, personal and funerary monuments wherever the Greek artistic *koinai* spread. The battle scene is again a standard image, with the usual Greeks substituted by the Macedonians, and appears on numerous public monuments from Athens to Pergamon. The individual images, however, are very specific to the monument and the deceased's immediate concerns. The images break the illusion of this as a public monument and bring us back to the world of the personal and the funerary.

The Tomb of Lyson and Callicles also illustrates this interest in the illusionary and the funerary. On the opposite walls of the tomb's antechamber are painted images of a *perirrhanterion* (ritual water basin) and an altar adorned with a snake. Both images clearly have ritual significance and the altar is composed with a perspective that clearly attempts to provide the illusion of greater space. On the interior, attempts at spatial illusion continue with the burial chamber festooned with images of garlands across all four walls and with depictions of armour and weapons painted on to an illusionistic 'shelf'. These weapons may be items loved by the deceased in life and/or material to be used in the afterlife. The whole interior is meant to recreate the impression of an interior room, emphasizing a sense of domesticity for where the dead will reside. Such architectural and decorative elements also invoke the styles of Roman wall painting and the discovery of the Macedonian tombs has also greatly added to our understanding of the forerunners to the painting of Pompeii and elsewhere. While other centres (for example, Alexandria and Delos) have also unearthed wall paintings that fit into the development of the form, the Macedonian examples are our earliest material for illusionistic architectural painting and may be the source for a style that was then diffused throughout the Mediterranean as Macedonia expanded its empire.¹⁷

While these frescos provide us with our best evidence for large scale Greek painting especially in the fourth century, the specific cultural and funerary contexts should not be forgotten. The subject

matter is often at times specific to the type of building, with both the abduction scene from the Tomb I and the figures from the Tomb of Judgement reinforcing beliefs about the afterlife among the Macedonians. With similar imagery in Athens and elsewhere typically depicting the deceased (even if ideally) in life or during a funerary ritual the Macedonian images contain mythological and allegorical images that could represent specific religious beliefs.¹⁸ In addition, the scene from Tomb II illustrates the importance that hunting had among the Macedonian elite. This importance has long been recognized, as have the possible links to similar Near Eastern practices, but there may be a general link between funerary and hunting. Specific images of active hunts are rare in Greek art and so, while a link between the two activities may be more common, this particular image reinforces the cultural specificity of the act.¹⁹ While the discovery of the painted tombs from Macedonia has provided an unparalleled window into Greek monumental painting, its vibrant colours and its graphic illusionism, these techniques follow the general trends and styles as described by the ancient sources about panel painting. Again, the Macedonians seem to be fully in line with the mainstream of Greek art styles, but the special emphasis on location (funerary monuments) and culturally specific images (hunting, afterlife imagery) mark a unique Macedonian use of the art form.

3 The Material: Metalwork

It is hardly surprising that the Macedonians had a bustling trade in metalwork given the vast mineral wealth of the area. Much of the early contact between the southern Greeks and the Macedonians revolved around the trade of these precious and useful resources and with this economic, cultural and artistic trade was sure to follow. It has been suggested that the quantity of valuable metalwork that has been uncovered in Macedonia may be a direct outgrowth of this cultural contact. Prior to the fourth century, most of the metalware that has been uncovered in Macedonia seems to have been imported. This is hardly surprising given the boost in economic activity under Philip II, but there may have been a cultural reason for this as well.²⁰ The importance of drinking and sympotic activities among the Macedonians has long been noted. This practice is also often associated with rituals for the dead and funerary activity, which may explain the presence for so much metalware in tomb contexts, especially of types connected with drinking. These may be associated

with the ever increasing adoption of Greek customs and art by the Macedonian elite from the reign of Archelaus onwards.²¹ While drinking may have been part of a broader Macedonian culture, the funerary connections of the symposium and associated rites may point to a unique cultural expression, often seen as some type of Homeric and pastoral throwback. Certainly some Macedonian burial customs match those to be found in Homer's *Iliad* (24.782–804) and *Odyssey* (24.36–97), though a linear relationship is to be viewed with suspicion. Perhaps the most well known of these customs is the disposal of the cremated dead in large kraters, illustrating the purpose of much of the metalwork found, such as the most famous of these vessels, the Derveni Krater.

This krater was discovered in 1962 near the city of Thessaloniki by Greek archaeologists, along with the largest deposit of bronze and silver works yet uncovered, when they undertook rescue excavations that found several tombs. The krater itself is large (0.905 m from the base to the tops of the handles), of bronze, and is covered in decoration relating to the god Dionysus and his retinue (plate 19). This seminal work of Greek bronze has recently received a lengthy and detailed study, from which I note three important aspects: (1) the burial context, (2) the ownership and (3) the artistic antecedents.²² The overall burial context suggests that the male occupant of the tomb was wealthy, as 43 metal vessels were found in Tomb B, had a military career, given the weapons, cuirass and greaves that accompanied the krater, and that there was a preoccupation with the afterlife. This last inference comes from both the decoration of the krater and from its associated finds. The scene on the vessel represents the god Dionysus reclining with Ariadne, Maenads, a Silenus and numerous other animal and mythological figures. The overall scene is complex and in general the images evoke Dionysian eschatology given the function of the krater as a wine mixing device in life and later a funerary urn for the dead. This notion is perhaps buttressed by the famed Derveni Papyrus, an Orphic text that was uncovered in Derveni in Tomb A. While the overall burial, its emphasis on cremation, sacrifice and wealth may invoke the Homeric culture that seems to have so interested the Macedonians, it is also clear that an interest in some type of afterlife was a major preoccupation for these people.²³

This particular person may have been identified given the inscription that is inscribed on the rim of the krater. Written in a Thessalian dialect, the inscription reads, 'of Astioun, son of Anaxagoras, from Larissa' and it suggests that the krater may have been an original by Astioun and buried by his descendents at a later date, or that the inscription is later than the manufacture of the krater (about 370) and was added at the time of burial (last quarter of the

fourth century). The Thessalians played an important part in Alexander the Great's cavalry and it may be that this particular individual was one of several Thessalians who returned from duty in Bactria. For our purposes it may be worth pointing out that multiple gold Orphic tablets in fourth century burials have been found in Thessaly and so may illustrate how far reaching some of these funerary ideas were.²⁴

Lastly, the artistic antecedents would seem to suggest a strong interest in Attic forms, both in the design of the krater and in the figural decoration. Barr-Sharrar notes the similarities to a metal shape that was invented in Athens about 480–470, but also to a strong Attic tradition of bodily form. The profiles are reminiscent of grave reliefs, the bodies sway languidly like those of Praxiteles, while the drapery may have a host of Peloponnesian parallels.²⁵ This would then suggest that this piece is strongly influenced by non-Macedonian contexts (Attic styles, Thessalian religion); indeed, it may have been manufactured in Athens, and so one wonders if this piece should be considered Macedonian at all.

Other metalwork obviously abounds and not just in bronze. Silver and gold work has also been uncovered, again often as grave goods illustrating the importance of such material in their concept of the afterlife. Like the Derveni Krater, much of the material finds its origins in the vase forms of Athens and elsewhere from the sixth century onwards and is often associated with sympotic activity with drinking vessels predominating. Gold material is understandably rare, but spectacular finds from Tomb I at Vergina and elsewhere attest to the wealth of the elite at this time. Crowns, diadems, containers and jewellery of all sorts show a remarkable skill in fine work, filigree and repoussé and attest to a thriving industry. Given the paucity of material from elsewhere it is difficult to note antecedents or parallels, but it should be said that there was a long tradition of fine work in coins in Macedonia, thus reflecting an ability to work with such detailed material. All of these pieces, vessels, jewellery, bronze, silver and gold would have proclaimed the wealth, taste and, in the case of the coins, royal ideologies of the rulers who could afford such expensive works.²⁶

4 The Material: Other Media

While monumental painting and metalwork are the most important artistic remains that have provided scholars with new insights into these art forms, there are other material finds that have also provided

a certain amount of information for their respective media. It would be beyond this chapter to deal with them all, but there are three categories of finds that can be briefly surveyed. The first is mosaic, an art form that is poorly understood prior to the Hellenistic period. Many important early pebble mosaics have been found at Pella and they have helped advance our understanding of the technical development of this art form. Dating to the end of the fourth century, these mosaics show a remarkable interest in advancing the compositional techniques of the medium through increased attention to the size, colour and types of pebbles used and the addition of border strips for detail.²⁷ Of equal interest is the subject matter of these pieces. Two relate to the Macedonian interest in the hunt, one a lion hunt and the other a stag hunt.

The Stag Hunt mosaic (plate 20 and this volume's cover) from Building II at Pella is noteworthy for its signature of the artist Gnosis and for the three dimensional quality of the figures, highly reminiscent of the illusionistic painting styles previously discussed. The huntsmen also conform to known types of Greek figures and again illustrate the indebtedness of the Macedonian artists to typical Hellenic forms but utilizing them to compose a culturally relevant scene. The Lion Hunt mosaic from Building I at Pella is a little more problematic in that some scholars have suggested that this is a historical scene illustrating a lion hunt with Alexander the Great and Craterus, the same scene that was the subject of a statuary group erected at Delphi. It is more likely, however, that this mosaic, in addition to the Stag Hunt, falls within the general iconographic vocabulary of royal pursuits.²⁸

Two other mosaics from Pella depict Dionysus riding a panther and the abduction of Helen by Theseus, both of which form striking thematic parallels with other Macedonian works. The Dionysus mosaic may allude to any facet of the god's mythology or refer to his aspect as god of wine, an appropriate deity for a dining context. Just as likely is that it may refer to all of the god's aspects, including his powers over life and death, the image finding meaning in its polyvalency. The Abduction of Helen mosaic (plate 21) clearly finds echoes compositionally with the Abduction of Persephone painting from Tomb I. The illusionism created through subtle shading is remarkable for the medium and while any meaning other than an interesting mythological story eludes us, the similarities to the Persephone painting may suggest a parallel meaning of sorts.²⁹

One category of material yet to be discussed is Macedonian architecture. This is because the topic is vast and covers a host of public and private buildings and forms. As such, this topic will only be touched upon, but it should be noted that those scholars who have

investigated public architecture have noted no individual style associated with Macedonia. At best, the Macedonian 'style' is seen as eclectic and composed of elements drawn from all over Greece and possibly the Near East. Similarly, private architecture from Pella, Olynthus and elsewhere shows little that is 'unique' to Macedonia. It is difficult to draw too many conclusions given how rare domestic architecture at this time is, but the courtyard house that develops from the fifth century changes little through to the *pastas* house of Olynthus, though the architecture becomes more standardized. If anything is unique, it is the size and level of decoration of the homes suggesting a new importance on conspicuous consumption.³⁰

One last type of material that is particularly associated with Macedonia is furniture. This is primarily because of the paucity of surviving material from elsewhere in Greece and what does survive suggests that there is little difference in form. What is perhaps unique is the level of decoration that can be found on the furniture, which ranges from painted scenes on thrones to ivory figures and other such embellishments. A marble throne from the Tomb of Eurydice has a painting of Hades and Persephone on it, while a funerary couch from Tomb II was elaborately decorated with ivory portraits of the royal family.³¹

If any of these media share anything it is in a particular emphasis on elaborate decoration. Both mosaics and furniture were obviously found in the home and domestic architecture shows an increasing sense of elaboration in size and design. Once again there is little that is innovative in the material, but the use of it and the particular cultural expressions show that it was not only the royal family that had a keen interest in art, but also the wealthy elite quickly followed suit, likely to declare their own wealth and taste in light of their leaders' attempts to do so.

5 Conclusion

What becomes clear from this cursory examination of some select pieces and media is that it is increasingly difficult to come to terms with what 'Macedonian' means within an artistic context. The 'Classical' phase of art, however one wishes to define its chronological limits, is seminal in the formation of a Macedonian sense of art, but a more exact definition remains elusive. As the state grew wealthier its leaders used this wealth to sponsor artists to come north to help forge a new artistic centre. The number of artists that did ply their trade in Macedonia certainly suggests an important centre of production and a

locus where they likely learned from one another, borrowed ideas and learned from the tradition of artists that had come before. Lysippus was famed for using nature as his teacher (Pliny, *Natural History* 34.61), which may be the sculptural equivalent of the illusionism seen in Macedonian painting. Similarly, he was famous for creating statues with multiple viewing angles, just as the figures on the hunt scene from Tomb II. Apelles was supposedly good at painting animals (Pliny, *Natural History* 35.95) and Lysippus created the Granicus monument depicting a lion hunt, while all of Alexander's artists had to portray images of the king that were similar to one and other. But these artists were not Macedonian themselves, or rather the 'name' artists were not. They created pieces that were in the tradition of Hellenic styles and, however individually innovative any one may have been, fell within recognizable forms. Could their products thus be considered Macedonian? Is it that Macedonian is a locative term, applied only to art produced within the kingdom's borders? Given how limiting this would be and how problematic regionalism is from a prescriptive standpoint, in addition to the ill-defined borders of the state, this would seem unlikely. We view material from around the Mediterranean as (at least inspired by) Hellenic, but does that mean that we should view Ptolemaic, Seleucid, even Pergamene art as Macedonian?

If anything we should perhaps see the 'Macedonian' in the iconography and use of the art produced. Culturally specific themes and images, such as the hunt and afterlife beliefs, form a series of iconographic models that are predominant in Macedonia to an extent that they are not elsewhere in Greece. While these ideas may not be unique to Macedonia, from this land these images and ideologies spread as the kingdom did. While Hellenic styles were to be found in the Mediterranean prior to Alexander's conquests, he certainly spread the popularity of these forms, if only through his generals who used similar royal imagery. From them, this too ultimately spread to/ among the Romans, ensuring its lasting effect. The beginnings of Macedonia as a locus of Hellenic art and as a disseminator of this art may be the most 'Macedonian' element of its 'Classical' period. Definitions are thus important – and often highly problematic.

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Badian, 'Greeks and Macedonians', pp. 35–6. Greek intellectuals such as Protagoras and Democritus were in residence in northern Greek states by the mid-fifth century, and so while similar individuals may have been in Macedonia earlier we know that Alexander I was entertained by Hellanicus, Herodotus, Pindar and possibly Bacchylides at the court in Aegae: see Daskalakis, *Hellenism*, pp. 209–10, Hammond, *Macedonian State*, pp. 46–7.

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²¹ Barr-Sharrar, *Derveni Krater*, pp. 3–4, who notes the painting of a symposium scene from a fourth-century Macedonian tomb at Aghios Athanassios: see M. Tsimbidou-Avloniti, ‘The Macedonian Tomb of Aghios Athanassios, Thessaloniki’, in D. Pandermalis (ed.), *Alexander the Great: Treasures from an Epic Era of Hellenism* (New York 2004), pp. 149–151, M. Tsimbidou-Avloniti, ‘Les peintures funéraires d’Aghios Athanassios’, in S. Descamps-Lequime (ed.), *Peinture et couleur dans le monde grec antique* (Paris 2007), pp. 57–67, Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, pp. 125–6. Aelian (13.4) and Aristophanes (*Frogs* 85) are both aware of Macedonian dining habits in the fifth century. For the importance of dining among the Macedonians, see E.N. Borza, ‘The Symposium at Alexander’s Court’, *Ancient Macedonia* 3 (Thessaloniki 1983), pp. 44–55, R.A.

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²⁴ On the inscription and its implications, see Barr-Sharrar, *Derveni Krater*, pp. 43–5. On the Thessalian gold tablets, see Betegh, *Derveni Papyrus*, pp. 235–349.

²⁵ Barr-Sharrar, *Derveni Krater*, pp. 7–8, 48–72. She notes the developments from the Athenian metal krater of the A-type for the form of the Derveni Krater, while also listing several specific precursors. The Peloponnesian parallels for the drapery come from the Argive Heraion and the Asclepium at Epidaurus. The figural prototypes for the Maenads may have influenced later Neo-Attic forms, but it is more likely that they are merely part of a general repertoire of images: see Fullerton, 'Atticism, Classicism', *passim*. Similarly, the use of the term 'Praxitelean' should be descriptive rather than proscriptive.

²⁶ B. Barr-Sharrar, 'Macedonian Metal Vessels in Perspective: Some Observations on Context and Tradition', in B. Barr-Sharrar and E.N. Borza (eds.), *Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times* (Washington 1982), pp. 123–39, B. Barr-Sharrar, 'Eastern Influence on the Toreutic Art of Macedonia before the Conquest of Alexander the Great', *Ancient Macedonia* 4 (Thessaloniki 1986), pp. 71–82. For a brief overview of goldworks, see R.A. Higgins, 'Macedonian Royal Jewelry', in B.

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²⁷ M. Robertson, ‘Early Greek Mosaic’, in B. Barr-Sharrar and E.N. Borza (eds.), *Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times* (Washington 1982), p. 242, K. Dunbabin, *Mosaics of the Greek and Roman World* (Cambridge 1999), pp. 10–15. The techniques are certainly more advanced than at Olynthus and suggest a translation of painting techniques into stone.

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Hellenistic and Roman Art, 221 BC–AD 337

Rachel Kousser

1 Introduction: Approaches to Macedonian Art under the Roman Empire

Macedonia in the late third century BC was a wealthy and artistically vibrant region of the Hellenistic world. It possessed luxurious palaces, architecturally sophisticated theaters, impressive temples, and grandiose tombs for the warrior elite and the royal family. Without a major source of marble, its cities nonetheless contained numerous examples of high-quality marble sculpture, and its metalworking – in bronze, silver, and above all, gold – was unsurpassed. Macedonia's distinctive painted tombs attest to its artists' command of the most up-to-date techniques in drawing and coloration, for instance foreshortening and chiaroscuro.¹ Also, while some areas retained their traditional rural character, the region had by now a number of well-appointed cities: Pella, the royal capital, Dium, the religious center, the important port of Thessalonica, and the royal foundations of Philippi and Cassandreia. In sum, Macedonia possessed a visual culture commensurate with its political importance as one of the major Hellenistic monarchies. It shared some common artistic features with rival empires (for example its descriptive and beautifully detailed ruler portraits on coins), while at the same time retaining certain distinctive visual forms and stylistic predilections of its own, such as a disjunction between the decorative facade of a building and its internal structure.

By the early fourth century AD Macedonia looked very different.²

It had by that time been part of the Roman Empire for some 500 years, and it possessed many of the characteristic appurtenances of Roman civilization: technologically sophisticated bath buildings, amphitheaters for gladiatorial games, luxury villas and imperial portraits. Several of Macedonia's cities had attained the highest status possible for a Roman town, that of colony, and all of its free inhabitants were Roman citizens after the passage of the *Constitutio Antoniniana* of AD 212 (a law promulgated by Caracalla that gave Roman citizenship to all free inhabitants of the empire). Its largest city, Thessalonica, had become an important seat of provincial administration and an imperial residence in the late third to early fourth centuries under the Tetrarch Galerius, who endowed it with an ornate triumphal arch, a palace and a hippodrome for chariot racing. And while it had long hosted one of the earliest Christian communities in Europe – visited by Saint Paul in about AD 50 – it would soon possess as well an array of Christian churches, with complex architectural plans and lavish mosaics.³

What explains this transformation of Macedonian art during the Hellenistic and Roman periods? As the preceding paragraphs suggest, it was an extensive and thoroughgoing process in the region, which had significant implications for its inhabitants' lived experience. Also, given Macedonia's influential role – as the first of the great Hellenistic empires to fall to Rome, then as an important point of contact between the Greek East and Latin West, and finally as a major center of the Late Empire – it is significant as well for the broader development of Roman and Late Antique art.

In recent decades, scholars have paid considerable attention to cultural transformations such as those outlined here, asking questions such as: How did they happen? Who was involved? What nonetheless remained unchanged, and why?⁴ When these questions were first extensively examined beginning in the 1970s, scholars tended to focus on what was termed 'Romanization', that is, the adoption of Roman cultural practices by conquered peoples. Some, for instance M. Bénabou, saw this as a conscious strategy formulated by the Romans, intended by them to facilitate imperial rule, and imposed by force if necessary.⁵ At the same time, Bénabou characterized adherence to prior local customs (for example, traditional religion) as a form of cultural 'resistance' to Rome. Other scholars have argued for a much less intentional and programmatic development. In their view, Romanization was less a conscious strategy promulgated by imperial administrators than a spontaneous process initiated by aspiring local elites: as Brunt put it, 'Provincials Romanized themselves'.⁶

More recently, scholars have questioned the 'Romanization vs. resistance' model and have aimed for more nuanced, locally specific

descriptions of the transformations wrought by Roman conquest.⁷ They have stressed provincials' active and selective response to imperial paradigms, and have emphasized occasions where Roman and local practices were combined to form a new synthesis.⁸ This new model, often termed 'hybridization' or 'creolization', seems particularly appropriate to Macedonia. After all, it is clear that Roman conquest had a transformative effect on Macedonian art, but it did not replace the pre-existing visual culture with a purely Roman one. Instead, Macedonian art of the Hellenistic and Roman eras remained visually distinctive, an intricately layered mixture of indigenous and imported features. Also, it incorporated elements not only from metropolitan Rome but also from nearby regions such as northern Turkey, the Balkans, and as far away as Egypt.⁹

But while this 'creolization' model can usefully be applied to Macedonia as to other Roman provinces, it is important to keep in mind as well what made the region distinctive. Three factors are particularly significant: first, Macedonia's historical position as the earliest major Hellenistic kingdom conquered by the Romans, second, the region's geographical position as a critical intermediary between the eastern and western halves of the Roman Empire, and third, its military and strategic position as a launching pad for the defense of the Danube provinces during the Late Empire. These factors are worth noting because they help to explain the eclectic and cosmopolitan character of Macedonian visual culture, its experimental nature, and its influential role both in the development of Roman art during the Republic and in the formation of Late Antique art.

In evaluating the evidence for Macedonian art of the Late Hellenistic and Roman eras, it is important to note two factors that have biased the preserved archaeological record.¹⁰ The first concerns the historical experience of Macedonia in the second and first centuries BC.¹¹ During this period, Macedonian rulers fought a series of wars with Rome largely on Macedonian soil. What was not destroyed in the wars was then largely looted, with extraordinary thoroughness, by the Romans. Following this, Macedonia in the Late Republic was again a major theater of war; it formed the refuge first of Pompey against Caesar, and then of Caesar's assassins Brutus and Cassius against Octavian and Mark Antony. In consequence of this troubled history, the Late Hellenistic and Republican material record in Macedonia is very limited although inscriptions, literary texts, and a few high-quality preserved artworks suggests its original importance. The evidence for the Roman imperial era is by contrast better preserved; Roman Macedonia was raided, especially in the Late Antique period, but it was never subject to looting on the scale of the Roman conquest.¹²

A second factor biasing the preserved evidence for Hellenistic and Roman Macedonian art is the region's natural resources.¹³ Macedonia is extraordinarily rich in metals, especially precious metals, while relatively poor in the quintessential classical architectural and sculptural material of marble. Rare preserved remains of metalworking suggest the considerable achievements of Macedonian art in this medium but mostly – since metal was valuable and could be re-used – it has been lost. Marble by contrast has survived in greater quantities, but was used only in a rather limited way in architecture; sculpture, especially of the Hellenistic era, tended to be small-scale, since the material had to be imported. We have consequently to imagine a much richer sculptural production in metal than is now preserved and at the same time to adjust our expectations for architecture; due to the cost of transport, large-scale marble temples were necessarily extremely rare in Macedonia.

With these biases in mind the preserved archaeological record of Macedonia becomes easier to understand. We have limited but impressive remains from the Late Hellenistic era: coins, a few sculpted works in marble and bronze, and the last of the great series of painted Macedonian tombs. These remains need to be supplemented with inscriptions (describing for example the erection of now-lost statues in bronze) as well as literary accounts of the triumphs of various Roman generals for a full picture of the cultural production of the period. For the *Provincia Macedonia*, the evidence is richer. For sculpture, we have a full range: imperial and private portraits, votives, funerary reliefs and cult statues. In architecture – made largely of bricks and mortar and thus both durable and hard to re-use – we have baths and theaters, villas and palaces, fora and temples. Painting is, as always, less well preserved, but there exists an impressive series of mosaics primarily from domestic contexts and some small-scale painted tombs from the third century AD onward help fill out the picture. In all, we have a rich and varied visual record for the Roman imperial era and a limited but suggestive one for Late Hellenistic/Republican Macedonia.

A few words concerning the definition of 'Macedonian art' are also necessary. The boundaries of Macedonia fluctuated considerably during the Hellenistic and Roman eras so that a definition based on them will inevitably be somewhat arbitrary. At the same time, Macedonia had as well an influence on art well outside its borders, for example through commissions of its monarchs in southern Greece, and through emulations of its art in Rome and Italy. I have consequently chosen to define my subject rather broadly, including not only works created in Macedonia by Macedonians but also monuments commissioned by Macedonians but set up elsewhere, as well as those created within the region for Roman as well as local patrons. This

broad definition seems to me best in order to do justice to the full scope and influence of Macedonian art.

2 The End of the Macedonian Monarchy and the Origins of the *Provincia Macedonia*

In the second to first centuries BC, the Romans imitated, appropriated, and selectively adapted Macedonian visual culture, especially the court art of the Antigonid monarchy. There is scant evidence, however, for the reverse, that is, for the Romanization of Macedonia at this time. The Romans' enthusiasm for Macedonian art was fueled by close contact between the two regions, initially through their wars, which occupied much of the first half of the second century BC, and then through the complex process of incorporating Macedonia into the Roman Empire. From the Macedonians, the Romans learned new modes of self-presentation for their leaders and for wealthy private citizens; they gained models for victory monuments and the ritual celebrations surrounding them, and they saw, in the palaces of the Antigonid kings, attractive precedents for an elegant and luxurious way of life.

The Macedonians by contrast did not choose to emulate the styles of their Roman antagonists and overlords. They largely adhered to traditional forms in depicting the gods, adorning the living and burying the dead. For their part, the Romans made few alterations in Macedonian material culture at this time. The most significant exception is the construction of the Via Egnatia, the central route that connected the eastern and western halves of the Roman Empire and was supported by military camps and Roman administrative posts along its length. The history of Macedonian art in the second and first centuries BC, then, centers on the monuments of the last Antigonid kings, Roman emulations and appropriations of them, and a conservative Macedonian visual culture coupled with a few high-profile Roman interventions such as roads and army bases.

Let us begin with one of the best preserved and most influential of these Antigonid commissions, a coin of Philip V, who was king from 221 to 179 (plate 22).¹⁴ It is the first coin portrait of a Macedonian ruler since that of Demetrius Poliorcetes in the early third century BC – Philip's immediate predecessors had preferred to decorate their emissions with the images of gods – and this fact on its own testifies to the king's determination to break with the past and to present a more

aggressive, charismatic image of himself. That image is, moreover, distinctly different from those of other rulers of the time.¹⁵ It boasts none of the tokens of divinity popular with Hellenistic monarchs, and it depicts Philip as a mature bearded-male rather than as a clean-shaven youth. This is quite striking; we have portraits of over 50 different Hellenistic rulers, of whom only 4 are depicted with beards.¹⁶ Since Philip came to the throne at a youthful 17, his numismatic image was not necessarily an accurate transcription of his actual appearance. Instead, it may perhaps have been intended to emphasize his maturity at a time when young monarchs were particularly vulnerable to attack.

In other ways, the coin portrait of Philip V is more closely aligned with those of his fellow rulers. He wears a diadem – the ribbon tied about his head that is the one invariable sign of Hellenistic kingship – and has the loosely curled medium-length hair typical of most monarchs after Alexander the Great. Philip's eyes are large and deep-set and his nose is prominent, straight and narrow. His features overall give the impression of an energetic ruler, mature and formidable.

The Roman emulation of the Macedonian king's image attests to its power in the visual culture of the time. This is particularly clear in the portrait of Philip V's antagonist, the Roman general T. Quintius Flamininus, reproduced on coins issued shortly after his defeat of the Antigonid monarch (see plate 23).¹⁷ On the coins, Flamininus appears very similar to Philip V: mature, with curly medium-length hair, a short beard, deep set eyes, and a prominent nose. The connections are sufficiently striking that the artist must surely have known Philip V's coins just as he knew the coins of Alexander the Great, whose image of Nike, goddess of victory, he used for the reverse.¹⁸ At the same time, this was not a simple case of copying but of adaptation for particular circumstances. On the reverse the coin artist substituted a palm branch, symbolizing victory on land, for the ship's mast on Alexander's coins. He also gave the Roman general his proper title in Latin by identifying him as T. Quintius. And for the portrait of Flamininus on the obverse, we see numerous variations that alter our impression of the image as a whole. The diadem was omitted, of course, since Flamininus was not a king. The features, too, seem more 'Roman' than those of Philip – the nose more prominent, almost beaky, the cheeks more hollow, the hair chaotic and beard scraggly.¹⁹ Overall, Flamininus looks older, less idealized, and more physically distinctive than Philip V; this is the more noteworthy since the Roman general was only about 30 at the time, and so appeared to the Greeks as a cultivated and handsome man (Plut., *Flamininus* 5.5–6).

The image of Flamininus is our first closely dated Roman portrait

of a living individual and as such has an outsize importance for the history of art. Yet it implies already a clear and well-established idea of what a Roman portrait should be, one that emphasized a close almost unflattering physical descriptiveness even while emulating Hellenistic royal precedents.²⁰ It was likely commissioned by Flamininus himself (as indicated by the use of Latin on the coin), but executed by a Greek artist (as suggested by the close resemblance to Philip V's portraiture as well as the artist's apparent difficulty in forming Latin letters).²¹ The combination is emblematic for much of early Roman art, which brought together Greek artists and Roman patrons to create monuments stylistically anchored in the Greek past but expressing something very new and characteristically Roman – in this case, the aspirations of a Roman general to vie with the most charismatic Hellenistic rulers while still promoting his language, his military achievements, and his distinctive, almost homely, appearance.

Similar aspirations are expressed in the monument of Aemilius Paullus at Delphi, although here we have to do not with an emulation of Macedonian art but with the intentional and clearly advertised appropriation of it (see [figure 25.1](#)).²²

The monument was originally commissioned by Perseus shortly after he succeeded his father Philip V as ruler of Macedon in 178; it is known as Paullus' monument due to the Roman general's subsequent appropriation of it. In Perseus' time, the monument seems to have formed part of a series of sculptures and inscriptions intended to highlight the Macedonians' achievements set up within high-profile locations at the important Panhellenic sanctuary at Delphi. These included an inscription detailing Perseus' proclamation of debt amnesty and other benefactions as well as others that reproduced letters and treaties of his illustrious ancestor Demetrius Poliorcetes. ²³ These reminders of the power and benevolence of the Antigonid monarchs were to be accompanied by a gilded statue of Perseus set up near the Temple of Apollo (Plut., *Aemilius Paullus* 28.2), and thus in competition not only with the gilded statues of earlier Macedonian kings – Alexander I and Philip II were both commemorated in the sanctuary in this form – but also with nearby statues of Perseus' fellow monarchs of the second century BC Prusias of Bithynia and Eumenes II of Pergamon.²⁴ Perseus' dedications at Delphi, then, seem intended to present him as the culmination of a long line of illustrious Macedonian rulers, as well as a formidable power within second century BC politics. Since the king himself visited the sanctuary to consult the Delphic oracle in 174, his personal involvement with these commissions seems likely, and it should be understood as part of his energetic attempt to improve the reputation of the Macedonian

his victory, Paullus ordered his own portrait set up upon the base intended for Perseus' gilded statue since 'it was only proper that the conquered should give way to the conquerors'.²⁶ He had the original Greek dedication excised and a new one in Latin inscribed that proclaimed in a few succinct, blunt words Paullus' defeat of Perseus and appropriation of his monument.²⁷

The Roman general was also likely responsible for other aspects of the work's final form. While the base of the monument was clearly commissioned by Perseus – as the still partly visible dedication in Greek attests – Paullus probably added the 8-meter-tall pillar on which his statue stood as well as the relief sculptures which decorated it. ²⁸ These sculptures, running in a continuous frieze along all four sides of the pillar monument, seem to depict the Romans' decisive victory at Pydna in 168 in the war against Perseus. This is indicated not only by the Macedonians and Romans shown fighting on the relief (each with their characteristic shields, round for the Macedonians and oblong for the Romans) but also by the presence of a riderless horse (plate 24). According to literary sources the Battle of Pydna began when a runaway horse escaped from the Roman army lines and was pursued by both sides.²⁹ The relief thus likely depicts this famous historical incident, thus giving an air of specificity and verisimilitude to what is otherwise a rather generic battle scene.

The pillar of Aemilius Paullus, like the coin of Flamininus, is a key monument within the history of Macedonian and Roman art. It demonstrates, first of all, Perseus' attempt to rehabilitate the kingdom of Macedonia in the memory of the Greeks by recalling the benefactions of his ancestors as well as his own achievements. Its subsequent appropriation by Paullus offered a different historical narrative, one centering on Roman military victories and the very prominent and explicit dishonoring of Antigonid memory. As such, Paullus' monument testifies to the importance of such works of art as political statements – no contemporary visitor to Delphi would be left in doubt as to who was now in charge – but also as sites for the creation and preservation of historical memory. Even some three centuries later, Plutarch knew that the monument had originally been intended for Perseus and then usurped by Paullus; he also knew the anecdote of the runaway horse, perhaps from seeing the monument during his time as a priest of the Temple of Apollo there.³⁰ In this way, the pillar of Aemilius Paullus helped to keep memories of the Roman victory over Macedonia vivid and concrete long after the wars were over and the region had been integrated into the Roman Empire.

At the same time, the monument, and in particular its reliefs, had also a significance within the history of Roman art. The reliefs constitute the earliest preserved sculptures which depict a Roman

historical narrative. Presumably executed by Greek artists using well-established visual formulas and in a typically Hellenistic style, the reliefs nonetheless included particularizing details (like the runaway horse) that anticipate the achievements of later Roman monuments such as the Ara Pacis, Trajan's Column and the Arch of Constantine.³¹ Thus, like the coin of Flamininus, the pillar of Aemilius Paullus documents the fundamental importance of Macedonia for the development of a key genre of Roman art.

In the years following the overthrow of the Antigonid monarchy, Macedonian court art became if anything even more important to aspiring Romans. Images from houses and villas in the Bay of Naples show how the Macedonian kings provided models for the ruling elite of Rome at least in their private lives. The Alexander Mosaic from the House of the Faun at Pompeii, the decoration of Room H from the villa at Boscoreale, and the extensive series of sculpted portrait busts from the Villa dei Papyri at Herculaneum offer high-quality Roman versions of major works of Macedonian state art.³² Also, the very form of the Late Republican Roman villa with its elegant bedrooms and dining areas disposed around immense peristyle courtyards – is indebted to Macedonian precedents, namely the palaces of the Antigonid kings.³³ The Romans became familiar with such palaces through military and administrative service in Macedonia;³⁴ they had also the opportunity to appreciate Antigonid court art when it was paraded through the streets of Rome in the triumphs of generals like Aemilius Paullus (Plut., *Aemilius Paullus* 32.1–34.8). In Italy, they recreated such artworks in order to suggest their military and political aspirations, as well as their knowledge of, and ability to afford, such impressive manifestations of Hellenistic culture.

While Roman art was developing rapidly in this period the visual culture of Macedonia itself remained largely conservative. In sanctuaries, statues of gods, for instance the Aphrodite Hypolympidia at Dium, appear entirely in line with earlier Hellenistic precedents.³⁵ In cities, characteristically Greek architectural forms such as temples, theaters, and gymnasia were maintained although few major new buildings were erected.³⁶ In cemeteries, we have no new 'Macedonian tombs' after about 150 but those that existed continued to be used; the tomb of Lyson and Callicles at Mieza, for example, was created at the end of the third century and eventually housed 19 members of 4 generations of the family.³⁷ The overall impression given by the art of Hellenistic Macedonia after the fall of the kings is one of continuity. What changes is less the character than the quantity and quality of new monuments, which decline precipitously; this is comprehensible given the impoverishment of the region following the wars with Rome, the looting of the country after the fall of the monarchy, and

then a series of rapacious Roman governors.

The monuments examined in this section demonstrate the complex dialogue between Macedonia and Rome in the first period of artistic contact between the two cultures. As noted above, this contact did not substantially alter the features of Hellenistic Macedonian art; it did, however, have profound effects on the visual culture of Republican Rome. What the Romans particularly responded to in Macedonian art were representations of power and authority: ruler portraits, victory monuments and palaces. These were well-established genres in Macedonia but less so in Rome so it is not surprising that the Romans found them attractive. The Macedonians by contrast clung to traditional styles and visual formulas, without the interest – or, perhaps, the economic wherewithal – required for a substantive artistic transformation. It is only with the accession of the first Roman emperor Augustus that this begins to change; this development deserves consideration next.

3 Macedonian Art in the Roman Empire

During the first three centuries AD, Macedonian art was radically altered. However, although the region was politically subordinate to Rome, its art did not simply echo that of the metropolis. Instead we see a range of options, from precise copies of Roman imperial portrait heads to divine statues in thoroughly Hellenic style to hybrid works combining features from Rome itself and from other eastern and western provinces together with local styles and visual formats. The result is a visual culture that has connections to those of other regions – above all, to the Danube provinces north of Macedonia, and Turkey and Syria to the east – but which remains distinctive. Macedonian art does not look quite like the art from anywhere else although it partakes of a recognizably Roman visual language. In this it is typical of Roman provincial art, which never coalesced into a homogeneous visual culture but remained instead a collection of interconnected but diversely inflected regional styles.

The second century AD grave *stele* of Onesimus from the outskirts of Thessalonica offers a good example of Macedonia's distinctive regional style and of the new patrons who encouraged it (plate 25).³⁸ As the monument's Greek inscription makes clear, Onesimus was a slave – though evidently a well-off and highly successful one – who worked as manager for a large rural estate; his master, Aelius

Menogenes, was likely an imperial freedman serving in the provincial administration.³⁹ Onesimus used the monument to commemorate his deceased wife, Neike, as well as himself and his stillliving mother and daughter. The emphasis in the inscription is thus on the family as a whole (a source of particular pride for slaves, who had no legal right to marriage) as well as on Onesimus' vocation and his ties to high-ranking individuals in the Roman administration.

The visual format of the *stèle* combines bust-length frontal portraits of Onesimus, his wife and their daughter on top with smaller narrative scenes below and beneath them the inscription. The portraits depict the family with up-to-date Roman hairstyles of the later second century AD based on imperial prototypes.⁴⁰ The facial features are rather generic and idealized, although Onesimus' age is alluded to through his lined forehead and hollow cheeks. But the overall impression given by the portraits is of a wealthy, respectable and rather fashionable family of the Antonine era, whose close bonds are intimated through the physical proximity of their images.

Beneath the portraits, whose inspiration goes back to freedmen's funerary monuments from Republican Italy, we have two scenes more closely connected to contemporary Roman artistic practice.⁴¹ On the left, we have a seated woman gazing at a standing female figure in the guise of Aphrodite; the pose and dress are based on a well-known image of the goddess of the late fifth century BC while the hairstyle is Antonine. Such representations of the deceased in the form of a divinity became increasingly popular in the second century AD.⁴² They offered an exalted yet nonspecific way to praise the virtues of the departed while also testifying to the patron's cultivated knowledge of Greek art. In this case, commemoration in the guise of Aphrodite suggested the beauty and desirability of Onesimus' wife Neike; the form chosen was a statue type known as the Louvre-Fréjus Aphrodite, popular in the Roman period and seen also in a high-quality reproduction in the round from the sanctuary of the Egyptian gods in Thessalonica.⁴³ The other scene shows Onesimus himself reclining on a dining couch with an elaborate table laden with food before him and a seated woman to his side. Banqueting scenes like this one have a long history in Greek art, going back to the Archaic period; they were adopted with enthusiasm by the Romans and appear throughout the provinces during the imperial era.⁴⁴ Given their widespread popularity in places with very different funeral customs, it is difficult to speak of a specific meaning; in general terms, they could allude to both banquets held in honor of the dead and also hopes for a pleasurable afterlife.

The funeral stèle of Onesimus is a typical but particularly thoroughgoing example of the eclecticism of Macedonian art during

the Roman imperial period. It combines portrait busts inspired by Roman Republican prototypes, a banqueting scene with Archaic Greek precedents, and an image of the deceased as Aphrodite that used a classical Greek statue type but in a manner characteristic of Antonine Rome. Close analogies can be observed with *stelai* of the Danube provinces, which have frontal portrait busts executed in a similarly static, linear fashion; for the combination of busts with narrative scenes, the best comparisons are with images from northwestern Turkey. ⁴⁵The overall visual effect of the *stèle* is however unlike its Balkan or Turkish parallels, but appears instead thoroughly Macedonian, with close connections to other *stelai* in Thessalonica, Beroea and Philippi.⁴⁶

A similar mingling of Macedonian and Roman forms is visible not only in the funerary realm but also in domestic art and architecture. The Roman villa – originally inspired by the palaces of the Macedonian kings – was in the imperial period adopted as a model for the luxury homes of the provincial elite in Macedonia as it was throughout the empire.⁴⁷ We thus see villas dotting the Macedonian countryside in the second and third centuries AD, and some quite grandiose constructions appear even within towns, where space was more limited.⁴⁸ The Villa of Dionysus from Dium, for example, was located inside the walls of the Roman colony but was nonetheless enormous; it dominated the southern sector of the city and by far exceeded the preserved remains of any other house there (plate 26).⁴⁹ The villa boasted some 60 rooms including 4 colonnaded courtyards, 5 innovative apsed halls, and its own bath complex. While the individual rooms are generally modest in scale their number and variety are striking as is their deployment of the most up-to-date forms of Roman domestic architecture. Particularly impressive is the bath complex, the only private bathing installation yet found in Dium, and a clear sign of the homeowner's wealth and ability to command precious resources – such as running water – for his own purposes.

The decoration of the villa is likewise notable. It is characterized by a lavish use of marble – for columns in the courtyards, for wall and floor decoration, and above all for sculpture – which stands out in a city lacking easy access to good quarries, and where even the temples of the gods have few columns and small-scale cult statues. The villa's sculptures included busts of imperial family members (Faustina Minor and Agrippina) as well as versions of well-known classical statue types: Nike, Dionysus, Hercules. And four marble statues of philosophers were found in the villa, their heads recarved in the third century AD, perhaps with portraits of the villa's inhabitants.⁵⁰ Just as the philosopher statues attested to the cultural aspirations of the villa owner, so too did the presence of a library with bookshelves, a rare

component of eastern villas, but present in the best Italian models such as the Villa dei Papyri at Herculaneum.⁵¹ And 'antique' bronze furniture – several centuries old already when the villa was built, about AD 200 – suggests the owner's pedigree and artistic sensibilities; this was also indicated by an immense and beautifully executed mosaic of the Triumph of Dionysus, which decorated a large banqueting hall within the complex.⁵² In all, the villa and its decoration demonstrate the wealth and artistic *savoir faire* of the Macedonian elite during the Roman empire as they adopted Italian villa culture and transformed it to suit their own, regionally distinctive, modes of life.

In the public monuments of Macedonian cities, as in the private sphere of house and tomb, we see a transformation, but one that created a new hybrid culture rather than an exclusively Roman one. Two areas where this is particularly apparent are sanctuaries of the imperial cult and sites for gladiatorial games – two quintessentially Roman institutions reformulated by the Macedonians for their own purposes. In terms of the imperial cult, many Macedonian cities set up temples and statues to the emperors, thus visibly demonstrating their loyalty to and enthusiasm for Roman rule.⁵³ Yet the cult statues they commissioned look like swaggering Hellenistic monarchs or classical gods, rather than the sober togate images popular in Rome itself; their visual forms suggest a reinterpretation of the Roman emperor in terms familiar to the local audience. So, too, gladiatorial games were performed in several Macedonian cities. Their popularity is demonstrated by the many preserved grave monuments of gladiators as well as large numbers of inexpensive terracotta lamps that feature their images.⁵⁴ Yet the games were rarely held in new purpose-built amphitheaters; they took place instead in traditionally Greek theaters and stadia, retrofitted to accommodate the new entertainments.⁵⁵ In this way, Macedonians incorporated into their public life some major aspects of Roman civilization but in a manner that integrated them with previous local customs.

At the same time, the public monuments of Macedonia took inspiration not only from Rome itself but also from regions throughout the empire. This is particularly well illustrated by the sanctuaries to the Egyptian gods Isis and Serapis that are among the best-preserved and most elaborate shrines in many Macedonian cities.⁵⁶ In their earliest forms, these sanctuaries go back to the third century BC and testify to the popularity of the tutelary divinities of the Ptolemaic monarchy far beyond Egypt. The sanctuaries were however greatly elaborated in the Roman imperial era; at Dium, for example, the cult complex of Isis was completely rebuilt in the late second century AD while that of Thessalonica had an extensive renovation in the third.

These sanctuaries, which featured imported Egyptian objects as well as Greek-style cult statues, attest to the continued ties between Macedonia and Egypt during the Roman Empire – this is not surprising given Thessalonica's position as the largest and most important port in the Aegean and Alexandria's as the great trading capital of the eastern Mediterranean.

Indeed, one might argue that Macedonian art under the Roman Empire was not so much Romanized as increasingly hybrid and cosmopolitan. Macedonia, after all, was a crossroads. In it, the Greek language was predominant but it was filled with Roman colonies and bordered Latin-speaking territories to the north and west. It stood along the Via Egnatia, a major route connecting Italy via the Adriatic Sea with the continent of Asia. Macedonia was also bisected by major north–south routes across the Balkan peninsula, which connected Rome's borders along the Danube river with her core territory on the Mediterranean sea. And Macedonia's ports, above all Thessalonica, hosted merchants from all over the empire, trading Italian wine, Spanish olive oil, Alexandrian glass and North African pottery for Macedonian silver, timber and tar. ⁵⁷It is consequently not surprising that Macedonia's art drew inspiration from the many and varied cultures contained within the Roman Empire; this was a natural concomitant of the region's participation in the globally interconnected Roman world.

4 Macedonia in the Late Empire

During the centuries of the *Pax Romana* Macedonia benefited from the peace and prosperity guaranteed by Rome's undisputed rule throughout the Mediterranean. Far from the borders of the Roman Empire, the region was wealthy, stable and culturally sophisticated; politically, however, it was something of a backwater, rarely visited by emperors and producing few senators or military leaders.⁵⁸ By contrast, in the more troubled years of the late third to early fourth centuries AD Macedonia gained a new prominence due to its proximity to the Danube frontier, which was then under threat. With its ports on the Mediterranean and its stations along the Via Egnatia, the region was an ideal launching pad for military campaigns in the Balkan region.

This was officially recognized in the period of the Tetrarchy when Thessalonica became the regular residence of one of the four rulers of the era, C. Galerius Valerius Maximianus (in residence AD 298–303 and 308–311).⁵⁹ Although the city was already a provincial capital,

Thessalonica was substantially transformed in the time of Galerius. A large quarter of the city was appropriated for his needs in an area stretching from the sea to the *decumanus maximus*, the main east–west road, and from the theaterstadium in the civic center to the east walls.⁶⁰ There were established the new buildings considered necessary for an imperial residence: a palace, a temple for the imperial cult, a triumphal arch celebrating the emperor's victories and a hippodrome. The preserved remains of these monuments are revealing; together with those of Galerius' colleague Constantius Chlorus in Trier, they constitute the most extensive evidence available for the residence of a Tetrarchan ruler.⁶¹ At the same time, they anticipate the similar but more elaborate complex constructed shortly thereafter by the first Christian emperor, Constantine, when he moved the capital of the empire to Constantinople. ⁶² Also, while the founding of Constantinople necessarily detracted from the preeminence of Thessalonica, the latter nonetheless remained an important city and at times an imperial residence, for instance for Theodosius I in AD 379–80. It consequently played an important role in the formation of Late Antique art.

What was most significant about the Late Antique monuments of Thessalonica was the manner in which they reflected, and indeed helped to construct, the image of the Roman emperor as an authoritarian monarch. The emperor now began to be presented as an absolute ruler, adorned with the trappings of monarchy – a jeweled diadem, an *The Urban Image of Late Antique Constantinople* (Cambridge 2004). orb to symbolize his universal rule, an ornate costume, etc. – and removed from the sphere of everyday life and from his subjects.⁶³ The images and buildings of the Tetrarchs constitute some of our most extensive and earliest evidence for this development. They are also remarkable for their cohesive uniformity, as each ruler in his sphere of power commissioned portraits and buildings characterized by a shared style and iconography. ⁶⁴ In this way, the Tetrarchs helped to create a new empire-wide visual culture of power and authority – ironically, at a time when the empire was in political terms beginning to split apart.

In Thessalonica, this new imagery of power can be observed both in the city's sculpted monuments and in its architectural ensemble. A small marble arch, which originally ornamented a statue niche within Galerius' palace, offers a good introduction to this development (plate 27).⁶⁵ In form and to some extent in decoration echoing a triumphal arch, it featured roundels with portrait busts of Galerius and his wife Galeria Valeria, the daughter of his fellow Tetrarch Diocletian.⁶⁶ These were held up by Persian prisoners, a reference to Galerius' recent victories in campaigns against Sassanian Persia.⁶⁷ Elsewhere the monument was decorated with elaborate architectural ornament

and, on its sides, figures from the entourage of Dionysus: Pan, the goat-footed god of the wilderness and a nymph or maenad. Since Dionysus was believed to come from the East these images may have been understood programmatically as further allusions to Galerius' victory. At the same time, Dionysus had long been a tutelary divinity of the city of Thessalonica, appearing on its coins from the Hellenistic period onward. Also, the god's associations with festive pleasure were always appropriate for palace decor as they were for wealthy homes like the Villa of Dionysus discussed above. What we see with the arch is the adoption of familiar themes of domestic decoration, which may here take on civic and political resonances due to their placement within the palace.

The image of Galerius on the small arch gives us useful insights into the selfpresentation of a Tetrarchan monarch. The emperor has a short-cropped military hairstyle and wears a soldier's cloak, secured by an ornate pin on his right shoulder. He has large, almost protruding, eyes, prominent ears, a small mouth, and a fat face with fleshy cheeks and strong nose-to-mouth lines. His expression, as he faces directly forward to the viewer, is tough and uncompromising. The portrait is executed in the static, abstract and linear style characteristic of late antiquity, softened somewhat by the fleshy modeling of his cheeks and chin, but appearing very strongly in the harsh delineation of his hair, his cloak and his large all-seeing eyes. In this it is characteristic of much Tetrarchan portraiture, which is abstract in style, stern and militaristic in iconography.

Elsewhere in Thessalonica the same style and message were deployed to decorate public monuments. They appear for example in the large-scale triumphal Arch of Galerius, which was visible both to visitors to the palace (where it connected the imperial cult temple in the north with the reception rooms in the south) and to the inhabitants of Thessalonica more generally since it lay along the main route to the hippodrome.⁶⁸ Four-sided and triple-bayed, the arch was blanketed with marble relief sculptures commemorating Galerius' Persian campaigns. The scenes depicted included specific historical incidents such as Galerius' capture of the Persian harem, as well as generic images of Roman victory and barbarian submission. Strikingly absent, however, were any images illustrating Galerius' constitutional role, for instance him as consul or accompanied by Roman senators. The focus is instead upon the emperor as charismatic ruler, successful in battle and merciful in victory. His isolation from ordinary mortals, and his exaltation as emperor, could not be more completely stressed.⁶⁹

In architecture as in sculpture, Galerius' status as authoritarian monarch was emphatically highlighted. This can be seen for example

in the palace, where the emperor received high-ranking administrators, military officials, and ambassadors from abroad. Among the best-preserved spaces within the palace are two impressive reception rooms. One was a 100-meter-long apsed hall similar to that of Constantius Chlorus' palace at Trier; the emperor likely stood at the far end, beneath the apse, as visitors advanced slowly and ceremoniously toward him.⁷⁰ Such spaces, with their immense scale, tend to dwarf the viewer, for the effect is intimidating and overwhelming. Like the triumphal arch, the apsed reception hall provided a visual metaphor for the power of the absolute monarch, who had at his disposal the vast resources and architectural sophistication necessary for the creation of such spaces.

A second reception hall was smaller in scale but more complicated in its architectural structure and more luxurious in its preserved decoration (plate 28).⁷¹ It was an octagonal room, 30 meters in diameter, facing south to the Mediterranean and perhaps meant for the reception of overseas visitors.⁷² Likely crowned by a dome, it would have had the largest open interior span of any building in Thessalonica; in essence, it brought the advanced architecture of Rome (seen for example in the Pantheon) to the Greek East.⁷³ Similar to the Pantheon as well was the lavish interior decor, including richly colored mosaic floors and walls reveted with red and green porphyry juxtaposed with white marble pilasters. Galerius' wealth, and his access to expensive, hard-to-obtain materials and talented architects, were very conspicuously displayed here.

The building that showcases most fully the talent of the architects at work in Tetrarchan Thessalonica is the Rotunda.⁷⁴ Likely initially a temple for the imperial cult, the Rotunda was converted into a Christian church in the Late Antique era; this conversion altered some of its architectural features – for example by elaborating the east end of the building into a sanctuary – but also preserved its overall form so that it stands to this day.⁷⁵ This provides us with the opportunity to appreciate the general effect of the building in a manner that is rare for Tetrarchan architecture. The Rotunda was slightly smaller in diameter than the octagonal reception hall but similar in its central-plan structure, its articulation with niches and its domed roof. It likewise recalled the Pantheon, even including an oculus (an opening at the apex of the dome, which allowed light into the building) similar to that of its Roman predecessor. But unlike the Pantheon, it was not constructed out of the quintessential Roman building material, concrete, but through the more laborious medium of mortared brickwork, which was traditional in the Greek East.⁷⁶ This suggests that the Rotunda's architect and craftsmen were local workers, who perhaps took inspiration from metropolitan precedents, but

interpreted them in accordance with Greek rather than western building practices. In this way, the Rotunda exemplifies the dual significance of Tetrarchan architecture with particular clarity; it makes use of architectural forms originally developed in Rome, but does so in accordance with local tradition, and in a manner with important implications for the subsequent development of Late Antique art. After all, while domed, central-planned buildings were unusual in the Greek East during Roman imperial times, they became increasingly popular in late antiquity, above all for the churches required by the new state religion, Christianity.

Elsewhere in Macedonia as well, the Late Antique era brought considerable changes. We see, for example, early Christian funerary monuments beginning to appear in cemeteries at this time.⁷⁷ At first almost indistinguishable from their pagan counterparts, with which indeed they were intermingled, they become over time more overt in their embrace of explicitly Christian symbols and more assured in their deployment of a developing religious iconography; this was made possible by the passage of an edict of toleration for Christianity – promulgated in the east by Galerius in AD 311 – and by later emperors’ support for the new religion.

Together with the graves, we have as well a few architecturally distinguished churches of the period although most date only from the late fourth century onward. But the cemetery church of Philippi, constructed about AD 300–50, attests to the early presence of ambitious Christian buildings in Macedonia; this is appropriate given the region’s history as the site of the first European converts to Christianity.⁷⁸

A final transformation of the Late Antique era – perhaps the most visibly striking for the region’s inhabitants – was the construction or refurbishment of city walls. ⁷⁹ Allowed to lapse during the *Pax Romana*, civic defenses were now strengthened and enhanced in response to the new threats emanating from the northern frontier. Frequently following the circuit of earlier Hellenistic walls and in some cases, as at Dium, built directly on top of them, these new defenses signaled very clearly the changed conditions of the late empire: a return to the military instability of the Hellenistic era. What these transformations demonstrate is the continued vitality of Macedonian visual culture in the Late Antique era as well as its responsiveness to historical conditions; this indeed helped to ensure its lasting significance for the development of Byzantine art.⁸⁰

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

Apart from the monuments of Galerius, the field of later Hellenistic and Roman Macedonian art has not been the subject of much sustained, analytical study, although this is beginning to change. The course of excavations can be followed in the specialist journals *Egnatia* and *To archaiologiko Ergo ste Makedonia kai Thrake*, along with brief mentions in *Archaiologike Ephemeris*. For the Hellenistic period, the coins of Philip V and Perseus are discussed in M. Price, *The Coins of the Macedonians* (London 1974), while the ruler's images and commissions are cataloged in H. Kotsidu, *Time kai doxa: Ehrungen für hellenistische Herrscher im griechischen Mutterland und in Kleinasien unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der archäologischen Denkmäler* (Berlin 2000). For the later Macedonian tombs, the best analysis is that of S.G. Miller, *The Tomb of Lyson and Kallikles: A Painted Macedonian Tomb* (Mainz 1994), focusing on the tomb of Lyson and Callicles but with a broader discussion of the genre also.

For the Roman imperial era, two recent exhibition catalogs emanating from the Thessalonica Archaeological Museum are especially significant: D.V. Grammenos and P. Adam-Veleni (eds.), *Roman Thessaloniki* (Thessalonica 2003), focusing on the city of Thessalonica, and P. Adam-Veleni, E. Poulaki and K. Tzanavari (eds.), *Ancient Country Houses on Modern Roads* (Thessalonica 2003), which covers Classical through Late Roman villas that came to light during construction of recent roads and train routes. Helpful as well is F. Papazoglou, *Les villes de Macédoine à l'époque romaine* (Athens 1988), which integrates archaeological with literary and epigraphic evidence to offer comprehensive entries on each of the cities of Roman Macedonia, and G. Despinis, T. Stefanidou-Tiverious, and E. Voutiras (eds.), *Catalogue of Sculpture in the Archaeological Museum of Thessaloniki* (Thessalonica 1997). Also, M. Fasolo, *La Via Egnatia 1: Da Apollonia e Dyrrachium ad Herakleia Lynkestidos* (Rome 2003), offers the first in a planned series of volumes on the course of the Via Egnatia, perhaps the single most significant Roman intervention in the Macedonian landscape.

The Late Antique era is comparatively well studied. The best relatively recent overview of the Galerian monuments in Thessalonica is E. Mayer, *Rom ist dort, wo der Kaiser ist: Untersuchungen zu den Staatsdenkmälern des dezentralisierten Reiches von Diocletian bis zu Theodosius 2* (Mainz 2003), which needs however to be supplemented both by the more comprehensive J.-M. Spieser, *Thessalonique et ses monuments du IV^e au IV^e siècle: Contribution à l'étude d'une ville Paléochrétienne* (Athens 1984) and by P. Adam-Veleni, 'History and Town-planning', in D.V. Grammenos and P. Adam-Veleni (eds.), *Roman Thessaloniki* (Thessaloniki 2003), pp. 121–76, with information on new findings from rescue excavations. While less information is

available for other cities, an outdated but still useful discussion is that of P. Lemerle, *Philippes et la Macédoine orientale à l'époque chrétienne et byzantine; recherches d'histoire et d'archéologie* (Paris 1945) on Philippi, perhaps the most extensively preserved and visually impressive Late Antique Macedonian city outside the capital.

¹ S.G. Miller, *The Tomb of Lyson and Kallikles: A Painted Macedonian Tomb* (Mainz 1991).

² The best general discussions of Roman Macedonia are F. Papazoglou, 'Quelques aspects de l'histoire de la province de Macédoine', in H. Temporini and W. Haase (eds.), *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 2.7.1 (Berlin 1979), pp. 302–69 and F. Papazoglou, *Les villes de Macédoine à l'époque romaine* (Paris 1988); see also J. Vanderspoel, chapter 13 *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia*, Edited by Joseph Roisman and Ian Worthington © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

³ On the Christian monuments of Thessalonica, see E. Koukoutidou, N. Kolaidou and A. Tourta, *Wandering in Byzantine Thessaloniki* (Athens 1997); for the Late Antique era in Macedonia more generally, see C.S. Snively, chapter 26.

⁴ For example, M. Bénabou, 'Résistance et romanisation en Afrique du Nord sous le Haut-Empire', in D.M. Pippidi (ed.), *Assimilation et résistance à la culture Greco-Romaine dans le monde ancien* (Paris 1976), pp. 367–75, P.A. Brunt, 'The Romanization of the Local Ruling Classes in the Roman Empire', in D.M. Pippidi (ed.), *Assimilation et résistance à la culture Greco-Romaine dans le monde ancien* (Paris 1976), pp. 161–73, G. Woolf, *Becoming Roman: The Origins of Provincial Civilization in Gaul* (Cambridge 1998), J. Webster, 'Creolizing the Roman Provinces', *AJA* 105 (2001), pp. 209–25.

⁵ Bénabou, 'Résistance et romanisation en Afrique du Nord'.

⁶ Brunt, 'Romanization of the Local Ruling Classes', p. 162.

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⁸ Webster, 'Creolizing the Roman Provinces'.

⁹ See below, n. 45 (Turkey and the Balkans) and n. 56 (Egypt).

¹⁰ For the evidence and its biases more generally, see P.J. Rhodes, chapter 2 and K. Dahmen, chapter 3.

¹¹ For the history of Macedonia in this period, see A.M. Eckstein, chapter 12 and J. Vanderspoel, chapter 13.

¹² On Late Antique Macedonia, see C.S. Snively, chapter 26.

¹³ On Macedonia's natural resources, see C.G. Thomas, chapter 4.

¹⁴ M .J. Price, *Coins of the Macedonians* (London, 1974), pp. 28–9, R.R.R. Smith, *Hellenistic Royal Portraits*, (Oxford 1988), pp. 112–13.

¹⁵ On monarchs' portraiture, see Smith, *Hellenistic Royal Portraits*.

¹⁶ Smith, *Hellenistic Royal Portraits*, p. 46 n. 2.

¹⁷ Smith, *Hellenistic Royal Portraits*, p. 126, M.R. Alföldi, 'Der Stater des T. Quinctius Flaminius', *Numismatische Zeitschrift* 98 (1984), pp. 19–26.

¹⁸ Price, *Coins of the Macedonians*, pl. XI.60.

¹⁹ On images of Romans in the second century BC, see Smith, *Hellenistic Royal Portraits*, pp. 126–30.

²⁰ Portraits from Delos, likely of Roman or Italian traders and dating to the period about 166–80 BC, have a similarly descriptive if not even more unflattering appearance, suggesting that Flaminius' image was not a one-off image but rather expressed a consensus about how Romans should look; on the Delian portraits, see Smith, *Hellenistic Royal Portraits*, pp. 126–7.

²¹ The fact that Flaminius' name on the coin is given in the genitive – as was typical for the individual responsible for the emission – constitutes additional evidence supporting his responsibility for the coin: Smith, *Hellenistic Royal Portraits*, p. 126, Alföldi, 'Stater des T. Quinctius Flaminius', pp. 21–5.

²² Delphi, Archaeological Museum. A. Jacquemin and D. Laroche, 'Notes sur trois piliers delphiques', *BCH* 106 (1982), pp. 191–218, H. Kähler, *Der Fries vom Reiterdenkmal des Aemilius*

²³ On the proclamation, see Polybius 25.3; for the treaties, which are second-century copies of third-century inscriptions, see A. Jacquemin, D. Laroche and F. Lefèvre, 'Delphes, le roi Persée et les Romains', *BCH* 119 (1995), pp. 125–36, F. Lefèvre, 'Traité de paix entre Démétrios Poliorcète et la confédération étolienne (fin 289?)', *BCH* 122 (1998), pp. 109–41. The substance of the treaties clearly dates them to the third century, but the letter forms are second century, indicating that these are copies made by Perseus of earlier inscriptions.

²⁴ S.G. Miller, 'Macedonians at Delphi', in A. Jacquemin (ed.), *Delphes: Cent ans après la grande fouille* (Athens 2000), pp. 263–81.

²⁵ On the visit, see Livy 41.22.5–6.

²⁶ The story is preserved, with minor variants, in Polybius (20.10.2), Livy (45.27.7), and Plutarch (*Aemilius Paullus* 28.2); the quote is from Plutarch.

²⁷ T. Mommsen (ed.), *Inscriptiones Latinae antiquissimae ad C. Caesaris morte* 1² (Berlin, 1893–1986), no. 622.

²⁸ This is suggested by the different color of the marble used for the pillar (pure white) as opposed to the base (bluish) as well as the different system of dowels in each case (Jacquemin and Laroche, 'Notes sur trois piliers delphiques', pp. 207–12). In addition, the relief sculptures likely depict the Roman victory at the Battle of Pydna, which would make them appropriate for a monument commissioned by Paullus but not by Perseus.

²⁹ Slightly different accounts of the incident are given in Livy (44.40.4–10, 41.3–5) and Plutarch (*Aemilius Paullus* 18.1). See also P. Christesen and S.C. Murray, chapter 21.

³⁰ On Plutarch and Delphi, see D.A. Russell, *Plutarch* (London 2001, originally published 1973), pp. 12–17.

³¹ D. Kleiner, *Roman Sculpture* (New Haven 1992), pp. 26–7 (*Aemilius Paullus* monument), pp. 90–9 (*Ara Pacis*), pp. 212–20 (*Trajan's Column*), pp. 444–55 (*Arch of Constantine*).

³² A lexander Mosaic: A. Cohen, *The Alexander Mosaic: Stories of Victory and Defeat* (Cambridge 1997); Boscoreale paintings: R.R.R. Smith, 'Spear-won Land at Boscoreale: On the Royal Paintings of a Roman Villa', *JRA* 7 (1994), pp. 100–28; Villa dei Papyri portraits: Smith, *Hellenistic Royal Portraits*, pp. 70–8.

³³ I. Nielsen, *Hellenistic Palaces: Tradition and Renewal* ² (Aarhus 1999), pp. 164–71.

³⁴ O n Pella and its palace after the Roman conquest, see M. Lilimpaki-Akamati, 'Recent Discoveries in Pella', in M. Stamatopoulou and M. Yeroulanou (eds.), *Excavating Classical Culture: Recent Archaeological Discoveries in Greece* (Oxford 2002), pp. 83–90. Romans certainly visited and made use of the Macedonian kings' palaces; Aemilius Paullus, for example, gave his sons Perseus' library (Plut., *Aemilius Paullus* 28.11), and made over the king's hunting grounds to his younger son Scipio Aemilianus (Polyb. 31.29.5).

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³⁶ For example, Pandermalis, *Dion*, G. Gounaris and E. Gounari, *Philippi: Archaeological Guide* (Thessaloniki 2004).

³⁷ Miller, *Tomb of Lyson and Kallikles*.

³⁸ T hessalonica, Archaeological Museum Inv. Nr. 1424, A. Despinis, T. Stefanidou-Tiveriou and E. Voutiras, *Catalogue of Sculpture in the Archaeological Museum of Thessaloniki* (Thessaloniki 1997), pp. 152–4, with previous bibliography.

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⁴⁰ K . Fittschen and P. Zanker, *Katalog der römischen Porträts in den Capitolinischen Museen und den anderen kommunalen Sammlungen der Stadt Rom* (Mainz 1983–5), 1, no. 59 (for Onesimus), 3, nos. 121–2 (for the female portraits).

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⁴⁴ For the Greek background to these banquet scenes, see A. Effenberger, 'Das Symposium der Seligen: Zur Entstehung und Deutung der Totenmahlreliefs', *Forschungen und Berichte* 14 (1972), pp. 128–63.

⁴⁵ D anube: S. Conrad, *Die Grabstelen aus Moesia Inferior* (Leipzig 2004); Turkey: A. Rüşch, 'Das kaiserzeitliche Porträt in Makedonien', *JdI* 84 (1969), p. 74.

⁴⁶ For examples, see the catalogue in M. Lagogianni-Georgakarakos, *Die Grabdenkmäler mit Porträts au Makedonien* (Athens 1998).

⁴⁷ O n the Roman villa and its provincial iterations, see A. McKay, *Houses, Villas, and Palaces in the Roman World* (Baltimore 1998).

⁴⁸ O n country houses, see P. Adam-Veleni, E. Poulaki and K. Tzanavari, *Ancient Country Houses on Modern Roads* (Athens 2003).

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⁵⁰ Pandermalis, *Dion*, pp. 87–90.

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⁵⁷ For trade, see P. Millett, chapter 23.

⁵⁸ Allamani-Souri, 'Province of Macedonia', pp. 71–2 and J. Vanderspoel, chapter 13.

⁵⁹ Allamani-Souri, 'Province of Macedonia', pp. 88–90.

⁶⁰ E. Mayer, *Rom ist dort, wo der Kaiser ist: Untersuchungen zu den Staatsdenkmälern des dezentralisierten Reiches von Diocletian bis zu Theodosius 2* (Mainz 2002), pp. 43–7, P. Adam-Veleni, 'Thessaloniki: History and Town Planning', in D.V. Grammenos (ed.), *Roman Thessaloniki* (Thessaloniki 2003), pp. 162–9.

⁶¹ Although their status as a 'palace' has been questioned, for example by N. Duval, 'Hommage à Ejnar et Ingrid Dyggve: La théorie du palais du Bas-Empire et les fouilles de Thessalonique', *Antiquité Tardive* 11 (2003), pp. 273–300, the buildings in Thessalonica certainly functioned at times as the residence of Galerius and should be evaluated as such; on this, see S. Curcic, 'Late-Antique Palaces: The Meaning of Urban Context', *Ars Orientalis* 23 (1993), pp. 67–90. The palace of Diocletian at Split is better preserved, but it was a residence built for the Tetrarch's retirement and so differs in significant ways from the homes of current rulers, for instance in the absence of a hippodrome. On

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⁶⁶ The latter portrait was recarved to serve as an image of the Tyche (good fortune) of Thessalonica, likely after the death of Galerius and his wife's exile and then execution; on the recarving, see Stefanidou-Tiveriou, 'Piccolo Arco di Galerio', pp. 292–5.

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⁶⁸ Mayer, *Rom ist dort, wo der Kaiser ist*, pp. 47–65, M.S. Pond, 'The Arch of Galerius' (diss. University of Michigan 1970), H.P. Laubscher, *Der Reliefschmuck des Galeriusbogens in Thessaloniki*, (Berlin 1975).

⁶⁹ Mayer, *Rom ist dort, wo der Kaiser ist*, pp. 64–5.

⁷⁰ Mayer, *Rom ist dort, wo der Kaiser ist*, pp. 43–7.

⁷¹ J.-M. Spieser, *Thessalonique et ses monuments du IV^e au VI^e siècle: Contribution à l'étude d'une ville paléochrétienne* (Athens 1984), pp. 113–23.

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⁷³ On the Pantheon, see W.L. MacDonald, *The Pantheon: Design*,

⁷⁴ T. Pazaras, *The Rotunda of St. George in Thessalonike* (Thessaloniki 1985).

⁷⁵ The building is identified as a temple for imperial cult on the basis of coins issued shortly after Galerius' death, which show a round domed building with the legend *Mem[oriae] Divi Maximiani* ('in memory of the deified [Galerius] Maximianus'); on this see A. Frova, 'Tessalonica', in *Milano capitale dell' impero romano 286–402 d.C.* (Milan 1990), pp. 204–6.

⁷⁶ On building techniques in the Greek East, see Ward-Perkins, *Roman Imperial Architecture*, pp. 273–8.

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⁷⁸ Gounaris and Gounari, *Philippi*, pp. 101–4. For examples in Thessalonica, see Koukoutidou, Kolaidou and Tourta, *Wandering in Byzantine Thessaloniki*.

⁷⁹ For example, Pandermalis, *Dion*, pp. 14–16, Gounaris and Gounari, *Philippi*, pp. 21–6.

⁸⁰ For Macedonia as it entered the Byzantine era, see C.S. Snively, chapter 26.

PART VII

After Rome

Macedonia in Late Antiquity

Carolyn S. Snively

The history of Macedonia in Late Antiquity was frequently turbulent. The three centuries between the establishment of the Tetrarchy at the end of the third century AD and the veritable collapse of civilization in the region at the end of the sixth century AD saw repeated waves of barbarian incursions and settlements, economic difficulties resulting from the invasions, a dramatic change in the religion of the empire with associated controversies, the transformation of Roman cities into Late Antique ones, and a surprising amount of new construction, both of new settlements and fortifications and of buildings within the surviving older cities. Space would not allow the painting of a complete picture of Macedonia during those three centuries even if the evidence were sufficient to provide it. Therefore in addition to an outline of the major political and military events, the emphasis will be on a few knotty questions, for example the location of the province(s) of Macedonia in Late Antiquity (see map 9), and on several themes, for example the development of Christianity and the changes in urban communities. Note that all dates and centuries in this chapter are AD except where indicated.

1 Sources

A surprising number of Greek and Latin sources can be cited for the history of Macedonia in Late Antiquity but their accounts are rarely focused on Macedonia and the relevant passages are usually brief. Suddenly historians have divided into Christian and pagan camps. Several fragments of Malchus' *Byzantiaka* are valuable, and other sources include Theodoret's *Ecclesiastical History*, Sozomen's *Church History*, Socrates' work of the same name, Jordanes' *Getica* or *History of the Goths*, and Zosimus' *New History*.

The letter that Ambrose, Bishop of Milan, wrote to emperor Theodosius I after the latter's large scale massacre of Thessalonians in 390 is extant. John Moschus' *Spiritual Meadow* preserves an account of hermits at Thessaloniki. A lacuna in the *Buildings* of Procopius has obliterated most of his account of Justinianic construction in Macedonia but a list of fortified settlements survives. The *Chronicle* of Marcellinus Comes, a year-by-year account of happenings in the empire, provides several important pieces of information.

In *Recueil des inscriptions chrétiennes de Macédoine du III^e au VI^e siècle* (Paris 1983), D. Feissel collected most of the Christian and Late Antique inscriptions of Macedonia known until the late 1970s.¹ Two law codes, the *Theodosian Code* compiled at the behest of Theodosius II, and the *Corpus of Civil Law*, the laws collected under Justinian I, together with the new laws (*Novellae*) issued during his reign, illuminate otherwise obscure topics.

A number of useful documents are lists, for example of bishops present at church councils between 325 and the seventh century; Hierocles' *Synekdemos* presents a list of provinces and their cities, and the *Notitia Dignitatum* lays out the administrative structure of the empire at the end of the fourth century with a list of civil and military officials and their responsibilities. The *Peutingier Table*, a Late Roman map preserved in a medieval copy, and several 'itineraries' (lists of places and the distances between them), provide geographical and topographical information. Finally and perhaps most difficult to interpret are the hagiographical sources, for example the *Miracles of St. Demetrius*, a monastic account of the church in Thessaloniki now known as Hosios David, and the *Life* of Hosios David.

2 Movable Provinces

The boundaries of the territory known as Macedonia never remained static for long, even to the present day. The difficulty in defining its territory during Late Antiquity is the consequence of a very small number of specific geographical references surrounded by great expanses of uncertainty. While towns and even provinces can be located precisely at particular times, many questions remain concerning the chronological and geographical boundaries of the provinces of Macedonia.

The administrative reorganization of the empire, initiated by Diocletian in the late third century and continued by Constantine in the fourth century, resulted in a greater number of smaller provinces, which were grouped into dioceses and then into prefectures. The

province(s) of Macedonia during the fourth to sixth centuries generally included the area of 'historical Macedonia' with additions and subtractions: see map 9.

The Nestos river continued to form the eastern boundary of the province, together with the province of Rhodope. The islands of Thasos and Samothrace belonged to Macedonia. The new province of Dardania, carved out of Moesia, lay to the north; its capital was at Scupi (modern Skopje). The border with Dardania was marked by a series of fortresses, most notably the one on the Via Axia near the confluence of the Pčinja River with the Vardar; it rises beside the south leg of the modern highway E75 between Skopje and Veles.² The provinces of Epirus nova and Thessalia, territories formerly part of the Roman province of Macedonia, now bounded the Late Antique one at south and west. The provinces of Macedonia, Epirus nova, Thessalia, Achaia, Creta, Epirus vetus, Praevalitana, Dardania, Dacia and Moesia superior formed the Diocese of Moesia, one of 12 dioceses created by Diocletian.

The regions of Orestis and Elimiotis, located on the south side of 'Upper Macedonia' and considered part of Macedonia since the time of Philip II in the mid-fourth century BC, were now attached to the province of Thessalia, probably at the same time as the creation of the new province. Two inscriptions identify Caesareia, the only Late Antique city known in Elimiotis, as a bishopric.³ In 431 Theoktistos, described as the Bishop of Caesareia in Thessaly, attended the Council of Ephesus. Both Procopius, who includes the city among those rebuilt by Justinian, and Hierocles place Caesareia in Thessaly, where they also locate a city named Diocletianoupolis.⁴ The fact that a Diocletianoupolis was located in Thessalian Orestis and that a city by the same name stood in central Macedonia, near Pella, led to the argument that two cities within one province would not both have been named in honor of the same emperor; therefore Thessalia was created during the reign of Diocletian and the territories of Orestis and Elimiotis attached to it at the same time.⁵

The border between Macedonia and Epirus nova, which included the Illyrian part of the former province, was mentioned in the Bordeaux Itinerary (603.3) as being located 13 miles east of Lychnidos (modern Ochrid). This document, dated to the 330s, confirms the existence of Epirus nova at that time but leaves uncertain an earlier date of formation. A chain of mountains, from Ilinska at the north to Galiica at the south, formed the provincial boundary with Epirus nova. The Bordeaux Itinerary mentions a border station, Brucida, on the Via Egnatia between Lychnidos and Heraclea; Mikulčić identifies it with the fortification called Prentov Most in the Opejnička Gorge just west of Bukovo pass.⁶

The Diocese of Moesia was divided into the Diocese of Dacia to the north and that of Macedonia to the south. This Diocese of Macedonia must not be confused with the province(s) of the same name; the diocese consisted of the provinces of Macedonia, Thessalia, Achaia, Epirus vetus, Epirus nova, Praevalitana and Creta. Although a count of Macedonia was mentioned in 327,⁷ the *Breviarium* of Rufius Festus, dated probably to about 369/370, provides the first definite evidence for an independent Diocese of Macedonia.⁸ This division of the Diocese of Moesia may have reflected or been a consequence of the linguistic division between Latin to the north and Greek to the south.⁹

The regional prefectures, into which the dioceses of the empire were grouped for administrative purposes, came into existence during the dynastic struggles that followed the death of Constantine I in 337.¹⁰ The Prefecture of Italy originally included the Dioceses of Pannonia, Dacia and Macedonia, as well as Africa. After the death of Theodosius I in 395 and the permanent division of the empire into eastern and western halves, the Dioceses of Macedonia and Thrace formed the separate Praetorian Prefecture of Illyricum under the control of the Eastern Empire. The western rulers continued to claim eastern Illyricum until 425 or 437; the region remained under the ecclesiastical control of the Roman pope until the eighth century.

The above arrangement is outlined in the *Notitia Dignitatum*, where the major change from earlier dispositions is that the province of Praevalitana has been moved into the Diocese of Dacia. Under the praetorian prefect of Illyricum, a vicar controlled the Diocese of Macedonia while a consul governed the province of Macedonia. But the joker in the *Notitia Dignitatum* is the province of Macedonia salutaris, whose existence is here mentioned for the first and only time and whose abolition is indicated in the same document. Macedonia salutaris appears within the Prefecture of Illyricum as one of eight provinces governed by a president (*Oriens* 1.125). In Part III, the six provinces of the Diocese of Macedonia include both Macedonia and 'Epirus vetus and part of Macedonia salutaris', while the last of the five provinces of the Diocese of Dacia appears as 'Praevalitana and part of Macedonia salutaris' (*Oriens* 3.13 and 19).

In other words, the province of Macedonia salutaris both appears and disappears within the *Notitia Dignitatum*. Probably created during the reign of Theodosius I, perhaps in 386,¹¹ no other document or inscription mentions it. Although the description of the Eastern Empire in the *Notitia* almost certainly reflects the arrangement in the late fourth century during the reign of Theodosius, the document cannot be dated precisely enough to determine the period of existence of the short-lived province.¹²

The only geographical information provided is that the province

was eventually divided between Epirus nova and Praevalitana. Thus Macedonia salutaris has often been placed in or near the northwestern part of traditional Macedonia. Because in a later division of Macedonia into two provinces the territory of Macedonia II¹³ can be defined more closely and Stobi served as its capital, attempts have been made to locate Macedonia salutaris in approximately the same northern area as Macedonia II with an additional strip of territory at the northwest. If the province included such a large area in the north, most of it must have been returned to the province of Macedonia to the south since no evidence suggests that Praevalitana and Epirus nova ever extended to the east. Despite the theories and speculations, the boundaries of Macedonia salutaris remain as uncertain as its chronology.¹⁴

After the disappearance of Macedonia salutaris no later than 412,¹⁵ a single province of Macedonia existed until perhaps the mid-fifth century. The evidence for a new division into the provinces of Macedonia Prima (I) and Macedonia Secunda (II), both sparse and contradictory, is summarized here. At the Council of Ephesus in 449, the bishops of Doberos, Serres, Cassandreia and Beroia were listed as being from Macedonia Prima.¹⁶ Two years later, at the Council of Chalcedon, where Bishop Quintillius of Heraclea represented Archbishop Anastasius of Thessaloniki, the bishops of Philippi, Doberos, Serres, Stobi, Bargala and Parthicopolis were again described as being from Macedonia Prima.¹⁷ The assumption, based on these identifications, that Macedonia had been divided again before 449,¹⁸ faces two problems. First, no other province of Macedonia is actually mentioned, and second, Stobi and Bargala are described as being in Macedonia Prima, but these two cities later unquestionably belong to Macedonia Secunda.

For the year 482, Marcellinus Comes mentions two provinces of Macedonia as he does again for 517. The most extensive source for administrative arrangements in Macedonia in the early sixth century is the *Synekdemos* of Hierocles, where Macedonia Prima claimed Thessaloniki as its capital among 32 cities; Macedonia Secunda included only 8 cities, of which Stobi was the capital. Although a number of the cities listed cannot be located with certainty, enough of them have been identified to define the general area of Macedonia II. Its western border with Epirus nova and the northern one with Dardania did not change significantly. The southern boundary, following natural features and traceable by the line of fortifications, ran to the north of Heraclea Lyncestis (modern Bitola), a city of Macedonia I, and south of Stenae (modern Demir Kapija), the 'Iron Gate' of the Vardar.¹⁹ At the northeast, however, a strip of territory that had earlier belonged to Dacia mediterranea was apparently added

to Macedonia II; in addition to Bargala, the cities of Zapara, Harmonia and Kelenidin should be located in that region.

Macedonia Secunda was also mentioned in Justinian's *Novella* 11, of 14 April, 535, where, along with the provinces of the Diocese of Dacia, it fell under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the newly created archbishopric of Justiniana Prima, the city built to honor the emperor's birthplace. Because in 545 Macedonia Secunda was not listed among the subject provinces in *Novella* 131.3, a document that reaffirmed the high position of the archbishop of Justiniana Prima, the assumption has been that it ceased to exist as a separate province and was reattached to Macedonia I or divided among Dardania, Dacia mediterranea, and/or Macedonia. Alternatively, Macedonia II continued to exist as a separate province but was returned to the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Thessaloniki.

In the mid-sixth century Procopius mentions only one Macedonia. Unfortunately only a brief description of fortifications in part of the Chalcidice and of a single new fortress near Thessaloniki are preserved after a major lacuna in the text of the *Buildings* (4.3.21–30); a limited number of the place names in his list of forts in Macedonia (*Buildings* 4.4) can be identified on the ground. Macedonia II is nowhere mentioned in the sources after 535.

3 The Enhanced Role of Thessaloniki

While it appeared expedient to deal with the shifting provinces and administrative organization first, those territorial changes often reflect historical trends and events. The administrative developments described above profoundly affected the city of Thessaloniki. After the formation of the Tetrarchy in 293, Galerius, Diocletian's Caesar in the East, chose this city as his primary residence and built a palace complex with hippodrome, large triumphal arch and a rotunda at its eastern edge. Given its harbor at the head of the Thermaic Gulf and its location at the crossroads of the Via Egnatia and the north–south route from central Europe, Thessaloniki had long been a polyglot and multi-ethnic community as well as a commercial center.²⁰ Already the seat of the governor of the province of Macedonia, in its role as Tetrarchic capital the city became for the first time one of the major administrative centers of the Roman Empire (see J. Vanderspoel, chapter 13).

Even after the establishment of Constantinople as the new Rome in the East, emperors were frequent visitors to Thessaloniki and other cities in Macedonia. Constantine I spent time in Thessaloniki in 323

and 324, using it as his base for the final campaign against Licinius. He constructed a large harbor at the west side of the city for his navy and may have briefly considered it as a candidate for his new capital. After the defeat of Licinius in 324, Constantine imprisoned him in Thessaloniki where he was later executed.²¹

Theodosius I and members of his dynasty were closely associated with Thessaloniki – for good and ill. Appointed *magister militum*, or Master of Military Forces, of Illyricum after the disastrous Battle of Adrianople, Theodosius stayed in Thessaloniki after his acclamation as Augustus in 379 in order to campaign against the Goths who were raiding Macedonia and Thessalia as well as to strengthen his power base before moving to Constantinople in 381. The Nicene bishop Acholius took advantage of the emperor's presence to instruct him in the Christian faith and baptized him in spring of 380. From Thessaloniki and under the influence of Acholius, Theodosius issued in February 380 the edict that marked the beginning of his attempt to create a Nicene Christian empire.²² A settlement was reached with the Goths in 382 that allowed them to settle in groups within the empire, possibly in Macedonia as well as in Moesia and Scythia, but required them to provide large military forces when needed by the emperor.²³

Thessaloniki was the refuge to which Valentinian II, Augustus of the West, fled with his family in 387 when the usurper Maximus invaded Italy (Zosimus, *New History* 4.43). Theodosius traveled to Thessaloniki, where he married Valentinian's sister, Galla. He also celebrated his *decennalia* in 388, possibly in the same city. While preparing to move against Maximus, the emperor dealt with a revolt of the Gothic *foederati* whom he had settled within the empire only a few years before. Theodosius issued several edicts from Thessaloniki and in June 388 two from Stobi as he traveled north on his way to Italy and the defeat of Maximus.²⁴

The Thessalonians undoubtedly remembered Theodosius most vividly for the massacre in the hippodrome in 390. Butheric, the Gothic *magister militum* of Illyricum, while based in Thessaloniki, imprisoned a popular charioteer for a homosexual act and, despite popular demand, prevented him from racing. In the ensuing riot the people of Thessaloniki killed Butheric and other officers. Theodosius heard about the incident in Italy and apparently sent orders immediately to the Gothic garrison to execute a large number of people. When the Thessalonians entered the hippodrome for what they expected to be the next set of races, the soldiers closed the gates and killed 7,000 people. Perhaps Theodosius repented and sent a countermanding order that arrived too late. Bishop Ambrose of Milan forced the emperor to do penance, and a law was issued in August 390

that all capital sentences should be delayed for 30 days before execution.²⁵ Somewhat surprisingly, Theodosius stopped in Thessaloniki in 391 on his way back to Constantinople and again in following years as he continued the war against the Goths.

Theodosius II (408–450) fell ill and halted in Thessaloniki in 424 or 425 while traveling from Constantinople to Italy for his cousin Valentinian's coronation.²⁶ In 437 Valentinian III (425–455), then emperor of the west, married Eudoxia, the daughter of Theodosius II, in Constantinople; they spent the winter in Thessaloniki on the way back to Italy (Marcellinus Comes).²⁷

In addition to its roles as Galerius' capital and as a base of operations or temporary residence for later emperors, Thessaloniki served as the capital city of the Diocese of Macedonia and the seat of its vicar. Likewise, at least from 395, it was the seat of the praetorian prefect of Eastern Illyricum. That official moved briefly to Sirmium in Pannonia, perhaps in 438,²⁸ but when the Huns captured the city in 440/1, the prefect Apraemius fled to Thessaloniki, which again became the administrative center of the prefecture. With one possible exception, the prefect continued to be located there until the disappearance of the prefecture.²⁹

According to the *Notitia Dignitatum* (Oriens 11.1.35–39), four factories for production of weapons were located in Illyricum, of which the first mentioned was at Thessaloniki. A number of Macedonian cities had issued coins, at least sporadically, from the time of Augustus until the mid-third century. Mints had been located in Dium, Pella, Edessa, Beroia, Amphipolis, Cassandreia, Philippi, Stobi and Thessaloniki.³⁰ Galerius re-established a mint at Thessaloniki in 298/9. Although many others were closed at the end of the fourth century, the Thessaloniki mint continued to operate through the fifth and sixth centuries until the reign of Heraclius (582–602). In addition to very rare silver issues, the mint produced copper and gold coins.³¹

Beside its roles as a civil administrative center, Thessaloniki was the seat initially of the metropolitan bishop of Macedonia and then of the archbishop of Thessaloniki, who had jurisdiction over the bishops in the Prefecture of Eastern Illyricum and served as the vicar of the Pope in Rome. The success of this arrangement varied, depending on the loyalty of the archbishop to the pope and his ability to influence the bishops within his jurisdiction, as well as the amount of pressure being exerted by the patriarch and eastern emperor in Constantinople. The Vicariate of Thessaloniki continued to exist until the eighth century.³²

Justinian's *Novella* 11, mentioned above in connection with the

province of Macedonia Secunda, took a very hostile tone toward the archbishop of Thessaloniki because of his position as the papal vicar; the edict referred to him as a bishop and stated that he had acquired authority not in his own right but only because of the transfer of the seat of the prefecture from Sirmium to Thessaloniki. The territory of the new archbishopric, basically the Diocese of Dacia, was carved out of and removed from that subject to the archbishop of Thessaloniki, and the new archbishop was to be totally independent of Thessaloniki.

Novella 11 also provides a brief historical summary, describing first Sirmium as the seat of the highest civil and ecclesiastical officials, then the move to Thessaloniki required by the raids of Attila, and finally the situation in 535 with the empire again firmly in control of the Balkans as far as the Danube frontier. Therefore, because it was a great distance for people to travel from Pannonia to Macedonia Prima, the seat of the prefecture should be moved north to Justiniana Prima in Dacia mediterranea. No reliable evidence indicates that the prefecture did in fact shift its location. The rapidly deteriorating situation in the northern part of the prefecture shortly after 535 would have made a move to the north look increasingly perilous, and the presence of the prefect in Thessaloniki can be documented in 536 and 541.³³

Thus, despite the loss of the Diocese of Dacia to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the archbishop of Justiniana Prima, whose territory would have shrunk as a consequence of barbarian incursions throughout the sixth century, Thessaloniki continued to be the primary administrative center of Eastern Illyricum for both civil and church officials. Its various roles enhanced its prestige, and it also served as the artistic, cultural and commercial center of the Balkan peninsula and became the second city of the eastern empire.

4 Political, Military and Economic Developments

Much of the history of Macedonia in Late Antiquity consists of a series of barbarian invasions, several of which have been mentioned in other contexts. The Gothic presence in Macedonia in the second half of the third century, together with earthquakes documented archaeologically at some sites toward the end of the century, and the general chaos of the period of short-lived military emperors (235–284), left Macedonia in economic decline in the later third century. The reforms of the Tetrarchy and of Constantine and the relative peace of the fourth

century brought renewed prosperity.

Raids by the Sarmatians, who were settled along the lower Danube, led to a campaign against them by Constantine in 323. A second campaign in 334 was successful but resulted in the settlement of a large number of Sarmatians in Italy, Thrace and Macedonia.³⁴

In the 370s a part of the western branch of the Goths, the Visigoths, were settled on the south bank of the Danube river, within the empire, as *foederati* – that is, they were required to provide military service to the empire. Having been badly treated by Roman officials, they rebelled and in 378 at Adrianople in Thrace overwhelmingly defeated a Roman army led by the emperor Valens, who was killed. The Goths then moved north and west and only in 380 turned south toward Macedonia, where Theodosius, first as *magister militum* and then as emperor, campaigned against them. An agreement was reached in 382 and the Visigoths were again settled as *foederati* but with the responsibility of providing large military forces under their own leaders to the emperor as well as the usual recruits.³⁵ Theodosius put down revolts in 387/8 and 392/3, however, and after his death in 395 the Visigoths under Alaric devastated Macedonia and surrounding areas. Alaric had been the leader of a Gothic contingent in the army of Theodosius but, angry because he did not receive the office of *magister militum*, his forces ravaged Illyricum. Although western forces led by Stilicho twice pinned down Alaric and his army, Stilicho withdrew both times without defeating him. In 397 Eutropius, acting on behalf of the eastern emperor, made Alaric *magister militum* of Illyricum and settled the Visigoths in Dacia and Macedonia, probably with provision of food. Two years later Eutropius lost power, and the government of the east no longer honored the agreement with Alaric. He led his forces to Italy, but by winter of 402/3 they were back in Macedonia and Dacia, where they remained until 306. Late that year, Alaric moved into Epirus and then in 408 left for Italy and the eventual sack of Rome, never to return.

Several laws in the *Theodosian Code* from the early years of the fifth century testify to the lasting impact of Alaric's depredations and presence in Macedonia; for example, one protecting refugees from Illyricum who were being seized illegally as slaves (10.10.25) and another referring specifically to provision being made for 'devastated Illyricum' (12.1.177). A third law, addressed to Herculus, praetorian prefect of Illyricum, stated that all persons, regardless of privileges, must pay for construction of fortification walls and building material, specifically in Illyricum (11.17.4). And yet, despite the picture of ruined cities and poverty-stricken inhabitants, the decades around 400 saw the first wave of church building in Macedonia, as well as palatial residences dated to the late fourth or early fifth century.

The *Notitia Dignitatum*, whose more complete title is the *Register of Dignitaries, Civil and Military, in Districts of the East*, sets out the administrative arrangement of the eastern empire at the time of Theodosius I. Among the highest officials were the praetorian prefect of Illyricum and the master of foot and horse (the senior military official in Illyricum). In addition to the arrangement of provinces within dioceses and their governors described above, the *Notitia* lists the staff of the prefect, among whom were a chief of staff, four receivers of taxes, the secretary in charge of correspondence, and a number of aides, secretaries and notaries. Under the control of the military official, who was not subject to the prefect, were a great number and variety of military contingents as well as a staff that also included a chief of staff, receivers of taxes, aides and secretaries. These dignitaries headed large bureaucracies in Thessaloniki.

The Huns moved in from Central Asia in the fourth century and had been responsible for pushing the Goths south of the Danube into Roman territory in the 370s. While some settled as *foederati* within the empire, others regularly made raids into it. After Attila became ruler of the Huns and of other tribes north of the Danube in 434, his attacks on the Balkans and defeats of Roman armies led to treaties according to which the eastern empire paid large amounts of gold as tribute. The prefect of Illyricum fled from Sirmium to Thessaloniki in about 441 because of the Hunnic threat. In 447 the Huns raided as far south as Thermopylae. Although Macedonia is not specifically mentioned in the sources as a target, the Hunnic depredations can be documented archaeologically at several cities in the province.³⁶ Attila's departure for the west in 450 and death in 453 ended their threat.

The collapse of the Hunnic Empire freed from their domination the Goths, who began to attack the Balkans already in the late 450s. Two Ostrogothic leaders with the same name, Theodoric Strabo and Theodoric Amal (later Theodoric the Great), were involved in complicated negotiations and feuds with the eastern emperors Leo (457–474) and Zeno (474–491). Strabo, angry at Leo, attacked Philippi in 473 and burned its suburbs; he died by accident near Philippi in 481.³⁷

Theodoric Amal was involved in three campaigns in Illyricum, although their chronology is problematic. Apparently during the first campaign in 471, led by Theodoric's father Thiudimer, the Goths advanced only as far south as Naissus. In 479 Theodoric, not satisfied with the generous offers made to him by Zeno, attacked Stobi, Thessaloniki and Heraclea, among other cities in Macedonia, before marching west into Epirus nova. Back again in 482, Theodoric continued to pillage the provinces of Macedonia and Thessalia, until Zeno in 488 persuaded him to march on Italy and establish a kingdom

at Ravenna.

The description of the attack on Stobi is brief. In Macedonia Theodoric first besieged the city of Stobi and killed those soldiers of the garrison who resisted.³⁸ The excavations have revealed little evidence of damage to the city in the late fifth century; perhaps it surrendered or paid off the enemy.³⁹

For the Gothic attack on Thessaloniki, however, a fragment of Malchus preserves details. While Theodoric and his army waited near the city, the citizens began to worry that the prefect and the emperor had agreed to betray the city to the barbarians. The archbishop brought an end to the ensuing riot, rescued the prefect from the mob, took possession of the keys to the city gates, and organized the defense.⁴⁰

Unsuccessful at Thessaloniki, the Ostrogothic forces traveled west along the Via Egnatia to Heraclea. When they arrived and established camp and while Theodoric was waiting for new offers from the emperor, the bishop sent them a great variety of gifts, thus keeping the countryside unplundered for the time being. When the king gave up on further negotiations with the emperor and decided to head for Epirus nova, he demanded provision of wheat and wine for the journey from the people of Heraclea. The citizens, who had taken refuge in a small fortress, refused, and the Goths burned most of the deserted city.⁴¹

Theodoric returned to Macedonia and Thessalia in 482 when he captured Larissa, the capital of the latter province. Most probably the following account from Jordanes describes this incursion. When the Roman general Hilarianus realized that Thessaloniki could not withstand the attack of the Goths, he made a deal according to which the towns of Cyrrhus, Pella, Europos, Methone, Pydna, Beroia and Dium were handed over to them.⁴² Presumably they held this region, a strip of territory about 80 km long north-south, along the west side of the Axios river and the west coast of the Thermaic Gulf, in the heartland of Macedonia, until Theodoric led them away to Italy in 488.

Brief references to other barbarian attacks in the late fifth and early sixth centuries may be found; since the writers of the period were not familiar with all the marauding tribes, the identity of the barbarians was often uncertain. Marcellinus Comes provides a brief but chilling account of an incursion in 517 when the cavalry of the Getae, perhaps Bulgarians, plundered Thessalia and both provinces of Macedonia and reached as far as Epirus vetus and Thermopylae. The emperor Anastasius (491–518) sent a huge sum of gold to the prefect of Illyricum for the purpose of ransoming prisoners taken by the

raiders, but the Getae considered the amount to be insufficient and either burned their captives alive in their own houses or slaughtered them in front of the walls of the cities. What this account suggests is that the barbarians did not threaten cities or fortified places but captured people in the countryside, villages and suburbs.

Macedonia in the sixth century did, however, suffer more and more barbarian raids and invasions.⁴³ Major incursions are recorded in the 530s, in 550–1 and in 559. They involved the Koutrigours, the Avars, more Goths, and by the middle of the century the Slavs, who by the 580s apparently began to settle in parts of Macedonia. The chronology of the Slavic raids depends to a considerable extent on the *Miracles of St. Demetrius* and is much debated. However, several coin hoards from the 580s provide an approximate date for the final abandonment and/or destruction of cities in the northern part of Macedonia; for example, Bargala, Heraclea Lyncestis and Stobi.⁴⁴ The first major siege of Thessaloniki by the Avars and Slavs probably occurred in September of 586;⁴⁵ although unsuccessful there, they destroyed other cities in Macedonia that same year or simply put the inhabitants to flight.

Justinian's response – and in fact the response of earlier emperors such as Anastasius – to the barbarian invasions was the strengthening of existing fortifications and the creation of new ones.⁴⁶ As discussed above, he established a new city at his birthplace and imagined briefly that the prefecture of Eastern Illyricum could be transferred to it. But Justinian also sacrificed the Balkan regions to his desire to recapture parts of the lost western empire.⁴⁷

The economy of Macedonia in Late Antiquity continued to be based on agriculture and animal husbandry, but both countryside and city housed a variety of craftspeople.⁴⁸ A badly damaged inscription from Thessaloniki appears to be an otherwise unknown edict concerning trade in hides or leather.⁴⁹ Although the occasional villa has been found, they were not so common as in other parts of the empire; the evidence suggests alternate methods of land distribution. Other natural resources were exploited, such as salt, forests for timber, and clay for pottery, bricks and roof tiles.

The operation of mines and quarries was an important commercial activity in Macedonia. One of the officials under the control of the 'Count of Sacred Bounties' or Minister of Finance (?) was the Count of Metals in Illyricum. Gold and iron ore were mined in Macedonia and possibly silver as well.⁵⁰ During the Principate, all mines and quarries had been owned by the Roman state. In Late Antiquity, several somewhat contradictory laws suggest that private individuals could own and operate quarries and mines, with the payment of a tenth part to the owner of the land and a tenth to the state.⁵¹ Edict 10.19.8 of

the *Theodosian Code*, from 376, offers members of the Senate not only the right to work private quarries in Macedonia and Illyricum but also the opportunity to do so without payment of special tax or harbor duties.

Being sent to the mines, usually for life, was the penalty for a variety of offenses, normally for criminals of the lower class or slaves. Several laws, on the other hand, express concern that miners may escape from the land of their birth – and their hereditary duties. Edict 10.19.7, from the 370s, directed that the praetorian prefect should spread the word throughout Illyricum and the Diocese of Macedonia that no Thracians, apparently miners or quarry workers, should be harbored but must be returned whence they came.⁵² In 386 the emperors decreed that the officials in charge of the mines in Macedonia, Dacia mediterranea, Moesia and Dardania, who had removed themselves from this compulsory service on pretense of fear of the enemy, would be dragged back to their duties (1.32.5). Despite their importance, for example for the mint and the arms factory in Thessaloniki as well as for metal products for everyday use, miners and mining seem to have been regarded with repugnance by all concerned.

The exploitation of stone, particularly marble, for building was essential in the construction of churches, residences and other projects. The most famous marble quarry in Macedonia was at Aliki, on the island of Thasos.⁵³ Blocks or partly finished columns and capitals were exported by sea to Italy and Asia Minor during the fourth and fifth centuries as well as to other parts of Macedonia and the Balkans. Other quarries that functioned in Late Antiquity have been identified in many parts of Macedonia, for example Pletvar and Debrešte near Prilep; the varieties of marble found in the major cities suggest a lively overland trade throughout the province as well as imports from elsewhere.

5 Christianity in Macedonia

Despite the importance of Macedonia as the first place in Europe where the new gospel was preached and the tradition of apostolic foundation for the churches of Philippi, Thessaloniki and Beroia, relatively little is known about Christian communities and practices in the province except for the evidence of churches and inscriptions. The role of the archbishop of Thessaloniki has been discussed above. The bishop in the capital city of each province held the title of metropolitan and had some authority over the bishops of other cities

within the province. The ecclesiastical organization generally followed the civil one, but which cities and how many had bishops and what the criteria were for being a bishopric are unclear.

The question has arisen whether the bishop of Stobi, the capital city of Macedonia Secunda, became the metropolitan of his province. For Macedonia salutaris, the question is moot, given the ephemeral nature of the province and the fact that Stobi may not even have belonged to it. But Macedonia II existed for more than a half a century, during part of which time (after 535) it was not even subject ecclesiastically to the archbishop of Thessaloniki; it is difficult to imagine that the bishop of Stobi did not carry the title of metropolitan.⁵⁴ The major reconstruction and enlargement after about 475 of the Episcopal Basilica at Stobi, the largest church in Macedonia II, cannot be used as proof of the bishop's enhanced status but should be taken into consideration.

Already at the Council of Nicaea in 325, bishops Alexander of Thessaloniki and Budius of Stobi represented Macedonia. Nearly two decades later, at the local – and not far distant – Council of Serdica, bishops from Thessaloniki, Heraclea Lyncestis, Philippi, Parthicopolis, Beroia and Dium were present. The identification of Bishop Porphyrius of Philippi with the Porphyrius mentioned in a mosaic inscription in an apsidal structure under the later octagon churches, if correct, provides a date in the mid-fourth century for the earliest known Christian building in Macedonia.

Inscriptions refer to anonymous bishops of Edessa, Amphipolis and Heraclea Lyncestis as well as Alexander from Thasos, Hermias from Bargala, Eustathius and Philip from Stobi and John from Heraclea Lyncestis.⁵⁵ Literary texts provide a few additional names of bishops, mostly from Thessaloniki. Inscriptions add color and detail to Christian communities and daily life. Of the 285 inscribed texts collected by Feissel from Macedonia, 272 come from the cities of Edessa, Beroia, Dium, Thessaloniki, Amphipolis, Philippi, Thasos, Heraclea Lyncestis, Stobi and Bargala, and they provide a view into the life of urban communities. The vast majority of inscriptions were in Greek and Feissel includes only 10 in Latin. The authors of a number of epitaphs attempted to write verse with mixed success.

Burials provide the earliest evidence for Christianity in Macedonia, and Feissel points to a small group of epitaphs identifiable as Christian already in the third century,⁵⁶ although the majority belong to the fourth to sixth centuries. Tomb monuments and other inscriptions may note a profession, which was more likely to be mentioned for clerics or members of minor orders than for secular occupations. In addition to bishops and priests, the inscriptions referred to deacons, deaconesses, readers, a choral singer and the bailiff of a church.

The church itself was mentioned, sometimes figuratively but occasionally very concretely. At Edessa the church owned a tomb.⁵⁷ At Amphipolis, Thasos and Philippi, boundary stones indicated the extent of church property; in the last instance, the real estate on one side belonged to the holy church of the Philippians and on the other to Maurentius, a high ranking official.⁵⁸

Bishop Eustathius renovated and enlarged the early episcopal church at Stobi and a later holder of the same office, Philip, built the Episcopal Basilica on the terrace above the earlier church.⁵⁹ At Thessaloniki, where the archbishops took on a military role in the defense of the city, an inscription found near the sea wall suggests that Archbishop Eusebius was responsible for constructing or restoring a part of that fortification.⁶⁰ Laypersons as well as clergy gave money for churches and their decoration. An inscribed capital at Beroia carried an inscription indicating that, because of a vow, an unnamed prefect of Illyricum had provided a church building.⁶¹ Both Peristeria and the deaconess Matrona contributed money for the mosaic decoration of the Episcopal Basilica at Stobi, while Philip and Dometia along with unnamed donors paid for the mosaic floor of a church at Boskochorio, south of Beroia.⁶² Several anonymous donor inscriptions employ the expression 'whose name(s) God knows', while the formula 'because of a vow' appears frequently in dedications.

Galerius has often been considered the impetus behind the last major persecution of Christians that began in 303 and continued until the emperor, on his deathbed, issued the Edict of Toleration in 311. Undoubtedly many Christians in Macedonia died during this persecution, but perhaps not so many as later tradition suggested. Demetrius, who became the patron saint of Thessaloniki, was alleged to have been martyred in the city at this time.

According to tradition, Demetrius was buried in the baths where he had been imprisoned and executed. Leontius, Prefect of Illyricum, miraculously healed by the saint, replaced a small shrine with a church dedicated to Demetrius early in the fifth century. This traditional account raises a number of problems, such as that the early accounts of the martyrdom are oddly focused, burial within the city in the first decade of the fourth century would have been illegal as well as unusual, and the sixth century bishops of Thessaloniki claimed not to know where the saint was buried. A theory that might explain some of these problems is that the cult was brought from Sirmium in the 440s when the seat of the prefect was moved back to Thessaloniki. Whatever his origins, Demetrius became a miracle worker and protector of the city against barbarian attacks, as told in the *Miracles of St. Demetrius*.⁶³

Tradition provides the names of several other martyrs at

Thessaloniki as well, such as Matrona, Anysia, Alexander, and the trio of Agape, Chione and Irene.⁶⁴ Martyrs were also mentioned in inscriptions. In the Agora Basilica on Thasos, in a tomb attached to the north side of the narthex, two of the three burial cavities still preserve inscriptions painted on the east side: '(Tomb of) Akakios martyr', and '(Tomb of) — deaconess'.⁶⁵ Back in Thessaloniki, Domesticus paid a substantial sum for his tomb and, presumably, for the privilege of burial near the martyr Ioannis.⁶⁶

Opinions about the existence of monasticism in Macedonia range from non-existent to the assumption of large, organized monasteries. In contrast to its spread in the East and West already from the fourth century, monasticism or organized asceticism was slow to take root in the Diocese of Macedonia,⁶⁷ and its development was disrupted by the chaos of the later sixth and following centuries. The only provinces that display significant amounts of evidence are Crete and Macedonia.⁶⁸

Because no standard architectural arrangement was established for monastic complexes in Late Antiquity, identification on the basis of architecture is difficult, but two complexes will be considered briefly. A monastic building inscription of the Monastery of the Archangel is tentatively connected with an establishment located at Tsoukalario about 1.5 km west of Limenas along the north coast of Thasos.⁶⁹ Established in the fifth century and renovated in the sixth, the complex was destroyed in about 620 by an earthquake.⁷⁰ The second establishment was located 2 km south of Stobi, near the road that led from Stobi to Heraclea Lyncestis.⁷¹ The Palikura basilica complex included a large structure identified as a *xenodocheion* or hostel. Originally built in the second half of the fifth century, the church's second phase has been dated to the sixth century; architectural pieces belonging to the second or later phase suggest that the workmen had forgotten the principles of architectural decoration.⁷²

The location of the Palikura Basilica complex beside a road linking two important cities ties in with a suggestion by Mikulčić that a group of churches located beside major roads a kilometer or two outside cities should be considered monastic and would have functioned as hostels or guest houses. In addition to the Palikura Basilica, he listed three sites along the road from Stobi toward Thessaloniki and others along the Via Egnatia south and west of Heraclea Lyncestis.⁷³ This hypothesis would explain the location of some rural churches, which, unlike urban ones, are little studied.

From Beroia comes the metrical epitaph of Theodora, dated to the fifth or sixth century. Given the description of Theodora as a 'teacher of purity', 'the mother superior of pious virgins', and 'ever virgin' (*aeiparthenos*), Feissel identified her as the abbess of a convent located

at Veria.⁷⁴ Not far away on the Via Egnatia, the city of Edessa yielded 5 tomb inscriptions that describe a total of 10 women as (1) virgin, (2) deaconess and virgin, (3) deaconess, or (4) ever virgin. Feissel makes a case for a convent in the vicinity of the modern church of Aghia Triada outside the lower city.⁷⁵ The most relevant question about female asceticism or monasticism in Macedonia is whether Theodora's convent at Beroia and the community at Edessa should be seen as large organized convents or small groups of women living together for mutual protection under the informal supervision of a notably pious woman such as Theodora.⁷⁶

It is surprising that no evidence for monasticism has been found at Philippi and that the evidence for Thessaloniki, which displays relatively well preserved Late Antique architecture and provides more than 40 percent of the inscriptions, should include neither monastic architecture nor inscriptions. Although a number of monasteries have been proposed in and around Thessaloniki, most of them disappear after close scrutiny.⁷⁷

Two monks who came from Mesopotamia to Thessaloniki and lived as hermits outside the city appear to be our most reliable examples of ascetics associated with the city. In about 580 in Alexandria John Moschus asked the elderly and respected Palladius why he had become a monk. Palladius, a native of Thessaloniki, replied that a Mesopotamian named David had lived as a hermit outside the city wall of Thessaloniki for 70 years. One night the soldiers who stood watch on the wall against barbarian attacks noticed flames coming out of the windows of David's hut and assumed that the barbarians had set it on fire. In the morning, however, the hermit was unharmed and his cell untouched. Palladius was so impressed by this miracle, long repeated, that he became a monk (Moschus, *Spiritual Meadow*, 69–70). Moschus' work was published during the second quarter of the seventh century, perhaps a century after the death of Hosios David.⁷⁸ He painted a fairly sharp picture of two Mesopotamian monks living as solitary hermits outside the city where their huts or cells were visible from the walls.⁷⁹

What is striking about the sparse indications of ascetic or monastic life in Macedonia in Late Antiquity is their variety. Two putative monastic complexes are insufficient to allow any conclusions,⁸⁰ but the possibility that monasteries were located outside but not far distant from towns must be kept in mind, for the establishments along roads would have served travelers and in time of trouble the monks could have fled into the towns for refuge. The inscriptions from Edessa and Beroia may point to less formal communities of dedicated virgins, deaconesses and respected leaders. At Thessaloniki, where the greatest sophistication might be expected, however, our best evidence is for

hermits living outside the city. For whatever reason, monasticism was under-developed and had less impact on society in Macedonia than in other parts of the empire.

6 Cities, Towns, Villages and Fortifications

What first comes to mind in connection with Macedonia in Late Antiquity is the string of cities: Thessaloniki, Philippi, Stobi, Bargala and others. A few standing if battered buildings at Thessaloniki, mosaics and opus sectile, and the foundations of churches, palatial residences, fortification walls and baths overwhelm the visitor. But these large urban sites represent only the most obvious part of a complex network of settlements.

In addition to the reorganization of the provincial system under Diocletian and Constantine, other decisions were made that affected urban life. Choosing to protect the population by fortifying settlements rather than defending the frontiers had major consequences as cities built or rebuilt fortification walls and in some instances created elaborate systems of walls and forts in the region around a major city such as Thessaloniki or Philippi. Some towns shrank dramatically in size and disrupted longstanding patterns of urban living as a result – an example is Amphipolis, where the Late Antique acropolis consists of a small fraction of the classical and Hellenistic town.⁸¹

Some substantial Roman settlements did not survive, especially those at lower elevations in valleys and plains. About half of the cities known in the early third century lost status or were abandoned or destroyed, such as Styberra near Prilep, which was never rebuilt after a third century destruction. Late Antique phases of several of the cities listed in the two *Macedonias* by Hierocles, *Synekdemos*, in the early sixth century, cannot be found at the traditional site; Dunn suggests that the communities relocated to more defensible positions on higher ground, as was the case with Bargala and Pella. The growth in rural settlements may explain why in certain regions no urban community can be found; the city listed by Hierocles may have been an administrative designation for a region that included only small fortifications and rural settlements, as at for example Pelagonia in Macedonia II.⁸²

A number of cities continued to exist near the Via Egnatia as well as along other major roads in Macedonia, such as the north–south route from Scupi via Stobi and Thessaloniki to Dium and Thessalia,

and the diagonal road that, branching off from the Via Egnatia at Heraclea, ran north–east through Stobi to Pautalia and Serdica. Akontisma, Neapolis, Philippi, Amphipolis, Apollonia, Thessaloniki, Pella, Edessa, Kellae and Heraclea Lyncestis, all listed by Hierocles, were walled cities of the Via Egnatia. In addition to the fortified urban settlements, a number of the stations between cities were fortified as well. This ‘militarization’ of the Via Egnatia continued at least into the mid-sixth century, when Procopius, *Buildings* 4.4, included in his list Cyrrhus, a site on the road west of Pella,⁸³ and it demonstrates that the Via Egnatia continued to be an important line of communication between east and west in Late Antiquity. The quality of architecture and decoration of the churches in the cities along the road, as opposed to those in the hinterland, also indicates that people and new ideas continued to travel the route.⁸⁴

A traveler through Macedonia in the fifth or sixth centuries would have found a number of heavily fortified settlements large enough and with status to be called cities; each had a bishop and several churches, but often suburbs as well as cemeteries located outside the fortification walls. In the surrounding region one might have seen fortified and unfortified villages and a few villas; a variety of forts large and small, some with permanent garrisons, others serving as refuges for the population in time of peril and perhaps guarded then by citizen militia; and guard posts along roads and at crossings between provinces. The Macedonias were accurately described as a militarized zone in Late Antiquity.⁸⁵

With few exceptions, the new settlements recently brought to light are known through survey rather than excavation so that the focus of attention still remains on the older cities and their transformation during Late Antiquity.⁸⁶ The overall Roman street grid often survived but new building complexes blocked off smaller streets and structures large and small encroached on the streets.

Theaters at Heraclea and Stobi went out of use at the end of the fourth century, the victims of Theodosius’ anti-pagan legislation, but some evidence suggests that the ones at Dium and Philippi continued to function into the fifth century. Once abandoned, theaters were robbed for their seat blocks that appeared in fifth and sixth century constructions.

A number of public baths continued to function and several churches in Thessaloniki were constructed above bath buildings. Although the evidence for new public baths being built in the fifth and sixth centuries is sparse, old ones continued to be patronized, into the sixth century, probably as long as a sufficient supply of water was available.

It is more difficult to generalize about the fate of temples, fora and agoras and buildings once used for local and provincial administration.⁸⁷ At Philippi the commercial agora and the palaestra south of the forum were demolished for the construction of Basilica B, around the middle of the sixth century. Similarly at Heraclea Lyncestis, the Roman forum is believed to lie under two churches. At Thessaloniki the agora went out of use in the fifth century; clay pits and ceramic workshops took over the courtyard, and lime kilns explain what happened to the marble columns and architectural sculpture. The *praetorium*, the administrative complex or ‘palace’ of the praetorian prefect of Illyricum, was probably constructed after 441 in the upper part of Thessaloniki where the later Byzantine palace has now been replaced by the church of Profitis Elias.⁸⁸ Temples were closed; their building material and real estate were eventually used for other purposes. It should be noted, however, that a church was rarely constructed on the former site of a pagan temple.⁸⁹

Numerous examples of residential architecture from Late Antiquity have been excavated at Philippi, Thasos, Thessaloniki and Stobi. Elegant residences included apsidal dining rooms and open courtyards surrounded by colonnaded and covered corridors. They frequently date from the fourth century with a reconstruction in the fifth. By the following century, however, the residences were often subdivided and turned into modest houses and workshops. More humble dwellings were built over abandoned theaters, at Stobi fairly early in the fifth century but at Heraclea not until the sixth. At the former site a trench on the ‘acropolis’ revealed small houses and workshops that were finally destroyed in the third quarter of the sixth century.⁹⁰

Intensive surveys carried out in R. Macedonia⁹¹ have identified several hundred churches in the Late Antique provinces of Macedonia, and the situation is undoubtedly similar in Greece and Bulgaria. Numerous churches appeared in or near cities and towns, others were associated with villages, but a number – some apparently large and richly decorated but none excavated – were located in isolated areas.

Of the known churches, relatively few have been excavated and published with a ground plan. The overwhelming majority are three-aisled basilicas with eastern, semicircular, protruding apses and a western narthex whose north and south ends give access to one or more annexes. A baptistery frequently occupied one of these annexes or groups of rooms, more often on the south side. Atria (colonnaded courtyards outside the narthex) appear mostly in urban churches. Central plan churches are relatively rare. There are a few examples of cruciform basilicas, of five aisle basilicas, of churches with transepts; Basilica B at Philippi represents an unsuccessful attempt to combine a dome with a basilica. The exquisite mosaics, fresco decoration and

architectural sculpture can be referred to only in passing.

When were most of these churches built? After the small and rather odd basilica of Paul at Philippi from the mid-fourth century, a small group of buildings were constructed in about 400 or during the first half of the fifth century; one might speculate that each bishop built a church around the end of the fourth century, such as at Stobi and Dium. The majority of churches in Macedonia, however, were constructed between about 470 and about 550,⁹² a period of less than a century and long after the presumed Christianization of the population.

A second question is who built the enormous number of churches not only in Macedonia but also elsewhere in the Balkans. One answer has been provided from the nearby province of Epirus, specifically that, despite imperial subventions and building by members of the elite, the majority of ecclesiastical buildings was constructed from regular and repeated offerings to the church made by middle-and lower-class inhabitants. Bowden concluded that this deployment of resources for construction and their removal from circulation eventually exhausted the economy around the middle of the sixth century, given the extra toll taken by plague and unending barbarian invasion.⁹³

After this brief survey of cities and their buildings, the final question is what happened to the urban culture of Macedonia in the late sixth or early seventh century. Barbarian incursions and the presence of barbarian groups within the province were not the only problems. In 518 an earthquake struck neighboring Dardania, damaging or destroying 24 towns and, according to Marcellinus Comes, utterly ruining the capital city of Scupi.⁹⁴ Marcellinus Comes provides a number of details; two cities were buried with their inhabitants, and others were destroyed to a certain extent. No mention is made of damage to Macedonia; this event is noted here because a number of archaeologists and historians have assumed that the 518 earthquake also marked the end of urban life in cities of Macedonia Secunda, such as at Stobi. However, although archaeological investigations have shown that Stobi was not destroyed in 518 and that urban life continued for nearly a century in some parts of the region, earthquakes are documented in Macedonia in the early sixth century⁹⁵ and again in the early seventh.

Between 541 and 544 bubonic plague first swept through the empire; it recurred every decade or two until the mid-seventh century.⁹⁶ Marcellinus Comes noted for 543 that death was devastating Italy and that Illyricum and the East were equally affected. The plague appeared in Thessaloniki again in 586 and spread into Thrace and beyond. It was associated with a barbarian attack on

the city and was followed by famine.⁹⁷ Another possible misfortune in 536 or 537 was the elusive 'year without sun', recorded by several sources, but not attested specifically for Macedonia or Illyricum.⁹⁸

During Late Antiquity the inhabitants of Macedonia lived through invasions, settlements of barbarians official or otherwise, economic hardship, famines, earthquakes, destruction of their cities, flight to the hills and no doubt other disasters as well. Those who survived usually returned and rebuilt their homes and cities. But sometime after the middle of the sixth century the population did not bounce back from the latest disaster and the cities did not rise again. At some sites the evidence of violent destruction by enemy action seems clear and the Avar-Slavic raid of 586 marks the end. But at Stobi, for example, the city was abandoned long enough for 20 cm or more of wind-blown soil to accumulate over the mosaic floor of the baptistery and elsewhere before the basilica and other buildings collapsed or were destroyed.⁹⁹

In eastern Macedonia two sites have shown a somewhat different scenario. On Thasos a destruction of unknown cause has been documented in about 575, but urban life continued at some level until a destructive earthquake in about 620, after which people continued to live in the vicinity, in small rooms constructed out of material salvaged from the ruins.¹⁰⁰ At Philippi the late sixth century destruction is less certain, but after an earthquake also in about 620 some segment of the population made homes for itself amidst the collapsed buildings. In addition to clearing the streets of debris and building a chapel in the presbyterium of the Octagon Church, they collected, sorted, and stored usable architectural pieces, apparently in preparation for reconstructions that were never carried out.¹⁰¹ Excavation in Basilica C near the museum has shown continuation of habitation and worship even after the seventh century.¹⁰²

Thessaloniki succeeded in holding out against the barbarian attacks and in maintaining precarious contact with the capital at Constantinople. As for the other settlements whose fate is known, cities, forts and villages experienced abandonment and/or destruction. One imagines that in many cases their situation was similar to that documented at Thasos and Philippi; a part of the population had died, a part had fled to Thessaloniki or to the hills, but some people continued to live in or near the no longer defensible towns, some of which would reappear as inhabited places, for example Edessa, Beroia, Heraclea/Manastir/Bitola, in later centuries.¹⁰³ However, the urban life of antiquity, already much changed during the fourth to sixth centuries, had reached its end.

7 Conclusion

During the three centuries of Late Antiquity, Macedonia experienced profound change in almost every sphere of public and private life as well as a series of misfortunes and disasters. Galerius' choice of Thessaloniki for his capital, the visits of emperors and other members of the imperial house to Macedonia, and the presence of the vicar of the diocese, the praetorian prefect of Illyricum, and the archbishop and vicar of the pope raised the profile of city and province. On the other hand, local Christians died in Galerius' persecutions, Constantine settled Sarmatians within the province, Theodosius was not only fighting Goths but also using them for his army, and the presence of a Gothic garrison in Thessaloniki led to the riot and resulting massacre of 390. The successive waves of invasion into the province killed or enslaved many people, required the fortification of settlements and the militarization of the province, and in some years prevented the cultivation of fields or harvesting of crops – or even the burial of the dead in extramural cemeteries.

Political stability was somewhat restored after the disruption of the third century but at the cost of social unease and changes in the interaction between government and citizens. The new religion brought change as well: in less than a century Christianity moved from severe persecution to the only legal religion in the empire. The Vicar of Thessaloniki tried to mediate between east and west and Theodosius issued intolerant edicts from various cities in Macedonia. Acceptable behavior changed, the public life of the agora, theater, and baths gave way to one centered around churches, and bishops took over political, judicial and even military roles.

The people of Macedonia proved to be remarkably resilient for a long time, but the addition in the mid-sixth century of plague and the resulting loss of manpower, adverse environmental factors, and economic exhaustion to the usual barbarian invasions, earthquakes and famine offers the most plausible explanation for the disintegration seen in the later sixth and seventh centuries. Depopulation and refugees, breakdown of municipal order and services and eventual collapse of urban life, and loss of technology and communication with the outside world are the characteristics of a Dark Age.

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¹ More recent finds are reported in the annual volumes of *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum* and the 'Bulletin épigraphique' of the *Revue des Études Grecques*.

² I. Mikulčić, *Spätantike und frühbyzantinische Befestigungen in Nordmakedonien: Städte, Vici, Refugien, Kastelle* (Munich 2002), p. 19. The fortress on the Pčinja, Mikulčić's no. 41, Letevci, is being excavated as Kožle.

³ N.A. Bees, 'Zum mazedonischen Bistum Kaesareaia', *Byz-Neugriech. Jahrbücher* 10 (1934), pp. 346–8.

⁴ Procopius, *Buildings* 4.3.1–4, describes the city as close to Lake Castoria; Hierocles, *Synekdemos* 642.12.

⁵ F. Papazoglou, *Les villes de Macédoine à l'époque romaine* (Paris 1988), pp. 91, 140. See also D. Feissel, *Recueil des inscriptions chrétiennes de Macédoine du III^e au VI^e siècle* (Paris 1983), no. 68, for the fifth to sixth century epitaph of an official of Diocletianoupolis from Beroia. *Itinerarium Antonini* 330.6 mentions Diocletianoupolis at Pella.

⁶ Mikulčić, *Befestigungen*, pp. 25, 36–7; a more direct but difficult branch of the Via Egnatia ran 10 miles south, along which he places numbers 436, 321A and 318. See also Papazoglou, *Les villes*, p. 271.

⁷ *Theodosian Code* 11, 3, 2, which is an edict of Constantine I addressed to Acacius, Count of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, 27 February, 327.

⁸ J.W. Eadie, *The Breviarium of Festus: A Critical Edition with Historical Commentary* (London 1967), pp. 2, 155.

⁹ P. Lemerle, *Philippe et la Macédoine orientale à l'époque chrétienne et byzantine: Recherches d'histoire et d'archéologie* (Paris 1945), p. 77.

¹⁰ T.D. Barnes, *The New Empire of Diocletian and Constantine* (Cambridge 1982), p. 139.

11 A. Konstantakopoulou, *Historical Geography of Macedonia (4th-6th c.)* (Ioannina 1984), pp. 61–73.

12 Given the paucity of information concerning the province of Macedonia salutaris, the bibliography concerning it is amazingly large: Papazoglou, *Les villes*, pp. 94–5, cites the earlier bibliography, to which may now be added C. Pietri, ‘Les provinces “Salutaires”: Géographie administrative et politique de la conversion sous l’Empire chrétien (IV^e s.)’, in G. Sanders, M. Van Uytfanghe and R. Demeulenaere (eds.), *Aeuum inter utrumque: Mélanges offerts à Gabriel Sanders* (Steenbrugge 1991), pp. 319–38, Mikulčič, *Befestigungen*, pp. 25–8.

13 Macedonia Prima or Macedonia I and Macedonia Secunda or Macedonia II are used interchangeably for the fifth and sixth century provinces.

14 Papazoglou, *Les villes*, p. 98.

15 Papazoglou, *Les villes*, p. 95 n. 41, refers to a letter of Pope Innocent I, written in 412, that lists the provinces of Illyricum without Macedonia salutaris.

16 Papazoglou, *Les villes*, p. 96, with citations.

17 Papazoglou, *Les villes*, p. 96, Konstantakopoulou, *Historical Geography*, p. 74.

18 As Konstantakopoulou, *Historical Geography*, pp. 74–81, assumes.

19 Mikulčič, *Befestigungen*, pp. 28–30.

20 For example, the Jewish community documented at Thessaloniki in Acts in the *New Testament* and by Feissel, *Recueil*, no. 291. Jews lived elsewhere in Macedonia: Feissel, *Recueil*, nos. 294, 295, from Beroia. For the synagogue at Stobi, see D.L. Moe, ‘The Cross and the Menorah’, *Archaeology* 30 (1977), pp. 148–57.

21 Zosimus, *New History* 2.22 and 28, D.S. Potter, *The Roman Empire at Bay, AD 180-395* (London 2004), pp. 379–80.

22 Potter, *Empire at Bay*, pp. 555–6, *Theodosian Code* 16.1.2.

²³ P. Heather, *The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the Barbarians* (Oxford 2006), pp. 185–6.

²⁴ *Theodosian Code* 16.5.14, 10 March, 388, from Thessaloniki; *Theodosian Code* 16.5.15 and 16.4.2, 14 and 16, June 388, from Stobi. The first two concern heretics and the third forbids discussion of religion.

²⁵ Theodoret, *Ecclesiastical History* 5.18, Sozomen, *Church History* 7.25, Ambrose, *Letters* no. 40, Rufinus, *Ecclesiastical History* 11.18. See J.F. Matthews, ‘*Codex Theodosianus* 9.40.13 and Nicomachus Flavianus’, *Historia* 46.2 (1997), pp. 196–213, for the disputed date of this edict and suggestions that the situation may have been even more complicated than it appears. Another edict (9.7.6) was issued in Rome in August 390, requiring that men guilty of homosexual acts be burned alive in public.

²⁶ Socrates, *Church History* 7.24.

²⁷ According to Socrates, *Church History* 7.44, Thessaloniki had originally been agreed on for the place of the marriage.

²⁸ M. Panov, ‘Illyricum between East and West: Administrative Changes at the End of the Fourth and the First Half of the Fifth Century’, in F.K. Haarer and E. Jeffreys (eds.), *Proceedings of the 21st International Congress of Byzantine Studies, London 21–26 August, 2006*, 3 (2006), pp. 33–4.

²⁹ How long the prefecture continued to function is unknown. A prefect of Illyricum is documented at Thessaloniki during the reign of Emperor Maurice (582–602): P. Lemerle, ‘Invasions et migrations dans les Balkans depuis la fin de l’époque romaine jusqu’au VIII^e siècle’, *Revue historique* 211

(1954), p. 268. The Byzantine theme of Thessaloniki was established no later than 836.

³⁰ C. Gatzolis, ‘The Roman Coinage’, in D.M. Grammenos (ed.), *Roman Thessaloniki* (Thessaloniki 2003), pp. 287–90. See also I. Touratsoglou, *Die Münzstätte von Thessaloniki in der römischen Kaiserzeit* (Berlin 1988) and P. Josifovski, *Rimskata monetarnica vo Stobi = Roman Mint of Stobi* (Skopje 2001).

³¹ D.M. Metcalf, 'The Mint of Thessalonica in the Early Byzantine Period', in *Villes et peuplement dans l'Illyricum protobyzantin* (Rome 1984), pp. 111–29 (no editor listed), K.M. Hattersley-Smith, *Byzantine Public Architecture between the Fourth and Early Eleventh Centuries AD* (Thessaloniki 1996), pp. 139–41.

³² G.I. Theocharidis, *History of Macedonia during the Middle Ages (285–1354)* (Thessaloniki 1980), pp. 103–25, provides extensive discussion and bibliography; G.D. Dunn, 'Innocent I and Anysius of Thessalonica', *Byzantion* 77 (2007), pp. 124–48, is more recent.

³³ Lemerle, *Philippe*, p. 83 n. 4, cites Cassiodorus, *Variae* 10.35, for the address of a letter written in 536 by a Gothic king to the prefect of Illyricum at Thessaloniki. Apparently a transfer of the prefect to the north is mentioned only in one hagiographical source, the *Life of Hosios David*: V. Rose, *Leben des heiligen David von Thessalonike* (Berlin 1887), supposedly written early in the eighth century but probably, given its anachronisms, much later: see Theocharidis, *History of Macedonia*, p. 102 n. 1, P. Lemerle, *Les plus anciens recueils des miracles de Saint Démétrius et la pénétration des slaves dans les Balkans* 1 (Paris 1979), p. 29 n. 16, p. 50 n. 55, p. 81 n. 100bis, C.S. Snively, 'Thessaloniki versus Justiniana Prima: A Rare Mention of the Conflict in the *Life of Hosios David of Thessaloniki*', *Niš & Byzantium* 5 (2007), pp. 55–61.

³⁴ O. Pritsak, 'Sarmatians', in *Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium* (Oxford 1991), p. 1844.

³⁵ Heather, *Fall of the Roman Empire*, p. 184.

³⁶ I. Mikulčić, 'Some New Factors in the History of Stobi', in B. Aleksova and J. Wiseman (eds.), *Studies in the Antiquities of Stobi* 3 (Titov Veles 1981), pp. 217–21.

³⁷ Marcellinus Comes for his death in 481; Malchus recorded the raid on Philippi: *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum* (FHG) IV, p. 114.

³⁸ Malchus, F 18, *FHG* IV, p. 125.

³⁹ No date has been suggested for the second phase of the Inner City Wall revealed in excavations of 2008 and 2009.

⁴⁰ Malchus, F 18, *FHG* IV, p. 125.

⁴¹ Malchus, F 18, *FHG* IV, pp. 125–7.

⁴² Jordanes, *History of the Goths* 286–287. Jordanes put this event in 472, but scholars generally believe that he conflated the two campaigns: Papazoglou, *Les villes*, p. 140 n. 112 and ‘, ‘New Factors’, p. 213 n. 28.

⁴³ The basic article is still Lemerle, ‘Invasions et migrations’, pp. 265–308. See J.-P. Sodini, ‘The Transformation of Cities in Late Antiquity within the Provinces of Macedonia and Epirus’, in A.G. Poulter (ed.), *The Transition to Late Antiquity on the Danube and Beyond* (Oxford 2007), pp. 312–13, for more recent bibliography.

⁴⁴ B. Aleksova and C. Mango, ‘Bargala: A Preliminary Report’, *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 25 (1971), pp. 273–5, T. Janakievski, ‘Funde byzantinischer Münzen in den Objekten 5A und 5B aus dem spätantiken Mikrowohnkomplex’, *Macedoniae Acta Archaeologica* 4 (1978), pp. 189–200, I. Mikulčić, *Stobi: An Ancient City* (Skopje 2003), p. 165.

⁴⁵ Lemerle had earlier dated this siege to 597, but in *Miracles de Saint Démétrius 2: Le Commentaire*, p. 65 n. 77, concluded that it took place in 586. See also S. Vryonis, ‘The Evolution of Slavic Society and the Slavic Invasions in Greece. The First Major Slavic Attack on Thessaloniki, A.D. 597’, *Hesperia* 50 (1981), pp. 378–90.

⁴⁶ A. Dunn, ‘Was There a Militarisation of the Southern Balkans during Late Antiquity?’, in P. Freeman (ed.), *Limes 18. Proceedings of the XVIIIth International Congress of Roman Frontier Studies 2* (Oxford 2002), pp. 709–12, argues that the praetorian prefects of Illyricum were probably responsible for the construction of defenses within the prefecture and that fortifications (and other buildings) ought not always be attributed to the initiative of some emperor.

⁴⁷ Lemerle, ‘Invasions et migrations’, pp. 284–5.

⁴⁸ For more urban occupations, see J.-P. Sodini, ‘L’artisanat urbain à l’époque paléochrétienne (IV^e-VII^e)’, *Ktema* 4 (1979), pp. 71–119, C. Bakirtzis, ‘Imports, Exports, and Autarky in Byzantine Thessalonike from the Seventh to the Tenth Century’, in J.

⁴⁹ Feissel, *Recueil*, no. 85.

⁵⁰ A. Kazhdan and A.M. Talbot, ‘Mines’, in *Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium* (Oxford 1991), pp. 1375–6.

⁵¹ Compare *Theodosian Code* 10.19.1-3, 10, and 11 with 10.19.13.

⁵² A general edict of 424 (10.19.15), addressed to the Minister of Finance, stated that miners who migrated must be brought back to their place of birth and status; if in the future a miner married a free person, then their children would have the lowly status of a miner and belong to the state.

⁵³ J.-P. Sodini, A Lambraki and T. Koželj, *Les carrières de marbre à l'époque paléochrétienne* (Athens 1980), J.J. Herrmann, Jr and V. Barbin, ‘The Exportation of Marble from the Aliki Quarries on Thasos: Cathodoluminescence of Samples from Turkey and Italy’, *AJA* 97 (1993), pp. 91–103.

⁵⁴ Papazoglou, *Les villes*, p. 322.

⁵⁵ Feissel, *Recueil*, no. 2 (Edessa), no. 215 (Amphipolis), no. 271 (Heraclea), no. 254 (Thasos), no. 283 (Bargala), no. 274 (Philip, Stobi), no. 266 (Heraclea, ambiguous monogram). For John at Heraclea, see *IG pars II Inscriptiones Macedoniae, fasciculus II (Inscriptiones Macedoniae Septentrionalis)*, no. 149. Feissel, *Recueil*, includes inscriptions of Preciticius at Serres (no. 209) and Domninus from Mount Athos (no. 208).

⁵⁶ Feissel, *Recueil*, p. 2.

⁵⁷ Feissel, *Recueil*, no.14.

⁵⁸ Feissel, *Recueil*, nos. 211, 253, 224.

⁵⁹ For the Stobi bishops, see Feissel, *Recueil*, no. 274 for Philip, whose building inscription appeared on the lintel over the doorway from narthex to nave; it may date to the first phase of the Basilica on the Terrace, dated after about 475, or to the major reconstruction of the second phase, tentatively 520s or 530s: see

B. Aleksova, 'The Old Episcopal Basilica at Stobi', *Archaeologia Jugoslavica* 22–23 (1982–3), pp. 50–63, for the mosaic inscription of Eustathios, from the second phase of the early church, first half of the fifth century.

⁶⁰ Feissel, *Recueil*, no. 91, notes that this is the same archbishop attested between 597 and 603 in letters of Pope Gregory the Great.

⁶¹ Feissel, *Recueil*, no. 56.

⁶² Feissel, *Recueil*, nos. 276, 275, 77, 76.

⁶³ Lemerle, *Miracles de Saint Démétrius*, J.C. Skedros, *Saint Demetrios of Thessaloniki. Civic -7th Centuries CE* (Harrisburg 1999), D. Woods, 'Thessalonica's Patron: Saint Demetrius or Emeterius?', *HTR* 93 (2000), pp. 221–34.

⁶⁴ Skedros, *Saint Demetrios*, pp. 10, 15, P. Lemerle, 'Sainte Anysia, martyr à Thessalonique?', *Analecta Bollandiana* 100 (1982), pp. 111–24.

⁶⁵ Feissel, *Recueil*, no. 256. This inscription in a tomb raises an important issue: in Eastern Illyricum martyrs are not usually found buried in tombs attached to churches because (1) the churches were mostly built a century and a half after the peace of the church, and the tombs attached to the churches rather than the other way around, and (2) an ordinary tomb provided neither security nor opportunity for veneration of a martyr's relics: see C. Snively, 'Cemetery Churches of the Early Byzantine Period in Eastern Illyricum: Location and Martyrs', *Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 29 (1984), pp. 117–24.

⁶⁶ Feissel, *Recueil*, no. 204, in Latin.

⁶⁷ Sozomen, *Church History* 3.14.38.1, writing in the second quarter of the fifth century, noted that although the Thracians and Illyrians and those living in Europe might be without experience of monastic communities, nevertheless they were not entirely lacking in contemplative men.

⁶⁸ S. Popović, 'Prolegomena to Early Monasticism in the Balkans as Documented in Architecture', *Starinar* 49 (1998) pp.131–44, C.

Snively, 'Invisible in the Community? The Evidence for Early Women's Monasticism in the Balkan Peninsula', in S. McNally (ed.), *Shaping Community: The Archaeology and Architecture of Monasticism* (Oxford 2001), pp. 57–66. For a very different approach, see G. Harizanis, 'The Beginnings of Monasticism at Thessaloniki', *Makedonika* 34 (2003–4), pp. 35–64.

⁶⁹ D. Feissel, 'Un monastère paléochrétien à Thasos d'après une inscription peu connue', *Acta X Congressus Internationalis Archaeologiae Christianae* 2 (Thessaloniki 1984), pp. 113–20, Feissel, *Recueil*, no. 255.

⁷⁰ C. Bakirtzis, 'What Happened on Thasos at the Beginning of the 7th Century', in *Philia epi eis Georgion E. Mylonan* 3 (Athens 1989), pp. 339–41 (no editor listed), J.-P. Sodini, 'La ville de Thasos à l'époque protobyzantine: Les lacunes de la topographie', *Byzantini Makedonia, 324–1430 m.Ch.* (Thessaloniki 1995), pp. 287 and 289, with earlier bibliography (no editor listed).

⁷¹ Originally excavated during World War I, the church was tentatively identified as a monastery in 1929 because of the attached annexes: R. Egger, 'Die städtische Kirch von Stobi', *Jahreshefte des Österreichischen archäologischen Instituts* 24 (1929), p. 42.

⁷² I. Nikolajević-Stojković, *La décoration architecturale sculptée de l'époque Bas-Romane en Macédoine, en Serbie et au Monténégro* (Belgrade 1957), pp. 45–6, pointed out that the masons had apparently forgotten the principles of decoration for the various architectural elements and transferred the crosses, palmettes and geometric decoration of the capital to the upper part of the column.

⁷³ I. Mikulčić, 'Frühchristlicher Kirchenbau in der S. R. Makedonien', in *Corso di Cultura sull'Arte Ravennate e Bizantina* 33, *La Macedonia Iugoslava* (Ravenna 1986), pp. 233, 237, 246–7. Although Heraclea became medieval Monastir, two ambiguous inscriptions offer the only evidence for monasticism: Feissel, *Recueil*, nos. 268, 272.

⁷⁴ Feissel, *Recueil*, no. 60.

⁷⁵ Feissel, *Recueil*, nos. 20–4, with the convent on p. 40.

⁷⁶ For female monasticism in Macedonia, see Snively, 'Invisible in the Community?', *passim*.

⁷⁷ For example, passages from the *Miracles of St. Demetrius* have been used to argue for a fortified monastery of the martyr Matrona outside the city, but none of the Greek words used has a necessary or even likely monastic connotation. A Byzantine text concerning the Latomos monastery, located at the church now dedicated to Hosios David, has been cited as evidence for an Early Byzantine monastery, but the text itself makes a fairly clear distinction between the mythical events of the fourth century, and the historical ones of the early ninth century in the monastery: Feissel, *Recueil*, no. 103, provides bibliography.

⁷⁸ J. Moschus and J. Wortley, *The Spiritual Meadow* (Kalamazoo 1992).

⁷⁹ For the *Life* of Hosios David, see above n. 33.

⁸⁰ There is a third complex in Epirus nova, west of Ochrid beside the Via Egnatia, where the atrium of a basilica may have been converted for monastic use.

⁸¹ A. Dunn, 'Continuity and Change in the Macedonian Countryside, from Gallienus to Justinian', in W. Bowden, L. Lavan and C. Machado (eds.), *Recent Research on the Late Antique Countryside* (Leiden 2004), pp. 562–3 and fig. 3, C. Bakirtzis, 'Excavation of Christian Amphipolis', *Praktika tis Archailogikis Etaireias* (1996), pp. 533–47.

⁸² The views expressed in this paragraph are primarily those of A. Dunn, 'Stages in the Transition from the Late Antique to the Middle Byzantine Urban Centre in S. Macedonia and S. Thrace', in *Aphieroma ston N.G.L. Hammond* (Thessaloniki 1997), pp. 137–50 (no editor listed), 'Militarisation of the Southern Balkans during Late Antiquity' and 'Continuity and Change in the Macedonian Countryside', providing extensive bibliography. For Pelagonia, see also Papazoglou, *Les villes*, pp. 287–8.

⁸³ Dunn, 'Militarisation of the Southern Balkans during Late Antiquity', pp. 707–8.

⁸⁴ M. Fasolo, *La Via Egnatia 1, Da Apollonia e Dyrrachium ad*

Herakleia Lynkestidos (Rome 2003). Unfortunately, volume 1 includes only the extreme western end of the road within Macedonia; a similarly detailed publication of the rest of the road is eagerly awaited.

⁸⁵ In addition to Dunn, 'Militaryisation of the Southern Balkans during Late Antiquity', 'Stages in the Transition', and 'Continuity and Change in the Macedonian Countryside', see also Mikulčić, *Befestigungen*, pp. 50–106.

⁸⁶ Sodini, 'Transformation of Cities', pp. 311–36, provides a recent summary.

⁸⁷ L. Lavan, 'The Political Topography of the Late Antique City: Activity Spaces in Practice', in L. Lavan and W. Bowden (eds.), *Theory and Practice in Late Antique Archaeology* (Leiden 2003), pp. 315–21.

⁸⁸ B. Croke, 'Thessalonika's Early Byzantine Palaces', *Byzantion* 51 (1981), pp. 475–83.

⁸⁹ There are two examples on the island of Thasos, one at Evraïokastro outside the city of Limenas, and above the sanctuary of Heracles within the city: see Sodini, 'Ville de Thasos', pp. 283–6.

⁹⁰ For residences in general, see Sodini, 'Transformation of Cities', pp. 326–8, with bibliography. For the acropolis and houses over the theater at Stobi, see J. Wiseman, 'The City in Macedonia Secunda', in *Villes et peuplement dans l'Illyricum protobyzantin* (Rome 1984), pp. 295, 310, and fig. 16 (no editor listed).

⁹¹ A huge amount of material from survey is included in Macedonian Archaeological Scientific Association (MASA), *Archaeological Map of the Republic of Macedonia 2* (Skopje 1996); see also Mikulčić, *Befestigungen* and 'Frühchristlicher Kirchenbau', pp. 221–4.

⁹² Mikulčić, 'Frühchristlicher Kirchenbau', p. 247, reached this conclusion many years ago.

⁹³ W. Bowden, *Epirus Vetus. The Archaeology of a Late Antique Province* (London 2003), pp. 151–9.

⁹⁴ In fact, the city continued to exist but with a much lower standard of living.

⁹⁵ Mikulcčić, 'New Factors', pp. 221–3.

⁹⁶ See L.K. Little (ed.), *Plague and the End of Antiquity. The Pandemic of 541–750* (Cambridge 2007), pp. 313–54, for bibliography.

⁹⁷ D. Stathakopoulos, 'Crime and Punishment: The Plague in the Byzantine Empire, 541-749', in L.K. Little (ed.), *Plague and the End of Antiquity: The Pandemic of 541–750* (Cambridge 2007), p. 102. Stathakopoulos actually gives the year as 597, but the same issues arises here about 586 or 597 for the major Slavic attack.

⁹⁸ See A. Arjava, 'The Mystery Cloud of 536 CE in the Mediterranean Sources', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 59 (2005), pp. 73–94, for sources and discussion. For other environmental factors, see J. Wiseman, 'Environmental Deterioration and Human Agency in Ancient Macedonia: A Case Study', *Geoarchaeology* 22 (2007), pp. 85–110.

⁹⁹ Wiseman, 'City in Macedonia Secunda', pp. 310–13. Unpublished excavations of 2003 and 2004 in the new Extra Muros Basilica at Stobi suggest that a small chapel was built over the presbyterium shortly after the destruction of the building, probably in the seventh century.

The assumption has been that two bishops of Stobi recorded in the seventh century never set foot in the city; see, however, Papazoglou, *Les villes*, p. 323 n. 100 and Konstantakopoulou, *Historical Geography*, p. 153, for the Sermesiani in Macedonia in the seventh century.

¹⁰⁰ C. Bakirtzis, 'The End of Antiquity in Eastern Macedonia', *Ancient Macedonia* 6 (Thessaloniki 1999), pp. 123–4, Sodini, 'Ville de Thasos', p. 294.

¹⁰¹ Bakirtzis, 'End of Antiquity', pp. 123–4.

¹⁰² E. Kourkitidou-Nikolaidou, 'Philippi from the Early Christian to the Byzantine Period', in *Byzantini Makedonia, 324–1430 m.Ch.* (Thessaloniki 1995), pp. 171–82 (in Greek; no editor listed).

103 I have chosen not to discuss the thorny issue of Slavic settlement. Bakirtzis, 'End of Antiquity', pp. 125–6, makes the point that the people who continued to live in Philippi and around Limenas on Thasos were undoubtedly the previous inhabitants and their descendants, not incomers unfamiliar with the abandoned cities.

Ancient Macedonia, Alexander the Great and the Star or Sun of Vergina: National Symbols and the Conflict between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia

Loring M. Danforth

In this chapter I offer an anthropological perspective on the role of ancient Macedonia in contemporary Balkan politics. More specifically, I examine the role ancient Macedonia has played in the Macedonian conflict, a ‘global cultural war’¹ that since the late 1980s has been waged by Greeks and Macedonians in the Balkans and the diaspora over which group has the right to identify themselves as Macedonians.

Given the often heated rhetoric that surrounds the Macedonian conflict, I would like to define my use of two key terms and state my position on several important points before beginning my analysis. The name ‘Macedonia’ is widely used with three different meanings. It can refer to a geographical area in the central Balkans; to the Republic of Macedonia, a newly independent state that emerged peacefully from the former Yugoslavia in 1991; and to a region in north-central Greece. In this chapter I use it primarily to refer to the Republic of Macedonia. The term ‘Macedonian’ is also used with different meanings. First, it is most widely used in a *national* sense to refer to people with a Macedonian national identity. When used in this way, ‘Macedonian’ contrasts with other categories of national identity, such as ‘Serbian’, ‘Bulgarian’ and ‘Greek’. According to this usage, ‘Macedonian’ and ‘Greek’ are mutually exclusive categories referring to people of two different nationalities. This is the sense in which I use the term in this chapter. While many Greeks object to this usage, both Greeks and Macedonians accept these names as terms of self-designation. Their use, therefore, is consistent with standard anthropological practice. Second, the term ‘Macedonian’ is used in an

ethnic or *regional* sense to refer to people with a Greek national identity who are from Macedonia. These people also refer to themselves as ‘Greek-Macedonians’, a term that conveys both their national and their ethnic or regional identity.

It is my opinion, and that of most anthropologists, that ancient history should not be the basis for determining national identities in the present, but that self-ascription and ascription by others are the most relevant principles to take into account in situations where conflict arises over the name and the identity of a particular nation. In the present case, Macedonians themselves and most scholars, human rights groups and political figures around the world agree on the appropriateness of terms such as ‘Macedonia’, ‘the Macedonian nation’, ‘the Macedonian language’ and ‘the Macedonian minority in Greece’. The only significant objections to this usage have come from supporters of the Greek nationalist position on the Macedonian conflict, who use the terms ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ (or ‘FYROM’), ‘SlavMacedonians’ (or ‘Skopians’ after Skopje, the capital of Macedonia), ‘the linguistic idiom of Skopje’, or ‘Slavic-speaking Greeks’.²

At the beginning of the twenty-first century Macedonians (people who have a Macedonian and not a Greek national identity) constitute a modern European nation that has been constructed through complex historical and political processes, just as all other modern nations have. The Macedonian nation is not an artificial invention of Marshall Tito, the former Yugoslav leader, as Greek nationalists claim, nor are modern Macedonians the descendants of the ancient Macedonians, as Macedonian nationalists claim. They are a Slavic people (i.e. they speak a Slavic language), just as Greeks are an Indo-European people (i.e. they speak an Indo-European language). This does not mean, however, that Macedonians should be called Slav Macedonians, any more than Russians should be called Slav Russians or Greeks should be called Indo-European Greeks.

As an anthropologist, I feel strongly that *both* Greek nationalists, who deny the existence of a Macedonian nation on the grounds that only Greeks can be Macedonians because Greeks are the direct descendants of the ancient Macedonians, *and* Macedonian nationalists, who deny they are Slavs and claim they are direct descendants of the ancient Macedonians, are making inaccurate statements that constitute poor scholarship and contribute to nationalist political positions that harm the prospects of peace and stability in the Balkans. I also feel strongly that *both* people who have a Macedonian (not a Greek) national identity *and* people who have a Greek national identity and a Macedonian ethnic or regional identity have the right to identify themselves as Macedonians. No one, in other words, has

the right to monopolize the term 'Macedonian' and deny others the right to identify themselves in this way.

In the first two parts of this chapter I present a brief historical overview of the Macedonian conflict and offer an anthropological perspective on the construction of national identities, histories and cultures. Then I present a detailed analysis of the role that ancient Macedonia, Alexander the Great, and the sun or star of Vergina have played in this 'global cultural war'. After all, since the Macedonian conflict is ultimately a dispute over national sovereignty, identity and history, the legacy of ancient Macedonia and the accomplishments of its most famous hero, Alexander the Great, are a major focus of attention for both parties to this dispute. The fundamental issues at stake, then, are these: Can either nation claim Alexander the Great and the ancient Macedonians as its legitimate ancestors? Do the name and the history of ancient Macedonia belong to any one nation?

Next I examine an international scholarly conference on Macedonia that was an important early skirmish in the dispute between Greeks and Macedonians over the historical legacy of ancient Macedonia. Here the relevance of ancient Macedonia to the current political conflict was dramatically on display. Finally, I offer a brief discussion of the two main issues that have dominated the Macedonian conflict for the past 20 years – the international recognition of the Republic of Macedonia by its constitutional name (the Republic of Macedonia) and the acknowledgment of the existence of a Macedonian minority in northern Greece. Both these issues are, in the last analysis, disputes over whether a particular national group, Greeks or Macedonians, can claim to be the rightful heirs to the glorious heritage of ancient Macedonia.

1 The Macedonian Question: An Overview

The Macedonian Question has been an important issue in Balkan history and politics for over a century. During the Ottoman period the population of Macedonia included an amazing diversity of linguistic, religious and ethnic groups. Toward the end of the nineteenth century Greece, Bulgaria and to a lesser extent Serbia became involved in the 'Macedonian Struggle', in which each state asserted its irredentist claims over the people and the territory of Macedonia. At the end of the Balkan Wars (1912–13) Macedonia was divided among Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia, and the inhabitants of all three regions were

subject to policies of forced assimilation whose goals were to transform the diverse population of the area into three ethnically pure and homogeneous groups consisting exclusively of Greeks, Bulgarians and Serbs.

In the late nineteenth century most of the inhabitants of Macedonia were illiterate peasants with no clearly developed sense of national identity. Any expression of national identity that could be found among the rural population of Macedonia 'was purely superficial, and owed its existence to religious indoctrination, educational propaganda, or terrorism'.³ Many disinterested observers at the time concluded that the Slavic-speaking inhabitants of Macedonia were 'Bulgarians' and that the term 'Macedonian' was not used to identify people as belonging to a distinct 'Macedonian' ethnic or national group, but rather was used to refer to the Slavic-speaking Christians living in the geographical area of Macedonia.⁴

H.N. Brailsford, a British journalist traveling through Macedonia in the first decade of the twentieth century, offered several revealing insights into just how superficial a hold national identities had on the rural population of Macedonia at the time. He describes a village that had been 'Greek' four years earlier, but which had recently become 'Bulgarian' because the Bulgarians had sent the village a teacher and a priest, while the Greeks had only sent a teacher. In this way, Brailsford observes wryly, 'the legend that Alexander the Great was a Greek goes out by one road, and the rival myth that Alexander was a Bulgarian comes in by the other'. Brailsford adds that he once heard 'a witty French consul declare that with a fund of a million francs he would undertake to make all Macedonia French'.⁵

There is clear evidence, however, that by the early twentieth century a definite sense of a Macedonian national identity had begun to emerge among the literate elite of the Slavic-speaking Orthodox Christians of the area. In 1892, for example, the parish school council in the city of Kastoria (then Kostur), which is located now in northern Greece, adopted the proposal of a group of teachers 'to eliminate both Bulgarian and Greek and introduce Macedonian as the language of instruction in the town school'.⁶ The most obvious example of the early development of a Macedonian national identity is the work of Krste Misirkov. In *On Macedonian Matters*, published originally in 1903 in Sophia, Misirkov wrote: 'I am a Macedonian. I write in the central Macedonian dialect, which from now on I shall always consider the Macedonian literary language'. Misirkov called unambiguously for the 'recognition of the Slavs in Macedonia as a separate nationality – Macedonians', and he stated clearly and simply that the Macedonians are 'a separate and independent Slav people'.⁷ Unlike many more recent Macedonian nationalists, Misirkov

acknowledged that the construction of a Macedonian national identity was a relatively recent phenomenon, noting that 'our fathers, grandfathers, and great-grandfathers have always been called Bulgarians' and that 'in the past we have even called ourselves Bulgarians'. Finally, Misirkov describes 'the emergence of the Macedonians as a separate Slav people' as a 'perfectly normal historical process which is quite in keeping with the process by which the Bulgarian, Croatian, and Serbian peoples emerged from the South Slav group'.⁸

Under the Metaxas dictatorship of 1936–40, the Slavic-speaking people of northern Greece experienced severe repression. Greek sovereignty over Greek Macedonia was seriously threatened in the 1940s, when Bulgarian troops occupied the eastern portion of Greek Macedonia during World War II, and again during the Greek Civil War (1946–9), when Greek communist forces supported by Tito and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia fought for an 'autonomous Macedonia' that might eventually come under Yugoslav control. After the Greek Civil War, in which many Macedonians supported the unsuccessful communist cause, some 35,000 Macedonians from northern Greece fled to Yugoslavia and other countries in Eastern Europe under extremely difficult circumstances. In the decades that followed, conservative Greek governments continued a policy of forced Hellenization. In the mid-1980s, a small group of people from northern Greece began to assert their existence as a Macedonian minority and demand increased linguistic and cultural rights.

Until World War II, the official Serbian (and later Yugoslav) position on the Macedonian conflict was that the Slavs of Macedonia did not constitute a distinct ethnic or national group, but were actually all 'South Serbs'. In 1944, however, Tito and the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia established the People's Republic of Macedonia with its capital of Skopje as one of the states of the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At this time the existence of a Macedonian nation was officially recognized. By 1950 a standard literary Macedonian language had been developed, and in 1967 an autonomous Macedonian Orthodox Church was founded. In this way Macedonians acquired a significant degree of cultural autonomy, even though they did not achieve complete national independence. After the death of Tito and the break-up of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Macedonia declared its independence in September 1991 and began its campaign to gain international recognition under its constitutional name.

According to the Greek nationalist position on the Macedonian conflict, because the ancient Macedonians were Greeks, and because ancient and modern Greece are bound in an unbroken line of racial

and cultural continuity, it is only Greeks who have the right to identify themselves as Macedonians. From a Greek nationalist perspective, the Slavs of southern Yugoslavia, who are descended from the Slavic tribes that settled in Macedonia in the sixth century AD, 1,000 years after the death of Alexander the Great, have no right to identify themselves now as 'Macedonians'. From this perspective, a Macedonian nation does not exist; it is an 'artificial creation', an 'invention', of Tito, who 'baptized' a 'mosaic of nationalities' with the Greek name 'Macedonia' for his own political purposes. In addition, the Greek government denies the existence of a Macedonian minority in northern Greece, claiming that there exists only a small group of 'Slavophone Hellenes' or 'bilingual Greeks', who speak Greek and 'a local Slavic dialect', but nevertheless have a 'Greek national consciousness'.⁹

For many Greeks, use of the name 'Macedonia' by the 'Slavs of Skopje' constitutes a 'felony', an 'act of plagiarism' against the Greek people. By calling themselves 'Macedonians' the Slavs are 'stealing' a Greek name and 'falsifying' Greek history. As Evangelos Kofos, a historian formerly employed by the Greek Foreign Ministry to represent the Greek government's position on the Macedonian issue, told a reporter, 'It is as if a robber came into my house and stole my most precious jewels – my history, my culture, my identity'.¹⁰ According to the Greek nationalist perspective, if 'Skopje' is recognized as 'the Republic of Macedonia', if 'Slavs' are recognized as 'Macedonians', then everything that is Macedonian, in particular the glorious accomplishments of Alexander the Great and the ancient Macedonians, will no longer be recognized as a part of Greek history and civilization, but will become the exclusive property of the 'Slavs'.¹¹

Macedonians, on the other hand, are committed to affirming their existence as a unique people with a unique history, culture and identity, and to gaining recognition of this fact from the academic community, international political organizations and world public opinion. In asserting what they sometimes call their 'ethnospecificity', Macedonians insist that they are not Serbs, Yugoslavs, Bulgarians or Greeks. In addition to affirming their existence as a nation, Macedonians are committed to affirming the existence of a unique Macedonian language as well. While acknowledging the similarities between Macedonian and other South Slavic languages, they point to the distinctions that set Macedonian apart as a separate language. They claim that although standard literary Macedonian was only formally created and recognized in 1944, the Macedonian language has a history of over 1,000 years dating back to the Old Church Slavonic used by Sts Cyril and Methodius in the ninth century.¹²

Finally, all Macedonians agree that Macedonian minorities exist in Bulgaria and Greece and that these minorities have been subject at times to harsh policies of forced assimilation.

2 The Construction of National Identities, Cultures and Histories

Nationalism is an ideology whose goal is to create territorially bounded political units, or states, out of homogeneous cultural communities, or nations. From a nationalist perspective nations are regarded as communities of people who share a common culture, identity and origin; they are considered natural phenomena of great antiquity. Benedict Anderson's well-known definition of a nation as 'an imagined political community', however, emphasizes the fact that nations are socially and culturally constructed through complex historical and political processes.¹³

One of the greatest challenges facing the anthropology of nationalism is to avoid being taken in or co-opted by the persuasiveness of nationalist myths. The anthropologists' task is to dereify the nation, to deconstruct national identities and cultures, by analyzing the process of nation formation, the process by which nations, national identities and cultures, are constructed from pre-existing cultural forms. These preexisting cultural forms, which include conceptions of shared blood, race, language, descent and religion, are what Clifford Geertz has called 'primordial attachments [...] The "givens" – or more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed "givens" – of social existence'.¹⁴

In nationalist discourse a national culture is considered to be a territorially based and mutually exclusive entity characterized by homogeneity, boundedness and continuity. A national culture is something a nation possesses, a nation's property; its existence according to Richard Handler is constitutive of the national identity and 'proves the existence of the nation itself'. Just as nationalists lay claim to a clearly bounded territory, they 'construct an account of the unique culture and history that attaches to and emanates from the people who occupy it. It is at this point that disputes about the ownership of cultural property come into play'.¹⁵

In their extreme form these disputes involve metaphorical or even literal attempts to treat some aspect of a nation's culture or history as a trademark, as something on which a copyright can be placed, marking it as belonging to one and only one nation. According to a

nationalist perspective, therefore, a nation has a responsibility to defend its patrimony, its national cultural property, against efforts by another nation to appropriate it. Threats to a nation's cultural property are often treated as seriously as threats to a nation's territorial integrity, for culture, like territory, is an objective manifestation of a nation's existence.

Intellectuals and scholars from disciplines such as archaeology, history, folklore and linguistics create the 'symbolic capital' from which a national culture is formed. This national culture is then disseminated by the state to its citizens through various institutions, such as the mass media and the educational system. In this way a national canon is created in a variety of fields. The material culture of national ancestors is excavated, a national history is written, a national folklore is collected and a national language is standardized. The construction of a national past is a particularly significant component of the nation building process, an essential act of national selfdefinition. Nationalist myths of shared descent from common ancestors with their imagery of kinship, blood ties and racial continuity constitute one of the most powerful tools with which to 'imagine' a national community, particularly if the ancestors involved happen to be the ancient Macedonians with their world-famous general and king, Alexander the Great. Historical and cultural patrimony is especially important to nations whose ancient past is much more glorious than their more recent past.

3 Ancient Macedonia

Both Greek and Macedonian nationalisms are based on a discourse of racial and cultural continuity in which national identities existing in the present are legitimated by being projected far back in time to the glorious age of Alexander the Great and the ancient Macedonians. According to this discourse, whichever nation is able to demonstrate the longer historical presence in Macedonia, whichever nation is able to demonstrate the stronger historical ties to ancient Macedonia, is entitled to identify itself as 'Macedonian'. As the slogan that dominated Greek demonstrations on Macedonia suggests, because (ancient) Macedonia *was* Greek, (modern) Macedonia *is and always will be* Greek.

Greek claims to ancient Macedonia, and therefore to all that is Macedonian in the present, are presented in a wealth of books, pamphlets, films and websites. Two particularly impressive examples of Greek nationalist discourse on Macedonia are *Macedonia: 4000*

Years of Greek History and Civilization and the two-volume *Macedonia*, both written by groups of well-known Greek historians and archaeologists, published in a lavish ‘coffee-table’ format, and donated by the Pan-Macedonian Association, a Greek-Macedonian diaspora organization, and the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America respectively to college and university libraries throughout the United States in order to ‘increase historical and cultural awareness concerning Greece’s national issues’.¹⁶ All this material has the same general goal. It affirms Macedonia’s ‘Hellenic character in ancient times’, follows ‘Macedonian Hellenism’s’ struggle ‘for survival and national emancipation’, and concludes with ‘the national liberation [of Macedonia] within the unified independent Greek state’.¹⁷ Although the political purpose of this work is to promote the Greek nationalist position in the present day Macedonian conflict, the imagery that dominates it is drawn primarily from antiquity: marble busts of Alexander the Great, the star or sun of Vergina and the famous mosaic from Pompeii depicting Alexander at the Battle of Issus.

The political nature of this material is clearly indicated by the ‘salute’ of Andreas Papandreou, then Prime Minister of Greece, which opens the first volume of *Macedonia*. ‘The historic continuity of Hellenism’, he writes, ‘has been etched on the Land of Macedonia. Greece and Hellenism cannot be perceived without the continuous reference to Macedonia. [...] [I]n Macedonia it is the land that speaks for itself, it is the land that provides the evidence with the assistance of the archaeological pick.’ As other works in this genre put it, ‘in Macedonia the earth itself speaks Greek’. In this way the Greekness of Macedonia is presented as an innate and natural quality of the land itself.

M.B. Sakellariou, the editor of *Macedonia: 4000 Years of Greek History and Civilization*, makes the scholarly case for the ‘Greekness of ancient Macedonian’. In a passage entitled ‘The Nationality of the Macedonians’ (i.e., the ancient Macedonians), Sakellariou writes that ‘the hypothesis that the Macedonians were Greeks is supported by all the reliable evidence’. He concludes ‘definitively’ that ‘the Macedonians were a Greek tribe’.¹⁸ Sakellariou’s conclusion, and the political implications that are presumed to follow from it, are contestable. His use of the term ‘nationality’ to apply to the ancient Macedonians is anachronistic, since nations did not exist in the fifth century BC. Sakellariou presents much evidence that the ancient Macedonians were not considered Greek, but considers this evidence ‘unreliable’.

Two well-respected ancient historians who have written about the ethnic identity of the ancient Macedonians, however, have argued persuasively that in antiquity the Macedonians were generally

perceived by Greeks and by themselves not to be Greek.¹⁹ The complexity of the issue of the ethnicity of the ancient Macedonians is explored further in chapters 5 and 6 of this volume. Furthermore, Sakellariou adopts an essentialist approach to the subject of ethnic or national identities, while anthropologists generally agree that these identities are situational, contextual, contested and socially constructed for political purposes. In any event, collective identities change over time, and names used for cultural groups 2,000 years ago do not constitute a legitimate basis for resolving contemporary national disputes.

The language spoken by the ancient Macedonians is another topic exploited by nationalists on both sides of the Macedonian conflict, with Greeks claiming that the language spoken by ancient Macedonians was a form of Greek and Macedonians claiming that it was not. Although it is clear that standard Attic Greek was the language spoken by the Macedonian elite, the precise nature of the ancient Macedonian language and its relationship to ancient Greek is an extremely complicated issue on which there is no scholarly consensus. Many ancient historians and linguists maintain that there is simply not enough evidence to determine exactly what the ancient Macedonian language was.²⁰ Greek nationalists go on to assert that because the ancient Macedonians spoke a language related to ancient Greek, it is not legitimate to call the Slavic language spoken by modern Macedonians 'the Macedonian language'. Again, from an anthropological perspective, the nature of the language spoken by the ancient Macedonians over 2,000 years ago, whatever its relationship to ancient Greek, has no bearing on the name that should be used for the south Slavic language that has been spoken by people in Macedonia for centuries and that is known by virtually all linguists as 'the Macedonian language'.

Extreme Macedonian nationalists assert the existence of an unbroken line of racial and cultural continuity between ancient and modern Macedonians. They deny that they are Slavs and claim to be the direct descendants of Alexander the Great and the ancient Macedonians. For example, a pamphlet published by the United Macedonians of Victoria in Melbourne, Australia, in 1992 protesting the Greek government's opposition to the international recognition of the Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name asserted that 'The Macedonians [...] have lived within a naturally defined territory on the Balkan Peninsula for over 4,000 years and are the descendants of the Ancient Macedonians and Alexander the Great. A common language, traditions, customs and national consciousness are shared by the Macedonians and have been preserved through a succession of invasions and centuries of foreign rule including Byzantium, Serbian,

Bulgarian and the Ottoman Turks’.

These claims have absolutely no scholarly evidence to support them, which is why they do not figure as prominently in the modern political dispute as Greek claims do. The more moderate Macedonian position, which is advocated by most serious Macedonian scholars, is that modern Macedonians have no direct biological relationship to Alexander the Great and the ancient Macedonians, but are a Slavic people whose ancestors arrived in Macedonia in the sixth century AD. Because they too attempt to argue from the ancient evidence, proponents of this position generally do claim that the ancient Macedonians were a distinct non-Greek people and for this reason insist that the Greek claim to continuity with the ancient Macedonians is no more valid than the Macedonian claim.²¹

Nevertheless, many of these more moderate Macedonian scholars often imply some vague form of historical or cultural continuity between the ancient and the modern Macedonians in what is ultimately a form of nationalist historiography. Andrew Rossos, for example, begins his recently published *Macedonia and the Macedonians: A History* with a short discussion of ‘the origin of the Macedonians’ and the ‘gradual formation of the Macedonian tribes and a distinct Macedonian identity’ in the Early Iron Age (c.1050–c.650 BC). He goes on to discuss the establishment of ‘the first Macedonian state’ in the early seventh century BC.²² Rossos’s implicit suggestion of a continuity linking ‘the first Macedonian state’ of antiquity with the modern Macedonian state of the twentieth century could be interpreted as a subtle attempt to counter the more convincing Greek claims for cultural continuity with Alexander the Great and the ancient Macedonians. I would like to stress again, however, that from an anthropological perspective neither the Greek nor the Macedonian claims to continuity with ancient Macedonia have any role to play in determining whether the Republic of Macedonia should be recognized under its constitutional name or whether a Macedonian minority exists in northern Greece.

The ‘global cultural war’ between Greeks and Macedonians over which group is entitled to claim for itself the glorious heritage of ancient Macedonia is ultimately linked in complicated ways with the issue of control over the land of Macedonia, since in a world of nation-states the sovereign territory of the state is without a doubt the most valuable possession of the nation. As Benedict Anderson has pointed out, maps of individual states, like detachable pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, serve as logos that can be infinitely reproduced, easily marketed and immediately recognized.²³ Surely there is no better example of the map as logo than the map of Macedonia, which can be found on an incredible variety of objects, from posters, napkins and T-

shirts, to key chains, lapel pins and wall clocks.

Supporters of the Greek position on the Macedonian conflict have objected strenuously to maps that have appeared in history and geography textbooks published by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Macedonia in the years following Macedonia's independence from the former Yugoslavia in 1991. These textbooks not only 'exalt the history of ancient Macedonia' and present it as 'the ancient history of today's modern Macedonian state'.²⁴ They also focus geographically, not on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia itself, but on a much larger territory, the territory of a 'natural', 'geographic' or 'ethnic' Macedonia, which includes areas of Macedonia now located in Greece and Bulgaria and which are known to Macedonians as Aegean and Pirin Macedonia respectively. These maps, which were also used in Macedonian textbooks during the Yugoslav period, are described by Macedonians as 'historical' maps that show the locations, both inside and outside the present boundaries of the Republic, where important events in 'Macedonian history' took place. Greeks, however, claim that the use of these maps proves that the Macedonian government promotes the goals of a 'greater' or 'united' Macedonia and has clear irredentist claims on Greek territory.²⁵

It is important to note, however, that the Greek government is responsible for the publication of similar maps whose significance is equally ambiguous. For example, in 2000 the Greek Parliament published a map entitled 'A Historical Map of Greece', which hangs on the walls of many Greek public buildings.²⁶ The legend of the map, labeled 'The Unification of Greece', documents the many changes that the borders of the Greek state have undergone since 1832. More controversially, the map includes eastern Thrace and the area around Izmir, which were 'ceded' to Greece by the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 and remained under Greek control only until 1923, when they were returned to Turkey by the Treaty of Berlin. The map also includes the island of Cyprus, which has *never* been part of the Greek state. Both these maps, the map of the 'Unification of Greece' and the map of 'natural', 'geographic' or 'ethnic' Macedonia, can be interpreted *either* as a simple representation of a national history that transcends the present boundaries of the nation's state *or* as a propaganda tool promoting the irredentists' goals of a 'Greater Macedonia' or a 'Greater Greece'. Just as history has been used by Greek and Macedonian nationalists to lay claim to the legacy of ancient Macedonia, maps have been used by both groups to assert a claim, more symbolic than literal, to the territory of Macedonia itself.

4 Alexander the Great

To many Greeks and Macedonians Alexander the Great is a famous national ancestor, a powerful symbol of their national identity and a central figure in their national history. Since the late 1980s he has also been a common figure in the delegations that Greek and Macedonian organizations in Canada and Australia contribute to festivals celebrating multiculturalism and ethnic diversity. Demonstrations held throughout the world in the early 1990s by Greeks and Macedonians in opposition to, or in support of, international recognition of the Republic of Macedonia were often led by men dressed as Alexander the Great, holding a shield and a spear and wearing a crested helmet, breast plate and greaves. Each group was outraged that the other had appropriated its own famous ancestor for such obviously political purposes.

Both the Greek and the Macedonian governments have been very active in using the figure of Alexander the Great to promote their respective positions in the Macedonian conflict. In 1992, a year after the Republic of Macedonia declared its independence, the Greek government changed the names of the airports of Thessaloniki and Kavala to 'Macedonia Airport' and 'Alexander the Great Airport' respectively. In December, 2006, the government of the Republic of Macedonia announced its decision to change the name of the main international airport in Skopje to 'Alexander the Great Airport'. The Greek Foreign Minister immediately protested the decision saying 'History cannot be changed or falsified 2,000 years on. [...] Alexander the Great is [...] [a] Greek conqueror who established himself in history by spreading Greek culture across the entire known world. With its announcement today, [Macedonia] once again seeks false supports in the past'. Macedonia's Foreign Minister replied disingenuously that the decision had been a 'goodwill gesture' and that Alexander the Great was an international figure, not the property of just one country.²⁷

The government of the Republic of Macedonia has pursued this policy of 'antiquisation' with several other attempts to lay claim to the heritage of Alexander the Great. In early 2009 it announced that 'Alexander of Macedon' would be the new name of the main highway running through the country from the Serbian border in the north to the Greek border in the south. It also announced the decision to name the main soccer stadium in Skopje after Alexander's father, Philip II. Local media reported that these decisions were made in response to the Greek veto of Macedonia's proposed entry into NATO the previous year.²⁸

The most visible example of the Macedonian government's policy

of 'antiquisation', however, will be the construction, planned for 2010, of a monumental bronze statue of Alexander the Great riding his horse Bucephalus that will be erected in the main square of Skopje. The statue, to be cast at a foundry in Florence, Italy, at a cost of 4.5 million Euros, will stand 12 meters tall atop a pedestal rising another 10 meters above the ground. It will be considerably larger than a similar equestrian statue of Alexander that stands on the waterfront of Greece's northern port city, Thessaloniki. As part of the same building project that includes this statue of Alexander, the municipal government of Skopje also plans to erect statues of Gotse Delchev, a Macedonian revolutionary hero from the early twentieth century, and Metodija Andonov-Cento, the first president of the People's Republic of Macedonia under Yugoslavia.²⁹ The most grandiose effort to claim Alexander the Great as a national hero, though, belongs to a group of Greek-Americans who established the 'Alexandros Foundation' and developed plans to carve a 70-meter-high bust of Alexander into a mountain top overlooking the Aegean Sea in Greek Macedonia at an estimated cost of 30 million Euros. Environmentalists, who fear damage to the local landscape, and archaeologists, who have described the project as a 'monstrosity', planned to go to court to block this ambitious project.³⁰

To support their rival claims to the glorious legacy of Alexander the Great, both Greek and Macedonian nationalists have mounted expeditions to far away Pakistan in search of people they believe to be the living descendents of the soldiers Alexander the Great left behind after his campaign in India in 327–325 BC. The Hunzakuts (also known as Hunza) and the Kalasha (or Kalash) are two indigenous groups who live in the Hindu Kush Mountains of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province. According to their own oral traditions, both groups believe they are the direct descendents of Alexander and have welcomed the attention lavished on them by Macedonians and Greeks, who consider them fellow members of their respective national communities. Some Macedonians have established relationships with the Hunzakuts and claimed them as fellow Macedonians, while some Greeks have established relationships with the Kalasha and claimed them as fellow Greeks.

Macedonian explorers, journalists and amateur historians have visited the Hunzakuts and report that they have found linguistic, cultural and genetic evidence proving that the Hunzakuts are Macedonians. In the summer of 1995, two Macedonians from North America traveled to Pakistan to 'meet some ancient Macedonians'. As a result of their research, they claim to have demonstrated 'the continuity of Macedonian Civilization from at least the time of Alexander the Great – if not earlier – until the modern age'. They also

argue that they have proved ‘that Macedonians still exist’ in Pakistan and that ‘a connection exists’ between the culture of the people of northern Pakistan and that of modern Macedonia.³¹

In July, 2008, the Macedonian Institute for Strategic Research invited a delegation of Hunzakuts, including the Hunza royal couple and their entourage, to visit Macedonia. When they arrived at Alexander the Great Airport in Skopje, the Hunzakuts were ‘startled and pleased’ when they were greeted by men dressed as soldiers of Alexander and welcomed ‘with flowers and treated like long lost cousins’. During their tour of Macedonia, the Hunzakuts met with Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski and the archbishop of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. Needless to say, the Hunzakuts’ visit to Skopje was ridiculed in the Greek press, but it was also criticized by educated Macedonians who considered it an expression of ‘Alexander-mania’ and an exercise in ‘shallow populism’ by a Macedonian ruling party desperate to remain in power.³²

Greeks have made similar claims about the Kalasha, asserting that based on their ‘European looks’ (fair hair and blue eyes) and certain cultural traits the Kalasha ‘are ethnic Greeks in Asia’.³³ One Greek writer goes so far as to claim that the Kalasha believe in ancient Greek gods such as Zeus and Apollo, that their language is a ‘mixture of Sanskrit and Greek’, and that ‘their carpentry is decorated with Macedonian stars and “suns”’.³⁴ Greek Volunteers, a Greek NGO founded in 1999, has carried out an impressive development program among the Kalasha with the financial support of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They have built several schools and a community center that includes a health clinic and a museum. Several of these buildings have included in their design Ionic columns, which are said to be a feature of both ‘local’ Kalasha and ancient Greek architecture. According to its founder, the goal of ‘Greek Volunteers’ has been to help these ‘brothers of the Greek people’ learn about Alexander the Great and protect their culture and their race from the Islamic people who surround them.³⁵

As a final example of the role the Kalasha play as living proof of the legacy of Alexander the Great and the ancient Macedonians, consider the following resolution passed in 2009 by the Pan-Macedonian Association, USA: ‘The KALASH of the northern Himalayan region of the Hindu Kush Mountains of Pakistan are Hellenic descendants of the armies of Alexander the Great. The KALASH indigenous people have sustained their ancient culture and traditions since the 4th century BC, yet they are in danger of extinction. Being our Hellenic Macedonian brothers and sisters, we support their efforts to sustain their ethnic values and identity’.³⁶ As Vasiliki Neophotistos has noted in a detailed study of these events,

‘the appropriation of the Kalasha and the Hunzakuts as kin allows Greek[s] and Macedonian[s] [...] to compete for exclusive ownership of the ancient Macedonian past and Alexander the Great’.³⁷

Competing claims to the legacy of Alexander the Great have also politicized scholarly work in the fields of ancient Greek art, archaeology and history. For example, when ‘The Search for Alexander’, a well-publicized art exhibit that toured major cities in the United States in the late 1980s, opened in Thessaloniki in July 1980, Constantine Karamanlis, then president of Greece, described Alexander as ‘the representative of all the Greeks’, and as ‘a symbol of indissoluble unity and continuity between ancient and modern Hellenism’.³⁸ In his review of the exhibition, Peter Green pointed out several ways in which historical accuracy was subordinated to ‘the interests of national pride and publicity’ when the Greek government realized the enormous political capital that could be made by using the exhibit as a vehicle for asserting the Greekness of Macedonia.

The ease with which scholarship dealing with ancient Macedonia and Alexander the Great can be used to legitimate nationalist ideologies was uncomfortably demonstrated by the controversy that developed around a lecture given by Eugene N. Borza, a professor of ancient history from Pennsylvania State University, at the Second International Congress on Macedonian Studies held at the University of Melbourne in July 1991. In a lecture, entitled ‘Images of Alexander the Great’, Borza examined the long history of the use of Alexander’s image in the West. He concluded with a perceptive analysis of the way the modern Greek government had attempted to control the manner in which Alexander the Great was presented in ‘The Search for Alexander’ exhibit mentioned above. Borza’s discussion of this issue proved extremely controversial in such a setting, and a number of Greek scholars walked out of the room during his presentation.

A more recent example of the politicization of the ancient history of Macedonia is the letter of 18 May, 2009, that Stephen Miller, Professor of Classical Archaeology Emeritus of the University of California at Berkeley, wrote to President Barack Obama protesting the recent efforts by the government of Macedonia to ‘misappropriate [...] the most famous of the Macedonians, Alexander the Great’. This letter, signed by over 300 classicists, ancient historians and classical archaeologists teaching at distinguished universities in Greece, the United States, Great Britain and Western Europe, claimed that the inhabitants of the Republic of Macedonia have no right to call themselves Macedonians and have ‘abducted [Alexander the Great] a completely Greek figure and made him their national hero’. By ‘fabricating’ history and ‘perverting’ the facts in this way, Miller continued, Macedonians ‘threaten the basis of our discipline’. Miller

argued that the United States should ‘no longer support this “silliness”’, and called on President Obama ‘to help [...] the government of Skopje to understand that it cannot build a national identity at the expense of historic truth’.³⁹

The response to Miller’s letter was immediate. Andreas Willi, a classical philologist at Oxford, published a short article, entitled ‘Whose is Macedonia, Whose is Alexander?’, in which he criticized Miller’s letter and called ‘for greater methodological and factual levelheadedness and caution when attempts are made to instrumentalize the classical world in modern day politics’. Willi wrote that Miller did not take into account recent work in the social sciences on the construction of national and ethnic identities and argued that there was ‘no reason why the modern Slavic Macedonians should not be allowed to continue to call their country “Macedonia”’. Willi concluded with this warning: ‘By putting our academic authority behind tendentious political statements [...] we risk not only bringing into disrepute our disciplines and the institutions at which we are allowed to work and teach, but betraying the past whose guardians we ought to be’.⁴⁰ After the publication of these responses, several scholars who signed Miller’s letter asked that their names be removed.

It is clear then that scholarship on ancient Macedonia, like the Orientalist scholarship analyzed by Edward Said, ‘calls in question not only the possibility of non-political scholarship but also the advisability of too close a relationship between the scholar and the state’.⁴¹

5 The Star or Sun of Vergina

The sixteen-ray sun or star of Vergina was virtually unknown to the public and had no political or national significance at all until it was discovered in 1977 adorning a gold chest in an ancient Macedonian tomb at Vergina, a small village 40 miles southwest of Thessaloniki. According to Manolis Andronikos, this larnax contained the bones of Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander. In his publications describing the royal tombs Andronikos has referred to this emblem in a variety of ways: as a ‘star’, a ‘starburst’ and even as a ‘sunburst’.⁴² Despite these inconsistencies in his description of this emblem, Andronikos has been very consistent in his assertions that it is a symbol of the Macedonian royal family.⁴³ In 1992, at the height of the Macedonian conflict, Andronikos was awarded the Great Cross of the Order of the Phoenix, the highest civilian honor bestowed by the Greek government. In presenting him this medal on behalf of the

president of Greece, the Minister of Macedonia-Thrace referred to Andronikos as Greece's 'national archaeologist' and praised him for 'arming the quiver of Hellenism [...] with arguments that refute the false claims [of those who] misrepresent, falsify, and distort [Greek] civilization and history'.⁴⁴

In the late 1980s both Macedonian and Greek nationalists, particularly those in the diaspora in Canada and Australia, eagerly seized on the star or sun of Vergina as a powerful national symbol that expressed their competing claims to ancient Macedonian civilization. In the early 1990s both Macedonians and Greeks carried flags depicting the gold sun or star of Vergina (against red and blue backgrounds respectively) during demonstrations for and against the international recognition of the Republic of Macedonia. The sun or star of Vergina could be found on T-shirts, lapel pins, key chains, medals and plaques distributed by Macedonian organizations like the United Macedonians and by Greek organizations like the Pan-Macedonian Association. At this time the Greek government also began using this symbol of ancient Macedonia in more official contexts; it issued a postage stamp of the star or sun of Vergina, as well as a 100-drachma coin depicting the head of Alexander the Great on one side and the star or sun of Vergina on the other. In Greece the star or sun of Vergina was placed on the walls of airports, banks and other public buildings. It could even be found on receipts handed out at tollbooths on the National Highway.

The controversy over this symbol reached its peak in August 1992, when the Macedonian parliament selected 'the Macedonian sun' as the 'state symbol' of the newly independent Republic of Macedonia and voted to place it against a bright red background in the center of the Republic's new flag. The Greek government, with the support of Greeks throughout the world, expressed outrage at what it considered to be the misappropriation of a symbol of Macedonian Hellenism by a group of Slavs. A spokesman for the Greek Foreign Ministry called this 'the outright theft of a Greek historical symbol', while a Greek newspaper in Melbourne wrote that 'the government of Skopje has rudely insulted Greek history and the political inheritance of Macedonian Hellenism by selecting as its national flag the well-known sixteen-ray sun of Vergina'.⁴⁵

Because the star or sun of Vergina was found on Greek soil, the Greek government claimed that its use by the Republic of Macedonia constituted proof of the Republic's irredentist designs on Greek territory. The Greek government, therefore, demanded that Macedonia adopt a new flag and prevented it from flying its flag at the United Nations and at the Olympic Games. In a final attempt to assert the Greek claim to this symbol – what could almost be called a campaign

of ‘heritage restitution’ comparable to the Greek attempt to regain possession of the Elgin Marbles from Great Britain⁴⁶ – the Greek parliament in February, 1993 designated the star of Vergina an official symbol of Greece. The Macedonian government finally abandoned its claim to the star or sun of Vergina when it signed the Interim Accord with Greece in 1995. In exchange for an agreement by Greece to end its economic blockade, Macedonia agreed to adopt a new flag, a stylized image of a gold sun with 16 triangular rays in red and gold extending out to the edges of the flag.⁴⁷

From an anthropological perspective, these attempts by the both the Macedonian and the Greek governments to appropriate the ancient Macedonians, Alexander the Great, and the sun or star of Vergina as part of their own exclusive national history and culture constitute provocative, nationalist gestures that are not in the long-term interests of either country, nor do they contribute to the establishment of mutual understanding and respect, which are fundamental preconditions for peace and stability in the Balkans.

6 The First International Congress on Macedonian Studies

The three major elements of the glorious heritage of ancient Macedonia – the name ‘Macedonia’, Alexander the Great and the star or sun of Vergina – were all bitterly contested at the First International Congress on Macedonian Studies, which was held in February 1988, at La Trobe University in Melbourne, Australia. The close relationship between scholarship on ancient Macedonia and modern Macedonian politics were particularly obvious at this controversial event. Officers of the Australian Institute of Macedonian Studies, the organization that sponsored the Congress, frequently described the Institute as a ‘non-political’ organization concerned with scholarly and academic issues. In a Greek Macedonian diaspora publication, however, the goals of the Institute were described in much more political terms: ‘to counter organized propaganda of the Slavs’, ‘to stop the uncontrolled corruption of the terms “Macedonian language” and “Macedonian culture” in Australian educational institutions’, and ‘to promote Greek positions’ on the Macedonian issue.⁴⁸ At the final planning session for the Congress, it was announced that some ‘Slav-Macedonians’ were planning a demonstration to protest the Congress, and a pamphlet put out by a local ‘Slav-Macedonian’ organization was passed around charging that the goals of the Congress were the falsification of the history of the

Macedonian people and the misappropriation of the term Macedonian to signify 'Greek'.

Early on the morning of opening day of the Congress a large crowd of demonstrators gathered in a parking lot on the edge of the La Trobe campus. Many wore bright red shirts with red and black armbands. They carried signs that read:

Macedonians Exist and They Are Not Greek

Macedonian Is a Literary Language, Not a Dialect of Greek

Aegean Macedonians Migrated to Australia to Escape Greek Terror and Racism

Movement for a Free, United, and Independent Macedonia

Salonica Belongs to Macedonia

A few demonstrators held red flags emblazoned with the gold star or sun of Vergina, the same image that appeared on the cover of the official program of the Congress and on the lapel pins distributed to all Congress participants. Some demonstrators handed out a leaflet published by the Australian Diocese of the Macedonian Orthodox Church stating that the purpose of the Congress was to 'Hellenize' the Macedonian community of Australia and 'inflame anti-Macedonian propaganda'. As a result, the leaflet continued, the Congress violated the essential principles of Australian multiculturalism under which the Macedonians of Australia enjoyed full ethnic and cultural rights. As participants in the Congress and members of the audience entered the Agora Theater on the La Trobe campus for the opening ceremonies, a small group of Macedonian demonstrators who had gathered there shouted 'Fascists! Nazis! Anti-Christ! Racist Vampires!'

The opening session of the Congress included welcoming remarks delivered by several leading Greek-Macedonian political figures. In a message published in the official program of the Congress, a well-known Greek politician called for 'scientific research clearly free from any expediency' to establish the 'essential truth' that Macedonians are 'a race exclusively Greek, indigenous since the most ancient times and with an incorruptible Greek conscience throughout the centuries'. With very few exceptions all the scholars participating in the Congress were Greek or Greek-Australian. They represented a wide variety of disciplines: archaeology, ancient history, linguistics, folklore and anthropology. While the focus of the conference was on ancient Macedonia, later periods of Macedonian history were covered as well. While many of the participants offered serious scholarly presentations, several speakers blurred the boundary between scholarship and politics by drawing overtly political conclusions that were not

supported by their scholarly work. One Greek speaker, for example, presented a sophisticated historical and comparative linguistic analysis of the relationship between the language of the ancient Macedonians and various ancient Greek dialects. He concluded that the language of the ancient Macedonians was Greek and that it was, therefore, illogical and unreasonable to call a modern Slavic language ‘Macedonian’. This language, he insisted, should not be called ‘Macedonian’; it should be called ‘the linguistic idiom of Skopje’.

My participation as an invited speaker at this Congress was without a doubt the most ethically troubling and intellectually exciting experience in my academic career. As an anthropologist committed to academic freedom, cultural pluralism and minority rights, I had most definitely *not* agreed to participate in the Congress in order to support the Greek government’s claim that ‘Macedonia was, is, and always will be Greek’, nor was I interested in denying Macedonians in the Balkans or in Australia the right to identify themselves as Macedonians. I realized immediately that I had a scholarly and a moral obligation to take a public stand dissociating myself from what I perceived to be the Greek nationalist politics that dominated the Congress and opposing what in my view was the inappropriate politicization of an event that was presented as an academic conference. I, therefore, decided to do what anthropologists are trained to do – assume the role of ethnographer, do fieldwork and analyze what I took the Congress to be: a thinly veiled attempt to provide academic legitimacy to the Greek nationalist position on what is generally known as ‘the Macedonian Question’. This decision dramatically changed the direction of my academic career. For the past 20 years I have been thinking, reading and writing about Macedonia.

7 International Recognition of the Republic of Macedonia

The controversy surrounding the international recognition of the Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name is the most important contemporary political issue in which competing claims to the heritage of ancient Macedonia plays a central role. This issue transcends the sphere of local Balkan politics. It has taken center stage in major international organizations such as NATO, the European Union and the United Nations, as well as in the domestic ‘ethnic politics’ of multicultural democracies with large Greek and Macedonian minorities such as Australia, Canada and the United

States.

In this controversy Greece claims that the Republic of Macedonia seeks to ‘monopolize’ the name Macedonia and challenge legally Greece’s ‘long established cultural property rights’ to its ancient Macedonian heritage.⁴⁹ On the contrary, however, as the International Crisis Group stated in its report on the name controversy, it is the Greek position that ‘implies a *superior* – often *exclusive* – right’ to use the name ‘Macedonia’.⁵⁰ The Macedonian position on the issue is equally straightforward. The Republic of Macedonia is located in the geographical region known as Macedonia.

From 1944 until 1991 it was known as the People’s (later Socialist) Republic of Macedonia, and the majority of its inhabitants have identified themselves as Macedonians for at least 50 years. Macedonians reject the name ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, or ‘FYROM’, as it is often abbreviated, on the grounds that it is demeaning and insulting.

When the Republic of Macedonia declared its independence in September 1991, Greece actively opposed its international recognition under its constitutional name on the grounds that the name posed a cultural threat to the Greek nation as well as a territorial threat to the Greek state. In January 1992, however, a European Community arbitration committee ruled that the use of the name ‘Macedonia’ did *not* imply territorial claims against Greece and recommended that the EC recognize Macedonia. As a result of Greek pressure, however, the EC did not recognize Macedonia until almost two years later. In April 1993, Macedonia was admitted to the United Nations, but only under the name ‘The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’. It took its seat in the General Assembly alphabetically under the letter ‘T’ and was not allowed to fly its flag at UN headquarters. Greece also claimed that the star or sun of Vergina featured on the new Macedonian flag was an exclusively Greek symbol.

When the United States recognized ‘The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ in February 1994, Greece imposed a devastating economic embargo against Macedonia, which lasted until Greece and Macedonia signed an Interim Accord in September 1995. In this Accord Greece agreed to end its embargo, and Macedonia agreed to change its flag and offered formal assurances that nothing in its constitution could be interpreted as constituting a claim ‘to any territory not within its existing borders’. Finally, both countries agreed to continue negotiations under UN auspices in an effort to resolve their outstanding differences, the most important of which of course involved the name by which the Republic of Macedonia would be recognized internationally.

These negotiations have long since reached a stalemate; neither side has been willing to make any significant compromise. Early in the negotiations Greek officials refused to accept any name for the Republic that included the word 'Macedonia' in any form. Among the suggestions put forward by Greek sources at the time were names used in antiquity to designate regions north of ancient Macedonia, such as 'Dardania', 'Paeonia' or 'Illyria', and names with more general geographical associations such as 'The Central Balkan Republic', 'South Slavia', or 'South Serbia'. Later in the negotiations Greek officials expressed a willingness to accept compound or composite names that did include the word 'Macedonia', such as 'Upper Macedonia', 'Northern Macedonia', 'Vardar Macedonia', or 'New Macedonia'.

All these suggestions have proven unacceptable to the Macedonian government. Macedonian officials have proposed what has been called 'a double name solution', in which one name, the country's constitutional name, 'The Republic of Macedonia', would be used in all international contexts and in communication with all countries except Greece. Another name, a special name, a name that remained to be agreed on, would be used in bilateral communications with Greece alone. The Greek government has consistently rejected this 'double name solution'.

In December 2001, the International Crisis Group recommended that: (1) the official name for the Republic of Macedonia to be used in all international contexts should be 'Republika Makedonija', written in the Macedonian language and the Roman alphabet; (2) the short or informal name of the country should also be 'Republika Makedonija' – not 'Macedonia' or 'Makedonija'; and (3) the country be listed under 'R', not 'M' in the alphabetical directory of the UN.⁵¹ Macedonian officials objected to this proposal on the grounds that the Republic of Macedonia would be the only member of the UN whose name could not be written or pronounced in English or French translation.⁵²

Then in April 2005, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs announced that Matthew Nimitz, the UN Special Representative for Macedonia, proposed a similar solution to the name dispute: 'Republika Makedonija – Skopje', to be used in its Macedonian form, untranslated, and written in the Cyrillic alphabet. A Macedonian official said that his country had never officially received this proposal from Mr Nimitz and quickly rejected it as an option for international use. He did, however, state that it might serve as a basis for negotiations on the name to be used in bilateral relations with Greece.⁵³ Both of these proposed solutions would reduce the Republic of Macedonia to the status of the Republika Srpska, a political entity whose name is not translated into English and which is not

internationally recognized as a legitimate sovereign state. These two solutions, while granting the Republic of Macedonia what could be called the Slavic rights to the name ‘Macedonia’, would effectively deny it the English and French language rights, the international rights, to its own constitutional name.

The next important development in the controversy occurred on 3 November, 2004, when the United States recognized the Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name. A State Department spokesman explained this decision saying: ‘We have now decided to refer to Macedonia officially as the Republic of Macedonia. By recognizing Macedonia’s chosen constitutional name, we wish to underscore the U.S. commitment to a permanent, multiethnic, democratic Macedonian state within its existing borders’.⁵⁴

The name controversy has also played an important role in the Republic of Macedonia’s efforts to gain membership in the European Union and in NATO. Since Greece is a member of both organizations, and since the unanimous agreement of all member states is required for the admission of new members, Greece is in a position to prevent the Republic of Macedonia from joining either of these two groups. At the 3 April, 2008, NATO summit meeting in Bucharest, Romania, when three Balkan countries, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia, sought invitations to join the alliance, Greece did just that. It vetoed Macedonia’s entry into NATO because of the unresolved dispute over which country has the right to use the name ‘Macedonia’ and thus claim continuity with Alexander the Great and the ancient Macedonians.

Representatives of Greece and the Republic of Macedonia continue to meet with UN mediator Matthew Nimitz in an attempt to negotiate a solution to the dispute. From an international legal perspective, however, the issue is perfectly clear. The International Crisis Group has unambiguously stated that ‘the Greek position implies a *superior* – often *exclusive* – right’ to use of the name ‘Macedonia’ (emphasis in the original) and concludes that ‘as a matter of law, the Greek claim [that Macedonia’s mere *use* of the name poses a threat to Greece’s heritage and identity] fails’.⁵⁵ And as the authors of a respected text on international law conclude, ‘There appears to be no basis in international law for Greece’s position [that recognition of Macedonia be withheld until it changes its name]’.⁵⁶

8 The Macedonian Minority of Northern Greece

The existence of a Macedonian minority in northern Greece is a much less wellknown aspect of the Macedonian conflict, but, like the international recognition of the Republic, it is in essence a dispute over the name 'Macedonia' and which group, Greeks or Macedonians, can claim to be the descendents of Alexander the Great and the ancient Macedonians. The great majority of the indigenous inhabitants of Greek Macedonia has been assimilated into modern Greek society and has developed a Greek national identity; that is, they are Macedonians *and* Greeks. They often refer to themselves as 'Greek-Macedonians'. Perhaps 10,000 to 20,000 of them, however, have developed a Macedonian national identity; they define themselves as Macedonians and *not* Greeks.⁵⁷

Since the incorporation of the southern half of Macedonia into the Greek state in 1913, the Greek government has consistently adopted a policy of forced assimilation, or Hellenization, toward local Macedonian inhabitants of the area. In the 1920s all Slavic personal and place names in Greek Macedonia were Hellenized, and under the Metaxas dictatorship of 1936–9 local Macedonians were beaten, fined and imprisoned simply for speaking Macedonian. After the defeat of the communist forces in the Greek Civil War (1946–9), some 35,000 Macedonians fled to Yugoslavia and other countries in Eastern Europe under extremely difficult circumstances. In the decades that followed, conservative Greek governments continued a policy of persecution toward the Macedonians of Greece. The Greek government continues to deny the existence of a Macedonian language, a Macedonian nation and a Macedonian minority in northern Greece.⁵⁸

While there are no longer any official restrictions on the use of the Macedonian language in northern Greece, until recently a climate of fear and intimidation existed which inhibited many people from speaking the language in public. Many middleaged Macedonians remember being beaten by Greek elementary school teachers for speaking Macedonian on the playground. In addition, Macedonian human rights activists have been subject to criminal prosecution as a result of provisions of the Greek Penal Code, such as Article 191, which 'prohibits spreading false information and rumors liable to create concern and fear among citizens and [...] incite citizens to rivalry and division leading to disturbance of the peace'.

On 8 September, 1995, officials of the Rainbow Party, the political organization of the Macedonian minority in Greece, opened an office in Florina and placed a bilingual sign in Greek and Macedonian above the entrance that read 'Rainbow, Florina (Lerin) Committee'. On 13 September, the public prosecutor of Florina ordered that the sign be removed. When the police did so, members of the Rainbow Party replaced it with another one. Later that night an angry crowd singing

the Greek national anthem attacked the office, setting it on fire and destroying it completely. While no one involved in the attack on the office was arrested, leaders of the Rainbow Party were taken to court on charges of 'disturbing the peace' and 'insulting the national consciousness of the citizens of Florina' by 'calling into question the Greekness of Florina' and 'supporting the territorial claims of Skopje'. When the case was finally heard in court on 15 September, 1998, all of the leaders of the Rainbow Party were acquitted.⁵⁹

Perhaps the most significant effort in the struggle for Macedonian human rights began in 1989, when a group of activists in the Florina area attempted to establish a nonprofit organization called the 'Home of Macedonian Civilization'. A local court rejected their application on the grounds that the main goal of the organization – the assertion of the existence of a Macedonian minority in Greece – posed a threat to the territorial integrity of Greece, was contrary to the national interests of Greece and was therefore against the law. In upholding the lower court's ruling, the Thessaloniki Court of Appeals cited the following 'well-known facts' as the basis for its decision. The inhabitants of 'ancient (classical) Macedonia [...] were one of the most ancient Greek tribes. [...] Their language was one of the oldest Greek dialects. [...] Their religion was that common to the Greeks, and their myths and traditions were similar to those elsewhere in the Greek world. [...] The Macedonian kings Philip II and Alexander the Great acted not just as Greeks, but as pan-Hellenists, [...] they were bearers, and the latter was a disseminator, not of an incomplete Macedonian civilization, but of Greek civilization'.⁶⁰ When the Supreme Court of Greece upheld this decision in 1994, the founders of the Home of Macedonian Civilization took their case to the European Court of Human Rights.

On 10 July, 1998, nine years after their initial attempt to establish the organization, the European Court ruled unanimously in favor of the founders of the Home of Macedonian Civilization. The Court held that the Greek government had violated their human rights by infringing on their right 'to freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association' guaranteed by Article 11 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. More specifically, the Court ruled that the stated aims of the founders of the Home of Macedonian Civilization (to preserve and develop the traditions and folk culture of the Florina region) were 'perfectly clear and legitimate' and that the opinion of the Greek courts (that the association represented a danger to Greece's territorial integrity) was based on 'a mere suspicion' as to the true intentions of the association's founders. Finally, the court concluded that all the arguments put forward by the Greek courts against the association's founders were 'baseless, vague

and unproved’, that ‘mention of the consciousness of belonging to a minority and the preservation and development of a minority’s culture could not be said to constitute a threat to “democratic society”’, and that ‘the existence of minorities and different cultures in a country was a historical fact that a “democratic society” had to tolerate and even protect and support according to the principles of international law’.⁶¹ It is interesting to note that while Greek courts specifically mentioned the relevance of Greece’s ancient Macedonian heritage, The European Court of Human Rights made no mention of ancient Macedonia in its decision at all. It seems that the European Court, unlike its Greek counterparts, did not consider details of the history of ancient Macedonia relevant to the legal issues before it: freedom of association and minority rights.

After the favorable ruling of the European Court of Human Rights, the founders attempted to register their organization again. For several years they were unable to find a lawyer to take their case. When they eventually did, the local court on 19 December, 2003, again rejected their application on the grounds that the preservation and cultivation of Macedonian language and culture ‘contains a direct danger to public order and provides an opportunity for exploitation by external agents who have tried from time to time, unsuccessfully, to create a historically non-existent “Macedonian nation”’.⁶² Then on 11 June, 2009, the Supreme Court of Greece for a second time upheld a lower court decision rejecting the application of the Macedonian human rights activists to establish a Home of Macedonian Civilization. The Supreme Court’s decision included a long essay presenting the Greek nationalist perspective on the history of Macedonia, complete with references to Herodotus, Strabo and Aristotle. It made no mention, however, of the recent ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in support of the Macedonian activists’ right to freedom of association.⁶³

9 Conclusion

From an anthropological perspective in which symbols can have more than one meaning, names more than one referent, the word ‘Macedonia’ can refer to more than one place. ‘Macedonia’ can refer to an independent country – the Republic of Macedonia – as well as a geographical region in northern Greece – Greek Macedonia (see map 10). Similarly the term ‘Macedonian’ can refer to more than one group of people – those with a Macedonian national identity (people who identify themselves as Macedonian and *not* Greek) and those with a

Greek national identity (people who identify themselves Macedonian and Greek, i.e. Greek-Macedonians). While this situation may create some confusion, it is preferable to a solution that denies the Republic of Macedonia the right to international recognition under its constitutional name and denies members of the Macedonian minority of Greece the right to identify themselves as they choose.

There is an alternative to this conflict between Greeks and Macedonians over which group is heir to the glorious legacy of ancient Macedonia, over which group can lay claim to Alexander the Great and the star or sun of Vergina. A decline in the ethnic nationalism that has for so long dominated political discourse in Greece and Macedonia on the Macedonian conflict would de-emphasize the production of national cultures and histories understood as the mutually exclusive property of one specific nation. This in turn would lead to the 'denationalization' of the national cultures and histories of both Greece and Macedonia. As a commitment to pluralism and multiculturalism grew, national communities could be imagined in new ways. Then the historical and cultural legacy of ancient Macedonia would no longer be treated as the bitterly contested patrimony of one nation or the other. It would become the shared inheritance of all Balkan peoples and even of humanity as a whole.⁶⁴

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

The most important task facing anyone interested in the Macedonian conflict is to distinguish work written from *within* a Greek or Macedonian nationalist perspective, on the one hand, from work written from a more balanced and objective point of view, on the other. While nationalist accounts can be valuable sources for understanding the construction of national identities and ideologies, they are extremely unreliable sources for learning the basic facts of the matter. The most valuable general accounts of the Macedonian issue that provide a disinterested scholarly perspective on this complex issue are J. Cowan (ed.), *Macedonia: The Politics of Identity and Difference* (London 2000), L. Danforth, *The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World* (Princeton 1995) and V. Roudometoff, *The Macedonian Question: Culture, Historiography, Politics* (Boulder 2000). For a Greek perspective on the controversy surrounding the name of the Republic of Macedonia, see E. Kofos and V. Vlasidis (eds.), *Athens – Skopje: An Uneasy Symbiosis (1995–2002)* (Athens 2003) available at www.macedonian-heritage.gr/

, last accessed May 2010. A more accurate and balanced perspective is presented in the International Crisis Group's two reports: *Macedonia's Name: Why the Dispute Matters and How to Resolve It* (Skopje/Brussels 2001), available at www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/macedonia/122-macedoniasname-why-the-dispute-matters-and-how-to-resolve-it.aspx, last accessed May 2010, and *Macedonia's Name: Breaking the Deadlock* (2009) available at www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/macedonia/b052-macedonias-name-breaking-the-deadlock.aspx, last accessed May 2010, and in chapter 6 of L. Danforth, *The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World* (Princeton 1995). The challenges facing the Macedonian minority of Greece are described in Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, *Denying Ethnic Identity: The Macedonians of Greece* (New York 1994) and L. Danforth, "'We are Macedonians! We are Not Greeks!'" The Macedonian Minority of Northern Greece', in J.S. Forward (ed.), *Endangered Peoples of Europe: Struggles to Survive and Thrive* (Westport 2001). More recent events are documented on the website of the Greek Helsinki Monitor (www.greekhelsinki.gr/bhr/english/index.html). The perspective of the leaders of the Macedonian minority itself is presented on the website of the Rainbow Party (www.florina.org/).

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² Bulgarian and Serbian objections to this usage have had much less political consequence than Greek objections.

³ H. Wilkinson, *Maps and Politics: The Ethnographic Cartography of Macedonia* (Liverpool 1951), p. 178.

⁴ R. King, *Minorities under Communism* (Cambridge, MA, 1973), p. 187.

⁵ H.N. Brailsford, *Macedonia: Its Races and Their Future* (London 1906, repr. New York 1971), p. 103.

⁶ V. Friedman, 'The First Philological Conference for the Establishment of the Macedonian Alphabet and the Macedonian Literary Language: Its Precedents and Consequences', in J. Fishman (ed.), *The Earliest Stage of Language Planning: 'The First Congress' Phenomenon* (New York 1993), pp. 159–80.

⁷ K. Misirkov, *On Macedonian Matters* (Skopje 1974), pp. 73 and 182.

⁸ Misirkov, *On Macedonian Matters*, pp. 27, 150 and 153.

⁹ E. Kofos, *Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia: Civil Conflict, Politics of Mutation, National Identity* (New Rochelle 1993), p. 226.

¹⁰ *Boston Globe*, 5 January, 1993, p. 9.

¹¹ See Center for Macedonians Abroad/Society of Macedonian Studies, *Macedonia: History and Politics* (Athens 1991), Institute of International Political and Strategic Studies, *The Macedonian Affair: A Historical Review of the Attempts to Create a Counterfeit Nation* (Athens 1991) and N. Martis, *The Falsification of Macedonian History* (Athens 1983).

¹² Virtually all linguists (with the exception of some Serbs, Bulgarians and Greeks) accept the existence of Macedonian as a standard literary language. Friedman, for example, states that the decision to establish Macedonian as the official language of the Republic of Macedonia in 1944, 'confirmed what was already *de facto* practice. It did not create a language out of the air, rather it granted recognition to a literary language whose modern development began in the 19th century' (V. Friedman, 'The Sociolinguistics of Literary Macedonian', *International Journal of Language* 52 (1985), p. 35). And Lunt notes that Bulgarian scholars who claim that a Macedonian language does not exist 'look not only dishonest, but silly', while Greek scholars who do the same are displaying 'arrogant ignorance of their Slavic neighbors' (H. Lunt, 'Some Sociolinguistic Aspects of Macedonian and Bulgarian', in B. Stolz, I. Titunik and L. Dolezel (eds.), *Language and Literary Theory* (Ann Arbor 1984), pp. 110 and 120).

¹³ B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London 2006, originally published 1983), p. 15.

¹⁴ C. Geertz, 'The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States', in C. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York 1973), p. 259.

- ¹⁵ R. Handler, *Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec* (Wisconsin 1988), pp. 51 and 154.
- ¹⁶ A. Paliouras, *Macedonia* 1 Athens 1994 frontmatter.
- ¹⁷ M. Sakellariou (ed.), *Macedonia: 4000 Years of Greek History and Civilization* (Athens 1983, repr. 1993) p. 9.
- ¹⁸ Sakellariou, *Macedonia*, pp. 54 and 63.
- ¹⁹ E. Badian, 'Greeks and Macedonians', in B. Barr-Sharrar and E.N. Borza (eds.), *Studies in the History of Art, Vol. 10: Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times* (Washington 1982), pp. 33–51 and E. Borza, 'Greeks and Macedonians in the Age of Alexander: The Source Traditions', in R.W. Wallace and E. M. Harris (eds.), *Transitions to Empire: Essays in Greco-Roman History, 360–146 B.C., in Honor of E. Badian* (Norman 1996), pp. 122–39.
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- ²² A. Rossos, *Macedonia and the Macedonians: A History* (Stanford 2008), pp. 11–12.
- ²³ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 175
- ²⁴ E. Kofos, *The Vision of Greater Macedonia* (Thessaloniki 1994) p. 18.
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⁶⁴ I have been able to pursue my interest in the Macedonian conflict for the past 20 years with the generous support of a Fulbright Scholar Award, two grants from the National Endowment for the Humanities, and a Roger C. Schmutz Faculty Research Grant from Bates College. Many Greeks and Macedonians from Florina and Kastoria (some still living there, some living now in Melbourne and Toronto) have generously shared with me their understandings of the many ways it is possible to be ‘Macedonian’. I would also like to thank my colleague and friend, Riki van Boeschoten, who for many years has shared with me her deep understanding of the Greek Civil War and the Macedonian Question.

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


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


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


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7. *Economy (especially pp. 472–504):*

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